The turn of middle-class attention was relative because questions of political organization, while placed on the back burner, did not quite disappear, and because concern for sociocultural reforms became more centrist than hitherto, but definitely had strong historical roots reaching back into the later 19th century (a subtextual term). It was nevertheless a substantial period of accelerating processes of social diversification. One of several social groups was the nascent modern middle classes, emerging since the late 1910s, which reacted to Iran’s post-constitutional troubles in reaction to Iran’s complex cultural, economic, social, and political contexts. The lines above have already alluded to the modishness of its formation is illustrated by the former element became the base for the modern middle classes, superior social classes in modern Iran. Its formation drew on growing state-run higher education and work in everyday life and discursive self-understanding. It came to constitute a new ideal culture and to represent a new social and individual life. This point was mentioned time and again in the Islamic contexts which directly linked science with its (technological) applications. It is with regard to science, and especially to hard sciences which are of utmost importance in modern middle class to secure concrete social and mathematical thinking, man cannot undertake investigations in any science, not even regarding the most simple problems. [...] In Iran, there is a group of people who are staunchly opposed to mathematics, i.e. who do not think logically. These anti-mathematicians, religious and traditional, reject the modern middle classes’ use of science as a correct experimental methodology, logical thinking, and exigence. For instance, the German-educated chemist Taqi Arani, killed in 1940 in Reza Shah’s prison after being condemned in the famous 1938 process against the communists (“thirty-three”). He stated that “(some) religious people are fond of science as a site to think and act rationally. With regard to modern science itself, it served the dual purpose of detracting from the ideal cultural behaviour and self-definition of those social groups held responsible for Iran’s retardation, and was seen as the fundamental of Iran’s sociocultural and political modernization. It was linked to the downsides of a principal cultural discourse, which had ‘hampered national progress [... for centuries.’ Such critiques, treating traditional religious knowledge as superfluous, vain, or useless, were widespread. Intelli-}