1. The Boycott Movement shows that the mobilization of people had significant social and political outcomes. The boycott was not a conspiracy or trick of the ruling elite. Rather, it involved spontaneity and the initiatives of different social classes. Therefore, this study highlights the role of human agency in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the older historiography on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, such as the works of Bernard Lewis and Niyazi Berkes, have attributed agency almost exclusively to the state elite. More sociological approaches, such as those espoused by Şevket Pamuk and Çağlar Keyder, have mainly focused on economic and social structures.

2. The Boycott Movement was a modern social movement. Pre-modern riots, rebellions, and insurrections were mere reactions, as they lacked a program and an organization. As discussed in by George Rude and E. J. Hobsbawm, they were local, short-lived, and spontaneous. The Boycott Movement, however, had an empire-wide network and organization. A significant feature of the boycotts was their prolonged time-span and the fact that they were multi-faceted and comprised diverse goals and agendas.

3. The boycott was officially the Ottoman consumers’ refusal to buy certain goods or use particular services. It was the peaceful preference of the people not to execute a certain act. Yet, the boycotted parties and foreign observers claimed that it was the intervention of the government or the Committee of Union and Progress that forced people by means of violence to avoid certain shops. Both arguments have their merits. The boycott was indeed primarily based on the preferences of the customers, port workers, and merchants; however, violence always accompanied these preferences and increased as the boycott approached its end.

4. The Boycott Movement as a social movement essentially contributed to the rise of nationalism and turned ethnic/religious differences and rivalries into mass clashes. In the historiography, Turkish nationalism is depicted as an intellectual current only. Studies on Turkish nationalism such as the work of Uriel Heyd, David Kushner, and Masami Arai, either concentrate on the thought and theories of political or intellectual figures, or they focus on the activities and regulations of the state, as in the work of Fuat Dündar and Ahmet Yıldız. Yet, Turkish nationalism was not only a political project of the intellectuals, or an outcome of the state regulations, but also a social phenomenon that had a social base. Muslim merchants, the workings class, urban notables, officials from different ranks of the bureaucracy and Muslim immigrants from the lost Ottoman territories (such as Crete and Macedonia) played a crucial role, both in the nationalist movement and the Boycott Movement.

5. The Boycott Movement that appeared in the Ottoman Empire was part and parcel of an era that can be called an “Age of Boycotts,” like the 1908 Revolution which was a significant link in the wave of constitutional revolutions of the early 20th century. For instance, the boycotts in Iran against the Tobacco Regie (1891-1892) and in China against the United States and Japan (1905, 1908, 1915, 1919, 1923 1925, 1932-33) had important similarities and parallels, as did the revolutions in Russia (1905), Iran (1906-1909), Mexico (1910), and China (1911) with the Ottoman case (1908).
6. A particular strand of thought in working-class historiography considers only one segment of the labor class to be a genuine working class. Therefore, the literature on workers is mired in a fruitless debate on industrialization, because scholars often consider only blue-collar male wage earners who work in a modern industrial plant and have a particular way of life and culture. This point of view equates capitalism and working-class formation with the development of industry. However, proletarianization is linked to the expansion of capitalist relationships, which turned artisans and guild members into members of the working class. Therefore, this study should be considered within the new wave of historiography on working-class formation, which emerged from the circles around the International Institute of Social History after the 1990s, in particular through scholars like Marcel van der Linden and Jan Lucassen.

7. Muslim merchants attuned themselves to the general transformation of the empire during the 19th century; they were not isolated from its economic and social life. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that there were Muslim notables and merchants in the provinces, as well as workers, who used their traditional network for modern purposes during the Boycott Movement. The Muslim merchant class played a significant role not only in the economic and social life in general during the late Ottoman period, but also in the boycotts; this paved the way for the cleansing of non-Muslims from the empire.

8. Scholars working on Turkey, especially Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper, generally claim that the concepts used for the so-called Western World do not suit the Ottoman or Turkish context. The emphasis on the uniqueness of a particular country or case may lead scholars to exceptionalism. Without a common terminology, a comparison between different cases and analysis or evaluation of a particular case cannot be possible. As a result, it becomes impossible even to highlight the uniqueness and particularities of a case. Therefore, instead of refusing to employ a common terminology and resorting to a descriptive approach, one should encourage a debate on the definitions of concepts and scientific categories. Without a transferable terminology and concepts (such as social classes, public sphere, civil society, revolution, and so on), it is hard to make sense of a historical process and an analysis of different cases.

9. Social classes and popular movements will expropriate the means of historians who have so far expropriated their place in the historical process and hide their contribution for so long.