A pragmatic focus on the dynamics of our second-person engagements not only does more justice to the phenomenology of social interaction but also results in new scientific findings.

Theory theory and simulation theory’s appeal to scientific experiments amounts to a self-fulfilling prophecy insofar these experiments are construed in accordance with their basic presuppositions about intersubjectivity.

Most of our encounters with others can be explained in terms of embodied and embedded practices without reference to mindreading or mental state attribution.

Mental representations are just placeholders for the more detailed dynamical explanations that need to be done.

The phenomenology of social interaction might be elusive and difficult to define or describe, but it always remains the starting point for philosophical reflection and empirical investigation.
Most philosophers of mind already made a ‘pragmatic turn’ - they just do not realize it yet.

Pragmatism might be a slippery slope towards instrumentalism or scientism, but as such this is not an argument against pragmatism.

Scientific experiments on social interaction are still not very social or interactive.

The litmus test for a pragmatic approach to intersubjectivity is whether it makes a difference. But the real question is: what does it mean to make a difference?

Many philosophical problems are not solved but simply cease to be interesting. This by itself is an interesting philosophical problem.

Science puts the philosopher’s feet on the ground; philosophy keeps the scientist’s head in the clouds.

Agreement on method is crucial to progress in science, but it would mean the end of philosophy.

A philosopher is a living thought-experiment.