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**Title:** Hervaeus Natalis, De secundis intentionibus, Distinctiones I&II : critical edition with introduction and indices  
**Issue Date:** 2012-03-20
De secundis intentionibus 1–v: overview

In Dist. 1 of his book Hervaeus starts with a definition of the notion of 'intentio'. He disposes of the concept of intentions in the sense of acts of volition or desired objects, since these have nothing to do with logic at all. Next, he subdivides intentions into first and second intentions and distinguishes between the intention as pertaining to the knowing subject or pertaining to the known thing, taken either formally and abstractly, or materially and concretely. Having freed his key notion from the most important unclarities that were left by his predecessors and contemporaries, Hervaeus can now elaborate on the consequences his definitions have for the answers to the questions in the remainder of his book. His goal is to narrow down his subject matter: starting from 'intention' in all senses in which the term is used (in Dist. 1), to first and second intention in the sense in which they are the subject of several scientiae reales, e.g., as acts of the intellect (in Disttt. 1 and 11), meanwhile explaining the attributes of the second intention (Distt. 11–1v) as pertaining to the known thing (the res intellecta), ending up with the sense in which the second intention is the proper subject of logic.

In Distt. 11 and 1v Hervaeus provides us with more detail about the second intention. In Dist. 11 he explains the relation between first and second intentions, more specifically how second intentions are founded

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1 For a short summary of Hervaeus’ doctrine of intentionality in De secundis intentionibus and his Quodl. 1 and 11, see Koridze, ‘Primae et secundae intentiones’. For the relationship between realism and intentionality in Hervaeus, Peter Aureol and Ockham, see Amerini, ‘Realism and Intentionality’.
2 See 21 ff.
3 See tables 1 (24) and 2 (25).
4 See table 1, B.1, and table 2, 1.a.
5 See table 2, 2.b.
6 Not all second intentions are the subject of logic, nor are all rational beings; only the second intention as defined in 2.b.2 is the proper subject of logic. See table 2, 2.b (2.b.2).
7 See table 2, 2.b.2 for the second intention which is the subject of logic. See also 9, n. 27 for De Rijk’s opinion on this matter.
upon first intentions.\(^8\) In Dist. \(iv\) he explains the predicability of second intentions by asking whether second intentions can be predicated of real things, of other second intentions, and whether they can be predicated of the foundation of other, opposite second intentions.\(^9\)

In Dist. \(v\) (the longest of all) Hervaeus finally comes to the point for which he has been preparing in the four preceding Distinctiones. Here he extensively discusses second intentions as the primary subject (also called ‘object’)\(^10\) of logic. He states that logic, and only logic, has the \textit{entia rationis} as its first object (ed. \(84^a\)), but logic concerns only objects that ‘follow’ the things insofar as these things are in the intellect objectively (\textit{logica considerat de his quae consequuntur res prout sunt obiective in intellectu}, \(101^b\)):\(^11\) or, as he says elsewhere, logic considers only rational beings that follow things that are by their nature suited to being apprehended by the intellect (\textit{tantum entia rationis quae consequuntur res quae proprie natae sint ab intellectu apprehendi}, ed. \(103^a\)). When \textit{entia rationes} are considered with respect to their having any real being or not, they belong to metaphysics and not to logic (\(104^a\)).\(^12\) So we see, says Hervaeus, that the object of a particular science is not determined by the object itself, but by the way in which that object is studied (\textit{secundum diversas considerationes possunt considerari [sc. entia rationis] a diversis scientiis, puta a metaphysica et logica}, ed. \(105^a\)).

The first question of Dist. \(v\) (ed. \(72/3^a\)–\(89^a\)) is about whether there is a science which has second intentions as its primary and essential subject. Hervaeus’ conclusion is that there is such a science, namely logic: for logic is primarily and essentially about the \textit{ens rationis} or rational being.\(^13\)

\(^8\) ‘\textit{Et primo quaerendum est de secunda intentione in habitudine ad primum prout in ipsa fundatur}’ (ed. \(34^a\)).

\(^9\) ‘\textit{Nunc quaerendum est de secunda intentione in comparatione ad primum quantum ad praedicationem […] Primo quaeritur utrum secunda intentione possit probari de re extra, de ente scilicet reali, utrum ista scilicet sit vera: “Homo est species”, et aliae consimiles […] Secundo quaeritur utrum una secunda intentione praedicetur de alia secunda intentione, et est quastio utrum vere possit dici quod species sit genus […] Tertio quaeritur utrum de re concepta prout verificatur de ea una secunda intentiono, possit verificari alia intentione secunda et maxime opposita, utrum scilicet ista sit vera: “Homo est genus” et “Animal est species specialissima”, et consimilia’ (ed. \(49^a\)).

\(^10\) In Hervaeus’ text we find ‘\textit{ut de prima et per se subjecto}’ next to ‘\textit{ut de prima et per se objecto}’. No difference in meaning seems to be intended.

\(^11\) As opposed to the \textit{entia rationis} that are in the intellect subjectively, such as an act of the intellect (table 2, 2.a).

\(^12\) Such as cognitive acts and intelligible species (table 2, 2.a).

\(^13\) ‘\textit{Primum est utrum aliqua scientia sit de secundis intentionibus ut de primo et
The second question of *Dist.* v (ed. 89°–100") asks whether logic is the only science with second intentions as its primary subject. Yes, says Hervaeus: logic is the only science dealing with second intentions as its proper subject, but logic is not about all second intentions; it is about second intentions that follow the things insofar as they are in the intellect objectively, not about second intentions in the other possible senses; more specifically, logic is about these intentions in the concretive or material sense of the word (table 2, 2.b.2).

Hervaeus warns us that we should not confuse the rational being that is the primary object of logic with the rational being that is the primary object of grammar and rhetoric; both consider the second intention as pertaining to the known thing, but whereas logic is concerned with second intentions insofar as they follow the known thing naturally, grammar and rhetoric consider second intentions insofar as they follow the known thing by institution.

The third and fourth questions are much more modest than the two first ones. The third question (ed. 100°–104") is whether logic is about all second intentions, a matter which Hervaeus has already addressed in the second question. Hervaeus here again states that logic is about rational beings, namely things that are objectively in the intellect; but now he adds the qualification that logic is about *entia rationis in communi*.

14 'Secundum est utrum sola logica de secundis intentionibus sit ut de primo et per se objecto vel subjecto' (ed. 72/3°); '[…] ex praemissis patet quod sic, quia de illo potest esse scientia ut de primo et per se subjecto cui possunt competere tres praedictae conditiones, scilicet quod processus scientiae sicut ad primum, et quod alia reducantur ad ipsum, et quod sit primo considerandum modo quo expositum est […]. Sed ens rationis est huissmodi' (ed. 84ab).

15 'Nam quaedam sunt entia rationis quae consequuntur res ex natura ipsarum rerum modo quo exponetur, quaedam autem sunt entia rationis quae consequuntur res ex institutione' (ed. 93c). Second intentions insofar as they follow the known thing by institution instead of by nature are not mentioned in Hervaeus' definitions in *Dist.* 1. If he had mentioned this further subdivision, it would have been an extension of table 2, 2.b.

16 'Tertium est utrum logica habeat tractare de omnibus secundis intentionibus' (ed. 72/3°).

17 'Secunda conclusio est quod logica non considerat ens rationis quod consequitur determinatum ens […]' (ed. 101c).
common rational beings, not determinate rational beings (these are the objects of more specific sciences); and he repeats that logic considers only rational beings that follow things that are by their nature suited to being apprehended by the intellect, not by institution. He also adds another aspect of the proper subject of logic: the consideration of its object must contribute to the manner of proceeding in any science, such as starting from simpler and well-known notions to more difficult and less familiar ones, or moving from the general towards the specific.\footnote{18} Examples of rational beings in logic are universale, particularare, genus, species, antecedens, consequens, etc., since, in logic as well as in other sciences, we divide subjects into different genera and species, moving from the universal to the particular, from the simple to the more complicated, from the well-known to the less well-known, using antecedents and consequents in our reasoning.

Hervaeus answers the fourth and final question of the book (ed. \footnote{19}), i.e., whether any other science is concerned with second intentions in any way, by means of an explanation about the type of act of the intellect in which the rational beings that are the subject of logic are known. This intellectual act, which is common to all rational beings that follow the things insofar as they are the objects of the intellect, is what constitutes the unity of the science of logic, that is, the unifying consideration of its proper object.\footnote{20} In other words, the same object can be studied in several sciences, but each science considers its proper object

\footnote{18} ‘[...] logica considerat de ente rationis, scilicet de his quae consequuntur res ut sunt obiective in intellectu, inquantum consideratio eorum valet ad habendum modum procedendi in aliis scientiis, inquantum scilicet in aliis scientiis proceditur primo defining simplicia quae definitio constituitur ex genere et differentia; et proceditur etiam a communibus ad specialia et a notis nobis ad illa quae in se sunt nota, et sic de aliis modis procedendi’ (ed. \textit{101ab}).

\footnote{19} ‘Quartum est utrum aliqua alia scientia praeter logica habeat tractare aliquo modo de secundis intentionibus et praecipue de quibus tractet logica’ (ed. \textit{72/3y}).

\footnote{20} ‘[..] quomodo unitas unius a quo, vel in ordine ad quod, sumitur ratio istorum entium rationis, facit ad hoc quod aliqua una scientia consideret de ipsis secundum quacumque sui communem considerationem natam haber; nam, sicut iam dicitum est, secundum diversas considerationes possunt considerari a diversis scientiis, puta a metaphysica et logica [...] Sicut patet de logica, quae una existens considerat omnia entia rationis consequentia omnia vel plura genera entium quantum ad praemissa quae consequuntur ea secundum se et secundum suum esse rationem, sicut praedicari in quid vel in quale, vel praedicari de differentibus specie vel numero, et sic de aliis. Nam ex hoc quod ratio sumitur in ordine ad unum, scilicet ad actum intelligendi, quia scilicet consequitur res prout sunt objective in intellectu, et ideo primum fundamentum sui generis in eis accipitur in ordine ad intellectum’ (ed. \textit{105a–106b}).
from its own unique angle, according to its unique \textit{ratio}. For logic, this unique way of considering its object lies in the act of the intellect being common to all rational beings. A second intention such as \textit{species} is one of the proper subjects of logic in this sense. In another sense (according to another unifying type of consideration), \textit{species} are the proper subject of a real science (\textit{scientia realis}) such as biology.

Throughout his book, but towards the end with increasing frequency, Hervaeus keeps referring to the many times he has repeated his point concerning the various definitions of \textit{intention}.

Hervaeus’ very method in reasoning, from the general (intentions) to the specific (second intentions \textit{qua} subject of logic) is a nice example of the \textit{modus procedendi} of scientific research as he explains it in \textit{Dist. v}.\footnote{The text contains a large number of expressions such as ‘sicut dictum est’, ‘ut supra dictum est’, ‘ut superior dictum est’, ‘ut saepe dictum est’, etc. Examples: ‘sed secundae intentiones dicunt mere ens rationis, actus vero intelligendi est ens reale, ut saepe dictum est’ (72/1\textsuperscript{b}); ‘actus autem intelligendi est actus realis, ut saepe dictum est’ (84\textsuperscript{a}); ‘sicut supra frequenter dictum est, prima vel secunda intentio potest accipi dupliciter; vel quantum ad ipsam in abstracto, quae nihil alius est quam habitudo objecti ad intellectum quae est relatio rationis, vel quantum ad objectum in quo fundatur et quod ab ipsa denominatur, prout dicimus quod objectum est terminus ad quem terminatur actus intelligendi’ (86\textsuperscript{b}).}

Of course, much more could be said about \textit{Dist. iii–v}; but for the purpose of this introduction it is sufficient to say that Hervaeus answers all questions of \textit{De secundis intentionibus} (including the main issue of the work, which he addresses in \textit{Dist. v}) with the help of the divisions and definitions he has explained so carefully in \textit{Dist. i}. From this perspective we shall now look in more detail at \textit{De secundis intentionibus i–ii}.\footnote{‘inquantum scilicet in aliis scientiis proceditur primo definiendo simplicia quae definitio constituitur ex genere [101\textsuperscript{b}] et differentia; et proceditur etiam a communi-nibus ad specialia et a notis nobis ad illa quae in se sunt nota, et sic de aliis modis procedendi’.