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Tradition and innovation in
*De secundis intentionibus* 1–II

In *De secundis intentionibus* Hervaeus starts with an extensive exposition of the notion of *intentio*, because in the contemporary debate this notion was by no means clear. The senses of ‘intention’ as the act of the intellect and as the intelligible species were confused not only with each other, but also with ‘intention’ as a concrete object such as ‘man’, and in the sense of a relation such as ‘universality’. We could also say that intentions as real beings were confused with intentions as rational beings, or that intentions as pertaining to the knowing subject were confused with intentions as pertaining to the known thing. Hervaeus’ treatise was a reaction not only to the tradition before him, which had been dominated by Thomas Aquinas and his views on intentions within the cognitive process, but also to those of his contemporaries who misinterpreted (at least in Hervaeus’ eyes) the ontological status of the intention and its role in the cognitive process, due to their confusion about the different meanings of the term ‘*intentio*’. A clear example of the latter case is the opponent who is painstakingly refuted by Hervaeus in *Dist.* 11. This opponent defends the theory that intentions taken abstractly are acts of the intellect, and intentions taken concretely are the known things themselves. In his refutation Hervaeus explains in which sense an act of the intellect or a known thing can or cannot be called an intention. Considering the striking similarity between their theories his anonymous opponent probably was Radulphus Brito. Therefore, I will discuss Radulphus’ theory of intentions in the third part of this section.

However, in order to understand Hervaeus’ distinction between intelligible species on the one hand and intentions in a particular sense on the other, we should first have a general idea of the relation between the intelligible species and the intention as it was conceived by Thomas Aquinas and Hervaeus’ contemporaries. In cognitive theories of the time the two notions are closely interrelated; Thomas Aquinas even identifies them in an early stage of his thought. Here, too, Hervaeus wishes to draw a sharp
distinction, namely between the sense in which an intelligible species can be called an intention and the sense in which it cannot be so called.

The first part of this section will contain a summary of Thomas Aquinas’ theory of cognition; the second part will offer some more detail on the views on intelligible species of Hervaeus’ contemporaries other than Radulphus Brito.

For a proper appreciation of the similarities and differences between Hervaeus on the one hand and Thomas, Radulphus and Durandus on the other we must bear in mind that, unlike them, Hervaeus was not primarily concerned with the epistemology and ontology of second intentions as such, but with intentions as the subject of logic. This explains why Hervaeus pays most attention to that specific type of intention which is the subject of logic, and to a clear delineation of this type as opposed to the other types of intention, whereas Thomas concentrates on the function of the intention in the cognitive process as he conceives it, contrasting the intention with the other elements in this process.

4.1. Thomas Aquinas

4.1.1. The process of cognition in Thomas Aquinas

Thomas’ incorporation of elements from the recently rediscovered Aristotelian philosophy as well as Augustinian Christian faith into his own theological and philosophical thought excited much opposition during his lifetime and the first decades after his death.1 His ideas were not accepted uncritically even within his own order, as reflected in the repeated official decrees about a strict adherence to Thomas’ teachings.2 Moreover, Hervaeus was by no means the only Dominican to adjust Thomas’ ideas to suit his own views, while at the same time vigorously defending Thomas against his opponents. In order to understand Thomas’ ideas about intentions, we need to take a close look at his epistemology. How exactly does cognition take place, what kinds of entities

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1 As shown, for example, by the condemnation of elements of his doctrine in 1277 by Bishop Tempier (a condemnation retracted as far as Thomas’ doctrine was concerned by Tempier’s successor, Bourret, shortly after Thomas’ canonisation). See also Knowles, ‘The historical context of the philosophical work of St Thomas Aquinas’, Decorte, Waarheid als weg, 173 ff., and Thijsen, Censure and Heresy, 52–56.

2 Koch notes this in his ‘Jakob von Metz, O.P.’, 169.
are involved in the cognitive process, and how are these entities related to each other?

In agreement with the traditional Aristotelian view Thomas holds that the senses are the source of our knowledge. Through the medium of the senses the mind receives impressions from extra-mental particular objects; by abstraction these impressions are converted into universal knowledge.¹

In his earlier works Thomas more or less identifies the intelligible species with the mental or inner word, the verbum mentis (also named conceptus, conceptio, or intentio), which is the significate of the external word.⁴ Even then, a division can be found: the species is a simple intuition, a direct knowledge of something, which can be imperfect; whereas the mental word, which has a higher grade of perfection, is the illuminated species.⁵ In Thomas' later works this division becomes more marked, until the intelligible species and the intention come to be considered as two entities with different roles in the cognitive process, even though they are both resemblances of the known object.⁶ Thomas now

3 Thomas explains this complicated process in, among other works, his commentary on the Sentences (1 27, it 11, 34, III 23), in De veritate (4, 11, 12, 15), Summa contra gentiles (1 53, it 11, 14, it 75, iv 11), De potentia (2, 7, 8, 9), Summa theologica (1 17, 78, 84–85, 89, II 2, 98, III 9), In II De anima, and Compendium theologiae (1 37). For Thomas Aquinas on cognition, see De Petter, ‘Intentionaliteit en identiteit’; Hayen, L'intentionnel selon Saint Thomas; Maritain, Distinguer pour unir ou Les degrés du savoir; Kenny, ‘Intellect and Imagination in Aquinas’; Wéber, L'homme en discussion à l'Université de Paris en 1270, Moreau, De la connaissance selon S. Thomas d'Aquin; Panaccio, ‘From mental word to mental language’ and Le discours intérieur, and De Rijk, Giralda Odonis vol. ii, ch. ii. On the agent and possible intellect, see Moreau and Wéber (L'homme). On the mental word, see Paissac, Theologie du Verbe; Meissner, ‘Some Aspects of the verbum in the texts of St. Thomas’; 1–30; Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas; Lisska, ‘Axioms of Intentionality in Aquinas’s Theory of Knowledge; Wéber, Le Christ selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin; and Panaccio, Les mots, les concepts et les choses. On the intelligible species, see Spruit, Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. On logic in general, see McInerny, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St Thomas; and Schmidt, The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. On logical intentions, see McInerny and Schmidt, and Simonin, ‘La notion d’intentio dans l’œuvre de S. Thomas d’Aquin’. On intentions and species, see Hayen, Chènevert, ‘Le verbum dans le Commentaire sur les Sentences de St Thomas d’Aquin’ and Wéber (L’homme). For a detailed bibliography, see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d’Aquino and Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin.

4 ScG iv 11; De pot. 7, 6c.

5 Sent. 1 27, 2 a. 2. See also Paissac, 139.

6 For this change in Thomas Aquinas, see Paissac (e.g. 138–140, 185–187), Chènevert, ‘Le verbum dans le Commentaire sur les Sentences de St Thomas d’Aquin’, 195–210 and Panaccio, ‘From mental word to mental language’ (127). Spruit ignores this
explains them as being the principle and the finishing point or the term (terminus) of the act of cognition, respectively. The intelligible species can serve as a starting point for such an act; the intellect works upon this intelligible species, so that the real thing now is represented to the intellect as a mental word (or concept, or intention).  

For Thomas then, the process of cognition involves four different items:

- The known thing, for example the external object, which does not remain totally passive in the cognitive process;
- The act of knowing or understanding;
- The intelligible species, which is not id quod intelligitur, that which is known, but id quo intelligitur, that by which the object is known. It is the quiditas, the essence or nature of the external object. The intelligible species can of course itself become the object of knowledge in a reflexive act of the intellect;
- The intention, to be distinguished from the other three, also called 'verbum mentis', 'mental word'.

change in Thomas Aquinas in his chapter about intelligible species (156–174); in his summary of the function of intelligible species in the cognitive process according to Thomas Aquinas he does not mention the clear explanations provided by McInerny, Schmidt and Panaccio (see ScG, n. 8). Nor does De Rijk (Giraldis Odonis vol. ii) mention this change in Thomas.

For the distinction between intelligere in a broad and a narrow sense ('thinking' or the formation and expression of any belief, and 'understanding' or the grasping of essences (273–275)), see Anthony Kenny, 'Intellect and Imagination in Aquinas'. Here we are of course concerned with the narrow sense of the word.

Cf. Hervaeus, De intellectu et specie (ed. Stella): ‘[…] videtur mihi […] quod verbum mentale non sit idem quod actus intelligendi. […] Sic igitur videtur mihi probabiliter quod verbum mentale sit diversum realiter ab actu intelligendi’ (147) (‘[…] it would seem that the mental verb is not the act of knowing […] Therefore, it seems probable that the mental verb is really different from the act of knowing’).

The Word is an emanation, a manifestation, a product; it is the Son of the Divine Mind, just as the mental word is a product and manifestation of our minds. The
4. TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN DE SECUNDIS INTENTIONIBUS

We will now have a closer look at the properties and functions of the fourth entity, the intention, as it figures in Thomas’ epistemology.

4.1.2. Intention in Thomas Aquinas

In Summa contra Gentiles IV 11, Thomas defines intentio as ‘id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta’ (that which the intellect in itself conceives of the known thing). The name of ‘intention’ conveys its function, says Thomas: ‘Intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significat in aliud tendere’ (from the sound of the name itself, it is clear that ‘intention’ means ‘reaching toward something else’). Alternative names, conveying different aspects, are intentio intellecta, conceptio or conceptus, verbum, ratio, notitia.

As one of the four different factors involved in the process of cognition the intention must be distinguished from the intelligible species. Both the species and the intention are a similitudo or likeness, but the species is the principle of a cognitive act, whereas the intention is the result of a cognitive act. As such, the intention is a likeness and a representation of the known thing. The intention is also called an ‘internal word’, the significate of an external word. In Thomas’ own formulation: the intention is that which is known, and the species is that by which it is known. This is another indication that intention and species are not mental word is essentially relative (see also Schmidt 171), it is not essentially a real thing in itself, just as a son (or the Son) is essentially relative because he derives all of his existence as a son from his being related to a father (or the Father). In this way Thomas Aquinas tries to solve the problem of the unity of the Three Persons in God (Paissac 126–128, 185ff.). For the comparison between Christ and the mental word, see also Weber, Le Christ selon St. Thomas d’Aquin, especially part 2: ‘Le verbe, terme du chemin’ (45–68). For Hervaeus on the verbum in relation to God, see his De verbo (ed. Venice 1513), q. IV (esp. f. 22r–24r).

S/T_h. 1-11 12, 1c. Radulphus and Hervaeus use the same definition of the term ‘intentio’ (20, 22n., 23, 33, 34, §16). For Thomas Aquinas on intentionality and esse intentionale, see Peter Sheehan, ‘Aquinas on Intentionality’ and Anthony J. Lisska, ‘Axioms of Intentionality in Aquinas’s Theory of Knowledge’.

ScG 1 53; De pot. 8, 1; ScG IV 11; STh. 1 34, 1 ad 2. Thomas Aquinas sometimes (STh. 1 85, 1 ad 4; In De an. III 8, n. 718) uses ‘intentio intellecta’ as opposed to ‘intentio intelligibilis’, by which he means the ‘species intelligibilis’. Schmidt, 103: ‘The use of the term intention to mean the intelligible species is comparatively rare and seems to be looked upon by Aquinas as a less proper use than the remaining two, designating the intentio intellecta or ‘internal word’ and the logical intention’.

De pot. 8 a. 1. 17
De pot. 8, 1; De verit. 4, 2; see also ScG 1 53.
18
ScG IV 11; De pot. 8 a. 1; ScG IV 11.
19
STh. 1 85, 2.
20
identical, just as the fact that the species remains in the intellect after the act of cognition, while the intention does not. In the act of forming the intention, the intellect grasps the thing. The intention being formed is to be distinguished from the cognitive act in which it is formed, and also from the external thing that is known in this act.

What type of being should be attributed to an intention? An intention, says Thomas, is a rational being, having intelligible being only. The intention is devised or invented by the intellect and it is attributed to the object as known; it is even said to be identical with the known object. The intention is inherent in the intellect as an accident or quality. For an intention, to be is to be understood, and its being understood is its being abstracted.

4.1.3. Thomas on privations, negations and fictions

Thomas approaches the subject of privations, negations and fictions by means of the division between real or extra-mental being and rational or mental being. Because rational beings do not have real existence, they are forms of non-being. Non-being is divided into two categories: on the one hand negations and privations, which include non-existence in their...

22. ScG 1 53.
23. De verit. 4, 1.
24. In his article 'The Translation ofTerms like Ens Rationis' (The Modern Schoolman, 41 (1964), 73–75), and in the extensive note in his book The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas (52, n. 15), Schmidt translates 'ens rationis' by 'rationate being', and defends this choice by discussing the disadvantages of other options. He proposes 'rationate' for rationis since 'its form shows its dependence upon an operation; its root shows its affinity to reason; and its very rarity keeps it free from the ambiguity and confusions that attend most of the other translations that have been used.' De Rijk adopts this translation in Giralda Odonis vol. II, 76.
25. Comp. 1 41.
26. In Met. iv 4, n. 475; Comp. 1 41. Schmidt (168) translates 'adinvenire' by 'devise', 'contrive', 'invent', 'elaborate'.
27. Sent. iii 5, 1, 1 sol. 1.
28. Sent. i 33, 1, 1 ad 3; De pot. 7, 6c; ScG iv 11; Sent. iii 5, 1, 1 sol. 1; cf. De pot. 8, 1c; Quodl. vii 4c; ScG iv 11; StTh. 1, 85, 2 ad 2. Sorabji (243) says that 'an intention, according to both Thomas and his teacher Albert, can exist outside the observer in the medium [...], so that although an intention involves a message, it cannot imply as a matter of necessity awareness of that message.' The texts mentioned above clearly disprove the existence of intention outside the mind. For Hervaeus an intention can exist inside and outside the mind, depending on what type is meant (see e.g. table 1 and 2).
definition, and on the other things that do not include non-existence in their definition, such as fictions. Negations, privations and fictions are all dependent on the operation of the intellect: they owe their rational being to being the object of the intellect. Rational beings are also divided into beings that are founded on something outside the mind, such as universals, and beings that are not founded on anything outside the mind, such as chimeras.30

Since Thomas does not speak of intentions ex parte rei intellectae for which the word ‘intention’ is used denominatively, he could not have called negations or fictions ‘intentions’ in this specific sense. But it is interesting that Thomas separates being in the sense of belonging to one of the ten categories (which applies to entities with real existence) from being in the sense of having existence in the mind only. Privations and negations are beings in the second sense, not the first.31 Hervaeus has a different view here: he argues that privations and negations belong to the same category of being as their positive counterparts, which makes them intentions ex parte rei intellectae in a denominative sense. And unlike Thomas Hervaeus would have said that, in a way, fictions such as mountains of gold are founded on something outside the mind; this is not stated explicitly, but Hervaeus does say that the being of a combination follows the being of its constituent parts (even if the combination, as in this case, is impossible and has no real being), causing such a fiction to be a first intention ex parte rei intellectae in a denominative sense. Thus, on this point Hervaeus clearly differs from Thomas.

4.1.4. Thomas on relations, intentions and the subject of logic

According to Thomas there are three types of beings. The first type consists of real beings that have their foundation outside our thought; the second type consists of beings that do have a foundation outside our thought but are still dependent upon our minds (such as genus and species); the third type consists of beings that have no foundation except

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30 In Met. 9, n. 88g; De Verit. 3, 4 ad 6; STh. 1, 16, 3 ad 2; Sent. 1, 19, 5, 1 sol.
31 De ente et ess. c. 1, n. 2.
32 For relations in Thomas, see Schmidt (especially 130ff.) and Henninger (13ff.). For relations in Thomas, Jacob of Metz, Hervaeus and Durandus, see Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, 351–492 and Koch, ‘Jakob von Metz, O.P.’ 207ff. For relations in Durandus, Hervaeus and Aureolus, see Dewender, ‘Der ontologische Status der Relationen nach Durandus von St.-Pourçain, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureolii.’
our thought (these are fictional beings such as chimaeras). Intentions belong to the second type of being.\footnote{33}

A relation is explained by Thomas Aquinas as a thing’s being related to something else.\footnote{34} Alternative terms, each stressing different aspects of the concept, are *ordo*, *comparatio* and *habitudo*.\footnote{35} Thomas distinguishes two types of relations: a real relation (*relatio realis*) and a mere rational relation (*relatio rationis tantum*).\footnote{36} This division between relations is based on their respective foundations. In a real relation, the related terms need to be actually existing and separate, and one has to be really dependent upon the other. A relation that does not meet these conditions is a mere rational relation.\footnote{37}

\begin{quote}
'Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine homo; et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus et quod nomen significans illum intellectum proprí de re dicatur. Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similítudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi; rem quae est extra animam: et huiusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum huius nominis *genus* non est similítudo alciuius rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et huiusmodi intentionis, licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa' (*Sent.* 1 2, 1, 3 sol.).
\end{quote}

\footnote{33} Note that for Thomas (and Hervaeus) a relation involving knowledge is not something that holds between two things; it is not mutual; it is an accident of one thing to be related to another. See also Schmidt 137–138. *Propria relationis ratio consistit in eo quod est ad alterum* (*ScG IV* 14); *ratio ordinis unius ad alterum* (*De Pot.* 7, 1 oc).

\footnote{34} 'Sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio racionis consistit in ordine intellectuum' (*De Pot.* 7, 11c); 'Ratio propria relationis non accipitur secundum comparationem ad illud in quo est, sed secundum comparationem ad alicuius extra' (*Sth. I 28 a. 2c*); 'Ipse res naturalem ordinem et hatitudinem habent adinvicem' (*Sth. I 13 a. 7c*), 'Relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas' (*Sth. I 13 a. 7 ad 1*). As have seen, *habitudo* is a key notion in Hervaeus’ definitions of different kinds of intentions (§16 and passim). The expression *habere habitudinem ad* is explained by Thomas as ‘having a certain bearing or state with regard to’. See also Schmidt, 136.

\footnote{35} 'Sicut realis relationis consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relation racionis consistit in ordine intellectuum' (*De Pot.* 7, 11c).

\footnote{36} 'Relatio non habet esse naturale nisi ex hoc quod habet fundamentum in re, et ex hoc collocatur in genere; inde est quod differentia relationum essentiales summarunt secundum differentias aliorum entium' (*Sent.* 1 26, 2, 2 ad 4); 'Relatio realis distinctionem rerum requirit' (*De verit.* 2, 2 ad 3); 'Relatio secundum actum exiguit duo extrema in actu existere' (*Sent.* 1 30, 1, 1 sol.), 'Ibi enim est realis relatio ubi realiter alicuius dependet ad altero […]' (*De pot.* 7, 1 ad 9). For an enumeration of the four ways in which a relation can fail to be a real one, see *Sent.* 1 26, 2, 1 sol. and *De verit.* 1, 5 ad 16.
The rational relation can again be subdivided into two types. The first type is called ‘rationis’ because it is the intellect which ‘invents’ this relation between two things as known; the relation exists in the thing as known. Examples are the relation of genus and the relation of species.\(^{38}\) The second type of relation is not the result of an invention by the intellect, but it follows the act of the intellect by way of some sort of necessity; the intellect attributes the relation not to the related things as known, but to the things as they are in reality; they are understood by the intellect as having an order which they in fact do not have.\(^{39}\)

For Thomas Aquinas the intention as a similitude (\textit{similitudo}) is the relation of likeness between the object and the intellect and belongs to the category of quality.\(^{40}\) The intention, however, is not essentially a likeness; it is essentially a relation of one thing to another.\(^{41}\)

From the name of ‘intention’ we can infer the aspect of the intention expressed by the phrase ‘\textit{in aliud tendere}’. This phrase also expresses the double foundation of the intention, namely on the act of the intellect as well as on the external object; and it expresses the relation of one foundation towards the other, namely the relation of the known object outside the mind towards the act of the intellect.\(^{42}\) As we have seen, the

\(^{38}\) ‘\textit{Relationes quae consequuntur solam operationem intellectus in ipsis rebus intellectis sunt relationes rationis tantum, quia scilicet eas ratio adinvenit inter duas res intellectas}’ (\textit{Sth. 1} 28, ad 4). ‘[…] \textit{relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere. Unum modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei; has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem}’ (\textit{De pot. 7}, 11c). See also Schmidt, 168.

\(^{39}\) ‘\textit{Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad alium; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adinveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re. Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus}’ (\textit{De pot. 7}, 11c). See also Schmidt, 168–170.

\(^{40}\) ‘\textit{Unum autem reductur ad genus quantitatis quasi principium quantitatis discreteae. Et supra ipsam fundatur identitas, secundum quod est unum in substantia; aequantitas, secundum quod est unum in quantitate; similitudo, secundum quod est unum in qualitate}’ (\textit{Sent. III} 5, 1 sol. 1).

\(^{41}\) ‘\textit{Intentio in ratione sua ordinem quemdam unius ad alterum importat}’ (\textit{Sent. II} 38, 1, 3 sol.).

\(^{42}\) The intention itself can also become the object of knowledge, in which case it is, of course, not outside the mind: ‘\textit{Aliud est intelligere rem et aliud est intelligere ipsam}’.
intention as founded upon the object outside the mind is a representation of this object; the intention as founded upon the act of the intellect is an accident of the intellect.  

Intentions are essentially relations, but not all intentions belong to the same type of relation. A first intention is a relation of a known object outside the mind towards the intellect. It is a real relation because both extremes of the relation, one of which one really depends on the other, exist in reality. A second intention is not a real relation; the order between the two extremes of a second intention is invented by the intellect only, and therefore the relation is a mere rational relation.

An example of a rational relation is the comparison of a man and an animal, which results in a relation of a species to a genus. Logic deals with this latter type of relation.

For Thomas the subject of a certain science is not defined by the objects studied but by the specific aspect under which they are considered within that science. Metaphysics and logic study basically the same things, but whereas metaphysics focuses on real things as they are in themselves, logic studies the intentions of those things which are formed by reason. Thomas says that it is the intentions of genus and species, or rational beings, that are the proper subject of logic.

4.1.5. Thomas and Hervaeus compared

Hervaeus’ interpretation of relations as presented in De secundis intentionibus does not really differ from that of Thomas. He dwells upon the

\[\text{intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dnum super opus suum reflectitur} \] (ScG iv 11).

43 'Notitia […] dupliciter potest considerari: vel secundum quod comparatur ad cognoscendum, et sic inest cognoscenti sicut accident in subiecto' (Quodl. vii 4c).

44 'Ordo autem unius ad alterum non est nisi per intellectum, cuius est ordinare' (Sent. ii 38, 1, 3 sol.).

45 'Aliquando vero respectus significatus per ea quae dicuntur ad aliquid est tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri, et tunc est relatio rationis tantum; sicut cum comparat ratio hominem animali, ut speciem ad genus' (S/Th. i 28, 1c); ‘Quarto modo quando ponitur relatio rationis: ipsa enim relatio per seipsam refertur, non per aliam relationem’ (Sent. i 26, 2, 1 sol.).

46 See Schmidt 44 ff., 49–71 and 89 for Thomas on the subject of logic. ‘Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione … sed philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia’ (In Met. vii 13, n. 1576); ‘Ens autem rationis dicitur propri de illis intentionibus quas ratio advenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprium subiectum logicae’ (In Met. iv 4, n. 574).
subdivisions of intentions he has made at the beginning of the book, and explains to what type of relation (what type of *habitudo*, as he usually calls it) these different types of intentions belong, but his categorisation is neither surprising nor innovative with regard to the basic distinctions between rational and real relations found in Thomas.47

Unlike his interpretation of relations, Hervaeus’ interpretation of intentions is rather different from that of Thomas in that it is much more specific. Hervaeus also recognises the four different entities involved in the act of knowing, but his definitions of these entities do not coincide exactly with Thomas’, especially not his definition of the intention.

Thomas initially identifies the intention with the intelligible species. He does not divide intentions in a formal/abstract and material/concrete sense, as Hervaeus does. In a later phase Thomas distinguishes explicitly between the intention, the intelligible species, the act of knowing and the known thing in terms of their function within the cognitive act. Hervaeus calls the intelligible species an intention, but only in a specific sense: as pertaining to the knowing subject. Intention in another sense, namely as pertaining to the known thing, is definitely not an intelligible species. Thomas distinguishes between intention and the act of knowing; Hervaeus calls the act of knowing an intention, but only in a specific sense (i.e., as pertaining to the knowing subject).48 Again, Thomas distinguishes between the intention and the known thing. Hervaeus does not adopt this without further qualification. He says that the known thing can be called an intention, but only an intention in a specific sense, by which he means the intention as pertaining to the known thing, which is the known thing insofar as the act of the intellect relates to it.49

Perler has argued50 that ‘Hervaeus’ definition [sc. of the intention *ex parte intelligentis*] can scarcely be called distinctively Thomistic, because

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47 For our present purpose we could say that Hervaeus, as well as Thomas, adhered to the ‘traditional medieval view’, as Henninger calls it (174 ff.). But a thorough further investigation of the notion of relations in Hervaeus, as Henninger has done for relations in Thomas, could be very useful.

48 Radulphus Brito also identifies the act of knowing with the intention, but only with a specific type (the abstract intention); see 68 ff.

49 We shall see that Radulphus Brito identifies the known thing with the concrete intention, which sets him apart from Hervaeus as well as from Thomas.

50 ‘Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality’, 231. Perler is of course correct in highlighting Hervaeus’ emphasis on the thing understood (*res intellecta*) in the cognitive process; we have seen that it is exactly by this emphasis that Hervaeus arrives at his main object, the intention insofar as it is the proper subject of logic.
the identification of intention and species can also be found in Roger Bacon and other late 13th-century authors. However, the case is rather more complex than Perler’s statement would suggest. First, we find a development in Thomas Aquinas’ thought from identifying intelligible species with intentions to distinguishing the two. And second, we can hardly say that Hervaeus identifies the intelligible species with the intention. What Hervaeus does is clearing up the confusion between intentions and intelligible species by distinguishing between different uses of the word ‘intentio’. The word can be used for everything that brings the intellect to knowledge (the act of cognition, the intelligible species, the concept), but it can be used in more specific senses as well, for instance in the sense of the second intention as the subject of logic, which is definitely not to be identified with the intelligible species. Since the identification of intelligible species and intentions is not unusual in Roger Bacon and other late thirteenth-century authors and is even referred to as a ‘very old opinion’, as Perler says, we might perhaps call Hervaeus Thomistic in this sense, after all: Thomas and Hervaeus both distinguish between intelligible species and intentions. But apart from this similarity there is good reason to say that Hervaeus is innovative compared with Thomas. Hervaeus’ approach in De secundis intentionibus is different from Thomas’. Thomas focuses on cognition, Hervaeus on second intentions in the specific sense in which they constitute the proper subject of logic, and this induces him to define the word ‘intentio’ in a much more detailed and sophisticated way than Thomas does. This means that we should in fact say that Hervaeus’ definition can hardly be called Thomistic, not because it resembles the definitions given by others more than it does Thomas’ definition (for it actually does not), but because of its far greater subtlety.

As regards the subject of logic, and Thomas’ claim that the difference between the subject of metaphysics and the subject of logic does not lie in a difference between the objects studied but in the aspect under which those objects are studied, this is exactly what Hervaeus says in Dist. v. Thomas’ definition of genus and species and such things (which he calls intentions or rational beings) as the proper subject of logic, places the proper subject of logic into the same category of beings as

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51 See 16ff, ‘secundum diversas considerationes possunt considerari [sc. entia rationis] a diversis scientiis, puta a metaphysica et logica’, De secundis intentionibus, ed. 105b.
4. TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN *DE SECUNDIS INTENTIONIBUS* 61

Hervaeus does (B.2.b and 2.b.2 in tables 1 and 2).\(^{52}\) However, Thomas does not explicitly distinguish between first and second intentions in the context of the subject of logic,\(^ {53} \) nor between the intention as pertaining to the knowing subject and the intention as pertaining to the known thing (*res intellecta*). And this is the important difference between them: Hervaeus is much more specific in his definition of the subject of logic than Thomas, because he is also much more specific in his definition of intention.

4.2. DEFINITIONS OF THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES IN HERVAEUS’ CONTEMPORARIES

4.2.1. Jacob of Metz, Durandus of St.-Pourçain, and Hervaeus

In the debate before and during Hervaeus’ time, the concept of the intelligible species was rather ambiguous. Not everyone accepted that it existed at all, as we will see shortly, and in current research on medieval philosophy the exact interpretation of the concept of intelligible species by medieval thinkers is still under discussion. It was especially its confusion with the intention that led Hervaeus to his extensive subdivisions of the uses of ‘*intentio*’. Which other views of the role of the intelligible species in the cognitive act were held after Thomas?

Thomas’ most famous 14th-century antagonist among the Dominicans was Durandus of St.-Pourçain, and Koch has also drawn our attention to Jacob of Metz.\(^ {54} \) About Jacob of Metz we know very little, except that he was a Dominican, read the *Sententiae* twice between 1301 and 1303 and wrote a commentary on the work. Twelve different versions of this commentary have survived in as many manuscripts, either partial or complete. During his reading of the *Sententiae* he may have had Durandus of St.-Pourçain, who apparently was much influenced by him, among his audience.

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\(^{52}\) See 24-25.

\(^{53}\) He does say that something can be understood in two ways, and distinguishes between *primum intellectum* (the extra-mental thing) and *secundum intellectum* (the intention following the way in which the primary objects are understood); the latter refers to the subject of logic. See Schmidt 122ff., where he explains that Thomas uses the term ‘secunda intention’ only for nouns signifying second intentions, to distinguish them from nouns signifying first intentions.

\(^{54}\) For more information about the commentaries to the *Sententiae* by Jacob and Durandus (among others), see Friedman, ‘The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320.’
Durandus of St.-Pourçain, a slightly younger contemporary of Hervaeus, aired opinions so radically opposed to those of Thomas that several times he was officially requested to retract them. Koch bases his suggestion that Durandus was a pupil of Jacob of Metz on some remarkable 'anti-Thomist' resemblances between them, but this is not certain. After his death in 1334 Durandus was gradually forgotten, possibly because other Dominicans did not care much for his doctrinal aberrations that had caused various conflicts during his lifetime. Among Durandus' most fiery opponents was Hervaeus, upon whom – as Master General of the order at that time – rested the responsibility to ensure a faithful adherence to the teachings of Thomas. The numerous writings against Durandus' controversial first version of his commentary on the Sententiae, not to mention his own modification of it in 1310–1311, show that this responsibility was taken very seriously.

Durandus wrote three versions of his commentary. Of the first version, written down by at the latest, we have no complete manuscript.

55 Also called doctor modernus and, later, doctor resolutissimus.
56 For an extensive overview of works by and against Durandus, see Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano. See also Mulchahey, 'First the bow is bent in study ....', 153 ff.
58 See 61, n. 54.
59 Though not entirely: 'Ausserdem wird noch heute in St. Pourçain der hl. Abt Portianus verehrt' (Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 398, n. 4). Durandus was born in St. Pourçain-sur-Sioule, so we may probably assume with Koch that this 'Abt Portianus' is our Durandus.
60 See 10, n. 29.
61 For Hervaeus' polemic writings against Durandus, see Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 211–271.
62 According to J. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, Durandus would have 'revised his commentary on the Sentences to please authorities in the order' to revert to 'his personal opinions contrary to the teaching of Thomas' in the third version of his commentary, since by then he was 'outside the jurisdiction of his order' (342–343). Koch holds a different opinion in his Durandus de S. Porciano (5–85). According to him, version b simply lacks the debatable questions, whereas version c returns to them again, answering them in a more mature, less controversial (and less interesting) spirit (88 ff.). For Koch's discussion of version a, see 5–85; version b, see 31–38, 49–60, 72–76; version c: see 72–76. Petrus de Palude – another Dominican who strongly objected to Durandus' subversive views, and a member of the committee headed by Hervaeus – includes large quotations of Durandus' commentary in his own commentary on the Sententiae. For a detailed discussion on the dating of Durandus' commentary and which versions of Durandus' commentary...
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Soon after the work had started to circulate among the Dominicans a committee was installed under the supervision of Hervaeus Natalis, with the task to point out Durandus’ deviations from Thomas Aquinas. Apparently the original version of Durandus’ commentary was in the hands of this committee, which might explain the fact that it did not spread much further.

Shortly afterwards a second version appeared, probably written between 1310–1312, in which a number of the most offensive passages in the first version had been deleted. In this period Durandus also wrote an apologetic treatise – Excusationes – in reaction to the list of errors composed by the committee. After 1317 Durandus edited a third version, which presumably shows the influence of time as well as of his critics in being much more moderate than the first one, though it is still controversial. The printed editions are based upon this third version.64

Jacob of Metz65 does not fully agree with Thomas’ view on intelligible species. He says that some people (presumably Thomas, as Hervaeus also supposes in his criticism in the Correctorium fratris Jacobi Metensis)66 assert that the immanent act, which is the act residing inside the intellect, is being worked upon by the possible intellect through the intelligible species. Others say that the immanent act is worked upon directly by the object, and they reject the intelligible species. Jacob compromises in saying that the immanent act is worked upon by the object, but through the intelligible species.67

Durandus, though agreeing with Jacob in identifying the mental word with the act of knowing, is more radical than Jacob regarding the intelligible species. He explicitly rejects it:

That we should not assume the existence of such a species in our intellect is clear for the same reason, namely that it would then be the first thing the intellect knows; whereas we experience just the opposite. Again, if such a species were in the intellect, it would be there either with respect to the

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64 See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano 16–22, 70, 85–92 and Friedman, ‘Peter of Palude …’, 213, and this Introduction, 61 ff.
65 This account of Jacob of Metz is based on ‘Jakob von Metz, O.P.’.
66 See Koch, ‘Jakob von Metz, O.P.’, 214 ff., and Le Mans 231, f. 165’ (unfortunately I have not been able to consult the ms.).
first known thing only, or with respect to all things. Not with respect to all things: if a species would exist in our intellect, it could be abstracted from phantasms; now, phantasms do not belong to all things, but only to sensible things, and only with regard to the accidents which cause them to be sensible; therefore, no species exists in our intellect with respect to anything else. Again, the cognition of a thing through a species – according to those who assume the existence of species – is not discursive, but many things are known by us discursively; therefore, the latter are not known through a species.68

In Hervaeus’ De secundis intentionibus the notions of intentio and species intelligibilis are strongly interrelated. This is not surprising, since Thomas at first identified the two and only came to distinguish them at a later stage. We have seen that Hervaeus draws many subtle lines between different meanings of the word ‘intentio’; in a more general conception of it the intention can be everything that leads to knowledge and in that sense an intelligible species could be called an intention.

However, Hervaeus’ subject matter in De secundis intentionibus is logical intentions, and intelligible species are certainly not to be identified with these. Though Hervaeus does not in so many words explain why or how the intelligible species is indispensable for the act of knowing in De secundis intentionibus, this work contains no suggestion of, much less any evidence for a different opinion on the relation between intelligible species and intentions from the one already mentioned. Nonetheless, some scholars69 do believe there is reason to doubt that Hervaeus considered the intelligible species a necessary ingredient of the cognitive act at all, and in this respect they compare him to Henry of Ghent.

68 ‘Quod autem in intellectu nostro non sit ponere speciem talem patet per eandem rationem, quia oporteret quod esset ab intellectu primo cognita; cuius oppositum experimur. Item, si in intellectu esset taliis species, aut esset respectu primi cogniti solum aut respectu omnium. Non respectu omnium, quia species in intellectu nostro si qua sit, potest abstrahiri a phantasmatica. Sed phantasmata non sunt omnium, sed solum rerum sensibilium, et quantum ad accidentia secundum quae solum sunt sensibilia, ergo respectu aliorum nulla est in intellectu nostro species. Item, cognitio rei per speciem secundum ponentes speciem non est discursiva, sed multa cognoscuntur a nobis per discursum; talia ergo non cognoscentur per speciem’ (Sent. ii (c), d. 6, q. 6 (139‘hf.), translation mine).

Kelley suggests that Hervaeus probably doubted the necessity of the intelligible species, and that only his loyalty to Thomas Aquinas kept him from expressing this doubt more openly. Kelley says that in *De intellectu et specie* Hervaeus only ‘permits himself to say against him [sc. Henry of Ghent] […] that he is wrong not to allow the possibility of the species’. In fact, Hervaeus says much more than this; although he begins one of his argumentations with the cautious statement that ‘… it seems to me that one could hold with good reason that some intelligible species exists in the intellect’, he ends it with ‘And thus it is completely clear that we must assume the existence of an intelligible species in the intellect which is different from the act of knowing’. Kelley does not mention *Quodlib.* III, 8, where Hervaeus fervently defends the intelligible species against the attacks of Durandus of St.-Pourçain; nor does he mention the *Correctorium fratris Jacobi Metensis,* where Hervaeus also defends the intelligible species.

Kelley says that Hervaeus sometimes adds ‘si ponatur’ when he mentions the intelligible species in *De verbo* and *De secundis intentionibus*. In Kelley’s view this would express a reservation on Hervaeus’ side regarding the necessity of the intelligible species. But the ‘si ponatur’ in these works would not seem frequent enough to call it a ‘constant qualifier’, and whenever it does occur it is perfectly explicable in the context of a description of a certain (somebody else’s or Hervaeus’ own) opinion. But even if this were an expression of Hervaeus’ own reservation about the intelligible species, it would lose much of its strength when compared to the many other instances where Hervaeus speaks of the nature and function of the intelligible species as something whose existence is a matter of course, without any need of further proof.

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71 ‘[…] videtur mihi quod possit probabiliter teneri quod in intellectu sit aliqua species intelligibilis’ (*De intellectu et specie* (ed. Stella), 143–144).
72 ‘Et sic ubicunque patet quod est ponere intelligibilem speciem in intellectu, diversam ab actu intelligendi […]’ (loc. cit.).
73 Kelley, 268.
74 Occurrences of ‘si ponatur’ in *Distt.* 1 and 11: see I §§ 24, 35, 58 and 11 §§ 34, 56, 67, 71, 84, 135 (and the reference is not always tot the intelligible species).
75 Since these works, with the exception of *De secundis intentionibus,* were all written within the same short period (see also the Introduction to this chapter), there would not seem to be any reason to suppose that Hervaeus changed his mind concerning the intelligible species, especially not since the works cited by Kelley by way of confirmation cannot be dated any later than the others.
Spruit’s argumentation for Hervaeus’ rejection of the intelligible species is founded mainly on his misinterpretation of Hervaeus’ Quodl. iii, 8. Hervaeus here describes an opinion with regard to the intelligible species which parallels Durandus’ opinion in Quaestio de natura cognitionis (= 11 Sent. (A) d. 3 q. 5). Spruit mistakes Hervaeus’ description of this position for Hervaeus’ own opinion, even though immediately after the description Hervaeus says: ‘Haec autem positio videtur mihi falsa et impossibilis’ (‘But this position seems untrue and impossible to me’), followed by a neat and systematic refutation of the arguments in favour of this position.

Spruit’s only other argument is that Hervaeus does not defend the intelligible species in ‘the more appropriate part’ (273) of his Quodlibeta (namely q. 11, 8). It is not clear why this quaestio quodlibetalis should be so much more appropriate a place for either attacking or defending the intelligible species than, for instance, De verbo, the Correctorium or De secundis intentionibus, works not mentioned by Spruit. We have seen that in De secundis intentionibus Hervaeus provides an accurate description of the similarities and differences between intentions and intelligible species, which would be rather strange and superfluous if he did not believe in their existence.

Hervaeus may or may not have secretly doubted the necessity of the intelligible species in the cognitive process. But Kelley’s and Spruit’s suggestions that he doubted or even denied its existence are not corroborated by any textual evidence, at least not in the texts in which Hervaeus deals with the subject most explicitly and comprehensively.

4.3. Radulphus Brito

As stated above, there is no textual evidence that Hervaeus intends to criticise Radulphus himself in when he explains and rejects the second opinion mentioned earlier, but this opinion is certainly very similar to

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76 Spruit mentions Kelley’s article in a footnote (292, n. 172) in the context of Ockham’s rejection of the intelligible species, but not in his account of Hervaeus.
77 Ed. Koch, 7–32.
78 Ed. Koch, 6411–12.
79 For Hervaeus’ description of the position, see 59–64; for his rejection of it, see 64–69 (ed. Koch).
80 See 32.
that of Radulphus. To illustrate this I will now discuss Radulphus' ideas on intelligible species and intentions in more detail.81

Radulphus Brito82 – or Raoul le Breton, or Raoul Renaud83 – studied and worked in Paris between 1295 and 1320.84 He apparently started as a student of philosophy and afterwards entered the faculty of Theology. His commentary on Lombard's Sentences dates from 1308 or somewhat earlier, which means that Radulphus was a close contemporary of Her-vaueus Natalis. Little else is known about him, except his works, among which are commentaries on Aristotle, Porphyry and the first three books of the Sentences, and several works on grammar.

Radulphus was a philosopher as well as a theologian, and belonged to a group often referred to as the 'Modists'.85 It is therefore not surprising that he uses the differences between modi essendi, modi intelligendi and modi significandi as key notions in his explanation of the way in which things

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81 See Pinborg, 'Zum Begriff der Intentio secunda', 54, and Perler, 'Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality', 233. See also my analysis of first and second intentions in Radulphus in Dijs, 'Radulphus Brito's Use of Intentio' (paper presented in 1992, published in 2003), and recently Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus, ch. iii, and De Rijk, Giraldus Odonis vol. ii, ch. vi.

82 The following account of Radulphus' life and works is largely based upon Fauser's introduction to his edition of Radulphus' commentary on Aristotle's De anima iii.

83 There is some discussion about the possible identification of this Radulphus Brito with a Raoul de Hotot (Hoitot, Rotos, Retos), originally defended by Glorieux (in his 'Raoul Renaud', 405–407 and his Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au xIIIe siècle, 52). Fauser thinks this identification probable, but cautions against it as long as there is no positive proof (op. cit. 12–13). A document edited by Glorieux at a later date ('Aux origines de la Sorbonne: Robert de Sorbon', (210)) seems to prove that Radulphus Brito and Raoul de Hotot are not one and the same (see also Pinborg, 'Radulphus Brito's Sophism on Second Intentions', 119, n. 1).

84 Or perhaps after 1320. The earliest dated ms. of one of his works stems from 1295, the latest from 1320; the Catalogus Provisorum, Sociorium et Hospitum Sorbonae gives 1320 as the year of his death (A. Franklin, La Sorbonne, 224). However, a document from the Parisian university dating from between September 1329 and March 1336 mentions a Dominus Rodulphus Brito (H. Denifil O.P.-A. Châtelain, Chartularium, t. 2, 661, n. 1184). If this is our Radulphus Brito, the Catalogus must be at fault.

85 The term 'Modist' refers to a group of 13th- and 14th-century philosophers who used the concepts modus essendi, modus intelligendi and modus significandi extensively in their grammatical and philosophical doctrines. See Friedman, 'Conceiving and modifying reality: some modist roots of Peter Auriol's theory of concept formation', where he argues that the ideas of the modist grammarians had quite an influence on the philosophical and theological ideas of Peter Auriol in that he extensively uses and integrates the concepts of modus essendi, intelligendi and significandi into his own theories. Interestingly, Hervaeus also uses the notion of modus intelligendi in De secundis intentionibus (e.g. in relation to the division of intentions (Dist. 1, §71)). See also Rosier, 'Res significata et modus significandi', for the development of the notion of modus significandi.
are conceived of and signified. Since I intend to consider Radulphus as a contemporary opponent of Hervaeus Natalis regarding intentions and intelligible species, I will focus on Radulphus’ ideas about this subject as they are found in his second sophism and his commentary on Porphyry – both probably written around 1300 – and his commentaries on Aristotle’s *De anima* 1 and 111. These works are all written in the didactic style of the *quaestio disputata*.

It is to Radulphus that we owe what Pinborg calls ‘the first systematic and extended treatment’ of second intentions. Radulphus’ works, on grammar as well as on philosophy, were very influential and have been used and criticised by both contemporary and later 14th- and 15th-century philosophers.

4.3.1. Radulphus on intelligible species, intentions and the subject of logic

As we have seen earlier, Thomas Aquinas in his early works identifies the intelligible species with the intention, but later on makes a division between the two. In Radulphus Brito’s thought intelligible species and intentions are also equated, but Radulphus makes a few divisions of his own. I will first investigate Radulphus’ explanation of the intelligible species.

The main part of Radulphus’ commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima* *III* is devoted to a treatment of the possible and the agent intellect.

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86 See Pinborg, ‘Die Logik der Modistae’.
87 Using the numbering of Pinborg’s list of Radulphus’ works in his ‘Logik der Modistae’, 96.
88 In ‘Radulphus Brito’s Sophism on Second Intentions’, 121.
89 In ‘Radulphus Brito’s Sophisma on Second Intentions’, Pinborg mentions the treatise *De clavibus intentionum*, and rightly points out that it is ‘nothing but a summary of Radulphus’ (121). An edition can be found in Domanski’s article ‘Jana z Grotkowa “De clavibus intentionum”’.
90 This issue originates from a debate between Avicenna on the one hand, who claims that the *intellectus possibile* is part of the human soul and therefore individual, whereas the *intellectus agens* is one and the same for everyone, and immortal; and on the other hand Averroës, who claims that both are immortal and the same for everyone. The debate between Avicenna and Averroës in turn originates from Aristotle’s *De anima*. See also Schroeder-Todd, *Two Greek Aristotelian commentators on the intellect*, for more information about the commentaries on Aristotle’s *De anima* by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius. The problem for Christian philosophers is, of course, the immortality of the individual soul and the question of personal responsibility. Radulphus wishes to save personal responsibility and individual immortality, together with individual knowledge, by explaining the intellect as a
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However, he also has a few things to say about intelligible species. For example, in q. 7\textsuperscript{th} – *utrum illud quod intelligitur, sit species intelligibilis existens in anima vel res extra animam existens* (whether that which is understood, is an intelligible species existing in the mind, or a thing existing outside the mind) – he states that the first object of the intellect is the ‘*quod quid est*’, or the essence of a thing and not a species in the mind.\textsuperscript{92} Of course the species is an intelligible being and as such can be understood by the intellect secondarily,\textsuperscript{93} but that which is understood primarily is the essence of the external thing. This essence, which has abstract being, is known in its mode of being understood, not in its mode of being outside the mind.\textsuperscript{94}

In q. 8\textsuperscript{th} – *utrum species intelligibilis vel alia cognitio de re remaneat in intellectu in habitu post actualem considerationem* (whether an intelligible species or another cognition of a thing remains in the intellect habitually after the actual act of cognizance), the formulation of the question already shows that to Radulphus an intelligible species is some form of cognition. Yet, Radulphus cannot deny that once the intellect has understood something, it can understand the same thing better the next time. If the species did not remain in the intellect, Radulphus says (referring to the opinion of the Philosophus, or Thomas Aquinas), studying would

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\textsuperscript{91} Ed. Fauser, 173–176.

\textsuperscript{92} ‘Dico quod illud quod primo intelligitur, est ‘*quod quid est*’ rei et non eius species’ (174\textsuperscript{21–22}). ‘[…]. Item illud quod est primum obiectum intellectus, est illud quod primo intelligitur. Modo ipsum ‘*quod quid est*’ est illud quod primo intelligitur […]’ (174\textsuperscript{39–41}).

\textsuperscript{93} ‘Tamen dico secundo quod, licet species rei non sit illud quod primo intelligitur, potest tamen intelligi ab intellectu secundario. Quia intellectus est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia. Modo species rei est quid intelligibile. Ergo potest intelligi secundario ab intellectu’ (174\textsuperscript{42–46}).

\textsuperscript{94} ‘[…] dico quod illud quod intelligitur, de se est quidditas rei secundum se, cui accidit et esse signatum et esse abstractum. Tamen intelligitur sub esse quod habet in anima, ita quod illud esse quod habet in anima, non est illud quod intelligitur, sed illud sub quo intelligitur. Et ita quidditas rei, quae est extra animam, intelligitur non sub esse quod habet extra animam, sed sub esse intellecto’ (176\textsuperscript{76–81}).

\textsuperscript{95} Op. cit. 176–182.

\textsuperscript{96} Hauréau, in his treatment of Radulphus’ commentary on the *Posteriora* (*De la philosophie scolastique in*, 389n.), wrongly reads *cogitatio* instead of *cognitio* several times. Since I have not been able to consult the ms., I cannot tell whether the error is Hauréau’s or the copyist’s (on 391n. H. does have *cognitio*).
be of little use since there would be no knowledge of a thing except in
the presence of that thing.\textsuperscript{97} If the intelligible species remains habitually
or potentially in the intellect, as Radulphus says, it must be more than a
mere act which only exists while it occurs, without leaving any habitual
or potential trace. This would imply that the intelligible species cannot
be equated with a mere act of the understanding, and that it must be
something more than just such an act. Radulphus answers the question in
the affirmative: some kind of species in \textit{habitu} remains in the intellect.\textsuperscript{98}

Yet in q. 25 – \textit{utrum species intelligibilis quae ponitur in anima, sit aliquid reale differens a cognitione rei} (whether the intelligible species that
is assumed to be in the mind is something real that differs from the
cognition of a thing) – Radulphus again says that the species in the mind
is nothing but a cognition of the thing.\textsuperscript{99} Radulphus here again identifies
the intelligible species (as he elsewhere\textsuperscript{100} identifies the intention) with
the cognition of a thing. In Radulphus’ treatment of first and second
intentions we find no further indication of his awareness of the difficulty
in explaining remembering and learning if cognition were simply an act
and nothing more.

Radulphus’ identification of the intelligible species with both the
cognitive act and the abstract intention would seem to suggest that in his
eyes the abstract intention is the intelligible species. This identification
of intelligible species, abstract intention and cognitive act distinguishes
him from Thomas Aquinas, as can be concluded from what has been
said before.\textsuperscript{101} It also distinguishes him from Hervaeus Natalis, who again
makes his own divisions between different kinds of intentions, as we have
seen above.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{97} ‘[… ] Philosophus, qui dicit quod, cum intellectus est in habitu, non eodem modo
est in potentia sicut ante addiscere. […] Hoc etiam in se ipso quilibet experitur, quia,
postquam intellexit aliquid, postea potest facilius illud intelligere. Modo illud non
esse, nisi post actualen considerationem aliqua cognitione remaneret in intellectu
(179\textsuperscript{60-67}). […] si non remaneret species, tunc frustra aliquis laboraret in studio,
quia sola conversione ad phantasmata statim haberet aliquis cognitionem cuiuslibet
rei’ (179\textsuperscript{83-85}).

\textsuperscript{98} ‘Post actualen considerationem remanet aliqua species in habitu in intellectu’
(179\textsuperscript{72-74}). Cf. the remark in his first sophism \textit{Omnis homo est omnis homo} (ed. Pin-
borg-Green Pedersen, § 39): ‘[…] post actualen cognitionem habitus nulla cognitione
potest manere in anima nisi potentia et habitu […]’.

\textsuperscript{99} ‘[… ] dicendum est quod species quae dicitur esse in anima, non est aliud quam
cognitione rei’ (op. cit. 292\textsuperscript{144-145}).

\textsuperscript{100} For example, in his second sophisma (see below).

\textsuperscript{101} See 4.1. \textit{Thomas Aquinas}, 50.

These observations are supported by Radulphus’ systematic exposé about intentions in his second sophism *Aliquis homo est species*. This sophism deals with the question whether ‘*species*’ is the name of a second intention, and whether second intentions are in a category or not. Radulphus’ solution is given in the fourth part. He begins by dividing intentions into four kinds.

First, Radulphus divides intentions into first intentions and second intentions. First intentions are subdivided into first intentions taken abstractly and first intentions taken concretely, or abstract and concrete first intentions. The first abstract intention is a certain ‘information’ of the intellect – the intellect acquires a form. By this ‘information’ the intellect tends towards (tendit in) something else. Such an intention is a *ratio intelligendi*, a specific cognition of a thing by which we primarily know the thing according to its proper mode of being; this cognition, in which the thing is considered apart from its relation to anything else, is called the ‘first cognition’ of the thing. Radulphus calls this first cognition a ‘first abstract intention’. The thing known in this way he calls a ‘first concrete intention’. For example: when the intellect knows a man (acquires the form of man), the cognition of a man in itself and absolutely is called a first cognition and a first abstract intention; the concrete man known in itself and absolutely is called a first concrete intention.

In Radulphus’ texts about intentions the expressions ‘*intentio prima in abstracto*, ‘*informatio intellectus*, ‘*ratio intelligendi*, ‘*cognitio/intellectio*, and ‘*actus intelligendi*’ are all used for the same operation of the
Radulphus does not explicitly place these different expressions in an exact relation to each other, but we can explain them as different aspects of the same operation of the intellect, or the same actus intelligendi. The word ‘intentio’ tells us that in this act the intellect tends towards something else, namely the thing; the term ‘informatio’ tells us that in this act the intellect acquires a form, or is ‘informed’; the term ‘ratio’ tells us that the act in which the thing is known, focuses on a certain aspect of that thing; the term ‘cognitio’ tells us that the act is an act of knowing.

A second intention taken abstractly is the second cognition of a thing, namely knowing it in its relation to something else, and knowing it as a particular. This way of knowing a thing is secondary to knowing the thing in itself (secundum se). In his description of first intentions Radulphus has already contrasted the cognition in which the thing is known absolutely (the first cognition) with the cognition in which the thing is known respectively (respective; this is the second cognition), that is, known with respect to many things. In q.7 of his Porphyry commentary he also uses the term ‘cognitio respectiva’ as opposed to ‘cognitio absoluta’. The corresponding second intention taken concretely is, again, the thing itself as known in this way.

These second intentions are caused by the thing taken in its universal mode of being, and by the intellectus agens as opposed to the intellectus possibilis. Since the possible intellect is only the passive recipient of a cognition, it cannot be an effective cause of such a cognition; but the thing under its mode of being apprehended, together with the agent intellect which can abstract the ratio intelligendi from the ratio essendi of a thing, constitute the effective cause of these second intentions, such as

107 See 71, n. 106; cf. De an. iii, q. 25, 297150-53: ‘Sed intellectus possibilis per se et primo est in potentia passiva ad actum intelligendi sive ad cognitionem intelligibilis […] Ergo primum quod recipit, est cognitio sive actus intelligendi’ (my italics).

108 ‘Unde res prius habet intellegi secundum se quam in habitudine ad alium, sicut prius est conoscere hominem secundum se quam ut est principium intelligendi plura vel ut est reperibilis in pluribus, quia intellectus absolutus prior est intellectu respectivo. […] Sed cognitio hominis ut est in pluribus dicitur secunda cognitio. Et ista cognitio rei in habitudine ad alium dicitur secunda intentio in abstracto, et res sic cognita dicitur secunda intentio in concreto, sicut quantum ad primam operationem intellectus cognitio hominis ut est in pluribus est secunda intentio, quae est universalitas’ (op. cit., §49).

109 Ed. Pinborg, 98.

110 For the function of the intellectus agens and possibilis, see also Radulphus’ commentaries on De Anima 1, q. 6 and to Porphyry, q. 7.
the genus, species and other attributes of things (being an animal, being a man, being rational, or laughing) that are apprehended according to the first operation of the intellect. With regard to the ontological status of second intentions Radulphus claims that, inasmuch as they depend on the first operation of the intellect, they are real *habitus* or *passiones* of the intellect, and therefore exist in the category of quality, even though he admits that there is a difference in the degree of reality between first and second intentions. Second intentions that depend on the second or third operation of the intellect, such as propositions or syllogisms, are not in any category.

In Radulphus’ commentaries on *De anima* and on Porphyry the account of intentions is more elaborate and somewhat less systematic, though not really different from the one in his second sophism. In his commentary on *De anima*, q. – *utrum universale fiat ab intellectu vel sit praeter operationem intellectus* (whether universals originate from the intellect or whether they exist without the operation of the intellect) – Radulphus begins by again saying that the intention is a cognition by which the intellect ‘relates to something else’. Then he goes on to explain the nature and ontological status of intentions.

The first abstract intention is an act of knowing the thing. This act is caused by the proper mode of being of the thing, and the thing that is known in this way is called a ‘first concrete intention’. The second intention – Radulphus must mean the *abstract* second intention here – is a cognition of the thing with respect to something else, and is taken from the universal and respective mode of being of a thing, such as being universal and universality. The universality is the cognition of the thing in this way, or an abstract second intention; and the universal is the ‘being known’ of this thing, or a concrete second intention.

*... istae intentiones causantur a re sub modo essendi communi eius et ab intellectu agente et non causantur ab intellectu possibili, sicut sunt genus, species, praedica-tum, subjectum et similia. [...] Ergo cum intellectus sit patiens respectu istius cognitionis, intellectus possibilis non erit causa effectiva istius cognitionis, sed solum est subjectum et recipiens istam cognitionem. Sed res sub modo eius fantasiato et intellectus agens abstrahens rationem intelligendi a modo essendi communi rei fantasiasi, ista sunt causa agens istarum secundarum intentionum sicut sunt genus, species et aliae attributae rei apprehensae secundum primam operationem intellectus’ (*op. cit.* §52).


Edited by Pinborg in his article ‘Radulphus Brito on Universals’.

Ed. Pinborg, 124.
This question focuses on the universal, which can be taken either as a first or a second concrete intention. If we take the universal as a first concrete intention, we should say that insofar as it exists materially in its signifi cate it does not depend on the intellect (the *quod-quid est rei*, the essence of the thing, does not depend on the intellect). If we take the universal formally, namely as the first cognition of the thing, we should say that it does not depend on the possible intellect as its effective cause, but on the agent intellect.115

If we take the universal as a second concrete intention, we can again say that insofar as it is materially in the thing it does not depend on the intellect; the thing can exist without the operation of the intellect. But the universal as an intention can be attributed to a thing which only exists in the intellect; its object cannot exist without the operation of the intellect. Again, its effective cause is the agent intellect and not the possible intellect.116

The following overview of Radulphus’ division of intentions can now be presented:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intentio prima</th>
<th>Intentio secunda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Cognition in which the thing is known <em>secundum se</em> and <em>absolute (prima cognitio/ intellectio rei)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Cognition in which the thing is known <em>ut in pluribus and respective (secunda cognitio rei)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td><em>In abstracto</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td><em>In abstracto</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td><em>Illud quo intellectus tendit ad aliud ('in aliud tentio'), that by which the intellect relates to something else</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a.</td>
<td><em>Informatio intellectus</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b.</td>
<td><em>Cognitio/ intellectio rei</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c.</td>
<td><em>Actus/ratio intelligendi</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td><em>In concreto</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6a.</td>
<td><em>Res subjecta intentioni</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6b.</td>
<td><em>Res sic cognita/intellecta</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td><em>Illud quo intellectus tendit ad aliud ('in aliud tentio'), that by which the intellect relates to something else</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7a.</td>
<td><em>Informatio intellectus</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td><em>In concreto</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8a.</td>
<td><em>Res subjecta intentioni</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8b.</td>
<td><em>Res sic cognita/intellecta</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

115 For the *intellectus agens* and the *intellectus possibilis*, see 68, n. 90.
The question of what is the proper subject of logic is answered by Radulphus as follows: the proper subject of logic is the second intention. It is objected that since they are in a category and therefore must be real things, second intentions cannot be the proper subject of logic without turning logic into a real science. This objection is answered by Radulphus in two ways. First, one can say that logic considers intentions insofar as they direct the intellect in its rational thinking; a science is called rational (rationalis) because it directs the ratio, not because its subject is not supposed to be a real being in a category — the subject of the rational science we are talking about, i.e., second intentions, are real beings in a category. Second, Radulphus points out that logic considers second intentions not as real things, but according to the way they refer to extra-mental objects. Second intentions may be real things in themselves and in their function of 'informing' the intellect, but they are not real things in their function of denominating objects. It follows that logic, which is not about second intentions as real things, is not a real but a rational science.

4. TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN DE SECUNDIS INTENTIONIBUS

4.3.2. Radulphus and Hervaeus compared

If we compare this account of intentions in Radulphus with the theory presented by Hervaeus as the 'secunda opinio' in his first question we see that it is basically a summary of Radulphus' theory as it emerges from the above-mentioned texts: the first intention is a cognitive act in which the thing is known absolutely, the second intention is a cognitive act in which the thing is known respectively and in relation to other things. We can take both the first and second intention either abstractly, meaning the act of the intellect itself, or concretely, meaning the thing known either absolutely (by the first act of the intellect) or respectively (by the second act of the intellect).

What Radulphus and Hervaeus do have in common is that they both felt the need to subdivide the notion of intention into different meanings,
probably because of the existing unclarity. However, Radulphus presents his much shorter overview within the framework of his epistemology, whereas Hervaeus aims at clarifying what makes a certain type of intentions the proper subject of logic. Hervaeus classifies acts of the intellect\textsuperscript{120} as intentions \textit{ex parte intelligentis}, pertaining to the knowing subject,\textsuperscript{121} and this type of intention does not belong to logic. Therefore, the objection to Radulphus’ theory, i.e., that cognitive acts are real things and would turn logic into a real science, would not apply to Hervaeus. He would agree with Radulphus’ remark that these cognitive acts \textit{direct} the intellect in its rational thinking, but not in considering this a sufficient refutation of the objection; we have seen that Hervaeus wants to separate intentions \textit{ex parte intelligentis} (which do not belong to logic)\textsuperscript{122} from intentions \textit{ex parte rei intellectae} (which do belong to logic).\textsuperscript{123} Radulphus’ answer to the second objection, i.e., that the classification of a science (in his case as either real or rational) depends not so much on the object itself but rather on the way in which the object is studied, reminds us of Hervaeus’ explanation of the unifying factor of a science, which is the way in which its object is considered.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{120} Table 3, items 3 and 4.
\textsuperscript{121} Table 1, B.1.
\textsuperscript{122} Table 1, B.1 and B.2.
\textsuperscript{123} Table 1, B.1.
\textsuperscript{124} See 16ff. Thomas says the same (see 60).