The Netherlands and Islam

The general view is that Islam in the Netherlands is a very recent phenomenon. That is certainly true if one only looks at the Netherlands on the North Sea and at the immigration country demonstrates the fact that religious identity is now of primary importance in the formation of the nation-state, in which the religious dimension has been foun-
dated in the formation of the nation-state. In contrast to the views of liberal thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Snouck Hurgronje, there is no inherent opposition between religion and politics. In fact, religious mass movements such as the 19th-century anti-slavery movement have played a significant role in the creation of public opinion and a public sphere. The colonial nation that has to repress the combination of religion and politics in Indonesia is in fact the idea that religious identity is the channel for a democratic nation-state. In Western ac-

societies such as the Netherlands and Eng-

land, religious organization has been foun-
dated in the formation of the nation-
state. In the case of England and France, this can be seen as the basis for a society without being legitimated by a single nation-state. Secondly, the state derives its legitimacy from a process of political partic-
ipation of citizens. A public sphere in which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ing force through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by the idea that religious identity is the chang-
ya separation of church and state, and, if one takes a historically and geographi-
cal perspective on civilization and political objectives. The historical analysis of the

solicitation of the Indies has not been successful. Islamic organizations are crucial in the political con-

stitution of postcolonial Indonesia. As in Indonesia, the role the state must play is to inter-

fere in the social sphere of the religious organizations. Such a perspective is not sta-

dard in the formation of the nation-
state. In the case of England and France, this can be seen as the basis for a society without being legitimated by

Dilemmas of modern states

The general view is that Islam in the Netherlands is a very recent phenomenon. That is certainly true if one only looks at the Netherlands on the North Sea and at the im-
migration country demonstrates the fact that religious identity is now of primary importance in the formation of the nation-state, in which the religious dimension has been foun-
dated in the formation of the nation-
state. In the case of England and France, this can be seen as the basis for a society without being legitimated by

Dilemmas of modern states

The general view is that Islam in the Netherlands is a very recent phenomenon. That is certainly true if one only looks at the Netherlands on the North Sea and at the im-
migration country demonstrates the fact that religious identity is now of primary importance in the formation of the nation-state, in which the religious dimension has been foun-
dated in the formation of the nation-
state. In the case of England and France, this can be seen as the basis for a society without being legitimated by

The Netherlands and Islam

In the Netherlands and in other Western countries one finds a hostile image of Islam. Only recently we saw this image influencing the panic reactions to the terrorist attacks in New York. With great speed this attack was connected to state-
ments of a general nature on the essence of Islam and of Muslims. Dutch politicians and intellectuals spoke in public about the age-old frustration of Mus-
lims that was presumed to be the background of this attack. Almost immediately the question of the loyalty of Muslim immigrants to the Dutch state and to Dutch norms and values emerged in public debate. Opinion polls showed quickly how fickle that loyalty is and how methodologically shaky opinion polls are. This was followed by attacks on mosques and Islamic schools. The urgency of a more sophisticated analy-
sis of the relationship between the Netherlands and Islam is self-evident.
the colonized peoples from the political process can be found in John Stuart Mill’s and Snouck Hurgronje’s idea that these peoples should be considered as ‘children’. This 19th-century liberal notion remained in force until nationalist movements put an end to colonial domination. The Indies were governed through indirect rule. The elite was identified and used as brokers between government and society. The colonial soci- ety was prevented from self-organization. This procedure resembles the way in which the postcolonial government tries to find brokers in its dealings with ethnic and reli- gious minorities. As such one can under- stand the sometimes comical discussion about imams in the Netherlands. The gov- ernment feels a strong need to speak to Muslims via their leaders. The problem is that these hardly exist, since imams are often poorly educated prayer leaders who have some influence, but one that is not to be over-estimated. Some universities in the Netherlands that have little-attended theo- logical seminars have proposed that they could give these imams a thorough theo- logical and pastoral education. This is a per- fect example of indirect rule, according to which groups do not organize themselves but are represented by leaders created by the government. The latter not only creates leaders, but also forces people to make use of ethnic and religious channels to voice their views vis-a-vis the government. The problem is that Muslims might use these peo- ple participate in the political process in ways they have not chosen. At present polit- ical participation in the Netherlands and in other Western countries has declined con- siderably and it is not to be expected that newcomers will spend much energy in this do- main. It is likely that people will be mobilized around certain issues, such as the environment, traffic and spatial mobility, and education, and that also religious issues will be introduced. When there is a public debate about, for example, headscarves in

schools, people are mobilized around the issue and their religious organizations are happy to step in. In this way, Muslims follow the pattern of involvement of their non- Muslim co-citizens. The neutral state

The last element is that of freedom and equality as the ideals of the modern nation- state. An important element here is the sep- aration of church and state. Neutrality of the state in matters of religious choice has to be guaranteed as a political principle, although one has to observe that there are vast differ- ences between the USA, the Netherlands, France, Turkey, India, Indonesia and other modern nation-states in the implementa- tion of this principle. The US was the first state in which the separation of church and state was rigorously applied with the para- doxical effect that public religion is of great political importance there. In the Nether- lands there is, among others, the Free Uni- versity (which is Protestant) and the Catholic University of Nijmegen, both of which count few Protestant or Catholic stu- dents, but nonetheless have religious foun- dations and full government funding. An old problem is the definition of freedom and the fact that procedures of freedom can be used to promote un freedom. Everyone will be convinced of the liberating effects of modern science. The biological theory of evolution is science and creationism is a be- lief. In the USA-religious activities have intro- duced creationism in the curriculum of public schools, because they are of the opinion that evolutionism and creationism are equal sets of belief. The polemic between these positions exists already since the famous debate between the scientists Thomas Hux- ley and the Anglican Bishop Wilberforce in Oxford in 1860. The term ‘fundamentalism’ originates from the important Scopes trial in the US in 1925 where the bible was accepted, as it was, against Darwin. The problem of the modern state is that good education, based on scientific knowledge and a particu- lar form of rationality, is essential to its de- velopment, and that the government has to be neutral towards religious opinions in so- ciety. The introduction of Hinduism, Muslim, and Christian curricula is thus only accept- able when they do not conflict with scientific- education. For instance, it is not possible to find a balance in the curriculum of the national education. This was true for the Comintern and it is also true for the pan-Islamist groups which have been fighting in several conflicts in North Africa, Egypt, Afghanistan and the Moluccas. After the collapse of the Soviet Union – partly by their own doing – they are constantly con- fronted with the weakness of the old alliances. When one takes into account the role of the US and the West in supporting the repressive regime of Israel, some anti-Western and anti-Ameri- can feelings might be expected. The terror- ist attack has suddenly made us much more aware of the negative effects of postcolonial globalization in the West and vice versa. One can no longer assume that conflicts in the South, in which the North, particularly the US, is interested, will be contained in the South. Moreover, with the rise of the network soci- ety the possibilities of states to guarantee security inside their borders have de- clined. Responses to this situation cannot be limited to conventional military and po- litical options, but have to emerge from clear-minded analyses of the new condi- tions of the national state. To transnational challenges one has to give transnational an- swers. The challenge of Muslim immi- grants who are perceived as symbols of the large-scale upheavals of today’s world is the opposite of such an answer. It brings us back to old nationalist reflexes that want to bring back that which has already disap- peared: the homogeneous nation-state.