3. Immigration, Crime and Criminal Justice Systems

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Abstract

The movement of millions of people throughout the world represents a major issue of global concern. Large-scale international migration is compounded by advances in technology, communication, transportation. Without doubt, these developments have also had a strong impact on crime in receiving countries in Europe, which will be dealt with in the chapter on Immigration, Crime and the Criminal Justice System. Although immigrant crime, and widespread fear of it, has had a long history in many countries, it is still a highly contested issue in criminology. With the emphasis on the Dutch case, this chapter discusses criminal involvement of immigrants, measurement and explanations; victimization of immigrants and the issue of cross border crimes. The latter refers to criminal activity that might have formerly been confined to national limits, but increasingly spills from one country to another. Finally, implications for the Criminal Justice system will be addressed.

Résumé

Les déplacements de millions de personnes à travers la planète représentent un sujet de préoccupation mondial. Les migrations internationales à grande échelle sont rendues plus complexes encore par des avancées technologiques, en matière de communication et de transport. Il ne fait pas de doute que ces développements ont également eu un impact très fort sur le crime dans les pays de destination européens, point que nous traiterons dans le présent chapitre sur l’immigration, le crime et la Justice pénale. Bien que le crime commis par les migrants tout comme la peur largement répandue à son sujet, sont de l’histoire ancienne dans la plupart des pays, ils n’en constituent pas moins des sujets faisant l’objet d’âpres contestations en criminologie. En mettant l’accent sur le cas de la Hollande, ce chapitre débattra de l’implication des immigrés dans le crime, des statistiques et explications, de la victimisation des immigrants, ainsi que de la question des crimes transfrontaliers. Ce dernier concept renvoie à une activité criminelle qui aurait pu antérieurement être confinée dans des limites nationales, mais déborde de plus en plus d’un pays vers l’autre. Enfin, nous traiterons des implications que tout ceci peut avoir sur la Justice pénale.
3.1. Introduction: migration to the Netherlands

Large-scale migration of people across the globe has been compounded by technological advances and profound changes in communication and transportation (Castles and Miller 2009). Without doubt, immigration processes have had a strong impact on receiving countries in Europe, including on perception and realities of crime. This chapter focuses on the Netherlands, a country with a significant population of immigrants and a strong tradition of doing research into crime and migration. Before doing so, the migration background of the country will be briefly sketched below. At the moment about one in five people who live in the Netherlands have a foreign background, meaning that they or at least one parent are born abroad, and 11 percent is from a non-western immigrant background (CBS 2010). Because migrants often live highly concentrated, in some urban neighbourhoods percentages of first and second migrants together can reach 80 per cent.

After the Second World War, the Netherlands was a country of emigration. Officially encouraged by the state-sponsored emigration policy of the Dutch government, many Dutch citizens emigrated to countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Between 1946 and 1969, nearly half a million Dutch citizens left the country. In the same period, the Netherlands was experiencing a massive influx of repatriates and Eurasians from the former Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) after Indonesia’s independence in 1949. A new pattern occurred in the early 1960s with the arrival of ‘guest workers’ from the Mediterranean. As the term guest worker implies, they were expected to stay in the Netherlands temporarily and to return to their countries of origin once they had done their jobs. This myth of immigrants returning home dominated official Dutch thinking on immigration and immigrant integration for many years (Engbersen et al. 2007). When workers started bringing their families over to the Netherlands it began to dawn that many of them were going to stay. This became even clearer when, around and after Suriname’s independence in 1975, major flows of post-colonial immigrants from Suriname began to arrive in the Netherlands as well. In the 1970s, almost half of the non-Dutch immigrants to the Netherlands came from five countries: Turkey, Morocco, Suriname, Netherlands Antilles and. In the 1990s, the percentage of immigrants from other EU countries in the total immigrant population in the Netherlands increased.

In the 1990s the ‘new migration’ differed from that in the more distant past (Koser and Lutz 1998) because of new geographical patterns and new types of immigrants including those with different or no residence statuses (asylum seekers, temporary labour migrants, and irregular immigrants). The traditional labour immigrants, family immigrants and people from former colonies and their offspring, who all had strong residence statuses were partially being supplemented with new categories of immigrants such as asylum seekers and irregular migrants. The latter category has caught attention since the 1990s,

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1 Organised crime falls outside the scope of this chapter.
leading to an ever stricter immigration regime which relies heavily on internal controls and regulations (Van der Leun and Engbersen 2001). Recent governments have tightened immigration laws and pushed to integrate legally residing immigrants better, introducing compulsory lessons in Dutch language and cultural habits.

To what extent an immigration country is also a multicultural society is matter of debate. During the most recent decade many Dutch people have become disappointed in the multicultural ideals and the former positive views on diversity (Rath 2009). Assimilation has become the aim and migrant communities are held responsible for the adapting to the receiving society. Populist parties gained ground and immigration and in particular immigration of people from Islamic countries is viewed negatively by a much larger part of the population than before the year 2002: the year in which politician Fortuyn was murdered and wide-spread discontent with societal changes that globalization brings surfaced.

3.2. Studies on criminal involvement of migrants

Insecurity at economic and societal level, together with technological revolution and the erosion of internal borders in an expanding Europe, have lead to all kinds of transformations, including new forms of criminal behaviour and changing perceptions of crime. These changes in turn led to a renewed interest in studying the classic theme of migration and crime (Tonry 1997, Engbersen et al. 2007). Traditional questions in this field are whether or not (certain groups of) migrants are more involved in crime than nationals and how these differences can be explained. Conventional wisdom is based on the law-abiding first generation and the more crime-prone second generation of immigrants. The idea is that first generation migrants tend to have preferences and expectations in line with their experiences in their home country, whereas their off-spring takes non-migrants as their reference group. In this sense, integrating into the receiving society can also foster crime. Yet, theoretical explanations are contradictory as a high involvement in crime is also often seen as a lack of integration or assimilation into the mainstream society (Junger-Tas 2003, Stevens et al. 2009). As can easily be derived from the work of the sociologist Robert K. Merton, who does not refer to immigrants but to people in the lower strata of society in general, blocked mobility may drive immigrants to alternative routes to success (Merton 1957). These alternative routes may be stimulated by the formation of sub cultures with divergent norms. More recent ‘segmented assimilation’ researchers in the US (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993) contend that the growth of immigrant communities can both result in higher and in lower levels of crime than the general population depending on the ‘modes of incorporation’ in the receiving society. Different groups in different periods of time face different opportunity structures (Van der Leun & Engbersen 2001).

More than in most Western European countries, Dutch criminologists have been doing empirical research into the criminal involvement of first, and later
second generation migrants. Many of these studies were descriptive and policy-driven. But there is also a strand of non-policy driven studies including in-depth ethnographic accounts. After heated discussions in the 1980s it is now more or less accepted that some categories of foreign-born immigrants are over-represented in certain forms of crime and that this overrepresentation cannot solely be explained on the basis of selective data. This is not to say that crime is primarily an immigrant issue, as it is sometimes portrayed in the media. After all, it is important to note that a very small and selective minority of the population comes into contact with the police as suspects. According to estimations by Van der Heide and Eggen (2003: 199) there were 4.65 million crimes committed against civilians in the Netherlands in 2001 of which only 1.6 million (34 percent) were reported to the police and for which 277,000 suspects were registered. Of these ‘known suspects’ registered by the Dutch police, 2.2 percent came from immigrant groups and 0.9 percent came from a non-immigrant background (Blom et al 2005: 85).

The first reports in this field in the Netherlands date back to the 1970s and 1980s, focusing on Moluccan youngsters and Surinamese drug dealers. They were part of a stream of publications since then (cf. Leuw 1997). Early studies in the Dutch context showed that boys of Ambonese (Indonesian) and Surinamese origin were more often registered as crime suspects than Dutch boys. A number of studies since then recognise a significant overrepresentation of Moroccan and Antillean youngsters in recorded crime. More recently, attention has also started to shift to ‘newer’ groups such as Africans, Eastern Europeans and for example Cape Verdeans (Kromhout and Van San 2003) and migrants with an asylum background and irregular migrants (De Boom et al. 2010).

At first sight, the general findings with respect to regular migrants are in line with the conventional wisdom of the law-abiding first generation and the more crime-prone second generation. But this does not apply to all groups of immigrants. An exception that has attracted attention, is the relatively low level of arrests of Turkish youngsters in crime statistics, who grow up under circumstances that are to a large extent similar to these of Moroccan youngsters (Junger 1990). More generally, the available studies show differential patterns of arrest: certain groups have below-average offender rates, whilst other groups score much higher than 'autochthonous' inhabitants.

In contrast to some years ago (see Junger-Tas 1997) more data are available by nationality and/or country of birth. Based on a combination of crime figures and population data (police registration of ethnic backgrounds is unlawful), the Ministry of Interior Affairs published an influential report on Crime in Relation to the Integration of Ethnic Minorities (CRIEM) in 1996, studying the nature, scope, and causes of crime in ethnic minority groups (Ministry of Interior Affairs 1997). The report focused on Turkish, Moroccan, Antillean, and Surinamese suspects. It confirmed popular beliefs that minorities, especially Moroccan, were disproportionately active in conventional crime. This finding held when controlling for socio-economic factors. Among juveniles between 12 and 17 years old, nearly all immigrant groups, with the exception of German, South
American and Indonesian juveniles and first-generation Asians, are recorded as suspects relatively more frequently than persons of Dutch origin and a comparable picture was obtained for people aged 18 to 19 years. There are some notable exceptions; the first generation Indonesians and West-Europeans and first and second generation Asian immigrants. It is often assumed that the low criminal involvement of Asian migrants is related to a high level of social control within their communities as well as a strong emphasis on upward mobility through education.

Police data for 2002 that were linked to population data showed that 37.5 percent of all recorded suspects of a crime living in the Netherlands are of foreign origin (including those of the second generation). The proportion of these persons in the suspect population is therefore almost twice as high as the share of immigrants among the Dutch population. The highest suspect rates per capita are found among first (4.9) and second generation (7.1) male migrants from a non-western background. Rates for so-called ‘western migrants’ are very close to those of the native Dutch. In all groups, rates for women are considerably lower than for men, with the highest found among non-western migrants (Blom et al 2005: 31).

Within immigrant groups, the percentage of suspects (people identified by the police as suspects within the year 2002) among the first generation is somewhat higher than among the second generation. This does not hold for Moroccan and Turks, among whom the second generation is suspected of crimes more often than the first generation.

Normally, crime figures are cross sectional data. Data on crime over the life span show much higher criminal involvement for young migrants, up to a 23 percent for young men on average and 54 percent for Moroccan boys (Blokland et al. 2010).

Although problems with youngsters with a Moroccan and Antillean background attract most of the attention, the 2002 police data also show that less noticed groups of immigrants also display higher crime rates than natives. They come from countries such as the Dominican Republic, Angola, Congo, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Algeria (Blom et al. 2005: 125). Apparently, the fragmentation of the new migration also leads to a fragmentation of crime patterns (see also Kromhout and Van San 2003).

3.3. Theories and explanations

How can high crime rates for some groups be explained? The relationship with integration is important, but much more complex than often assumed. Some groups are well integrated, like Surinamese migrants, and still show relatively high crime rates. Other groups are less integrated, like many Chinese immigrants, but demonstrate no significant crime problem. It is clear that social position and cultural factors are often interrelated. Regardless of ethnicity, many poorly educated and unemployed youngsters are demoralized and turn away from conventional society (Leuw 1997). In some groups, this leads to high criminal involvement. The literature focuses strongly on
Moroccan boys and emphasises besides structural problems of a low education an high unemployment, on feelings of being caught between the modern Western culture and the more collectivist culture of the own ethnic groups, particularly because the gap between parents and children in the pace of modernisation appears to be wide. (Distelbrink and Pels 2002). These feelings may feed criminal behaviour. Furthermore, many Moroccan parents feel the behaviour of their children outside the private realm is not their business, leading to a lack of parental control especially on boys who tend to spend a lot of time in the streets. Additionally, feelings of deprivation and disappointment about not succeeding in Dutch society also provides fertile ground for deviant behaviour (Van Gemert 1998). The stigmatisation of the Moroccan population, in particular, already leads to the withdrawal of this group into their own community: a survey demonstrates that second-generation Moroccans have begun to identify more with their own group in recent years (Dagevos and Schellingerhout 2003).

For Caribbean boys from the Dutch Antilles the situation is different. Since the second half of the 1980s the Netherlands has faced the problem of first generation Antillean youngsters with a very low level of education, insufficient command of Dutch, a high proportion of teenage mothers and one-parent families, unemployment, debts and criminal behaviour. The problems are found mainly in a few municipalities’ where a large proportion of Antilleans in the Netherlands live. Their problems largely stem from a lack of perspective, but according to van San the problems are also culturally reproduced because many boys grow up in single parent families with mothers who do not reject the criminal behaviour of their sons (Van San 1998). For both groups feelings of alienation appear to be worsened through stigmatisation and discrimination.

Cultural explanations are brought back into the debate by ethnographic researchers as Van Gemert (1998) and Van San (1998). Van Gemert stresses a culture in which honour and especially distrust plays an important role in the everyday life of young Dutch Moroccans, who are seen as one of the major problem groups in the Netherlands at the moment (Van Gemert 1998). Van San concludes on the basis of fieldwork among Antillean boys, another problematic group, and their mothers that ‘respect’ is crucial for them. The neutralisation techniques that they collectively adopt make them believe they are not doing anything wrong when using knifes to restore their respect (Van San 1998). The anthropologist and criminologist Bovenkerk warns for essentialist views on culture and ethnicity (Bovenkerk and Yesilgoz 2004). Yet, all researcher stress that cultural and structural factors influence each other in dynamic ways. Recent studies emphasize the role of youth culture and street culture. Youngsters also react to the position they have in society and how the public sees them (De Jong 2007)

3.4. Selective law enforcement

The above findings are in many cases plagued by selectivity. Police data, crime registrations and data of the judicial system are biased because they depend on...
police policies and routines and complex decision making processes (Sampson and Lauritsen 1997). The national police database on suspects (HKS) which is a main national source of information does not comprise information of special investigation services, therefore street crimes and conventional crimes are overrepresented and white-collar crimes and organised crime underrepresented. Furthermore, vulnerable groups in general run a relatively high risk of drawing the attention of the police and the public. Police statistics represent particular acts committed by the less powerful, which in turn tend to be the types of crimes that most people think of when they refer to crime. This makes crimes committed by immigrants highly visible.

There is also the issue of discrimination. The Dutch Aliens Act and Identification Act were explicitly designed to prevent discrimination of foreigners. According to some authors this aim has succeeded (Junger-Tas 1997; Boekhoorn, Speller, and Kruijssen 2004), others doubt that. For instance, it has been reported in early studies that negative stereotyping of non-western immigrants is not uncommon among police officers. Non-western immigrants appeared to be stopped by the police more often than Dutch citizens (Bovenkerk 1991). Junger (1990) maintained that ethnic selectivity by the police is usually not racist as such. It rather arises from the desire to optimize the ‘organizational output’ given the condition that police resources are limited. Police officers tend to monitor groups they suspect of crime. These practices probably inflate the figures on crime involvement of immigrants and ethnic minorities. In a review study Rovers concludes that at the stage of arrest there is no ground to assume a selective approach towards individuals from a migrants background (Rovers 1999).

More recently, Wittebrood (2004) draws on a multi-level research design to examine ethnic differences in crime registration. Her findings confirm that ethnic bias does not have unidirectional effects. On the one hand, all else being equal, the chance that the police registers a crime reported by a crime victim depends on the type of neighbourhood in which the crime victim lives. In poor (immigrant) neighbourhoods, reports are more often registered (which suggests poor neighbourhoods are controlled more intensely). On the other hand police officers are less likely to register offences reported by members of non-western immigrants in comparison to Dutch crime reporters (since most crime is ‘intra-ethnic’ this practice contributes to the underestimation of ethnic minorities’ crime involvement). There is a certain consensus that selective law enforcement influences but not causes or fully explains ethnic differences in.

Yet, in the mean time the social context has changed dramatically. It is not clear if or to what extent recent anti-immigration sentiments in the country have also affected relations between immigrants and the police, which were traditionally relatively good. A study on the discriminatory nature of immigration control by the Aliens police (mainly targeted at illegal or irregular immigrants) concludes that recent policy changes have not resulted in ‘indication of serious violations of the non-discriminatory nature’ of foreign nationals surveillance. But targeted actions aiming at combating overpopulation and public in certain urban areas do indicate ‘that the
boundaries of the law are being explored’ (Boekhoorn, Speller, and Kruijssen 2004: 212).

3.5. Victimization and fear of crime as blind spots

Years ago, Bowling and Phillips (2002: 76) observed for the United Kingdom that relatively little attention had been given to immigrants as victims of crime: “The ‘race and crime’ debate has (. . .) largely been detached from discussions about ethnic differences in the extent and nature of victimisation and how patterns of offending and victimisation interrelate”. This still holds true for the Dutch case. Given the substantial number of studies on minority offending, the scarcity of academic research on victimization and fear of crime among immigrants and ethnic minorities in the Netherlands is remarkable. Research in the United Kingdom suggests that ethnic minorities generally have a greater risk of criminal victimisation (Bowling and Phillips 2002: 89), a finding which cannot be corroborated on the basis of Dutch research.

In the early 1990s researchers of the Ministry of Justice (1993) pioneered the topic and reported elevated victimization rates for minorities in urban areas. As their findings were severely criticized for ignoring ‘neighbourhood effects’ the claims were quickly revoked in 1994 (cf. Lempens et al. 1997: 359) and the issue is now largely surrounded by silence.

A survey study among youngsters in Rotterdam finds that youngsters from an immigrants background are less often victim of an offence than their Dutch counterparts. This was confirmed in other research in Rotterdam among adults from the four large immigrants groups, except for Turkish adults who reported more victimisation than Dutch respondents in the same survey sample (Rotterdam Municipality 2004). Some authors express their doubts about the validity of these data because of potential differences in perception (Junger-Tas e.a. 2003: 85).

Overseeing the available studies, it is probable that ethnicity correlates with both victimization and fear of crime in a myriad of (direct and indirect) ways. First of all, we know that offenders – many of whom are first and second generation immigrants – run an increased risk of also becoming crime victims (Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta 1997). Moreover, much crime is intra-ethnic, and is often tied to the spatial vicinity of offenders. Crime is concentrated in deprived urban areas where non-western immigrants are also over represented. As long as non-western immigrants are spatially segregated in the Netherlands (with high concentrations in disadvantaged urban areas), a disproportional share of immigrant youth’ offences is probably committed at the expense of neighbouring co-ethnics. For similar reasons it is probable that ethnicity correlates with fear of crime. Firstly, we know that anxiety strongly declines with increased socio-economic position of neighbourhoods in general and individual households in particular, and also increases with the degree of urbanization (Wittebrood 2004).

As to fear of crime, some local surveys offer information. A local report on safety in the city of Rotterdam reveals that 36 percent of the respondents from
Surinamese, Antilleans, Turkish, Moroccan and Cape Verdeans background report that they sometimes feel unsafe, against 45 percent of the native Dutch inhabitants. Moroccans score very low with 23 percent and Turkish respondents score very close to the native population (Rotterdam Municipality 2004). All in all, we know very little about differences in perceptions when responding to survey questions on feelings of safety or fear of crime and reliable evidence with respect to victimization is severely lacking.

3.6. Cross border crimes as an emerging theme

Although most scholarly attention has gone to criminal activities of migrants with the motive to settle in the receiving country, police authorities started to warn for mobile groups of Eastern Europeans who allegedly came to the Netherlands (and other western European countries) to commit property crimes after external border controls had been eased following the fall of the Iron curtain and the European Union’s Eastern enlargement.

In the early 1990s, visa requirements for short visits were already dropped for a number of countries such as Poland (EU member state since 2004). In 2001 this was done, at the time, for the future EU member states Bulgaria and Romania. It appears that the relaxation of external border controls has indeed facilitated an increase in Eastern European offenders committing crimes in Western Europe, such as house burglary and car theft (Bort 2000; Von Lampe 2004, Weenink and Huisman 2003). There are no reliable indications of the scale of this rather new phenomenon and very little is known about the level of organization and the extent to which offenders (or suspects) can be seen as migrants or rather as ‘tourists’ with dubious motivations.

3.7. Implications for the Criminal Justice System

It is not without reason that the national government has commissioned many studies into the links between migration and crime. The Criminal Justice system has to deal directly with an over-representation of individuals with an immigrant background. This is most visible in the later stages including the stage of imprisonment and detention, when selectivity causes a more serious bias than at the stage of arrest (Rovers 1999). A relatively high number of foreign born people in prisons and detention centres was already observed in the 1980s and the over representation has become much more outspoken since then. Whereas the Dutch penal policy has for long been characterized as relatively lenient with low incarceration rates, the rate of imprisonment is rapidly rising. In ten years time, the number of prisoners has almost doubled in the Netherlands (CBS 2005). On 30 September 2004, 16,455 people were imprisoned (i.e. approximately 0.1 percent of the population at that given point in time). For 1994 this figure was only 8,740 (CBS 2005). The share of first and second-generation immigrants in prison is also on the rise. Official data on imprisonment only discern foreign born or in other words first generation immigrants. Between 1994 and 2004 the percentage of prisoners born in the
Netherlands decreased from 50 to 45 percent (among whom are also second-generation immigrants). Relatively large groups come from Surinam, the Dutch Antilles, Morocco, Turkey, Algeria and the former Republic of Yugoslavia (CBS 2005). Rates per capita are especially high for Algerians, Antilleans, and Surinamese.

Most prisoners have been sentenced on the ground of violence and theft, and immigrants are no exceptions in this regard. In addition, a disproportional share of foreign-born prisoners has been sentenced on the basis of drug laws (predominantly production, trafficking and sale). The rise of the share of foreign born prisoners since 1994 is partly due to enhanced enforcement of anti-drug laws; between 1994 and 2004 the number of prisoners sentenced on the ground of drug laws rose by 240 percent from 1,355 in 1994 to 3,255 in 2004 (CBS 2005). The sociologist Koopmans (2003) has attempted to compare the available figures on the prison population internationally and concludes that the overrepresentation of foreign-born inmates is much higher in the Netherlands than in countries such as Great Britain, Germany or France (Koopmans 2003). Koopmans relates these findings to ‘soft’ integration policies. It is likely, however, that the high involvement of certain migrant groups in drug related offences is also related to the position of the Netherlands as a transit country for drugs.

Part of the rise of the foreign born prison population is also caused by the exclusionary Dutch alien policy that specifically targets unwanted (irregular) immigrants, who are increasingly being detained (Van Kalmthout 2005). Illegal immigrants are by definition the products of legislation that aims at controlling migration (Van der Leun and Engbersen 2004). In recent years, controls have been intensified and in particular detention figures have risen quickly. Under the Aliens Act 2000 it has become easier to arrest and detain illegal immigrants. On 30 September 2004 the number of immigrants held in custody because of immigration laws (1,655) had almost quadrupled since 1994 (425). This increase was also partly enabled by the construction of special deportation centres at Schiphol airport and Rotterdam airport.

But also outside prison walls, governmental bodies have to decide how to deal with immigrant crime. A central dilemma is whether to rely on general policies or to adopt policy measures specifically aimed at specific groups. Whereas practitioners often call for specific measures, scholars warn that a preoccupation with the cultural or ethnic dimensions of crime will lead focus away from age-related, socio-economic and social class or status dimensions of criminal behaviour. They tend to call for policy responses rooted in education, employment and community development strategies and for effective policing in a multiethnic society.

Policy makers and politicians alike have in the mean time realized that Criminal Law is not going to solve all problems. Increasingly, policies are based on the pragmatic use of both Criminal and Administrative laws. Although these concerted approaches are seen as promising, there are also concerns regarding the use of criminal sanctions, or administrative sanctions which are very similar to criminal ones (such as detention), for immigration control aims.
3.8. Conclusions and future directions

Immigrant crime is and will probably remain a controversial subject. In most countries including the Netherlands authorities respond to issues of immigrant crime in a different, often more dramatic way than they respond to non-immigrant crime of the same dimensions (Collins 2003). Invariably, public and media discourses around crime and disorder focus on migrants or foreigners. Negative stereotypes foster negative sentiments about immigrants, Muslim migrants and irregular migration in particular and political parties tap into these feelings. Although it is not at all new to blame others or outsiders for crime, it is within a highly volatile context that criminologists and sociologists conduct their research on the links between migration and crime.

In the Dutch case, researchers have rather openly engaged themselves into research in this field, with the inevitable pros and cons of such an approach. On the one hand, one can praise the attempt to provide societal debates and governmental policies with empirical findings, on the other hand the research can be criticized for fuelling anti-migration sentiments and adding to moral panic. Evidently, different countries with different research and policy traditions deal with these dilemmas in divergent ways.

When assessing the available findings we can at least conclude that the available studies tend to focus on immigrants as perpetrators and suspects more than on immigrants as victims of crime. Contrary to the situation in other countries, there has been little scholarly interest in selective law enforcement and discrimination in the Dutch context. The time appears to be right to open up the views on migration and crime by including these themes into the research agenda. Moreover, a more comparative and transnational view on issues of crime and migration may also help overcoming national biases and gaining a more thorough insight of the changing faces of crime in a changing world.
3.9. References


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