4. Complementizers and evidentiality: direct vs. indirect speech

4.1. ‘Source of information’ in direct and indirect speech

Ross (1970) famously argued that every declarative sentence is underlyingly selected by a covert performativ verb. The subject of that performativ was claimed to be the speaker, on the basis of arguments that anaphors as in (43b)–(44b) took this speaker as their antecedent:

(43) a. Jules said that as for himself he wouldn’t be invited
b. I said that as for myself I wouldn’t be invited
c. As for myself, I won’t be invited
d. * As for himself, he won’t be invited

(44) a. I told Monk that composers like himself are a godsend
b. Composers like myself/*himself are a godsend

Ross’s underlying performativ can now be reinterpreted in terms of Cinque’s adverbial Mood_evidential. The ‘default’ interpretation of Mood_evidential in the absence of other indications, is that the speaker (source of information) assumes responsibility (evidence type) for a sentence uttered (Cinque, 1999). This speaker can be represented by a 1st person feature in the Mood_evidential of main clauses.

Such a formalization immediately evokes a host of questions with respect to the representation of Mood_evidential in complementation, more in particular in direct and indirect speech. Such a discussion is important here in view of the evident relationship between direct speech and the evidential category of quotative.

Reinterpreting ideas of Banfield (1982), I would like to propose that the person features which function as ‘Source of information’ in Mood_evidential of indirect speech complements are coreferential with the matrix subject, even when this subject is not 1st person. The analysis does not give an explanation as to why direct speech allows such coreference (see also Schlenker, 2000). However, although such cases of ‘switch reference’ are commonly taken to be intertwined with evidentiality, they seem to constitute an independent problem (see Stirling, 1993). I will therefore not concern myself with this issue here.

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Johan Rooryck, Department of French, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands, j.e.c.v.rooryck@let.leidenuniv.nl

Johan Rooryck’s State-of-the-Article on Evidentiality appears in two installments. Here is the complete table of contents of both Part I and Part II.

Part I (last month):
1. Introduction
2. Definitions
3. Configurational aspects of evidentiality
4. Parentheticals as evidential markers

Part II (this month):
5. Complementizers and evidentiality: direct vs indirect speech
6. Evidentiality in DPs: insults, inversion structures, and evaluation
7. Invisible evidentiality
8. Conclusion
9. An Evidentiality Bibliography
The idea that Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}} in indirect speech complements is ‘anaphoric’ can now be used to explain the fact that parentheticals cannot appear in embedded indirect speech clauses, while adverbials can, as observed in (29) repeated here.

(29) a. Sarah told me that (she admitted) Jan has
b. Sarah told me that (admittedly) Jan has
\begin{itemize}
\item Jan has strong qualifications, (admittedly)
\item Jan has strong qualifications, (admittedly)
\item Dubya reportedly bombed Bagdad
\item Dubya (reportedly) bombed Bagdad
\item Dubya, (they say) bombed Bagdad
\item Dubya (they say) bombed Bagdad
\end{itemize}
Recall that the verb in parentheticals needs to move to Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}}\textsuperscript{\textdegree}. This movement ensures that the ‘Source of information’ subject of the parenthetical verb will agree in features with the ‘Source of information’ features of the evidential head. In matrix sentences, such agreement will take place without problems. In embedded sentences, however, Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}}\textsuperscript{\textdegree} is anaphoric and therefore its ‘Source of information’ features are determined by the matrix subject. Also recall that in the analysis of parentheticals assumed in (32), it is the parenthetical verb that embeds the sentential it modifies. The embedded Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}}\textsuperscript{\textdegree} in (29) thus is in the sentential domain of admitted in (29a) and say in (29d). As a result, in (29d), there will be a feature conflict between the subject they of the parenthetical verb moving to the embedded Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}}\textsuperscript{\textdegree}, and the features of this embedded Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}}\textsuperscript{\textdegree} as determined by the matrix subject Jules. In the case of (29a), there appears to be no feature conflict, as the matrix subject Sarah and the subject of the parenthetical she are coreferential. However, parentheticals in (29a) are ruled out by Principle B of the Binding theory. Since the embedded Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}}\textsuperscript{\textdegree} is bound by the matrix subject Sarah, the pronoun she and the anaphor coindexed with Sarah share the same Binding domain. As a result, the pronoun and the Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}}\textsuperscript{\textdegree} anaphor, hence the matrix subject, cannot be coindexed. This ‘double jeopardy’ (feature conflict or Principle B) effectively excludes parentheticals in embedded clauses. Evidential adverbials are not subject to this restriction, since they do not have a subject specifying a ‘Source of information’. Evidential adverbs can therefore be licensed by Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}}\textsuperscript{\textdegree} both in matrix and embedded clauses.

Direct speech complements are often treated as quotations involving verbatim reproduction by the speaker. Clark & Gerrig (1990) show convincingly that this is not the case. Many examples illustrate that quotations only have a degree of resemblance to the original. They argue that in quotations, speakers only take responsibility for aspects of the presentation of the quote (intonation, style, register), and not for its contents or information status. The use of blah blah in (46) for instance allows the speaker to ignore the propositional content, while commenting on John’s longwindedness.

(46) John said: ‘I just can’t stand it anymore, it is too much, and blah blah blah’
In other words, in quoting, speakers are only responsible for their comment or judgment of the form of the information, and they dissociate themselves from its contents. Direct speech complements differ with respect to the extent to which their form and contents are reproduced faithfully. Direct speech complements can be marked by intonation, but they can also be introduced by the manner/degree markers thus and so or by the pronominal this. Van Gelderen (1999) observes that these elements are not equivalent. The use of this requires the speaker to be faithful to the propositional content of the original utterance. In (47a), the speaker must have literally uttered blah blah blah.

(47) a. John said this: ‘I just can’t stand it anymore, it is too much, and blah blah blah’
\begin{itemize}
\item ‘I just can’t stand it anymore, it is too much,
\item and blah blah blah’, so said John.
\end{itemize}
Thus and so are even more restrictive and strongly suggest that the speaker is including the manner of speaking of the person quoted in his rendition of the quote.

These observations can easily be interpreted in terms of the definition of evidentiality in §1. As an essential property of evidentiality, I suggested that the information status of the sentence is measured on a scale whose type varies: the sentence is measured with respect to reliability, probability, expectation, or desirability. In the case of quotations, the reliability of the form of the sentence is measured and evaluated, not its contents.

This analysis now yields an interesting problem. I have argued that main clauses and direct speech complements share the same Mood\textit{\textsubscript{evidential}}\textsuperscript{\textdegree}, i.e. they have a 1st person ‘Source of information’ feature. However, direct speech complements and main clauses differ considerably in their evidential properties. Contrary to direct speech complements, in main clauses the form of the sentence is not evaluated or measured by the speaker. If we hear (48) uttered, we are in the presence of a literal, verbatim, utterance, and the speaker will have literally uttered blah blah blah. This is in contrast with (46), where blah blah blah reflects the comment/judgment of the speaker on the form of the utterance of the person quoted.

(48) I just can’t stand it anymore. It is too much. Blah blah blah.
It therefore seems that separate evaluation of form and contents of a sentence can only occur with (direct or indirect) complement clauses.

The question thus arises how this difference between direct speech complements and main clauses
can be captured if we want to maintain that both have a 1st person Mood$_{evidential}$. The problem is only an apparent one, however. Sentences featuring direct speech complements have two Mood$_{evidential}$Ps, one for the matrix clause, and another in the direct speech complement. Both of these involve 1st person ‘Source of information’ features. These features are nonidentical, since the direct speech complement’s 1st person ‘Source’ is coreferential with the matrix subject.

This means that the direct speech complement’s 1st person ‘Source’ is responsible for the information contents of the quote, while the matrix sentence’s 1st person ‘Source’ is responsible for the form of the direct speech complement. In the same way, it is the matrix 1st person ‘Source’ which is responsible for adjuncts in the matrix clause which modify or comment on the form of the direct speech complement:

(49) John said loud and clear/in a threatening tone: ‘I won’t do it’

Note that direct speech complements pose all sorts of interesting syntactic questions, such as its argumental status, and the syntactic relation between the direct speech complement and the expletive-like elements thus, so and this. Barbiers (1998) observes that sentential complements in Dutch necessarily receive a quotative interpretation when moved to the canonical DP object position in SpecAgrOP:

(50) a. Jan heeft (een verhaal) aan Marie (een verhaal) verteld (een verhaal)
    Jan has a story to Marie a story told (a story)
    ‘Jan has told Mary a story’

b. Jan heeft aan Marie gezegd dat hij komt
    Jan has to Marie said that he comes
    ‘Jan has said to Mary that he is coming’

c. Jan heeft ‘(dat) hij komt’ aan Marie gezegd.
    Jan has dat he comes to Marie said
    ‘Jan has said to Mary: ‘(that) he is coming’’

In light of what was observed about this, thus and so, it is important to point out that this ‘configurational’ quotative involves a literal quote. If dat ‘that’ is included in (50c), then Jan must have uttered it verbatim.

Barbiers (1998) derives the quotative interpretation of the CP from his Principle of Semantic Interpretation (PSI), which relates the interpretation of complements to their configurational position with respect to the selecting head. When a CP occurs in SpecAgrOP, the PSI determines that this CP must be interpreted as an element of the set denoted by the selecting verb. Since the selecting verb is a verb of saying, the CP will have to be interpreted as a quote. Barbiers’ PSI also derives factive and propositional interpretations obtained when CPs occur in configurations other than SpecAgrOP.

4.2. Complementizers

The relation between direct speech complements and the evidential category of quotative raises the question as to whether indirect speech complements also encode indications of evidentiality.

Typologically speaking, sentential complementizers in the world’s languages are derived from verbs of saying or reporting (so-called SAY-complementizers), from pronouns (English that, French que < Latin quod) or from elements indicating comparison translated in English by such, as, or like (Lord, 1993). It cannot be a coincidence that the grammaticalization source of evidentials similarly includes verbs of saying and pronouns, and that the evidential measuring of the information status of the sentence often involves verbs of comparison, such as English seem or French paraître, sembler (cf. Tasmowski, 1989; Rooryck, 2000, ch 1).

This observation predicts that complementizers will to some extent carry evidential information. In this context, questions arise as to the relationship between the ‘proximate’ direct speech pronoun this mentioned above, and the ‘distal’ pronoun that which diachronically evolved into an indirect speech complementizer. It is often assumed that complementizer that is optional with verbs of saying, and obligatory with factive verbs (see Bolinger, 1972 for the factors influencing the appearance of that in complement and relative clauses). But even with verbs of saying, interpretive differences arise that can be related to evidentiality, as Van Gelderen (1999, 10(16)) shows.

(51) They all looked at each other across the table, but none of them dared to say anything. There was an uncomfortable silence. Finally, John said
    *(that) the wine was corked.

In (51), the context implies that the propositional content of the CP complement the wine was corked is common knowledge shared by everyone at the table. The absence of that suggests, according to Van Gelderen (1999), that the propositional content of the CP complement is John’s personal opinion. This is then in contradiction with the presentation of that information as common knowledge. The use of that therefore seems to mark a CP whose evidential information status/truth value is more ‘definite’ or ‘presupposed’.

Similar evidential effects can be observed for infinitival complementizers. Van Craenenbroeck (2000, 2001) observes that the presence or absence of complementizer van in the variant of Brabant Dutch spoken in Belgium correlates with a meaning difference.

(52) a. Freddy probeert den auto te repareren.
    Freddy tries the car to fix
    ‘Freddy tries to fix the car.’

b. Freddy probeert van den auto te repareren.
    Freddy tries of the car to fix
    ‘Freddy tries to fix the car.’
In (52b) the speaker doubts whether Freddy will actually be able to fix the car. The use of \textit{van} carries the interpretation that Freddy’s efforts will most probably be in vain, and that they only constitute an attempt. The sentence (52a) is perfectly neutral with respect to Freddy’s chances of success. When contrasted with (52b), it acquires a reading where the speaker is fairly confident that Freddy will succeed. Other cases with similar, testable meaning differences are construed for other verbs. The data suggest that the use of \textit{van} introduces uncertainty about the actual realization of the state of affairs described in the complement clause. As a result, Van Craenenbroeck (2000, 2001) argues, the matrix predicate acquires focus: the speaker emphasizes that Freddy’s efforts constitute but an attempt.

Van Craenenbroeck (2000, 2001) then derives this interpretation along the lines of Kayne’s (1999) analysis for the Romance complementizer \textit{de/di} ‘of’. \textit{Van} does not form a constituent with the infinitival clause it introduces, but it is merged as a preposition with the complement clause in its Spec-position. Van Craenenbroeck explicitly draws an intriguing parallelism between the use of \textit{van} in the nominal domain in constructions such as \textit{die heks van een Eva ‘that witch of an Eve’} (see §5 below), and its use in the verbal domain with respect to complementation. In both cases, a comparative/evaluative operation is instrumental in the interpretation of the DPs and CPs involved.

Typologically, it seems that pronominal complementizers are mostly restricted to indirect speech. By contrast, in languages featuring \textit{SAY}-complementizers, these often function both for direct and indirect speech complements.

(53) a. He said that it is not good / He said: ‘(that) it is not good’

b. He said (this): ‘it is not good’ / ‘It is not good’, (so) he said

(54) a. Na-lua haromu wà-na-ngga
3sN-go tomorrow report-3sG-1sD
‘She told me that she is leaving tomorrow’

b. Mi táki táá á bunu
3sG say say 3sG-NEG good
‘He said that it is not good/he said: ‘it is not good’’

(Saramaccan, Veenstra 1996, 155)

c. ná-méye no
FOC 1-FUT-do him
‘Say not, I will do so to him as he has done to me.’

(Twi, Lord 1993, citing Christaller 1875)

Lord (1993) also mentions similar facts for other languages. When \textit{SAY}-complementizers do not function both for direct and indirect speech complements, they carry extra morphology typing them as indirect speech complementizers, or the language has other, more specialized complementizers (e.g. Biblical Hebrew’s \textit{le mer} (to-say.inf) for direct speech vs. \textit{ki} for indirect speech, Guy Deutscher p.c.).

(55) a. tete le á-kè ayi tsù nì li
Tete know part+say Ayi work thing the ‘Tete knows that Ayi did the work.’

b. ram [kal ašbe (bole)] bollo
Ram tomorrow come:FUT.3 SAY+PERF said ‘Ram said that he will come tomorrow.’

(Bangla, Tanmoy Bhattacharya, p.c.)

At the beginning of this section, I suggested that the “Source of information” in Mood\textsubscript{evidential} of indirect speech is anaphoric in nature, taking the matrix subject as the “Source of information”, while the Mood\textsubscript{evidential} of direct speech complements is 1st person. SAY-complementizers introducing both direct and indirect speech complements thus require a “Source of information” that can be both anaphoric and 1st person. One proposal could be that this “Source of information” is radically underspecified featurewise, accommodating both 1st person for direct speech and anaphoric interpretations for indirect speech.

5. Evidentiality in DP: insults, inversion structures, and evaluation

In this section I would like to show that evidentiality is not only relevant for sentential structure, but that it also extends to the syntactic structure of the DP. This suggestion is not new: Banfield (1982) already suggested that the analysis of DP’s such as \textit{that idiot of a doctor} is to be related to the speaker’s perspective active at the sentential level. As such, this take on things adds to the similarities between the functional structure of DP and CP which has been driving a lot of work of the last decade.

It is well known that the syntax of qualitative (56a) and relative constructions (56b) constructions shares a structure of the type (Det) N1 de N2 in e.g. French:

(56) (Det) N1 de N2

a. Beaucoup de livres
Quantitative

b. Ton phénomène de fille
Qualitative

your phenomenon of daughter

Especially the syntax of qualitative constructions has received a lot of attention in recent years (den Dikken, 1995, 1998; Español-Echevarría, 1996; Hulk & Tellier, 1999a,b). Qualitative constructions have been studied by Doetjes (1997). However, we have to go back to Milner (1978) for the observation that quantitative and qualitative constructions share the same syntactic structure (see also Ruwet, 1982).

Kayne (1994) innovated the thinking about the syntactic structure of possessive constructions. He analyzes possessive and qualitative constructions by making use of ‘predicate inversion’, in the same way as relative clauses:
Following Kayne (1994), den Dikken (1995, 1998) proposes a structure for qualitative constructions in which Det is generated in a DP outside of a CP headed by de as in (58). In this structure, qualitative constructions are uniformly derived by predicate inversion, with movement of NP1 to SpecFP, and incorporation of the head of XP into de/ef (see also Bennis, Corver & den Dikken, 1998).


\[
\text{DP} \text{D[FP NP1 de/of+X [XP NP2 t X tNP1]]}
\]

Hulk & Tellier (1999a,b) further elaborate the ‘inversion’ analysis. They observe an important difference among qualitative constructions in terms of agreement. Agreement can be triggered by the element preceding de or by the element following de.

(59)

a. Ton phénomène de fille
your phenomenon-MASC of daughter-FEM

est distrait*(e)
absent-minded-FEM/*MASC

is a mountain.

b. Ce bijou d’église romane
that jewel of roman church

a été reconstruit(e)
was rebuilt-MASC/*FEM

was a doctor.

Hulk & Tellier (1999a,b) introduce special mechanisms to cope with feature conflicts among the functional heads of the DP structure: features cannot be copied onto a functional head if they conflict.

Doetjes & Rooryck (2000) propose a radically different syntactic structure for both types of qua(nt/l)itative constructions. They restrict predicative inversion to those structures that are paraphrasable in terms of comparison. The predicative properties of the small clause are responsible for the relation of comparison between the qua(nt/l)ifying and the qua(nt/l)ified noun. The Spec-Head relation between C° and the inverted qualifier ensures that the entire CP carries the features of the qualifier.

By contrast, the ‘pure degree’ constructions do not involve ‘predicate inversion’. ‘Pure degree’ constructions have a syntactic structure containing an (adverbial) functional projection expressing Evaluation in the sense of Cinque (1999).

(60) ‘pure degree’ qua(nt/l)ification

a. [EvalP beaucoup EvalP [NP fille]]
that phenomenon of girl

a lot of books

b. [EvalP une montagne [NP livres]]
a mountain of books

The qua(nt/l)ifying noun is base-generated in Spec-EvalP. As EvalP is adverbial in nature, it cannot determine agreement. The qua(nt/l)ifying noun assumes the interpretation of evaluation of ‘pure degree’ associated with EvalP, losing the rest of its lexical meaning. In this, the qua(nt/l)ifying noun is similar to the verbs in parentheticals moving to Mood-evidential°, and raising verbs such as promise and threaten which similarly lose their lexical meaning to assume a purely evaluative function by moving to an evaluative functional head. Such similarities between evidentiality in the DP and the CP domain should not surprise us. Evidential adverbs have their counterpart in de DP domain as adjectives:

(63) a. Sarah is an apparent/alleged/supposed/reported genius

b. Sarah is apparently/allegedly/supposedly/reportedly a genius

6. ‘Invisible’ evidentiality

In a number of cases, evidentiality is not indicated by a specific morpheme, but ‘rides piggyback’ on another construction. Modal verbs for instance can receive evidential meanings as in (64):

(64) ‘invisible’ evidentiality

a. [CP [NP voiture]]
that car

is absent-minded/

was lost

b. [CP [DP une montagne]]
a mountain

is a lot of

original


BRESNAN, J. (1968) Remarks on adsententials. Manuscript. MIT.


