Before the Balkan Wars, boycotts had been organized against European countries and their economic representatives in the Ottoman Empire. However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the non-Muslim Ottomans also suffered from the boycotts. Their losses went hand-in-hand with the rise of Turkish-Muslim nationalism. Although the Boycott Movement’s statements never openly targeted Ottoman citizens, political and economic developments in the 19th century had paved the way for a clash between different religious and ethnic communities. As is widely argued in the Turkish historiography, Turkish nationalism eventually gained an unprecedented power in the empire after the Balkan Wars. Thenceforth Turkish-Muslim nationalists increasingly excluded native non-Muslims from economic and social networks.¹ In this context, the Boycott Movement, in late 1913, propagated solidarity within the Muslim community and began to exclude non-Muslims in early 1914.

In this chapter, I will first analyze the widely distributed pamphlets that addressed Muslims and called for economic and social solidarity. The distribution of leaflets and mass propaganda for a National Economy coincided with the revival of the Boycott Movement. The discourse and the organization of the movement directly targeted non-Muslims and propagated the domination of Muslims in the economy, which was

hoped to pave the way for the full power of Muslims/Turks in the Ottoman Empire. Violence among different communities accompanied the Boycott Movement and was the topic of public discussions and diplomatic negotiations. This is why the role that Muslim gangs played in the Boycott Movement became as significant as the mobilization of the masses. In the course of the Boycott Movement, different political and social actors competed and negotiated with each other. The boycott organizations were generally comprised of local notables, local bureaucrats, and immigrants. The government and the Committee of Union and Progress were for the Boycott Movement, but at the same time tried to control it. The non-Muslims, particularly the Greeks and the Armenians, who suffered from the boycott tried to publicize their problems with the international public. Thus, the patriarchs of these communities put pressure on the Ottoman government by informing the Great Powers. The Great Powers and their diplomatic representatives were much more involved in this than in previous cases. For this reason it is crucial for the study of the Boycott Movement to understand the struggle and relationships between the Great Powers, the patriarchates and the church network, the Committee of Union and Progress and its social base in Asia Minor, Muslim/Turkish nationalist organizations and their cadres, and the masses of Muslim immigrants flowing into the Ottoman Empire from the lost territories.

4.1. The Political Milieu

The Boycott Movement came to different towns of Asia Minor approximately in February of 1914 and targeted particularly Ottoman Greeks and, to a lesser extent, Armenians and Bulgarians. In order to grasp the general characteristics of the Boycott Movement in 1914, one has to focus on the contemporary social and political agenda. Apart from the general devastating social consequences of the Balkan Wars, which deeply influenced Ottoman Society, there were also political and diplomatic problems that the Ottoman elite used in order to galvanize the sentiments of Muslims in the Ottoman Empire.

Before the declaration of World War I, the Ottoman press closely followed the alliance formation among the Great Powers. Apart from the issue of the balance of power, the Ottoman public opinion was almost exclusively occupied by two crucial diplomatic questions: one of them was
the Islands Question (Adalar Meselesi). It was so significant that newspapers included a special column reserved for news and comments regarding this question. The question involved the controversy about the sovereignty rights of the Ottoman Empire and Greece over the Aegean islands. The dispute between the two states continued until July 1914, when the two states came to terms with each other as they realized that the world was approaching a great war. However, until then the issue continued to cause tension between the two countries.

The second problem between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was the question of Macedonia. The plight of Muslims in Macedonia provoked nationalist and religious sentiments among Ottoman Muslims. Therefore, the Macedonian Question is significant for understanding mobilization patterns and discourses related with the Boycott Movement. The Ottoman Turkish press utilized the issue to stir up national and religious sentiments. There appeared voluminous news items and many rumors regarding the persecution of Muslims in the newly lost Macedonia. The misery of the immigrants who were constantly flowing into the Ottoman Empire fueled the resentment of Muslims.

In a confidential memorandum, the British consul W. D. W. Matthews reported that the educated Turks were convinced that the loss of the islands of Lesbos, Scio and Samos to Greece would result in the “disintegration of the Turkish possessions in Asia.” The Committee of Union and Progress considered the islands a threat to the motherland, Anatolia. The Turkish press blamed the Great Powers for their injustice towards the Turks and for not keeping their words so as to “assist Turkey to consolidate her position in Asia.” The Turkish press, according to the memorandum, asserted that these islands would be a base for Greek gangs for agitation and attack an Asia Minor, as it had happened in Macedonia.

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2 For instance, see: “Adalar Meselesi,” *İkdam*, 8 February 1914, Sunday, p. 2; “Adalar Meselesi,” *İkdam*, 10 February 1914, Tuesday, p. 2; “Adalar Meselesi,” *İkdam*, 11 February 1914, Wednesday, p. 1. Similar news were continuously published every day.
5 For examples of such news items from *İkdam*, see: “Varna’da Mitin, Yunan Mezalimi,” *İkdam*, 5 June 1914, Friday, p. 3; “Yunan Mezalimi,” *İkdam*, 11 June 1914, Thursday, p. 3; “Yunan Mezalimi, Selanik Cemaat-i İslamiyesinin Muhtarısı,” *İkdam*, 12 June 1914, Friday, p. 3; “Yunan Mezalimi,” *İkdam*, 13 June 1914, Saturday, p. 4.
Matthews also referred to the extremist and chauvinist views in newspapers such as Tanin, Köylü and Tasvir-i Efkar, which incited anti-European and anti-Greek feelings among Muslims. These newspapers, on a daily basis, reported about ill treatment of Muslims in Macedonia and on the islands, according to the British consul. The stories most often quoted in these news were the hoisting of a Greek flag over the mihrab (prayer niche) of the Hagia Sofia, the conscription of local Greeks into the Hellenic fleet, and the embellishment of Istanbul for the prospective arrival of the triumphant Greek King Constantine. The memorandum stated that these claims were nothing but baseless allegations that instigated Muslims’ sentiments against Ottoman Greeks.\(^7\)

The Islands Question and the Macedonian Question created an unstable atmosphere for the Ottoman Greeks since both issues were related to Greece. Furthermore, the Ottoman/Turkish press published news of the atrocities and assaults of Greek gangs on Muslim villages, or of the lessons taught in Greek schools, or of the state of Muslims in places densely populated by Greeks. These rumors circulating among the Muslim population increased the tensions between the two communities\(^8\) and facilitated the mobilization of Muslims against Ottoman Greeks during the Boycott Movement.

Among the Turkish elite, and particularly the Committee of Union and Progress, there was widespread fear of an invasion of Asia Minor. The presence of non-Muslims in Thrace and along the coastal regions was considered as a threat. Therefore, the Committee of Union and Progress probably wanted to replace non-Muslims with Muslims whom they considered to be more loyal.\(^9\)

To sum up, there were sufficient reasons for intense tension between various elements of the Ottoman Empire. Last but not least, the elections for the Ottoman Parliament, which took place between the win-

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8 “Rum Mekteplerinde neler okutuluyor,” Ikdam, 8 June 1914, Monday, p. 2; “Sakız’da Müslümanlar Tehlikededir,” Ikdam, 10 June 1914, Wednesday, p. 2; “İzmir’de Küstahliklar,” Ikdam, 8 March 1914, Sunday, p. 1. For instance, a gendarme and a guard of the Regie were killed in an assault on a police station in Karareis / Smyrna. Ikdam claimed that this assault had not been executed by Greek bands or Greek soldiers, but by the native Greeks. The newspaper expressed “grief” over this incident. “İzmir Vaka,” Ikdam, 17 June1914, Wednesday, p. 2.

9 This idea was expressed in the reports of the British consuls. For instance, see: FO. 195/2458, No. 308, 6 May 1914, p. 326.
ter of 1913 and the spring of 1914, contributed to this uneasy social environment. There occurred numerous incidents between the Committee of Union and Progress and prominent members of the Armenian and Greek communities.\(^{10}\) Therefore, the social and political milieu legitimized the actions of different segments of Muslim society and the cadres of the Turkish nationalist movement, who wanted to improve the social and political position of Muslims vis-à-vis non-Muslims. The setting was convenient for agitation against non-Muslims.

### 4.2. Pamphleting the Muslim Public

At the end of 1913, numerous pamphlets were handed out for free, addressing the Muslims and Turks of the Ottoman Empire. The aim of these leaflets was to bring about a revival of the Muslim population. This was an economic revival which was hoped to rescue Muslims and Turks from the “merciless hands” of the non-Muslims who were working against the empire.

A call for *milli iktisat* (National Economy) had been on the agenda since the promulgation of the constitution in 1908. At first, National Economy merely implied the development of a native economy and industry. The first approach to a national economy included all religious communities in the empire and propagated total development and recovery.

However, particularly after the Balkan Wars, the discourse on National Economy became more critical of the economic inferiority of Muslims vis-à-vis the Christians. Mehmed Rüşid, the governor of Kağıs, wrote in his diary on 30 July 1913 that national sentiments were on the rise and that a national economic awakening was taking place among the Muslim population of Edremit. During his visit, he also underlined that the Muslims of Edremit and Burhaniye were in need of a national bank for their economic progress. He claimed that Muslims had started to compete with the Christians.\(^{11}\)

On the one hand, it was claimed that still primarily non-Muslims profited from the current state of the economy. Non-Muslims were profes-

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10 Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1995), pp. 177-178.

sionalized in different crafts, while the Muslim population constituted their consumers and bought only from them. Non-Muslims became wealthy thanks to the money that Muslims spent. On the other hand, non-Muslims used the money they earned against the interests of the Ottoman Empire. That is to say, non-Muslims, and particularly the Greeks, were betraying the country, by economically supporting Greece with their endowments and donations.

As a result, there appeared a shift in the boycotters’ discourse which directly targeted non-Muslim Ottomans. This idea became prevalent among the Ottoman elite and was echoed in the news, articles, and commentaries of the Turkish newspapers. Pamphlets addressed Muslims and tried to popularize this new concept of National Economy among the Muslim and Turkish lower classes. At least four pamphlets were published in 1913 and 1914 in Istanbul, and another one in Smyrna in 1914. In fact, the four pamphlets published in Istanbul are to a great extent identical and offer almost the same plot. Thus, tone may talk of different versions of a particular text. Thousands of these leaflets were distributed for free, both in Istanbul and in the provinces. They had very similar, but slightly different titles. Two of them were named Müslümanlara Mahsus (Especial for Muslims), and the others were titled Müslümanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu (A Path of Salvation for Muslims) and Müslüman ve Türklerle (To Muslim and Turks).¹² There may be several other versions, since the short versions do not include the list of merchants that were attached to these pamphlets to help Muslim consumers in finding Muslim merchants.¹³ Secondary information regarding these pamphlets indicates that some of these short versions did enclose a list.

The authors of these leaflets were anonymous. However, thanks to the publication of the diary of Ahmet Nedim Servet Törr, in which he wrote

¹² Müslümanlara Mahsus, ([n. p.], 1329). This is a short version and does not involve a list of Muslim merchants. Müslümanlara Mahsus, ([n. p.], 1329) is the longest version, with a red cover page, and includes a long list of Muslim merchants. This is probably the last version and published at the very beginning of 1914. Müslümanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu, ([n. p.], 1329). Müslüman ve Türklerle, ([n. p.], 1329) is the shortest version, but does have a short list of Muslim merchants. This short list indicates that it was published particularly for the Asian part of Istanbul, since the addresses of these merchants belong to this region.

¹³ Zafer Toprak has introduced Müslümanlara Mahsus to the historiography on Turkey. His transliteration of the pamphlet also reveals the fact that there are significant differences between different existing leaflets. Zafer Toprak, “1913-1914 Müslüman Boykotaji,” Toplum ve Bilim, No. 29/30, Bahar-Yaz 1985, 179-199.
about the day-to-day life of his little daughter Nevhiz, we now have ample information about these pamphlets.\textsuperscript{14} Ahmet Nedim was a civil bureaucrat working in the Ministry of War and published patriotic and nationalist pamphlets and poems in order to generate a mobilization among the Muslims and Turks after the Balkan Wars.\textsuperscript{15} His brother Edib Servet Bey was among the ten members of the \textit{heyet-i aliye} (sublime board) of the Committee of Union and Progress before the revolution.\textsuperscript{16} This fact, and his being an officer in the Ministry of War, indicates that the state and the Committee of Union and Progress had a much more active role in the Boycott Movement after the Balkan Wars.

The first of these booklets was \textit{Müşlûmanlara Mahsus}.\textsuperscript{17} Ahmet Nedim first mentioned this pamphlet in the diary entry of 10 November 1913, as an excuse and apology for not concentrating on the diary for about two months. He summarized the introduction of \textit{Müşlûmanlara Mahsus} in order to explain to his daughter the reasons why he had embarked on such an endeavor. The “articles in the newspapers and other publications on \textit{milli iktisat} were inexplicit and obscure and therefore were not effective on people,” writes Ahmet Nedim. Therefore, he decided to address Muslims directly in order to force Muslim merchants, artisans and tradesmen to “spend their capital” within the empire and to induce Muslims to buy native products. He wanted to reach those people who were largely illiterate, did not read newspapers, and did not have money to spend on books. This is why he handed out the pamphlets for free and wrote in a very simple and basic Turkish.

At first, he distributed 2,000 copies. The pamphlet attracted so much attention that the second print appeared after a very short time, this time 20,000 copies. To the second edition he added a list of merchants. He

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\textsuperscript{14} Ahmet Nedim Servet Tör, \textit{Nevhiz'ın Günülgü “Defter-i Hattıra,”} (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2000). Nevhiz received many presents from her relatives at her birth. As a result, her father decided to leave her a \textit{rûzname-i hayat} (diary) as a present in order to leave her with memories of her childhood. In this diary, he also mentioned crucial political and social developments in the Ottoman Empire, in addition to family affairs. Thanks to this diary we also have information about Ahmet Nedim’s propaganda activities.

\textsuperscript{15} His son and the brother of Nevhiz was Vedat Nedim Tör. Vedat Nedim was educated in Berlin and participated in the communist movement in Turkey until the Turkish Communist Party was put on trial in 1927. Thereafter he turned to Kemalism and continued to be an influential figure in Turkey’s cultural life.

\textsuperscript{16} Tanrık Zafer Tunaya, \textit{Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, İttihat ve Terakki, Bir Çağın, Bir Kusahağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi}, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), p. 38.

\textsuperscript{17} I will refer only to the longer and most developed version of this pamphlet in this chapter.
mentions that the preparation of the pamphlet took almost a month. On 10 November 1913, he considered printing another 100,000 copies. Ahmed Nedim was content with the demands for the pamphlet and the attention it had garnered among the people. He was also very happy since he had heard of the bankruptcies of five or six Rums (Ottoman Greeks) in different quarters of Istanbul.\textsuperscript{18} Ahmet Nedim claimed that the publication of the pamphlet inspired an \textit{inkilab-i iktisadi ve ticariye} (economic and commercial revolution). He was proud of the fact that the pamphlets and its contents became a subject of daily conversations among ordinary people.\textsuperscript{19} The Greek consul in Ayvalık reported to the Greek Foreign Ministry that government agents throughout the country had tried to entice Muslims to participate in the Boycott Movement, by distributing booklets that provoked Muslims against the Greek population.\textsuperscript{20} The Greek newspaper \textit{Embros}, published in Athens, also reported of leaflets that instigated Muslims around Smyrna.\textsuperscript{21} These sources indicate that these pamphlets indeed did reach Muslims in different provinces.

It was not only the pamphlets of the Boycott Movement that inflamed Muslims against Greeks, but also booklets written before. The metropolitan bishop of Ephesus claimed that a book called \textit{Kavm-i Cedid} (The New Nation),\textsuperscript{22} which supposedly cursed Jesus Christ, was provoking Muslims.\textsuperscript{23}

\underline{Müslümanlara Mahsus} begins by reminding its readers of the terrifying defeat of the Balkan Wars. Although Edirne and the areas around Kırkkilise were taken back, the general loss of territory was tremendous. The pamphlet mentions lost towns such as Iskeçe, Salonica, Yan-ya, Manastır, and Işkodra, the Aegean Islands and the lakes, rivers, fertile plains, and forests that these embraced. The Muslims in these towns and regions were abandoned and destitute. Even the wealthy now led miserable lives. Children were begging on the streets, and some of them were serving \textit{raki} to enemy soldiers in the taverns.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ahmet Nedim Servet Tör, \textit{Nevhiz’in Günü}, pp. 122-123. The pamphlets were free for the people, but on sale for merchants in order to collect money for their reprint.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 124.
\item \textsuperscript{20} AYE, A21a, 1914, Ayvalık, No. 6251, 23 February 1914.
\item \textsuperscript{21} “Anthellinikos Diogmon eis tin Mikran Asian,” \textit{Embros}, 14 March 1914.
\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{Kavm-i Cedid} (The New Nation) was written by Ubeydullah Afgani and published in 1913.
\item \textsuperscript{23} “Ta Pathimata ton Omogenon,” (Atrocities incurred by the Nation), \textit{Ekklisiastiki Alitheia}, 8 March 1914.
\item \textsuperscript{24} \underline{Müslümanlara Mahsus}, pp. 3-4; \underline{Müslümanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu}, p. 4.
\end{itemize}
Compared to Müşlûmanlara Mahsus, Müslüman ve Türklerle has a much more bitter and fierce tone and is reminiscent of the sentimental articles in contemporary Turkish newspapers. It first refers to the “rotten skins” and “carved eyes” of Muslims in the lost lands, then goes on to talk about the enemies who killed their brothers with bayonets, raped mothers and sisters, and afterwards drank wine.25 The pamphlet published in Smyrna was much more moderate compared to the others. İzmir Tüccaran ve Esnafan-ı İslamiyyesine Mahsus Rehber (A Guide for Muslim Merchants and Artisans of Smyrna) does not have a provocative tone, but was written in a moderate language in order to convince its readers. The revenues from the sale of the leaflet went to the Donanma Cemiyeti, a typical nationalist act of the time. Therefore, this pamphlet was not free of charge. It was comprised of a detailed list of merchants and artisans of Smyrna and Aydın.26 This Guide also refers to the Balkan Wars as a turning point in Ottoman history, which enabled the Muslims/Turks to see developments more clearly. The pamphlet explains its reader why trade and money are crucial for a nation. The writer, on the other hand, is also grateful for the economic and commercial awakening among the Turks and Muslims. Although there is a list of merchants at the end of the leaflet, the writer quotes several examples of Muslim entrepreneurs in order to depict what Muslim wealth should accomplish. The pamphlet mentions Mehmet Rasim Bey, who constructed a factory of fabric in Tarsus/Adana with a capital of 100,000 lira.27 Mehmed Rasim also had an agent, Bosnali Suhadlizade Abdullah Hilmi Bey, indicating that Muslim merchants not only constructed factories, but also built a business network within the empire.

The pamphlet heralded newly emerging national companies in Konya, Istanbul, and Izmir. Like in other leaflets and publications in Turkish periodicals, the significance of grocers was highlighted. Most of the population in Asia Minor was said to depend on the network of Greek grocers.

25 Müslüman ve Türklerle, p. 2-4.
26 İzmir Tüccaran ve Esnafan-ı İslamiyyesine Mahsus Rehber, ([n. p.], 1330). The pamphlet mentions the marriage ceremony of Enver Paşa and Naciye Sultan, which took place on 5 March 1914. Therefore, the pamphlet must have been published after this date. This pamphlet has been transcribed and published by Engin Berber. Engin Berber (Translator), İzmir 1876 ve 1908 (Yunanca Rehberlere Göre Meşruiyet Izmir), (Izmir: IBB Kent Kitaplığı, 2008), pp. 115-135.
27 Ibid., p. 6; Mehmet Rasim [Dokur] contributed to the War of Independence by sending cloth to the army. Therefore, on his first visit to Tarsus, Mustafa Kemal (with Latife Hanım) visited him and had dinner at his house.
Therefore, the emergence of Muslim grocers was a vital development for Muslim/Turkish nationalists. This is why *İzmir Tüccaran ve Esnaf-ı İslamiyyesine Mahsus Rehber* does not employ the term “boycott” for the new entrepreneurship of Muslims in economy and trade. For the writer, this was a struggle for living; a struggle for survival. The leaflet employed the notion of “catching up” by stressing the preference of non-Muslims for their co-religionists. The writer claimed that Turks, at last, took the economy and the trade of the country into their own hands and would genuinely and actually own them.28 These arguments which would also prevail in the discourse of Turkish nationalism were a call to re-conquer the country. In terms of trade and commerce, Muslims and Turks had virtually been asleep, which reduced them to the level of slavery in their own country. Therefore, Muslims should help each other and particularly those who were rich should invest in the economy and come together to establish banks.

All pamphlets attributed the responsibility for these atrocities to those who hoisted foreign flags, and ultimately to those Muslims who surrendered themselves to the non-Muslims by buying from them and making them rich. The Muslim merchants could not compete with their non-Muslim counterparts because of the “silly preferences” of Muslim consumers. Non-Muslims were “sucking the blood of Muslims,” and as a result Muslims were “financing the bullets that kill their co-religionists.” These ideas became prevalent among the Turkish elite in the course of the Boycott Movement. For instance, the medical students Behçet Salih, Mahmut Halit and Mustafa Muzaffer delivered public lectures on hygiene in the province of Aydın and repeated the arguments of these pamphlets. The acting British consul-general in Smyrna, Heathcote Smith, quoted in his report a part of their lecture: “We are broken hearted at finding you Muslims are still asleep. The Christians, profiting from our ignorance, have now for ages been taking our place and taking away our rights. These vipers whom we are nourishing have been sucking out all the life-blood of the nation. They are the parasitical worms eating into our flesh whom we must destroy and do away with. It is time we freed ourselves from these individuals, by all means lawful and unlawful...”29

The cost of Muslim consumer patterns was allegedly 5,000 Muslim lives in Rumeli. The leaflet warns its readers that they were next and that

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28 Ibid., p. 7.
29 FO, 195/2458, No. 84, 11 July 1914, p. 470.
it was their turn to suffer, if they did not change their habits. Otherwise, the caliphate and the Turkish sultanate would not prevail, and the coat of the Prophet would be trampled under the feet of the gavurs (infidels).\footnote{属实于Turklere, p. 2-4.}

At this juncture, the warship Averof entered the scene. The Averof was a warship bought by the Greek Navy from an Italian shipyard and became the flagship of the navy. For at least three reasons, this armored cruiser (\textit{thorakismeno katadromiko}) was crucial for the rising Turkish nationalism. First, in spite of bargaining with the producer, the Ottomans had not been able to buy the ship.\footnote{Zafer Toprak, “Osmanlı Donanması, Averof Zırhlısı ve Ulusal Kimlik,” \textit{Toplumsal Tarih}, No. 113, Mayıs 2003, pp. 10-20.} Secondly, the Averof played a significant role in the Balkan Wars and particularly in the Ottoman defeat. Thirdly, a Greek benefactor by the name of Georges Averof had donated a large amount of money and thereby facilitated its purchase. Müşlûmanlara Mahsus claims that the Ottoman Army could not exit through the straits to help Salonica and the islands and, therefore, could not stop the Greek army, ultimately because of the Averof.\footnote{Müslûmanlara Mahsus, p. 5; Müslûmanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu, p. 7; Müslûman ve Türkler., p. 5.}

How was it possible that a small state like Greece was able to buy such a battleship, but not the Ottoman Empire? The pamphlets underlined the fact that in Greece it was not the state, but the nation who bought such battleships. This argument was very popular among the Ottoman elite and gave rise to the establishment of the \textit{Donanma Cemiyeti} (Navy Society) in 1909. The \textit{Donanma Cemiyeti} was one of the most active civil societies in the Ottoman Empire and tried to collect donations to buy new battleships for the navy. Therefore, the pamphlets reiterated the arguments behind the existence of the \textit{Donanma Cemiyeti}. Furthermore, the pamphlets pointed out that the battleship was bought by a Rum, Averof, who was not a Greek citizen, but an Ottoman Greek from Görice (Korça in Albanian). The leaflets regret that Ottoman citizens helped the enemy. Müşlûmanlara Mahsus asked: “How many citizens are there whose hands we shake and whom we see every day and who work day and night to endow to Greek government.”\footnote{Müslûmanlara Mahsus, p. 7; Müslûmanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu, p. 9.} Georges Averof was proof for non-Muslim treason and coincided with news of non-Muslims who regularly gave to Greek charities. In fact, Averof was not from Görice, but from Metso-
vo (also on Ottoman territory) and had at a young age migrated to Egypt where he made his fortune with a business based in Alexandria. By the time the Greek navy bought the cruiser, Averof (1815[8]-1899) had already passed away. Therefore, it was not him personally, but his charitable foundation that contributed the donation.

The name George M. Averof was utilized in nationalist discourse to mobilize the Muslim public to shop only from Muslim merchants. According to the pamphlets, every penny given to non-Muslims was become a bullet aimed at Muslims. This is why the pamphlets argued that they should not earn any money, or at least Muslims should not pay any money to them. Instead, the native economy should be supported. Here, one should mention that, in relation to the attitude towards non-Muslims, a fundamental shift occurred: until 1912 non-Muslims were not excluded from the definition of “us” within the discourse of the Boycott Movement. They were also part and parcel of the native economy and industry. During the 1910-11 Boycott Movement, non-Muslims were also invited to invest in the development of native production. However, after 1913 they were no longer treated as a constitutive element of the empire and excluded from the National Economy. This shift in emphasis was not completely new, but it only became apparent and spoken about at that point.

The pamphlets warned Muslim consumers about the marketing tactics and strategies of non-Muslims: how they decorated their windows, how they treated their customers, how they convinced people to buy from them, how they followed fashion, and so on. 34 Non-Muslim shops did not employ Muslims because they only wanted to support their co-religionists. They hired Muslim workers only for menial tasks, which did not cost much in terms of wage expenses, because they considered Muslims and Turks stupid and foolish. 35 The first part of Müslümanlara Mahsüs and Müslümanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu ends with a call to the people, warning that Müslümanlık and Türklük (Muslim and Turkish communities) were perishing because of their own negligence. Therefore, Muslims should start to think about their future and strive to become merchants and amass fortunes. If they only proceeded on this path, they could protect their nation and religion. 36 The pamphlets also informed their read-

34 Müslümanlara Mahsus, p. 8-9; Müslumanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu, pp. 10-11.
35 Müslümanlara Mahsus, p. 14; Müslümanlara Mahsüs Kurtulmak Yolu, p. 16.
36 Müslümanlara Mahsus, p. 15; Müslümanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu, p. 17.
ers that Greece was working to buy another battleship, the Konstantin, and half of its cost was to be paid by Ottoman Christians. The leaflets claim that, if Muslims had frequented Muslim shops, there would have been wealthy Muslims who could purchase one or two battleships for the Ottoman navy. And if Muslims would succeed, then Christians would no longer be able to take over “the Ottomans’ beautiful countries” where mosques were now turned into barns and churches and the tombs of dervishes washed with wine.37

The pamphlets urged Muslims to buy from Muslim and Turkish stores, because after the loss of Rumelian territories, Anatolia and Istanbul were next. Therefore, people should stop paying money to Christians who welcomed and cheered for the enemy soldiers and showed them where to find Muslim houses and Muslim women in the lost Ottoman territories. Compared to the other pamphlets, Müslüman ve Türklerle was much stricter in its tone. The anonymous writer admonished Muslims who criticized other for their clothes. Native products might be tasteless, rough and dull, but of course they were better than a probable occupation and the loss of the remaining lands. Those who continued to wear luxurious clothes would probably wear them as costume while dancing before the infidels while these drank their raki and wine. The pamphlet ends with a threat: Muslims who enter Christian stores will be prohibited from doing so with warnings, threats, and force. In the end, the writer wanted Muslim and Turks to repeat the following oath: “I will never shop from Christians. If I do so, I am dishonest and a bastard and deserve every kind of curse and insult.”38

These pamphlets also included different stories meant to motivate the Muslim public to buy native products. Müslümanlara Mahsus covers a story of an English lady in Egypt who gave a lesson to her Muslim servant regarding National Economy. The wife of Lord Cromer, the British Viceroy in Egypt, gave a lira to her Muslim servant and wanted him to buy a bolt of unbleached muslin for one lira from a particular store. However, her servant brought her a better and cheaper fabric but from a different store. The lady became angry and told servant that the fabric was not English, but a French product. And probably the store from which he bought it was not an English shop either. Therefore, she claimed that, although she had paid a mecidiye less, her nation had lost one lira, and

37  Müslüman ve Türklerle, pp. 5-6.
38  Müslüman ve Türklerle, p. 9.
her nation’s loss was her loss. As a result, the servant who had served in the house for five years was dismissed. The story ends with a commentary on how even a very wealthy lady only thinks about her country, even for one mecidiye.39

Müslümanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu contains a different story, the story of Selanikli Ayşe Hanım (Mistress Ayşe from Salonica). As stated in the text itself, the touching and tearful story of the Maraşoğlu family (claimed to be based on a true story) was attached to the leaflet in order to teach the public a lesson. Ayşe Hanım—whose father, husband and children had been killed by Greeks in Salonica—went for a walk from Mahmutpaşa to Sultanhamami in Istanbul. She was shocked when she came across the store of the Garamatopoulos Brothers, the Binbir Çiçek Mağazası (The Store of One thousand and One Flowers). As is repeatedly described in these pamphlets, there was an employee at the door, kindly inviting prospective customers into the shop. Ayşe Hanım also recognized inside the store Muslim women who had taken off their veils and did not hesitate to show their powdered necks. Ayşe Hanım also entered the shop. The owner and salesman tried to advertise their products to her, while she slowly moved around the store. She asked whether the person to whom she was talking was Gramatopoulos himself. When he confirmed that he was Gramatopoulos, she asked if he had a brother in Salonica who owned a similar store.

Ayşe Hanım then told the Muslim shoppers her story and the story of who the Gramatopoulos in Salonica were. Nikolaki Gramatopoulos had escorted Greek soldiers to Ayşe Hanım’s konak (mansion). The soldiers then killed her servant and mother. Ayşe Hanım hid, until Nikolaki saw her and ran towards her, saying “Oh my beautiful young woman. I want you, you!” She escaped over the roof and hid in the house of an Austrian lady. Upon hearing her story, the shop owner began to quarrel with Ayşe Hanım. Yet, she continued to address the Muslim women: enemies bought their weapons thanks to the help of non-Muslim Ottomans. After the invasion of Salonica, she saw military cars with inscriptions stating that these had been presents from the Greeks of Istanbul, Smyrna, Bursa and Samsun. She asked women how they could buy from non-Muslims who worked against the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the Muslim women understood the truth and left the store, thanking Ayşe Hanım.40

39 Müslümanlara Mahsus, pp. 16-18.
40 Müslümanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu, pp. 36-48.
Ahmet Nedim attached a list of merchants in order to indicate that it was possible to satisfy all needs by buying from Muslim traders only. He left blank spaces within the list to give the readers the opportunity to add missing names of Muslim merchants, so that Muslims themselves could actively create a perfect list. He stated that Istanbul was a large city and that it was almost impossible to collect the names of all Muslim businessmen. He was also happy that, thanks to the economic awakening among Muslims, there appeared many new Muslim shops, stores and companies. He wished for one of the vakıf hans (apartment blocks containing offices and shops) built in Istanbul to be reserved for Muslim and Turkish producers and merchants only, so that customers would immediately know where to go.41

Ahmet Nedim was still working on new editions of Müslümanlara Mahsus at the end of January 1914. On 28 January 1914, he wrote in the diary for Nevhiz that he had just completed editing a new, improved version of the pamphlet. He defined his endeavor as “propagandism” and stated that the pamphlet would be distributed to Istanbul and Anatolia in two or three weeks.42 This date also coincided with the Boycott Movement. The Boycott Movement and related complaints of non-Muslims occurred in late February and early March of 1914. The effective propaganda activities for a National Economy and the extensive distribution of pamphlets for an awakening of the Muslim and Turkish public resulted in the revival of the Boycott Movement after the Balkan Wars.

4.3. The National Economy and an Open Letter to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate

Like most others, the Ottoman 1913-14 Boycott Movement was directly related to notions of economic nationalism, economic revivalism, and the development of a national economy. The number of Muslims in the economy started to increase over the course of the Second Constitutional Period, particularly after the Balkan Wars. The boycott was a crucial factor in this increase. It was not a coincidence that Hüseyn Kazım took

41 Müslümanlara Mahsus, pp. 35-37. The writer(s) of Müslüman ve Türklere gives a particular address at the Kadıköy post office for readers to register new names of Muslim merchant and craftsmen who were absent in the short list in the pamphlet. Müslüman ve Türklere, p. back cover.
42 Ahmet Nedim Servet Tör, Nevhiz’in Günlüğü, p. 127.
into consideration the boycott as such in his open letter to the Orthodox Patriarch who complained about the movement. In this pamphlet, which constitutes a significant document of the Boycott Movement, Hüseyin Kazım tried to legitimize the movement by referring to the state of Muslims in the economy.\footnote{Hüseyin Kazım (Kadri), \textit{Rum Patrigine Açık Mektup: Boykot Müslümanların Hakki Değil midir?} (İstanbul: Yeni Turan Matbaası, 1330).}

He began by referring to the dispute between the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate and the Ministry of Justice. The Greek Patriarch had proclaimed that he would consult different means and ways to solve the problem, if the Boycott Movement did not stop. For Hüseyin Kazım, the patriarch in this statement implied the intervention of the European Great Powers. He argued that there had been many instances in Ottoman history in which these powers interfered in Ottoman politics. Furthermore, there was much evidence concerning the collaboration of the patriarchate and Athens.\footnote{Ibid., p. 5.} He touched upon the issue of the capitulations and how they had impoverished the empire. At last, Muslims and Turks had started to learn how to earn money and to produce. According to Hüseyin Kazım, the patriarch wanted Muslims to remain poor and Greeks to earn money and make donations to the Greek navy.

Hüseyin Kazım claimed that it was the Muslims who constituted the poor of the empire and this was why they had to learn how to earn money. In his view, Muslims now merely tried to imitate the Greeks who only made business with and employed their co-religionists. With the boycott, Muslims were doing the same, by buying from each other. However, their preference was exempt from violence, force and illegality. He claimed that no violent act was possible, since the government would not allow to let such a thing happen.\footnote{Ibid., p. 8.} The boycott was merely the awakening of Muslims. Hüseyin Kazım asked his readers whether Greeks would shop from a Greek or a Muslim grocer. He asked whether they acted in line with their patriotic duties. He implied that Greeks did not donate to the \textit{Donanma Cemiyeti} (Navy Society) or bought shares in national organizations and particularly national companies. Therefore, for him, the movement was not even a boycott, but a duty and revival of Muslims. It was only with the disaster of the Balkan Wars that Muslims understood their backwardness in the economy and decided to improve themselves.
Now, they started to invest and learn how to earn money. Hüseyin Kazım claimed that, within the span of two or three months, approximately 450 new Muslim stores had opened in Istanbul.46

Hüseyin Kazım argued that similar acts in foreign countries were regarded as patriotic activities, whereas such nationalist endeavors in the Ottoman Empire were considered the acts of crowds, rowdies, and fanatics.47 He reminded his readers of the atrocities that the Muslims encountered in Macedonia under the Greek yoke: how the Greeks killed their co-religionists, how they raped Muslim women, and how they destroyed the houses of their Muslim neighbors. The Ottoman Greeks who donated to the Ottoman fleet and participated in national mobilization were exceptions. Therefore, for him, Muslims should decide to support each other.48 He concluded his pamphlet with the following paragraph:

We are not interested in your claims since you do not show any kind of loyalty to this country. We cannot give our bread to the others. We shop from a Muslim. We help a Muslim. We love Muslims. We curse those who do not shop from a Muslim. God has promised his benevolence to those Muslims who support each other. In God we trust. We know the path of God. We pray also for those who deviate from the path of God for their salvation. Make sure Patrik Efendi we pray also for you!49

Similar thoughts concerning the need for National Economy were common in the contemporary Turkish press. For instance, a leading article published in Ikdam claimed that the movement about which the Greeks were complaining was not a boycott, but a type of solidarity.50 According to Ikdam, Muslims would no longer work as public employees, but rather invest in industry and trade. They would earn their own bread and produce. The newspaper repeated the argument that Muslims in general did not work hard, but as slaves of the state and that they left business activities to non-Muslims. Furthermore, Ikdam claimed that, as Muslims started to become entrepreneurs, non-Muslims began to worry. Accordingly, Europeans would from now on prefer Muslims as trade

46 Ibid., p. 10.
47 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
partners, because one could trust them without any reservation. As a result, Armenians and the Greeks were alarmed. For *Ikdam*, there was enough food in the empire for everyone, and Muslims would act in line with Armenians and Greeks who did not employ or work with Muslims and preferred their co-religionists.\(^{51}\) The propaganda activity resulting from the Boycott Movement also tried to motivate the Muslim public to undertake an economic revival; at the same time, it also aimed at restricting non-Muslims' economic transactions. For instance, fifteen tile-making factories in Menemen were destroyed in June of 1914. Nicolas Kaydachi's losses ruined his factory.\(^{52}\)

The term “awakening” was a metaphor that the rising discourse of National Economy frequently employed. The emergence and the expansion of the boycott was also considered a sign of this awakening during the Second Constitutional Period. The Greek Patriarchate, on the other hand, repudiated the claim that the boycott would lead to the salvation of the Turkish people from economical slavery. Rather, the boycotting of Greeks was against the economic interests of the empire. The economic and social status of the Greeks was a result of tradition and system, and it was the preference of the Turks to specialize in the fields of administration and military, which removed them from the economy. Therefore, it was the Greeks who undertook the civilizing mission and dealt with trade. Since the Greeks had deep roots in the economy, it was futile to remove them from the sector.\(^{53}\) The patriarchate claimed that the government would prevent a possible catastrophe, since the destruction of such a loyal and hard-working segment of society was contrary to the interests of the state.\(^{54}\)

However, the Turkish press of the time passionately supported attempts to build a national economy in which the Muslim/Turkish element would dominate. For instance, the formation of Muslim companies and partnerships was announced in *Ikdam* with praise and admiration.\(^{55}\) Turkish nationalist organizations likely played a crucial role

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52 FO, 195/2458, No. 81, 7 July 1914, (The date of the report is 25 June 1914), p. 513-514.


in the rise of National Economy and the expansion of the boycott network. For example, Türk Ocağı wanted newly established Turkish and Muslim businesses to send them the photographs of their shops and offices. The organization planned to facilitate the formation of a network and to encourage solidarity between Turks and Muslims. Türk Ocağı declared that it planned to exhibit these photographs to the people and to contribute to the development of national trade, by making use of “effective advertising.”  

4.4. “Henceforth Goods to Be Purchased from Muslim Merchants”

The 1914 Boycott Movement started around February. The British consul-general in Smyrna, Henyr D. Barnham, reported on 18 February 1914 that the distrust between Muslims and non-Muslims was increasing for several reasons. In Smyrna, Greeks were put under pressure by “frequent expulsions on trumped-up pretexts, by forced contributions to the fleet, by the prohibition to wear or display any colors that might suggest they were not Ottoman subjects and by a close police control over all their actions.”  

On the other hand, in the interior of the province, there appeared a “systematic boycott” against Greeks and Armenians, according to the report. In Manisa, Muslims and Greeks were forbidden from entering the shops of non-Muslims. Those who dared to do so were beaten. Barnham claimed that the Boycott Movement was an outcome of the influence of the Committee of Union and Progress and that the envoys of the committee were provoking people everywhere. He also referred to eyewitness accounts of two Englishmen travelling in the province and asserted that the cruel boycotting was happening “under the eyes and with the assistance of the gendarmes.” The consul concluded his report with the statement that the relationship between Turks and Christian was worsening, compared to the two past generations. He argued that the Turkish press was also instigating the Muslim public against Christians. They even wanted people not to salute Christians and act as if they did not exist.

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56 “Türk ve Müslüman Tüccara, Esnafa, Türk Ocağından,” Ihdam, 8 June 1914, Monday, p. 5.

57 FO. 195/2458, No. 20, 18 February 1914, p. 211.

58 FO. 195/2458, No. 20, 18 February 1914, pp. 211-214.
A report that the French ambassador submitted to the Sublime Port also provides information regarding the early phases of the Boycott Movement. From the outset, the Boycott Movement engendered violence. Instances of violence that had occurred occasionally during the 1910-11 Boycott, but now, after the Balkan Wars, started to appear with greater frequency. Both Ottoman public opinion and international diplomatic circles became used to the incidents of the Boycott Movement, but the patterns of violence changed. Both the targeted non-Muslims and the foreign consuls conceded that the boycott was a refusal of the consumers to buy from non-Muslims. Yet, they complained over and over about the violence that went along with the boycott. The report of the French ambassador also described these violent acts. In one of these instances, an Ottoman Greek merchant by the name of Stilianos Yordanou sent 32 sacks of sugar to Sadizade Hasan, through the agency of Deveci Emin. However, Emin was stopped five kilometers from Bandirma by four armed individuals who seized the sacks in the worth of 50 lira. The boycotters tore the sacks with a knife and ruined the sugar by pouring petroleum on it. Deveci Emin who had carried the sugar was attacked because he transported something that belonged to a Christian. The merchant Sadizade also received a threatening letter, warning and ordering him to break off his relationships with Christians. The letter was signed by Vatan Fedaieri (Guards of the Homeland).

In another incident, again in the region of Bandirma, another agent was captured by an armed gang on 25 February. This time, one of the camel drivers was wounded and a donkey killed. Two days later, the merchant Nikolayidis sent flour from Bandirma, but the camel convoy was held up about an hour down the road. The camel drivers were “persuaded” by disguised armed men to go back to Bandirma and return the flour to Nikolayidis. The Greek merchant informed the local governor in Bandirma about the incident. The governor advised Nikolayidis not to send any goods without informing him. However, although the governor and the commander of the gendarmerie assured that the road was safe, his goods were seized once again on 11 March. This time, the gang consisted of fifteen men, with covered faces, and was armed with martini rifles; they scattered his merchandise on the ground. By the time the

59 “Ta Pathimata ton Omogenon,” (Atrocities incurred by the Nation), Ekklisiastiki Alitheia, 8 March 1914; and BOA, DH. KMS. 63/58, 1 April 1914.
60 BOA, DH. KMS. 63/58, 1 April 1914.
gendarmerie arrived in the district, the villagers had already looted the goods. The merchants Anagnostou and Vasiliiyou also experienced similar misfortunes; their camel drivers were threatened with death, and the boycotters handed their manifestos to them.

The report also mentioned several other incidents that took place in Smyrna. Two of them were boycotts against Ottoman Greeks. On 4 March, five Greeks and, on March 8, a woman with her child were not able to disembark in the port of Kuşadası. The report claimed that the officers in the port and the policemen were responsible for this incident. The husband of the woman with the child did his best to disembark his family from the ship, but without success. On 9 March, Muslims assaulted a Greek quarter in Old Smyrna where more than four hundred Greeks families were living. As a result many were wounded. These types of claims continued to appear in consular reports and non-Turkish newspapers, revealing the tension between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

However, in addition to the acts of violence, there were also typical and universal patterns of boycotting in the report. For example, on 15 March several students of the İttihat ve Terakki Mektebi (School of Union and Progress) and the Sanayi Mektebi (School of Industry) held a protest in front of the Greek shops and stores in the bazaar of Smyrna. During the demonstration, the owners of the shops were ordered to remove any signs and objects that reminded people of their Greek nationality. The boycotters were most sensitive to the national colors of Greece, white and blue. The students broke the shop windows when the owners resisted their orders. On 21 March, two boycotters poured petroleum on a donkey carrying merchandise belonging to a Greek. The owner of the goods, Yanko Pavlidis, consulted the police, but received only the advice that the boycotters were protected by high-ranking officers. Therefore, it was impossible for the policemen to stop the boycotters.

The Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate reported in the Ekklisiastiki Alitheia that the commercial boycott became most wide-spread in the empire at the end of February. It was publicly announced in mosques, public squares and bazaars. Merchants and people who wanted to contin-

61 BOA, DH. KMS. 63/58, 1 April 1914. The articles of 25 and 27 February.
62 “Ta Pathimata ton Omogenon,” (Atrocities incurred by the Nation), Ekklisiastiki Alitheia, 8 March 1914.
63 BOA, DH. KMS. 63/58, 1 April 1914. “İzmir Mintikasında.”
ue commercial relationships with the Greek-Orthodox community were warned and threatened. The merchandise of Greek traders was destroyed, and the Greek population was replaced by Muslim immigrants.64

In Edirne, the boycotting of Greek and other non-Muslim dealers was particularly strong in February and early March of 1914. Its intensity decreased in April, until severe clashes between different religious communities and the emigration of local Greeks occurred in May and June of 1914. However, even during the Boycott Movement’s weak period Muslims were warned that they would better deal with their co-religionists. On the other hand, many non-Muslim merchants had already left the province because of the Balkan Wars, and the agriculture, the main base of commerce in Edirne, was not productive enough for trade.65 Moreover, due to the Boycott Movement the situation of the still working merchants deteriorated. Still, Muslims opened grocery shops in the poorer quarters of the town after the Balkan Wars and still did so in spring of 1914 in spite of all the political and economic crises, according to the quarterly report of the British consul of Edirne.66

There are two significant points that should be highlighted in this context. First, the picketing of non-Muslim shops and the terrorizing of customers were also part of the boycotts before 1914. However, the intensity, persistence and frequency of the boycott acts increased. Secondly, the support of the local bureaucracy for the Boycott Movement became much more obvious. For instance, there appeared a crucial change in the bureaucratic hierarchy of Smyrna after 1913. This change became one of the main complaints of non-Muslims during the Boycott Movement. In 1913, Rahmi Bey who was known for his strict Unionist identity became the governor-general of the province of Aydın. Moreover, Emin Efendi (the former gendarmerie officer of Serez and the new head of the gendarmerie in Manisa) and Çerkez Eşref Efendi (Kuşçubaşı) arrived in Smyrna from Serez, and their activities were considered proof for the committee’s association with the Boycott Movement and Turkification policies. Their activities were not only against non-Muslims, but sometimes also against Ottomans who were not ethnic Turks. For instance, in one of his

65 The Balkan Wars and the treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria facilitated the ethnic cleansing of Bulgarians in Eastern Thrace. Fuat Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Sıfresi, pp. 182-191.
66 FO, 195/2456, No. 17, 31 March 1914, pp. 5-6.
dispatches the British consul-general in Smyrna reported their anti-Albanian policies in the province of Aydın. He underlined the fact that the expulsion of Albanians increased after their arrival and attached a detailed list of Emin Efendi’s and Çerkez Eşref Efendi’s activities.67

One can also trace the increasing intensity of the boycott and the local support for the movement in the incidents that occurred in Kayseri. Several persons prevented Muslim customers from entering the non-Muslim shops. Usually, the boycotters verbally warned the customers, but sometimes they also pulled Muslims from the shops by force. Such acts increased, and as a result policemen detained several aggressive boycotters and sent them to court. However, although the aggression was evident in these instances, the judge released the suspects. The governor of Ankara wrote to both the local prosecutor and the governor and warned them concerning the release of the suspects. The governor general feared that such a verdict would encourage similar acts in the near future. The local governors replied that these acts were not a crime according to Ottoman law and asked to receive a document that showed that these acts were a crime. The local governors also asked the Ministry of the Interior whether these aggressors should be send to court or not.68

The official journal of the Greek-Orthodox patriarchate, Eklissiastiki Alitheia, began to publicize these acts when they became prevalent in the Ottoman Empire. According to the reports of the Metropolitan Bishop of Ephesus, many watchmen were placed particularly in front of the doors of Christian butchers. He reported that boycotters had placed notices with insulting remarks on Christians in forty different places in Neo Kesaria (Niksar) and Parthenio. The peasants who came to the town to shop were pulled from Greek stores and taken to Turkish shops. He also wrote about a marching band in the bazaar that sang anthems and propagated the boycott. The committee collecting money for the navy also called citizens to take part in the Boycott Movement by playing drums.69

67 FO, 195/2458, No. 23, 26 February 1914, pp. 236-239. In one of the sessions of the International Commission in Valona (Avlonya, Vlore), the Albanian delegate Mufid Bey argued that the persecution of Albanians particularly in the province of Aydın had increased after the arrival of Rahmi Bey as governor and requested the intervention of the Great Powers. FO, 195/2458, No. 65, 3 February 1914, p. 242. (The original dispatch of the British delegate Harry H. Lamb was sent from Valona to London on 5 December 1913).

68 BOA, DH. KMS. 20/4, 1332.Ca.12.

69 “Ta Pathimata ton Omogenon,” (Atrocities incurred by the Nation), Eklissiastiki Alitheia, 8 March 1914.
Sokratis Prokopiou mentioned in his memoirs that Muslims were harassed in Uşak whenever they attempted to enter the shops of the Rum community. There were watchmen armed with sticks and knives. Over night Greek names were removed from shop signs. It was no longer only the Hellenes of Greece, but everything Greek that openly became a target for the Boycott Movement. Even the Greek alphabet and the Greek national colors became a target.

The Armenian merchants of Bandırma also complained about the indifference of the local bureaucracy regarding their complaints and grievances about the boycotters. The telegram that they sent to the Ministry of the Interior was signed by 41 persons. They asserted that it was almost impossible to pursue their business and pay their taxes under such circumstances; it was only a matter of time until they had to close down their shops. They appealed to the Grand Vizier for help, stating that they were the “uncoupled sons” (evlad-i gayr-i müfark) of the Ottoman fatherland.

The merchants’ situation did not change, since they sent another telegram to the government, this time with 46 signatures. They claimed that, although they were among the most loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims had been provoked against them. They complained about the following: boycotters beating and injuring Muslims who wanted to buy from Armenian shops, pouring petroleum on Armenian merchandise, and destroying Armenian goods. Several Muslim customers had been forced to return what they had bought. The telegram also emphasized that the boycotters walked up and down in front of Armenian stores and warned “poor people” in advance that “henceforth, goods were to be purchased from Muslim merchants.” The merchants claimed that they had suffered great losses in the past three months and repeated that the local bureaucracy took no notice of their complaints. This time, the Armenian merchants and tradesmen requested at least precautionary measures against the boycotters’ attacks on their businesses. The situation of the Armenian merchants was deteriorating day by day; thus, they—who identified themselves as zavallı Ermeniler (poor Armenians)—expressed that they would be satisfied as long as the Boycott Movement’s worst offenses stopped.

71 BOA, DH. ID. 108-2/30, 1 Mart 1330 (14 Mart 1914).
72 BOA, DH. H., 70/2, 21 Mart 1330 (3 Nisan 1914).
These complaints regarding the Boycott Movement were not restricted to individual initiatives of non-Muslim merchant communities. The Armenian Patriarchate also conveyed the grievances, anxiety and fear of Armenian merchants to the Ottoman Government. The patriarchate, who had been informed by Armenian delegates (murahhas), wrote to the Ottoman Government on 16 March 1914, stating that Armenians had been boycotted and that there were many people picketing their shops. The customers of Armenian merchants were threatened by these aggressors, while the Boycott Movement grew due to the government’s inactivity. The provocation against Armenians undermined the unity of the different elements of the Ottoman Empire. This is why the patriarchate urged the government to take action immediately.73

As was the case in previous boycotts, many foreign merchants also suffered economically. For instance, a ship of Marmara Express, which belonged to a French company, was not able to unload its cargo and land its passengers in the port of Bandırma. The government sent a decree to the local governors and wanted them to investigate if there had occurred any incidents against non-Muslims. The government ordered the local bureaucrats not to permit such aggression. The government also underlined that the boycotting of ships belonging to the Great Powers was not permissible and should be banned because of potential diplomatic and political problems.74 Therefore, one may claim that the government’s priority government was not to protect its non-Muslim subjects, but foreign powers.

Nevertheless, the government’s policy also differed towards various foreign countries. The Greek Foreign Ministry stated in its dispatch to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry that Greek ships arriving from Chios were blocked in Ottoman ports due to the plague epidemic on the island. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Ministry of the Interior whether these claims were true since Ottoman, French and Italian ships were freely sailing between the island and the Ottoman land.75 The governor-general of the province of Aydın, Rahmi Bey, confirmed that the passengers

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73 BOA, DH. HMŞ., 14/77, 3 Mart 1330 (16 Mart 1914). The patriarchate sent this note to the government only two days after the Armenian merchants of Bandırma had sent their telegram.

74 BOA, DH. ŞFR. 40/86, 12 Nisan 1330 (25 Nisan 1914) (from the government to the governor [mutasarrif] of Karesi).

75 BOA, DH. KMS. 23/46, 21 Mayıs 330 (3 Haziran 1914) (from the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of the Interior).
of ships arriving from Chios were not permitted to land due to the plague epidemic, as a precautionary policy. Rahmi Bey wrote that the ban had been removed a short while before and that there was no longer a particular ban for Greek ships arriving in his province.76

It was not only the Armenians and Greeks who suffered from the Boycott Movement, but also the Bulgarians. The rather effective application of the boycott forced the ambassador of Bulgaria to complain to the Sublime Porte. The Bulgarian embassy informed the Ottoman government that the boycott against Greeks had started to include Bulgarians. The embassy also attached a list of Bulgarian merchants who had received damage because of the Boycott Movement.77

As a result, the Ministry of the Interior wrote to the provinces where the Boycott Movement was particularly strong, requesting the governors to investigate the situation and, if Bulgarians had really been affected, to prevent further damage.78 This telegram of the Ministry of the Interior was sent to İzmit, Hûdavendigar, Canik, Karesi, Kala-i Sultaniye, Bolu, Aydin and to the Minister of the Interior, Talat Bey, who was in Manisa at the time.79 Talat Bey was on a trip through Thrace and Western Anatolia in order to deal with the rising social tension among the different communities. In these almost identical telegrams, the Ministry of the Interior wanted governors to protect the Bulgarian merchants mentioned by name from the Boycott Movement. The governors replied to this telegram by submitting information regarding the Bulgarian merchants. Most of them claimed that there were not many Bulgarian merchants and that there was no boycott against Bulgarians. Several governors also sent information concerning the mentioned Bulgarian merchants.80

This correspondence regarding the boycotting of Bulgarian merchants

76 BOA, DH. KMS. 23/46, 2 Haziran 1330 (15 Haziran 1914) (from the province of Aydin to the Ministry of the Interior).
77 BOA, KMS. 23/53, 1 Haziran 1330 (14 Haziran 1914).
78 BOA, DH. ŞFR. 42/8, 1 Haziran 1330 (15 Haziran 1914); BOA. DH. ŞFR. 42/30, 3 Haziran 1330 (17 Haziran 1914).
79 BOA, DH. ŞFR. 42/34, 3 Haziran 1330 (17 Haziran 1914); BOA. DH. ŞFR. 42/35, 3 Haziran 1330 (17 Haziran 1914); BOA. DH. ŞFR. 42/33, 3 Haziran 1330 (17 Haziran 1914); BOA. DH. ŞFR. 42/38, 3 Haziran 1330 (17 Haziran 1914); BOA. DH. ŞFR. 47/7, 1 Haziran 1330 (15 Haziran 1914); BOA, DH. ŞFR. 42/36, 3 Haziran 1330 (17 Haziran 1914); BOA, DH. ŞFR. 42/37, 3 Haziran 1330 (17 Haziran 1914); BOA, DH. ŞFR. 42/32, 3 Haziran 1330 (17 Haziran 1914).
80 For these answers from the governors, see: BOA, KMS., 23/53, 1332.Ş.4. They were received between 17 and 27 June 1914.

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reveals that the bureaucracy took the boycott of Ottoman Greeks and Greeks in general as granted. The orders sent from the capital prohibited the boycotting of particular communities or nationalities, but not boycotting in general. It was only at the beginning of July 1914 that such orders were sent to the provinces, only after the movement reached its peak point. Compared to the boycott against other non-Muslim communities, the one against the Bulgarians was limited, since there were not many in the Ottoman Empire. However, the boycott against them indicates that after 1913 the Boycott Movement targeted all non-Muslims.

As the relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims deteriorated, an International Commission of Inquiry was formed and travelled throughout Western Anatolia, following the Minister of the Interior, Talat Bey. The commission, which consisted of British, French, Austrian, Russian, Italian and German members, set out on 20 June 1914 and concluded its travels on 11 July 1914. The report of the British member of the commission, Consul Matthews, provided detailed information regarding the anti-Greek movement in Asia Minor. In villages and small towns, the primary outcome of the movement was the migration of Greeks en masse to the larger towns and cities. There appeared dozens of reports concerning the assault of Muslims on non-Muslim villages or neighborhoods. This created significant problems in terms of housing and providing the livelihood of these non-Muslims. Many Greeks migrated from the towns near the western coastline to the Aegean Islands, such as Lesbos, Samos and Chios. Particularly after February 1914, panic occurred among the Greek community; this was echoed in the correspondence of the Greek Foreign Ministry. Some of the Greeks also com-

81 BOA, KMS, 23/53, 1332.5.4. The names of the Bulgarian merchants in Asia Minor who were boycotted were as follows. “Noms des négociants bulgares en Asie mineure 1-Stephan N. Skotchcheff Abaci a Ismit, 2- Nanu M. Metchkaruff & Co. Abaci a Ismit, 3- Spasse Hadji Rousseff Abaci a Ismit, 4- Peitcho Grudeff Abaci a Ismit, 5-Frieres Vassileff Abaci a Brousse, 6- Dimitre Nentchoff Abaci a Brousse, 7- Stoyan Kimdikoff Abaci a Brousse, 8- Petko Sivrieff Abaci a Brousse, 9- Simson Maounoff Abaci a Brousse, 10- Athanas Kourdalieff Abaci a Guemlik, 11- Ivan Soungaroff Abaci a Guemlik, 12- Christo Doundoff Abaci a Guemlik, 13- Kiro Vassilkoff Abaci a Yalova (Kourie), 14- Kosta Chocheff Abaci a Yalova (Kourie), 15- Fieres Sava Stefanovi Abaci a Yalova (Kourie), 16- Kiro Panaitoff Abaci a Isnik, 17- Freres Toromanoff Abaci a Bergama, 18- “ Abaci a Dikili (Didim), 19- Rachko Slataroff Abaci a Bourhanie, 20- Milu Jv. Georghieff Abaci a Edremid, 21- Christo Sazaroff Abaci a Esine, 22- Niagol Filchoff Abaci a Mihalitch, 23- Christo Nikoloff Abaci a Kermasli, 24- Andon Nikoloff Abaci a Kermasli, 25- Stoyan Noutchoff Abaci a Bolou, 26- Stoyan Nikoloff Abaci a Bogtcha-Chehir, 27- Ivan Popoff & fils Abaci a Samsoun, 28- Dimitre Sieffec Abaci a Eski-Chehir.”
explained about the Greek consuls whose efforts were ineffective vis-à-vis this catastrophe. M. Konstantinidis wrote directly to Venizelos to lodge a complaint against the Greek ambassador and demanded help.  

The Ottoman officers claimed that the emigration of Ottoman Greeks was the result of active Hellenic propaganda. They referred to propaganda documents such as Greek maps, which, according to them, had provoked the mass migration of Greeks to Greece. For instance, a müdür by the name of Salim Efendi informed the British consul Matthews in Tri-lye (Zeytinbağı/Mudanya) that they not long ago had arrested a Greek reserve officer engaged in propaganda activities. By contrast, the notables of the Greek community claimed that Muslim gangs were attacking their villages and driving off their cattle, which brought about the exodus of the Greeks. Reports of murder and rape were not common, but looting was widespread according to these claims. There were also rumors of the killing of Greeks in order to attract the attention of the international public to the problems of non-Muslims. For instance, there were reports that several Greeks, including a priest, had been killed in Gürüklü (around Mihaliç – Karacabey/ Bursa). When the British consul reached the village, he found out that no one had been killed, but that the village had been plundered.  

Although unknot very common, there did occur murders and rape in Anatolia. For instance, the British consul saw the corpses of Greeks in Başıköy/Bursa. Also, people had been shot and injured, and several women raped there. The gangs that had attacked the village consisted of Muslims of the region whom the village inhabitants knew. They argued that the aggressors were Circassians and Gypsies. The inhabitants of Başıköy and other like villages began to depend for their subsistence on the aid and charities of Greeks living in larger towns. According to the report, a significant number of Greeks in villages such as Çatalağil, Ekisjeh(?), and Uluabad had left their villages. (Similarly, the Greeks of Seyrekköy, Gerenköy and Uluçak now lived as refugees in Menemen.) The British vice-consul in the Dardanelles, Palmer, stated that there were 2,000 refugees in Erenköy. Their position was not improving, and they were entire-

82 AYE, A21a, 1914, Istanbul, 13 March 1914.
84 Ibid., p. 516.
85 Ibid., p. 521.
ly dependent on the help of their community since they had lost all their possessions on the way.\textsuperscript{86}

The governor of Mihaliç, Cemil Bey, claimed that the corpses that Matthews had seen belonged to two Greeks who had committed suicide. The public prosecutor stated that ten Muslims had already been arrested and reported to Matthews that in Başköy six Greeks had been killed, one wounded, and two had committed suicide. Also, nine Muslims had been killed in the clashes there. Yet, these Muslims were from different villages. This fact indicates that they were attacking the village.\textsuperscript{87} The governor left Mihaliç for Kurşunlu where two Greeks had been killed, in order to hold an inquiry.

The engineer of a mill told Matthews that the raids on Greek villages were organized by the commandant of the gendarmerie, Captain Abdulkadir. He claimed that Abdulkadir received the larger share of the plundered goods and possessions. The public prosecutor and an army captain by the name of Alibeyzade Raşid Bey (of Circassian origin) also played a significant role in the looting. Raşit Bey was told to collect the sheep from the plundered villages in Emreköy. The engineer argued that the pillaging had been done by gangs of Muslims whose members were natives of the region.\textsuperscript{88} In Foça and Yenifoça, the commission observed the marks of axes on the doors of buildings; as far as possible, these were removed under the control of Hacim Bey (the police chief of Smyrna). As a result of these violent incidents, the public prosecutor Şukrü Bey informed the commission that Giritli Ferid Efendi (the governor of Foça), Mehmed Efendi (the local commander of the gendarmerie), Talat Bey (the commander of the gendarmerie in Menemen), and Cafer Efendi had been arrested and sent to be court martialled.\textsuperscript{89} On the other hand, officers such as Mehmet Efendi, the governor of Soma, whom the British consul and the Greeks considered a protector of Christians, was dismissed; at the same time, Muslim refugees were settled in Greek houses.\textsuperscript{90}

As in many coastal towns, all the Greek residents of Foça and Yenifoça had already left their town and escaped to the islands close to the main-

\textsuperscript{86} FO, 195/2458, No. 6, 6 June 1914, p. 383.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p. 520.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 523-524.
\textsuperscript{90} FO, 195/2458, No. 84, 11 July 1914, p. 484 (report from 6 July 1914).
land. The Greek consul repeated the often-mentioned claim of Turkish officers that the Greeks were forced to sign a declaration stating that they were leaving the country on their own will and that they would not make any claims on their possessions.\textsuperscript{91} Yet, there were also cases standing in stark contrast to such attitudes. The Greeks of Menemen informed the international commission that the Muslims of Çukurköy had refused to take part in the attack on Seyrekköy, thanks to the efforts of the imam of the village.\textsuperscript{92} The British consul attached to his report a document for a Greek worker, Kosta from Urla, who was working on the construction of the macadam road of Çeşme. The document was addressed to the leaders of the gangs and soldiers in the area and asked them not to prevent his passage to Urla. This document, signed by Karabinazade Ali, indicates that the gangs and soldiers controlled the roads.\textsuperscript{93} According to the Greek consul, houses and shops were pillaged in May, and Kato Pan-oiya was totally devastated. The Christians in Urla and Çeşme thought of migrating since they had heard that there were more muhacirs coming to their district.\textsuperscript{94} The British reports state that particularly in late May and June of 1914 there occurred looting, expropriation and injury against the local Greeks; therefore, in the Greeks fled Western Anatolia.\textsuperscript{95}

The anti-Greek movement appeared in the form of boycotting in larger towns such as Bursa, Manisa, Bandırma, Aydın, Smyrna, Ödemiş, Kışık, Aziziye, Nazilli, Bayındır, Tire, and Soma. The fundamental trait of the boycott was the picketing of stores and shops. The mobilization of the Muslim public for the Boycott Movement and for Turkish nationalism in general occurred after the Balkan Wars. Even Muslim women started to play a role on the streets in the course of Boycott Movement. As mentioned above, the boycott pamphlets also called Muslim women to take action. On 4 May 1914, a Muslim woman with her children denounced a group of Greek youngsters singing in Greek. The Greek consul asserted that they were singing Smyrniot songs; however, the Muslim woman complained about them to the police because they might have sung the Greek national anthem or songs in the name of King Konstantin. One of the de-

\textsuperscript{91} AYE, A21a, 1914, No. 15479, Midilli, 22 May 1914.
\textsuperscript{93} FO, 195/2458, No. 3, 2 July 1914, p. 380 (a brief note attached to this file). The date on the note of Karabinazade is 28 Mayys 330 (10 June 1914).
\textsuperscript{94} AYE, A21a, 1914, Urla, No. 15685, 23 May 1914.
\textsuperscript{95} FO, 195/2458, No. 81, 7 July 1914, pp. 436-451.
bated issues of the day was the singing of Greek national songs, praising the King of Greece and revealing the singer’s loyalty to Greece. Therefore, the youngsters were detained by the police.\footnote{AYE, A21a, 1914, No.? 4 May 1914.} On 5 May, the watchmen on the picket line were replaced by watchwomen. Muslim women started to take part in the Boycott Movement by preventing customers from entering Christian shops around the mosque of Hisar in Smyrna.\footnote{AYE, A21a, 1914, No.? 5 May 1914.}

Non-Muslims complained mainly to the local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress and the local authorities. They pointed out as perpetrators in particular the Circassians who had played a role in the boycotting on the street. For instance, on 11 June 1914 in Bursa they broke the windows of Greek shops and beat the owners. The goods in the stores were also destroyed. Afterwards, Greek shops remained closed. It was just before the arrival of the international commission that the police wanted the Greeks to reopen their business. However, a great majority of Greeks refused to do so. Therefore, the British consul Matthews could observe the outcome of the Boycott Movement in Bursa.\footnote{FO. 195/2458, File of “Anti-Christian Boycott,” (former reference 306/3080), Enclosure No. 1 (report on the tour in the district of Brusa and Smyrna), p. 515.} Since there were cases of emigration and clashes between different communities, the actual boycotting was considered rather calm after May 1914. For instance, the report of the commission stated that “no serious incidents had occurred but a strict boycott” in Manisa. For Bandırma, it was reported that “there had been a panic at Panderma during the preceding 10 days but nothing serious had occurred. A boycott was being enforced against the Greeks.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 520-521.} The boycott rapidly succeeded in interior regions such as Simav, where all Greek shops had already closed down due to the severity of the Boycott Movement on 27 June 1914.\footnote{FO, 195/2458, No. 81, 7 July 1914 (the date of the report is 27 June 1914), p. 442.} The boycott actions were always accompanied by violence. It was reported that in Torbalı/Smyrna the agents of the Boycott Committee carried out the boycott by means of violence and intimidation. The public prosecutor, Şükru Bey, ordered the arrest of Mehmet and Bilal Usta, who were considered responsible for the violence. They were sent to be court martialled in Smyrna.\footnote{FO, 195/2458, File of “Anti-Christian Boycott,” (former reference 306/3080), Enclosure No. 1 (report on the tour in the districts of Brusa and Smyrna), p. 525.} Even in major cities such as Istanbul there appeared armed gangs who prevented...
customers from entering Greek stores. A Greek report claimed that 200 
younger armed with knives prevented Muslims from entering Greek 
shops.\textsuperscript{102} The Greek consul in Ayvalık stated that the owners of the Greek 
shops began to refuse serving Muslim customers themselves in Edremit, 
in order to avoid trouble.\textsuperscript{103}

The violence resulting from the boycott was the logical outcome of 
the regulations of the movement. As it is happened in Aziziye/Smyr-
na, the boycotters urged Muslims not to buy from Greeks. This demand 
turned into a ban, and Greeks were no longer allowed to sell their pro-
ducts in neighboring Muslim villages. When a Greek gardener refused to 
comply, he was beaten and his arm broken. The boycott evolved along 
similar lines in different villages and in the towns of the region, such as 
Değirmencik, Ayasoluk (Selçuk), and Karapınar. It was not only Greeks 
who were beaten, if they did not adhere to the rules, but also Muslims. 
A Muslim in Karapınar who bought from a Greek shop was beaten and 
petroleum poured on his purchases. One person threw a stone into the 
compartment of the train in which the members of the commission of in-
quiry were sitting while they travelled from Karapınar to Köşk. Şükrü Bey 
who travelled with them sent a telegram and informed the authorities in 
Karapınar about the incident from the next station.\textsuperscript{104}

In Köşk/Aydın, the boycott was provoked by posters depicting Greek 
cruelties in Macedonia. Two active members of the Boycott Commit-
tee had arrived in the town from Smyrna, but boycotting was not only 
restricted to their activities. The mobilization of the people and the ac-
tions of the local notables in the towns also played a significant role in 
the Boycott Movement. For instance, in Akça (Söke) the orange trees of 
the Greek Yovan were cut down. The gardener Simeon in Akça also com-
plained that his trees had been cut down and that his Muslim neighbors 
cut off his water supply. The house of Yorghi Themopoulo was burned 
and his property looted by the locals. Greeks could no longer to go their 
fields. Although the Greek stores had remained open, Muslims were pre-
vented from entering. Similarly, the leader of the boycott in Nazilli was 
at the same time the police commissar and land assessor from Istanbul. 
In June, notices were distributed to the Greek quarters, advising them to

\textsuperscript{102} AYE, A21a, 1914, Pera, No. 16153, 27 May 1914.
\textsuperscript{103} AYE, A21a, 1914, Ayvalık, No. 8443, 16 March 1914.
\textsuperscript{104} FO, 195/2458, File of “Anti-Christian Boycott,” (former reference 306/3080), Enclosure 
leave the town. If not, then great misfortune would befall them. The notice was signed by “The Nation.”

It was the kadi Ahmet Efendi, who also served as the treasurer of the town, who proclaimed and triggered the boycott in Bayındır. A meeting in the club of the Committee of Union and Progress also played its part in the making of the movement there. In Tire, the boycotters’ leasers were the notables of the district: Mehmet Bey, Tokatlıoğlu Ismail Efendi, Derebaşlı Molla Mehmet and Hacı Ramiz Bey. The report of the commission underlined the fact that they were all natives of Tire and had good relationship with the governor of the town, Muhtar Bey. Another report stated that Tokatlıoğlu, a Cretan immigrant, had attacked Muslim workers who were employed by Greeks. It was also the notables who gathered the Muslims in the mosque and incited them against the Christians in Kula, according to report of the Greek consul.

Prokopouli writes in his memoir that Deli Ahmet (Ahmet the Mad), the leader of the boycott in Uşak, made a great fortune thanks to the movement. Dr. Nazım and the governor-general Rahmi Bey also visited him when they came to Uşak. They called him Ağa (chief), in reference to the famous boycott leader Kerim Ağa. Deli Ahmet exploited the opportunity provided by this network and the Boycott Movement and entered the carpet business.

A lawyer, Refik Bey, played a crucial role in the emergence of the boycott in Ödemiş. He gave a speech before the government office (konak) of the town and urged Muslims to take revenge on the local Greeks for the crimes of their co-religionist in Macedonia. The governor of the town was also present during the speech. A gang of Muslims, whose chief was Sarıköylü Hasan Efendi, several times had attacked Greeks, according to the complaints of the Greek priest of Ödemiş, Papa Nicola. Sarıköylü Hasan Efendi was arrested, but managed to escape. Apart from him, Fahri Efendi, a member of the Administrative Council of Ödemiş and a former police commissar, were among the leaders of the Boycott Movement. In the region around Ödemiş and Sarayköy, three more persons

\[105\] Ibid., p. 527.
\[106\] Ibid., p. 529.
\[107\] FO, 195/2458, No. 81, 7 July 1914 (date of the report is 25 June 1914), p. 438.
\[108\] AYE, A21a, 1914, No. 5667, 27 February 1914 (article on Kula).
appeared as gang leaders. In a report of the British Acting Consul General Heathcote Smith, they were described as brigands: Ödemişli Ömer, Giritli Hüseyin, and Büyük Emin Mustafa. The Greek consul on the island of Meis (Kastelorizo) informed his ministry that the shops of the Christians in Asia Minor were closed down. The ties between the island and main land had been cut due to the boycotting activities. However, since Meis was a small island, it was unable to sustain itself. The consul named several persons who played active roles in the Boycott Movement in the region: Kubrukçuoğlu Süleyman, Nail Efendi (the forest watchman), Çolak Hasan, Giritli Ali, Gökçe Mehmet, Aptullah Efendi, Nazmi Sarıoğlu, and Hasan Kurdaroğlu. Their roles, their names, and their occupations should lead one to the discussion of agency within the Boycott Movement.

4.5. Banditry and Agency in the Boycott Movement

As the violence related to the boycott increased, practices of banditry were also employed by the boycotters. Banditry had a significant tradition, particularly in Asia Minor. In 1914, the boycotters’ actions extended beyond the outskirts of towns, and violent acts employed in the cities (such as picketing and intimidation) changed. As they were carried to the countryside, these actions evolved into banditry. The tradition of banditry and its symbols were there and available for the boycotters to employ as strategies. Therefore, the Boycott Movement started to make use of an existing repertoire of bandit-like actions. Boycotters appeared with guns or rifles and covered their faces. No longer did they only force the merchants’ agents to return the merchandise, but they ruined it or left it behind to be looted. Therefore, in 1914 boycotters turned into bandit characters and were also called başbozuk (irregulars), a term generally used for the brigands, even in British documents.

Several state officers seized the properties of non-Muslims, and so did local notables who probably had been rivals of those who had left. The ownerless estates were generally taken over by thousands of incoming

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both Fahri Bey and Sarıköylü Hasan were once again mentioned because of their activities in Ödemiş: FO, 195/2458, No. 84, 11 July 1914, p. 471.

111 FO, 195/2458, No. 81, 7 July 1914 (date of the report is 25 June 1914), p. 439.

112 AYE, A21a, 1914, Kastelorizo, No. 2955, 1 February 1914.

113 For instance, see: FO, 195/2458, No. 84, 11 July 1914, p. 471.
Muslim refugees from the lost territories. In one of the often-mentioned incidents, the Muslim Cretan Army led a Muslim muhacir to the house of Tombalacı Evanghelos in Karantina and ordered him to take possession. According to the British report, the Muslim immigrant did so. These acts resembled instances of social banditry, although there were conducted within a nationalist framework. Yet, these banditry-like actions were also based on personal interests. For instance, on the same day as the house of Tombalacı Evanghelos was transferred to a Muslim, in the same town the wife and mother of Nicolas Arvaniti were beaten, and their jewelry stolen.114

It was not only in the reports of the foreign consuls or the Ottoman state’s correspondence that instances of violence found mention. In his book on the Turkish nationalist movement in Western Asia Minor, the nationalist historian Nurdoğan Taçalan has claimed that the boycott was not sufficient for eliminating non-Muslims from Turkey. Therefore, nationalist organizations started to terrorize non-Muslims and tried to force them to leave the country. He underlined the activities of Kuşçubaşı Eşref who organized Turkish gangs and attacked Greek villages, particularly around Söke. According to Taçalan, Turks were doing the same as the Greeks had done to Muslims in Macedonia. They had expelled Muslims to the Anatolia, and Turkish nationalists now made room for the newcomers. Therefore, for him boycotting and deportation are two faces of the same coin and were the last resort in the struggle of the Turkish nation for survival in Asia Minor.115 Taçalan has claimed that the deportation of the Greeks was organized by a particular committee comprised of Pertev [Demirhan], Cafer Tayyar [Eğilmez], and Mahmut Celal [Bayar]. The Rums of Smyrna were not disturbed, since they were under the protections of the Great Powers, but other Rums in provincial towns were harassed by various means.116

The agency in the Boycott Movement was not clear, even for the victims and the foreign observers. Non-Muslims and foreign consuls were complaining and blaming the Committee of Union Progress and its local members for the Boycott Movement and the concurrent violent acts. However, they were not certain in their assertions. The report of the British consul

114  FO, 195/2458, No. 84, 11 July 1914, p. 480.
115  Nurdoğan Taçalan, Ege'de Kurtuluş Savaşı Başlarken, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1971), 69-71.
116  Ibid., pp. 72-73.
Matthews—who with an international commission had travelled to the villages, towns and cities of Western Anatolia for twenty days—referred to the suggestions of German officers who found the presence of Greeks on the seacoast of Asia Minor dangerous and advised their expulsion. Matthews claimed that this advice removed the last hesitations of the government. However, the expulsion of Greeks was not directly ordered by the central government, but only approved. According to him, the government wanted to get rid of the Greeks only by means of intimidation, but not violence or bloodshed. The governor-generals of Bursa and Smyrna were active in the anti-Greek movement, but their orders were enthusiastically followed by the minor officers, civil, military and semi-military. In a report to the British Foreign Minister Edward Grey, the British ambassador L. Mallet claimed that he had the impression that the Grand Vizier Said Halim Paşa and the Minister of Naval Affairs Cemal Paşa were ignorant of the actions against the local Greeks, particularly the incidents that occurred in areas around Istanbul, such as Pyrgos (Kemerburgaz). The Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate accused the Ottoman government and state officers for not preventing the Boycott Movement and encouraging emigration. Segments of the bureaucracy and the Turkish press were inciting illiterate people against the Greeks. Therefore, the patriarchate blamed the government, the state officers and the people for various reasons. Another article claimed that the mobilized people belonged to the lowest classes who had turned into fanatics.

The British consul in Edirne reported that the governor-general of the province and the Minister of the Interior had had a conversation via telegraph on the issue of Greek emigration. The Minister of the Interior was said to instruct the governor-general to stop the molestation and encourage the emigration of Greeks. Thanks to these instructions and their execution by the local governors, such as the mutasarrif of Kirkkiile (Kirklareli), the movement for a while seemed to come to an end. However, the entire Greek population of Vize had already emigrated at that point, and there still were reports about the killing of Greeks. In his

118 FO, 195/2458, No. 402, 2 June 1914, p. 371.
119 “Epi to Neo Takrrio,” (On the New Memorandum), Ekklesiastiki Alitheia, 30 June 1914.
120 It should be highlighted that Ekklesiastiki Alitheia had an elitist world view. “To Zitima ka i Katastasis,” Ekklesiastiki Alitheia, 15 March 1914.
121 FO, 195/2458, No. 24, 4 May 1914, p. 323.
quarterly report on the province of Edirne one month earlier, he had reported that the government had been willing to create an entirely Muslim population in this region. This was a result of the experience they had had in the Balkan Wars.\footnote{122}{FO, 195/2456, No. 17, 31 March 1914, pp. 515, 517.}

The protest and the flow of Greeks to Greece reached such an extent that the Minister of the Interior, Talat Bey, had to travel to Thrace and Western Anatolia. Cavit Bey, the Minister of Finance, who stood in for Talat Bey in the capital made a statement to the newspaper Tan and claimed that it was the mass emigration of Muslims from Macedonia that had caused problems. He told that 24,400 people had immigrated from Salonica to Thrace between 17 March and 10 May 1914. He asserted that, had these people not been forced to leave their land, nothing would have happened in the Ottoman Empire. The native population had not upset the order anywhere in the empire, according to Cavit Bey. For him, the ultimate goal of Talat Bey’s visit was to prevent any clashes between immigrant Muslims and native Greeks.\footnote{123}{“Cavit Bey’in Beyanatı,” Ikdam, 17 June 1914, Wednesday, p. 2.}

The violence against Greeks increased in a very short time and forced the government to take action against the chaos resulting from the anti-Greek movement. Talat Bey even visited the small towns and villages located on his travel route. In each settlement, he addressed the people and tried to inculcate trust in the Greeks. For instance, he spoke at a train station to the people waiting for a train to leave the town permanently. Talat Bey convinced them to stay and return to their houses.\footnote{124}{“Muhaceret Meselesi, Talat Bey’in Seyahati,” Ikdam, 16 June 1914, Tuesday, p. 2.} However, the same Talat Bey wrote to Tekirdağ and immediately wanted the governor to deport to Greece the Greek peasants who were crowded in the port.\footnote{125}{BOA, DH. SFR. 40/11, 1 Nisan 1330 (14 April 1914). Taner Akçam also quotes the document: Taner Akçam, ‘Ermeni Meselesi Halâlümustur’ Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Savaş Yıllarında Ermenilere Yönelik Politikalara, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayımları, 2008), pp. 88-89.} The most active centers of the Boycott Movement coincided with the areas from where Greeks emigrated en masse. First, the boycott was strictest in Smyrna and the town in its hinterland, such as Menemen, Foça, Urla, Bergama and Ulucak. Bithynia and Mysia, to the south of the Marmara Sea, were the second center of the Boycott Movement. Third was Thrace.

Due to the mass emigration of Greeks, many small towns were depopulated in a very short time. The Ottoman government sent a decree to the
province of Aydıner at the end of July 1914 and wanted the governor-general to stop the Boycott Movement against the Greeks to prevent their emigration. The political situation and the ceaseless appeals of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate put pressure on the government. Yet, the governor-general of the province of Aydıner, Rahmi Bey, replied to the Ministry of the Interior that it was impossible to boycott Greeks since there were no Greeks left in Ayazmenci.⁷⁶

During his travels, Talat Bey also dealt with the incidents that occurred while he was on the road. The Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate sent a telegram to report that Ayvalık was burning. An investigation showed that in one of the villages of Ayvalık four houses were burnt in one night. The owners of the houses and the remaining population decided to emigrate, but were persuaded to stay. The Greeks of Burhaniye were resettled in their town and assured their security. The Ottoman officers brought the Metropolitan Bishop of Karşıyaka with them to a train station in order to convince the Greeks not to leave the country.⁷⁷

The patriarchate and the church network in the Ottoman Empire also tried to influence social and political developments. Due to the strained political and social atmosphere and the Boycott Movement of the spring of 1914, the relationship between Muslims and the Greek-Orthodox community deteriorated. This culminated in the crisis between the Unionists and the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate. The patriarchate decided to shut down the churches and suspended education in the Greek schools, arguing that the Greek population was under risk. Another reaction of the Greek population was the migration of Greeks from small settlements to bigger towns and cities. Greeks firstly fled from villages to cities such as Istanbul and Smyrna and then emigrated to Greece. This was also an opportunity to attract the attention of the Ottoman government and the international public to the state of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire.

The inclination of Greeks to leave their homes was not always directly related to the Boycott Movement. The Boycott Movement was just a part and parcel of a general political and social atmosphere. It is not a coincidence that one encounters news about the emigration of Greeks in the Ottoman press at the time when the boycott was in its initial phase.⁷⁸

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126 BOA, DH. EUM.VRK. 13/22, 19 Temmuz 1330 (1 Agustos 1914).
128 For an example of news about the Greeks who emigrated first from Babaeski to Istanbul and then to Salonica, see: “Rum Muhacirleri,” İkdam, 8 February 1914, Sunday, p. 4.
The Greek-Orthodox Patriarch and the two administrative bodies of the Greek community, the Holy Synod and the National Permanent Mixed Council, convened to take action regarding the “critical situation that the nation faced.” The patriarchate submitted an official report to the constitutional government. The content and the message of the report were summarized in the official journal of the patriarchate. It was the duty of the constitutional government to defend the rights of its subjects. According to the patriarchate, the “so-called economical independence of the Turkish people which demands a so-called spontaneous awakening” was just an alibi, a “demagogical claim.” Such an awakening and salvation could not be realized by destroying and robbing the Greek nation. Such an independency was not attainable by placing armed guards in front of Greek stores, forcing Greeks to leave the country, and distributing pamphlets that preached hatred against the Greek-Orthodox community. Economic salvation may come only as a result of free trade and free economic activities. The report stated that Greeks were not against the development and commercial progress of the Turkish people, but the violence, lawlessness and mistreatment targeting them. The report announced that, as the “strongest native element” of the country who “had historical rights, the Greek-Orthodox community would not permit this transgression,” 129

The Greek-Orthodox Patriarch visited the Minister of the Interior, Talat Bey, together with his commission and issued a memorandum. Talat Bey promised them to take preventive measures. The delegation then visited the Minister of Justice, Ibrahim Bey. Although he was affirmed the content of the memorandum, he regarded the protest expressed in it as improper. This is why he did not accept the memorandum, and why the patriarchate did not insist on the issue. However, the two administrative bodies of the Greek-Orthodox community convened and decided to cut their relationship with the Ministry of Justice. The patriarchate informed the grand vizier about their decision. 130 However, in the end the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch and the commission visited both the grand vizier and the Minister of Justice and received reassurance regarding the safety of the Greek nation. 131

129 “I Thesis tou Omogenous Sticheiou,” (The State the Nation), Ekklesiastiki Alithea, 1 March 1914.

130 “Apofaseis kai Energiai ton Patriarchion,” (The Decisions and Activities of the Patriarchate), Ekklesiastiki Alithea, 1 March 1914.

In order to persuade the Greeks to stay in the Ottoman Empire, the government tried to prove its sincerity in maintaining security. For instance, on 16 June 1914 more than forty Muslims were detained. Moreover, the governor of Ayvalık was dismissed from his post due to his incompetence.\footnote{“Ayvalık Kaymakamının Azlı,” \textit{Ilkdam}, 17 June 1914, Wednesday, p. 2.} One day later, the precautionary measures of the Ottoman government were extended. The newspaper \textit{Ilkdam} considered these measures a challenge to those who acted against Greeks. The governors of Foça, Ayvalık and Biga, the administrators of the districts of Gōmez and Barbaros and the gendarmerie captain of Çeşme were removed from their offices. Furthermore, two military officers and a hundred peasants were sent to the court of martial law (\textit{divan-i harb-i ᵬrфи}). The newspapers \textit{Anadolu}, \textit{Köylü} and \textit{Lareforum} were suspended due to their provocative publication regarding the immigration of Muslims.\footnote{“Muhaceret Meselesi,” \textit{Ilkdam}, 18 June 1914, Thursday, p. 3.} However, the Ottoman government did not change its stance and continued to blame Greece for the disorder in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, in addition to punishing public officers, the government also submitted a memorandum to Greece, addressing Greek atrocities to Macedonian Muslims. According to the government, the main reason for these atrocities was the flow of Muslims into the Ottoman Empire.\footnote{“Yunan Mezalımı, Bab-ı Alının Muhtarları,” \textit{Ilkdam}, 18 June 1914, Thursday, p. 1.}

In the province of Aydın, Talat Bey who travelled with Governor-General Rahmi Bey gave orders to the local officers and admonished the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in the towns of Nazilli, Aydın, Söße, Tire and the like. In one of his speeches there, a non-Muslim interrupted him and complained about the boycott. In his reply to this complaint, Talat Bey warned the notables of the town that the boycott had a harmful impact on the economy of the country and wanted its end.\footnote{“Muhaceret Meselesi, Talat Bey’in Seyahati,” \textit{Ilkdam}, 20 June 1914, Saturday, p. 3.} Talat Bey returned to Istanbul on 27 June 1914.

However, the boycott was not lifted after Talat Bey had left the region. This is why the government kept sending orders to stop it. Moreover, the Minister of the Interior demanded the symbolic punishment of an aggressor as public example. He wrote to Rahmi Bey that it was evident from the report of the public inspector, Şäkrü Bey, that everybody knew about the suspension of the boycott. Therefore, the minister wanted the governor-general to execute capital punishment on an aggressor who had committed
a murder and to punish a few boycotters who had gone too far.\textsuperscript{136} The government sent similar telegrams to different provinces in order to prevent a continuation of the boycott. Such a telegram to Menteşef affirmed that governors should stop the boycott and also the emigration of the Greeks. The Vice-Police Inspector Kadri Efendi was dismissed from his post.\textsuperscript{137}

Many officers were removed from their offices since the government could not halt the Boycott Movement due to their support. For instance, the report sent to the governor of Lazistan stated that the guards of the regime and public officers had taken part in the picketing of Greek stores.\textsuperscript{138} However, similar orders by the government attest to the fact that these official precautions were not successful in stopping the boycott. For instance, a telegram sent again to the province of Aydın province and the governor-general reinforced that the continuation of the boycott was harming state interests as long as political negotiations were ongoing. The central government repeated its demand to threaten and advise those responsible for the Boycott Movement. It also underlined that some of the prominent members of the Boycott Movement should be punished. The government was quite desperate, and this was clearly reflected in its discourse. In the last telegram, the government wanted the governor to stop boycott by any means possible, “at least for the moment.”\textsuperscript{139}

It was not only to the province of Aydın that the government sent such orders, but also to districts such as Lazistan. The government told the governor of Lazistan that the Boycott Movement should first be relaxed and then completely stopped.\textsuperscript{140} Similar orders banning the boycott and punishing aggressors were also sent to the provinces of Edirne, Adana, and Hûdavendigar and the districts of Izmir, Bolu, Çatalca, Canik, Karesi and Kala-i Sultaniye.\textsuperscript{141} Yet, these telegrams were sent in vain, and this is why the Minister of the Interior sent orders again and again. On 14 July 1914, Talat Bey repeated his orders, emphasizing that the abolition of the boycott was in accord with state interests and that those who could not stop the movement would be dismissed.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{136} BOA, DH. ŞFR. 42/166, 18 Haziran 1330 (1 Temmuz 1914).
\textsuperscript{137} BOA, DH. ŞFR. 43/18, 20 Haziran 1330 (3 Temmuz 1914).
\textsuperscript{138} BOA, ŞFR. 42/173, 19 Haziran 1330 (2 Temmuz 1914).
\textsuperscript{139} BOA, DH. ŞFR. 42/198, 22 Haziran 1330 (5 Temmuz 1914).
\textsuperscript{140} BOA, DH. ŞFR. 42/208, 23 Haziran 1330 (6 Temmuz 1914).
\textsuperscript{141} BOA, DH. ŞFR. 42/199, 22 Haziran 1330 (5 Temmuz 1914).
\textsuperscript{142} BOA, DH. ŞFR. 43/12, 1 Temmuz 1330 (14 Temmuz 1914).
Yet, it should also be underlined that after the Balkan Wars the Committee of Union and Progress, and particularly Talat Bey, decided to clean the country from those who they thought had betrayed the empire. This claim was a strong statement, since it was made by Halil Menteşe, a prominent political figure in the Committee of Union and Progress and the president of the Ottoman parliament. Menteşe confirmed that Talat Bey had decided to eliminate the Bulgarians and Greeks. Yet, when it came to the Greeks, this was not easily accomplished, since the government was not in favor of a war with Greece. Therefore, the government and the Ottoman bureaucracy did not plan to intervene or take part in the deportation of Greeks from Thrace and Western Asia Minor. The Committee of Union and Progress and its network were to manage the mission. Halil Menteşe also argued that Talat Bey’s travels were arranged in order to convince the consuls of the Great Powers that the government was trying to calm the prevailing nationalist fever and to decrease the reaction of foreign consuls. It was claimed that the Greeks were leaving the country because the Balkan Wars had greatly disturbed them. As a result, the committees terrorized the native Greek population who could do nothing but flee from Anatolia, while Talat Bey and the governors acted as if they tried to stop their citizens. Halil Menteşe stated that 100,000 Greeks from Thrace and 200,000 Greeks from around Smyrna had left their homeland as a result of this policy before World War I. The governor-general of Edirne, Hacı Adil Bey, the governor-general of Aydın, Rahmi Bey, and Celal [Bayar] helped Talat Bey in this plan. Hacı Adil Bey was assassinated by a Bulgarian and Greek gang while inspecting the deportations, and his son was also killed in this attack.

This account reveals that the Unionists employed a double correspondence, both public and secret, in governing the empire. The official state correspondence gives the impression that the government was not involved in the deportation of non-Muslims and did not try to prevent the harassment by punishing the local bureaucrats. The pamphlet of Hüseyin Kazım, as mentioned above, was confiscated by the Administration of

143 The deportation of Greeks and Bulgarians occurred, because the flow of Muslim immigrants after 1912 brought about a land shortage in 1914. Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918), (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 184.

Public Security. At least, such an official statement was made publicly. However, memoirs of Unionists and Turkish nationalists, memoirs of victims, and documents from the archives of other states show a different picture. Yet, this should not lead us to a conspiracy theory of the sort claiming that the mission was executed by a group of nationalist komitadjis. On the contrary, these different accounts point to a social and political network and the social base of the Committee of Union and Progress. On the other hand, the mobilization of the Muslim public was not total and absolute. This is why victims were always blaming gangs, committees, and several prominent leaders of the national movement. For instance, Dimosthenis Stamatos underlined the fact that it was not the average Muslim population, but the boycotters who attacked them. It was the boycotters who provoked the Muslim mobilization. His and his family’s relationship with the Turks was good. His family sold tobacco and salt in Tatarti/Salihli, and most of their Muslim customers continued to buy from them. Those who wanted to remove Rums form the economy were the Committee of Union and Progress and the boycotters. Similarly, Prokopiou, who has been mentioned above, also claimed that the Muslim majority was against the boycott. Kiriakos Miçopoulos said that it was the immigrants who provoked the boycott of non-Muslims during which his family lost its possessions, particularly the flour factory, in Kermasti (today’s Mustafa Kemalpaşa/Bursa). Thanks to the operators and the foreman of the factory, who refused to work without their boss, the father of Miçopoulos, the family was able to return to their town.

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146 Taner Akçam has very clearly shown how this dual mechanism worked in the Aegean region and Thrace after the Balkan Wars during the deportation of the Greek population. He has considered these events as a preparation for the catastrophe that would happen during World War I. Taner Akçam, ‘Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmustur’, pp. 82-107.

147 Oral Tradition Archive LD 28, Center for Asia Minor Studies, Region: Sydia-Salihli, Village: Tatarti, Interview with Dimosthenis Stamatos.


149 “Kiriakos Miçopoulos’un Tanıklığı,” Oral Tradition Archive of the Center for Asia Minor Studies, in Göç: Rumlar’ın Anadolu’dan Meburi Ayrılışı (1919-1923), Ed. Herkül Milas (for Turkish translation), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp. 140-143. This account of Miçopoulos is valid for different reasons. First, it indicates that his father had a Turkish shareholder at the beginning. Therefore, Muslim merchants did invest in industry, even with non-Muslim partners. Second, the argument that the immigrants were employed in
This story is also based on a rigid differentiation of natives and the newcomers.

There were also high-ranking local bureaucrats who opposed the Boycott Movement. For instance, it was only the governor-general of the province of Adana who replied to the decree of the Ministry of the Interior, which was sent on 18 June 1914, together with a long and detailed report. Contrary to other Ottoman bureaucrats who were in favor of the Boycott Movement, the governor of Adana, Hakkı Bey, strongly criticized the movement. The governor replied to the decree of the government on the same day, which indicates that his reply was a reaction. He wrote that the boycott at first was very active in Adana for ten to fifteen days. That is to say, the boycott around Adana started only after it gained prominence in Western Anatolia. The boycott spread to different regions in the Ottoman Empire, but did not start simultaneously. Although the boycott commenced quite late, it became powerful over a very short period; as a result, the governor advised a total suppression of the movement. The governor revealed his discontent regarding the Boycott Movement and the boycotters with the terminology he employed in his report: “brainless,” “simple-minded,” “imprudent,” “injudicious,” and “lack control of their emotions.”¹⁵⁰ Hakkı Bey warned that boycotting was nothing but playing with a delicate weapon. It might have disastrous results for the country, which was in a financial and political crisis. According to the governor-general, the Ottoman Empire tried to heal the material and moral casualties caused by the Balkan Wars. Probably, he was annoyed about the interference of ordinary people in politics and state affairs. The autonomous character of the Boycott Movement provoked the state officers.

Hakkı Bey stated in his report that Adana was a region of farmers and that the buyers of their products were to a great extent non-Muslims. If these buyers stayed away because of the Boycott Movement, then the prices would collapse. As a result, the peasants and the treasury would lose in the process. Hakkı Bey asserted that the Boycott Movement could not succeed with empty words. The boycott forced weak and poor peasants to a fight against a strong enemy, a fight they would probably lose.

¹⁵⁰ BOA, DH. KMS., 25/29, 5 Haziran 1330, (18 Haziran 1914).
This argument was a typical response of the opponents of the Boycott Movement, since the weapon was generally utilized by the weak against the strong. Therefore, it is not surprising that the same argument was also recruited by a high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrat.

Another significant point in Hakki Bey’s report is his reference to a telegram that was sent from Smyrna to the merchants of Adana. This information indicates that the boycotters and Muslim merchants were connected by a communication network throughout the empire. It also reveals their organizational capabilities and reminds of the claims about the merchant Mehmed Rasim [Dokur] mentioned above. This is why the governor-general of the province of Adana stated that the precautionary measures implemented by him only could not put a stop to the boycott that harmed the interests anybody involved in industry and trade. These official measures should also affect other major boycott centers, such as Smyrna, in order to prevent the expansion of the movement. Hakki Bey repeated his intention not to tolerate the Boycott Movement in Adana in another dispatch to the Ottoman government. He also referred to his detailed report that he had sent in 18 June 1914.151

According to the memorandum mentioned above, the Muslim population in general was reluctant to cut their relationship with the Greeks. Therefore, it was the Committee of Union and Progress that undertook the task “on behalf of the nation.” Yet, one should also be aware of the attitude of Matthews who claimed in the memorandum that “an order or a permit is required as a preliminary to almost any action.” Therefore, he was looking for an order, claiming that it was circulated to the local branches of the Committee of Union and Progress in the second half of May 1914. Boycott committees, comprised of government officers and groups of Muslims, were formed at the beginning of June. Therefore, Matthews was not entirely sure who was responsible for the excessive acts of the boycotters, since in the end he again alluded to the government losing control of the situation.152

Likewise, the Greek consul in Ayvalık argued that it was the officers of the state who encouraged and protected the boycott, although he claimed that this was hard to prove. However, he did not assert that the officers and the boycotters were the same people. Moreover, he mentioned the sup-

151 BOA, DH. EUM. EMN. 85/7, 23 Haziran 1330 (6 July 1914).
port that the boycotters received from the Turkish guilds and the unions of Turkish merchants. It was these institutions that paid the wages of the boycotters.\(^{153}\) Another report of the Greek consul claimed that the boycott was initiated by an organization, the Society for Pan-Islamic Union.\(^ {154}\)

The social and economic milieu also contributed to the decisions of Muslim merchants who cut their ties to non-Muslim traders. Therefore, it was precarious and economically unsound for them to continue their business with Greeks. The general social and economic atmosphere might have forced some of the Muslim merchants to come to terms with the Boycott Movement, even if they were not really enthusiastic about it or did not belong to the network of National Economy.

The most frequently mentioned actors were low-ranking bureaucrats, such as local governors (\textit{Kaymakams}), police officers, gendarmerie, directors (\textit{müdürs}) of various official institutions, and local gangs. These gangs mostly consisted of Muslim immigrants. Over the course of the 1910-11 Boycott Movement, it was the Cretans who were most active, particularly in port cities. After 1913, the Macedonian \textit{muhacirs} (immigrants) joined them. The flow of Muslim immigrants into Asia Minor provided the street-level force to the Boycott Movement. They were eager enough to play their part after an exhausting journey. Moreover, a political group generally described as the extremist section of the Committee of Union and Progress came to the fore in 1914. Nazım Bey was considered one of the prominent members of this group, along with the Rahmi Bey in the province of Aydın.

In a conversation with the British consul Matthews, Rahmi Bey stated that Muslims in general and Muslim officers in particular were touched by the stories of ill treatment of \textit{muhacirs} at the hands of Greeks in Macedonia. Therefore, Rahmi Bey told him that “it was no wonder that local Greeks had been subjected to aggression,” and that he would not have been astonished if this aggression appeared in Smyrna. For him, “it was too much to expect gendarmes or police sent against the Moslems to carry their orders, so strongly did they sympathize with their brethren in Macedonia.” He repeated his point of view also to the Metropolitan Bishop of Philadelphia (Alaşehir), and it was also published in the journal of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate.\(^ {155}\) Therefore, the highest bureaucrat

\[153\] AYE, A21a, 1914, Ayvalık, No. 8443, 16 March 1914.
\[154\] AYE, A21a, 1914, No. 3390, 31 January 1914.
of the region considered legitimate the movement, the violent incidents, and the indifference of the security forces.

Dr. Nazim Bey, who was regarded as the organizer of the Boycott Movement, argued in another conversation with the consul that the nation was imbued with the “sentiment of hatred”; therefore, it was impossible for the government to put an end to the anti-Greek Boycott.\textsuperscript{156} The British Acting Consul-General Heathcote Smith also argued that many moderate-minded Turks believed that they had to express their hatred against Greek to prove their patriotism.\textsuperscript{157}

The historiography on Turkey to a great extent sees all Unionists as if they were state officers, \textit{komitadji}, or soldiers. However, the Committee of Union and Progress had members and supporters from different segments and classes of society. For instance, one of the prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress, Ali Bey, who was also a leader of the Boycott Movement in Edremit, had an olive oil factory and various stores.\textsuperscript{158} The diary of the \textit{mutasarrif} (governor) of Karesi, Mehmed Reşid, who visited Ilica/Edremit on his trip to the region, also refers to the factory of Ali Bey. It was one of the four factories of the region owned by Muslims.\textsuperscript{159} However, it was generally the bureaucrats whom the contemporaries and historians took into consideration.

The British Acting Consul-General Heathcote Smith reported in July that Rahmi Bey was imbued with blind and bitter hatred of the Greeks and therefore would probably tolerate the anti-Greek violence in the coming war. In a personal conversation, he implied to Smith that the Greeks would probably be sent to the interior regions for strategic reasons. Yet, the same report stated that, thanks to the efforts of Rahmi Bey, who travelled to the interior towns of the province, the boycott ceased in late June and early July. He also informed the consul that in Torbali sev-

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\textsuperscript{156} FO, 195/2458, File of “Anti-Christian Boycott,” (former reference 306/3080), Enclosure No. 6 (account of the conversation between Rahmi Bey, governor of Smyrna, and Dr. Nazim Bey), p. 553.

\textsuperscript{157} FO, 195/2458, No. 96, 27 July 1914, p. 585. He also reported that Turkish officers did not hesitate to publicly show their feelings against the Greeks and quoted a talk of Hacim Bey, the Chief of Police in Smyrna, who said: “Our duty is to hate the Greeks, whether Hellenic or raya, and further our duty is to make them feel we hate them. They are our enemies; until we have swept them out, we can have no peace.” FO, 195/2458, No. 96, 27 July 1914, pp. 584-5.

\textsuperscript{158} AYE, A21a, 1914, Ayvalik, No. 9345, 23 March 1914.

\textsuperscript{159} Mehmed Reşid visited the town on 1 August 1913. Nejdet Bilgi (Ed.), \textit{Dr. Mehmed Reşid Şahingiray Hayati ve Hattıraları}, p. 68.
\end{flushright}
eral Turks had been bastinadoed for continuing to boycott contrary to his orders. Although the buying and selling was resumed to an extent, the region was unsafe for its Greek inhabitants.160

At this point, the report of the British consul mentioned the confession of the governor-general that the Circassian ex-brigand Eşref Bey and his brother Sami Bey were beyond his reach. According to Rahmi Bey, Eşref, who was living in Cordelio (Karşıyaka/Smyrna), had armed the Cretans in his entourage and was strongly supported strongly by the Minister of War, Enver Paşa.161 Hence, there were different power centers among the anti-Greek movement. Eşref Bey as a powerful man had special relationships with foreigners. For instance, he protected a European merchant who had large interests “up country” and gave him him a personal letter of safe conduct in order to save him from any kind of nationalist intervention. He also gave a guard to a European who was a friend of the British consul-general in Smyrna. When this guard was dismissed in July 1914, the British consul deduced that the boycott was to relax.162

Yet, it should be highlighted that there was a mass mobilization within the movement, since there were numerous incidents of cattle theft, injury, seizure of land and houses, pillaging of gardens, and thousands of emigrants. In Marmara, in the province of Aydın, Muslims were just carrying the grain that they had taken from the mill of Sophocles Panavogolou when the street criers proclaimed that the boycott should end. However, on their way to mill boycotters attacked them and tried to drive them back.163 This incident also indicates the will of the people, the power of the governors and the point at which they came into conflict with the boycott organization and its leaders. As a result, different from the previous cases, the political groupings and gangs were much more visible than the groups of merchants and port workers. This was so because the level of social mobilization increased and social relationships deteriorated. A group of Muslim notables seems to have taken advantage of these ethnic clashes and made a fortune out of this turmoil.

160 The Boycott Movement gained its power in a very short time. The British consul Matthews reported that, with the exception of a few localities, the movement prevailed throughout the region. FO, 195/2458, No. 92, 21 July 1914, p. 504.
161 FO, 195/2458, No. 82, 8 July 1914, pp. 453-461.
162 FO, 195/2458, No. 96, 27 July 1914, p. 587.
163 FO, 195/2458, No. 92, 21 July 1914, p. 509.