Incipient Law

Aspects of Legal Philosophy

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The initial Dutch title of the project, to which this paper is a contribution, was begin­nend recht ('incipient law'). Its subtitle read: 'the development of law in a society, as seen from the viewpoint of legal history, legal anthropology and legal theory'. My contribution will be that of the legal philosopher or legal theoretician.

Incipient law for legal philosophers. But what is law? When does 'incipient law' become 'law'? Does legal philosophy provide any answers to this question? Or would it be better to consult certain legal philosophers, but not others? And if so, who are they?

At first sight legal philosophers are not so well equipped to answer this question as legal historians and legal anthropologists, who, after all, have studied the first patterns of customary law that evolve into 'law'. Or rather: written law. But it does not take long to realise that this question brings up some very fundamental issues of legal philosophy, the most obvious one being: what is law? How should those early normative patterns be interpreted? Is it ethics? Is it religion? Is it custom? And how does it relate to 'aw'?

In other words, the 'incipient law' issue presumes an opinion about 'completed' or 'finished law'. Legal philosophers have written much about this. Or rather: this is virtually the only subject about which they write. A large chunk of legal philosophy is a search for a convincing concept of law. As you know, according to Kant, lawyers had still not succeeded in their search in the eighteenth century and I fear that the situation has not much improved since then.

Every academic student of jurisprudence faces this embarrassing shortcoming when the sources of law are discussed.¹ These are means to identify applicable law. As such the books mention: legislation, custom, case law and treaties. With regard to the existence of those sources there is – at any rate for Europe in the year 2002 – considerable consensus, but not as a rule about the ratio and the comparative significance of those sources of law. Or, in other words: no one will dispute that legislation, custom, case law and treaties are sources of law. But the question what the comparative importance of each of those sources is, and the question whether or not one source should be considered the foundation for the other sources evokes a cacophony of opinions.

Legal philosophy, however, does comprise a school of thought that believes that the question of what law is can be answered unambiguously. It is the analytical doc-

trine that goes back to the work of John Austin and Jeremy Bentham, which was further developed by H.L.A. Hart. But if I understand it correctly, these legal positivists remained utopians: searching for the Holy Grail, which to this date has not been found. What’s more: many of today’s philosophers of law teach us that this Holy Grail will never be found. Below I will discuss the reasons for this.

Let me start by making some remarks about the four sources of law referred to above.

First, legislation. Legislation is a popular source of law. Most of all with the general public. One popular misconception about the study of law is that lawyers should know statutes because they contain all law exhaustively. We know that for certain areas of law such as criminal law this perception is more or less correct. In an area of law in which legal certainty is an important ideal, law based on legislation, if not to be preferred, deserves pride of place. In the nineteenth century in particular this view inspired an aspiration after codification in criminal law, constitutional and civil law.

To what extent did those major codifications help us? Do they clearly mark the transition from incipient law to law? Of course they intended to, but reality has proven more willful than envisaged by the legal utopians (and as I mentioned earlier: that is what the legal positivists were).

Perhaps the following everyday and well-known example can serve as an illustration. In the twenties a dentist in The Hague tapped electricity illegally by blocking the electricity meter by the insertion of a pen. He was taken to court on account of ‘theft’. The Dutch criminal code defines theft as the wrongful appropriation of an item that belongs, wholly or partially, to someone else. But is electricity an ‘item’? And does the insertion of a pen into a meter constitute ‘appropriation’?

The Dutch Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative. Here lies – and that is vital to our subject – the first defeat of legal utopianism. It is, after all, the court of law that provides for clarity, not the legislator. Napoleon as well as other codifiers would no doubt have regarded this as a crushing defeat.

Legal utopians are of course aware of this problem. The solution proposed by Thomas Hobbes, one of the predecessors of Austin and Bentham, was that the court use the phrase ‘in the name of the law’. And of course that is partially correct. Moreover, an attempt can be made to bind the court to the law as strictly as possible by means of stringent interpretation techniques such as a historical and grammatical interpretation. But that does not change the fact that legislation cannot explain itself and that the court’s discretion will never be far away.

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3 See also: Feldbrugge, FJM. Tussen theologie en medicijnen. Recht als re gels en recht als proces, Leiden 1968, 6, who refrains from giving a definition of law.
5 Article 310 Dutch Criminal Code.
6 Supreme Court, 23 May 1921, Nederlands Jurisprudentie, 1921, 564.
When I was a law student myself, the gas meters in Amsterdam could be tipped in such a way as to reduce the registration of gas consumption. Was this theft? The ruling about the dentist in The Hague could be a precedent in settling this new, yet old issue.

A precedent means a decision by a court of law. In particular the American philosophy of law emphasises the contribution of a court of law to the creation of law. ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do and nothing more pretentious are what I mean by law’, are the famous words written by Oliver Wendell Holmes in his essay The Path of the Law.\(^8\) He wished to view law ‘realistically’ and thought he could best do so through the eyes of the ‘bad man’. The ‘bad man’ is interested in the risk of sanctions. The people tipping the gas meters are not interested in grandiloquent considerations of natural law, but in the risk of a court equalling ‘gas’ with ‘electricity’ or ‘tipping a gas meter’ with ‘inserting a pen into a electricity meter’. Lawyers are expected to make a ‘prophecy’. That – and nothing more pretentious – is law, according to the father of American realism.

As with all revolutionary theories, there are always people plus royaliste que le roi and the king of American realism was quickly passed over by students who took an even more cynical attitude towards the law than the sceptic Holmes. To Jerome Frank the prophecies were just a gamble and law came about only after the judge had pounded his gavel and pronounced a concrete judgement. Law is a ‘law suit won’. An obligation is a ‘law suit lost’.\(^9\) It will be clear that this type of law is produced all the time. In their Journal, mémoires de la vie littéraire (1835) the Goncourt brothers described the production of law as follows [in translation]:

Inside the Law was buzzing about. As soon as one suspect had left the dock, another took his place. And all at a terrifying speed! One, two or three-year sentences rained down on the heads so fleetingly perceived. It was frightening to see punishment gurgle from the president’s mouth like water from a fountain, in a steady, never-ending stream. Examination, witness statement, defence and claim, it was all over in five minutes. The president turned to one side, the justices nodded, the president muttered something, and that was the judgement.

Judgement as law. Could it be so simple? The Goncourt brothers compared the law to water from a fountain. But that does not make a fountain identical to water. And although law contains an element of indeterminateness, does that mean that there is nothing but indeterminateness?

Perhaps here custom could play a role, which brings us to the German Von Savigny. ‘In dem gemeinsamen Bewusstsein des Volkes lebt das positive Recht, und wir haben es daher Volksrecht zu nennen’ (positive law lives in the common awareness of the people, which is why we should call it people’s law), according to Von Savigny.\(^10\) Law, therefore, is not a conscious creation. Neither by the legislator, nor by the court.

Law is a structure of spontaneous growth. It is, rather, a national spirit, working and

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living in all individuals, which produces law. The people form a natural unit, or ‘Ein­heit durch die einander ablösenden Geschlechter hindurch’ [a unit transcending the successive generations), which links the present to the past.\textsuperscript{11}

Not only did Von Savigny stop the aspiration after codification in Germany, but in other countries as well.\textsuperscript{12} His ideas live on in the general principles of proper administration (which, according to some administrative law experts, are principles that live in the sense of justice).

In particular in the ‘seventies and ‘eighties of the twentieth century great importance was attached to principles of law. Ronald Dworkin made it his primary weapon in his fight against H.L.A. Hart’s legal utopianism.\textsuperscript{13} According to Dworkin the law cannot be identified as a ‘system of rules’, as Hart thought he did in his book The Concept of Law.\textsuperscript{14} The law includes ‘principles, policies, and other sorts of standards’. Legal positivism, which believes that the law can be identified by means of a test that is related not to content but to ‘pedigree’, fails.

Law is not an order of the highest ruler in the state, as John Austin claimed, nor a system of rules, as Hart wrote. Law is a story.

With this last argument the American Dworkin sustained the criticism set in by his compatriot Lon Fuller (without Dworkin paying any royalties, by the way). Fuller compares the development of law to the telling of a funny story or a joke. When you try to retell a funny story, Fuller said in 1940 in a series of lectures that were published under the title The Law in Quest of Itself, it is always the product of two factors.\textsuperscript{15} First the story as you heard it. That is, ‘as it is at the time of its first telling’.\textsuperscript{16} Legal positivists (or in my terminology: legal utopians – they who think that you can identify law with an unambiguous factual criterion) are preoccupied with this element.

The legal positivist ideal translated into interpretation could be that the interpreting party tries to carefully reconstruct the story ‘as it is at the time of its first telling’. This is done when an interpretation technique such as ‘original understanding’ is used, which is favoured by various members of the American Supreme Court,\textsuperscript{17} as well as the controversial Robert Bork.\textsuperscript{18} Fuller, however, finds this much too re-

\textsuperscript{11} Von Savigny, System, I, 20.
\textsuperscript{15} Fuller, Lon L., The Law in Quest of Itself, Chicago 1940 (AMS edition 1978).
\textsuperscript{16} Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, 8.
stricted. When we consider how we tell a funny story, we are aware that it is not just the story as it was told for the first time. In retelling a story, the point of the story becomes the focal point. In other words: ‘the story as it should be’. 19

A retelling of the story always combines these two elements. If the story was told poorly, you try to improve on it to make it sound as you think it should. You try for maximum effect.

42 years later, in 1982, Ronald Dworkin would embroider on the same idea as Fuller in an article entitled ‘Natural’ Law Revisited. 20 Like Roscoe Pound 21 and Lon Fuller 22 before him, Dworkin advocated a moderate or non-traditional variant of natural law. Dworkin compares the judge to a mythical figure, Hercules, who is entrusted with the difficult task of further developing the law in the light of past events, but also against the background of what could be regarded as a desirable development. Every interpreting party is a link in a process that resembles a chain novel.

What is someone to do who writes a chain novel together with others? The author is bound by the past. Characters that were killed off by previous authors cannot be revived, and previous events are binding. But an author could (and should) use his creativity to help the story evolve in the best possible way, by wondering ‘which decisions make the continuing novel better as a novel’. 23

In my view the above is close in spirit to Von Savigny and Fuller. Fuller concluded his 1940 lectures with the words that in interpreting the law it is impossible to ascertain whether a specific contribution is novel or rather ‘the better telling of an old story’. As to the judge, Mansfield observed: ‘he is playing his part in the eternal process by which the common law works itself pure and adapts itself to the needs of a new day’. 24

This brings me to a fourth source of law: the treaty. The law of treaties as a source of law became extremely popular after World War II. In a comparatively brief period the 1948 Universal Human Rights Declaration took the world as a moral Esperanto that has been adopted almost everywhere. Some years later various European treaties (pursuant to Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution) became directly binding in the Dutch legal system. The fundamental rights in the Dutch Constitution with its ban on review have been made virtually obsolete by the effect of human rights clauses in treaties.

The sense of awe inspired by the law of treaties is also remarkable. The question whether or not certain conventional obligations should be modified met with a storm of indignation in legal circles some years ago. The law of treaties is regarded as almost

19 Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, 8.
23 Dworkin, op.cit. 94.
24 Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, 140. See also 114.
immutable. It has thus acquired a significance of quasi-natural law – or is perceived as such. Rightly so or not, I will discuss later. For the moment I wish to confine myself to the observation that philosophers of law are divided on the relation and prioritisation of sources of law. Where legal positivists and legists point to the law’s primacy, they are contradicted by realists such as Holmes, Gray25 and Frank who consider statute law merely as potential law. Legists and realists in turn contend with the followers of the Historic School, Friedrich Hayek26 or Lon Fuller27 who recognise the law in the spontaneous structuring in society. It seems this strife in legal philosophy is far from over. A ‘master rule’, the ultimate rule of recognition by which law can be distinguished from its peripheral manifestations, seems more remote than ever. This is why I dubbed the legal positivists who think they have found the key to the concept of law ‘legal utopians’. Another apt name would be ‘scientific optimists’. But the same reproach could be made against the followers of the Historic School or the realists, for they, too, believe that in custom or case law they have found that one source of law from which all other law can be derived. Fuller (who himself remained critical) described what the legal utopian has in mind as follows: Its object is to develop a criterion which will enable us to distinguish between those ideas or meanings which are only trying to become law and those which have succeeded – to set up a kind of finishing line, as it were.28

Perhaps a comparison with theology would be appropriate here, a comparison which I have taken from Fuller, but which can also be found with Kelsen.

Before Hobbes and Bodin appeared on the stage, morality and jurisprudence were dominated by a multitude of ‘deities’. ‘Polytheism’ was the norm. Reason, custom, consensus, the state’s mandatory power – all were regarded as factors that could structure the relations between people. As with the old gods in Greek society and the Roman empire there was no clear division of tasks. Sometimes they were allies, and sometimes they were adversaries. But with Hobbes a new era set in: monotheism. This is when ‘one supreme power ruling over the whole legal universe’ was introduced, Fuller wrote.29 Custom, for instance, may create law only if the law refers to it. Fuller himself leans more towards polytheism than towards monotheism. The master rule is an illusion, legal utopianism untenable. It is difficult to make a demarcation between law and incipient law, between law and morale.

This inevitably begs the question: why is this so? After all those efforts by the greatest minds, why is it impossible to identify the law with an unmistakable demarcation criterion, as envisaged by the legal positivist? Why are lawyers still trying to find a definition of their concept of law? Why haven’t we reached the monotheism stage yet?

28 Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, 56.
29 Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, 80.
My answer would be: because this is not just an intellectual task, but a search for the most satisfactory ratio of elements that can be found only through long experience.

Let me explain. Many disciplines of science focus on discovering patterns in reality that occur independent of the human will. We cannot choose the law of gravity or the theory of relativity, but we should recognise certain patterns as they present themselves to us. Because jurisprudence, too, can be regarded as a science, the misconception can take root that we can study legal reality in the way we study natural reality. In this way the law could 'in essence' be called a command from the sovereign. Or a complex of rules that are identified as law by a master rule. Or a complex of rules and principles and standards that have evolved into a spontaneous social structure. Or ... take your pick.

But this could easily give rise to the misunderstanding that the law is something that somehow exists in reality, whereas the law is a matter of what we wish to regard as such. The law is a man-made construction that we wish to use. It is a pragmatic construct, which has a more or less useful function. It presupposes an entirely different form of scientific study than is common in sciences in which a segment of reality is discovered that forces itself upon us, independent of the human will.

It is possible to regard law as the rule formulated by a judge, as envisaged by Gray. Or as the judgement passed by a judge, as Frank wants to have it. Or as the rule laid down by the legislator, as defined by Austin. Or as the 'results of human action but not of design' arising from the spontaneous order of actions, as Hayek observed in imitation of Ferguson. None of those views is 'true' in the sense that it depicts reality better than another opinion. Each view, however, does have different consequences.

As yet we do not have much experience with what those consequences are. We only have about two hundred years of experience and since then we have been experimenting with different opinions about what could be regarded as law. In the laboratory of history experiments are carried out to find the best balance between legislation, custom, treaty and case law. By the British, the Americans, the Dutch, the French and other nations. Each of these systems features an entirely different ratio between the different sources of law. Law does not mean the same to an American as it does to a Frenchman.

Yet today there are many similarities between the different systems. One dominant model that tries to balance several sources of law is the model of the constitutional state. Again – as goes for other legal constructs – the constitutional state is a deliberate construction with which we are experimenting. We know that governing a country requires power. Men are no angels. But we have learned from our mistakes. In par-

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31 'What is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.' James Madison in *Federalist papers*, edited by Isaac Kramnick, Harmondsworth 1987, no. 47.
ticular in the 20th century.32 We know that a concentration of power in the hands of a government can easily lead to perversion. This is why we started looking for safeguards with which power can be granted to a government, but at the same time can be curbed and be brought under the control of those governed. For this purpose the constitutional state has been designed. The constitutional state indicates in what way government control can be checked by the law.33

The first element of the constitutional state is that the government or state, too, is bound by legislation. This is the principle of legality. It has aspects of constitutional law and of criminal law. Each, however, attaches great value to legislation.

But the constitutional state does not coincide with the regularity of the administration. This, at any rate, has proven too restricted. We were confronted with ‘gesetzlichen Unrecht’ (legal injustice) and set out to find new conceptions of the constitutional state.34 Since the sixteenth and especially the seventeenth century there have been lawyers who claimed that we can only bind the government to the law effectively if in addition to the binding force of legislation, a binding force would be awarded to subjective higher rights.35 This is the origin of natural law, which would later take the shape of constitutional or human rights to be codified. Even if they are not yet rooted in statutes or conventions, some people regard these rights as an unequivocal part of the law. As customary or natural law or as legal principles generally perceived as just.

But what to do with these principles, besides establishing their existence? In 1803 John Marshall, an American judge, carried out a historic experiment. As Chief Justice in the American Supreme Court he passed a judgement in which he designated the court of law as the body that could review the binding force of the legislator’s ordinary laws against the principles contained in the American constitution.36 Case law thus became a major source of law. That case law is a source of law is therefore not a far-fetched idea. It does not form part of the natural order of things. It is a historic fact. And will remain so for as long as we want it to. And we want it to as long as we like the system’s consequences.

This is the actual topic of discussion. Some people say that with judicial review case law has gained much too much in importance as a source of law.37 And this is a problem because it is contrary to the ideal of democracy. Democracy is served best if legislation takes pride of place as a source of law. Laws, are, after all, – these days at any


rate – democratically legitimised, while court judgements are not. The counter-majoritarian dilemma of the law of review therefore implies that caution is called for. However, in practice no such caution is exercised. The higher law contained in treaties proliferates. On an every-increasing scale new rights are formed against which courts review the legislation. Constitutional politics have gradually usurped normal politics. This means that the question is not so much where does law start but rather where do we think that law should start. In other words: we will have to reconsider a healthy relationship between democratic politics (taking decisions by parliamentary majority) and law (awarding the power of decision to courts of law). This presumes a new view of a good relationship between the sources of law: legislation, custom, case law and treaty.