Proceedings of the Fifth Afrasian International Symposium

Conflict Resolution in the Afrasian Context: Examining More Inclusive Approaches

Edited by

Nobuko Nagasaki, Pauline Kent, Kosuke Shimizu, Shiro Sato and Kazue Demachi

6 February 2010

Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies
Ryukoku University
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Kyoto and Shiga
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Preface

With substantial support from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies was established in 2005 to conduct thorough research on conflict analysis. Our Centre has organised annual symposia ever since its establishment. We focused on “Conflict in the Middle East and Asian Approaches to Conflict Resolution” (March 2006), “Conflict Resolution in Everyday Life” (February 2007), “Sustainability of the Local Community” (February 2008) and “Poverty and Development” (November 2008).

Unlike the previous symposia which were organised on issue based perceptions towards conflict resolution, this year’s symposium aims to focus on theories (and practices) of it. This means that the Centre is now moving towards a new term of its research, the second phase of conflict resolution. This second phase aims at not merely conflict ‘resolution,’ which is based on a relatively short-term analysis of conflict, but also at conflict ‘reconciliation,’ which leads to a long-term peace and conflict prevention.

In order to achieve the new goal, but at the same time retain our extensive focus on Asian and African regions, we set the title of this year’s symposium as “Conflict Resolution in the Afrasian Context: Examining More Inclusive Approaches.” The Centre invited a variety of scholars specialising in different academic subjects ranging from international relations, post-colonialism, and post-structuralism to history, philosophy, and intercultural studies.

We are extremely honoured to have such distinguished scholars as participants, and hope this symposium would be able to contribute to conflict resolution and reconciliation studies.

Kosuke Shimizu
Programme Chair of the Fifth Afrasian International Symposium
March 2010
INTRODUCTION

This paper critiques the ‘realism’ of Great Power competition by exploring how Japan and China’s human security focused anti-piracy policies in Southeast Asia and East Africa provide a soft power path to Great Power status in the international society. Since the end of the Second World War and the process of decolonization, Great Powers can no longer emerge through the exercise of military might and the conquest of territory, but instead, states must seek soft power paths to achieve Great Power status in the international society. One soft power path is provided by the concept of Human Security that aims to free individual human beings from want and fear; thereby shifting the security referent from the state to the human level and transferring security responses from ‘hard,’ military responses to ‘soft,’ police actions and aid programs. Japan and China promote themselves as responsible, benevolent Great Powers by addressing threats posed by hostis humani generis (enemies of mankind), as pirates are termed in international law. China and Japan’s anti-piracy responses emphasize cooperation with members of the international society to tackle human security concerns posed by pirates from the perspective of both victim and perpetrator.

A Neo-Gramscian approach highlights that the international society is tiered into an economically developed core and a developing periphery and attempts by states in the periphery to enter the core are derided as threats or Great Power competitors. What a Neo-Gramscian approach misses, however, is how the historical construction of state identities conditions the foreign policy options of states in a ‘core’ or ‘periphery’ of the international society. The US and European states, in the core, remain trapped by a realist, imperialist mindset that emphasizes Great Power competition and aims to kill or capture pirates. As an ‘in between’ state (Ikeda 2008: 22-25) or ‘bridge of civilizations’ (Shih 2009), in both the core and periphery of the international society, Japan has sought to build the capacities of Southeast Asian and East African states in a human security mission to protect seafarers, but also to confront the threats to human well-being on land which is the root cause of piracy. China’s response to piracy aims to project the image of a responsible, benevolent Great Power that only intervenes when called upon to do so by a state that cannot guarantee security in its own borders and when this intervention is mandated by the United Nations. Both Japan and China’s anti-piracy policies emphasize Great Power responsibilities to secure human beings from fear and want, thereby providing an alternative to US and European responses. This divergence in Great Power discourse highlights new opportunities to realize Great Power status by following soft power paths.

1. REALIST INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ANTI-PIRACY DISPACH TO THE GULF OF ADEN

The policy brief of a 2008 Dutch International Relations think-tank Conference on multinational
anti-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia, emphasized the “obvious risk of countries competing for regional influence; this would mainly concern relations between China, India, Japan and the USA” (Ginkel et al. 2008: 2). The emphasis on Great Power competition reflects a wider discourse that focuses on ‘emerging’ powers and the security threats they pose to other states. In the case of anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, this realist discourse centres on China as a threat in particular (Burnstein and Munro 1997; Roy 1994). China’s involvement in the anti-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia is perceived as an opportunity for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to demonstrate its growing capabilities, as well as to provide a rationale for further improvements in Chinese naval capabilities and expanding foreign naval bases (BBC 2009). In the case of Japan, interpretations of the dispatch of the Maritime Self-Defence (MSDF) forces to the Gulf of Aden to participate in anti-piracy operations are embedded in a wider discourse relating to the development of the Japanese military forces and the potential transformation of the constitution. A revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution in particular would enable Japanese military forces to contribute to collective self-defence operations with the US enabling Japan to become a ‘normal power’ (Samuels 2007; Hughes 2004). The discourse in the field of international relations focuses on the development and deployment of Chinese and Japanese military forces as constituting hard power paths to Great Power status.

Critical approaches to International Relations theory highlight the self-serving and self-fulfilling nature of such realist interpretations (Booth 2005: 4-10). ‘Dominant’ Great Powers seek to embed ‘emerging’ Great Powers in particular discourses that serve to constrain these up-and-coming powers by stigmatizing their contributions to the international society as not ‘normal’ in Japan’s case, or a ‘threat’ in China’s case. Such discourses can be interpreted from an Orientalist or Neo-Gramscian perspective. An Orientalist position highlights the dominance of Western Great Powers that seeks to force other states, such as Japan and China, to abide by what these Western Great Powers view as their ‘superior’ norms (Nayak and Malone 2009; Suzuki 2008). Alternatively, a neo-Gramscian perspective emphasizes the military, economic, and social contexts of power political relations that are established by and for powerful states in the core of the international society in order to prevent challenges from weaker states in the periphery (Van Ness 2002; Keene 2002).

Whilst such accounts stress the unequal nature of the international society, more research is required in order to understand the influence of a Western dominated discourse in the international society upon the identity and practice of ‘emerging’ Great Powers, such as China and Japan, and how these states develop counter-discourses (Hurrell 2006). Neo-gramscian scholars have not focused on how Great Powers, either ‘emerging’ or ‘dominant,’ act in accordance with their prescribed identity which is rooted in their past and seek through discourse and action to shape the identities of other states in, as well as the rules, institutions and norms of, the international society. By contrast, Nayak and Malone provide a critical account of US hegemony that emphasizes an American self-belief in being an ‘exceptional’ state with a historical duty to transform the world in its image. Nayak and Malone stress the orientalist nature of this US ‘exceptionalism’ which leaves the US as a “city on the hill,” not only “separate from the rest of the world,” but also unattainable, “above the rest of the world, closer to God than the rest of the world” (Nayak and Malone 2009: 264). This ‘exceptional’ identity is rooted in American history and has a profound influence on US foreign policy (Beeson 2006; Buzan 2004: 154-165).

This article extends Nayak and Malone’s work to examine how China and Japan adopt foreign policies in accordance with their prescribed identities which are grounded in history, but also reproduced
through social interaction in the international society. The article begins by examining Suzuki’s argument that the ‘legitimate Great Powers’ exert peer pressure on ‘frustrated Great Powers,’ such as China and Japan, to compel them conform to their norms (Suzuki 2008). Suzuki delivers a convincing argument that does explain how China and Japan, through their anti-piracy policies, have responded to this peer pressure by pursuing ‘soft power paths’ that centre on the concept of human security in order to demonstrate their commitment to uphold the rules and norms of the international society. However, this article returns to the concept of ‘emerging Great Powers’ challenging the normative framework of the international society governed by ‘dominant Great Powers’ through a counter-discourse (Hurrell 2006). Our reason for doing so is to highlight that neither the status of Great Powers in nor the normative framework of the international society is fixed. Instead, emerging Great Powers may act as norm entrepreneurs in accordance with their identities to challenge the dominant norms of the international society. The argument engages with the concepts of Japan as an ‘in-between state’ and ‘bridge of civilizations,’ and China acting according to the notion of Tianxia (all under heaven), to explore Japan and China’s respective identities. In so doing, we ask how Japan and China might shed their status as ‘emerging’ Great Powers to become ‘dominant’ Great Powers. This article therefore examines the recent work on a China and Japan School of International Relations to reassess how China and Japan’s identities work in the practice of their respective foreign policies. In particular, the concern here is to demonstrate that though ‘dominant’ Great Powers in the international society attempt to shape China and Japan’s foreign policy behaviour, China and Japan’s underlying identities serve to create unique responses to international problems, such as maritime piracy, that can in turn reshape the discourse on inclusion and exclusion in the international society.

2. SOFT POWER PATHS TO GREAT POWER STATUS

Buzan develops the traditional conceptions of Great Powers by distinguishing between Superpowers and Great Powers (Buzan 2004: 55-76). Buzan highlights that Superpowers must possess the requisite military, economic, and political power to extend their influence and intervene when necessary across the globe. Superpowers also provide the key normative content of the international society upon which the legitimacy of the Superpower itself is based (ibid., 69). In contrast, Great Powers may not be powerful in all the required dimensions (political, military and economic) to be a Superpower, but are perceived by other members of the international society as having the capabilities to achieve such status in the future (ibid., 69-70). Great Powers and Superpowers play a central role in the management of the international system by creating and enforcing the rules and norms of the international society, as well as by maintaining the balance of power between states (Bull 2002: 194-201).

In addition to the material facet of Great Power status, there is a social dimension whereby, “great power identity … is a reciprocal construction composed of the interplay between a state’s view of itself and the view of it held by other members of the international society. Since each view affects the other, this social status is in a continuous state of flux” (Buzan 2004: 61). Implicit in this discourse is the notion that dominant Great Powers can recast the identity of states, which fail to abide by the norms and rules of the international society, as outlaw states (Saunders 2006: 25, 35, 37-38). Suzuki explores the social aspect of Great Power status by distinguishing between ‘legitimate’ and ‘frustrated’ Great Powers. According to Suzuki, China and Japan constitute ‘frustrated Great Powers,’ as both possess the requisite economic, military and political capabilities to play a central role in the management of the international society, but
are not accorded the ‘social privileges’ or ‘legitimate status’ that are required to constitute the rules and norms of international society (Suzuki 2008: 49). China is denied equal status by the ‘legitimate’ Great Powers, comprised of the US, France and Britain, on account of China’s human rights record and authoritarian system (ibid., 51-52). Japan, on the other hand, is derided for its ‘chequebook diplomacy,’ paying the cost of upholding international security, but failing to make adequate troop commitments (ibid., 52-53). As a result, China and Japan are forced to play ‘recognition games’ where active contributions to the international society, such as participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs), gain these states recognition that potentially elevates them to ‘legitimate Great Power’ status (ibid., 50).

The need for China and Japan to play recognition games highlights that the path to Great Power status has changed over time with the emergence of new norms governing the behaviour of states in the international society (Finnemore 2003; Buzan and Little 2000). Suzuki notes this contrast in his earlier work arguing that Japan’s rise to Great Power status at the turn of the twentieth century until the 1930s was bounded by the normative context of Great Power status of the time. For Japan to be accepted as a Great Power by other Great Powers in the international society of the early twentieth century, Japanese leaders had to advance a policy of imperialism towards Asian states (Suzuki 2005). Such hard power paths involving coercion by military force are no longer accepted as legitimate by members of the post-Cold War international society, due to the rejection of imperialism and colonialism and focus on states’ responsibility to protect human communities in the world society.

New norms encompassing humanitarian intervention, a responsibility to protect, and human security intermesh and create the normative context in which states, like China and Japan, can demonstrate their ability and commitment as Great Powers in the international society (Wheeler 2000). By securing human communities in the world society from fear and want, emerging Great Powers pursue soft power paths to achieve Great Power status. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas, and policies. When [a state’s] policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, [the state’s] soft power is enhanced” (Nye 2004: x). The ‘recognition games’ that Japan and China play to reassure fellow members of the international society of their benign intentions and legitimacy as Great Powers are soft power foreign policies that accept and defend international rules and norms and secure human beings. Responding to piracy provides emerging Great Powers with the means to reassure the dominant Great Powers of the international society by combating an outlaw of the international society and thereby freeing seafarers from the fear of attack and their own citizens from want, in terms of protecting merchandise at sea.

In Japan’s case, peer pressure (nakama no atsuryoku) exerted by the international society encouraged the Japanese government to pass a piracy law enabling the dispatch of MSDF vessels to the Gulf of Aden.1 According to Yamada Yoshihiko, a Professor at Tokai University who helped to draft this law, the passage of this legislation constituted a further break from Japan’s pacifist Constitution due to the “magic of the word ‘piracy’” (kaizoku to iu kotoba no majikku) (Yamada 2009). Yamada highlights here the notion that as pirates are deemed enemies of mankind (hostis humani generis) according to international law, so the Japanese government could easily sell the dispatch of the MSDF to the Japanese public (ibid.). Essentially, this form of peer pressure is geared to push Japan’s international security role away from the pacifism of

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1 Japan Coast Guard (JCG) officials are also on board the Self Defence Force (SDF) vessels dispatched to the Gulf of Aden in their capacity as law enforcement officers. Any arrests, boarding and searching of vessels for evidence or other law enforcement activity is conducted by these JCG officers.
the Japanese Constitution.

Members of the Japanese government, who have actively been pursuing a greater international security role for the Self Defence Force (SDF), readily appealed to Japan’s international responsibilities in and the application of peer pressure by the international society. There was concern amongst Japanese authorities that Japan would be perceived as being slow to act by the international society as the dispatch of naval forces from China and South Korea preceded Japan’s response. In a Parliamentary session on Japan’s anti-piracy law, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) representative, Eto Akinori, stated that as suppressing piracy was the “duty of all states,” Japan should “keep in step with the international society by actively contributing through the passage of meaningful legislation” noting that while Japan dispatched MSDF ships in March 2009, some 20 other members of the international society had been patrolling the Gulf of Aden since 2008 (HoR 2009: 2-3). This appeal to support the international society is echoed by a number of LDP politicians and party members, such as Tamura Shigenobu, the chief political specialist in the party, writing in the April edition of Jiyūminsoku, the pro-LDP journal, who writes that Japan must swiftly respond to the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden to meet the expectations of the international society (Tamura 2009: 36-37). By invoking the term ‘international society,’ these politicians and supporters are employing a type of reverse peer pressure that highlights Japan’s duty to fulfil the international role set out in the preamble to the constitution.

In addition to galvanizing public support, the LDP rhetoric aims to counter the critiques of the opposition parties who argue that the dispatch of the SDF abroad is contrary to the constitution. Eto’s comments were challenged by members of Japan’s other political parties from a variety of angles. Writing in the April edition of Zenei, the journal of the Communist Party of Japan (CPJ), Tagawa Minoru of the Party’s International Bureau details the rationale behind the CPJ position in opposing the dispatch of the MSDF. According to Tagawa, the Liberal Democratic Party and Kōmeitō (New Clean Government Party) were using the pretext of anti-piracy measures to expand the interpretation of the Maritime Security Special Measures Law that enables the dispatch of the MSDF abroad, relax laws pertaining to the MSDF’s use of weapons and work towards the implementation of collective self-defence (Tagawa 2009: 91, 100-101). Tagawa argues in favour of a non-military response involving the dispatch of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to build the capacity of local forces, rebuild Somalia’s economy and political system on land (ibid., 96-98); a point supported by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (Akanegakubo 2009: 10). Though the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) were generally supportive of the LDP’s position in responding to piracy, indeed, a DPJ House of Representatives member Nagashima Akihisa first proposed that Japan react, the DPJ opposed the dispatch of the MSDF arguing that maritime police operations should remain the responsibility of the JCG (Easley et al., 2010: 14-15). The LDP’s stress on dispatching the SDF to fulfil Japan’s responsibilities to the international society marginalized alternative policies that focussed on international aid, rebuilding Somalia’s societal, political and economic structures, and maritime policing through the dispatch of the JCG.

As Yamada notes, the JCG was in no position to actually dispatch and rotate patrols to the Gulf of Aden in addition to its existing commitments. Indeed, the Shikishima is the only vessel in the JCG’s fleet with sufficient armour to patrol international waters in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Yamada would welcome an enhanced JCG of approximately 30,000 personnel (two and a half times its current staff) to undertake the policing of international sea lanes (Yamada 2009). In this sense, Prime Minister Aso Taro’s government missed an opportunity to augment the role and capacity of the JCG. With the victory of the DPJ
in the August 2009 elections, however, the direction of Japan’s foreign policy has shifted to emphasize closer ties with East Asian states and a propensity to rely on the JCG where possible (Easley et al., 2010). The DPJ’s victories in Japan’s most recent Upper and Lower House elections has thereby enabled a power shift in Japanese politics that revitalizes debates on the formation and execution of Japan’s foreign security policy. As a result, alternative security discourses, which the LDP had previously sidelined, have emerged to reshape the contours of Japan’s international security role. These emergent discourses do not sit well with Suzuki’s argument on Japan as a ‘frustrated Great Power,’ they suggest rather the foreign policy of a dynamic and innovative Great Power establishing new norms and approaches to securing international space.

Before turning to Japan as an ‘emerging Great Power’ and entrepreneur of international security norms, China’s response to piracy in the Gulf of Aden highlights a rather different problem for Suzuki’s argument; namely, when and why do recognition games fail to achieve their objective and what are the repercussions when they fail? China’s dispatch of PLAN vessels to the Gulf of Aden certainly meets the criteria constituting a recognition game, as China is upholding the rules of the international society by protecting merchant shipping from pirates. In addition, China is acting in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions that legalize the international response. The PLAN Deputy Chief of Staff when explaining China’s anti-piracy policy stated that the Chinese government aimed to “active[ly] fulfil … its international obligations” (cited in Kaufman 2009: 7). As this article states at the outset, however, rather than the ‘legitimate Great Powers’ applauding China’s contribution, the dispatch of the PLAN to the Gulf of Aden has met with derision; a resurgent ‘China threat’ engaged in Great Power competition.

Some analysts have welcomed China’s contribution to anti-piracy activities. However, we remain critical of Kaufman’s assertion that panellists at a US Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conference were “overwhelmingly positive” about China’s participation in anti-piracy activities (ibid., 12), when these same panellists stress their concerns about Chinese naval expansion and argue that, “it is unproductive to think of China as either a threat or a partner – rather, China may play both roles in the U.S.’s future, and thus U.S. planning should take the entire spectrum of Chinese military activities into account” (ibid., 13, emphasis in original). In other words, no matter how China responds to the ‘China threat’ thesis, US policy-makers ensure that recognition games fail and that China remains a socially subordinate ‘frustrated Great Power.’

Though countering the peer pressure of the international society has influenced Japan and China’s response to piracy in Southeast Asia and East Africa, Japan and China have also sought to influence other members of the international society by promoting their own identities through their anti-piracy activities. Japan’s identity as an ‘in-between’ state and ‘bridge of civilizations’ has conditioned Japan’s response to piracy by focussing on capacity building and reconstruction. China, on the other hand, has acted in accordance with the concept of ‘Tianxia’ (all under heaven) that emphasizes international interaction based on social relationships rather than on formal rules of conduct. By engaging with the concepts of an ‘in-between state,’ ‘a bridge of civilizations’ and ‘Tianxia,’ we are assessing the theoretical contributions of the emerging China and Japan Schools of International Relations theories. Adopting these non-Western theoretical approaches may enable us to analyze China and Japan’s distinct responses to tackling piracy that may provide alternative pathways for other members of the international society to consider and adopt.

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2 We are not endorsing the proliferation of national schools of International Relations theory here, but engaging with some of the concepts that the China and Japan Schools have promoted to ascertain what new purchase these concepts might provide to understand China and Japan’s international relations. We concur with...
3. JAPAN: CAPACITY BUILDING OF AN IN-BETWEEN STATE

Japan’s contribution to tackling the problem of maritime piracy began under Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō who was concerned by rising acts of piracy in Southeast Asia that included attacks on Japanese vessels (Black 2010). The character of Japan’s response can be charted in terms of power political, legal and social order. In terms of power political order, the Japanese government played a coordinating role in sponsoring and chairing international anti-piracy conferences and meetings. The Japanese government dispatched Japan Coast Guard personnel, vessels, and aircraft to build the capabilities of Southeast Asian maritime authorities and provided financial and material aid, including patrol boats. In terms of legal order, the Japanese government worked with its Southeast Asian counterparts to establish the Information Sharing Center in Singapore, designed to collect and assess data on piracy and to coordinate responses to acts of piracy. The key legal change was to adopt the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) definition of piracy in conjunction with the definition of piracy in international law; namely Article 101 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The distinction between these definitions lies in the location of an act of piracy. According to UNCLOS, an act of piracy can only occur on the high seas, thereby excluding the majority of acts of maritime violence and depredation that occur within a state’s sovereign waters. The IMO therefore defines acts occurring within a national jurisdiction as cases of armed robbery against ships. In accepting these two definitions, Southeast Asian states assumed responsibility for combating acts of piracy and armed robbery both on the high seas and in their sovereign territories. In terms of social order, the Japanese government worked within the normative boundaries of the Southeast Asian region, by advocating regional non-military measures that built the capacity of littoral states to respond to a common security problem without interfering in the sovereign affairs of these states.

Japan’s response to piracy in Southeast Asia contrasts with that of the US, which through the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) sought to employ US naval forces to assist in patrolling Southeast Asian waters. The Indonesian and Malaysian governments rejected the RMSI on account of the use of military forces would constitute a violation of their sovereign rights and would attract more acts of maritime violence in the form of terrorism directed at US naval forces (Bradford 2005: 75). The divergence between these two approaches to tackling piracy may lie in the difference between the US as an ‘exceptional’ state and Japan’s international identity as an ‘in-between state’ (Ikeda 2008: 22-25) uniquely placed to act as a bridge between civilizations (Shih 2009).

By in-between state, Ikeda Josuke is referring to Japan’s unique historical experience as “being

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Callahan’s critique of the English School’s imperial and hegemonic essence (2004) and the China School’s replication of this hegemonic tendency (2008). The same could be said of the Japan School, though as Shimizu notes in this volume, there is awareness of the connections between the Kyoto School, upon which the key concepts of the Japan School derive, and Japanese imperialism, as well as a concern regarding how the project of the Japan School may be hijacked by the Japanese right-wing (Shimizu 2010). We agree with Chen (2010), also in this volume, that to avoid replicating the hegemonic ambitions of the Western mainstream International Relations theory, all Non-Western theory should be Critical Theory and that all International Relations theory, from the ‘core’ or the ‘periphery’ requires decolonization.

3 For more details on Japan’s response to piracy in terms of power political, legal and social order, see Black (2010). Note that Black substitutes the term ‘boundaries’ for ‘order’ in this work. In many respects the term ‘boundaries’ is more appropriate than the term ‘order’ here, as order suggests stability and conformity, ‘an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values’ (Bull 2002: 3-4). By contrast the term ‘boundary’ denotes a conscious setting of the parameters of acceptable and unacceptable action that is malleable and can be reset in accordance with the needs and circumstances of the international society.
between the colonizer and the colonized” (2008: 23) such that the concept of autonomy plays a central role in Japan’s conceptualization of and participation in the international society. By autonomy, Ikeda means the extent to which individual states are or are able to become “free from other [sic] actor’s control” (ibid., 24).

Ikeda’s position explodes the perennial debate in studies of Japan’s international relations that seek to locate Japan’s foreign policy on a spectrum between East (Asia) or asianist and West (the US) bilateralism (Miller 2006). For proponents of Japan’s position ‘in the West,’ this debate centers upon the degree to which Japanese policy makers are guided by US pressure (beiatsu) or Western-founded norms of Human Rights and intervention (Calder 1988; 2003). For advocates of Japan ‘in the East,’ the debate highlights the extent to which Japanese foreign policy making is drawn towards East Asia in terms of political, economic and security practices (Mahathir and Ishihara 1994).

As an in-between state, Japan’s international identity combines both Western and Eastern influences enabling Japan to develop a world culture that other states can adopt (Ong 2004; Inoguchi 2007; Shimizu 2010). At the same time, according to Ikeda, Japan is neither in the East or the West (Ikeda 2008: 23), instead Japan is removed from either camp and thereby has its own distinct identity. Shih Chih-yu has engaged further with this conception of Japanese identity by exploring Nishida Kitaro’s ‘place of nothingness.’ According to Shih’s reading of Nishida, Japan is a natural bridge between civilizations that can act as either a Western or East Asian state, while Japan’s true identity is withheld or hidden in a place of nothingness (Shih 2009). Shih’s formulation differs from the concepts of kakehashi or watashiyaku (both bridging role) that describe Japan as a negotiator between East and West. Instead, Shih is suggesting here that while Japan may appear as between East and West, in reality Japan is neither and has a distinct identity that informs its foreign policy, but remains hidden. In a way, Shih’s reading of Nishida mirrors the Japanese cultural norms of honne (true self or substantive reality) and tatemae (formal self or reality) in the sense that honne is withdrawn and tatemae is presented. Phil Deans uses this honne-tatemae construction to analyze Japan’s relations with Taiwan, noting that on the level of tatemae, Japan does not officially recognize the Taiwanese government, whilst in terms of honne, unofficial ties exist, such as between elected officials, that serve to guide the relationship (Deans 2001: 154-155).

Japan’s response to piracy in Southeast Asia could be interpreted in terms of Japan pursuing an asianist norm, but this might only be tatemae. Indeed, as the Japanese government looks to replicate many of the dimensions of its anti-piracy policy, such as the deployment of the JCG, anti-piracy centres modelled on the Information Sharing Center, capacity building and aid programs, in the Gulf of Aden, so the asianist norm does not capture the broader international implications of Japanese foreign policy, namely: the pursuit of a soft power path to Great Power status. As a bridge between civilizations, Japan’s act of withdrawal enables Japan to intervene in distinct ways, providing the financial, material, legal and social power and knowledge to enable fellow states in the international society reinterpret and adapt Japanese models according to their own distinct cultures and situations. Unlike the US, Japan does not stand aloof directing others to become like it but never on a par with it (Nayak and Malone 2009), but instead offers others the opportunity to transform Japanese models and approaches according to their wishes and needs. Commander Wakabayashi, a JCG official who has trained maritime authorities in Southeast Asia over the past twenty years, describes his experience as a process of mutual learning that requires patience to understand the diverse approaches of the maritime authorities in each Southeast Asian state (Wakabayashi 2009). Commander Wakabayashi adds that the “JCG began international activities by teaching search and rescue,” and that after twenty years the JCG “learned [about] international relationship[s] … we learned … tailor
made ways to [work with] each country” (ibid.). The JCG does not therefore pursue its homme in terms of internationally replicating the JCG model; rather it works through *tatamei*, encouraging states to adapt the JCG model. The difference with the US is that while the US seeks to transform others in its own image, Japan seeks others to transform its own image. This is the essence of an ‘in-between state’ that acts as a ‘bridge between civilizations’ in foreign policy practice.

4. CHINA: *TIANXIA AND DATONG IN THE GULF OF ADEN*

Chinese scholars have engaged in a parallel process to their Japanese counterparts by mining Chinese philosophical traditions to cultivate a China School of International Relations theory. Though Schwartz cautions against employing traditional concepts that no longer fit the realities of the present day (Schwartz 1968: 284) and Yang (1968) emphasizes the inconsistencies between such concepts and their actual application, Confucian thought, in particular, now pervades the discourse on China’s international relations (Barabantseva 2009). As one of the major proponents of such a China School, Zhao Tingying has popularized the use of the Confucian concepts of *Tianxia* (‘All under Heaven’) and *Datong* (‘Great Harmony’) as the primary resource for a world theory (Zhao 2006: 39). Zhao defines *Tianxia* as encompassing three meanings: the whole world, the hearts of all the people and the world as one family united under one institution. Essentially this division of *Tianxia* into these three categories implies that the primary unit of analysis in international relations should be the world and that a single institution be created to manage global affairs, ensuring that all human needs are met (ibid.). According to Zhao it is China’s role to promote the principle of *Tianxia*, whereby people do not owe their primary allegiance to their nation or state, but must assume responsibility for the whole world (Bell 2009: 29-30). In so doing, China will win over the human race to the principle of *Tianxia* and usher in a new era of *Datong* in which all people will “share the world in common” (*tian xia wei gong*) (ibid., 29). In this period of *Datong*, it is the benevolent duty of China to provide for the periphery, just as the periphery depends on the center for leadership and guidance (Callahan 2008). According to Zhao, the concepts of *Tianxia* and *Datong* entail a foreign policy based on attraction to rather than coercion from the centre (Zhao in Callahan 2008; Barabantseva 2009). The articulation of the concepts of *Tianxia* and *Datong* indicate a clear attempt to theorize China’s emergence as a Great Power along a soft power path based on attraction and international responsibility, such as in the case of China’s response to Somalia piracy.

The essence of *Tianxia* according to Zhao means that China is not conceived of as an emerging Great Power, but rather the greatest of all powers and therefore above playing ‘recognition games.’ Of course, Zhao’s appeal to the concept of *Tianxia* is designed to place China above all other states is in itself a ‘recognition game’ whereby China is presented as able to not only catch up with the West, but also surpass it. As Chen (2010) points out, by maintaining the West as the primary referent for all international relations theory, the China School is relegated to an inferior position from which it constantly has to justify itself to the West.

Moreover, as a self-proclaimed hegemon, the China School’s interpretation of the concept of *Tianxia* recreates a Sinocentric world order in which foreign states are relegated to the periphery and subordinated to Chinese rule (Callahan 2008). As Zhao states, “[t]he unspoken theory [within the concept of *Tianxia*] is that most people do not really know what is best for them, but that the elite do, so the elite ought genuinely to decide for the people” (Zhao 2006: 32), for ‘elite’ in this quote, read politburo. Essentially, ‘recognition
games’ are merely reversed according to the concept of Tianxia, as the periphery pays tribute and ‘kowtows’ to the center. Whilst Zhao argues that Tianxia encourages cultural difference (ibid., 37), the concept itself implies homogeneity as foreign states and peoples accept China’s cultural dominance. Furthermore, Tianxia presupposes that all states behave according to Chinese modes of conduct, as Fairbank highlights, “the Chinese tended to think of their foreign relations as giving expression externally to the same principles of social and political order that were manifested internally within the Chinese state and society” (Fairbank 1968: 2). Finally, though China accepts responsibility for the world in this hierarchical system, Confucian thought emphasizes that the duty of the core to provide public goods diminishes the further a state is from the centre (Bell 2009: 31). Hence, the China School replicates the fallacy of Western International Relations theories that conceal hegemonic and imperialist interests within their frameworks (Chen 2010).

The discourse on the concept of Tianxia, Datong and the China School is therefore, simultaneously, an assertion that China has overcome its ‘century of humiliation,’ whilst still in the process of reconciling itself with the dominant norms in the international society, as Rana Mitter highlights in the case of humanitarian intervention (Mitter 2003). In this sense, China has reached somewhat of an impasse in its international relations, as Beijing continues to emphasize non-interference in the sovereign affairs of nation-states when the dominant norms of the international society entail growing interference. For example, the international community asserts a responsibility to protect citizens suffering abuse at the hands of their rulers. Chinese representatives in international forum remain critical of ties between Western conceptions of intervention and human rights (Bellamy 2009: 49). Instead, and in accordance with the concept of Tianxia (Bell 2009), Chinese policy-makers recognize that states have a duty to ensure the well being of their citizens (Bellamy 2009: 50) and therefore emphasize freedom from want concerns over freedom from fear. When a foreign state’s ruler is unable to provide for their citizens, intervention becomes possible providing the ruler of the state in question invites international intervention and the intervention has the support of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Stäle 2008; Carlson 2006). In the China School discourse, the perception of the UN mirrors China’s difficulty to reconcile international norms with its past ‘century of humiliation.’ For Zhao, the UN is a mere shadow of the real ‘Son of Heaven,’ imposing the will of Western states over a weaker periphery (Zhao 2006: 36-38); whereas for Gong Gang, when the UNSC acts collectively to counter aggression, as in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the UN is the embodiment of the ‘Son of Heaven’ (Gong quoted in Bell 2009: 34).

China’s maritime intervention in the Gulf of Aden fits this latter interpretation of UN intervention, as the governing authority in Somalia has acquiesced in the presence of foreign naval forces and the naval deployment is supported by a number of UN resolutions. Furthermore, the concept of freedom from want plays a dominant role in the Chinese official discourse on piracy. For example, China’s Ambassador to the UN, Liu Zhenmin, stressed that “the international community needs to take concerted actions … to enhance the capacity building of Coastal States to help them eliminate economic, social and other problems that give rise to piracy” (Zhenmin 2009). Nonetheless, the dispatch of Chinese naval forces to the Gulf of Aden underlines the difficulty for China to reconcile with the dominant norms of the international society, as Chinese officials have found it particularly challenging to work within a multilateral security framework. For example, whilst Chinese naval officers have cooperated with EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), the Europe-led multinational task force, Beijing had been reluctant to have their military forces operate under a foreign admiral (EUNAVFOR 2010). This is a clear statement that power lies with China, the centre point
to which ‘all under heaven’ owe their allegiance. However, China has now shifted this stance to cooperate with US, European and NATO vessels operating under the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) operation that protects merchant shipping in the Gulf of Aden (BBC 2010).

Of course, China’s participation in the SHADE framework could be interpreted as China playing a recognition game to gain the trust and respect of dominant Great Powers, were it not for the opportunity that maritime intervention provides for Beijing to strengthen its claim over Taiwan.

When explaining China’s anti-piracy policy, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson emphasized that the PLAN would protect any vessel belonging to the People’s Republic of China, including Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Yamazaki 2009: 66), thereby undermining claims that China is seeking recognition for contributing to international security. As the centre of power of ‘all under heaven,’ China is also not obliged to explain itself to neighbouring states, such as Japan, that might be concerned with the dispatch of Chinese forces on international missions; a point that worries Japanese analysts and policy-makers (Terashima 2009). Hence, China is not acting as a ‘frustrated Great Power’ playing games to gain recognition from ‘legitimate Great Powers,’ but an emerging Great Power eager to demonstrate its strength, unity and independence.

CONCLUSION

Suzuki’s article on ‘frustrated’ and ‘legitimate’ Great Powers is instructive in terms of sketching out the attempts of states to gain the approval of fellow states in the international society. We therefore agree with Suzuki that “the allure of attaining status within the dominant normative structures in international society appears to be surprisingly strong” (Suzuki 2008: 60). However, when taking Suzuki’s challenge to examine the intentions of Great Powers, such as China and Japan, we find neither so frustrated. Rather, in Japan’s case we perceive the quiet diplomacy of an ‘in-between state’ acting as a ‘bridge of civilizations’ to spread its maritime security model, not through imposition, but through an engagement that allows for adaptation. In this sense, Japan acts as a norm entrepreneur in the international society providing an alternative response to maritime security threats, such as piracy, that are comprehensive in their design and execution; spanning patrols, aid, capacity building and institution forming. This comprehensive approach secures human beings from both fear and want by seeking to build the political, economic, security and societal structures that will protect human communities over the long-term.

China’s approach to piracy reflects less a sentiment of desiring recognition for upholding international societal norms, as it does an opportunity to promote an alternative to Western Great Powers which focus on interference in the affairs of other states and the enforcement of Human Rights. In terms of Human Security, China’s emphasis therefore lies in securing freedom from want through development, rather than freedom from fear through humanitarian intervention. China does seek recognition of its Great Power to reconfirm its identity to itself and the world as the centre of ‘all under heaven’ by protecting the lives and goods of all who belong to China, including Taiwan. It is a benevolent Great Power that cooperates readily with fellow states in the international society, but only ever on an equal footing or one where China is perceived as superior.

Realists describe the deployment of naval forces to the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy as Great Power competition. In a sense, they are right. Great Powers are always competing, but not in a power game of alliances and military power. Rather, Great Powers, whether emerging or dominant, pursue their foreign
policies according to identities prescribed by historical experience and within the social context of the international society. New norms that emphasize a responsibility to protect humans from fear and want guide China and Japan as emerging Great Powers along soft power paths. These paths are self-constructed and identity dependent. The soft power paths these powers pursue transform the normative context of the international society enabling other states to adopt similar models and approaches.

Of course, from a Somali perspective, piracy can be interpreted from a rather different human security perspective. In a ‘failed state’ that lacks the political, economic, social, and security structures to free humans from fear and want, armed bands may be perceived as ‘Robin Hoods’ that rob rich vessels and distribute the wealth to the poor (Yamada 2003: 163-164). Somali pirates have justified their actions by arguing that pollution from international shipping coupled with illegal competition from foreign fishing trawlers has forced Somali fishermen to resort to piracy (Schofield 2009: 2). As the second and third largest economies in the world depending on the maritime trade in goods and energy and the two largest consumers of seafood products, neither China nor Japan is willing to transform their own identities and behaviour through self-reflection and critique. Perhaps this is the prerogative of Great Powers and thereby a further indicator of Great Power status, but then was it not through self-reflection and critique that Japan emerged as a Great Power during the Meiji era and again in the adoption of a pacifist Constitution following defeat in the Second World War? Has China not cast off its ‘century of humiliation’ precisely by reflecting on the mistakes of the past? Where do soft power paths lead once Great Power status is achieved?

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