

Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal System
An analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and
the Court of Justice of the European Union

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Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal System

An analysis of the European Court of Human Rights
and the Court of Justice of the European Union

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