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**Author:** Cheng, Weichung  
**Title:** War, trade and piracy in the China Seas (1622-1683)  
**Date:** 2012-06-12
At the beginning of 1650s, firmly in command of his newly recruited private soldiers and by exploiting the rich Taiwan trade Coxinga managed to supplant the Macao trade where was under Manchu siege. His unremitting exertions also enable him to incorporate the Ming garrison in Amoy into his private army. By choosing the Ming Yung-li Emperor as the symbol to legitimate his local leadership, he ensured the consolidation of his combined army corps by throwing it into several battles against the Manchus in the Chang-chou region in 1652 and 1653. By the time the Manchu Emperor Shun-chih sent delegates to negotiate with him, his status as the leader of the An-hai merchants and Amoy troops was already uncontested. On the other hand, change of the Chinese foreign trade was already on the horizon because the Ming resistance in Chê-chiang collapsed in 1651 and Kuang-chou (Canton) and Macao were besieged by the Manchus. Hence, when the bans on foreign trade were implemented along most of the Manchu coast, Amoy was left as the only active overseas trading port and consequently the overseas silk export was concentrated there.

Table 11-1. The concentration of Chinese raw silk exports during 1651-1654

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (catty)*</th>
<th>Exported from Coxinga’s areas (catty)*</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>66,717</td>
<td>5,950 (An-hai+ Chang-chou)</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652.11-1653.11</td>
<td>88,150</td>
<td>49,150 (An-hai+Chang-chou)</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ELEVEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1653.10-1654.9.25</td>
<td>58,150</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(An-hai+Chang-chou+ Fu-chou)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653.10-1654.9.25</td>
<td>71,900</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(An-hai+ Ch’üan-chou )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44,050</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(An-hai+ Ch’üan-chou+ Fu-chou)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 336-7; 48-50; 52-8; 58-61. The total amount is cited directly from the report in the VOC account. The numbers for the separates areas are the sums of the single inventories of each junk, but do not cover every junk arriving in Japan. Therefore, the amounts from the different areas are the lower estimates. The raw silk and white silk in the different inventories are all counted as raw silk.

The largest shift in the export-volume happened in 1652, when Coxinga and the Manchus were engaged in fighting in the vicinity of Chang-chou and Hai-ch’êng. The proximity of these battlefields distracted the Manchu troops from supervising the main overland trading route which led from An-hai to Fu-chou. Freed from this burden, An-hai merchants armed with the passes issued by Iquan in Fu-chou continued to enjoy free access to raw silk and silk goods throughout an area reaching as far as Nanking (including all of the Chiang-nan region, the prime production site of silk in China). When the terms of the truce came into force after September 1653, the An-hai merchants stepped up their activities and Coxinga’s tax collectors scattered all over the coastal areas, covering all the districts and villages in the Chang-chou, Ch’üan-chou, and Hsing-hua prefectures. Limited garrisons of Manchu soldiers closed themselves up behind the walls of the main cities so Coxinga’s officials could post placards wherever they arrived and

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1 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard Wiminx, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, fo. 1; Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 526. 28 June 1655.
harvested rice from the fields as tax in kind. In this fashion, the Sino-Japanese silk trade fell like a ripe plum into the hands of the An-hai merchants, as the table shows.

Frustrated and dissatisfied, the Manchu delegates left An-hai on 3 November 1654. Coxinga steadfastly refused to give the Shun-chih Emperor any official reply but did write to his father Iquan and had the letter delivered in Peking by his private servant. His message was passed on to the Shun-chih Emperor by Iquan on 22 December. Five days later, the Emperor and his Court concluded that the empire should no longer permit Coxinga’s merchants to range any more of the coast, but this is as far as he went. He had not yet devised any further plan for a new campaign.

In the south, Coxinga did his best to continue carry out the usual rice-collecting operations and to keep the rice trade going in the Ch’ao-chou area. He sent his troops into the Ch’ao-chou region as the Cheng clan used to do in the 1630s and, on 30 November 1654, dispatched troops overland to the Chieh-yang and Ch’ao-yang regions to purchase or levy rice. These troops ran the risk of naval attacks because a local fleet of 150 junks which had surrendered to the Manchus was actively carrying out operations in the area. The fleet was under the command of Su Li (Soulacq[D.]) who resided in

3 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 67.
5 Li Ch’i-fêng, ‘Li-ch’i-fêng t’i wei chêng-ch’un chin-ju ch’ao-hui shu-i chêng-liang shih-pên [Letter Written by Li Ch’i-fêng Reporting that the Cheng Army Had Levied Rice from Ch’ao-chou and Hui-chou] 27 Jan 1655*, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I No. 6, 94-5.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Chieh-shih.\(^6\) This Su Li had originally been the leader of an independent, native group which had organized itself in the wake of the collapse of the Ming administration. The Dutch sources report:

‘... He used to be a friend of both the Manchus and of Coxinga, but recently he has surrendered to the Manchus.’ \(^7\)

The Chinese sources state:

‘Su Li is from a family with its roots in Chieh-shih. His soldiers or self-defence corps are all natives and most of them have private junks at their disposal. They earn their livelihood by fishing and exporting salt.’ \(^8\)

After the Manchu troops had invaded Kuang-chou city in 1651 and expelled the defeated Ming troops to Hai-nan Island, Su Li put his junks at the disposal of the Manchus.\(^9\) In May of 1654, the Kuang-tung Manchu authorities submitted a petition to the Shun-chih Emperor, asking permission to recruit Su Li’s people to act as coastal defence troops on their own turf.\(^10\) After their formal submission, they were expected to remain in their home harbours and earn their living as usual, unless ‘the situation should require otherwise’.\(^11\) The Manchu Court would grant them some autonomy in exchange for their naval assistance in fending off Coxinga’s irruptions into Kuang-tung.

Chieh-shih is located on the coast of Hui-chou near T’ien-wei-yang where Coxinga’s father Iquan had once defeated his Kuang-tung foe, the notorious pirate Liu Hsiang in 1633. This body of water is part of the

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\(^6\) Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 526. 27 June 1655.

\(^7\) VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan maetsujcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 323\(^t\).

\(^8\) TWHY(ed), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 230.

\(^9\) Ibidem, 251.

\(^10\) Ibid., 230.

\(^11\) Ibidem.
sea-route from Macao to Japan and from Hai-nan to Amoy and represented a focal point for Coxinga’s trade network with Kuang-chou and the ‘Western Ocean’ (Southeast Asia). As he wished to gauge the strength of Su Li’s fleet, Coxinga dispatched 100 war-junks under Naval Commander Lin Ch’a to patrol the coastal waters and blockade Su Li’s force. Lin Cha’s fleet left Amoy sometime around the first day of 1655 and arrived in T’ien-wen-yang waters around 12 January 1655.12

In the meantime, Chang-chou city had surrendered to Coxinga on 10 December 165413 and the surrounding districts and villages soon followed suit. Coxinga now directed his troops towards Ch’üan-chou prefecture and laid siege to the cities of Ch’üan-chou and Hsing-hua on 17 January 1655.14 His strategy meant that the Manchu troops still occupying towns in southern Fu-chien were confined to several isolated spots, a situation which allowed Coxinga’s merchants to go about their business freely.

In March 1655, Coxinga reached the conclusion that the Manchu Court in Peking would not respond to his political proposals if he did not make any military threats. He therefore decided to establish a well-organized cabinet around himself, moulding it into the form of the Ming Court.15 The tax revenues he levied from all the subjected areas proved extremely rich: 1,080,000 taels from Chang-chou city and its six districts and 750,000 taels from the seven Districts in Ch’üan-chou prefecture.16 He might have used

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12 Li Ch’i-fêng, ‘Li-ch’i-fêng t’i wei chêng-chûn chin-ju ch’ao-hui shu-i chêng-liang shih-pên’, 94; 97.; Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 68.
13 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 71.
15 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 85.
16 Ibidem, 72; 73.; Chi-êrh ka-lang, ‘Chi-êrh ka-lang têng t’i-wei ch’ing-fa ta-ping
CHAPTER ELEVEN

part of this revenue to equip the twenty-five junks which sailed southwards during the northern monsoon season that year: eight to Batavia, two to Tonkin, ten to Siam, four to Quinam and one to Manila.17

These richly laden trading-junks had to sail past T’ien-wei-yang where Su Li’s naval force was on the look out for them. Indeed he might have attempted to intercept them, but the flotilla commanded by Lin Ch’ä successfully warded off the attacks. This is what the Dutch sources reported:

‘There is a certain Chinese pirate named Su Li (Soulack), a mandarin from Hai-nan, who is a friend of the Manchus. He has been commanding a large number of war-junks which have been plundering the coastal areas for quite some time. They were met by the above-mentioned Admiral [Lin Ch’a] who was assigned by Coxinga to deal with them off south Nan-ao. After heavy fighting and the loss of forty junks,[Su Li] was chased away and is believed to have been swept from the sea. This news gladdens the hearts of


17 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 466. 9 Mar. 1655. VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuikjer gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuikjer] door Joan Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 15 Mar. 1655, fo. 220v. The former source reported seven junks bound for Batavia, the latter sources reported eight. It was confirmed by Governor-General’s letter to Coxinga: VOC 869, Letter from Governor-General Maetsuikjer and Councillors of India to Cheng Ch’eng-kung, Batavia, 17 Jun. 1655, fo. 296-298; re-cited from Johannes Huber, ‘Relations between Cheng Ch’eng-kung and the Netherlands East India Company in the 1650s’, in Leonard Blussé (ed.), Around and About Formosa: Essays in honor of Professor Ts’ao Yung-ho (Taipei: Ts’ao Yung-ho Fundation for Culture and Education, 2003), 209-41, at 232-3.
the maritime merchants, because this pirate used to endanger the sea-route and played havoc with the merchants.'

More or less around the same time, the Manchus gradually managed to close the trading route from both Ch‘üan-chou and An-hai to Fu-chou again. Their move meant that the maritime trading route used to fetch raw silks in Chê-chiang (and farther away in Nanking) was also cut off.

‘…because all routes in China were barred by Manchus, no more goods could be sent to Fu-chou by Coxinga’s merchants in An-hai and Ch‘üan-chou. The moment any of his merchants appeared in areas where the Manchus were in control, all their goods were confiscated… This situation has lasted eight to ten months [since August of 1654].’

Although the An-hai and Ch‘üan-chou merchants had already ceased purchasing silk because of the rising tension, they were still able to ship 131,600 catties of raw silk on twenty-one junks (the majority belonging to Coxinga) to Nagasaki between January and March, even though they had to sail against the north monsoon. Because this was an abnormally large amount of silk, the Japanese merchants were reluctant to pay the set pancado price. This was a fixed price decided upon according to the amounts of silk imported during the past south monsoon season until 28 September 1654, but the unexpectedly large quantity of newly arrived silk in the spring of 1655 would have depressed the market price of later domestic distribution. The twenty-one junks were held in Nagasaki Harbour by the Governor of

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18 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 514. 5 June 1655.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Nagasaki until the Shogunal Court had had time to permit the Japanese merchants to lower the price at the end of May 1655. Coxinga received news of this price crack-down from a returning junk about June 1655. He considered that he had been hardly done by by the Shogunal Court and was soon claiming that, as a counter action, he would forbid any Chinese junk to carry to Japan ‘a single thread of white raw silk on penalty of death’ in the following southern monsoon season. As the main trading route between Fu-chien and the silk-production areas in Chiang-nan had been cut off by the Manchus, this order meant that all he had to do was to exclude other silk exporters from elbowing in on the silk Japanese business. Hence, this was the first time Coxinga imposed an embargo as a measure to maintain his monopoly on this export commodity. The amount of raw silk exported was indeed sharply reduced, but the An-hai and Ch’üan-chou junks were not strictly forbidden to carry it.

The siege of Ch’üan-chou was lifted at the end of March. Meanwhile the Manchu Court had given orders to unite the troops stationed in Chê-chiang province and Nanking and dispatch them to Fu-chou to prevent any further incursions by Coxinga. The main body of the troops arrived on 21 May 1655. According to a contemporary Chinese source, at this juncture the total number of soldiers under Coxinga’s command amounted to 100,000 men. The Dutch sources report that 40,000 to 50,000 Manchu soldiers and

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21 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 209. 22 May 1655; 214, 9 July 1655.
22 Ibidem, 214, 9 July 1655.
25 Li-chi, Li-chi t’i-wei hsing-hua chang-chou ch’üan-chou san-fu shu-hsien
another 20,000 cavalry men were dispatched to Fu-chou in June 1655.26 Because of the onerous cost of financing this ongoing war, Coxinga must have hoped that the twenty-two junks due to return from Japan in the spring of 1655 could relieve his financial burden somewhat. As he had to give matters some serious thought in an attempt to allocate his resources more efficiently, Coxinga decided not to spend money on the strengthening the fortifications of the inland cities in Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou prefectures but directed his troops to focus on more rewarding goals. He demolished the small forts around the shores of An-hai Bay, including the An-hai, T’ung-an (Thota[D.]) and An-hsi (Lamsing[D.]) Forts.27 He used the bricks and stone from the demolished structures to build a new castle named ‘Ping-chou’ to be used as a bridgehead in the Wei-tou Bay (Erasmus Bay), on the opposite shore from Quemoy, to protect Pai-sha (Peeswaal[D.]) Harbour where most of Coxinga’s uncle’s (Cheng Hung-k’uei) trading-junks were anchored.28 He also demolished Kao-p’u Fort on the shore opposite Amoy, using its materials to rebuild three redoubts around Amoy to block the advancing Manchu troops.29 While all this construction work was going on, all the rice and paddy within a radius of 50 kilometres of Amoy was collected and stockpiled in Amoy and in Hai-ch’êng Fort.30 To ensure that Hai-ch’êng

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26 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 526. 28 June 1655.
28 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard Winninx, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, fo. 2.
29 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 53-4.
30 VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fos. 290’-291’.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Fort was a part of an extensive defence scheme, Coxinga constructed a line of defence which encircled Amoy Bay and included the islands of Amoy and Quemoy. This would give him control of all the shores on which the Manchus might land. Later he ordered the walls of Chang-chou city be torn down, so that the Manchus troops would have no walls within which to establish an army camp. Just he used the bricks and stones from the walls to enlarge the walls of Hai-ch’êng.

Just as Coxinga was spending all his captial on relocating and fortifying his strongholds, he had to swallow another disappointment, the silver from the Sino-Manila trade fell short of expectations. This trade had been an important source of income for An-hai merchants during the 1630s, but the Sino-Manila trade had increasingly been hampered by the Dutch since 1642. The truce concluded between the Dutch and the Portuguese gave the Dutch a free hand to attack Spanish Manila and, in the course of their prosecution of their old enemy the Dutch also attacked Iquan’s Manila-bound junks in an effort to try to force him to sign the contract which would give the Taiwan factory the sole right to engage in the Sino-Japan silk trade. Although the An-hai merchants stubbornly continued to sail to Manila between 1644 and 1648, the Dutch continued to threaten them from time to time. However, after Spain concluded the Treaty of Westphalia with the Dutch Republic in 1648, the legal basis for patrolling against Chinese junks trading with the enemy was vitiated.

Table 11-2. Number of Chinese junks visiting Manila

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Junks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1645</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1646</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1647</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1648</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 89; VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fos. 288v-289r; NFJ 287, Missive van Pieter de Goyer en Jacob Keijser naer Taijouan aen den Ed. Heer gouverneur Cornelis Caesar, Canton, 4 Dec. 1655, fo. 50. 32 TWYH(ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 517.
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Junks from China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1649</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques* (XVIe, XVIIe, XVIIIe siècles), 148-60.

There are no reliable statistics available about the quantities of silver carried away from Manila on Chinese junks but the customs records of Manila do give some impression.

Table 11-3. The tax revenues of silver imports and Chinese commodities imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tax revenue from the silver imports (rial)</th>
<th>Tax revenue from the Chinese commodities (rial)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1631-1635</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>22,673.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1636-1640</td>
<td>2,551.8</td>
<td>23,831.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1641-1645</td>
<td>2,464.2</td>
<td>12,249.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1646-1650</td>
<td>2,857</td>
<td>9,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651-1655</td>
<td>1,488.6</td>
<td>4,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656-1660</td>
<td>2,553.8</td>
<td>2,786.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques* (XVIe, XVIIe, XVIIIe siècles), 200-219.

As the table shows, the amounts of silver shipped to Manila from Acapulco were low in the first half of the 1650s, exacerbating the unsatisfactory economic situation caused by the fact imports of Chinese commodities had already been declining since the last half of the 1640s. In short, the supply of silver which had been abundant during 1646-1650 and
CHAPTER ELEVEN

became tighter during 1651-1655. Between 1651 and 1653 a scarcity of silver occurred because, as Dutch records show, no silver galleons visited Manila during these three years. The situation improved in the spring of 1654 when two silver galleons finally arrived. The Sino-Manila trade should have picked up but no Acapulco galleon appeared again in 1655. Of the three junks which visited Manila in 1655, at least one belonged to Coxinga. Given the shortage of silver, the return cargo must have fallen below Coxinga’s expectations.

In the middle of July 1655 angry Coxinga placed a strict embargo on the Manila trade, just as he had done earlier against Japan. He accused the Spanish merchants of postponing payment or paying only half the price the commodities shipped were worth. He argued that having had to endured such ill-treatment for several years in a row, the Chinese merchants were fed up and no longer prepared to accept it lying down. Pertinently, the key issue in his accusation was the not ill-treatment meted out to the merchants but the disappointing amount of the payment in silver. Coxinga also pleaded for assistance from the Dutch Governor in Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, hoping that he would also proclaim his edict to Chinese subjects living on Dutch soil. Coxinga’s request reveals the essence of his embargo. The crucial point was not to take revenge on Manila but to state his ultimate authority over any Chinese maritime merchants who might decide to engage in this trade in some way or another. Another possibility is that the embargo was issued in a

34 VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naar Batavia aan den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 317.
desperate move to conceal the real problem which was that Coxinga was no longer able to acquire the supplies of silk he needed.

While arranging the supply of provisions for his newly established administration and his troops, Coxinga ordered his army of 30,000 soldiers to march slowly through the fields between Chang-chou and Ch’ao-chou and levy rice to supplement the food supply and perhaps also some sugar for the Japanese market. Since the overland silk route was blocked by the Manchus in Fu-chou, he dispatched a fleet with 30,000 soldiers northwards to the coast of Chê-chiang, bypassing Fu-chou, so that purchases of silks could be made direct from the Nanking area.

While preparing the essential trading commodities for this fleet, Coxinga had to bear in mind that he would need to provide silver bullion and such tropical goods as pepper and sandalwood. These commodities could be purchased from a fairly wide range of places: Japan, Taiwan, Batavia, Quinam, Cambodia and Siam. Most pepper came from the more southerly places, more particularly from the western part of Sumatra, where it was cultivated. Since the Dutch had occupied Malacca in 1642 and had gradually extended their domination over the pepper-producing areas, Coxinga had no

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37 Yang, Ti’ung-chêng shih-lu, 89; VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 291'; Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 561. 22 Aug. 1655. The rice shortage might have been a particularly curial reason. Cf. The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 214. 9 July 1655. ‘…rice was being sold for 15 rixdollars a picul on account of the shortage.’

38 Yang, Ti’ung-chêng shih-lu, 90. VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 291'; Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 561. Although the Dutch sources record there were 300,000 soldiers in total under Coxinga, this does not tally with the Chinese records, which say that twelve camps of soldiers participated in both actions. Since each camp housed about 2,500 soldiers, 30,000 soldiers would be a more appropriate estimate.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

choice but to consult with the VOC if he were to obtain a lower price for it. The anachodas of the eight junks dispatched to Batavia from Amoy in the name of their lord, Coxinga, submitted a petition to the High Government in Batavia on 23 April 1655, in which they asked for a lower purchase price for pepper and lead. They were granted a one rial discount per picul of pepper or seven rials per picul, by the High Government. The Batavian authorities had hoped that offering this discount price would attract Amoy merchants to Batavia rather than having them deal directly with the Pepper Coast.\(^{39}\)

Compared to the pepper sold in Taiwan (which was 13.5 to 14 rials per picul), this was almost half the price,\(^{40}\) but it was still almost twice as expensive compared with the 4 rial pepper price in Jambi (on the Pepper Coast).\(^{41}\) Thanks to its contracts with the ruler of Palembang, the VOC itself could purchase pepper at the low price of 2.5 rials per picul, which allowed it to make a 440 per cent profit in Taiwan.\(^{42}\)

Apart from his sparring partners the Dutch, Coxinga also regarded the Macaonese merchants as rivals in Pepper-trade. Although the Portuguese had lost Malacca to the Dutch, Macao still managed to keep connections with the trading networks on the Pepper Coast. A small wankang visited Jambi in February 1654, carrying Japanese, Portuguese mestizo and Chinese merchants from Macao. To exchange for the pepper, they brought double-sided satins, Chinese gold thread, porcelain, iron pans and earthenware. The rumour spread that four more Macao vessels which had obviously also come with the idea of purchasing pepper were anchored at

\(^{39}\) VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 23 Apr. 1655, not foliated.
\(^{40}\) VOC 1206, Missiven door den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar en raedt uijt Taijouan aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1654, fo. 201.
\(^{41}\) VOC 1209, Missiven aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en raden van India door Jacob Nolpe, Jambi, 23 Feb. 1655, fo. 288'.
This was also the point in time at which Coxinga was harbouring dreams of expanding his ‘crown’ trade. At more or less the same moment as the Macao vessels were visiting Palembang a wankang from Amoy was arriving in Malacca. She carried similar commodities: 34,000 pieces of coarse porcelain, 50 picul of copper, 810 large and small iron pans, umbrellas, Chinese gold thread, *radix China*, raw silk and 24 catties of colourful satins, 3,000 pieces of cotton cloth and so on. It is possible that Coxinga’s junks also visited Palembang that year. In April 1654, one big junk and a small wankang visited Palembang to trade pepper and cotton. It was said that they were from Cochin-China. One Chinese resident of Palembang even planned to send pepper to China on this wankang. Later in her voyage, its crew intended to visit Jambi, where the local ruler had given them permission to trade in the past.

When the wankang put in to Malacca, its *anachoda* claimed he carried a pass issued in 1652 by the Dutch merchant in Jambi who had invited the Chinese merchants to return to Malacca in the future. After protracted negotiations, the Governor of Malacca allowed them to trade. They sold most of their cargoes and purchased pepper at the price of 8 rials per picul on condition that they would not return again. It was said most of the return

43 VOC 1209, Missiven aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en raden van India door Jacob Nolpe, Jambi, 21 Feb. 1654, fo. 286v.
44 VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1654, fo. 312v.
45 VOC 1202, Missiven van Jacob Nolpe aen de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Jambi, 17 Apr. 1654, fo. 378v.
46 VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1654, fo. 312v. It is said he departed from Hai-nam (Aijnam). Perhaps the junk set course to Malacca at Hai-nan, but had actually begun their voyages in Amoy.
47 *Generale Missiven*, II 1639-1655, 753. 7 Nov. 1654.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

cargo consisted of rattan.48

Coxinga’s desire to purchase pepper at a lower price strengthened perceptibly in 1655. Besides the eight junks which visited Batavia, the Amoy wankang which had visited Malacca the previous year returned again on 20 February 1655. It brought two letters from Coxinga and his ‘uncle’, Hung Hsü (signed ‘Chung-chên[C] Kingingh[D]’ his honorific title ) respectively. In his letter Honshu questioned the regulations the Dutch had imposed on trade:

‘What is the motivation behind the Dutch forbidding their [junks] to trade in Malacca? Malacca does not differ from Taiwan and Batavia with which we have always maintained neighbourly relations and a correspondence. People who have sent innumerable junks to trade there could not understand why he [Hung hsü] had been treated so peculiarly. He could not see any reason people should consider it beneficial to exclude his vessels from there. He also mentioned that Coxinga had written a letter to Batavia, to apologize about sending this wankang to Malacca again, asking [the Dutch] not to impound it. He had sent this junk because he [Coxinga] needed to obtain some rattan to make shields for his soldiers.’49

The Dutch Governor eventually allowed this wankang to return to Amoy on 12 July 1655, on condition next time she should sail to Batavia instead. She carried away 650 piculs of pepper sold at 8 rials per picul and some rattan.50

48 VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 10 Sept. 1654, fo. 341v.
49 VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsu ijker gouverneur generael door Joan Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 15 Mar. 1655, fos. 220v. Hung Hsü is not a member of Coxinga’s family, but considering his age and relationship with Coxinga, it is no exaggeration to introduce him in this way.
50 VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael door Joan
As the eight Chinese junks were on the point of leaving the roadstead of Batavia on 17 June 1655, Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker wrote a letter in reply to Coxinga’s request for cheaper pepper in both Batavia and Malacca. In this letter he expresses his position in no uncertain terms, stipulating that no Chinese vessel would be allowed to trade in either Malacca or Palembang. He insisted that Coxinga’s junks should trade only in Taiwan and Batavia. Joan Maetsuijker believed that the Chinese merchants ‘…would not find another place where they could earn more profit or be treated better’. He refused to make any concession on the pepper trade with Coxinga, despite the fact that he was an ally and good neighbour of the Dutch.

Joan Maetsuijker did not confine himself to a verbal statement, he took action on the matter. In July 1655, VOC Merchant Antony Boey took a big junk to Batavia with him on his return trip from Palembang. Discovering three Chinese junks loaded with 1,900 piculs pepper and 400 piculs of cotton in the roadstead, Boey urged the Pangeran of Palembang to impound these junks, citing as his legal basis the contract concluded between Palembang and the VOC. Boey insisted that because the junks had come from Quinam which was currently in war with the Dutch, as a loyal ally of the Dutch the Pangeran should impound the vessels of their common enemy. Boey took the one big sturdy junk to Batavia, but burned the two other older ones after he had confiscated their cargo, including cottons which were sold right away.

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Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 17 Aug. 1655, fós. 246-247.
52 VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 13 July 1655, not foliated.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Four hundred piculs of the 1,900 piculs pepper were assigned to the Pangeran of Palembang as his share. He re-sold this party to the Dutch under the terms of the sole-right contract he had concluded with them. After he arrived in Batavia, the anachoda lodged an appeal with the Council in Batavia and affirmed that this junk did indeed belong to Coxinga. He also argued that, since the VOC still maintained an alliance and a friendship with Coxinga, the Council should return the cargo and junk to him. The anachoda insisted she had not come from Quinam but had anchored there only temporarily before continuing her voyage to Palembang. After its own investigation, the Council found out that this anachoda had lived in Quinam and that therefore this junk was liable to be impounded. Consequently the junk including her cargo were sold at auction.54

When Governor-General Maetsuijker’s letter reached Amoy in the middle of August 1655, Coxinga was assembling commodities for sale in the Chê-chiang and Nanking markets.55 Almost at the same time as the fleet led by Hung Hsü left Amoy sailing in a northly direction, Coxinga wrote a letter to the leaders of the Chinese community in Taiwan and asked them to pass his message word-for-word to Governor Cornelis Caesar of Taiwan. In his first point in this letter Coxinga required the VOC should treat his merchants in Batavia more courteously. He must have been referring to the petition about reducing the pepper price submitted by the anachodas. His second point was that the VOC should not exclude Chinese junks from Malacca, Ligore, Pahang and other nearby locations. These were all ports around the ‘Pepper Coast’ where this commodity was sold at only 20 per cent of the Company fixed price in Taiwan. Coxinga was also concerned about the junks

54 VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 13 July 1655, not foliated.
55 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 557. 16 Aug. 1655. Most of the junks dispatched to the South China Sea had returned home. Of the eight junks which returned from Batavia, three had lost their masts.
which the Dutch merchant Anthony Boey had detained in Palembang. He had not yet been informed about what had become of them in Batavia. If his requests were not met, he would put an embargo on Batavia and Taiwan in the following monsoon season.56

A couple of weeks before the main fleet of the northern expedition led by Commander Hunghsu departed in the middle of July 1655, the vanguard fleet carrying 15,000 soldiers had landed in Sha-ch’eng (Swatea[D,]), the most important harbour on the border between Chê-chiang and Fu-chien provinces.57 Dutch sources mention that even though this harbour had been maintaining a neutral status in its relations with the Manchus and Coxinga, the latter’s troops had occupied it.58 This fleet continued to patrol the coast of Chê-chiang and kept a grip on several sites on shore until November 1655.59 Besides escorting the the Japan-bound junks and pursuing their rice-collecting mission, the soldiers with this fleet ‘plundered’ about 200,000 taels of booty in the course of their mission.60 Coxinga had assigned other troops to march southwards. These soldiers reached the southern border of Fu-chien on 20 August 1655.61 With the assistance of the fleet, this army laid siege to Chieh-yang and encircled it on 8 September 1655.62 One month later,
CHAPTER ELEVEN

on 6 October 1655, Coxinga’s troops seized the town.63 The soldiers remained there and occupied most of Chao-chou prefecture for half a year until 15 March 1656, after which they brought 100,000 piculs of rice provisions and 100,000 taels of silver back to Amoy.64 In the meantime, in a tactical manoeuvre the naval force which had been escorting the southward-bound junks was again assigned by Coxinga to patrol T’ien-wei Bay to ward off Su Li’s fleet. It reached its destination on 9 May 1656.65 According to the Dutch:

‘The 300 junks had sailed southwards, intending to levy rice along the coast below Nanao. Manned with Coxinga’s best soldiers, they were well supplied with weapons and ammunition. However, this was all just a pretext. They were actually preparing to make an assault on the junks of the pirate Su Li, who had his lair in the Chieh-shih Guard (Kitsjehoi[D]) around Tien-wei Bay (Groeningens baij). Coxinga’s first strike at Su Li was very successfully, because many of Su Li’s junks which were lying pulled up dry on the beach were set on fire. About 100 junks were taken away back to Amoy with the fleet.66

64 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 98.
66 NFJ 287, Appendix tot de missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar uijt Taijouan naar Japan [aan Joan Boucheljon] [Appendix: Letter from Governor Cornelis Caesar in Taiwan to Joan Boucheljon in Japan], Taiwan, 18 July 1656, fo. 74. It also recorded that these 400 junks later ran into a very fierce typhoon on their way to Amoy and
During Iquan’s several battles in 1630s it had been proved that from technically speaking, the Wu-wei or black-stern junks of Su Li were superior to the Fu-chienese war-junks. Although Su Li’s naval force consisted of only about 5,000 men and 200 junks, it was the only naval force which ever really threatened Coxinga’s base in Amoy and his comparatively more lightly armed junks.67

On land, the Manchu troops attempted to break through Coxinga’s defence line. In November 1655, the new Manchu General-in-Chief of the Southern Expedition, Heir of the Imperial Prince of Cheng (Chêng-ch’în-wang shih-tzu), Chi-tu, arrived in Fu-chien with 100,000 soldiers. Shortly after his arrival he gave orders for the rebuilding of the walls of Chang-chou city as well as those of various other cities which had earlier been demolished by Coxinga’s army.68 Chi-tu sent a conciliatory letter to Coxinga hoping to re-open peace negotiations.69 According to the Dutch, Coxinga intimated that the Manchu Court should concede two more prefectures to him, namely Hsing-hua (Ginwa[D.]) and Hui-chou.70 A truce which lasted several months was concluded between Ch’üan-chou and Amoy, so that Coxinga’s merchants were allowed to trade freely in Fu-chou and

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68 Ch’en Shou-ch’î, *Fu-chien t’ung-chih t’ai-wan-fu*[A History of Fu-chien Province (Taiwan Division)], TW no. 84, 943; NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raet aldaer, Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fo. 55
69 Yang, *T’ung-chêng shih-lu*, 93.
70 *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, III 1648-1655, 607. 30 Oct. 1655; VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 345v.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Sha-ch’êng (which was then under Manchus). 71 In April 1656, the Manchu General-in-Chief, Chi-tu, broke the truce without prior warning, and immediately impounded all the trading-junks to use them as troop carriers for the Manchu cavalry and soldiers for a landing in Amoy. 72 This Manchu fleet departed on 9 May 1656 but ran into a very fierce typhoon. The bold attempt failed and most of the vessels fell back into Coxinga’s hands. 73

During this short truce, the trade embargo against Manila and Batavia came into force. In the spring, a news spread around Mindanao claiming that Coxinga was preparing a large fleet to conquer the Philippines. 74 Later it turned out to be a rumour spread by an indigenous king (King of Coralatt) who wanted to use this situation to weaken the alliance of one of his rivals with the Spanish. 75 The situation in Manila remained pretty much as usual,

72 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon, opperhooft over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raet aldaer, Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fos. 55-56; VOC 1218, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 20 Nov. 1656, fos. 33r-34r.
73 Yang, Ti’ung-chêng shih-lu, 100; NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon, opperhooft over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan ende den raet aldaer[Letter from the Governor of Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, to Joan Boucheljon in Charge of all the Company Property in Japan as Chief Merchant and His Council], Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fos. 55-56.
75 VOC 1216, Missiven door gouverneur Simon Cos en raad aen de Ed. heer Joan
one silver ship was scheduled to arrive from Acapulco but she ran aground near Aparri (*Takang*[C.], *Twakan*[D.]) on the northern tip of Luzon. The Manila authorities later tried to salvage the silver from the shipwreck.

As the embargo held, no junks from Amoy visited Malacca and Batavia during the north monsoon season of 1656. However, Coxinga had sent a letter to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker by way of the Chinese Captain of Batavia, P’an Ming-yen (*Bingam*[D.]) and Yen Erh-kuan (*Giequa*[D.]), in which he lodged a protest with the High Government in Batavia about Antony Boey’s confiscation of 400 piculs of pepper from his junk in the roadstead of Palembang in 1655. He also requested the restitution of the deerskins which had been confiscated from his junk off the coast of Siam in 1653. On 7 March 1656, the Council agreed to the first request and showed its willingness to restitute the pepper according to the price in Palembang, if the *anachoda* came to present his case in person. It refused to acquiesce in the second request because this case had been closed a long time ago by verdict handed down by the Siamese Court, and it had issued a warning to the Chinese traders not to purchase deerskins before it took action. It seized the opportunity to accuse the Chinese *anachodas* of having tried to intimidate Dutch merchants during this incident. Although the contents of the original

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Maetsuikjer gouverneur generael ende Ed. heeren raaden van India tot Batavia, Ternate, 31 Aug. 1656, Fo. 221v.
76 *Dagregisters Zeelandia*, IV:1655-1662, 75. 28 June 1656.
77 VOC 1216, Missiven door gouverneur Simon Cos en raad aen de Ed. heer Joan Maetsuikjer gouverneur generael ende Ed. heeren raaden van India tot Batavia, Ternate, 31 Aug. 1656, Fo. 221v.
78 VOC 880, Missive van Batavia [van Joan Maetsuikjer] naer Taijoan aen den gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar] ende den raet, Batavia, 13 June 1656, fos. 229-235.
79 VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maetsuikjer ende raeden, Batavia, 7 Mar. 1656, not foliated. According to a later letter sent to Taiwan from Batavia, the restitution had been made to Coxinga’s authorized representatives in Batavia, but they had taken another 3,000 rials as surety that the junk would not abuse their restrictions
CHAPTER ELEVEN

letter are no longer available in any of the archives, it is clear that Coxinga’s intention was to challenge the Dutch monopoly on deerskins and pepper, two very lucrative items on the Japanese and Chinese markets.

While Coxinga was fitting out his fleet for his routine northern expedition on 27 June, although he had not yet received any reply from Batavia, he issued a placard announcing that the embargo on Taiwan would begin in a hundred days’ time (5 October 1656). The placard set out the two-fold reasons for his action. On the one hand the embargo was a measure against the Dutch to squeeze a better price and was aimed directly at the Batavian authorities; on the other hand it was a measure addressed at the Chinese community in Taiwan to give them a shake up, because Coxinga was worried that this community would create the only loophole in his monopoly on Chinese trade and make good profits from Taiwan-Manila trade, taking advantage of the fact the Dutch were prevented by the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia from opening the trade with Manila. Coxinga threatened this small Chinese community, giving it a choice between joining his camp or abandoning its share in the Chinese trade.

Although Prince Chitu’s attempt to land in Amoy had failed, he refused to give up his aim of capturing Ping-chou Fort, Coxinga’s bridgehead on the mainland. He was to be disappointed because its garrison was well entrenched and the Manchus had to return to Fu-chou empty-handed. Three again. See: VOC 880, Missive van Batavia [van Joan Maetsuijcker] naer Taijoan aen den gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar]ende den raet, Batavia, 13 June 1656, fo. 234.

80 Dagregisters Zeelandia, IV:1655-1662, 80-1. 9 July 1656. The yacht, the Leeuwinne, carrying the letter from Batavia about this matter arrived Taiwan on 28 July 1656. Dagregisters Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 89, 28 July 1656.

81 As the Dutch and Spanish had concluded peace in 1648 with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia, any direct trade between Batavia and Manila would have violated the treaty. However, the Chinese communities under Dutch were not restricted by this Article.

82 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E Joan
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

months later, an internal crisis unexpectedly broke in Coxinga’s ranks. One of his Defence Commands, Huang Wu (Huang Erh-yeh[C], Onnia[D]), suddenly surrendered Haich’eng city including its garrison to the Manchus on 12 August 1656, fearing the wrath of Coxinga on account of his recent serious defeat in a battle with the Manchus.83 His defection not only opened up a break in Coxinga’s sealed defence line, but the Dutch records state it also caused him a loss of valuable resources:

‘The same person [Huang Wu] has also taken his [Coxinga’s] money. It was indeed a huge loss for Coxinga as this city was said to be unassailable, because it is surrounded by open sea on the outer side and enclosed by three layers of walls inside. Coxinga’s principal treasures, which had been accumulated over a [long] period of time, were also kept there and an incredibly huge amount of paddy and military resources, according to Chinese sources. Coxinga therefore has lost more than two-thirds of his fortune. Problems have also arisen as it was the only place from where he could supply his junks with all their necessities. Therefore his junks will soon be in urgent need of masts, planks, nails and other supplies, which he will not be able to procure from anywhere else.’84

This dire picture might not have been an overexaggeration. Chinese records report that the 374,000 piculs of paddy and 410,000 catties of gunpowder from this city fell into the laps of the Manchus like a gift from the gods.85 Most of the commodities were stored in Amoy and Quemoy, but more trade would be needed before this merchandise could be transformed

Boucheljon, opperhooft over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raet aldaer, Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fo. 56.

83 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 101.
84 VOC 1218, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 20 Nov. 1656, fo. 35v.
85 Li Huan, Ch’ing-c’i-hsien lei-chêng hsüan-pien[Selections from the Biographies of Individuals under the Ch’ing Dynasty], TW no. 230, 331.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

into military supplies. This realization made Coxinga rely even more heavily on his trading activities as the vehicle through which to achieve his political ambitions.

Now that Coxinga had risen to power as the sole leader of the Amoy naval force, a position from which was able to monopolize the Chinese trade, he did not scruple to use both military and economic power in his pursuit of his goals. To sum up: he challenged the Manchu political structure by inventing a new political framework comparing the situation of Fu-chien province with that of Korea; he challenged the settled price required by the *pancando* system in Japan by unexpectedly dispatching junks to Japan in the teeth of the north monsoon; he challenged Spanish control of the Mexican silver supply by declaring an embargo on all Chinese junk shipping to Manila; he also challenged the Dutch monopsony on Sumatran pepper and Siamese deerskins by conducting official negotiations to purchase commodities and once again imposing an embargo. As his only hope was to push all these enterprises through to keep all his subjects together, he occasionally had to play the tyrant over his own people. For Defence Command Huang Wu, the choice was obvious: since living under Coxinga was no easier than to submitting to the Manchus, why bother continue to fight the Manchus?

**Expanding war and trade 1656-1659**

The loss of Hai-ch’êng may put an end to Coxinga’s plans to enlarge his trading fleet, because he had lost most of the materials to maintain and repair his ships. As these items were essential, he immediately decided to raid and try to occupy the coast of Fu-chou (from where all kinds of timber were exported), so that his ship-building programme would not be thrown out of joint and his ambitions not be thwarted. The plan was that his troops would gain control of all the ship-building sites and seize any materials which were needed. As this was what he had set his sights on, Fu-chou prefecture was the
primary goal of the next northern expedition. Coxinga’s fleet sailed into the Min River and occupied Min-an-chên (now Ma-wei) on 23 August 1656. Alerted by this attack, the Manchu General-in-Chief quickly assembled all his soldiers, withdrawing his men back to Fu-chou which he fortified from various scattered outposts. As Min-an-chên is situated on the northern bank of the Min River between Fu-chou city and the coast, Coxinga’s troops were in a prime position to blockade any attempt the Manchus might make to fight back by the Min River estuary. Besides occupying the estuary, they opened a series harbours along the coast including Sha-ch’eng. Coxinga arrived in Min-an-chên on 20 October 1656 and immediately arranged for the building of several forts from which to blockade the Manchu troops in Fu-chou city. In November he ordered his fleet to sail to San-tou Island in preparation for the siege of Ning-te District (Lintekwan[D.]) which is located between Fu-chou and Sha-ch’eng. If he gained control of both Ning-te and San-tou, which lies opposite it, Coxinga would be able to secure the sea route from Amoy to Sha-ch’eng and this would give him access to the land route via Chê-chiang which connected up with the Chiang-nan silk market. Once the Manchu soldiers were sealed off by Coxinga’s blockade of Fu-chou, the trade between Amoy and Chê-chiang was re-opened. The Chief of Deshima,

86 I T’u, ‘i-t’u têng wei ch’ih kai-tou-fu yü huang-wu t’o-i chin-hai shih-pên ([Suggestions from I T’u about the Imperial Edict Regulating the Enforcement of the Maritime Ban by Huang Wu and Related Governors and Grand Co-ordinators] 15 Aug. 1657’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no. 6, 377. ‘The pirates [Coxinga’s navy] seized the rice from Ch’ao-chou and Hui-chou which provided them with adequate supplies; they stole the commodities from Hsin-hua, Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou which they sold at a satisfactory price; they purloined the ship-building materials from Fu-chou, Fun-ning and Wen-chou which were ample for their needs.’
87 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 102.
88 Ibidem, 103.
89 Ibid., 104.
90 Ibid., 105.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Zacharias Wagenaer wrote:

‘The Chinese brought the news that the war in their region had ended. The Tartars (Manchus) were holding on to where they were and were keeping quiet. Coixinga on the contrary was taking advantage of this lull in the fighting and was busying himself with trade, sometimes sending two or three junks simultaneously to one place or many more richly laden ones to another place.’

Between 1 February and 15 September 1656, fifty-two junks from China and Southeast Asia visited Nagasaki. All the thirty-four junks which came directly from China this monsoon season were from the areas under Coixinga’s control (An-hai, Chang-chou, Fu-chou), with the exception of two junks from Nanking which carried only a few goods. In a word, Coixinga had gained complete control over the Chinese silk exports to Japan. For the first time the Dutch merchants in Japan noted that the junks carried passes issued by Coixinga. During the time he spent in San-tou, he consummated his plan and was able to collect enough timber to carry out his ship-building project satisfactorily.

When Coixinga launched his raid on Ning-te on 11 February 1657, the Manchu cavalry and infantry troops led by a Banner Vice-Commander-in-Chief (Mei-Lê Chang-ching), A-Kê-shang, left Fu-chou to curb the invasion by Coixinga’s troops. While Coixinga’s main

92 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 271. 1 Nov. 1656.
94 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 104.
corps laid the siege to Ning-te, other soldiers of his defeated the Manchu cavalry in a surprise attack.\textsuperscript{95}

As soon as the Chêchiang route became accessible again, Coxinga dispatched two junks carrying all kinds of commodities, including Chinese gold, to Batavia with a letter addressed to the Chinese Captains of Batavia, P’an Ming-yen and Yen Erh-kuan, asking them to forward his message to Governor-General Joan Maetsuikjer.\textsuperscript{96} He explained that he had no intention of attacking Taiwan, even though he had issued a placard banning Chinese trade to Taiwan. His motive for this had been purely to ensure his traders in Taiwan were treated better. In his second point, he implied that the Batavian authorities should also reduce the price of some commodities (apparently he was referring to pepper) or he would no longer send any junks there. In this letter, the requests he had made earlier asking that the pepper price be lowered and that his junks should be allowed to sail to the Pepper Coast were omitted. The purpose of this letter was to avoid the conflict escalating into an all out war. While maintaining his embargo, Coxinga was also looking for better means to protect his junks against Dutch harassment.

Perhaps Coxinga did not really have any clear picture of what he might gain from this embargo, but it was absolutely certain that it was not going to hurt his trade. In 1655, one wankang carried a letter from Hung Hsü to Malacca, another richly laden Amoy junk and two Quinam junks with cargoes of equal wealth visited Johor and three other junks sailed to Ligore, Sangora, and Patani.\textsuperscript{97} Some rumours mentioned other Chinese visits to Pahang and Palembang too.\textsuperscript{98} It would be hard to believe that most of these

\textsuperscript{95} Ibidem, 105; Dagregisters Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 141. 1 Apr. 1657.  
\textsuperscript{96} Daghregister Batavia, 1656-1657, 100-101. 18 Feb. 1657.  
\textsuperscript{97} VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuikjer gouverneur generael door Joan Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 15 Mar. 1655, fos. 221\textsuperscript{v}-222\textsuperscript{v}.  
\textsuperscript{98} VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Malacca aen den gouverneur Jan Thijssen, Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 405\textsuperscript{v°}.  

324
CHAPTER ELEVEN

junks did not buy pepper, tin and rattan at low prices, even though the eight junks which visited Batavia in the same year had also purchased more than 16,000 piculs at a relatively higher price.\(^9\) The Dutch Governor of Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, estimated that Coxi nga’s junks must have purchased the same or slightly more than the usual amount the Dutch generally provided to Amoy by way of Taiwan.\(^10\) Although one of these junks had been captured by the VOC merchant Antony Boey near the roadstead of Palembang, Coxinga did not feel any need to stop dispatching junks to the Pepper Coast. For example, in the spring of 1656 one Chinese \textit{wankang} from either Cambodia or Quinam still visited Jambi.\(^11\)

The most important trade item exchanged between Coxinga and the VOC in Taiwan was Chinese gold. The trade in gold, which was shipped to India, was the real centre of gravity in the Sino-Dutch trade in Taiwan.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Gold exports from Taiwan by the VOC}
\begin{tabular}{l c}
\hline
Year & Chinese gold exported via Taiwan (f.)* \\
\hline
1646-1647 & 291,665 \\
1647-1648 & 910,595 \\
1648-1649 & 1,962,697 \\
1649-1650 & 1,321,351 \\
1650-1651 & 1,423,761 \\
1651-1652 & 668,410 \\
1652-1653 & 629,086 \\
1653-1654 & 1,110,525 \\
1654-1655 & 312,229 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\(^9\) Ibidem.
\(^10\) VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Choromandel aan den gouverneur Laurens Pith, Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 409f.
\(^11\) VOC 1214, Missiven door Jacob Nolpe aan haar Eds. tot Batavia geschreven, Jambi, 22 Feb. 1656 ,fo. 182f.
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

1655-1656  
1656-1657  
1657-1658  
1658-1659  
1659-1660  
1660-1661  

104,497102
168,200103
424,736104
525,000105
180,000106
141,901107

102 NFJ 287, Missive door haer Edle [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] uijt Batavia per 't schip Aernhem over Siam [aan oppercoöpman Joan Bouchelion in Japan], 4 May 1656, Batavia, fo. 78. In the spring of 1657, the yacht Swarte Vos carried f. 48,000 Chinese gold to Batavia. Cf. Generale Missive, 31 Jan. 1657, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 409.

103 VOC 1218, Missive door Frederik Coijet en verderen raad int Casteel Zeelandia aen d'Ed. heer Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en d'Ed. heeren raden van India tot Batavia, Taiwan, 27 Dec. 1656, fo. 467r. In: Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 116. 31 Jan. 1657. It was recorded as f. 168,113.

104 At the end of 1657, 10,486 62/73 rials or 7,655 taels pure gold was sent to Malacca (1 tael=100 condijn, 1 rial=73 condijn), which equals 393,256 guilders (1 rial pure gold = 750 stuijvers. Cf. VOC 1212, Missive door Cornelis Cesar en raad aen haar Eds. tot Batavia, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 305) Cf. VOC 1228, Missive naer Batavia aen de heeren den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] ende raden van India door gouverneur Frederick Coijett en raet, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 476; VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naar Malacca aen gouverneur Joan Thijszen, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 551. In the spring of 1658, 31,480 guilders of gold were sent to Batavia.Cf. VOC 1228, Factura van de poeciersuijcker en anderesints gescheept door ordre van Frederick Coyett in 't fluijtschip Breukelen, gaende van Taijouan naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 2 Mar. 1658, fo. 669. The two numbers added together show that the gold export from Taiwan during 1657-1658 was worth 424,736 guilders.


106 Ibidem.

107 VOC 1236, Missive van den gouverneur Frederick Coyett naar Batavia aen den gouverneur generael joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 10 Dec. 1660, fo. 167. 1,759 taels of Chinese gold, which equalled f. 90,359, was sent to the Coromandel via Malacca. Added to the gold sent to Batavia from Taiwan, which was 950.8 taels or 48,842 guilders, the total is 141,901 guilders, c.f. Daghregister Batavia, 1661, 61. 22 Mar.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

As mentioned earlier, when Coxinga recruited his first group of soldiers he and the An-hai merchants exported extraordinary amounts of gold through Taiwan in the period 1648-1650, when Kuang-chou was under siege and the passes issued by Iquan were still valid in the areas under the Manchus. Since 1651, after the Manchus occupied Canton and the Macao trade resumed, the exports of Chinese gold to Taiwan from Amoy had also been gradually declining. During the truce between Coxinga and the Manchus between June of 1653 and March of 1654, the gold exports jumped to a high level again. The VOC wanted Chinese gold to pay for the silks exported from Bengal and especially for the textiles from the Coromandel Coast. Rather than purchase the tropical commodities offered in Taiwan by the VOC, the Amoy merchants preferred to trade the Chinese gold for Japanese silver. They knew that the tropical commodities could be obtained cheaper elsewhere and the fact that the silver price in Taiwan had dropped below that in China since 1652 was an added incentive (they could barter more silver from Taiwan than before).108

The High Government in Batavia decided that Japanese silver should be invested in other places (especially India) and therefore in the summer of 1653 ordered the Governor of Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, to stop paying for Chinese gold with silver. On his own discretion, Governor Caesar decided to follow the order only in part and paid the Chinese merchants half in silver and half in tropical commodities as a means to get rid of the goods which were not in demand and were clogging up the Company warehouse.109

1661. (1 tael= 100 condijns, 1 rial=73 condijns, 1 rial gold= 750 stuijvers, 1 guilder=20 stuijvers)
109 VOC 1206, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aan Joan Maetsuijcker,
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

restricted policy certainly contributed to large exports of Chinese gold in 1653, but it backfired on the Amoy merchants because the Dutch postponed payment and trapped them, forcing them to accept these goods for which there was no demand. Despite resorting to such ruses, heavy debts still forced Governor Caesar to use silver coins from the Company warehouse as payment to settle these debts in 1654.110

Coxinga’s embargo on Japan and Manila and his policies to disadvantage Taiwan were devised to squeeze yet more silver out of his suppliers. Before a total embargo was announced in June 1656, since February of 1655 the trade between Amoy and Taiwan had been gradually falling into a decline.111 Just as when Coxinga had earlier announced the embargo on the trade in raw silk to Japan, the present embargo on Taiwan was also meant to conceal his incapacity to offer the goods demanded from China. Naturally, his own junks were excluded from the trade ban and he still sold gold to Taiwan. For example, in February 1657 several junks carried 48,000 guilders’ worth of Chinese gold to Taiwan.112 Therefore even under Coxinga’s ban the gold exports were still maintained, though at a low level. Consequently, the restriction of the gold trade did his traders no special harm, for two reasons: he now purchased pepper directly from the pepper-producing areas at a lower price and the gold price in China had risen 5 per cent, which made it less profitable as an export commodity. When the silver price in Taiwan rose in comparison to that in China after the March 1657, the gold-for-silver trade became a less attractive prospect for the Amoy merchants.113

Taiwan, 5 Dec. 1653, fos. 134v-135r.
110 VOC 1194, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz. Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1654, fo. 157.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Dutch in Taiwan were anxious to be able to get their hand on increasing quantities of Chinese gold to fuel the expanding Coromandel silk trade. Since the beginning of 1650s, the VOC had increasingly depended on the raw silk exports from Coromandel to supply the Japanese market and, after 1655, the Coromandel Coast became the sole source for the raw silk trade with Japan. The VOC merchants in India expanded their credit by borrowing money from local merchants, thereby incurring heavy debts because of the interest. As the price of gold in India was higher than that of silver, the rich profits reaped in the gold trade helped the Company to quit its debts in India.

Table 11-5: The VOC Exports of Bengal (Coromandel Coast) Raw Silk to Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bengal raw silk amount by the VOC in Japan (picul)*</th>
<th>Percentage in total raw silk exports by the VOC in Japan**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>525.22</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td>979.69</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td>453.86</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>810.77</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>1,394.82</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>1,097.03</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658</td>
<td>1,446.83</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>1,321.42</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1660</td>
<td>1,567.18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Nagazumi, ‘You Hè-lan shih-liao ㄆ an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê ㄫ ai-wan mao-i',42. Table.1;**The denominator of this percentage is the total amount of silk exported annually to Japan by the VOC, which is the sum of exports from China, Tonkin and Bengal. The silk exports from other places have omitted because they were insignificant.

Under these circumstances, the order sent from the Coromandel Coast to Taiwan in 1655 amounted to 1,000,000 guilders of Chinese gold, but only
10 per cent was actually delivered.\textsuperscript{114} In the following year, 1656, Coromandel Coast required an even larger amount of up to 1,200,000 guilders of Chinese gold.\textsuperscript{115} The Taiwan factory was only able to provide about 14 per cent of this amount as the above table shows.

On 27 December 1656, Cornelis Caesar resigned and Frederick Coyet was appointed Governor of Taiwan. Seeking to redress the problem, Coyet dispatched a Chinese interpreter, He T’ing-ping (\textit{Pinquan}[D.]), to Amoy at the end of March 1657.\textsuperscript{116} When the envoy arrived there on 4 April 1657, Coxinga and his main fleet were residing on San-tou Island outside the Min River estuary, from where they were preparing to sail farther north to trade on the Chê-chiang coast.\textsuperscript{117} He T’ing-ping delivered the letters from Caesar to Coxinga’s uncle, Cheng Hung-k’uei (whose name was written as ‘\textit{Sikokon}[D.]’, his noble title ‘\textit{Ting-kuo-kong}[C.]’ (Duke of Ting-kuo)’ in Quemoy), and Cheng Tai (who was addressed by his nickname ‘\textit{Sauja}[D.]’) respectively and lodged with them for five days.\textsuperscript{118} Although He T’ing-ping had tried to catch up with Coxinga by ship, he had been held up in Amoy for

\textsuperscript{114} VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Suratta aen directeur Hendrick van Gendt [Letter from Governor Cornelis Caesar to Director Hendrick van Gendt in Surat], Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 414\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Dagregister Zeelandia}, IV 1655-1662, 157. 12 June 1657.
\textsuperscript{117} VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 38\textsuperscript{v}; Yang, \textit{Tsi’ung-chêng shih-lu}, 110.
\textsuperscript{118} VOC 1222, Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brielff door den Chinese Tolcq Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Presedient deses Eijlants Formosa [Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T’ingpin to Governor Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527\textsuperscript{v}; \textit{Dagregister Zeelandia}, IV 1655-1662, 157. 12 June 1657. Mr. Chiang Shu-shêng pointed out that ‘Si’ may refer to ‘four’ according to his previous nick name ‘Si sia’ (the fourth son).
CHAPTER ELEVEN

a fortnight because the sea route between Amoy and San-tou was under the threat from Manchu vessels.\footnote{119} In late April, the unexpected strength of the north monsoon prevented the whole fleet from sailing north, so Coxinga had to return to Amoy.\footnote{120} At the beginning of May, He T’ing-ping encountered Coxinga’s returning fleet and finally delivered Coyet’s letter to him. The next morning, Coxinga summoned a committee and asked He T’ing-ping about the unfulfilled contract between Iquan and the former Taiwan Governor, Johan van der Burg (although he did not mentioned the latter by name). Coxinga and his court doubted whether the contract had really been concluded and were dubious about whether the Dutch had bothered to pay their duty or rent to be handed over annually since 1647 after Iquan had left to Peking. This suspicion was allayed by He T’ing-ping, who assured them that he had never heard any whisper of this since he had taken up residence in Taiwan and that there were no records of it in the Dutch documents.\footnote{121} Coxinga took He T’ing-ping with him to Amoy where he summoned his Council to deal with this case on 25 May 1657.\footnote{122} At this meeting, Coxinga

\footnote{119} VOC 1222, Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolecq Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa [Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T’ing-pin to Governor Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527r. According to Chinese sources, these were vessels of the Ch’ao-chou Coastal Defence Fleet under Hsü Lung, sailing from Kuang-tung.

\footnote{120} Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 110.

\footnote{121} Daghregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 161. 13 June 1657; VOC 1222, Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolecq Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa [Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T’ing-ping to Governor Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527r-528r.

\footnote{122} Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolecq Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa [Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T’ing-pin to Governor Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527r. Cheng Hung-k’uei passed away when
raised several trivial matters to do with the treatment of Chinese merchants in Taiwan and wondered why former Governor Caesar had forced all the Chinese merchants to accept payment in commodities rather than in silver?\footnote{Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 157. 12 June 1657.} Instead of writing all these matters down, Coxinga wrote to Governor Fredrik Coyet saying that he condemned all the wrong doings of his predecessor and had high expectations that Coyet would set matters straight. Only two conditions did he mention for the lifting of the embargo (or ‘for restoring the old friendship’).

The first of these required the Dutch would not harm any Chinese junks visiting Siam, Cambodia and Palembang, or anywhere else in the South China Sea. The second required that the goods which had been confiscated from his junks by the Dutch should be restituted.\footnote{VOC 1222, Translaet uijt zekeren Ch inesen brief door den groot mandorijn Coksinja geschreven aan den heer Frederic k Coyett [Translation of a Chinese Letter Written by Great Mandarin Coxinja to Frederick Coyett ], not located, 25 May 1657, Fol. 516’-517”.}

This message was carried to Taiwan by He T’ing-ping on 13 June 1657.\footnote{Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 158. 13 June 1657.} It was translated into Dutch and read in the Council of Taiwan. Governor Coyett and the Council of Taiwan immediately drafted a reply. Promising the Chinese merchants prompt payment, they promised that they would also forward Coxinga’s requests to the High Government in Batavia, but they remained silent about the restitution of the lost goods.\footnote{Ibidem, 162-3. 14 June 1657.} In his letter to Cheng Tai, Governor Coyett stated he would ‘welcome a renewal of the old friendship’, and ‘the opening of free trade on this place (Taiwan) according to the old custom’.\footnote{VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coye tt naer Aimuj aen Sauja, Tjonhoehse} Shrewdly Coyett let He T’ing-ping handle they arrived in Amoy, therefore Coxinga and Cheng Tai had set aside five days to deal with the funeral. Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 157. 12 June 1657.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

The negotiations first before giving any firm promise. He T'ing-ping must have felt like pig-in-the-middle because Coxinga’s side was also expecting him to bargain for concrete concessions. Cheng Tai had drawn up a list of commodities for which he asked a discount ‘in order to trade with gold at the first [possible] opportunity’. He asked for 10,000 piculs of pepper, 2,000 piculs of red sandalwood, 500 piculs of lead, 500 piculs of tin and such spices as cloves, putchak and incense. The Dutch discussed the list but refused to sell the commodities at the prices proposed by Cheng Tai, which were obviously too low to accept.128 He T’ing-ping left Taiwan for Amoy carrying the official letters and the oral communications. He arrived there on 14 July 1657129 and was summoned to Coxinga’s court three days later. In the past weeks, Coxinga had received news that one of his junks had been captured by a Dutch yacht off the coast of Quinam.130 When he heard about this, Coxinga’s suspicions about the true intentions of the Dutch, who were talking about restoring the old friendships, deepened. He T’ing-ping replied that the Taiwan authorities had also heard about this incident and were willing to keep the confiscated goods until he could collect them. Coxinga thereupon put an end to the dispute and ordered his court to prepare a placard announcing that the embargo had been lifted.131 The placard was officially stamped and proclaimed everywhere in Amoy on 6 August 1657.132

Meanwhile, before he set off on his northern expedition to Chê-chiang Coxinga was preparing a huge banquet to treat all his captains, officials,

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128 Theloia, mandorijn in Aimuij [Letter from the Governor of Taiwan Frederick Coyett to Cheng Tai], Taiwan, 2 July 1657, fo. 509v.
129 VOC 1222, Resolutie des Casteels Zeelandia voorgevallen onder de regeringe van den president Frederick Coyett [Resolution Zeelandia Castle Issued during the Term of Office of President Frederick Coyet], Taiwan, 27 June 1657, fo. 72v
130 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 185. 2 Aug. 1657.
131 Ibidem, 168. 29 June 1657; 169. 30 June 1657.
132 Ibid., 186. 3 Aug. 1657.
soldiers and their families. Although He T’ing-ping was in a hurry to leave, he was invited to tarry and join the feast. Only one day after the placard was proclaimed, a Chinese junk returned from Siam and reported that another Chinese junk had been captured by Dutch ships on its homeward-bound voyage from Johor. This accident embarrassed Coxinga and he ordered the removal of all the placards posted. He was in a quandary. Because the northern expedition was at stake and the demands of the Chê-chiang market had to be met, he needed merchandise from Taiwan. Thanks to He T’ing-ping’s mediation, a reliable chain of communication with the Dutch in Taiwan had been opened and Coxinga therefore decided to set the dispute aside and lift the ban before the fleet departed on 19 August 1657. On 21 August 1657 a Chinese junk belonging to the Mandarin of Nan-ao arrived in Taiwan (via Amoy) with 20 pieces of gold ingots and 1,005 taels of silver. Her arrival meant the Chinese gold trade could be resumed. Up to the end of December, the Taiwan factory received 393,256 guilders in gold, while it sold 11,000 piculs of pepper at the price of 10¼ rials to 12 rials per picul. He T’ing-ping carried letters from Coxinga and Cheng Tai as well as the Chinese

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133 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 113. Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 199. 23 Aug. 1657.  
134 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 200. 23 Aug. 1657.  
136 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 196. 21 Aug. 1657.  
137 In the end of 1657, 10,486 62/73 rials or 7,655 taels pure gold was sent to Malacca (1 tael=100 condijn, 1 rial=73 condijn), which equalled 393,256 guilders (1 rial pure gold = 750 stuijvers, cf. VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naar Batavia aen den gouverneur generael joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 305') cf. VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 476'; VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Malacca aen gouverneur Joan Thijssen, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 551'. VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 35'. Generale Missive, III 1655-1674, 194. 6 Jan. 1658.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

placards to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{138} In his letter Cheng Tai wrote that he had managed to calm Coxinga down when the news about the captured junk arrived. He trusted that the Governor Coyet would take care of the restitution of the Johor junk.\textsuperscript{139}

Around the end of September in 1657, the two junks dispatched by Coxinga to Batavia returned, bringing Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker’s reply.\textsuperscript{140} In his letter the Governor-General confirmed that the Dutch were at peace with Coxinga and would welcome his traders, but he made only minor concessions as far as the trade to the Pepper Coast was concerned. Nevertheless, the High Government in Batavia graciously permitted Coxinga to send two or three junks to Malacca.\textsuperscript{141} Although this was not mentioned in the above letter, the two junks which delivered this message had also been offered half a rial discount per picul on the pepper purchased.\textsuperscript{142}

Coxinga’s northern expedition to the Chê-chiang coast ran smoothly because only few Manchu banner troops had been posted in the province and most of the Ch’ing soldiers were Chinese who had surrendered to Manchus. Altogether there were only 35,000 to 39,400 Ch’ing soldiers scattered over the whole province. In contrast, Coxinga had at least 40,000 soldiers congregated at his disposal.\textsuperscript{143} Most of the Ch’ing garrisons at fortified sites

\textsuperscript{138} Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 199. 22 Aug. 1657.
\textsuperscript{139} VOC 1222, Translaet uijt seeckeren Chinesen brief door den Mandorijn Suja geschreven aan Frederick Coyett, [1657-8], fos. 522'-523'.
\textsuperscript{140} Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 225. 27 Sept. 1657.
\textsuperscript{141} Daghregister Batavia, 1657, 188. 17 June 1657.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibidem, 145-6. 24 Apr. 1657.
did not carry more than 500 men, while Coxinga’s fleet would have no trouble transporting more than 10,000 soldiers at one time. Just at this critical juncture, Coxinga directed his troops to T’ai-chou (Tjoetiauw[D.]). On 21 September 1657, 20,000 soldiers landed in the vicinity of this city and laid the siege to it four days later, on the 25th. Two days later T’ai-chou surrendered to Coxinga. In the weeks which followed, all the neighbouring towns in the prefecture surrendered without offering any defence. As soon as the take-over had been completed by Coxinga’s officials, the markets were re-opened. Having discovered that Coxinga’s main force had moved from his base in Amoy to the Chê-chiang coast, the Manchu Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien, Li Shuai-tai, shrewdly prepared a massive assault on Coxinga’s various bridgeheads in Min-an-chên. On 20 October 1657, his Manchu troops broke through the Min-an-chên fortifications which meant that the land route from Fu-chou to the


145 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 214. 6 Sept. 1657; Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 114.


147 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 115.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Chê-chiang coast could be re-opened and the aid to Chê-chiang coast from Fu-chou (both on land and on water) would be allowed. Coxinga therefore had to abort his advance and return to Amoy in November.

Meanwhile, Cheng Tai had urged Governor Coyet to honour his promise to restitute the impounded junks and confiscated goods and to give a guarantee that Chinese junks would be able to visit any port in the South China Sea region. He also made it tactfully understood that Coxinga might be provoked to proclaim another embargo if these conditions were not met.

Governor Frederick Coyet and the Council of Taiwan had already discussed the seizure of the junks on 4 September 1657 and they believed that Cheng Tai had already been informed about the outcome by his agent. Their resolution declared that the confiscation of the Johor junk had been legal because the embargo was interpreted as a malicious action against the Dutch. Although they had given orders that the impounded Chinese junks should be brought to Taiwan, the Johor junk was lost in a typhoon and the Company would only return the cargo which had been captured and salvaged. In the case of the junk which had been captured off Quinam, the list of goods lost submitted by the Chinese owner was not accepted as accurate. Nevertheless, the Council had punished the captain who had seized the junk and Cheng Tai’s agent was free to sue him if he wished. Finally, the case of the junk captured in 1654 off the Kuang-tung coast had already settled by the Batavian authorities with Coxinga. For various reasons, the Taiwan authorities therefore repudiated Cheng Tai’s request for compensation.

As Coxinga was fitting out his trading-junks in the next monsoon and

149 Ibid., 118; VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 38v.
150 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 256. 13 Nov. 1657.
151 VOC 1222, Misive van Frederick Coyett naer Aimuij aen den mandorijn Saujia[Cheng Tai], Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1657, fos. 292'-293'.

337
preparing to escort them southwards, Cheng Tai asked Governor Coyet to grant four passes to Siam, Palembang, Malacca and Johor. Perhaps because Governor Coyet was worried about having failed to satisfy all of Coxinga’s demands, he decided to comply with the request. In his letter to Cheng Tai, he emphasized that this should be seen as an exceptional gesture. Explaining his decision to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker, Coyet writes:

‘If only the Kings of Cambodia, Palembang, and other places which have concluded contracts with the Company would honour their promises properly and order their subjects not to sell designated goods to anyone other than the Company, the Company would suffer no harm. They should also punish those transgressors in their own kingdoms, which is more fitting than that we should have to check the junks and confiscate their goods. This had reaped us more than enough odium in Japan and China, and it has also caused the loss of earlier privileges in Siam since 1653.’

Even the Japanese Shogun was aware of the recent Dutch patrol actions against Chinese junks. After she had been struck by a typhoon, some confiscated goods and the surviving crew of the Johor junk had been brought directly to Japan by the Dutch ship the *Urk* on 23 August 1657. This caused an uproar among the Chinese in Nagasaki who shouted ‘Death to you’ and ‘Dutch robber ship’, as they pelted the crew of the *Urk* with stones, even though the latter were already in custody. After the Chinese merchants had

152 Ibidem, fo. 294
153 *Dagregister Zeelandia*, IV 1655-1662, 256. 13 Nov. 1657
154 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 21v; VOC 1228, Resolutie in rade van Formosa, Taiwan, 13 Nov. 1657, fo. 499r
155 NFJ 288, Missive door den E Zacharias Wagnier en den raet deses Comptoirs aan haer Edts [gouverner generael Joan Maetsuijcker]tot Batavia, Japan, 12 Oct. 1657, fo. 34. According to the log of the *Urk*, the crew of this ship had disobeyed the
CHAPTER ELEVEN

lodged an appeal with the shogunal court, the verdict was that the legal owner should be compensated in Taiwan for the loss of the junk and her cargo. The shogunal court also warned the Dutch not to commit any such acts of piracy again on pain of being expelled from Japan forever. The upshot was that the urgent need for Chinese gold and the pressure exerted by the Japanese authorities forced Governor Coyet to make some concessions. After he had received these four passes, in his reply the Official of Revenue, Cheng Tai, who was residing in Amoy (the Chu-shou Hu-kuan), revealed that Coxinga’s real intention was to challenge the pass system:

‘Your Honour has sent me four passes, a splendid gesture and I feel highly satisfied with this treatment, even though Coxinga’s junks sailing to the east and to the west are more than several hundred. My agent, Pingsick, has written to me that you had told him our junks can sail freely to your places. Even if we encounter some of your ships, we shall be treated as friends and there will be no antagonism as there was before. This being the case, all the junks can now sail the sea freely and there will no longer be any bother with the[Dutch] passes here’

In 1646, Iquan had made an attempt to remould the Chinese tribute instructions issued by Batavia. They not only chased junks far off their planned course, but also confiscated some goods for themselves. Cf. NFJ 288, Naerder bericht schrift gedaen door voornoemden E Zacharias Waginaer aan haer Eedle [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Bataiva [Report Written by Zacharias Wagenaer to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Japan, 13 Dec. 1657, fos. 99-100.


157 VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Malacca aen gouverneur Joan Thijsen, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 552r.

158 VOC 1228, Translaet uijt zeekeren Chinesen brief door den groot mandorijn Sauja geschreven naer Taijouan aen den gouverneur Frederick Coyett, Amoy, 2 Mar. 1658, fo. 656r.
system by absorbing the crown trade as a means to protect his business against the depredations of the patrols of the VOC. Between 1647 and 1653, Coxinga was still not aware of the fact that the VOC could use its privileges with local rulers as a legal basis to exclude him from certain lucrative trades. It was only after the VOC had confiscated deerskins from his junks off the Chao Phraya estuary in Siam, Coxinga and the Amoy merchants realized that the warning from the Japanese shogunal court was the only effective weapon which would give them any security. Hence, they began to require the VOC factory merchants grant them passes for their return journey to Amoy and their voyage to Japan. As early as May 1652, Chief Merchant Volkerus Westerwolt in Siam issued a pass to a Chinese *anachoda* for his return voyage to Ch’üan-chou.159 In the summer of 1654, the *anachodas* of eight Chinese junks again asked the Westerwolt to grant them passes to secure a safe voyage home. Although Westerwolt refused their requests for passes, he did give them a guarantee that no junks would be captured at sea in response to the Siamese king’s admonition of keeping Chinese junks secure. 160 In the summer of 1655 nine Chinese junks visited Siam and five of them intended to sail from there directly to Japan,161 but they ran into a typhoon and had to turn back, apart from a few which sought shelter in Quinam. When one of the junks finally arrived on Japan in July 1656, she carried the pass issued by

159 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 79. 2 Sept. 1652.
160 VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckerieus Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India [Letter Written by Volckerieus Westerwolt from Ayutthaya to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and the Council of the Indies], Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fo. 13v. Serious tension had been mounting between the two groups because the *anachodas* tried to gain restitution by the expedient of threatening the Dutch merchants in Siam with violence.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Westerwolt and a prince’s flag bearing the motto ‘Vive Orangie’.162

The support of the Siamese King was a very important element in the struggle waged by Coxinga’s merchants against the Dutch pass system. In the past, the Sino-Siamese trade had been monopolized by the Siamese King who dispatched junks with tributary embassies to Kuang-chou. When Iquan tried to break into this trade during the 1630s, he was excluded but, as soon as the Lung-wu Emperor was pronounced the legal Emperor of the moribund Ming Empire in 1645, Iquan seized his chance and tried to set up a crown trade under the cover of the tributary system. As mentioned earlier, Siamese envoys did indeed visit Amoy in 1653. At that moment in time it would appear that the Amoy merchants had temporarily snatched the Sino-Siamese trade out of the hands of the Kuang-tung merchants.

Table 11-6: The expansion of Chinese trade to Siam 1650-1661

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese junk visited Siam</th>
<th>Chinese junk sailing directly to Japan from Siam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td>10(^{163})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>6(^{164})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>4(^{165})</td>
<td>1(^{166})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

162 *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 255. 7 July 1656; 256, 10 July 1656; 257-8. 17 July 1656; VOC 1219, Rapport van de coopman Volckerius Westerwolt wegen den toestant van ‘s compagnies negotie in Siam [Report Written by Merchant Volckerius Westerwolt about the Situation of the Company Trade in Siam], Siam, 16 Nov. 1656, fo. 803v.

163 VOC 1175, Missive door Volckerius Westerwolt [van Siam] aan de Ed. heer Anthonij van Brouckhorst president in Japan, Japan, 4 July 1650, fo. 547; *Generale Missive*, II 1639-1655, 448. 20 Jan. 1651.


166 VOC 1194, Missive [aen haer Eds. Joan Maetsuijcker te Batavia van Volkerius Westerwolt en Jan van Rijck te Siam], Siam, 22 Oct. 1652, fo. 248v.


168 VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volkerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker ende ra den van India, Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fo. 2v.

169 VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en raden van India door Volkerius Westerwolt, Siam, 12 Oct. 1655, fo. 945v.

170 VOC 1219, Rapport van de coopman Volkerius Westerwolt wegen den toestant van 's compagnies negotie in Siam, Siam, 16 Nov. 1656, fos. 803v-804v.

171 VOC 1223, Missive aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael ende raden van India residerende tot Batavia, Siam, 16 Nov. 1657, fo. 812v; but in: VOC 1223, Missiven aen opperhoofd Zacharias Wagenaer en raet tot Japan van Siam, Siam, 6 July 1657, fo. 600v. recorded there were 13 Chinese junks arrived.

172 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 194. 6 Jan. 1658.

173 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia opt Nederlants Comptoir Siam aan E Joan Boucheljon president ende opperhooft in Japan, Siam, 4 July 1658, not foliated.

174 Ibidem.

175 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia opt Nederlants Comptoir Siam aan E Zacharias Wagenaer President opperhooft over s' Compagnies voortreffelijke negotie als vorderen ommezlaech int konincrijkische Japan, Siam, 5 July 1659, not foliated.

176 Ibidem.

177 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia op t nieuw comptoir Siam aan den E Joan Boucheljon, president en opperhooft over compagnies voortreffelijke negotie
The expansion of the Chinese junk trade to Siam was another outcome of the wars between the VOC and Quinam and Cambodia during the 1640s. VOC ships frequently blockaded the harbours of these two countries, so that the Chinese junks were obliged to sail elsewhere.

Ever since 1646 when one of his vassals in the Malay Peninsula had rebelled, the Siamese King frequently required Dutch aid for the long-distance military expeditions he mounted to pacify these areas. In 1648 the Company sent seven ships to attack Kedah, forcing its ruler to pay homage to Siam again. When Songkla, Ligor, Patani and Pattalung joined together to rebel in 1649, the VOC personnel in Ayutthaya assisted the King Prasat Thong to mount an expeditionary force with his army. By 1650 most of the rebellions had been suppressed but the Siamese King demanded an even larger force from the Dutch in 1651 for another expedition against Songkla. It was not forthcoming as in 1652 most of the Dutch military resources were already invested in the Moluccas and Amboina.

As the Dutch were otherwise occupied and not able to help the Siamese Court in its pursuit of its expansionist policies, they found themselves alienated from the Siamese King. The new staff at the Deshima factory in Japan were informed that:

‘He[the Siamese king] is upset because of the refusal to send military aid from Batavia. His displeasure has been intensified by several Chinese

als vorderen ommevelgh int koninkrijcke Japan, Siam, 10 Aug. 1660, not foliated.

Ibidem.  

179  VOC 1236, Missive door den koopman Jan van Rijck aen haer Eds. tot Batavia geschreven, Siam, 10 Oct. 1661, fo. 672.  

Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand, 32.  

181  Ibid, 33.  

182  Ibid, 34. The reign of King Prasat Thong almost exactly paralleled the period of Dutch political involvement in Ayutthaya.
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

and Japanese who are ill disposed towards us [the Dutch] and who have taken this opportunity to curb our special freedoms. ¹⁸³

As the Dutch-Siamese relationship deteriorated, Chinese and Japanese merchants gained more weight at the Siamese Court because the King fostered the ambition of personally controlling the Siam-Japan trade. In the early decades of the seventeenth century, the tributary trade between Siam and Japan had been pretty constant but it ground to a halt after Prasat Thong usurped the Siamese throne in 1629. He had poisoned the Japanese mercenary captain, Yamada Nagamasa, and had added insult to injury by burning down the Japanese residential area in Ayutthaya in 1630, effectively destroying the existing tie with Japan. ¹⁸⁴ Not surprisingly, the trading-junk and the tributary envoy he sent to Japan in 1634 in an attempt to resume relations were rejected out of hand. Between 1634 and 1655, Prasat Thong sent six different consecutive envoys to Japan, all of whom were either repudiated by the Japanese Court or were lost at sea, swallowed up by the fury of the typhoons. ¹⁸⁵ The two embassies dispatched in 1653 and 1656 were mostly probably sent under an arrangement with Chinese merchants. The first was sent on a private junk but the second, accompanied by both Chinese and Siamese sailors, was accommodated on the King’s personal ship built in the Dutch style. ¹⁸⁶ This vessel left Japan in October 1656 and visited Amoy on her way home. She left there on 25 February 1657 with two other Chinese junks. ¹⁸⁷ This arrangement is a very strong clue that Coxinga was

¹⁸³ The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 104. 16 July 1653.
¹⁸⁵ Ibidem, 18.
¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 16-7.
¹⁸⁷ VOC 1123, Missive aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] ende raden van India residerende tot Batavia van coopman Jan van Rijck uijt Siam, Siam, 16 Nov. 1657, fo. 812v.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

the organizer of this voyage, an exercise devised to build up a Japan-Amoy-Siam crown trading system.

The passive attitude adopted by the Siamese Court towards honouring the Dutch monopsory on cow hides and deerskins reinforced the expansion of Coxinga’s trade and weakened the position of the VOC in Siam. In 1654, the head of the Ayutthaya factory complained that rivalry with the Chinese merchants was forcing the purchase prices to rise. 188 A year later, in 1655 he had not been able to purchase the appointed quantity of skins for Japan. 189

The upshot was that the balance of the Dutch factory in Siam was negative in 1652, 1655 and 1656. 190 Apparently the Dutch monopsory on deerskins had outlived its effectiveness. The friendship and favours shown the Dutch by the Siamese King entered even more troubled waters when King Prasat Thong passed away and his youngest son was enthroned as King Narai in October 1657. 191 That year, not only did the Chinese purchase deerskins in large quantities but many Indian and Muslim merchants also entered the market in Siam to sell cotton textiles from India. 192

Again that same year, Coxinga’s junks obtained VOC passes for Siam. These junks enjoyed a very rare opportunity to trade because all the vassals of the Siamese King thronged to Ayutthaya to pay homage to the new incumbent on the throne. Vessels from all over the Malay Peninsula, Patani, Johor and Pahan, crowned the roadstead. 193 The following year, 1658, the

188 VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckeries Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fos. 11'-12'.
189 VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en raden van India door Volckeries Westerwolt, Siam, 12 Oct. 1655, fo. 945'.
190 Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand, 64. Table 3.
192 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijk in Judia opt Comptoire Siam aan den Zacharias Wagenaar president ende opperhoofd in Japan, Siam, 6 July 1657, not foliated.
193 VOC 1223, missive aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael ende raden van India
Chinese merchants were able to purchase no fewer than 70,000 pieces of deerskins and an equal quantity of cow hides because the privileges granted to the Dutch by King Prasat Thong ceased to be acknowledged after his decease.\footnote{NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijk in Judia opt Comptoire Siam aan den Zacharias Wagenaar president ende opperhoofd in Japan, Siam, 6 July 1657, not foliated.} Obviously, it was an opportunity not to be missed and well aware of their chance, Coxinga’s merchants snatched away the deerskin trade from under the nose of the VOC.

On the Philippines front, Coxinga lifted the ban on the trade to Manila in the spring of 1657 after some negotiation with Spanish priests who had been dispatched by the Manila government.\footnote{VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 10 Mar 1657, fo. 1\textsuperscript{r}.} When Cheng Tai asked the Taiwan factory to grant him several passes, the junks which had returned from Manila already begun to sell spices from the Moluccas.\footnote{VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1657, fo. 46\textsuperscript{r}.} Even before Coxinga had lifted the ban on Taiwan at the end of 1656, his merchants had already purchased 300,000 taels’ worth of cotton textiles from Japan to supply the demand in Manila.\footnote{NFJ 288, Missive aan haer Edlen [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia dato ultimo December per Chinese Jonck over Siam geschreven [door Joan Bouchelion], Japan, 31 Dec. 1656, fo. 8.} In the following spring of 1658, twenty junks carried coarse goods like \emph{cangans} (cotton textiles), iron utensils and wheat to Manila, expecting to be able to acquire more Spanish silver there.\footnote{VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 11 Mar. 1658, fo. 492\textsuperscript{r}.}

In conclusion, Coxinga had not only succeeded in monopolizing the silk exports from China, but he also penetrated the Dutch trading bulwarks in...
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Siam and the Malay Peninsula, and had begun to focus seriously on Japan and Manila. Buttressed by the large income pouring in from his expanding trading empire, he intended to strike the weakest coastal areas of the Ch’ing empire, thereby forcing the Peking Court return to the table for peace talks.

Two ultimate strikes, 1659-1662

Not long after they had broken through Coxinga’s blockade of Fu-chou Harbour, the Manchu tribal cavalry returned to Peking. At the end of December 1657, the Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien, Li Shuai-tai, immediately sent a letter to the Manchu Emperor, Shun-chih, requesting that another troop of Manchu tribal cavalry again be dispatched. This request was turned down on 14 January 1658, because the Shun-chih Emperor had just decided to dispatch Manchu soldiers on a new mission to eradicate the remaining forces of Yung-li Emperor in Yün-nan and Kuei-chou in southwest China. The formal order for this was issued on 18 January 1658. At the end of February, two separate armies of Manchu troops went south and regrouped in the hinterland on the western border of Hu-nan province about 900 kilometres from Amoy.

On 5 December 1657 Coxinga led his fleet on a routine mission to Nan-ao Island, where rice was both purchased and levied during February and March. Before the junks left in June, they had conquered two districts

200 TWYH(ed.), Ch’ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi, 136-139.
201 Ku Ch’êng, Nan-ming shih[A History of the Southern Ming], (Peking: Chung-Kuo Ch’ing-Nien, 1997), 901.
202 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 120.
203 Ibidem, 121.
along the coast near Chieh-yang. They discovered that the fortifications in Chieh-yang and Ch’ao-chou were better reinforced than they had been in previous years. The Manchu authorities had built two bastions on the bank of the Jung River, which obstructed Coxinga’s naval troops from sailing upstream and reaching Chieh-yang. Coxinga must have detected the moves of the Manchus before March, because even the Dutch had heard about it by then:

‘Yung-li, the opponent of the Manchus, is causing them so much trouble around Hu-nan (Honan[D]) they have had to dispatch many soldiers there. This has allowed the lower land far away from there to find some peace. The direct journey from here (Taiwan) to Sha-ch’eng and the land route beginning from An-hai (to the north) has all become safer.’

Since the Manchu garrison troops in Fu-chien and Chê-chiang provinces were scattered around various locations and could not be readily assembled to make the massive force needed to invade Amoy and Quemoy, Coxinga faced fewer risks than might have been thought in mounting a long-range expedition. Since 1654, his strategy had been to attract massive numbers of Manchu troops to Fu-chien and keep them away from the coastal areas. This tactic weakened any impact they might have had on the trading routes to the Chiang-nan area. This was an important move because now that he had collected adequate supplies of commodities from both Japan and Southeast

204 Ibid., 124.
206 VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naar Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 2 Mar. 1658, fo. 487v; VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naar Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 11 Mar. 1658, fo. 498v.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Asia, the best way to expand his trade was to construct a direct link between the Chiang-nan region and Japan. If he laid siege to the city of Nanking and forced the Manchus to withdraw their scattered garrisons from the Chiang-nan region, he reasoned he could operate his trade at will in Su-chou and other locations in the vicinity of where the silk was produced. The siege would have the added advantage of forcing the Manchu Court in Peking to open peace talks with him.

On 13 June 1658, Coxinga led all his ships northwards, towards the Chiang-nan region.207 The fleet sailed along the Chê-chiang coast where it was able to levy sufficient quantities of rice around Wen-chou prefecture. This was stored on San-p’an Island off the coast. In August the ships sailed on to the Chou-shan Archipelago.208 Although Coxinga laid siege to the prefectoral city of Wen-chou for one day, for unknown reasons he suddenly withdrew. The junk which arrived in Japan on 24 July carrying Coxinga’s ambassadors probably departed after this sudden withdrawal. Perhaps the Wen-chou authorities helped to fit out this valuable junk in exchange for a guarantee of the safety of their city. The junk arrived in Nagasaki flying ‘many flags’ and bringing ‘beautiful gifts of curious silk fabrics worth about 60,000 taels’.209 The Japanese records show the envoy’s suite consisted of 147 people and he carried an official diplomatic letter addressed directly to the Shogun in Edo.210 The Dutch Chief merchant, Joan Boucheljon, witnessed their unusual appearance:

‘The suite, consisting of 40 persons, proceeded him and came on shore first. They were dressed in strange garb. Once ashore, they stood in order in neat rows with all their ornaments, flags, fans, spikes, cutlasses, chains, trumpets and such. Then the ambassador came in on a similar barge, sitting

207 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 128.
208 Ibidem, 129.
209 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 354. 24-5 July 1658.
210 Ishihara, Nihon kisshi no kenkyu, 51.
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

on a chair, with his norimono and bodyguards. He rested for a while at the top of the stairs. 211

In the letter, after addressing some words of praise to the Japanese, Coxinga implied that if he could defeat the Manchus successfully, he would restore the formal tributary relationship with Japan. 212 But this only scratched the surface of the bargain. According to the information Governor Frederick Coyet of Formosa received, Coxinga presented a direct request through this envoy.

‘In this way he (although it is not a hundred per cent certain) would also send a junk carrying two of his servants to Japan in order to bring his brother back, and he required a huge number of well-armed soldiers on condition that he could promise them (the Japanese soldiers) a piece of land to occupy as a reward. In fact, he would be willing to give them the best island in Nanking [province].’ 213

This news was also later partly confirmed by Joan Boucheljon in Nagasaki:

‘He also requested that permission be given to his half-brother (a son of the above-mentioned woman, who had been left with a Japanese and still lived in Nagasaki) to join him. Furthermore, according to our interpreter, because they were not sure whether the letter requesting assistance in their war against Manchus had been delayed, it was revealed to the interpreters that their envoy enjoyed as great an authority in China as the Shogun did in

211 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 355. 26 July 1658.
212 The letter was also preserved by the Japanese interpreters, see: Kai hentai, 3 vols., ed. Hayashi Harukatsu and Hayashi Nobutsu, (Tōkyō: Tōyō Bunko, 1958-1959 ), I, 45; Chang T’an, ‘Chêng ch’êng-kung tê kung-tu[Official Documents Written by Chêng ch’êng-kung]’, T’ai-wan Wên-hsien[Taiwan Historica], 35/2 (1984),11-48 at 24-5.
213 NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon en raadt in Nangasaequi, Taiwan, 30 July 1658, not foliated.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Coxinga needed Japanese aid to maintain the occupation of Ch’ung-ming Island. Since the 1650s, his forces had made several attempts to hold on to Ch’ung-ming Island because it was so strategically located in the mouth of the Yang-tze River. The distance between Nagasaki and Ch’ung-ming Island in the Yangtze River estuary was equidistant from this island and Amoy, about 800 kilometres in either direction, the crucial factor was that it was apparently easier to get provisions to maintain the garrison on Ch’ung-ming Island from Japan than from Amoy. The Dutch records report that in Nanking and the Chiang-nan area the price of silk was only half that in Kuang-chou and pepper could be sold at 25 taels (= 31 rials) per picul.215 Indubitably the direct trade between Ch’ung-ming and Japan would maximize the profits of the triangular Siam-Sino-Japan trade. The Shogunal Court passed over Coxinga’s bold request in silence and adopted a neutral stance towards the civil war on the continent. Before Coxinga’s delegates departed from Nagasaki on 8 October, he had already left with his fleet to sail north from Chou-shan. Unfortunately it was struck by a fierce typhoon on 6 September 1658, a calamity which made any further expedition impossible because of the turn of the monsoon season was swiftly approaching.216

Coxinga had to regroup his fleet using Chou-shan Archipelago as the gathering point and then commenced raiding several of the district towns around Ningpo. Since his departure from Amoy, until this raid no Manchu

214 VOC 1228, Het rapport van het opperhoofd Joan Bouchelion wegens zijn verrichten in Japan gericht aan de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker tot Batavia [Report Written by Chief Merchant Joan Bouchelion about His Administration in Japan to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Japan, 30 Nov. 1658, fo. 700'; NFJ 289, Missive van Joan Boucheljon naer Taijouan aen gouverneur Frederick Coyett, Japan, 13 Oct. 1658, fo. 15.


216 Yang, T’ung-chêng shih-lu, 131-2.
garrison troops had actually been engaged in combat with Coxinga’s soldiers. Even after the raids began, the conflicts were pretty small-scale. When Coxinga laid a siege to the district city Hsiang-shan which was situated on an island, the local gentry sent some representatives to negotiate with him and promised their co-operation in his trading ventures. He therefore spared the town.217 Apparently trade loomed larger than war in the minds of both sides. Later, in October Coxinga’s troops also occupied the Wen-chou and T’ai-chou regions.218 Reports from Manchu scouts revealed that by and large his soldiers were engaging peacefully in trade in the countryside, after taking the precaution of shutting up the garrisons within in the city walls.219 San-p’an Island was used as the base at which the provisions for all the troops were stored. Chou-shan Island was transformed into a base from which to operate the Japan trade and Sha-ch’eng Harbour was exploited to maintain communications with Amoy. According to Dutch sources: ‘Coxinga had occupied two cities in Chê-chiang and was planning to advance into Nanking province.’220 He maintained a truce with the Manchu garrisons when he was living in Wen-chou and Sha-ch’eng from October 1657 to May 1658.221 In December and January he dispatched five large junks to Japan, carrying different sorts of silk piece goods and sugar valued at about 270,000 taels altogether.222 Because the silk cargo was estimated at 200,000 taels, Zacharias Wagenaer, the Dutch chief merchant, began to worry about

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217 Ibidem, 133-4.
218 Ibid., 134-5.
219 TWYH(ed), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 855.
220 NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan [aen Joan Boucheljon], Taiwan, 7 Aug. 1658, not foliated.
221 Yang, Ts‘ung-chêng shih-lu, 136-138.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

whether this competition might not reduce the profits on Bengal silks.\textsuperscript{223} The following year 1659, Coxinga summoned the whole of his fleet and all his troops and assembled them on the coast of Wen-chou on 13 May. Once the south monsoon set in, he went ahead with his plans for the northern expedition.\textsuperscript{224} The cold-shoulder turned on him by the Shogunal Court forced him to shift his original plan of establishing a Japanese garrison on Ch’ungming Island to posting his best troops with their families there. Coxinga therefore gave the unusual order that his captains and soldiers should bring their spouses with them on this expedition.\textsuperscript{225} As he moved northwards, he dispatched another ten junks to Japan during the north monsoon. The Dutch records say this group of ten junks exported some 641.2 piculs of raw silk in total, which was about 2/3 of the amount for one season.\textsuperscript{226} The Chinese raw silks exports must have been approaching their zenith because the main forces of the Manchus were destined to march on Yün-nan province from Hu-nan province and hence moved farther away from Chiang-nan region.

Table 11-7. The Chinese and the Dutch Silver Exports from Japan and the Chinese Raw Silk Exports in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese Silver* Exports (kanme)</th>
<th>Dutch Silver* Exports (kanme)</th>
<th>Chinese Raw Silk exports in Japan (picul)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td>6828</td>
<td>3940</td>
<td>963\textsuperscript{227}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{223} NFJ 290, Missive door den E Zacharias Wagenaer, en den Eaadt deses comptoirs [in Japan] aen Sr Jan van Rijck, met een Chinese jonk, naer Siam gesonden, Japan, 20 Jan. 1659, fo. 2.
\textsuperscript{224} Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 139; Ku, Nan-ming-shih, 935-6.
\textsuperscript{225} Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 138.
\textsuperscript{226} The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 384. 3 June 1659. Nagazumi, Tôsen yushutsunyûhin sîryô ichiran, 342. Appendix A.
\textsuperscript{227} Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 423. 10 Dec. 1650.
### The Passions 1655-1662

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>3rd Quarter</th>
<th>4th Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>4749</td>
<td>4896</td>
<td>937.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>5687</td>
<td>5719</td>
<td>881.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td>3517</td>
<td>6191</td>
<td>719.20</td>
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<td>8181</td>
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<td>4655</td>
<td>4002</td>
<td>1401.23</td>
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<td>5241</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>2450</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658</td>
<td>11029</td>
<td>5640</td>
<td>1360.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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229 Nagazumi, *Tōsen yoshutsuyūhin sūryō ichiran*, 337. Appendix A.
230 Ibidem.
231 NVJ 286, Missive van Gabriel Hapart naar Batavia aen de Ed. Heeren den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] en raaden van Nederlants India [Letter from Gabriel Hapart to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and the Council of the Indies], Taiwan, 18 Nov. 1654, fo. 105.
233 NVJ 287, Missive van ’t Comptoir Nangasackij [van Joan Boucheljon ] aen den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] ende de raden van India per t retour schip Aernhem naar Batavia gesonden, Japan, 16 Oct. 1656, fo. 78.
235 VOC 1228, het rapport van het opperhoofd Joan Bouchelion wegens zijn verrichten in Japan gericht aen de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker tot Batavia, Japan, 30 Nov. 1658, fo. 707"
Coxinga was very confident that he would be able to occupy Ch’ung-ming Island, which would give him control of the Nanking area, or more precisely what was known as the Chiang-nan region. The reason for his confidence was he was in secret contact with the commander of Ch’ing garrison named Ma Chin-pao in Su-chou. When his the van of his fleet anchored in the roadstead of Ch’ung-ming Island on 7 July 1659, he immediately announced:

‘Ch’ung-ming and its sounding islands will be our real base, as important as Amoy, because we shall bring our families to live here. The troops should treat the inhabitants here mildly. Therefore, anyone harassing the inhabitants, including the others in his section, will be sentenced to death.’

The next day, Coxinga sent a messenger to Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao but the latter was hesitant about joining him and would only vouchsafe the reply that, if Coxinga approached the city of Nanking, he

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236 NFJ 290, Missive door meergenoemde E [Zacharias Wagenaer]aen d E dle Heeren Gouwereur Generael [Joan Maestsuijcker] en raaden van India met de fluyt de Vogelsangh naer Batavia geschreven, Japan, 15 Oct. 1659, fo. 36
237 NFJ 291, Missive aan dEdle heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generaal ende E Heer Raden van India tot Batavia door Joan Boucheljon, Japan, 15 Oct. 1660, not foliated.
238 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 142.
would offer his assistance. Since it was Coxinga’s plan to keep Ch’ung-ming Island as his own trading station, he decided not to subject it to a violent assault but to cower the residential garrison into surrender. He had few qualms that he would not succeed because he had brought some 100,000 soldiers with his fleet. Time was pressing as the onset of the south monsoon season could expected at the end of September. If he could not obtain certain political concessions from the Manchu Court, he might have no option but to return south. Ch’ung-ming Island was difficult to defend during the strong north monsoon and the attenuated supply lines made it unlikely that a Manchu attack could be fended off. Therefore as his only reasonable option was to force the Manchu Court back to the negotiation table for peace talks within two months, Coxinga decided to trust the word of Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao and ordered his fleet upstream. The distance from Ch’ung-ming Island to Nanking along the Yang-tze River is about 380 kilometres. At a distance of 270 kilometres lies Chen-chiang, which was considered the crucial jumping-off place for any invasion of Nanking. On 10 August Coxinga defeated the garrison of Chen-chiang in front of that city. His fleet finally anchored outside the Nanking on 25 August. On 29 August, he began to lay siege to the city walls of Nanking from the river banks: the northern and the western sides. The eastern side is hilly, but the southern side lay open. If Coxinga’s troop could scale the walls the city would be his, but Coxinga was still waiting Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao’s assistance to seal off the southern side of the city. His delegate to Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao left on 4 September and he planned to start bombarding the northern city gate on 8 September. Unfortunately the Manchu cavalry broke through the entrenchment before the bombardment could begin and created a gap in Coxinga’s siege lines. As these Manchu cavalymen were no more than 3,000 Coxinga decide to lure them out into the open field and to

239 Ibidem.
240 Ibid., 161.
241 Ibidem.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

destroy them once and for all. He divided the whole army up in four parts on the hills along the Yangtze River and faced the Manchu cavalry in the open field. Seasoned soldiers, the Manchus did not fall into the mistake of rushing into the middle of his formation, but adopted a circuitous movement to attack the right flank. Coxinga’s heavily armoured soldiers moved too slowly to be able to reinforce their flank and consequently the formation collapsed under the charge of the cavalry. Most of Coxinga’s best soldiers and commanders fell in battle. On 13 September Coxinga decided to retreat with his whole fleet and on the way pick up the survivors from the river. His chief concern was to protect the families of the soldiers from the depredations of Manchu warships which were even then sailing downstream. He arrived at Ch’ung-ming Island six days later and again sent a delegate to Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao, asking him to mediate in the negotiations with the Manchu authorities. On the 25th, Coxinga resumed his original plan of attacking Ch’ung-ming Island, but just one day later Commander Ma Chin-pao dispatched a delegate to Coxinga, asking him to abort this attack which would allow him to initiate peace talks with Manchu Emperor. Coxinga therefore retreated and led the fleet southwards to the coast of Wen-chou.

Although Coxinga’s plan to occupy Ch’ung-ming island was aborted by his defeat, Sino-Japanese trade still continued to expand successfully, undisturbed by the invasion. A report from Taiwan states that the Chinese trading route was left unimpeded:

“The land routes are pretty secure, the hostilities have recently halted and peace is being offered to Coxinga on good terms. He is on the island of Chou-shan just off the Nanking coast now and is residing there so as to

\[\text{242 Ibid., 163-4.}\]
\[\text{243 Ibid., 164.}\]
\[\text{244 Ibid., 166.}\]
As the above table shows, the Sino-Japan silk-for-silver trade still maintained its momentum even though Coxinga had been defeated at Nanking. Furthermore, during his retreat, Coxinga had also captured plenty of rice and provisions which had originally been gathered to pay the taxes to Peking. Therefore when Coxinga took his fleet and troops to Wen-chou this time, he did not have to send another fleet out to Ch’ao-chou to levy rice as he had done earlier. Since he had sent his delegate to engage in peace talks with the Shun-chih Emperor, trade was also tolerated to a certain extent. In 1658, Coxinga chose to reside in Wen-chou rather than in Amoy and he no longer dispatched a well-equipped fleet to patrol the Kuang-tung coast. In the same year, the Ping-nan Viceroy in Kuang-tung had been ordered by the Manchu Emperor to attack the Ming loyalist troops of Yung-li in Kuang-hsi province on the western border of Kuang-tung, a diversion which afforded Coxinga’s forces some breathing space. Dutch sources record that Coxinga moved north since he ‘could not get a grip on the pirates around Nan-ao nearby Kuang-tung’. When Coxinga’s main force was in the northern expedition and absent from the Kuang-tung coast, the Ping-nan Viceroy had already established a naval force which was based in several harbours around

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245 NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aen den E. Zacharias Wagenaer, opperhooft, en raat des Comptoirs Nangasacqui, Taiwan, 2 Aug. 1659, not Foliated.
246 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 164. ‘The junks were all fully loaded with rice and consequently were too heavy to sail.’ How serious the impact of this raid was on the Manchu Court in Peking is uncertain. However, together the land-tax in Chê-chiang and Chiang-shu was 64.05% of the total land-tax revenue in China. C.f. Chang Hai-ying, Ming-ch’ing chiang-nan shang-p’in liu-t’ung yü shih-ch’ang t’i-hs[The Market System and Circulation of Commodities in the Chiang-nan Region under the Ming and Ch’ing Dynasties], (Shang-Hai: East China Normal University Publisher, 2001) , 122.
247 NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aen den E Joan Boucheljon en raadt in Nangasacqui, Taiwan, 30 July 1658, not foliated.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

the Ch’ao-chou area during 1657-1659. The Dutch also witnessed a flurry of building activity in the Kuang-tung coast. Although under Manchu command, the naval force under Su Li still remained in communication with Coxinga’s force in Nan-ao and Amoy. For example, in May of 1657, when He T’ing-ping was in Amoy, he passed on some information about the situation in Kuang-tung obtained from four junks which had just arrived in Amoy from there. Again, in the summer of 1658 the nachoda of a junk which had been battered by a typhoon and had drifted to Macao where she was impounded by the Manchu Coastal Defence Fleet, was released before the junk reached the shores of Kuang-chou. Therefore ‘in a roundabout way, the nachoda managed to join Coxinga, his master’. Furthermore, a big Kuang-tung junk loaded with all kinds of Chinese goods accompanied by a junk from Amoy also visited Johor in the spring of 1659. In July of 1659, a Kuang-tung junk visiting Japan also claimed that she had anchored first in Amoy. Both junks were actually part of the fleet of junks dispatched to Manila, Siam and Japan by the Ping-nan Viceroy. No matter what arrangements were made between Coxinga and Su Li or the Ping-nan Viceroy, the Kuang-tung trade undeniably recovered while Coxinga was absent on his expedition to Nanking.

248 TWYH(ed), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 971; 1000.
250 VOC 1222, Translaet uijt zeekeren Chines en brief door den Chinese tolcq Pincqua geschreven aen Frederick Coyett [translation of a certain Chinese letter written by the Chinese translator Hê T’ing-ping to gouvernor of Taiwan Frederick Coyett], Amoy, 22 May 1657, fo. 528.
251 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 375. 3 Jan. 1659.
252 VOC 1229, Missive door d’Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia geschreven [Letter written by the Gouvernor Joan Thijsz. from Malacca to Batavia], Malacca, 10 Apr. 1659, fo. 442c.
253 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 389. 6 July 1659.
As long-standing competitors of the Portuguese in Macao, in 1653 and 1655 the Dutch also dispatched envoys to contact the Manchu authorities in Kuang-tung. What prompted this move was that the ending of the Dutch-Portuguese truce in 1652. Freed from its constraints, the Dutch again began to raid Portuguese settlements in Asia. The Kuang-tung authorities arranged to have the Dutch envoys who arrived in 1655 welcomed as a tributary embassy. The envoys, Pieter de Goijer and Jacob de Keijser, arrived in Peking on 17 July 1656. Before they returned to Kuang-chou with a formal reply from the Manchu Shun-chih Emperor, the Ping-nan Viceroy asked De Goijer and De Keijser to grant him a pass to trade in Cambodia. The junk assigned to be the bearer of this pass returned to Kuang-chou fully laden and was accompanied by another junk belonging to the King of Cambodia, carrying rattan, sandalwood, ray- and deerskins. The following year, the King of Cambodia dispatched another big junk to Kuang-tung laden

CHAPTER ELEVEN

with pepper, benzoin and lacquer (gemelak).258

Meanwhile, the end of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1654 terminated the Dutch right to prevent the English from taking a share in the Southeast Asian and the China trade. In 1657, three English ships which had departed from Bantam, Surat and England respectively paid a successful visit to Macao. They initiated a reciprocal trade with the mediation of the Chinese merchants serving under the Pingnan Viceroy.259 In 1659, another two English ships visited Kuang-chou but left without engaging in any trade and thirteen small Portuguese vessels brought commodities from Makassar, Siam and Cambodia to Macao. The Ping-nan Viceroy controlled the Kuang-chou trade with an iron fist, preventing the local people from trading with foreign vessels, restricting this privilege to the owners of his own junks.260 The tributary junk dispatched to Kuang-chou by the Siamese King also fell victim to this monopoly policy. Her crew was detained in Kuang-chou for three years and did not return to Siam until January 1660 with nothing to show for their detention.261

258 VOC 1223, Missive aan opperhoofd Zacharias Wagaer tot Japan door opperhoofd Hendrick Indijk tot Cambodja, Cambodia, 8 July 1657, fo. 766v.
259 NFJ 353, Missive uit opperhoofd de Tonkin Gustavus Hansz int Nederlants Comptoir Tonkin aan den E Heer Joan Bouchelon oppercoopman en opperhooft wegens dE Compagnies Negotie en ommeslagh ten Comptoir Nangasackij, Tonkin, 18 July 1658, not foliated; VOC 1222, Missive van [gouverneur van Taijouan] Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aan [gouverneur generael] Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 33°; Generale Missive, 6 Jan. 1658, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 450. The last record mentions only two English ships. The English captains also reported they saw pirates fighting furiously with the Manchu Coastal Defence Force troops around Macao, actions which also hindered the trade in Canton. Cf. VOC 1226, Missiven door den gouverneur Joan Thijsz. naer Batavia geschreven, Malacca, 18 Jan. 1658, fo. 585v.
261 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 327. 16 Dec. 1660.
Another party interested in the Macao trade was Spanish Manila. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the intermittent wars between the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of Spain, which had lasted eighty years, were over. In 1659, the Spanish merchants in Manila dispatched a yacht to Macao where she was loaded with typical Chinese goods like silk and iron pans. She then continued her voyage south to Johor in a quest to purchase pepper. The crew of the yacht intended to take that cargo of pepper back to Macao.262 In the meantime, the Manchu Emperor had turned down the Dutch request for free trade which the latter had submitted during their ‘tributary’ embassy in 1655. Instead granting them free trade in Kuang-chou, he allowed them one tributary embassy every eight years. Smarting the Dutch found themselves saddled with an inferior position in the Kuang-tung trade. The Spanish country trader Joan Verguesse was allowed to leave for Manila from Macao and visited Johor again in January 1659.263 When the Viceroy of Kuang-tung also showed his eagerness to participate in this trade, this situation became even worse.

Against this background, further negotiations between the VOC and Coxinga began to unfold. After the Coxinga had lifted the ban against Taiwan, he wrote a letter to Governor-General, Joan Maetsuijker dated 7 February 1658. In this letter he stressed that he had lifted the ban because the interpreter He T’ing-ping told him that the Governor of Taiwan, Frederick Coyet, had arrested those captains who had captured his junks and had guaranteed that the VOC would pay a proper compensation of 180,000 taels.264 He also dispatched three junks to Batavia to express his appreciation.

263 VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Joao Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia geschreven [aan gouverneur generael Joao Maetsuijcker], Malacca, 24 Mar. 1659, fo. 441'.
264 NFJ 290-2, Translaet missive door de mandorijin Coxinja aen de Ed. Heer
CHAPTER ELEVEN

of the presents sent to him by the Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker. It seems only two junks arrived. They were carrying 30 pieces of gold ingots, some gold thread, coarse porcelain and Japanese copper staves. 265 The contents of the letter Coxinga sent via the two Chinese Captains or Headmen in Batavia were the same content as those in the letter addressed to Maetsuijker, but this time he required 200,000 instead of 180,000 taels in compensation. He also added one more line at the end of the letter, announcing that, if the Dutch did not honour their promises,

‘...[I, Coxinga] shall never again send junks to Taiwan and Batavia. Besides, I shall send letters everywhere proclaiming that the Dutch are such an evil people they are no longer worthy trading partners.’ 266

Coxinga’s junks carried 3,323 piculs of pepper when they left from Batavia on 8 June 1658. 267 They also carried a letter from Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker which stated that the Dutch ship captains had been punished but argued that the required compensation was highly exaggerated. He took the chance to point out that the Dutch had earlier been obliged to use force to gain the right of free trade with China:

‘Proof will be found if Your Highness will examine the old records of the history of the Chinese coast. You will discover we have sought to use
every courteous means to seek the free trade with China, as China has permitted some other nations, for sixty years. According to the rights enjoyed by all civilized people, the Chinese could not refuse this to us without great injury to themselves and deep disgrace. Being honest merchants, we shall not do harm to anyone else but neither do we like to be wronged or harmed by anyone else. This is why, when we found out that very friendly talks with the authorities in China had not been efficacious, we seized our weapons without a moment’s hesitation, to achieve a better understanding. After some victories and defeats, eventually an agreement or contract was reached with the authorities. So we shelved the hostilities, and enjoyed free trade in Taiwan and Batavia [by all junks] from all Chinese harbours. This can be verified from our records over and over again.  

Joan Maetsuijker considered that Coxinga’s ban on the Taiwan and Batavia trade had violated this ‘agreement’, therefore the Dutch had the right to take arms against him if necessary.

‘If Your Highness wants to persist with your pretensions and announce to all countries and people that we are evil people and boycott us, as Your Highness has threatened in your letter to Pan Ming-yan and Yan Er-kuan, we shall take due note of that. But Your Highness should also know that there will be plenty of means for us to take revenge and to discommodes Your Highness’ overseas commerce.’

The two Chinese junks returned to Amoy safely in July. The Dutch in Taiwan did not receive a reply about these matters until 1660, but nevertheless obtained a continuous supply of Chinese gold before the

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268 NFJ 290-2, Missive van gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker aen den mandorijn Coxinja, Batavia, 8 June 1658, not Foliated.
269 Ibidem.
270 NFJ 350, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon en raadt in Nagasacqui, Taiwan, 30 July 1658, not foliated.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

summer of 1659 as the above table shows. On the surface, the dispute was temporarily put aside. While this was happening, the Amoy merchants traded freely on the Pepper Coast of Sumatra with passes issued by Governor Frederick Coyet and in 1658 dispatched three junks to Ligore to purchase tin, another very lucrative commodity.\textsuperscript{271} When an English ship visited Amoy she was welcomed by the merchants there.\textsuperscript{272} Now free to trade in East, the English merchants were also trying to sell their pepper in Amoy and Canton.

Actually the gold trade did not run as smoothly as the table indicates. Because the Chinese gold prices were rising, the Amoy merchants preferred to pay in Taiwan with silver rather than to hand over their gold. Governor Frederick Coyet and the Council of Taiwan therefore decided to forbid any silver imports from China after the spring of 1658.\textsuperscript{273} In search of a higher price for their gold, the Amoy merchants dispatched one junk to Johor and one junk to Malacca in the spring of 1659. The gold could be traded for 12.5 taels silver per tael in Taiwan but fetched 14 taels in Malacca. Another incentive was that the Chinese merchants could meet Muslim merchants from Coromandel in Malacca who were willing to purchase the gold for as high as 15.5 taels. Eventually, they sold for 97¼ rials of gold (=£. 3636.8) to the Dutch in Malacca but 28 rials of gold (=£. 1050) to the Coromandel merchants.\textsuperscript{274}

Now joining the throng of Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish and English competitors, Muslim merchants from Coromandel were also busy gradually

\textsuperscript{271} VOC 1226, Missiven door den gouverneur Joan Thijsz. naer Batavia geschreven, Malacca, 25 May 1658, fo. 604\textsuperscript{t}.
\textsuperscript{272} NFJ 289, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Japan aan E. Joan Bouchelon en den raadt in Nangasiaqui, Taiwan, 26 Aug. 1658, fo. 40.
\textsuperscript{274} VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia geschreven, Malacca, 24 Mar. 1659, fo. 440\textsuperscript{t}. 1 rial gold equaled to 750 stuijvers.
expanding their cotton textile trade with Southeast Asia. They exported cheap cottons to Siam via Tenasserim (present-day Taninthary in Burma) in 1655, and continued to export from Machilipatnam and Bengal via the same route. In 1659 they were even spotted in Jambi and Kedah.  

King Narai of Siam was eager to secure his crown trade so that he could finance his troops he needed to combat two threats on the Siamese border. In 1659 the invasion of Cambodia by Quinam forced the Siamese King to lead 100,000 soldiers to his eastern border to protect his country. The Manchu troops hunting the last Ming Emperor Yung-li to Burma, also pressed King Narai to send 60,000 soldiers to the northern border in 1660. Partly because of disappointment in the unpropitious course of the crown trade with China and Japan, in 1659 King Narai approved the Dutch request for the sole right to purchase the deerskins and cow hides.  

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276 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijk in Judia opt Comptoir Siam aan den Zacharias Wagenaar president ende opperhoofd in Japan, Siam, 6 July 1657, not foliated.
279 NFJ 291, Missive uit Jan van Rijck aan den E Joan Boucheljon President en Opperhoofd over ’s Compagnies voortreffelijke negotie als vorderen ommeslagh int Coninck rijk Japan, Siam, 29 June 1660, not foliated; NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia op t nieuw comptoir Siam aan den E Joan Boucheljon, president en opperhoofd over compagnies voortreffelijke negotie als vorderen ommeslagh int koninckrijdke Japan, Siam, 10 Aug. 1660, not foliated; NFJ 291, Missive uit Janvan Rijck aan den E Joan Boucheljon President en Opperhoofd over ’s Compagnies voortreffelijke negotie als vorderen ommeslagh int Coninck rijk Japan, Siam, 29 June 1660, not foliated.
280 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia opt Nederlants Comptoir Siam aan E
CHAPTER ELEVEN

King ordered all deerskins and cow hides to be removed without warning from the Chinese junks and the warehouses in the Japanese quarter, and let the Dutch pay the same price for the confiscated skins as the Chinese had purchased them for from the local people.²⁸¹ Now that they had been cut out of the competition for deerskins, the Chinese merchants seized upon a new opportunity and gradually opened up a new business link with the Indian Muslim merchants. The following year, a group of twenty-two Muslim merchants was even transported to Japan from Siam on a Chinese junk. They brought Bengal cotton textiles imported via Tenasserim to the Nagasaki market, stealing a march on the Dutch.²⁸² Dutch sources claim that the Chinese merchants under Coxinga were planning even greater co-operation in the Japan trade with the Coromandel Muslim merchants:

‘The trade by Chinese junks from Siam has begun to increase year by year and has obstructed the honourable trade of the Company. They live in a prodigious style, keep large houses with their own servants and employ some Japanese to serve them, as if they will immediately bring larger quantities of all kinds of cloths and also part of the Bengal silk hither.’²⁸³

The Chief Merchant of Nagasaki, Joan Boucheljon, wrote a letter to his colleague Laurens Pitt in Coromandel disclosing his concerns:

‘It is a shame that we have not been provided with more white cotton

²⁸¹ Ibidem. The order was still in force the following year 1660, c.f. NFJ 291, Missive uit Janvan Rijck aan den E Joan Boucheljon President en Opperhoofft over ‘s Compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie als vorderen ommeeslagh int Coninck rijck Japan, Siam, 29 June 1660, not foliated.
²⁸² NFJ 291, Missive uit Joan Boucheljon in Japan opt comptoir Nangasackij aen de Edle Heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur general en d EE heer raden van India [tot Batavia], Japan, 15 Oct. 1660, not foliated.
²⁸³ Ibidem.
cloth this year, otherwise we should have made rich profits... Now the Muslims have brought quite a quantity from Siam on a Chinese junk .... I am afraid that these people have shared the rich profits and now, once they have tasted the sweetness of success, they might immediately import many more Bengal and Coromandel cotton textiles, as well as silk and other goods, from elsewhere. This heavy burden could force the Company to lower the price of its exports. 284

Apparently either Coxinga himself or his merchants had begun to toy with the idea of using Siam as a transit harbour in plans to initiate the triangular Chinese gold- Bengal silk-Japanese silver trade which the VOC did as well via Malacca. If the Shogunal Court and the Siamese King would throw their weight behind the idea of Chinese junks sailing between their ports, the VOC would have its hands tied and be bereft of any means to curb this plan. If it were successful, the Chinese gold exports would no longer flow into Taiwan, but would be channelled directly to either Siam or the Pepper Coast and end up largely in the hands of Indian Muslim merchants.

Even if Coxinga had decided to shift the gold flow from Taiwan to the Coromandel merchants in Siam or to the Pepper Coast around Sumatra, he would not have had it all his own way. The Dutch would still do all in their power to force him to maintain the gold supply to Taiwan until they were able to take over Macao, which would have guaranteed them access to the Chinese gold supply. Hence the Dutch base in Taiwan turned into a possible thorn in Coxinga’s side, since the Dutch could well become his direct competitors once they had taken Macao. Come what may, without this gold-for-pepper trade between Amoy and Taiwan, the alliance between

284 NFJ 290, Missive uit Joan Boucheljon in Japan opt Comptoir Nangasackij aan ’d ‚E Heer Laurens Pitt extraordinarij Raat van India ende gouverneur der Chormandelse kust, Japan, 25 Oct. 1660, not foliated; NFJ 291, Missive uit Joan Boucheljon in Japan opt comptoir Nangasackij aan de Edle Heer Joan Maetsujicker gouverneur general en d EE heer raden van India [tot Batavia], Japan, 15 Oct. 1660, not foliated.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Coxinga and the Dutch would be meaningless. In that case, war would be unavoidable. Sooner or later, either Coxinga or the VOC would take action against the other party.

A Chinese source relates that after Coxinga’s delegate returned from Nanking in January 1660 and reported that his request for peace talks had been refused, he put forward a proposal to attack Taiwan. A Dutch source also reports that Coxinga had arranged for some fishermen to join the fish tax-farm auction on the fishing grounds around Taiwan in December 1660, in a manoeuvre to seize secret control of the fishing harbours in preparation for an invasion on the southwest coast of Taiwan. While he waited, he ordered all Chinese junks to return to Amoy, probably to reduce the damage to his trading-junks in the South China Sea once the VOC began to take retaliatory actions. The Dutch authorities in Taiwan believed that Coxinga had planned to invade the island on 10 March 1660 and had sent an emergency message to Batavia at about the same time.

On 25 August 1659, the Emperor Shunchih dispatched 10,000 Manchu cavalrymen to Fu-chien. They finally arrived in Fu-chou on 2 March 1660, having travelled all the way from Peking on horseback. This deliberate

285 Yang, Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu, 167.
286 VOC 1235, Resolutie van den gouverneur [Frederick Coyett] en den raedt van Formosa rakende Coxinja’s machination gegen de Compagnie [Resolution Issued by Governor Frederick Coyett and Council of Formosa concerning Coxinga’s Machinations against the Company], Taiwan, 16 Apr. 1660, fo. 433r.
287 VOC 1233, Missive door den coopman Jan van Rijck en desselfs raet, Siam, 26 Feb. 1660, fo. 563r - 564r. Although the junk which brought this message had reportedly sailed from Japan, she might have put in at Amoy first. Besides, no such order was recorded by the Dutch chief merchant on Deshima. It also proves that this order was primarily concerned with junks accessing the Pepper Coast.
289 TWYH (ed.), Ch'ing shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi, TW, No. 158, 159; Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 168.
move by the Emperor Shun-chih forced Coxinga to respond by postponing the invasion for the moment. In April, the Manchu General of An-nan (An-nan Chiang-chün), Ta Su, arrived in Ch’üan-chou and set plans in motion to prepare all vessels for war. Coxinga judged that the best opportunity to ambush Taiwan had passed. If the Dutch interpreted his preparations as a declaration of war, he would not be able to wage two simultaneous wars against both Manchus and the Dutch. Probably at his instigation, Hung Hsü (Gampea), the most senior merchant and old trading partner of the Dutch, sent a letter from Amoy to Taiwan on 25 May 1660, informing Governor Frederick Coyet that all rumours about Coxinga’s invasion plan were false and that ‘Coxinga had never entertained any idea of undertaking a venture against the Company’. Meanwhile, Coxinga was busy reorganizing his troops and raising their low morale. By May 1660, Coxinga had prepared his defence. He had ascertained that the Manchu force lacked large junks and hence planned to carry the Manchu cavalry on smaller vessels to storm the shores of Amoy. Therefore, on 11 May 1660, he proclaimed that all the families of soldiers and officials should move to Quemoy. He was determined to take advantage of his superior large-size junks to strike all the Manchu troops while they were at sea. The Manchu troops departed on the morning of 19 June 1660, in an endeavour to cross the narrowest strait between Amoy and Chang-chou Bay from the north and west. Coxinga’s strategy proved very effective. The Manchu cavalry could not approach the shore because the smaller vessels could not break through the cross-fire from Coxinga’s cannons on his large junks. Coxinga gained the day in this sea battle. It is said that more than 10,000 soldiers on both sides

290 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 170.
291 VOC 1235, Resolutie van den gouverneur en den raedt van Formosa rakende Coxinja’s machination tegen de Compagnie, Taiwan, 26 Apr. 1660, fo. 437.
292 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 170-2.
293 Ibidem, 172.
294 Ibid., 176-7.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

were killed during the battle, but the proportional loss of Coxinga’s men and the Manchu forces were about 3:7.295 After this defeat, the Manchu General led the remaining Manchu cavalry to Fu-chou and returned to Peking in November. The Fu-chien authorities decided to beach all the vessels of the Ch’ing coastal defence force, fearing they might otherwise be captured. Coxinga allowed the civilians to return to Amoy after 6 October 1660. 296 The biggest threat to Quemoy was the Ch’ao-chou naval force under the Ch’ing Regional Commander Su Li. But, although he received the order from the Governor-General of Fu-chien to send his ships in 1659, he failed to appear around Quemoy, offering the excuse that the Ping-nan Viceroy needed them in Nan-ao to guard his position against Coxinga’s force.297

On the Dutch side, the High Government in Batavia had decided to send a fleet of twelve ships and 600 soldiers to guard Taiwan on 6 July 1660.298 Yet the question of whether it was essential to the VOC to keep Taiwan as a base for the China trade at all costs had already emerged as an issue since the Dutch had obtained an official reply from the Emperor Shun-chih in 1658. The Batavia authorities reported to the Gentlemen Seventeen that:

‘We should consider carefully whether it is more important to occupy Macao than to trade peacefully in the northern areas[China and Japan]. Even if we are allowed to trade in China, the trade will face huge obstacles. In order to eliminate these troubles, we should occupy a place nearby like Macao which is occupied by the Portuguese... We believe that there is no place more suitable than Macao. The Company should reduce its operations

295 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 35.
296 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 182-4.
297 TWYH(ed), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 1271.
298 Generale Missive, 26 Jan. 1661, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 475; VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 6 July 1660, fo. 70.
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662

on Taijoun and in Formosa, or withdraw from there once the business which can be done there has dried up. The Company would then have to leave this place anyway. 299

In the resolution to dispatch a fleet to Taiwan, the Governor-General and Council also showed their preference to mount an attack on Macao rather than keep Taiwan as ordered by the Gentlemen Seventeen:

‘According to the letter of Our Lords[Gentlemen Seventeen], whatever force the Company has should inflict all possible damage on the Portuguese as soon as possible, who cause the greatest obstacles to the Company trade and therefore are our enemies, so that the island and the city of Macao inhabited by Portuguese will no longer give the Company cause to be suspect by the Manchus or Chinese through their servants, and obstruct the Company trade in the Empire. 300

In short, the High Government ordered the fleet to attack Macao from Taiwan after the north monsoon began to blow. 301 The commander of this fleet, Joan van der Laan, was experienced in the combat against the Portuguese army on the Coromandel Coast. His deputy was Jacob de Keijser, who had been the envoy in the tributary embassy to Peking in 1656-1657. 302 Van der Laan’s mission was to defeat the Portuguese and occupy or destroy Macao, De Keijser’s mission was to persuade the Ping-nan Viceroy that the Dutch would be worthy successors to the Portuguese, able satisfy all the services the Emperor Shun-chih might require. 303

300 VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, 6 July 1660, fos. 71-2.
301 VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, 7 July 1660, fo. 72.
302 Ibidem, fos. 72-3; Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 260 n 4. 16 Dec. 1659.
303 VOC 678, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, 7 July
CHAPTER ELEVEN

The ships departed on 17 July and arrived in Taiwan on 19 September 1660. The fleet should have been prepared to attack Macao in October, but Governor Frederick Coyet and the Council of Taiwan insisted that the ships linger around Taiwan and the Pescadores. To solve the discord which had arisen between Van der Laan and Coyet, in a somewhat naive move, two delegates were sent to Amoy with three ships for the express purpose of asking Coxinga if he was really planning to attack Taiwan. Coxinga who was currently enjoying the fruits of his victory over the Manchus categorically denied fostering any plan to attack Taiwan but, even after receiving this reply, Governor Coyet still did not give the fleet permission to sail to Macao. When Joan van der Laan abandoned the Macao expedition and departed from Taiwan to return to Batavia on 27 February 1661, six of the ten vessels in the support fleet had already left to undertake different duties.

This more or less coincided with the time Coxinga again planned to invade Taiwan. In December 1660, Coxinga had dispatched his best troops to the Ch’ao-chou area to purchase or levy rice. Since he had shifted his trading base to T’ai-chou on the Chê-chiang coast in the early summer of 1658 and had set about preparing the proposed expedition to the Nanking area, Coxinga’s force on Nan-ao Island had maintained a truce with Su Li’s local naval force stationed in Ch’ao-chou. During this truce, the Amoy merchants still frequently purchased rice from this area and probably Coxinga gave Su Li some leeway to share his foreign trade in 1659. A nasty surprise was in store. The Manchu officials had taken advantage of this truce

1660, fo. 73.
304 *Daghregister Batavia*, 1661, 62. 22 Mar. 1661.
to consolidate their ground troops around the bastions on the Jung River, which allowed them gradually to expand their control over Ch’ao-yang and Chieh-yang districts. Coxinga’s troops had not made any approach on Chieh-yang city since 1657. In the winter of 1660, the Manchu officials in Ch’ao-chou successfully managed to keep Coxinga’s troops away from their richly provisioned rice storehouses inside the city walls.\textsuperscript{308} Without a steady rice supply from the Ch’ao-chou area, Coxinga and his Court ran the risk of running out of food.

Although all his Defence Commands were reluctant to invade Taiwan, Coxinga insisted on having his project executed.\textsuperscript{309} He could not afford to suffer any further defeat in the Ch’ao-chou area where some of his Defence Commands had proved to be disloyal during the last battle there.\textsuperscript{310} Any failure would cut off his food supply and he would be deprived of the means to keep his officers and troops together. Once his force had been reduced, Su Li’s naval force could easily mount an attack on Amoy and Quemoy by sea. If Coxinga could no longer guarantee the security of his soldiers’ families and property, the whole army would eventually collapse. Although the attack on Taiwan would not guarantee adequate supplies, even if he were defeated by the Dutch Coxinga could at least keep his soldiers away from China and prevent them from going over to the Manchus.

Once resolved in his purpose, on 21 April Coxinga sailed from Quemoy with 300 junks carrying 30,000 soldiers and landed on the shores of Taiwan on 30 April 1661. A long siege of nine months followed. On 1 February of 1662, Governor Frederick Coyet surrendered to Coxinga, conceding the whole fort, including the cannon, muskets and gunpowder, provisions,
CHAPTER ELEVEN

commodities and cash, amounting to 1,200,000 guilders. This victory came at an enormous cost as a large number of Coxinga’s soldiers had died of starvation. As expected, Coxinga’s garrison on Nan-ao surrendered to the Manchus in April or May 1662. Coxinga himself might also have fallen victim to his harsh lifestyle. He gained Taiwan but died suddenly on 23 June 1662, without even leaving clue about how he intended to perpetuate his maritime enterprise. If passion is an obsession which constantly drives someone on relentlessly to achieve a goal, it would be right to say that Coxinga was heavily afflicted by the passion of a merchant prince.

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313 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 40.
314 Ibidem.