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FU-CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

CHAPTER TEN
FU-CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM
TRANSFORMED INTO A POLITICAL PROJECT
1650-1654

The Renewed Struggle for the Monopoly on the Export of Silk

In September 1650, Coxinga murdered his courtesy-cousin, Cheng Lien, and seized control of Amoy and its garrison troops, while the victim’s elder brother, Cheng Ts’ai, was still busy patrolling the coast of northern Fu-chien. Of the 963 piculs of raw silk exported to Japan that year, at least 50.4 per cent (485.5 piculs) was shipped from An-hai and Chang-chou, 7 per cent came from Nanking and Chou-shan and 16.7 per cent from Fu-chou.1 Obviously Prince Lu on Chou-shan and Cheng Ts’ai in Fu-chou were still managing to produce about 22.7 per cent of the Chinese raw silk export in 1650. Shortly

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1 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 423. 10 Dec. 1650, mentions that 963 piculs of raw silk from China, including An-hai and Fu-chou, were exported to Japan. The amounts of raw silk imported into Japan were respectively, 138.5 piculs from An-hai, 347 piculs from Chang-chou, 160.7 piculs from Fu-chou, 59.7 from Chou-shan, and 7.5 from Nanking, figures taken from the cargo manifests of the junks. Yoko Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637-1833: fukugen tōsen kamotsu aratamechō, kihan nimotsu kaiwatashichō[Overview of Commodities Imported into and Exported from Japan on Chinese Junks 1637-1833], (Tokyo, Sōbunsha: 1987), 42-8. The Dutch sources also give the total amount of raw silk imported to Japan in 1650, including that exported from Southeast Asia as 1081.2 piculs. Ibid, 336. If the total of 963 piculs refers only to An-hai and Fu-chou exports, the export from there could have made up 90 per cent of the Chinese raw silk exports to Japan that year. Because the numbers in the total amounts do not tally with the sum given on the particular list, what the above figures really mean still need to be investigated in more detail.
CHAPTER TEN

afterwards, in March or April 1651 followers of Prince Lu defeated Cheng Ts’ai’s fleet at sea off the Fu-chien-Chê-chiang border. Cheng Ts’ai’s power was seriously diminished as a consequence of this defeat but, despite his victory, Prince Lu did not manage to carve out a better niche in this trade for himself. Nature also put her oar in. Owing to a persistent drought the following summer, a famine which undermined the export network based on the support of the Nanking (Chiang-su) and Chê-chiang merchants held Chê-chiang province in its grip. The Manchu coastal defence troops gladly seized this opportunity it offered and, in the second half of September 1651, managed to defeat the main fleet stationed off Chou-shan and thereafter occupied the archipelago. In February 1652, the remaining ships of the defeated Chou-shan fleet sailed to Amoy where they submitted to Coxinga. Prince Lu had fled with his fleet leaving his court on Chou-shan in a state of total collapse. Some of Cheng Ts’ai’s fleet chose for the other side and surrendered to Manchus after the Battle of Chou-shan. One of his naval commanders, Chang Yün-fei, was assigned to the newly established coastal defence force. Before he went over to Cheng Ts’ai’s camp, Chang had been part of the Manchu garrison troops in Fu-chou. Consequently, after his

2 Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 201.
3 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 17. 18 June 1651.
4 Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 203.
5 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 20.
6 Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 203.
FU-CHICHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

return he was re-appointed to his old position and was once again able to take control of the Fu-chou raw silk export.

Considering that the negotiations between the Manchu authorities and Iquan had been interrupted since 1648, the relationship of the An-hai merchants with their northern neighbours in Fu-chou and Ch’üan-chou under the domination of the Manchus should also have been suspended since that year. Obviously they paid little heed to this and, according to the Dutch sources, before October 1654 the An-hai merchants carrying passes issued by Iquan were still allowed to trade in all the territories under Manchu control. ⁹ The junks which sailed to Japan were sometimes even listed under Iquan’s name, although his stepmother, Madam Huang, and his younger brother, Cheng Chih-pao, were the true owners. When Coxinga seized the fleet of Cheng Lien whom he had murdered, he had probably been incited to take this step by his step-grandmother and uncle. ¹⁰ In December 1650 or January 1651, Coxinga led the newly recruited, well-trained and experienced naval force southwards, claiming he was on a mission to rescue Ming troops who were still holding out in the siege of Kuang-chou by the Manchus. ¹¹

In fact, there was an even more urgent mission. Since Manchu troops had already penetrated into Kuang-tung and Ch’ao-chou had announced that it was prepared to surrender to the Manchus, the defence of the southern territory already conquered by Cheng Hung-k’uei and Coxinga had top priority. Thinking out his strategy carefully, Coxinga resorted to conservative measures and kept his troops in the border area between Fu-chien and Kuang-tung with the idea of preventing the Manchu troops from penetrating

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⁹ NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard Winninx, opperhoofd over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, Taiwan, fo.1.
¹⁰ Both of them contributed their trade revenues to Coxinga directly after the incident.
¹¹ Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 13.
CHAPTER TEN

into Fu-chien. His fleet lay anchored off the border area for five months. Rather than launch an outright assault, he opted to collect rice from the eastern part of Kuang-tung province as he had done in previous years rather than to speed to the rescue of Kuang-chou city.

Unperturbed by these military excursions, the An-hai merchants continued to run their trade as usual, which enabled the Dutch in Taiwan to ship about 600,000 guilders’ worth of Chinese gold to Coromandel at the end of 1650. Although this was a large amount, it was only about 52 per cent of what Batavia had ordered. Coxinga’s expedition to Kuang-tung did not throw up any obstacles to impede this trade. In other words, the trade between An-hai and the northern parts under Manchu rule was still permitted. Since the An-hai merchants had made the pretence of having submitted to the Manchu regime, which is why they had been granted this trade, the Manchu authorities even used them to transport their troops to Amoy during Coxinga’s absence. On 20 April 1651, the Regional Commander of the newly arrived Manchu Ch’üan-chou Garrison Troops, Ma Te-kung, was ordered to mount a raid on Amoy by Grand Co-ordinator, Chang Hsüeh-sheng. This was to be done under the guise of levying taxes from his ‘subjects’. Therefore, the Manchu Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and Ch’üan-chou Prefectures, Huang Shu, ordered the leader of the An-hai merchants, Iquan’s younger brother Cheng Chih-pao, to arrange the junks for transportation.

12 Ibidem.
13 VOC 1183, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aan [gouverneur generaal]Cornelis van der Lijn, Taiwan, 20 Dec. 1650, fos. 542-3. The estimate should also include the orders for silver from different factories, therefore it is only a approximation.
while he held Iquan hostage.\textsuperscript{15} Just one day before Regional Commander Ma arrived in Amoy, he was still fighting against Coxinga’s garrison in Liu-wu-tien. Finally forced to meet the Manchu troops face to face, the Amoy, Garrison Commander, Cheng Chih-wan, deserted his post and most of the garrison and the inhabitants fled away on ships.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, the Manchu troops landed without meeting any resistance and in the days following 20 April furiously plundered Amoy.\textsuperscript{17} Upon hearing this news, Cheng Hung-k’uei rushed his fleet from Quemoy to blockade Amoy three days later but Regional Commander Ma threatened to kill his mother whom he had taken hostage in An-hai and, holding this over his head, forced him to arrange the transportation of the Manchu troops back to Ch’üan-chou on 16 May 1651.\textsuperscript{18} Two days later, Coxinga rushed his fleet back to Amoy after receiving an urgent call for assistance from Cheng Hung-k’uei.\textsuperscript{19} The Dutch in Taiwan were also informed about this incident:

\begin{quote}
'We certainly knew that, having levied tax from almost everywhere around the coastal areas, the Manchus conquered Amoy city last April and seized loads of booty. But [soon afterwards] they were expelled [again] by Coxinga, the son of Great Mandarin Iquan. He is now residing there and employing as much violence as the Manchus did on his own subjects as he forces An-hai under his control.'\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Pa Hana, ‘Pa-ha-na téng t’i wei lieh-fu ch’ing-t’an ch’i-hsin sha-mên téng-ti shih-hsien shih-pên [Accusation Written by Pa Ha-na about How the Corrupt Grand Co-ordinator Caused the War and the [Subsequent] Loss of Amoy ], 6 Nov. 1653’, in CKTI(ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsü man-wên tang-an i-pien, I no 6, 28; Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 16-7.
\textsuperscript{16} Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{17} Pa, ‘Pa-ha-na téng t’i wei lieh-fu ch’ing-t’an ch’i-hsin sha-mên téng-ti shih-hsien shih-pên, 6 Nov. 1653’, 6.
\textsuperscript{18} Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu,10.
\textsuperscript{19} Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 16.
\textsuperscript{20} VOC 1183, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz,
CHAPTER TEN

Cheng Chih-wan was sentenced to death and beheaded by Coxinga on 28 May 1651. Coxinga raided several enemy camps around the shores of Ch’üan-chou Bay on 22 June, an action which finally gave him control of An-hai. Since the Manchu troops had plundered several tens of thousands piculs of rice from Amoy, Coxinga had to take this booty back by force. He landed in Hai-ch’êng in July but not long after withdrew to Amoy from where he launched another raid on T’ung-an in December 1651. He engaged the Manchu garrisons in both Ch’üan-chou and Chang-chou, and cleared an area into which the Manchu force was unable to make a break-through. While Coxinga was engaged in waging this war from February to August 1651, the An-hai merchants did not dare to do any business. The Dutch in Taiwan received no more than 200,000 guilders in Chinese gold during these seven months, far less than they had expected. In a breathing space between these two expeditions, Coxinga had returned to Amoy for a short while to reward his army. The An-hai merchants (who should have been moved to Amoy by Coxinga) brought another 72,000 guilders’ worth of Chinese gold from An-hai and Amoy to Taiwan on 8 November. For their return cargoes, they purchased 1,518.6 piculs of pepper, sold at 14¼ rials per picul during the same month, 56,264 guilders in all. As they purchased hardly any other goods, the remaining 15,736

Taiwan, 25 Oct. 1651, fo. 888r.

21 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 18.


23 VOC 1183, Missive van Nicolaes Verburgh naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 25 Oct. 1651, fo. 867r.

24 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III:1648-1655, 284. 8 Nov. 1651; VOC 1194, Missive van Nicolaes Verburgh naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 16 Dec. 1651, fo. 51r. The letter recorded that 272,000 guilders’ worth of gold would be sent to Coromandel. Since an earlier letter mentions that they collected fewer than 200,000 guilders between February and August 1651, they must have gathered more than 72,000 guilders between November and December.

25 VOC 1183, Missive van den commissaris Willem Verstegen naer Batavia aen den
guilder was probably paid by the Dutch in silver.

As mentioned earlier, Kuang-chou lay under the Manchu siege from 7 March to 24 November 1650. When it was finally taken by the Manchu troops, about 40,000 citizens were either expelled from the city or killed.26 The Portuguese in Macao delivered their letter of surrender to the Manchu commander, the Ching-nan Viceroy, Keng Ching-chung, on 20 December 1650, to which he replied in a formal letter on 31 January 1651.27 After enduring three years of serious troubles (1648-1650), the Kuang-tung-Macao business gradually began to bounce back. Perhaps this change of fortune also explains why the gold exports declined to only 46 per cent since the end of 1651, compared with the previous year when Kuang-chou was still under siege. Nevertheless, the same low level still persisted the following year 1652, when three Portuguese vessels brought sandalwood and pepper from gouverneur generael Carel Reniers [Letter from Commissioner Willem Verstegen to Governor-General Carel Reniers in Batavia], Taiwan, 24 Oct. 1651, fo. 842v; 151.4 piculs were sold between May and October; VOC 1183, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Carel Reniers, Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1651, fo. 514v. 1,670 piculs were sold at 14¼ rials per picul. Therefore 21,640 rials of pepper had been sold in all.


CHAPTER TEN

Makassar back to Macao, thereby offering China an alternative source of tropical goods over and above those which the Dutch in Taiwan had to sell.28

Although Coxinga was not able to rescue the resistance fighters in Kuang-chou his naval commander, Lin Ch’a, had been active on the Kuang-tung coast. The local gazette of Tien-pai District records that Lin Ch’a occupied Tien-pai, which is situated not far from Kao-chou, in late August 1650.29 Following hard on the heels of this development, a junk from Kao-chou arrived in Nagasaki on 3 September 1650.30 The leader of the resistance in Kuang-chou, Tu Yung-he, did not surrender to the Manchus when the city was overran but sailed to Hai-nan Island before he finally surrendered to the Manchu Viceroy, Keng, in October 1651. Even when he was holding out in Hai-nan, he still managed to play a role in Kao-chou trade. No fewer than three junks sailed from Kao-chou to Japan under his aegis.31 One of these belonged to Coxinga, evidence that he was still actively participating in the Kuang-tung trade even while he was fighting the Manchus in Fu-chien.32

As the Chê-chiang resistance gradually fell to pieces in 1651, the Manchu coastal defence troops steadily gained control of the coasts of Chê-chiang and northern Fu-chien, Kuang-tung also fell into their laps. Despite their steady encroachment, the Dutch records show that 937¾ piculs of raw silk were exported to Japan by Chinese junks in 1651, almost equal to

28 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 10 Mar. 1657, fo. 15v; VOC 1197, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch near Batavia aen den gouveruer generael Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 29 Dec 1652, Fo. 769v; Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 658. 31 Jan 1653.
29 Hsiang Tou-nan, Tien-pai hsien-chih[Local Gazette of Tien-pai District], in the Palace Museum Committee (ed.) (here after cited as PM), KKCP no. 183, 330. The precise rank and title of Lin Ch’a has yet not been identified.
30 Nagazumi, Tösen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 47.
31 Shao, His-nan chi-shih, 94.
32 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 17. 4 Aug 1651; . 19-20; 7 Aug. 1651.
FU-CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

the amount of the previous year.\(^{33}\) Although junks departed from different places along the China coast in the summer of 1651 and were sailing for different parties, by the time they returned from Japan at the beginning of 1652 Amoy was the only harbour left open along the whole coast of China. Besides the resurgence in the Japan trade, the commerce between An-hai and Manila was also resumed. After the Dutch Republic and Spain concluded the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the Dutch were deprived of their legal basis to mount patrols and stop Chinese junks sailing to Manila. This was a lucky break for two junks owned by Cheng Chih-wan (Chao-ming-yeh[C.], Samnia[D.], which means the Honourable ‘Marquess of Chao-ming’) which could bring wax, sugar, venison, deerskins and rice to An-hai from Manila in 1651.\(^{34}\) The following year, 1652, the An-hai merchants brought about 300 piculs of raw silk to Manila at 350 rials per picul.\(^{35}\) Manchu coastal defence fleet challenged the supremacy of the Amoy fleet after they apprehended the blooming commercial development in Amoy. In April 1652, Chang Yün-fei led a Manchu naval force from Ch’üan-chou for the specific purpose of attacking Coxinga’s Amoy fleet, but he was defeated two months later. \(^{36}\) This is one clue which indicates that Coxinga’s naval force was gradually gaining the advantage on the Fu-chou coast and had been able to impound one junk which had returned from Japan in December of 1652. \(^{37}\)

After the Manchu troops garrisoned in Hai-ch’êng city had surrendered on 11 March 1652, from his headquarters on the coast, Coxinga pushed the frontier 30 kilometres inland through Chang-tai district. On 20 April 1652, outside Chang-tai he won a victory over the Manchu troops from Fu-chou led

\(^{33}\) Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 542. 19 Dec. 1651.

\(^{34}\) VOC 1183, Missive van den commissaris Willem Verstegen naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 24 Oct. 1651, fo. 841°.

\(^{35}\) Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 658. 31 Jan. 1653.

\(^{36}\) Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 22, 25.

\(^{37}\) The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 101. 14 Feb. 1653.
CHAPTER TEN

by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Ch’ên Chin. Coxinga now laid a siege to Chang-chou which lay even farther inland and this siege lasted from May to the end of October, when Manchu reinforcement troops arrived. This time the Emperor had dispatched native-born Manchu tribal troops from Nanking and Chê-chiang. When the two armies clashed on the 1 November 1652, Coxinga lost the battle and had to retreat to Hai-ch’êng.

Although defeated, Coxinga’s troops had no worries about food supplies because the towns in the area between Chang-chou and Ch’ao-chou had all been under his control just before the siege of Chang-chou began. Coxinga’s personal authority had expanded by the expedient of unleashing several waves of raids on the area and he had succeeded in building up a centralized military establishment. Clearly the struggle fought out along the Chinese coast had contributed to his financial base in Amoy and the An-hai merchants had been steadily able to extend their grip on foreign trade, with the exception of the Portuguese in Macao.

Expansion of the ‘Western Ocean’ Trade in China and Japan

Even before Coxinga had gained control of Amoy, An-hai merchants were engaged in fitting out some of the ten Chinese junks which eventually arrived in Siam in 1650. They sailed just at the point at which the Manchus began to lay siege to Kuang-chou city. In Siam large amounts of tropical

38 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 27.
40 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 32.
41 VOC 1175, Missive door Volckererus Westerwolt aan de Ed. heer Anthonij van Brouckhorst president in Japan, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo. 547”; NFJ 284, Missive in dato 4en Julij anno 1650 aen ‘d Edle Hr Gouverneur Generael Cornelis vander Lijn ende d’E Hrn Raden van India ter rheede voor Siam door Pieter Sterthenius int schip de Vrede, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo. 3’. Although it records that the Chinese junks came from different areas, some of junks must have come from China itself.
merchandise including sapanwood, borijborij unction\textsuperscript{42}, thin, lead, saltpetre, Cambodia nuts, black lacquer (namrack), rice, cow hides, buffalo horns, rattan, deerskins in various sizes, sugar and pepper were purchased.\textsuperscript{43} The appearance on the scene of these junks threw a spanner in the works of the Dutch merchants who were consequently not able to purchase their planned quantities of rayskins (rochvellen), buffalo horns, Patani rattan, wax and tin. Their records reveal that large-scale purchases by the Chinese pushed prices up, even exhausting the supply of some commodities.\textsuperscript{44}

In 1646 the VOC had been granted the monopoly on the export of deerskins from Siam.\textsuperscript{45} Since the Chinese usually fetched their export deerskins not from Siam but from Quinam or Cambodia, there had never been any real reason to enforce the monopoly right but, just as these ten Chinese junks were on the point of departure, the local Dutch merchants urged the Siamese officials to do their duty and examine the Chinese junks to see whether they had infringed on Dutch privileges. The Siamese officials did indeed confiscate 551 pieces of cow hide, but soon after returned all these to the Chinese by the order of the Okya Sombatthiban (an official at the Royal Treasury).\textsuperscript{46} The merchant reported to Batavaia:

\textsuperscript{42} A concoction of coconut and sandelwood oil and crocus.
\textsuperscript{43} VOC 1175, Missiven uijt Judia aan de Ed. heer Carel Reniersen gouverneur generael ende d'Ed. heeren raden van India door Volckerijs Westerwolt, Siam, 13 Oct. 1650, fo. 530\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{44} NFJ 284, Missive in dato 4en Julij anno 1650 aen d'Edle Hr Gouverneur Generael Cornelis vander Lijn ende d'E Hrn Raden van India ter rheede voor Siam door opperhoofft Pieter Sterthenijs int schip de Vrede, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo.1\textsuperscript{r}. These commodities were rayskins, buffalo horns, and Patani rattan.
\textsuperscript{45} Smith, George Vinal, \textit{The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thiland}, (Northern Illinois, Northern Illinois University:1977), 60-1. According to Smith, the Company had been trying to compete with Chinese merchants in the China trade since 1635, but it had been being forced to retreat from the China market (via Taiwan) since 1643.
\textsuperscript{46} Smith, \textit{The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thiland}, 180.
CHAPTER TEN

'We believe that all this came about because of the gifts the Chinese had given him. Despite the privileges granted us by the Siamese king, if the Chinese can make a great profit from the cow hides and deerskins and give presents to the grandees, these privileges will not be worth the paper they are written on. Furthermore, although we were allowed to carry out an investigation at Camon Bantenauw, what would happen if they shipped illegal deerskins and cow hides from Bantienpia on Pegu vessels? Or after they [the ships] had been examined were to pick skins and hides up at Camon on some other day as happened this year? We were informed that one-quarter of the cargo holds of some junks had been reserved for stowing deerskins and cow hides downstream.'

Besides the ten Chinese junks which visited Ayutthaya that year, another two Chinese junks visited Ligor, where they purchased a huge amount of tin. After the Chinese had left, the VOC merchants realized that they could not possibly fulfill the order from Batavia because not enough tin was left. Information gathered in Ayutthaya led the Dutch to believe that six Chinese junks were planning to sail directly to Japan from Siam. The VOC records in Nagasaki of 1650 do indeed show that six junks carrying animal skins arrived in Japan, four from Quinam and two Cambodia. Apparently they were the six junks which visited Siam. They had put in at

47 VOC 1175, Missiven uit Judia aan de Ed. heer Carel Reniersen gouverneur generael ende d'Ed. heeren raden van India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 13 Oct. 1650, fo. 530r.
48 VOC 1175, Missiven door den gouverneur Joan Thijssen aen de Ed. heer gouverneur generael[Carel Reniersen] ende heeren raaden van India, Malacca, 26 Nov. 1650, Fo. 385r.
49 VOC 1175, Missive door Volckerius Westerwolt aan de Ed. heer Anthonij van Brouckhorst president in Japan, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo. 547r.
50 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushitsu yūhin sūryō ichiran, 46-7. The Quinam junks arrived on 13, 20 and 23 August and 2 September 1650. The Cambodia junks arrived on 17 August and 4 September 1650.
Quinam and Cambodia first before heading for Japan.

The competition between Chinese and Dutch merchants to offer tropical commodities on the Japanese market began in real earnest in 1649, when thirteen Chinese junks from Quinam and Cambodia arrived in Nagasaki carrying what were basically the same goods as those the VOC imported from Siam. The Dutch had also captured two Chinese junks in the Bay of Saint Jacques (Vũng Tàu) near the Mekong estuary in September of 1649. The Chief of the Deshima Factory, Dircq Snoecq, did his best to put his finger on the attitude adopted by the Japanese authorities to this action. He received the reply from the Nagasaki Governor stating that:

‘As long as it happened outside Japanese territory, the Dutch can do what they think best’

Snoecq therefore wrote a letter to Governor Overwater in Taiwan asking him to fit out some armed junks which could reinforce the patrols in Cambodian waters. Most of the Dutch ships sailing along the Siam-Japan or Malacca-Japan corridors anchored at Pulo Candor (Côn Sơn Island) to take on fresh supplies of food and water. From Pulo Candor they could easily mount patrols in the vicinity of St Jacques Bay. Since Quinam and Cambodia were still at war with the Dutch at this period and as the routes taken by the Chinese junks and the VOC vessels overlapped, the latter frequently captured Chinese junks in this bay.

51 NFJ 282, [Missive aan gouverneur generael Cornelis van der Lijn op Batavia] uit Japan van Dircq Snoecq int Comptoir Nagasackij, Japan, 29 Oct. 1649, no foliated. The head page of this document is missing, but its contents indicate it was a letter sent to Batavia.

52 VOC 1180, Missive uijt Taijouan aen seigneur Jan van Muijden opperhooft van 's Comps. negotie in Siam, Taiwan, 30 Sept. 1649, fo. 602’.

53 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 357. 8 Aug. 1649.

54 NFJ 282, [Missive aan gouverneur generael Cornelis van der Lijn op Batavia] uit Japan van Dircq Snoecq int Comptoir Nagasackij, Japan, 29 Oct. 1649, no foliated.
CHAPTER TEN

After the six large junks arrived in Nagasaki, the Chinese captains realized that there was a good chance that the Dutch might intercept them in Cambodian waters in the vicinity of the Mekong estuary on their return voyage. In an effort to take precautions before they left Japan in the winter of 1650, the captains of the four Quinam junks asked the Dutch Chief of Deshima, Pieter Sterhemius, to issue them with four passes and Prince’s flags (VOC flag). He refused their request but did give them a promise that no junks returning to Quinam would be attacked. The Chinese merchants also appealed to the Nagasaki Governor for protection. The VOC records reveal that the petitions of the Chinese captains might even have reached the Shogun’s court. The Governor of Taiwan, Nicolaes Verburgh, was informed by his colleagues in Japan that the Japanese had announced that ‘no more Cambodian junks bound for Japan should be captured or harassed by the Dutch.’

Six Chinese junks visited Siam in the spring of 1651. Once again, notwithstanding the Dutch monopoly, the Chinese entered into open competition with the Dutch merchants in the purchase of skins and hides. Again the VOC factory in Ayutthaya found itself in the awkward position of not being able to acquire the planned numbers of rayskins and buffalo horns. In spite of this bold-faced attempt to trespass on the monopoly, Governor-General Carel Reniers in Batavia procrastinated about giving orders to commence patrols as he was afraid of upsetting the susceptibilities

55 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 3. 22 Nov. 1650.
56 Ibidem, 8. 5 Feb. 1651.
57 VOC 1183, Missive van nicolaes Verburch near Batavia aen gouveur generael Cornelis van der lijn, Taiwan, 20 Dec. 1650, fo. 542’.  
58 VOC 1187, Missiven [aen haer Eds. te Batavia] [door Hendrick Creijers en Volckerus Westerwolt], Siam, 20 Oct. 1651, fo. 664’.  
59 NFJ 284, Copie Missive door den E Hendrick Craijers oppercoopman en opperhoofd des Comptoirs Siam aen de Hr Pieter Sterthenius president in Japan, Siam, 30 Juni 1651, fo. 51.
FU-CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM 1650-1654

of the Japanese authorities.60

Under the protection of the Japanese Bakufu and the Siamese grandees, the Chinese merchants succeeded in breaking through the commercial barriers built by the VOC. Four Chinese junks visited Siam in 1652 and again caused difficulties for the Dutch by not leaving them sufficient quantities of cow hides to purchase.61

In 1653 six Chinese junks visited Siam. Worried about the market in deerskins, Director Volckerus Westerwolt in Siam appealed directly to the King, insisting that the Siamese government should honour the Dutch monopoly on the export of deerskins. He visited the Oya Phrakhlang (Minister of Foreign Affairs) several times and informed him that he had seen with his own eyes that the Chinese junks did carry away deerskins. The Phrakhlang went to appeal to the King, taking with him the royal charter, and advised his royal master to allow the Dutch to examine those junks. When the six Chinese junks left the capital Ayutthaya and sailed downstream along the Chao-phraya River, the Dutch Director and the Phrakhlang immediately sought the King’s permission to carry out an examination. However, the King always managed to avoid tackling this subject, by announcing that he was not in the mood to deal with it.

On 20 May, the Dutch merchants went to the check point Canon Batenaow to see whether the Chinese junks had been detained by the Siamese officials. Obviously the Phrakhlang had not taken the Dutch petition

60 NFJ 285, Extract uit de Generale Missive van ’d Ed heeren bewinthebberen, ter vergaderingh van seventhiene binnen amsterdam aen haer Ed op Batavia geschreven, Amsterdam, 14 Oct. 1651, fo. 67. The extract was done by Andries Frisius.
61 NFJ 285, Copie missive door ’t opperhoof [Henrick Craijers, Volckerues Westerwolt, Jan van Rijck] uijt Siam per deselven Coningh van Poolen en Trouw nae Japan gesonden [Letter from Senior Merchants Henrick Craijers, Volcker Westerwolt [and] Jan van Rijck Sent to Japan on the Ships the Coningh van Poolen and theTrouw], Siam, 3 July 1652, fos. 75-6.
seriously because the junks were gone. Aware that this might happen, the Dutch merchant Jan van Rijk had sent a written call for help to the VOC establishment in Malacca. In response, the Governor of Malacca, Balthazar Bort, dispatched the ship *Gecroonde Liefde* on to Siam after she had completed her mission to Ligor. When the ship arrived at the mouth of the Chao-phraya River, the five junks were still at anchor off the coast. Seeing the Dutch ship drop anchor and lower a sloop, the five junks immediately raised anchor and set sail. The Dutch ship was apparently anticipating such a manoeuvre and also set sail. She caught up with three of them on the high seas about 7 to 8 Dutch miles from the shore on 14 July 1653. After having summoned all the *anachodas* on board, the Dutch sailors examined the junks and confiscated 26,366 pieces deerskins from two of them.62

When they arrived in Japan at the end of July 1653, the Chinese merchants lodged a complaint with the *Bakufu*.63 Because the Dutch confiscation had damaged the investments of some Japanese and Siamese courtiers, the Nagasaki Governor demanded the Dutch desist from these actions in the interests of all the parties concerned.64 On 10 November, the Merchant of Deshima Frederick Coyet was told that:

“They were not pleased with our account of why we had taken the deerskins from the junks which planned to sail hither from Siam. If we had the sole right to export deerskins from Siam, we should have stopped the purchase there and not harmed the Chinese who had already left that kingdom and were out at sea. We could attack the Quinamese, with whom we were again at war at will. But they ordered us explicitly not to harm in any way the Chinese, our friends, who trade only in these places and supply the

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62 VOC 1197, Missiven [aen haer Eds. te Batavia [door den raedt te Siam], Siam, 31 Oct. 1653, fo. 497r-498v; *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 108. 20 Aug 1653; 114. 28 Sept. 1653.
63 *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 105. 27 July 1653.
64 Ibidem, 112. 21 Sept. 1653.
Shogun and his subjects with the silk and calambac they require on their voyages here, in compliance with what Ambassador [Andries] Frisius had promised when he was in Edo, if we want to continue to be welcome in this Empire."65

The Nagasaki officials were seriously concerned about this affair. The Chinese merchants must have also begged the services of the Japanese authorities in an effort to force the Dutch to compensate their losses. Since no records about these matters have been preserved, it is possible that the Bakufu turned their request down and chose to maintain neutral.

It seems Coxinga was kept in the dark by his merchants about this dispute. Although the suppression of a Chinese peasant revolt had ended in a bloody massacre in Taiwan in 1652,66 he offered shelter to some Dutch sailors who had survived a shipwreck on the Chinese coast and arranged transportation for these survivors to return to either Taiwan or Batavia in that same year.67 Towards the end of October 1653, Coxinga and his uncle (Cheng Hung-k’uei or Cheng Chih-pao) wrote separate letters to the Governor of Taiwan Cornelis Cesar:

‘Containing nothing but compliments and declarations that they

65 *The Deshima dagregisters*, XII 1650-1660, 120. 10 Nov. 1653; VOC 1197, Letter from Japan to Taiwan, Japan, 12 Nov. 1653, fo. 820".


intended to live in friendship with Company, and that they would like to continue their current trade with Taiwan. Therefore they had asked the merchants to lend a helping hand as far as this was in their power. Coxinga had also fitted out ten big junks for trade with Taiwan.\(^68\)

Because he had heard a rumour that a Dutch ship had been wrecked near Nan-ao, Governor Cornelis Cesar also wrote a letter to Hung Hsü (alias Gampea [D.]) asking for his help. In his letter, he mentions Coxinga’s intention expressed in a previous letter:

‘We are keenly conscious of the contents [of Coxinga’s letter] and are most appreciative of the greetings transmitted by both Your Honour and Coxinga. We shall also treat all Chinese merchants, especially those recommended by Your Highness [Coxinga], with all due courtesy. Your Highness should have complete trust in our promises and our reputation.’\(^69\)

In other words, although the original letter Coxinga wrote to the Governor of Taiwan has not been preserved, it seems that it contained not only greetings but also listed the official merchants in Coxinga’s service. The VOC administration would therefore have handled them with kid gloves. In the following north monsoon season, Coxinga sent a similar letter to Batavia and requested Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker conclude an alliance with him.\(^70\) These letters are express signs that Coxinga had been trying to build up a new trading system ever since Iquan had lost his leadership of the

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\(^{68}\) VOC 1197, Missive van Cornelis Caesar near Batavia aen Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 24 Oct 1653, fo. 803’.
\(^{69}\) VOC 1207, Brieff aen den mandorijn gampea door den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar, 16 Nov. 1653, fo. 546’.
An-hai merchants.

**The Politization of Fu-chien Exceptionalism**

On 10 June 1653, Manchu troops who had now been buttressed with reinforcements laid siege to Hai-ch’êng in a desperate effort to expel Coxinga’s force from the coast. The Manchu troops were led by an ethnic Manchu Commander (*Gusa* or *Banner*). Their initial tactic was to bombard the palisades surrounding all the camps with cannons for a period of one and a half days before launching a cavalry charge. Coxinga had predicted their tactics and had buried landmines to forestall them. His strategic thinking made it possible to repel the Manchu assault successfully and he was said to have eliminated 30,000 Manchu soldiers in this battle; another 10,000 soldiers fled away. 71 After this momentous battle, the Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien (*Chê-min Tsung-tu*), 72 Liu Ch’ing-tai, decided to re-open negotiations between the Manchu Emperor and Coxinga.

According to the daily records of the Manchu Court, on 11 October 1652 Emperor Shun-chih ordered Iquan who was being kept hostage in Peking to write a letter to his son and act as mediator in the negotiations. The Emperor set four conditions: first, if Coxinga surrendered to the Manchu coastal defence troops, he could continue to reside where he was now living; second, he would not, like his father, be summoned to Peking; third, he would remain in charge of levying the taxes from all trading-junks; fourth, he should guarantee to pacify all the pirates in Fu-chien and Kuang-tung coastal waters. 73 Not until September 1653, almost one year later, did his father’s

71 VOC 1202, Missive van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28, Feb 1654, fo. 313’.
72 Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles*, 534. The same title was translated as Supreme Commander in the Ming dynasty, but as Governor-General in the Ch’ing dynasty as its functions had changed slightly.
73 TWYH(ed.), *Ch’ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi*, 75.
CHAPTER TEN

Servant reach Coxinga with this letter. 74 Although the original letter from Iquan has not been preserved, there is a record which says that Iquan mentioned the Manchu Court would be willing to concede him a prefecture (Fu, lower than province but higher than district) as a place of residence. 75

Coxinga sent a reply to his father and began to bargain with the Manchus in the same letter. He took the offensive and began with the criticism that Iquan’s words did not tally with those of the Emperor in the letter which had been delivered under separate cover by the Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien, Liu Ch’ing-t’ai. Perplexed by the discrepancy, he wanted to make sure which place, how large a region and how much authority he would be granted by the Manchus. He emphasized that ‘the coastal areas had belonged to us originally’ and implied that they should not be included in the bargain but were his possession unconditionally. He argued that, on the basis of the number of his current troops, he should have at least Fu-chou prefecture from which he would enjoy a legal tax revenue as his place of residence. 76 These negotiations were not confidential, because even the Dutch in Taiwan soon heard about them from Chinese merchants who visited there frequently.

‘Lately a rumour has begun to circulate saying that Coxinga, the son of Mandarin Iquan, has entered into negotiations to conclude peace with the Manchus. And it is said that the great Manchus will offer him authority over Fu-chou and Ch’üan-chou prefectures, including all subjugated towns and villages.’ 77

During the period of negotiations, Coxinga and the Manchu did

74 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 42-4.
75 Ibidem.
76 Ibid., 43.
77 VOC 1197, Missive van Cornelis Caesar near Batavia aen Joan maetsijcker, Taiwan, 24 Oct 1653, fo. 803'.
manage to conclude a truce. Coxinga took full advantage of this and dispatched his officials to collect taxes from all the subjugated towns and villages in the coastal areas of Fu-chien. In October he collected 200,000 taels of silver from the towns under Ch’üan-chou and in November 50,000 piculs of rice from the hinterland districts of Chang-chou. In December he levied another 300,000 taels of silver from the hinterland of Ch’üan-chou.

In the meantime, the Ming resistance fighters in Kuang-hsi under General Li Ting-kuo pushed their forces eastwards along the coast making for Chao-ch’ing in Kuang-tung. If Chao-ch’ing was taken, the fall of Kuang-chou would be inevitable, so Li Ting-kuo urged Coxinga to dispatch troops to strengthen his action. Honouring the truce, Coxinga set this request aside.

After the Shun-chih Emperor had read Coxinga’s reply to his father Iquan, he declared that he would not concede any jurisdiction to Coxinga. However, he was willing to assign four coastal prefectures, namely: Ch’üan-chou, Chang-chou, Ch’ao-chou and Hui-chou, as an area in which Coxinga’s troops could reside and from which they would then enjoy the tax revenues. In choosing this arrangement, the Ch’ing Court was following in the footsteps of the Ming Court in the agreement the latter had reached with Iquan in the years 1629-1636. That agreement had acknowledged Iquan’s substantial influence and had permitted his troops to be absorbed into the coastal defence establishment. It had also sagaciously allowed Iquan a certain degree of autonomy to engage in foreign trade. The Grand Co-ordinators had been pretty close-lipped about this latter arrangement as it was they who had functioned as mediators with Iquan at the provincial level with the consent of the Emperor.

The arrangement which Coxinga had visualized was completely

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78 What the military rank of Li Ting-kuo was has still not been sorted out by the author.
CHAPTER TEN

different from that proposed by the Manchu Emperor and his court. He asked that Fu-chou be his city of residence and that he be allowed full jurisdiction over the land. His demand shows that he was sticking to the conditions agreed between the Emperor Lung-wu and Iquan after 1646. Under the terms of that agreement, Iquan was to reside in Fu-chou and have jurisdiction over Fu-chien province, including the rights to levy taxes and maintain an army and a civil administration. Coxinga had insisted that this legitimate power had been granted by the Ming Lung-wu Emperor and therefore he assumed that the Manchu Court would accept this 1646 arrangement as a basis for the negotiations. On the level of provincial political affairs, there were no substantial difference between the two proposed arrangements since they were both based on using the foreign trade revenues to maintain the coastal defence troops, but they did diverge widely when it came to foreign trade. Under the terms of the 1646, arrangement Iquan had both legalized the post-1644 Sino-Japan trade and he developed a new tributary system centred on Fu-chou in the name of the Ming Lung-wu Emperor, as an instrument to resist the pressure of the growing competition presented by the VOC in the East and South China Seas. The Manchu Court was apparently well informed about the legalization of the Sino-Japanese trade in the post-1645 period, because in a letter written to the Shun-chih Emperor by the Provincial Administration Commissioner of Fu-chien (Pu-chêng Shih[C.]), Tung Kuo-ch’i, in April 1653, the suggestion was made that the Ch’ing Emperor should open up the Sino-Japanese trade to the inhabitants of Fu-chou, Ch’uan-chou and Chang-chou under the terms of this previous arrangement with the Ming court orchestrated by Lung-wu and Iquan.79 They were certainly not ignorant of the fact that Iquan had initiated the tributary trade, since envoys from Liu-ch’iu (Ryûkyû[J.]) had visited Peking earlier on a

79 TWYH(ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 109. ‘After the new dynasty was installed, it was forbidden to go aboard or to trade from the coastal areas… my suggestion is to lift this ban and allow all merchants from Fu-chou to Chang-chou to trade abroad with legal passes…’
After he had gained control of Amoy, Coxinga tried to revive this tributary trade system and establish formal relationships with the rulers around East and South China Seas. Although the Chinese sources do not mention this attempt of his, the Dutch Factory in Malacca was informed about official communications which had taken place between Coxinga and various other countries in the region. On 24 February 1654, a Chinese wangkang arrived in Malacca which brought news that:

Ambassadors from Siam and Cambodia had arrived in Amoy. The former carried rice as present and the other brought two elephants as well as other valuable curiosities to do honour to Coxinga.

As mentioned earlier, the letter Coxinga addressed to the Governor of Taiwan, Cornelis Ceasar, might offer a clue that his tributary trade had reached this stage in the summer of 1653. Certainly, towards the end of the spring of 1654 Coxinga dispatched nineteen junks southwards. These included eight junks bound for Batavia, seven junks for Siam, two junks for Cambodia, one junk for Ligore and one junk for Patani, all of them richly laden. The number of the junks tallies with the extant Dutch records. Therefore this information must be reliable. Furthermore, Coxinga also

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80 Ts’ai To (comp.), Li-tai pao-an [Tributary Documents Preserved in Liuch’iu], I, 189.
81 VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1654, fo.313v.
82 Ibidem.
83 Eight junks did indeed arrive in Batavia, see: VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fo. 2r; also eight junks visited Batavia, see: Generale Missive, 7 Nov. 1654, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 364; VOC 1202, Missiven van Jacob Nolpe aen de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, Jambi, 17 Apr. 1654, fo. 378v. It reported two Chinese junks visited Palembang, but it
CHAPTER TEN

wrote in his letter to Iquan in which he said that: ’The foreign soldiers from Japan and Cambodia might arrive in [Amoy] at any moment.’\footnote{Yang, \textit{Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu}, 43.} This could be seen as an expression of his claim that he was operating a substantial crown trade as Iquan had done in the tributary system in Lung-wu’s name in the post-1647 period. If this surmise is correct, it is an unequivocal indication that Coxinga must have to require the highest authority in Fu-chien province and exercised command over the coastal defence troops of Chê-chiang, Fu-chien and Kuang-tung as well as over the crown trade. Coxinga’s aim was to be recognized as ruler of a subordinate kingdom like Korea. In February of 1654, the Manchu delegates dispatched by the Emperor from Peking arrived in Fu-chien province, Coxinga told the delegates personally and publicly that:

’His troop numbers were so large that he required the area of several provinces to maintain them. Any political arrangement between him and the Imperial Court should follow the same pattern as that between the Manchus and Korea.’\footnote{Ibidem, 48.}

This announcement made no bones about the fact that Coxinga wished to preserve all the institutional arrangements which Iquan had been granted by the Ming Emperors in the period 1643-1647. The only thing which was not explicitly mentioned was that the crown trade (in the form of tributary missions) could only exist if Coxinga ruled an independent kingdom.

When the delegates arrived in Fu-chien, Coxinga’s fleet had already sailed north to Chê-chiang coast.\footnote{Ibid., 48.} The true mission of this fleet was to penetrate the Chê-chiang coast and suppress the vessels of the Manchu coastal defence troops stationed there and escort the trading-junks which exported silks to Japan. The Chief of Deshima, Gabriel Happart, noted a

\footnote{Yang, \textit{Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu}, 43.}
group of junks carrying silks and news from An-hai which arrived in Nagasaki during the same period:

‘Loads of commodities, including quite a large amount of silks and silk goods, were brought in by some junks from An-hai and other places a few days ago. They brought the rumour that Coxinga was about to make his peace with the Manchus. He will be appointed Mandarin of several harbours and part of Kuang-tung province.’

This piece of news gathering is also proof that most merchants serving under Coxinga had been informed about the conditions agreed in the peace negotiations. In the records of one of his contemporaries, Ch’ien Su-t’u, Coxinga’s intention is set out unequivocally:

‘In the year 1654...Coxinga asked that Fu-chien province to be ceded to him, a request which was rejected by the Manchu Emperor.’

The delegates transmitted Coxinga’s conditions to the Shun-chih Emperor who repudiated them and proceeded to initiate negotiations in a slightly revised version of the original one. In September 1654 another group of delegates, including Coxinga’s youngest brother who was living with Iquan in Peking, arrived. Since the Manchu delegates had no intention of entering into any bargains, the gap between both sides grew so wide as to be irreconcilable. Coxinga was confident about maintaining his independent financial source from foreign trade and persisted in his demand that the Manchu Emperor would eventually have to conclude a peace treaty with him because the Manchu Grand Co-ordinators would not be able to find any other source of wages more stable than those which he had at his disposal.

87 NFJ 286, Missive van Gabriel Happort naar Taijouan aen de Ed. Heer gouverneur Cornelis Caesar, Japan, 12 May 1654, fo. 57. The news about the negotiations had been spread in Japan; The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 150. 25 Apr. 1654. The above news should have arrived in Japan around April 1654.
88 Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 207.
CHAPTER TEN

In 1567 the Ming Court had allowed its subjects in Fu-chien to pursue foreign trade, as it recognized the need to create a stable revenue with which to support the coastal defence troops and their vessels. This privileged trading system created Fu-chien exceptionalism, setting it apart from all the other coastal provinces. As a mercenary, after 1636, Iquan had manipulated politics and personal relationships to create a niche through which his private troops could be granted official status as coastal defence troops and continue to be supported by foreign trade. The original status of economic exceptionalism now began to take the shape a political shell. After 1646, by dint of developing the crown trade model under the tributary system in Lung-wu’s name, Iquan gave Fu-chien exceptionalism its political form. As his successor, his son Coxinga wanted to preserve this exceptional political status of Fu-chien province with at least the toleration, if not the approval, of the Manchu Court. He never actually planned to contest the central power of the Manchu Court over China although he publicly claimed this to be his ultimate goal. In reality, all he wanted was to hold on to his own power in Fu-chien and be acknowledged by the Manchu Court. In short, his ultimate goal was to see Fu-chien exceptionalism be accepted in its political form.