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Chapter Two: Japanese ‘Heritage’ in Postcolonial Taiwan

When I first entered the Zhanghua wudedian 彰化武德殿 (butokuden in Japanese) in Zhanghua 彰化 City in 2007, I noticed an interesting hybrid of historical layers and unconscious use of the past. This is common to many Japanese ‘heritage’ sites that have emerged over the last two decades.

Inside this newly renovated Japanese building was a modern restaurant. You could order coffee and cake, or some light food. Its remodelled interior was like many other cafes in urban Taipei. The restaurant was run by a private company which had signed a contract with the Zhanghua 彰化 municipal government for commercial use of this historical site—another example of the famous BOT34 model promoted by

Fig. 2.0.1 Zhanghua Wudedian in July 2007. A waxen statue of a Japanese samurai (knight, warrior) temporarily stood at the entrance and later was moved to a side of the building. Photo was taken by the author.

34. BOT: Build-Operate-Transfer is a form of project financing, wherein a private entity receives a concession from the private or public sector to finance, design, construct, and operate a facility stated in the concession contract. This enables the project proponent to recover its investment, operating and maintenance expenses in the project. In Taiwan, the Act for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects (Act for PPIP) was promulgated in 2000, since then BOT has become a model for cutting down the government expenditure, accelerating development and improving public service. See the official website of PPIP: http://ppp2.pcc.gov.tw/pcc_2010/en/Introduction.aspx (accessed 23 August 2011)
the state government. Amid the urban, casual atmosphere of this café, an altar with tablets inscribed with names stood in the middle of the building. Visitors found themselves in front of this altar immediately after entering the space.

The names on the tablets are those of the national heroes and martyrs of the Republic of China (ROC). In the postwar period, many Japanese colonial sites were deliberately demolished or used for different functions by the KMT (Kuomintang 国民党; Chinese Nationalist Party) government, particularly religious and political sites. The Zhanghua butokuden represented Japanese nationalism and Shinto beliefs.

announced in 1937 that all the schools should set altars in the dōjō. In colonial Taiwan, alters were placed in most butokuden, including the Zhanghua butokuden.

After the Japanese period, most colonial remains were removed or changed by the KMT (Kuomintang 国民党) in an effort to eliminate any reminders of Japanese rule. The butokuden buildings were kept as martial arts training centres for the police of the KMT government. Some buildings were turned into Zhongshan Public Halls (Zhongshan tang 中山堂) or centres of living supplies for military personnel, public servants and teachers (jun gong jiao fuli zhongxin 军工教育中心) (Chen Xin-an 1997, 1-2). The Zhanghua martial arts centre was later transformed into a martyrs’ shrine (Zhonglieci 忠烈祠) for the worship of national heroes.

According to the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, a ‘historic building’ (lishi jianzhu 历史建筑) is a heritage level legally lower than guji 古迹 (Historic Monument).

Subsidies from the Local Museums project (地方文化馆计划).

The restaurant was in fact not in operation after my visit. This was due to problems surrounding an architectural license. My visit in 2007 was during a trial promotion of the restaurant.
as heritage sites and received subsidies from the state government for renovation. These subsidies were closely related to the state’s Integrated Community-Making Programme. Under this scheme, the status of Japanese colonial sites was dramatically changed to places of local pride and local memory; many sites were expected to become catalysts for the invention of community identity and economic revival. In the process of architectural renovation and management after renovations, however, the ambiguity of representing ‘heritage’, or a ‘site of memory’, is inevitably revealed. This ambiguity refers to the drag between ‘foreign’ and ‘local’ in representing ‘Japaneseness’ at a site of local identity. It also refers to the impact of structural colonialism that continues in postcolonial society, and to representations of Japaneseness in relation to the image of Japan within the global consumerist framework. Moreover, this ambiguity emerges from an environment where locality and community has been enthusiastically promoted by the central government. Projects in making sites of memory on the local level were greatly supported by subsidies from the central government. Nevertheless, this top-down prospect of locality confronts the actor network of local society. Constructing a collective past of Taiwan has always been a dynamic process. Local actors are not simply passive receivers. Each has a separate framework of memory, and strategically reacts to the authorised prospects. Within this actor network, the Japanese past is re-edited and sometimes contested by different actors for their various prospects of locality. As a result, some of these sites have been transformed to sites of memory, while others eventually became deserted ‘mosquito halls’, losing their connection precisely to the local communities which are supposed to be their owners under the scheme of community-making.

The Zhanghua butokuden is one example among many of Japanese heritage sites which were ‘rehabilitated’ in the ‘era of localism’. This chapter aims to provide a framework for subsequent analyses of such case studies. We begin with a discussion of the paradoxical phrase ‘colonial heritage’, revealing the inevitable ambiguity of its interpretation. Considering the distinctive complexity and multivalence of Taiwanese experience and memory of Japanese colonialism, particularly since the 1990s, the ambiguity of Taiwanese conceptualisation of Japanese colonial sites is all the more profound. During the ‘era of localism’ that accompanied Taiwan’s democratization and the decline in KMT dominance, Japanese colonial sites were changed from being official places of hatred to ‘sites of memory’ in the government narratives and heritage policies. Nevertheless, local perception of colonial sites was not necessarily in accordance with official narratives. In the 2000s, numerous Japanese sites were designated as heritage. At the same time, disagreement still existed, for example in the case of the renaming of Taoyuan Martyrs’ Shrine to Taoyuan Shinto Shrine. These Japanese sites have been incorporated into diversified conceptualizations and appropriations by postcolonial actors. These local actors had been active within the framework of the ‘predominant thoughts’ (Halbwachs 1992). They responded to the government narratives or reinterpreted and appropriated the narratives strategically. In doing so these local actors sometimes challenged decisions made by the bureaucratic system, resulting in changes; sometimes, their acts reinforced authorised discourses. Discussions on the representation of Japanese sites in Taiwan allow a close look into this dynamic. In the case of the Zhanghua butokuden, despite the architecture being in the style of the Japanese imperialist period and rich in Shinto associations, it was registered as a cultural heritage site and renovated using government subsidies in expectation of the reward of tourist revenue and local identity. At the same time, the site remains ‘foreign’ to the postcolonial community for various reasons. Local communities have attached their own distinct memories to this site, while the intention of the local government was to use it for local tourism. The memory discourses propagated by the central authorities have not always fit the memories of local communities, and especially the different reinterpre-

40. ‘Mosquito hall’ (wenzhi guan 枚子馆) is a phrase used to satirise the states of these buildings; constructed and renovated by the government with a large budget, they are now left unattended as breeding grounds for mosquitoes.

41. Era of localism, defang shidai地方時代, refers to the 1990s and 2000s when Taiwan gained enormous attention in many fields. A “new era of localism” (xin defang shidai 新地方時代) was anticipated by Chen, Qi-nan in 1997. The phrase was taken from the Japanese counterpart (Lu 2002, 24).
Representing Japanese Colonial ‘Heritage’ in Taiwan

The dynamics represented by heritage activities at Qingxiu Yuan Temple are an example of this: the grassroots activist organization who managed the temple from 2003 to 2010, tried to reconnect the temple to the past of the Japanese immigrants and the earlier indigenous community. The reinterpretation of the organization on the one hand raised diverse opinions among the postcolonial indigenous communities; on the other hand, they were challenged by intentions of the local government in turning the site into a tourist attraction through bringing in a popular image of Japan.

The second section of this chapter examines the historical context of this ‘era of localism’. The state community-building initiatives of this time lasted for one and a half decades (1994-2008), and provided a supportive environment for heritage-making. Within this environment, the recollection of local memories prospered under government support and grassroots endeavours. The traces of Japanese colonialism, once suppressed by the postwar KMT regime, evoked diversified memories and provided fields for claiming one’s own past. In using the colonial sites of foreign cultural context to assert self-identity and uniqueness, reinterpretation is crucial. However, the top-down community-making projects at heritage sites often lacked processes of reinterpretation. This is largely due to the rigidity of the bureaucratic system. The government mechanism deals more easily with building renovation with a fixed budget and visible results, than with management and community-building plans which require creativity and flexibility with long-term investment. In other words, the latter is difficult to fit into the rigid budget and bureaucratic procedure which was originally designed mainly for preventing corruption. Moreover, reinterpretation was often delayed or restricted by development-oriented incentives underlying the community-making projects. Even if reinterpretation had been initiated in the process of heritage making, the representation of Japaneseness as local heritage would inevitably mean a continuous process of re-fitting Japaneseness to Taiwanese senseness. This second section of this chapter examines the results of incorporating Japaneseness into Taiwanese in the period from the 1990s to 2008. The final section investigates the quantitative changes made to Japanese colonial sites in the period, in order to reveal the transition from ‘Japanese colonial sites’ to ‘cultural heritage of Taiwan’.

2.1 The Colonial ‘Heritage’?

2.1.1 Whose ‘heritage’?

The meaning of ‘heritage’ cannot be separated from the concept of ‘people’. Following Peter Howard’s definition, the Western connotation of heritage is closely associated with the concepts of ‘inheritance’, ‘volition’, ‘identification’ and ‘ownership’ within the major European languages: “the usual French word for heritage is patrimoine and the Spanish patrimonio comes from a similar root, stressing the concept of familial (and patrilineal) descent, but also the national patrimony, the holdings of the group.” (Howard 2003, 7-8) Howard also notes that the word ‘heritage’, an Anglo-Saxon concept, relates to the concept of ‘inheritance’. This relationship can be seen in French today—the French word héritage exclusively refers to ‘legacy’ (Howard 2003, 6). This close relationship between heritage and one’s legacy can be seen from the UNESCO’s conceptualisation of heritage: “Heritage is our legacy from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass on to future generations. Our cultural and natural heritage are both irreplaceable sources of life and inspiration.”

Since the semantics of ‘heritage’ originates from the social context of familial and patrilinéal relationships, ‘heritage’ exists only when it is claimed to be owned by people. The concept of heritage always revolves around the question of whose heritage it is.

In Taiwan, the phrase ‘cultural heritage’ was translated as wenhua zichan (文化資產; lit. ‘cultural assets’) and formalized as such in the first Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (Wenhua zichzn baocun fa 文化資產保存法) in 1982. Prior to the use of wenhua zichan, the terms guji古蹟 (‘historic monu-

ment’) and 
古物 (‘antique’)\(^{43}\) were used in daily conversation, academic discussions and popular media. The phrases 
guiji \(\) and 
guwu \(\) reflect the tradition of Chinese historical writing \(\text{(Zhao Jun-xiang 2003)}\). Features of ‘materiality’ and ‘antiquity’ are essential to both phrases. The conceptual substance of 
wenhua zichan \(\) is connected to these Chinese terms, and embodies the inevitable difficulties of Taiwan’s place-making movements through heritage construction in recent years. As Wang Horng-luen asserts, “…the Chinese term ‘wenhua zichan’… is literally translated into ‘cultural assets’. Whether a mistranslation or an intentional coinage, this formalized term keenly reflects what ROC cultural officials have in mind when they speak of culture: culture, after all, is regarded as a kind of ‘asset’ endowed with values and productivity.” \(\text{(2004, 792)}\) In comparison to strong personal linkage and a sense of rootedness suggested by the Western term ‘heritage’, the translation 
wenhua zichan \(\) is rather connected to material quality and economic value. This connection was particularly salient when heritage projects became strategies of community-making in the 1990s and 2000s, as discussed in section 2.2 of this thesis. The relatively strong pragmatic concern of ‘cultural assets’, as opposed to the emotional connectedness of ‘cultural heritage’, has been behind Taiwan’s official conceptualisation of heritage.

The systematic conceptualisation and practice of historic preservation was first brought to Taiwan under Japanese rule. The Preservation Act of Historic Sites, Resort and Natural Heritage (史跡名勝天然紀念物保存法) was declared by the Japanese government to cover Taiwan from 1922, as well as thirty-five other Japanese domestic legislations.\(^{44}\) However, the legislative context of Taiwan’s current heritage act relates more to the ROC legislations in China. In 1930, the Preservation Act of Antiques (Guwu Baocunfa 古物保存法) was promulgated by the ROC government (led by the KMT) in China. After the Second World War, Japan ceded Taiwan to the ROC government, and the Chinese Preservation Act of Antiques replaced the Japanese Preservation Act of Historic Sites, Resort and Natural Heritage as official legislation on Taiwan’s historic preservation. However, not until the Cultural Revolution in China did the ROC government begin to consider issues concerning historic preservation. In late 1960s, the Ministry of the Interior (內政部) initiated the process of revising the Preservation Act of Antiques in order to show the cultural superiority of the ROC over the communist PRC (People’s Republic of China) \(\text{(Lin Hui-cheng 2011, 73)}\). This revision process was ended with the legislation of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act in 1982.

The criterion of ‘antiquity’ underneath the legislation and designation in the 1980s embodied the Chinese nationalist narrative of KMT government. By stressing the significance of Chinese civilisation and its historical traces, sites of Taiwanese, Japanese and aboriginal cultures were excluded, and the status of KMT in leading a authentic cultural ‘China’ was legitimated.\(^{45}\) Jeremy E. Taylor has pointed out that the “question of time and vintage was a criterion of 
guiji codification as set out in the 1980s legislation” \(\text{(2005, 162)}\). The feature of ‘antiquity’ was part of the entire discourse of “ROC nation-building on Taiwan and its claims to the inheritance of ‘five thousand years’ of Chinese civilisation” \(\text{(Taylor 2005, 163)}\).

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43. For example the Regulations for the Preservation of Relics, Scenic Spots, and Artefacts \(\text{（民署古物風景古物保存條例）}\), formulated in 1928 by the ROC (Republic of China) government in Nanjing. The Preservation Law of Ancient Artefacts \(\text{（古物保存法）}\) was promulgated in 1930, and became the only legislation for historical preservation until 1982 and the proclamation of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act \(\text{（文資保存法）}\).

44. On December 29 in 1922, the Taiwan Governor-General Office promulgated the “Order of Implementing Administrative Laws in Taiwan” \(\text{（行政諸法臺灣施行令）}\). Thirty-six domestic laws in Japan were officially implemented in Taiwan—the Preservation Act of Historic Sites, Resort and Natural Heritage is among the thirty-six \(\text{(Lin Hui-cheng 2011, 53)}\).

45. In 1966 Mao Zedong started the decade-long Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. In order to show that the KMT reign in Taiwan preserved the authentic Chinese culture compared to Communist destruction in the Cultural Revolution, the KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek initiated the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in Taiwan in 1966. This movement shows the KMT’s enthusiasm to be the orthodox representative of China despite the KMT having lost its reign over China to the Communist Party at the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was intended by the KMT to legitimate the Chinese orthodox status of the KMT in the Cold War world structure, and to consolidate the KMT rule in Taiwan by strengthening the Chinese nationalist narrative through cultural policies.
Yan Liang-yi (2009) also noted that the first guji (historic monument) designated before 1985 contributed to a national narrative of Taiwan’s inseparable cultural and historical connections to China under postwar KMT governance. This narrative is represented by the 18 sites designated in 1983, the first series designations after the implementation of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, which either relate to the Han people’s resistance to foreign invasion, or to Taiwanese assistance to the Qing repression of rebellions in Taiwan. Other versions of the past were meanwhile excluded, for instance the indigenous sites and Japanese remnants (Yan Liang-yi 2009, 20-21). The criterion of ‘age’ helped to disqualify Japanese colonial sites from a national list of preservation, and hence helped to exclude the colonial past from the history of Taiwan (Taylor 2005). This criterion of what can be regarded as ‘historic’ was not changed until the 1990s.

2.1.2 Is there any colonial heritage?

If the core concept of ‘heritage’ is associated with an individual or community who owns, inherits, and decides to pass on a precious belonging to the next generation, then who is the subject that owns the colonial heritage? If heritage is, as the World Heritage Committee of UNESCO has declared, “our legacy from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass on to future generations”, then in the case of colonial heritage in Taiwan, who is “we”? Does heritage belong to the colonizers who created the objects, dwelled in the built environments, applied cultural significance and custom to the material products and hence have strong emotional connections to the places and objects? Alternatively, do the colonial remnants belong to the postcolonial community, the former colonized, who found the material remains in their recovered homeland, and who have lived with and within the remnants and have developed a sense of place? Can these colonial remnants be conceived as the ‘heritage’ of the postcolonial community, contributing to their identity and deserving to be preserved for the next generation?

Two perspectives on colonial heritage are dealt with in this section: the material remains of the colonizer in the postcolonial locale; and the material remains of the former colonized people in the colonizer’s national territory.

Regarding the first perspective, the term ‘shared heritage’ as well as those of ‘mutual heritage’, ‘common heritage’ and ‘heritage overseas’ have been proposed by heritage management practitioners over the last decade to deal with the overseas material remains of European countries, mostly with the material products resulting from former colonization (Fienieg et al. 2008, 25). The aim of these overseas projects is either to improve the diplomatic interactions of countries, or to promote the national identity and pride of different countries (Fienieg et al. 2008, 37-52). This was also reflected by the international policy of the global governance institutions. According to the Heritage at Risk report of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) of 2001-2002, a Shared Colonial Heritage Committee was added to the ICOMOS International Scientific Committee network in 1998. In 1999, during the ICOMOS Assembly in Mexico, it held its first formal meeting. The report pointed out that the Shared Colonial Heritage refers to the architecture, urban planning and infrastructure introduced overseas by European colonizers in the period from the late 15th century to the Second World War. The target of this committee was clear: “...it shall concentrate on the influence of the various

46. The Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (Wenhua zichan baocun fa 文化資產保存法) defines guji, historic buildings and villages as “the constructions and related infrastructures with historical and cultural significance, built by human beings for their living needs.” (Translated from The Cultural Heritage Preservation Law: No. 1, article 3, category 1; the original text reads: “古蹟、歷史建築、聚落：指人類為生活需要所營建之具有歷史、文化價值之建築物及其附属設施。”)

47. 台湾孔庙、淡水孔庙、二醜館(皆地政署)、澎湖天后宫、台南孔子廟、鹿港龍山寺、竹芸武廟、西螺古堡、臺南城城樓(安平古堡樓)、基隆二沙灣炮台(海軍陸戰)、五妃廟、金瓜石公館、彰化孔子廟、王得祿墓、台北府城北門、鳳山蔘靈宮、大天后宮、邱良功母節孝坊 (Li Qian-lang 1988).


European powers in the nominated period. It only focused on the colonies established by European nations, and, in the early decades of the 20th century, the United States. The report summarized the major threats to the European colonial remains overseas as: the emerging nationalism and identity-building of newly established nations; war damage; the departure of colonial regimes; economic pressures; urban issues; development programmes, etc. Mainly considering the holistic physical conservation of European colonial heritage, the committee seemed to regard the ‘partner’ nations, those newly established postcolonial countries in which the material remains are located, as the origin of potential threats to ‘European’ heritage. The question of how the heritage could be shared was scarcely mentioned.

This perspective seems to have been modified in the later organization and public occasions of the ICOMOS. In 2003 its original title of Shared Colonial Architecture and Town Planning, set up in 1998, was changed to the International Scientific Committee on Shared Built Heritage (SBH). Currently chaired by the Netherlands, the SBH aims to “support public and private bodies engaged with preservation, management and research of (mutual) heritage. It would like to promote the integration of heritage into the social and economic fabric and processes of communities.” Rather than focusing on the physical intactness of European remains, the participation of the partner countries is now accentuated. This coincides with developments in indigenous and postcolonial discourses in the Western arena. However belated, the above changes in the ICOMOS agenda are a reflection of how critiques of heritage practices regarding the remains of colonized people have inspired an increasing Western attention to inclusive and participative heritage practices. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, indigenous political movements gained wide public attention in the White settler countries, mainly the United States and Australia (Smith 2004, 4-6). Along with the increasing popularity of ‘heritage’, the institutionalization of archaeology, and the democratic and liberal atmosphere of Western governments, the indigenous movements not only stimulated public concern about indigenous rights but further fertilised the awareness of community participation within Western heritage practices and academy. This was also reflected in Western-based international heritage activities. At the World Archaeological Congress in Southampton in 1989, for instance (Fienieg et al. 2008, 34), Western-centred heritage management and archaeological practices were criticised and developed into a wider concern about including cultural, regional and ethnic diversity. Extended from the issue of indigenous heritage, the awareness of cultural diversity and heritage claims from once-peripheries—for instance the ethnic minorities and newly independent nations—facilitated the theoretical, practical and policy revisions of heritage practices (Skeates 2000; Smith 2006).

2.1.3 Making postcolonial places

...President Chen Shui-bian addressed the significance of renaming the ‘Chiang, Kai-shek Memorial Hall’ to ‘Taiwan Democratic Memorial Hall’. He mentioned that ‘this event represents the actual practice of freeing the space, thoughts and spirit controlled under the previous authoritarian rule’.

...the destruction of Japanese colonial heritage such as the Joseon Government-General building

52. The formation and legislation of discourses on inclusive heritage-work emerged with the issue of indigenous heritage in the Western arena from the late 1960s (Smith 2004). The power relationship and indigenous sovereignty over archaeological sites and objects within a postcolonial context were reexamined, and resulted in statements about including local communities in heritage practice.
53. These include the built environment, objects, and the bodies of indigenous ancestors et cetera.
54. Translated from Chinese to English by the author. The original text was from: http://web.ner.gov.tw/culturenews/culture/culture-detail.asp?id=81614 (accessed 25 August 2011)
is a national project to symbolically raise the Korean flag instead of the Japanese one at the courtyard of Gyeongbok palace. (Korea Liberation Association 1993) (Lim 2006, 182)

“Heritage,” writes Laurajane Smith,

is about a sense of place . . . While heritage is representational or symbolic both in its physicality and in the intangible acts of doing or performing heritage, it is also a process and a performance where the values and meanings that are represented are negotiated and worked out” (2006, 74,77).

The ‘concreteness’ of materiality is a crucial component of heritage, as the immobile built environment is the most prominent means of stabilising and imprinting the desired past into the locale. The spatial physicality is not only a negative container, but acts as an influential ‘actor’—interacting with the individuals, communities and interest groups resulting in the interwoven bodily experiences and ‘sense of place’. In research on the colonial heritage of the former Belgian Congo, Johan Lagae asserts that since colonization is a form of appropriating a territory, it is always operating with a “physical impact” such as erecting monuments and constructing buildings. These acts of spatial construction serve to stress one’s presence in a colonized space, and the act of ‘making a presence’ in a colonial context is inseparable from the play of power and issues of culture and identity. In Lagae’s words, “[m]onumentality is a characteristic almost intrinsically inherent to colonial architecture and urbanism, as these are instruments to articulate the power relations between ‘colonizers’ and ‘colonized’” (Lagae 2004, 173-4). ‘Place making’, therefore, is largely used by colonizers to “produce self-legitimating narratives but also […] to disinherit locals and local memory” (Butler 2007, 38). Japanese construction of the Government-General buildings in Seoul and Taipei were good examples of this materialisation within the colonial context. The project of the Government-General buildings not only altered the spatial fabric and local landscape, but also imposed a power hierarchy through the material presence of the buildings and city planning, and through the removal of local spatial context.

As Lagae notes, ‘monumentality’ was the reason for colonizers to conserve and select sites of ‘heritage’. And since traditional African buildings were mostly constructed from earth, ‘monumentality’ became the excuse for exclusion. This also represents the colonial hierarchy recreated by the colonizer for displaying the superiority of the colonizer’s ‘civilisation’, and thus the presumed inferiority of the colonized culture. This hierarchical structure of colonialism was parallel to the ideological development of guji in postwar Taiwan. Under the rule of the KMT, ‘antiquity’ was the major criterion for nominating a site for conservation. Compared to the ancient civilization of the colonizers’ ‘inner land’ (內地 lit. the mainland or homeland), most sites in Taiwan were considered too young to be valuable for conservation. As Taylor has suggested, before the ‘indigenization’ (bentuhua) movements were fostered in the 1990s, the criteria of age had not been challenged by prominent claims for conserving the local heritage.

Since heritage is often used by the colonizer to create “signatures of the visible” (Appadurai 2008, 215), it is inevitable that postcolonial communities feel strong hostility towards these material symbols of colonial rule. Lim Jong Hyun discusses the fierce debate between the government and diverse social groups in dealing with the Japanese colonial buildings in the Republic of Korea. As a result, the Joseon Government-General building was eventually dismantled under a strong nationalist claim of “the policy of correction of Korea’s history” by removing colonial heritage” (Lim Jong Hyun 2007, 183). Many of the post-Soviet nations are undergoing transformation and reconstruction of national identity, represented by their policies on coping with Soviet monuments and memorials (Forest and Johnson 2002). During the 2000s the intense debates on the

55. Monumentality here refers to a quality of greatness and antiquity which can serve for long term commemoration. In this regard, monumentality is usually decided by a group high in the power hierarchy to materialize their symbolic superiority in a space. This acts as an everlasting ‘commemoration’ of their success and colonizes the space of others.

56. For instance, the ‘inner land’ refers to Japan during the Japanese colonial era.
former Chiang Kai-shek statues and monuments were highlighted by the public media in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{57}

However, in contrast to the hostility directed towards KMT monuments, the government and public discourses of Taiwan in the 1990s and 2000s showed rather a favourable attitude towards Japanese colonial remains. Since the 1990s, a prominent number of Japanese religious and industrial sites, and colonial architecture, have been designated as municipal or national ‘heritage’, and promoted as local tourist attractions. What are we to make of this?

2.1.4 Japanese ‘heritage’ in Taiwan

The buildings constructed by Japanese during the Japanese occupation could not be regarded as guji; only those representing the resistances of our people to Japanese rule (could be regarded as guji) (Lin Heng-dao 1974).

“We only watch Japanese channels and the NHK news” (Interview of Mr. and Mrs. Qiu in 2009).

During our interview in 2009, Mr. and Mrs. Qiu, the former principal of Tongxiao Primary School and his wife, recalled their attendance in the ceremonies of the Tongxiao Shinto Shrine during the Japanese colonial period. “Only students who performed well in the school were able to join”, they mentioned with pride. Mrs. Li was one of the female dancers wearing Japanese traditional dress and dancing in slow and elegant motions in front of the shrine. Mr. Qiu was one of the trumpet players. We were talking in Mr. and Mrs. Qiu’s living room while the television was broadcasting Japanese programmes, and they told me “we only watch Japanese channels and the NHK news”.

On the streets of Taiwan, you may be surprised to see Japanese words printed on Taiwan-made products, restaurants and business logos. On television you can watch Japanese channels around the clock, and when enquiring about a Taiwanese person’s holiday plans, you may well hear about a trip to Japan. According to data collected by the Interchange Association (Japan) (IAJ), Japan remains the most favourable and familiar country for people in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{58} However, Japanese-built remains were not included in the heritage list until 1991. Over one decade since then, the number of Japanese sites listed as guji (historic monuments) and historic buildings rose rapidly from 2 to 845. Taylor (2005) suggests that the changing criteria of historical preservation are in accordance with the growing popularity of Taiwanese history in the 1990s, and that they show a pro-colonial tone in interpreting the Japanese past. This can also be found in daily conversations in Taiwan, in which the Japanese colonial infrastructure is often referred to as being the foundation of Taiwan’s modernisation. To the locals of Taiwan, the sites of the Japanese past are often the place of local memory, and have even become the sites of local pride and identity.

Taiwanese ‘Japan Syndrome’\textsuperscript{59}

The ‘Japan Syndrom’ issue of \textit{Reflection Quarterly} (當代) discusses this trend towards fond remembrance of the Japanese. This special issue was published in January 2010, after the success of the hit film \textit{Cape No. 7} (海角七號). The film revolves around a set of Japanese love letters, written by a Japanese teacher who was forced to leave Taiwan at the end of the Second World War. Sixty years later in Hengchun, an economically depressed town in South Taiwan, the male protagonist, a postman who used to be a rock musician in Taipei, joins the town’s musical self-promotion project. He meets the Japanese female manager of the band and through the sixty-year-old love letters coincidently retrieved by the postman they gradually overcome their individual life struggles in searching for the intended recei-
ver of these letters. The scenes reflect the real situation in many places in Taiwan: the young generation leave home to look for better life in urban areas, especially Taipei, and developing the local tourist industry seems the only hope to improve the local economy, even though large enterprises monopolise the local tourist industry through BOT projects. In this film, many Taiwanese slang words, Japanese and Mandarin words are used, reflecting the linguistic mixture of many Taiwanese locals. Ethnic multiplicity is shown by the appearance of indigenous actors among the major figures. If this film presents the period of Taiwan’s localism, it also reflects scenes of ‘Taiwaneseness’. It is noteworthy that ‘Japaneseness’ is an important element to grassroots ‘Taiwaneseness’.

The great success of Cape No.7 in box offices in Taiwan and Hong Kong raised fierce debates about the Japanese association of this film, and attracted particularly strong responses from internet users from China. A famous blogger called the film “a great poisonous grass” (大毒草), spreading colonial ideology. Similar controversies had occurred in the past in Taiwan, such as debates on destroying and renaming the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine and criticism of Japanese association of this film, and attracted particular strong responses from internet users from China. In 1985, the event surrounding the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine for the first time drew public attention to the issue of Japanese colonial architecture. As a rare Shinto shrine remaining intact in postwar Taiwan, Taoyuan Shinto Shrine was planned to be renovated entirely into a new building functioning as a martyrs’ shrine of the ROC. Li Zheng-long 李正隆, who won the competition to determine the architect, decided to preserve the original architectural fabric instead. This announcement drew great attention from public and press, and evoked fierce debates (Ye Nai-qi 1989, 104-9). The shrine was eventually conserved in its original form yet was designated as a ‘historic monument’ (gujì 古蹟) only after 1994. The conflicting attitudes toward Japanese sites had not changed even a decade later; the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine was designated as a historic monument as late as 1994, and the renaming of the building from the Taoyuan Martyrs’ Shrine to the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine still faced strong objection in 2007. See "Event of Preserving the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine" at the website of Encyclopaedia of Taiwan: http://210.69.67.10/web/index (accessed 1 December 2010)

It is undeniable that a ‘Japan complex’ exists in Taiwanese society, although this differs between individuals and communities. The special issue of Reflection Quarterly examines this seemingly ‘pro-colonial’ phenomenon from diverse angles.

Investigations into the issue of pro-colonial attitudes usually start from the concept of ethnic differences, particularly the difference between the mainlanders and Taiwanese groups. It is commonly believed that the Taiwanese group shows a more favourable attitude for Japan because of their collective memory of Japanese colonial experiences. In contrast, the mainlander group shows hatred, resulting from their resistance to the Japanese invasion during the Sino-Japanese War. In a newspaper article, the scholar Que Hai-yuan 鄭懷遠 clarified the difference in understanding of the Eight-year War against Japan (八年抗戰; the Second Sino-Japanese War) between the two groups: a larger percentage of the mainlander group showed recognition of the importance of the war. The percentage increased with age. Huang Zhi-hui (2010) expands the discussions on the Taiwanese attitude toward Japan to include major ethnic groups, for instance the indigenous and Hakka groups. Despite distinguishing between different group attitudes toward Japan based on ethnic categorisation, Huang recognises the problems in assessing the attitudes of Taiwanese to Japan by only considering ethnic background. She notes the necessity of elaborating on layers of historical experience and including factors of generational, social status and vocational differences. This is important when we compare the diversities that Huang has noted to the results of the field studies of this thesis. For instance, memory recollection in Tongxiao shows the diversified memories connected to the Tongxiao Shinto Shrine, and this diversity is associated with different social frameworks, particularly generation, gender, vocation and historical experiences (See Section 4.1).


61. In 1985, the event surrounding the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine for the first time drew public attention to the issue of Japanese colonial architecture. As a rare Shinto shrine remaining intact in postwar Taiwan, Taoyuan Shinto Shrine was planned to be renovated entirely into a new building functioning as a martyrs’ shrine of the ROC. Li Zheng-long 李正隆, who won the competition to determine the architect, decided to preserve the original architectural fabric instead. This announcement drew great attention from public and press, and evoked fierce debates (Ye Nai-qi 1989, 104-9). The shrine was eventually conserved in its original form yet was designated as a ‘historic monument’ (gujì 古蹟) only after 1994. The conflicting attitudes toward Japanese sites had not changed even a decade later; the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine was designated as a historic monument as late as 1994, and the renaming of the building from the Taoyuan Martyrs’ Shrine to the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine still faced strong objection in 2007. See "Event of Preserving the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine" at the website of Encyclopaedia of Taiwan: http://210.69.67.10/web/index (accessed 1 December 2010)

62. Mainlanders refer to the group who immigrated from China to Taiwan with the KMT retreat in the 1940s and 50s.

63. The civil war of China in 1949 resulted in large-scale political immigration from China to Taiwan. These immigrants are known as ‘mainlanders’ (wai-sheng-ren外省人, ’), and count for around 13% of the population (according to Huang Yuan-fan, 1993, Language, Society and Ethnic Identity, Taipei: Crane Publishing Co.).

CHAPTER TWO: JAPANESE ‘HERITAGE’ IN POSTCOLONIAL TAIWAN

Japan, China and Taiwan

The pro-colonial attitude has to be considered alongside the triangular relationship between Taiwan, Japan and China. Japan and China here are not political entities such as the PRC (People’s Republic of China), but refer to the imaginary and conceptualised Japan and China. This imagination and conceptualisation frequently mixes with diplomatic and political entities, and accordingly adjusts the distances between self and other, thereby identifying the self. The comparison between the Japanese and KMT rule is perennially heard in daily conversation and at academic occasions. As one of many examples, a former employee of the sugar factory in Ciaotou described the differences between the management of the factory under Japanese and KMT rule in an oral account recorded by local cultural society in the late 1990s. He mentioned the abuse of personnel by, and lack of professionalism of, the KMT management. In comparison, he claimed that the Japanese managers were much more effective and professional (Kaohsiung County Government 1997, 88). This kind of description provides an example of what Ching (2001) has claimed: as a result of the lack of any decolonization process by the break-up of the Japanese Empire,

“[in] Taiwan, the sudden void left by the Japanese colonizer after ‘liberation’ was filled not by the Taiwanese but by the takeover army from mainland China. The graft and corruption of the mainlanders fostered in the Taiwanese a deep resentment against the Chinese, and they consequently reconstituted and reimagined their colonial relationship with Japan.” (Ching 2001, 20)

This sentiment has frequently been represented within modernisation discourses in the form of comparison. Within the comparison, images of the KMT army, the imagined KMT China and the political PRC have been mixed and formed a negative image of China, strengthened by economic competition and diplomatic conflict between Taiwan and the PRC. This image stands in contrast to that of the ‘modernised’ and ‘advanced’ Japan, generated from the mixture of colonial modernity and Taiwan’s self-identity in the global arena. This imagination process is inseparable from identity consciousness in Taiwan.

According to data analysis by Chuang Jing-Yi and Li Mei-Chih (2003), the factor of ‘Taiwan consciousness’ is more effective than “ethnic division” in explaining pro-Japan interpretations. The results of this research show that the interviewee who identifies her/himself as ‘Taiwanese’ rather than ‘Taiwanese and Chinese’ showed a greater pro-Japan attitude, by valuing Japan more positively than China, feeling less close to China and interpreting Japanese negative historical behaviours in a more positive way (Chuang and Li 2003, 119-120). It suggests that “distinguishing from China and being close to Japan are two sides of identifying Taiwan” (背離中國與親近日本是認同台灣的一體兩面反映) (Chuang and Li 2003, 113). In the 1990s, the national narrative of Taiwan was in transition from being China-centred to Taiwan-centred. Japanese cultural associations concomitantly became a component of ‘Taiwanese-ness’, constructing a unique culture of Taiwan and stressing the differences between Taiwan and China. Wang Horng-luen (2004) states that in order to shape a unique ‘Taiwanese culture’, a new model of multiculturalism replaced Chinese nationalism, proclaiming a Taiwanese national identity under the governance of the Democratic Progressive Party (Minzhu jinbu dang DPP). He proposes that “[u]nder the new mosaic model of multiculturalism, aboriginal cultures, along with the once disgraced imprints of Japanese colonialism - both of which were repressed and destroyed under the KMT’s project of Chinese culture - are now preserved and promoted to a ‘national’ status to represent Taiwanese culture.” (2004, 806) In this regard, the Japanese remains are valued as ‘heritage’ which represents a component of Taiwanese identity. Furthermore, this is interwoven with regional and local identities that construct regional heritage. The past is represented, intensified and even reshaped by contemporary museums and through the interpretation of heritage.

65. The definition of “ethnic division” is derived from Chen, Chuang and Huang (1994, 5).
2.2 PLACE AND LOCALITY: CULTURAL HERITAGE AND COMMUNITY BUILDING

The 1990s signified the beginning of Taiwan’s “era of localism.”66 Local places in Taiwan, as well as the idea of Taiwan as a place, were to gain unprecedented status in both political narratives and social practice. “Place” in Taiwan has been imbued over time with social attachments by a variety of agents, each with their own motives. President Lee Deng-hui 李登輝 bound the place of Taiwan to the narrative of “living community”67 in 1993, in order to legitimize the nation-state, local governments held festivals spotlighting products or attractions with local distinctiveness, local groups participated in the recollection of local memories, and architectural and planning professionals worked on the conservation of historical buildings. These acts, as well as place-based social and environmental movements, gradually converged into the state-led Integrated Community-Making Programme (shequ zongti yingzao 社區總體營造), which was officially inaugurated in 1994. Amid the prevailing place-centered phenomena, the past of a place was frequently perceived as representing a utopia which was rapidly fading or had been already lost as the result of development. People in both the public and private sectors in Taiwan believed that the reconstruction of the present based on an ideal image of the past, would contribute to a better future. In this regard, “sites of memory” (lieux de mémoire) (Nora 1989, 7) quickly spread in conjunction with the aforementioned place politics. Local museums and heritage sites in Taiwan rapidly increased in number from the 1990s. Not only do they serve as what we might call ‘memory tactics’ (De Jong and Rowlands 2007) in determining the distinctiveness of a place— in other words, strategically rebuilding the sense and identity of a place according to present needs—but are also expected to mediate the construction of a better future in terms of locality production.

66. A “new era of localism” (defang shidai 地方時代) was anticipated by Chen Qi-nan 陳其南 in 1997. The phrase comes from a Japanese counterpart phrase (Lu 2002, 24).
67. Shengming gongtongti 生命共同體.

The emergence of “localism” in Taiwan is inescapable from the dramatic social and political transformations that occurred in Taiwan prior to the 1990s. However, at least at the level of narrative, the discourse of globalization has been an essential element in the development of the local: The concept of ‘locality’ that emerged as a focal point in Taiwanese discourse was derived from globalization discourse. The term ‘international’ prefixes numerous local festivals, art events and academic occasions, and ‘globalization’ has been frequently accentuated in policy documents, being regarded as critical to the very substance of the country.68

As Chen Qi-nan and Sun Hua-xiang (2000, 4-12, 4-13) note, the strategy of place-making, in other words, “developing the cultural distinctiveness of local places”, directed cultural policy in the post-Martial Law era, and this was closely related to the prevailing discourse on globalization in the 1990s. Globalization has been appropriated to serve the context of Taiwan, and the term seems to appear everywhere, from government announcements to scholarly discussions and public discourse. The political stress on globalization has been interwoven with an attempt to define the position of Taiwan in the global arena as a place bounded by the identity of a living community, particularly regarding diplomatic and economic competition. If, within the global arena, the criterion for being classified as an advanced country is how ‘local’ or ‘unique’ it is, then it is necessary to build a recognizable and irreplaceable local culture. ‘Globalization’ has been taken up as a strategic discourse in order to mediate a variety of diverse motives. Within the context of localism in Taiwan, the ‘globalization’ discourse justifies the imperative for Taiwan to pursue its policy of ‘Taiwaneseness’ and also the uniqueness of Taiwan’s places. Hence, the images of ‘global’ and ‘international’ are closely tied to Taiwan’s discourse linked to the local. This implies a developmentist mentality in Taiwan’s place-making movement. The pursuit of cultural distinctiveness simultaneously means economic benefit and a national profile as an advanced, modern country.

The perception of the global is inseparable from the image of modernity. Su Zhao-ying (2001, 54-55) identifies a modernist character in the state’s policy of classifying and institutionalizing cultural affairs. This tendency reached its zenith in the late 1980s, as revealed in the proposal of the Great Cultural Nation (wenhua daguo 文化大國) by the CCA (the Council for Cultural Affairs; Wenhua jianshe weiyuanhui; 文化建設委員會). The proposal itself referred to Japan’s Great Life-style Nation Five-Year Project (生活大國五年計畫). The influence of Japan, as well as that of modern Euro-American countries, is essential to the development of Taiwan’s cultural policies, based as they are on the image of modernity. Su suggests that this modernism underwent a fundamental change when the community-building programme (the Integrated Community-Making Programme) was initiated. However, a central argument of this study is that this image of modernity has been and was initiated. However, a central argument of this study is that this image of modernity has been and remains projected onto community-building. This is not only indicated by the rhetorical use of terms such as ‘advanced countries’ in the pronouncements of leading figures, but also by importing community-building models from these ‘developed’ countries, especially the Japanese place-making model of machizukuri (street/neighbourhood-making).

The physicality of memory and place in the form of heritage is embedded with diverse social attachments; it triggers emotional connections between individuals and places, as observed in many community-building projects. This section examines the substantial components of locality in the context of Taiwan’s community building initiatives. Locality seeks to project the multi-faceted image of a collective future. Its essence has changed over time, as a result of the collision of various actors. Three separate frameworks are identified in this research: globalization, machizukuri and community-building. Together, the three comprise the significance of locality in Taiwan. The section concludes with a number of case studies, which examine the social practice of place-making through the development of controversial sites of memory. It attempts to reveal the dialectical relationship between state propaganda and the local practice of community-building, and the dilemma generated from the uses and abuses of global/local discourse.

The data in this section mainly stem from two types of sources. One is government policy papers, news reports, articles, speeches and publications about and by leading figures. The other type is field studies, including interviews (Ciaotou and Jinguashi) and participant observation (Jinguashi), conducted by the author from 2002 to 2011. Regarding the analysis of the community-building movement, this section investigates the essence of the “authorized discourse” (Smith 2006, 11), namely, the discourse produced by major figures and government bodies within the context of Taiwan. This section begins the analysis of the discourse of policy makers and leading figures concerning the organic nature of the community-making movement. This authorized discourse has been in transition and has often interacted with, or been challenged by, a diverse variety of local practices, grassroots concerns, social networks and public conceptualization. The case studies in this section reveal the actual responses and products generated from these interactions in Taiwan.

2.2.1 Colonial Heritage as Sites of Memory

Monumentalization has been in vogue in the Euro-American countries. Along with the more material perspective of monumentalization, memory studies has become a rapidly growing area of scholarly as well as public interest. Since the 1980s, research into the workings of memory have been widely developed. The phenomenon is closely related to the post-modern focus on nostalgia in relation to ‘origin, rootedness, and belonging’ (Butler 2006; Lowenthal 1985). It is entangled with issues of national identity. This European-derived consciousness and strategy aimed at linking the past and identity were also constructed by governments of newly established nations, many of which had been freed from colonial status. This approach was adopted as a means of consolidating their national identity or legitimizing the government through an account of a collective past and future. In Taiwan, a memory boom emerged in the 1990s: the number of museums and heritage sites increased remarkably in tandem with the transforma-
Prominent memory studies have responded to an emerging public culture and multicultural awareness. Many social groups have fought for their right to select and represent their own past. This is a claim for participation in cultural politics and the democratic process. In Taiwan, the challenge to the dominant narrative of identity was represented by a variety of heritage sites and the trend of memory recollection. Sites of Spanish, Dutch and Japanese remains, as well as indigenous and Hakka locations, have been increasingly nominated for conservation, in contrast to previous, Chinese-centered heritage policies. This trend was also exemplified by the increasing number of ‘local cultural and historical workers’ (zaidi wenshi gongzuozhe 在地文史工作者) who appeared in the late 1980s (Lü 2002, 16-18), the Nativist Literature Movement, and emerging concerns regarding the conservation of architecture after rapid industrialization and urbanization (Ye Nai-qi 1989).

The ‘memory boom’ mentioned earlier is closely related to the new pursuit of locality which developed after the political changes of 1987.71 During the colonial and authoritarian eras, the sense of place and memory in relation to Taiwan was intentionally erased by the ruling powers. In the 1990s, however, this sense of place and memory was accentuated and served different eco-political purposes. A new policy initiative was promoted by the central government, namely the Integrated Community-Making Programme (shequ zongti yingzao 社區總體營造).72 This programme was concerned with the development of a vision of the future, mediated by heritage-making and other projects such as the reinstating of traditional crafts and ecological preservation, emphasizing local uniqueness for the purpose of tourism.

Like many other movements concerned with local, grassroots strength, the historic preservation movement in Taiwan existed prior to the community-building movement. Within the community-building movement, preservation was a subset of different goals and interests. Yet it can also be argued that the heritage-making project was often the link between these diverse interests, and a core element in strategically unifying diverse objectives. This is visible, for example, in a project aimed at conserving a particular historic area in Jinguashi. This project included urban development, landscape reformation, tourism development, industrial transformation and cultural development. These programmes were financially supported by community-building projects of different state departments. The fact that the heritage-making project can serve as a motivating and unifying core for the community-building programme can be seen in grassroots examples in many local regions, for instance the case of Ciaotou 橋頭 Sugar Factory which will be investigated in a later section of this thesis.

Endowed with local memory and emotional attachments, the sites of the past appear in the era of localism as the starting point for the re-creation of the future of local communities.

Heritage-making has been ambiguously applied at colonial sites, which were originally created by the colonizer as a spatial instrument subordinating the local sense of place to the imagination of a far away “home country.” It is often noted that the colonial sites either become void of memory, function and meaning or a contested field of memories and interpretations, depending on the continuation of memory activities. Natural attachment to a place – as required by community-building movements – disconnects when the original cultural context is altered to correspond to postcolonial eco-political structures. It is hence necessary to explore memories and connections attached to the sites during the process of building the sites of memory. Colonial heritage often triggers contested interpretations, but it also generates new possibilities for engaging multiple voices and

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70. The term ‘local cultural and historical workers’ (zaidi wenshi gongzuozhe 在地文史工作者) refers to local individuals or groups, mostly amateurs, who dedicate themselves to collecting, recording and researching local culture and history based on a strong sense of love of hometown. Many of these local workers have been participating in editing teaching materials on local history for local schools, and in arranging guided tours for cultural tourists during the rise of Taiwan’s indiginization and domestic tourism.

71. Specifically, the lifting of Martial Law in 1987.

72. The translation is according to Lü Hsin-Yi (2002), The Politics of Locality: Making a Nation of Communities in Taiwan, 10.
cultivating the potential strength of place as a social agent. The discordant nature of memories attached to colonial sites indicates a potential space for exploring previously marginalized voices, engaging communities in building new social proximities to the place, and assisting in the development of a collective version of locality by cultivating local autonomies.

2.2.2 Locality in the Context of Taiwan

2.2.2.1. Locality in Connection to Machizukuri

The Japanese model of machizukuri has had a great influence on Taiwan’s community-building. The aims, features and practices of machizukuri have been reviewed in section 1.2.2 in the previous chapter.

It is worth mentioning that Neighbourhood Associations\(^{73}\) have played a proactive role in the development of machizukuri in Japan, although this differs case by case and has changed over time. They have received attention from some researchers for being “an essential part of Japanese civil society” (Hashimoto 2007, 224). Taiwan’s community-building units of shequ 社區 (community, neighborhood) are substantially different from Japan’s Neighbourhood Associations, and these shequ imply the structural difficulties of putting the Japanese community-building model in place in Taiwan. Appropriation and alterations are inevitable in the process of interpreting machizukuri in Taiwan.

The positive public perception of Japan’s machizukuri is mainly thanks to Professor Miyazaki Kiyoshi 宮崎清 and the area of Furukawa-chō 古川町 in Japan. Miyazaki and Furukawa-chō cannot in themselves represent all the diverse examples of machizukuri, and may not provide a complete understanding of machizukuri. They are, however, the most widely quoted names when reflecting on machizukuri in Taiwan.

*Miyazaki Kiyoshi 宮崎清*

Miyazaki has been invited to Taiwan regularly since 1991 by the Taiwan Provincial Handicraft Institute (台灣省手工業研究所). His visits were initially expected to bring to Taiwan information about the Japanese experience in relation to the revitalization of population-reduced areas. It was believed that the insights gained could help to address Taiwan’s economic problems, associated with the aftermath of industrial transformation. Since then, he has been invited to join numerous community-building events, from coordinating government projects, to giving public lectures and taking part in numerous community-building promotion events. His concepts and approaches were regarded as being compatible with a community-building project proposed in 1994, and so the Handicraft Institute and the CCA (Council for Cultural Affairs) agreed upon a convergence of government resources (Weng and Miyazaki 1996, 169). As Su (2001) recalls, the community-building projects of the CCA were greatly influenced by Miyazaki. In 1997 the First Community-Building Exposition was held and a “Miyazaki Pavillion” displayed Japanese examples of community building.\(^{74}\) Miyazaki showed particular concern with “conserving and appreciating the living aesthetics and traditional values, not on the issues of reconstructing the spaces and civil society” (Su 2001, 137). The different focuses of community-building imply a divergence in the practice and targets of community-building. Miyazaki’s version of locality was perceived and reinterpreted by many government, scholarly, and activist figures surrounding the community-building programme.

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73. Neighbourhood Associations (NA) are widely distributed organizations joined by residents of regions in Japan. The basic unit of the NA is a household. The majority of NAs are made up of fewer than 200 households. Participation in a NA can be autonomous or compulsory, regulated by the policies of the municipality. The assembly of an association is responsible for arranging activities for improving the living environment and quality of life of residents, and may also be in charge of communicating between the local government and residents etc. Please refer to Shizuka Hashimoto 2007, 224–246.

The utopian image of locality as expressed by Miyazaki is best represented in the form of a series of questions: “Can you still see the clear starry sky at night? Are you able to enjoy safe and healthy food? Is garbage not strewn everywhere? Can your children play safely? Do family members get together often? Are you an important figure participating in the community festivals and rituals? Do you appreciate the objects in use? Do you create something with your own hands?” The scenes implied by these questions certainly existed in the past, yet have been lost in the process of urbanization. Miyazaki’s ideal images of a shequ comprise respect for nature, proximity of family, the legacy and creativity of traditional crafts, valuing hand-made objects, continuity of history and culture, and a safe and clean living environment. These ideals should be autonomously motivated and practiced in cooperation with the government and other stakeholders. Two of the most quoted elements of Miyazaki’s concept are, first, the creative transformation of traditional crafts, and second, the five aspects of local resources: “person, culture, production, nature, landscape” (人, 文, 産, 地, 景). The first element was particularly reinterpreted in connection to the production of cultural products, while the second element was widely used and expanded with diverse interpretations in numerous dissertations and reports. In light of the approach of Miyazaki, ‘area revitalization’ (quyu huohua 区域活化) has been the major objective of many community-building projects in Taiwan. Economic improvement through cultural products and tourism are often expected by community-building participants, despite the fact that Miyazaki himself clearly states that the economic benefits should not serve as a major driving force or represent the expected result of community building.76

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75. Taiwan Provincial Handicraft Institute and Miyazaki Research Studio, Shequ zongti yingzao: shequ zongti yingzao de linian yu shili, 1.

The Legend of Furukawa-čo 古川町

“If you walk in the town of Furukawa-čo, you can see the traditional temples, well-planted flowers, the clear stream, and swimming carp. It is as beautiful as a wonderland.[…]

Walking in Furukawa, you can sense its history and culture; walking in Furukawa, you realize the importance of the quality of life; walking in Furukawa, you will want to make your shequ better and beautiful.”77

Many primary school students in Taiwan learn the story of Furukawa-čo from texts like these in their Guoyu 国語 (Mandarin) textbooks. Furukawa-čo is a small, mountainous town in Gifu Prefecture, Japan. The image of this Japanese town was first introduced to Taiwan in 1994, the initial year of community-building. Constant contact and educational visits have been arranged since then.78 Yet the story of Furukawa-čo only later became widely known due to a TV programme, “The Vision of A City” (城市的遠見), produced by the Public Television Service (PTS) in 2001.79 This visual material has become a popular educational aid for many lecturers, promoters and community workers.

Furukawa-čo is associated with the image of thousands of swimming carp. The river in which the carp live was polluted in the 1960s, and later cleaned by the collective efforts of the locals, a scene which impressed Taiwanese audiences. This autonomous maintenance of a clean and comfortable living environment is perceived in Taiwan as the essence of Furukawa-čo. The landscape and architectural fabric, as well as the traditional crafts and festivals of the town are preserved autonomously within the community. As described by a member of a community-building organization: “Furukawa-čo is nearly the ideal of community workers in Taiwan.”80

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77. Hanlin Edition 翰林 Textbook (2010) Guoyu 国語 (Mandarin) Year 7 (Grade 4, the firstsemester), Section 13.
80. The E-Paper of the Charming New Hometown No. 73: the
2.2.2.2. Changing Locality within the Shequ

Movements

The term *shequ* was initially used to gain financial support from the United Nations (UN). The beginning of national policies concerning shequ development was roughly in accordance with the policies of the United Nations in the 1950s, in particular Social Progress through Community Development (published in 1955). Subsidized by the United Nations, the postwar KMT government invested in public infrastructure, improving the standard of living in Taiwan and reducing poverty. Shequ, which was translated from the English word 'community', implies that the will of the state is applied to every geographical and administrative unit of local neighborhoods. It not only reflects the manipulation of state power over the local (Huang Li-ling 1995), but also represents what Lü observes: "the term shequ in this period triggered the imagination and expectation of a developing country toward modernization."\(^{81}\)

This rhetorical shequ was grafted onto an apparently contrasting value context in the 1990s. During this period, the significance of community was redefined in the term shequ. President Lee Deng-hui's promulgation of the concept of a “living community” (生命共同體) in 1993 provided an ideal political environment for the development of the policy of the Integrated Community-Making Programme proposed by the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA in short) in 1994. Since the 1990s, shequ has been expected to achieve a multi-faceted development of the production of locality.

The title of the state-oriented community-building movement includes the term ‘integrated’ (整合). It suggests that community-building projects incorporate multiple perceptions and interpretations, based on different geographical and industrial conditions of regions, and operate within a complicated network of public and private sectors. Because of the requirement of ‘integratedness’, the organic and holistic nature of shequ is difficult to clarify. In tandem with the rapid increase in the participation of scholars, local groups and grassroots organizations in community-building, the actual interpretations and practices of this conceptually compounded phrase have inevitably become diverse in nature. This section investigates the essence represented by the “authorized discourse,”\(^{82}\) namely, the discourse produced by major figures and government bodies, particularly the CCA.

Alongside the aforementioned influence of the Japanese machizukuri model, the development of the concept of community-building in Taiwan owes much to Chen Qi-nan 陳其南, who was the deputy minister of the CCA during the proposal period of the community-building programme (1993–97) and minister\(^{83}\) of the CCA from 2004 to 2006. His notion of shequ and locality has endured, despite changes in the interactions between the diverse ranges of eco-political actors.

The idea of ‘citizenship’ has always been central to Chen’s concerns. In his widely distributed article, “The Meaning of Integrated Community-Making,”\(^{84}\) he argues that citizenship is critical in solving the contemporary social problems in Taiwan. Building up citizenship is urged in places with poor spatial aesthetics and quality of life, and an absence of community awareness. Chen states that “the substance of community-building is to make citizens (zaoren 造人)” and that citizenship “aims to raise the will and awareness of participating in public affairs; and to raise the aesthetic level of the living environment.”\(^{85}\) The aesthetic quality of space and culture is particu-

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82. The idea derives from Laurajane Smith (2006), Uses of Heritage, 11.
84. This article has been published or quoted in many places, for instance: Magazine Shuishalian (水沙連), Quarterly Journal of Yangshan Cultural and Educational Foundation (仰山文教基金會季刊), and The Communities in Taiwan (台灣的社區) etc.
85. Chen Qi-nan, "Developing the great Taiwan through small communities—the meaning of integrated community-making"
larly stressed. As subsequent minister of the CCA, he proposed the concept of “cultural citizenship”. Cultural citizenship embodies Chen’s vision of community-building: a utopian image of society lies in every living culture with beauty, and this signifies that civilization has been achieved by the efforts and autonomy of local communities.

An equally important article co-authored by Chen in 1998, “Retrospection on the Community-Building Movements in Taiwan,” (Chen Qi-nan and Chen Rui-hua 1998, 21-37) showed perspectives of locality other than Chen’s own vision of cultural citizenship. Alongside concerns about spatial quality and public taste, the concept also included cultivation of citizen awareness, equality in distributing public resources and the establishment of community learning systems. The locality reflected by this vision shows a genealogical link to former grassroots movements, and presents concerns in relation to social welfare and equality. However, this aspect of locality has been less emphasized within discourses addressed by Chen Qi-nan and state policy implementation.

During the time of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) governance between 2000 and 2008, the Integrated Community-Making Programme was strengthened through national-scale projects such as the New Hometown Community-Making Programme (xinguxiang shequ yingzao jihua 新故鄉社區營造計畫) announced in 2002 and the Healthy Communities Six-Star Programme (Jiankang shequ liuxing jihua 健康社區六星計劃) in 2005. The second stage of the New Hometown Community-Making Programme and the Project of Local Museums remained in the CCA annual plan for 2009, although with less prominence. Instead, developing ‘cultural industries’, in other words, enhancing economic value through cultural products has gradually become core of state cultural policy. Notions and projects surrounding cultural industries and economic profits from cultural products emerged and were stressed by the state cultural department regardless of the ruling party. This economic drive grew stronger after the Taiwan-centred DPP party lost the presidential election in 2008. Still, community-building programmes allowed grassroots initiatives and all sort of social movements to develop, supported by civil ideology and government subsidies, through a state narrative stressing love for the earth and the community of Taiwan. Thus, the economic drive, which always exists in the mind the ROC cultural bureaucrats in the form of taking cultural heritage as ‘assets’ as mentioned in previous sections of this thesis, were able to be balanced to some degree by civil claims on social, environmental and ecological welfare. The following section shows the economic considerations underneath the community-building programme, and points out the growing impact of economic motivation as ideals of community-building lost support from the state government. Moreover, a discussion on this economic drive offers insights in the complexities of making Japanese sites into local heritage within the community-building framework. Lacking direct memory linkage to local communities, Japanese colonial sites are easier than other sites to be directed by a drive to commoditise within a space devoid of memory and rootedness.

2.2.3 The Economic Drive in Community Building

During his speech at The Third National Culture Congress (第三屆全國文化會議) in 2002, Chen Qi-nan, a ‘minister without portfolio’ for the Executive Yuan (行政院政務委員), stated that the “economy should only be a means or tactic, not the target” (Chen Qi-nan 2002, 49). This speech was reminiscent of Miyazaki’s stance on the secondary role of economic rewards in the development of community-building. However, a redirection of targets in community-building crystallized in the White Paper on Culture, published in 2004 by the CCA. The slogan “culturalized industry, industrialized culture” (文化產業化，產業文化化) was introduced early in 1995 when the state community-building programme had been underway for just a year. Since then, the concept of ‘culture as assets’ for economic profits and area regeneration has been addressed by the state and local governments regardless of political background. The 2004 White Paper on Cultural Affairs elaborated on “culturalized industry, industrialized culture”. It stated that “the concept of ‘cultural industries’ (wenhua chanye 文化產業) has become the
core of the Integrated Community-Making Programme" (Council for Cultural Affairs 2004, 194). This growing emphasis on the economic effects of community-building emerged in the Consultation Symposium of Community-Building Works, the Executive Yuan (行政院社區營造工作諮詢座談會), held by Chen only two weeks after his speech at the National Culture Congress. According to Luo Zhong-feng (2004), the participants stressed the need to develop the following issues in the face of the eco-political and cultural crises brought on by globalization: revitalizing areas, cultivating a new vision of local residents, and developing a new economic model. Luo points out the ideological discordance between the humanistic initiatives of community-building, and the substance of cultural industries. This discordance is also reflected in the case studies introduced in this section.

2.2.3.1. Case Studies: Ciaotou (Qiaotou) Sugar Factory 橋頭糖廠

Ciaotou started community building from the very beginning of the state’s ambitious promotion of the shequ programme. Since 1994, a series of cultural events, conservation activities and educational courses have been held by the Ciaotou Township Office (橋頭鄉公所). The Kio-A-Thou Culture Society (橋仔頭文史協會) was founded in 1996 and became the spearhead of community-building work, second only to the township office. The initiation of Ciaotou’s community-building programme was in reaction to the state project, New Town. This project was an urban development scheme aimed at solving the problem of overpopulation in city centers. Ciaotou, a suburb of Kaohsiung City, was included in the project.

The township office came to realize that this scheme might bring destruction to Ciaotou, since the plan aimed at development and showed interest in the real estate market, without proper concern for the historical fabric and cultural context of Ciaotou. Therefore, community-building projects were initiated. Activities such as workshops on the history and culture of Ciaotou, environmental education and research groups on the New Town project have been held since 1994. These activities were initiated by a group of Ciaotou inhabitants, who demonstrated their collective awareness and capacity for mobilization by creating the first state National Festival of Culture and Art (全國文藝季) in 1995. This festival was part of a series of state programmes which aimed to explore and present local distinctiveness and, most importantly, to show the state’s intentions to empower regional governments for the first time regarding cultural affairs. Ciaotou attracted one million visitors. This number of visits, on the one hand, persuaded the property owner, the state enterprise of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, to transform the local sugar factory into a cultural park. On the other hand, the visits encouraged the gathering and training of Ciaotou’s community-building core members.

The Japanese colonial landscape of the local sugar factory has played an important role in catalyzing the sense of community in Ciaotou. Despite the fact that the experiences of the “white iron gate” and colonial exploitation still exist in the memory of residents, the sugar factory, which was founded by the colonial power and resulted in a change in Ciaotou’s industrial and social structure, is, in an ambiguous

87. "New Town" is an urban planning model developed in Britain during the late 19th century and early 20th century. It aimed to reconstruct urban suburbs in order to solve the problems associated with overcrowding in city centres. Ciaotou was included in the project of "Kaohsiung New Town," announced by the state government in 1994.

88. Local residents call the gate blocking the office area of the sugar factory the "white iron gate." The office area has been separated from the residents since the Japanese colonial period, and was detached from the local community by a ‘white iron gate’ under surveillance of security guards during the postwar period and remains so at the present time.

89. According to oral records, a number of local elders recalled how former generations were forced by the Japanese police to give up their ownership of the land to the Japanese sugar company. See Kaohsiung County Government 1997, 72–92.

90. In order to build up the sugar industry in Ciaotou, the Japanese sugar company, with police assistance, forced local people to give up their land and to adopt new forms of industry and labour, such as growing sugar canes or becoming hired labourers working for the sugar factory. The landscape of Ciaotou endured great change as well during the building of the sugar industry. The spatial division of Ciaotou since then was following colonial hierarchy—the factory and associated residential area belonged to higher class of Japanese managers and
way, also the core of local distinctiveness and pride.91 The fear that the New Town project would destroy the sugar factory greatly aided the formation of Ciaotou’s community awareness programme. The core community-building practitioners, organized during the community-building projects, became more and more involved in conservation protests and memory recollection activities. Their cooperation with the Cultural Bureau of Kaohsiung County, alongside pressure from the property owner of the factory, successfully resulted in the area of the sugar factory being designated a guji (Historic Monument). The Sugar Corporation changed its development plan for the sugar factory site during the popular National Festival of Culture and Art and there is now a museum of sugar industry since 2006 and a commitment to the development of a “Cultural Park,” focusing on the sugar industry.

After a decade of community-building, however, the sense of community has not resulted in a collective vision of the future. This discordance surfaced with the construction of a metro line in Ciaotou. In 2000, the Kio-A-Thou Culture Society initiated a series of resistance activities against the new metro, taking particular issue with the fact that the construction work would destroy parts of the sugar factory. At that time, the stance of the Culture Society was not supported by other opinion leaders or the township office. Lin Jing-yao, initiator of Ciaotou’s community-building project, later contended that:

“The Factory cannot be conserved only in terms of its cultural heritage [...]; its conservation has to be an asset to regional development [...] not merely in relation to the perspective of cultural value, [the conservation] should offer a leisure function and create job opportunities. Thus the conservation should be considered with regard to regional scale, not only be considered in terms of the details. If the large scale spatial elements, the ecological environment, the spatial culture, and the architectural fabric remain visible, we should conserve them; others can be compromised when new needs and values emerge” (interview by the author in 2008, italics added).

He expressed his disappointment with the Culture Society, pointing out that although the Society itself was renting and using an office in the sugar factory, it seemed to be neglecting the community issues of the entire town.

Japanese colonial modernity has been transferred to the locality of Ciaotou in the process of continuous memory activities within the factory area. The sugar factory has gradually become a site of memory for Ciaotou. However, this site of memory has failed to catalyze a communal vision of the future in the face of forces of modernization. In the early years of community-building, a multifaceted version of locality was envisioned. Lin articulates his targets of community-building work as: “making civil servants, making professionals and making citizens” (造官,造匠,造人) (Lin Jing-yao 1996); ensuring that community schools and workshops represent the wider concerns of citizens’ lives: holding courses aimed at “making citizens” on subjects such as capacity and leadership training, education and culture, landscape planning, financial management and the economy, ecology and the environment.92 This version of locality was later discontinued. A vision based on economic improvement seems to have come to dominate the image of a better future.

2.2.3.2 Case Studies: Jinguashi Mining Remains 金瓜石礦業遺址

The construction of museum and heritage sites is popular among municipalities in that they stimulate regional development and raise political profile. This was particularly salient in the era of localism. The plan for the Gold Ecological Park,93 which opened to the public in 2004, was among these initiatives. Concerned with the distinctiveness of Jinguashi’s

91. Ciaotou is proudly known as the town of the first modern sugar industry in Taiwan.
92. See Brochure of the First Community School, 1995.
93. The Gold Ecological Park is a municipal museum built in the Jinguashi area, Taipei County. The museum aims to preserve the industrial heritage and local memory of Jinguashi, and aid local development.
landscape and history, the municipal government’s plan for the Gold Ecological Park followed the ideal model of an ecomuseum.\textsuperscript{94} A type of museum which gained great popularity in the era of localism in Taiwan. Often, the understanding of ‘ecomuseum’ has been based on a Japanese translation of “living environment museum” (生活環境博物館).\textsuperscript{95} The Gold Ecological Park was suggested by the planner, who has Japanese associations, in order to revitalize Jinguashi. The designer suggested that a convention concerning the preservation of the landscape and spatial fabric resonating with the Japanese machizukuri model should be created and signed by the residents.

The plan for the Gold Ecological Park fitted well with many government programmes and state community-building propaganda. The renovation of old Japanese residences attracted various funds from state departments: the Project of Local Museums (地方文化館計畫) of the CCA, the Doubling the Tourists Plan (觀光客倍增計畫) of the Tourism Bureau of the Ministry of Communication and Transportation (交通部觀光局), and the Reconstructing the New Urban and Rural Landscape Plan (城鄉新風貌改造) of the Department of Construction, the Ministry of Interior. All of these policies were designed to aid locality production in alignment with the community-building discourses of leading figures in the state government such as Chen Qi-nan on improving spatial aesthetic quality and revitalizing local regions through cultural strategies.

A strong economic drive dominates the development of the Gold Ecological Park. Not mentioning the intention of the Taipei County government toward regional development, politicians and leading figures in the local area have expressed concerns about economic rewards since the implementation of the museum strategy. Within these fragmented communities, tourism development has gained communal recognition as the most attractive development programme. This resonates with Xiang Jia-hong’s observations based on his experiences as a community practitioner:

“I asked the students (all of whom were residents of the community) to write down and present the reasons for doing shequ work. Most answers were ‘in order to make the shequ better’. But when I asked further, ‘what do you mean by better?’, the two most frequent answers were to make the living environment clean and beautiful and to develop industry […] This enthusiasm is common in communities new to community-building and who are not familiar with the concepts of community-building. It is the same for many of the communities which have experience with community-building, and even for the professionals in the community-building field. That is to say, industry has always been a focus point of great concern within community-building. Thus, within the discussions on policies and projects between ministries and government departments, the development of industry is the only item receiving trans-departmental agreement.” (Xiang Jia-hong 2008, 63) (my translation)

Disappointment of local residents over the lack of immediate economic revenue from the project of the Gold Ecological Park has caused a difficult relationship between the museum and local residents, and this has weakened the potential for community-building.

2.2.5 Building locality at sites of memory

The two examples discussed in this section represent the use of the Japanese colonial past as a resource when creating locality in Taiwan, either with regard to local identity, social cohesion or economic prosperity. Regarding identity, the colonial past helps formulate the identity of a place based on local distinctiveness, in this case distinguishing Taiwan, as a place, from its competitor China. This, in part, naturally follows from Taiwan’s efforts to be viewed as a member of the international community, especially the community of ‘advanced’ countries. Moreover,
the ‘golden past’ of a place – some aspects of which are the result of the colonial past, for instance the sugar industry in Ciaotou and the mining industry in Jinguashi – has frequently been projected as an image of a future which is characterized by modernity and development.

In conjunction with the strong economic drive of the state community-building programme, the expectations of regional revival and the rewards of tourism play a major role in most locales. A strong economic incentive for local development was witnessed in both Jinguashi and Ciaotou, both of which saw the use of memory sites as a strategy for creating local distinctiveness and regional revival. The multifaceted locality targeted at the beginning stage of heritage-building has gradually converged with the pursuit of economic development. A noteworthy issue that Miyazaki warned us about in an interview in 2004: “community-building is not for earning tourist revenue”. The humanistic aspects concerning a better quality of life, the empowerment of the community, the accumulation of culture, social welfare, and social equality and justice are often sacrificed for the sake of economic benefits.

In an era of localism, the authorized discourse on ‘the local’ – an agent showing potential strength in resisting or responding to global homogeneity – is ambiguously phrased as globalization, i.e. as a means of “building a bridge between Taiwan and the world through local mobilization” (quanqiu jiegui zaidi, 在地行動) and “winning in the face of global competition.” It was expected that the local would simultaneously trigger a substantial change in Taiwanese society, which has long been influenced by a development-centred ideology. This development-drive has often led to a dilemma in local place-making practices, as revealed in the case studies in this section.

In the 1970s and 1980s, grassroots localism emerged in the form of environmental, political and cultural movements in Taiwan. It represented resistance to development-centered state policies, and cultivated an awareness and autonomy of place in the subsequent two decades. These grassroots initiatives have gradually been co-opted into the community-building projects in the era of localism. The state government has provided a large amount of subsidies and promoted terms and concepts in all departments and public occasions for raising community-building awareness and participation. Many social groups—some may be stimulated by the community-building ideas; some were already founded before the community-building policies but with similar aims—strategically used the state community-building phrases to compete for subsidies in supporting their own social targets. Complying with bureaucratic demands from governments, for example by producing reports, writing official documents, meeting accounting requirements and so on, a sort of operational mechanism has developed. Some non-government organisations and community groups, normally without independent financial support, increasingly rely on the subsidies from governments. Especially these community groups performed well and produced spectacular effects. For instance, as Lü (2002) argued, Baimi village (白米村) in Yilan County has easily attracted subsidies from all sorts of government departments by continuously producing what government officials want from it. Eventually many community or social groups lost energy in pushing for government change while having to rely on government support and collaborate with the government. Still, there have been societies or organisations insisting on their own social ideals. They may strategically use the terms and frameworks set by the government yet retain their role as avant-garde citizen groups. Their involvement in community-building and heritage-making projects often leads to series of conflicts with the governments since they do not fulfill all the bureaucratic requirements, which they feel create homogeneity rather than creative diversity centred around the significance of locality. The state community-building programme has created a welcoming environment for grassroots’ social and ecolo-


97. ‘Accountability’ of economic reward is important for local politics in attracting support. Local politicians as well as community workers easily persuade local groups to support their projects by explaining the projects would improve the local economy.

98. emph type="italic">Challenging the Year 2008, the revised edition of 2003, 1–4.
gical actions, and to some degree encouraged citizen movements and creative diversities; at the same time, it has also appropriated revolutionary energy and aid to standardised community-building ‘products’ by offering subsidises and resources. Hence, one may ask whether the place-making movements of the past two decades have actually made substantial changes to society in terms of accommodating the social welfare/equality-concerned and other diverse facets of locality. An alternative perspective would ask whether the grassroots initiatives and community-building autonomy might eventually fade away.

2.3 JAPANESE COLONIAL HERITAGE IN THE ERA OF LOCALISM

2.3.1 The Historical Context of the 1990s ‘Memory Boom’

According to statistics from the Chinese Association of Museums, in 1989 and 1990 the total number of museums in Taiwan was 99. By 2007, the number had exploded to 580.99 The number guji (historic monuments) also grew enormously during the same period. The sense of ‘locality’ has dominated the discourse on guji and local museums since the 1990s. As the museum scholar Zhang Yu-teng noticed (2007), the 1990s is the “era of localism” of museums. The increasing number of museums in Taiwan since 1991 mainly included large, local museums. These local museums were encouraged by the state policies of “Rehabilitating Unused Spaces” and “Local Museums” within the scheme of the Integrated Community-Making Programme.

The close relationship between historic preservation and pursuit of locality actually emerged before the 1990s within the postwar economic, political and social context. When the KMT lost the Chinese civil war and retreated to Taiwan in the late 1940s, numerous Japanese temples, shrines and other buildings were occupied by KMT armies and their families. In the following decade, the issue of historic preservation was not considered by the KMT government except in the light of tourist demands of the American army100 and the Chinese cultural renaissance movement in the 60s and 70s.101 In the 1960s, Taiwan experienced dramatic change from an agricultural society to an industrial society. Fast urbanization, migration and changes of life style resulted in damage to traditional architecture through urban development, causing nostalgia of lost traditions and lifestyle, and an emerging demand for domestic tourism and awareness of historic preservation. At the same time, social and economic change was informed by the political propaganda of the KMT’s Chinese nationalist narrative. Within the authorised agenda, Taiwanese history and culture existed only in relation to the Chinese ‘mainland’. Two groups of historic preservationists sparked an architectural conservation awareness in the 1960s within the aforementioned context: folk-historical scholars in collecting data on Taiwanese traditional architecture, Lin Heng-dao 林衡道 being the representative figure; and artists and architects concerned with traditional buildings in Taiwan. Their efforts brought about the guji (historic monument) preservation movement in the 1970s. As Yen Liang-yi 阮亮一 (2005) mentions, nationalism, localism and tourism serve as the framework for analysing the development of historic preservation in Taiwan. Prior to the 1970s, the official narrative of Chinese identity and anti-communist propaganda monopolised the field of cultural reproduction in literature, the arts, humanities and historic preservation. This situation began to change in the 1970s. Yen (2005, 9) associates the initiative of historic preservation with the Nativist Literature Movement (xiangtu wenxue yundong鄉土文學運動)102, and asserts that the movement shows the close relationship...
between the institutionalisation of historic preservation and the national identity crisis of Taiwan that emerged from this period.

In the 1970s, many landmark events of historic preservation such as the conflicts on preserving Lin An-Tai Old Residence, reflected a rising conservationist awareness in the public arena. Nevertheless, the KMT Chinese nationalist narrative still dominated the historical preservation field. Taiwanese architecture was able to be qualified as ‘historic’ only when it demonstrated a connection to the Chinese civilization or patriotic ideology of a great China. Until the Martial Law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan-centered discourses had been barred from publicity. Against a background of political liberation during the 1990s and a dramatic change in economic and social environments, Taiwan experienced the aforementioned boom of “museumification” and “heritagization”. As a reaction to the cultural amnesia of the postwar KMT period, the retrieval of local memories coincided with the rapid development of local museums and cases of historic preservation that represented reflection on local identity (Mu Si-mian 1999). With this pursuit of ‘locality’, the collective past has been reshaped by multiple interpretations of memories, indicating the complex forces underlying the reconstruction of the past.

The rapid increase of local museums and heritage sites in 1990s represents a shift of national narrative. In 1993, president Lee Teng-hui proposed the ‘living community’, emphasizing the land of Taiwan as a source of identity. This identity narrative was further framed and demonstrated by the ‘Integrated Community-Making Programme’ since 1994. The leading urban planning scholar and activist Hsia Chu-Joe 夏铸九 elaborates on this close connection between historic preservation and state domination (Hsia 1998). In the 1990s, historic preservation served as a means of identity reconstruction for the nation-state. In order to legitimize the national government by earning support from local communities, a combination of community building and historic conservation became the new policy of the national government (Hsia 1998, 1, 4-5). However, the bureaucratic system was not able to deal with the fierce conflicts between rapid urbanisation and participative conservation. Hsia thus asserts that conserving guji is to create “heterotopia”104 and generate the locality needed for survival within the fierce competition of global economy, as well as forming a sustainable space for social inclusion. Hsia’s points of social practice and humanistic concern have been influential in the scholarly field of conservation with aid of the National Taiwan University Graduate Institute of Building and Planning, an avant-garde institution in the field of area development with historical conservation.

After the lifting of martial law in 1987, numerous social movements emerged to resist the ‘de-local’ and ‘de-Taiwan’ policies legislated under the Kuomintang (國民黨 KMT) version of Chinese nationalism. Meanwhile, the local governments that arose within the new political network played an important role in promoting locality through cultural tourism, utilising such means as museums, cultural festivals and the production of local artefacts. Along with strategic support from the central government and new trends in leisure and tourism, the idea of local specialities was promoted as a catalyst for local development and identity. For example, cultural festivals (wenhua-ji 文化季), which emerged to promote the idea of local agricultural products, crafts and heritage sites were held by regional governments in the 1990s and sponsored by the central government as a part of the national culture programme (Mu Si-mian 1999).

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103. The Lin An-Tai Old Residence (Lin An-Tai gucuo 林安泰古厝) was built up in 1822 in north-east Taipei as a family residence of the rich merchant Lin Zhi-neng. In the 1970s, the east district became the site of a new urban development plan in Taipei, and it was planned that the residence would be destroyed to make room for broadening the road. After preservation movements raised by cultural and architectural practitioners, the Taipei City Government promised to conserve all building materials of the residence and recompose the compartments at a new location.

104. "Heterotopia" was a cultural geographical concept discussed by Michel Foucault to describe spaces of otherness. Heterotopia deals with spaces with multiple layers which may be invisible, unpleasant and even controversial, yet as mirrors, they reflect the real image of self and represents physical approximation of a utopia.
Within this social and historical context, the idea of developing museums and heritage sites was born and grew rapidly during the 1990s and the following decade. The recollection of local memories was sought by both the government and local residents to reconstruct the local identity which became intertwined with Taiwanese national identity. The representation of the past, as well as the construction of locality, is a dynamic process constantly reshaped by diverse actors within a complex social framework. The interpretation of memory was not only restrained by this grand social framework but also influenced by conflicting conceptions of memory during the actual practices of planning, construction and recollection.

The situation is even more complicated when dealing with colonial sites. Within the museum and heritage boom, Japanese colonial sites received greater attention than ever. In the postwar era, the KMT interpreted Japanese remains as symbols of the enemy country which had invaded China during Second World War. An anxious attempt to cut connections between the local Taiwanese and their previous colonizer was another underlying motive of this official propaganda.

This anti-Japanese attitude changed at the transition of identity narratives of the state from China-centred to Taiwan-centred in the 1990s and 2000s. Over the last two decades, a pro-colonial attitude has emerged in the field of conservation, coinciding with prominent research on Taiwan history (Taylor 2005). Increasingly, Japanese remains have been nominated as sites of national or regional heritage. In addition to the factors of Taiwan’s intense commercial and tourism connections with Japan, the Japanese heritage sites represent a collective mentality, intensified by the new political propaganda of national identity building in the Republic of China (Zhonghua mingguo 中華民國 ROC) under the Democratic Progressive Party (Minzhu jinbu dang 民主進步黨 DPP). As asserted by Wang (2004), in order to shape a uniquely Taiwanese culture, a new model of multiculturalism replaced Chinese nationalism, proclaiming a Taiwan national identity. In this regard, the Japanese remains are valued as ‘heritage’ which represent a component of Taiwanese identity. Furthermore, this is interwoven into the regional and local identities that construct regional heritage. Within this complex, a past

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**Fig. 2.3.1** Part of the torii (sacred gate) of the Tongxiao Shinto Shrine. In this picture the year of the construction of the shrine, written on the torii according to the Japanese counting system for years, has been scratched off. This sort of postwar defacing is a typical of many contemporary Japanese sites. Photo was taken by the author.

2.3.2 How Colonial Remnants Became Heritage: reading the numbers

As mentioned earlier, cultural heritage is a new, western concept translated into a Taiwanese context.
Data analysis of this section provides hard evidence on how the ideology of ‘heritage’ has been appropriated in the political and social context of Taiwan, and how Japanese colonial sites have gradually become heritage of Taiwan.

The analysis in this section is based on three figures. Figure 1 and 2 show the number of sites that were designated as guji (historic monuments) and historic buildings each year since 1983, the initial year of the Cultural Preservation Act. Figure 3 shows the number of Japanese sites that were designated as historic monuments and historic buildings each year105 from 1985 to 2008. The year 2008 was the last year of the DPP’s (Democratic Progress Party 民進黨) reign, in which much attention was given to the ‘subjectivity of Taiwan’ through community-building projects. Both tables provide crucial information not only about the conceptualisation process of cultural heritage in Taiwan, but also about the changing perceptions of Japanese remains and their close relationship to the state community-building projects.

Data Collection

The quantitative data in the figures is based on three main sources. The first source is the statistical account in The Almanac of Taiwan Cultural Heritage Conservation: Monuments, Historical Buildings, Human Settlement, Archaeological Sites, Cultural Landscapes, Traditional Arts, Folklore and Related Artifacts, Antiquities (Wenhua zichan baocun nianjian 文化資產保存年鑑), 2001 to 2008. The series was officially published by the state cultural heritage department, the Headquarters Administration of Cultural Heritage (HACH 文化資產總管理處), and provides annual statistic data on cultural properties including the number of historic monuments and historic buildings. However, this almanac has only been in publication since 2001. As for statistics prior to 2001, this study has relied on another source: the Retrospection List of Guji on the Past Twenty Years Period106 included in The Almanac of Taiwan Cultural Heritage Conservation 2002. Another list collected in the 2006 Almanac. The Overall List of Different kinds of Cultural Properties (2006各類文化資產總清冊), also provides detailed data for comparison and further examination. The third main data source is the official website of the HACH. This is the most up to date version of the cultural heritage list. There are concerns about the accuracy of the data, however, because of the changing nature of online information. Nevertheless, this online database is of great help when selecting cases according to different categories. The primary list of ‘colonial sites’107 in this section comes from the database.

105. The term ‘Japanese period related historic monuments and historic buildings’ refers to the historic monuments and historic buildings that were constructed during the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945). They can not be simplified as ‘colonial heritage’ since many of them have Japanese associations such as the architectural or decorative forms, yet were designed or built by local architects or local businessmen.


107. The primary list was established only with the criteria of ‘construction time’. Hence ‘colonial sites’ here refers to the sites constructed during the Japanese colonial period, including the architecture built by the Japanese rulers, by Taiwanese businessmen or the traditional Han residences and shrines built by local families. These sites are not necessarily examples of the ‘colonial heritage’ discussed in the previous section.
2.3.2.1. Interpreting the Increase of Guji Designation in 1985 (Figure 1 and 2)

The emerging significance of cultural heritage

After the proclamation of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (文化資產保存法) in 1982, the first list of Historic Monuments (guji 古蹟) was published in 1983 and included 15 sites.¹⁰⁸ According to Chen Qi-lu 陳其祿¹⁰⁹, the first Minister of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA), the 1983 designation of sites as guji was based on a preliminary list provided by the Ministry of the Interior (內政部). Before the official legislation of the Cultural Heritage

¹⁰⁸. 五妃廟、金廣福公館、彰化孔子廟、王得禄墓、台北府城北門、鳳山郡舊城、大天后宮、邱良功母節孝坊 (Council for Cultural Affairs 1986)

Preservation Law, the controlling organization of historic preservation, the Department of Civil Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior (內政部民政司), started to collect recommendation lists from the municipal governments. The Minister selected 53 sites as provisional ‘First Level Historic Monuments’ (第一級古跡) from a list of more than 300 recommendations from local governments, and sent the shortlist to the CCA for further examination. As a result, 15 sites were designated as First Level Historic Monuments by the Minister of the Interior in 1983, after field assessments conducted by the CCA. In 1985, a list of Second and Third Level monuments was announced. 206 sites were added to the official list. It is noteworthy that the recommendation lists collected from municipal governments during this period matched the field results of Lin Heng-dao 林衡道, published in Taiwan Historica, Taiwan Folkways and numerous books of field visits and guide information. Lin’s influence on historic preservation cannot be ignored, and his attitude toward the question of what can be valued as a historic monument is reflected in the official designation list.

As mentioned previously, the question of what can be valued as cultural heritage is inseparable from the concept of what is historic. Most Taiwanese sites did not qualify as ‘antiquity’ under the China-centred conceptualisation in the postwar era. The local culture and history of Taiwan could only permeate the official version of the past by strengthening Taiwan’s historical connection to China. Historical preservation reflects this strategy. The publication and frequent activities of Lin Heng-dao gradually helped enable the inclusion of the vernacular architectures of Taiwan within the category of cultural heritage by interpreting them as a branch of Chinese architectural culture. However, none of Japanese colonial sites was included in the list. As Lin claimed, “the constructions created by Japanese during the colonial era cannot be qualified as historic monuments, only the ones showing resistances of our people against Japanese occupation can be historic monuments. Our China has to be the subject of the historic monument of Japanese occupation period” (Taiwan Historica 1974, 96; my translation).112

Around the time of the announcement of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, the modern concept of ‘cultural heritage’ appeared in public discourse, and historic preservation was gradually directed away from the postwar focus on guji and guwu (古蹟古物), to a holistic concern with cultural significance. In 1981, Chen Qi-lu, the first chief of the Council for Cultural Affairs, stressed that “cultural heritage doesn’t have to fine and splendid, and doesn’t have to be old. It is identified by showing its significance and value to national culture” (Taiwan Folkways 1982: 32: 4: 88; my translation).114 This transition from individual objects to cultural significance was reflected in the 1982 Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, and resulted in changes in practice and value, as more categories were included in cultural heritage such as natural resources, folk arts and artifacts. The local culture and natural landscape of Taiwan had now been officially recognised as ‘heritage’. Furthermore, the new concept of cultural heritage encompassed neighbouring countries, especially Japan (Taiwan Folkways 1984, 81; 1982: 32: 2). Yet the Japanese influence was not attributed to the colonial legislation (Preservation Law for the Special Places of Scenic Beauty, Historic Sites and Natural Monuments; 史跡名勝天然記念物保存法), but to visits and international conferences in the 1970s. ‘Culture’ was linked to ‘nation’ in the discourses of leading figures, and appeared as a sign of an ‘advanced’ country in the 1970s and 80s.115

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110. According to Urban Planning Studio of National Taiwan University Graduate School of Civil Engineering 1980, 11.
111. Lin visited and recorded historical sites all over Taiwan. His field results have been published and had great influence in public understanding of historic sites and local history. The publications include The Origin of Historic Sites in Taiwan (臺灣史跡源流), Brief Introduction of Historic Monuments in Taiwan (臺灣古跡概觀), Visiting Record of Popular Sites in Taiwan (臺灣路邊採訪冊), Guidebook on Historic Sites and Resorts Along the Roads in Taiwan (臺灣公路史跡名勝之導遊) etc.
112. The original text is “舊時日本人留下的建築物不算古蹟，而我們同意抗日的材料才算是古蹟。舊時的古蹟，必須以我們中國自己為主體。” (Taiwan Historica 1974, 96)
113. The original text is “文化資產不必一定要精緻華麗，也不一定要年代久遠，主要在於其是否有民族文化的意義和價值”.
114. This is part of his speech "How to preserve cultural heritage"(如何保存文化資產) at the 21st Taiwan Studies Symposium in 1981.
115. For instance, see the presentation by Ma Yi-gong 马以工
lu’s speech in 1981 also used examples of Japan, Korea and Germany to emphasize importance of heritage preservation. He warned that if people continued to ignore (natural) heritage preservation, then “we are far from the way to a great nation of culture” (Taiwan Folkways 1982, 89). This connection between culture and being an advanced country has continued in the discourses of leading government figures in the 1990s and 2000s as shown in section 2.2. Japan is of particular importance to the government leaders of Taiwan, whether as an enemy or a partner.

Colonial constructions and cultural heritage

Despite the fact that the concept of cultural heritage opened up in the 1980s, Japanese colonial constructions were still surrounded by controversy. Until the debate on renovating the former Taoyuan Shinto Shrine in 1985, Japanese sites were not considered ‘heritage’.116 Under the surveillance of the postwar KMT government, the conservation of this Japanese shrine became entangled with the debate of loyalty to the country (aiguo愛國). Shinto shrines were a symbol of the colonial devil and of the Japanese invasion of China during the Sino-Japanese Wars.117 The conflicting attitudes toward Japanese sites had not changed a decade later. One of the representative examples of this ambiguous situation was the Taoyuan Martyrs’ Shrine, the former Taoyuan Shinto Shrine. The original building of the shrine was eventually preserved after debates in 1985; however, it was designated as a historic monument not until 1994, and the renaming of the building from Taoyuan Martyrs’ Shrine to Taoyuan Shinto Shrine still faced strong objection in 2007.118 A veteran group (rongmin榮民), who were retired KMT army men who had retreated from China to Taiwan with the KMT party, criticised the renaming act by the county cultural bureau as an act of “fawning on Japan” (meiri媚日). It shows that even in the 2000s, Japanese colonial sites were still a politically contested arena in Taiwan.

The fact that Japanese colonial buildings were included in the category of cultural heritage in Taiwan can be linked to research on ‘modern architecture’ (近代建築). Colonial architecture was not recognised as guji and was still a sensitive issue in the 1980s, as seen in a speech on Modern Architecture in Taiwan (臺灣的近代建築) delivered by the architectural scholar Li Qian-lang 李乾朗 at the 17th Symposium of Taiwan Studies in January 1981.119 ‘Modern architecture’, as defined by Li, meant architectural constructions by foreign influences. In...

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116. See note 61.
117. Here: the wars between Japan and China around the time of Second World War.
118. See “Incident of Preserving the Taoyuan Shinto Shrine” at website of the Encyclopaedia of Taiwan (台灣大百科全書「桃園神社保存事件」): http://210.69.67.10/web/index (accessed 2 November 2010)
the case of Taiwan, he said, this appeared first in 1860, when the Western powers came to Taiwan during Xianfeng’s (咸豐) Qing (清) reign, and has lasted through the postwar and to the contemporary period (see also Li 1980). A large number of Japanese sites were included in the category. This speech shows that the study of colonial architecture itself was hidden under the larger rubric of modern architecture in the 1980s. In his investigation report for Ministry of Interior in 1993 Li explicitly placed his investigation in the context of modern architecture on the buildings constructed in the Japanese period (Ministry of Interior 1993). This interpretation of ‘modern architecture’ which nearly equals to Japanese colonial architecture was continued and became greatly influential in later years.

Emerging Local Governments

Prior to 1985, the entire process of designating a historic monument was under the control of the central government. That is to say, the Ministry of the Interior (Neizheng Bu 内政部) hired professionals and scholars to visit the sites and to propose a list of provisional historic monuments. Based on this list, the Council for Cultural Affairs invited other professionals to re-examine the listed sites, and return the results to the Ministry of the Interior for designation. This procedure was changed in 1985. The municipal and Zhixia municipal governments were made responsible for the primary investigations, and proposed the potential list to the Taiwan Provincial Government (the county and city governments) and the Ministry of the Interior (Zhixia municipal governments) for further examination. The results came to the Ministry of the Interior for final evaluation. The ministry would then announce the list of designation, and the level of each individual site. This process was changed again after the modification of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act in 1997. A tendency towards decentralisation was a defining feature in the development of heritage policy, and this was in accordance with the emerging importance of local politics. As shown in the Figure 1 and 2, the number of designated guji increased significantly in 1998. Most of these sites are municipal-level monuments.

2.3.2.2. Japanese colonial construction in the era of localism (Figure 3)

Several moments in time in figure 3 are worth paying attention to. First, in 1991 for the first time two colonial buildings – Kangyo Bank (勧業銀行) and Tainan Court (台南法院) – were designated as guji. 1991 was the first year in which Japanese sites were formally recognised as ‘heritage’.

The change in perspective which led to the recognition of Japanese remnants as heritage was closely linked to the growing research field of modern architecture. In 1976, the Architectural Institute of Japan (日本建築学会) initiated a five-year project of investigating modern architectures in Japan and former colonies; 123 pieces of Japanese colonial architectures in Taiwan were included in the final publication. This was the origin of research on modern architecture in Taiwan (Huang Jun-ming 1997, 7). As noted by Huang (1997), Taiwanese researcher, Guo Zhong-duan 郭中端 assisted the survey of the architectural Institute of Japan in Taiwan. In 1986, Japanese architectural scholars Toshi, Kenchiku (藤木健) and three in 1988 (台北賓館、經濟護國禪寺、澎湖二崁陳宅). Most sites were not considered to be ‘colonial heritage’, and the designating year of two sites associated with ‘colonial heritage’ (台北賓館、經濟護國禪寺) were recorded incorrectly. The correct year would be 1998 for both sites. Please Refer to the official website of Headquarters Administration of Cultural Heritage: http://www.hach.gov.tw/


123. Prior to 1991, three sites constructed during Japanese colonial era were designated as historic monuments in 1985 (馬偕墓、臺中林氏宗祠、臺中張家祖廟) and three in 1988 (台北賓館、經濟護國禪寺、澎湖二崁陳宅). Most sites were not considered to be ‘colonial heritage’, and the designating year of two sites associated with ‘colonial heritage’ (台北賓館、經濟護國禪寺) were recorded incorrectly. The correct year would be 1998 for both sites. Please Refer to the official website of Headquarters Administration of Cultural Heritage: http://www.hach.gov.tw/


120. The Treaty of Tien-tsin 天津條約 was signed between Qing Dynasty and The Second French Empire, United Kingdom, Russian Empire, and the United States in 1858. Taiwan (here refers to Anping 南平, a port in southern Taiwan) was one of the Chinese ports required to be opened for opium import. Christian missionary activities were also allowed in Qing territory after this treaty.

121. (Direct-Controlled Municipality) means cities directly managed by central government. Before December 2010, only two cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung City were categorized as Zhixia City in Taiwan.
1991.125 This was the first general survey on Japanese modern architecture by cooperating with Asian architectural researchers. The association published two field investigations reports, one in 1990 and another in 1993. Architectural professionals Li Qing-lang, Huang Qiu-yue, Guo Zhong-duan, and Huang Jun-ming were assigned by the Ministry of the Interior and the National Science Council respectively to investigate sites of modern architecture on the main island of Taiwan. Li Qian-lang investigated the Japanese colonial era between 1895 and 1945. He stated in the foreword of the report that “modern architecture [...] is honest evidence recording modern history; it is also a part of the Taiwanese culture” (Li 1994a, 2). Li’s words show that the criteria for what can be considered ‘historic’ had changed, at least in architectural professional circles and the head heritage administrative departments of the central government. The number of colonial period buildings that were designated as historic monuments increased steadily between 1991 and 1997, showing the gradual transition of state attitudes toward the colonial remains. This attitude was in accordance with the scholarly re-conceptualization of Japanese colonial buildings as of modern architecture.

A sudden increase in 1998

All figure 1, 2 and 3 show a great increase in the number of historic monuments in 1998. Out of the 70 newly added sites, 44 were designated by the Taipei City Government. It is worth noting that only 7 of these sites are State Designated Level (guoding), while the others are Municipal Designated Level (xianshiding). The modification of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act in 1997 made Taipei City, and other municipal governments, a powerful actor in the designating process.

The 1997 modification of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act changed the definition of the classification of guji (historic monuments) from ‘historic significance’ to ‘administrative hierarchy’. In the modified version of the Preservation Law, the original classification of First, Second and Third Level was changed to State Designated (國定), Provincial and Zhixia Municipal Government Designated (省及直轄市定) and Municipal Government Designated (縣市定). After 1999, when the Taiwan Provincial Government (台灣省政府) was formally relegated to a small administrative unit belonged to the Administrative Yuan, the middle level, Provincial and Zhixia Municipal Government Designated, was changed to Zhixia Municipal Government Designated (直轄市定). The title of each level refers to its controlling organization. That is to say, the municipal governments of Zhixia cities and counties were enabled to organise their own guji examination committees, and designate and manage the historic monuments within their administrative regions. If they believe a certain monument to be highly valuable, they can put forward a proposal to the Ministry of The Interior for the monument to be upgraded to state designated monument. Within this legal framework, the Taipei City Government has the power to select its own heritage. What is noteworthy here is that most of the sites on the 1998 list of Taipei City were created during the Japanese colonial era. Moreover, the mayor of Taipei in 1998 was Chen Shui-bian, a member of the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party 民進黨) who are concerned with localism.

125. The two reports are: Overview of Modern Architecture in Taiwan: North Taiwan (台灣現代建築概覽—台灣北部卷) (1990) and Overview of Modern Architecture in Taiwan: West, South and East Taiwan (台灣現代建築概覽—台灣西、南、東部卷) (1991).
By the end of 1990s, a considerable number of designated historic monuments had connections to the Japanese past.\(^\text{129}\) This confirms that the attitude of local governments toward Japanese remnants changed in the 1990s compared to the 80s when the preservation of Taoyuan Shinto Shrine still provoked fierce debates between county government and council. This transition can be observed in the increasing number of local government survey projects on colonial-period architecture. For instance, in 1994 the Tainan (台南) City Government commissioned architectural scholar Fu Chao-qing (傅朝卿) to investigate and record the historical buildings in Tainan city, and the results were in 1995. Taoyuan (桃園) County Cultural Centre asked researcher Huang Jun-ming (黃俊銘) in 1996 to conduct a survey on architectural construction during the Japanese era within Taoyuan county (黃俊銘 1997). As Fu recalled, “the negative attitude toward Japanese architecture gradually improved in the second half of 1990s. This owes to designation of much architecture as legitimate cultural heritage; and owes to the emerging trend of ‘rehabilitation’ (再利用) which gave the chance of rebirth to the colonial architectures” (2009, 3; my translation). However, most of the Japanese colonial buildings could not be included in the heritage list until the creation of a new legal category after 1999.

*Historic buildings as heritage*

On 21 September 1999, Taiwan was hit by an enormous earthquake. Traumatic scenes from the 9-21 earthquake were deeply inscribed in the minds of the Taiwanese. In October, a Cultural Heritage Rescue Team was organised by professionals and scholars, and relevant issues were hotly discussed. The subject of finding a legal status for historic buildings, the provisional *guji* which had no legal support, many of which were damaged in the earthquake, urged the state government to revise the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act. A new category of ‘historic building’ finally appeared in the new version in February 2000.\(^\text{130}\) This new category opens up space for many Japanese buildings, which were not old enough to be qualified as *guji* yet are rich in historic or local significance. The definition of heritage in Taiwan’s context was widened by the great diversity of these historic buildings. Among the number of designated historic buildings, Japanese colonial constructions now occupy a large proportion. This is the reason for the considerable increase after 2000 shown by Figure 3.

After the earthquake, rescue work and field surveys were organised by professional circles and encouraged with state funds. Subsidies\(^\text{131}\) were arranged by the state government for restoring historic buildings of private ownership or owned by local governments. Lists of historic buildings suitable for financial support were proposed by local governments. Once the buildings had been included in the list of state subsidies, they had to be registered as ‘historic buildings’ (歷史建築) on the cultural heritage list. The number of historic buildings gradually increased, and between 2002 and 2004, the number reached a climax. The number dropped in 2005, before increasing yet again in 2006 after the revision of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act in late 2005. This quantitative change is closely related to the trend of ‘rehabilitation’ (再利用).\(^\text{132}\)

The projects of Rehabilitating Unused Spaces (閒置空間再利用) and Planning and Promoting the Rehabilitation and Conservation of Historic Buildings (歷史建築保存再利用之策劃與推動) were listed in the 2001 annual budget of the CCA (Council for Cultural Affairs). In 2002, the budget of both projects was replaced by A Town, A Museum of Living Culture (一鄉鎮一生活文館),\(^\text{133}\) a six-year project in-

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129. In 1999, 15 out of 40, and in 2000, 14 out of 34 were historic monuments built in the Japanese era.


131. For example, The Cultural Heritage Budget of the "Special Budget of Reconstruction after 9-21 Earthquake" (九二一震災復原特殊預算之文化資產預算). According to *The Almanac of Taiwan Cultural Heritage Conservation 2001*, the budget for cultural heritage occupied 3.7% of the total amount (NTD 72,758,795,000) of the Special Budget of Reconstruction after 9-21 Earthquake. See page 108 of the Almanac.

132. It means ‘to renovate and reuse the old buildings in stead of building new ones’.

133. From 2002 to 2007, the budget reached NTD 816,000,000 in total. This number is according to *The Almanac of Taiwan Cultural Heritage Conservation 2002*, page 117.
cluded in the larger scheme of the ‘Community Building Affairs’ (社區總體營造業務). The project was renamed ‘Local Museums’ (地方文化館) later in 2002. Supported by an enormous amount of state subsidies, local governments registered and restored historic buildings in the period from 2000 to 2007. Moreover, this fashion of rehabilitation was accompanied by a trend of leasing cultural sites for private sector operations (委外經營).\textsuperscript{134}

\textit{Rehabilitating the Unused Spaces and Community Building}

As mentioned in Section 2.2, the project of Local Museums (地方文化館) was part of the Integrated Community-Making Programme. The CCA provides subsidies for local governments and private organisations to rehabilitate unused spaces in the local area. The programmes can involve exhibition halls, community spaces, folk art centres etc. The applicant can apply for funds to restore old buildings and accommodate operating programmes. Many historic buildings have been selected by local governments or community organisations as targets for funding. After the 9-21 earthquake in 1999, community building was re-stressed in places that had suffered damage because of the earthquake. Simultaneously, the Japanese examples of \textit{machizukuri} and Miyazaki’s ‘area revitalization’ were appreciated by the state government. The CCA project of Local Museums was one strategy to use cultural artefacts for community building and improving the local economy. Each year, the editorial board of \textit{The Almanac of Taiwan Cultural Heritage Conservation} invites heritage professionals and scholars to vote for the ten most important events regarding cultural heritage affairs of the year. Two events, ‘Rehabilitating Unused Spaces Comes into Fashion’ and ‘The CCA Actively Pushes Forward the Project to Establish Local Cultural Halls’, were selected separately among the Ten Major Events of the Year 2002 and 2003. As stated by Chen Ji-min (陳濟民), a staff of the CCA, “the Project of Local Museums effectively explores local cultural resources in order to display the rich and multiple cultural uniqueness of Taiwan, to shape the aesthetic cultural spaces in the local, and to increase the tourist resources of the local.\textsuperscript{135} The project of Local Museum was expected to be able to implement diverse political, civil and economic objectives of the state in local areas.

\textit{Constructing the subjectivity of Taiwan}

Using historic spaces to incorporate multiple community-building objectives has been stressed by the state government in 2000s, especially during the reign of Chen Qi-nan as minister of the CCA from 2004 to 2006. Chen has been a leading figure of community building since the initial year of the programme in 1994, and has continued to be concerned with the community-building progress in his job as Minister without Portfolio at the Executive Yuan. In the preface of \textit{The Almanac of Taiwan Cultural Heritage Conservation 2004}, he stated his policy objectives and the crucial role which cultural heritage was expected to play in achieving the objectives. He listed ‘extending cultural citizenship, reconstructing the subjectivity of Taiwan and establishing the value of diversity (multiplicity)’ (文化公民權的伸張，台灣主體性的重建與多元價值觀的建立) as three major areas of work for the CCA. Cultural heritage, as he noted, is an “important catalyst for cultural citizenship, resource for constructing subjectivity of Taiwan, and proof for the value of diversity. It is the core to bind the three objectives”.\textsuperscript{136} In order to achieve the mission, a programme named Constructing the Subjectivity of Taiwan was proposed by the CCA. This programme comprises projects concerning cultural events, world heritage and Taiwan landscape images. Historic spaces were continually invested in with state funds, and served as the sites of memory for the new nation in order to stimulate the growth of proud citizens. Japanese sites represent the value of diversity, and many have been ‘unused spaces’ existing in local daily lives because their time of creation was not too long ago. Colonial sites were refashioned to serve large state programmes, for instance the Huashan Art Special District (華山...

\textsuperscript{134} Please refer to \textit{The Almanac of Taiwan Cultural Heritage Conservation 2004}, page 9.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{The Almanac of Taiwan Cultural Heritage Conservation 2002}, page 8.

\textsuperscript{136} Chen Qi-nan, \textit{The Almanac of Taiwan Cultural Heritage Conservation 2004}, Preface; my translation.
Aside from showing the outcome of heritagizing Japanese sites in Taiwan in the 1990s and 2000s, I aim to first present the social dynamics underneath this period of heritage making. I argue that despite the fact that the state indeed plays a core role in heritage politics, there is no one-way process from state promotion to reception by the local public. Through memory approach, every actor in the process of heritage-making is actively contributing. This process is always dynamic: people at the local level do not naively receive the will of the state. Rather, they may respond to it and use it strategically. Second, I hope to identify the complexity of turning coloniality into locality through case studies in order to contribute to a better decolonized interpretation and to avoid taking for granted Japaneseness during heritage activities. Third, I suggest that, as shown by case studies in this thesis, the developmentist mentality underneath cultural policies and heritage practices within the framework of community-building obstructs grassroots’ humanistic initiatives, and eventually creates a ‘spectacle consumerism’ marked by homogeneity rather than locality and diversity.

137. See Lü Xin-yi 2002.