Are you talking to me?! Separating the people from the problem when expressing emotions in negotiation

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Abstract

Emotions such as anger and happiness have pervasive interpersonal effects in negotiations. We propose that the nature of the effects depends on the target of the emotion, that is, whether the emotion is directed toward a person or a specific behavior. In a computer-mediated negotiation (N = 87), participants received either angry or happy messages from a simulated opponent, which were either behavior-oriented or person-directed. Behavior-oriented anger elicited larger concessions than behavior-oriented happiness, whereas person-directed anger elicited smaller concessions than person-directed happiness. This reversal could be attributed to the strategic value of the emotional expression, which was higher in the behavior-oriented condition than in the person-directed condition. These findings show that the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness depend critically on the target of the emotion.

Keywords: Negotiation; Conflict; Behavior-oriented emotion; Person-directed emotion; Interpersonal effects; Strategic behavior

Introduction

Conflicts occur on a daily basis, throughout all levels of society. Conflicts often bring about intense emotional reactions, which may strongly affect the individuals involved. Given that conflicts are often infused with emotions, it is important to understand how these emotions may shape conflict development and resolution. One of the most common and constructive ways of resolving conflict is through negotiation, which may be defined as “a discussion between two or more parties with the apparent aim of resolving a divergence of interests” (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, p. 2). Although an increasing amount of research indicates that emotions play a crucial role in negotiation, findings are ambiguous when it comes to the nature of these effects. While some research indicates that expressions of negative emotions such as anger elicit more cooperative responses than do expressions of positive emotions such as happiness (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b), other research suggests that positive rather than negative emotions elicit cooperation (e.g., Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). We argue that the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiation depend on how these emotions are communicated. More specifically, inspired by Fisher and Ury’s (1981) classic advise to “separate the people from the problem” in negotiation, we test the idea that the effects of a counterpart’s anger vs. happiness on a focal negotiator’s demands depend on the target of the emotion, that is, whether the emotion is directed at the negotiator’s offers or at the negotiator as a person.
Interpersonal effects of emotions in conflict and negotiation

In the last decade or so, researchers have become increasingly interested in the social effects of emotions, addressing the question how one individual’s emotions may influence others’ cognitions, impressions, and behavior (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). The basic premise of this perspective is that emotions have important social functions and consequences (Frijda, 1986; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Parkinson, 1996), by which they may influence not only the behavior of those experiencing the emotion but also the behavior of others (Levenson, 1994). At the interpersonal level emotions convey information to others about an individual’s feelings (Ekman, 1993), social intentions (Fridlund, 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), and orientation toward the relationship (Knutson, 1996). Further, emotional expressions may evoke reciprocal or complementary emotions in others that may in turn help individuals respond adaptively to social events (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Finally, emotions can serve as positive or negative reinforcers of other individuals’ behavior (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983). More specifically, positive emotions may encourage others to continue their course of action, whereas negative emotions may serve as a call for behavioral adjustment (Averill, 1982; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999).

How do these emotional mechanisms play out in the context of conflict and negotiation? There is abundant evidence that one negotiators’ expressions of anger trigger reciprocal anger, negative impressions, and feelings of hostility in the opponent (e.g., Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Accordingly, studies by Friedman et al. and Kopelman et al. have found that expressions of anger (compared to expressions of happiness) reduced the likelihood of settlement and elicited competitive behavior. For example, Kopelman et al. showed that participants in a face-to-face dispute simulation, an ultimatum bargaining setting, and a distributive negotiation were less likely to close a deal and to make concessions to partners who displayed negative rather than positive emotions.

The pervasive effects of emotions on reciprocal feelings and impressions notwithstanding, these affective reactions do not always become manifest in behavior. A growing body of research suggests that these gut reactions may be overruled by strategic considerations. As mentioned earlier, emotions convey information about a person’s intentions, and they may serve as incentives or deterrents for others’ behavior. Especially in situations in which negotiators lack relevant strategic information about their opponent’s bargaining position, they turn to other sources of information to locate the opponent’s limits (Liebert, Smith, Hill, & Keiffer, 1968; Pruitt & Syna, 1985; Yukl, 1974), a behavior that is referred to as tracking (see Pruitt, 1981). For instance, when an opponent reacts happily to one’s offer, one may assume that the current offer is within the opponent’s limits. When an opponent reacts angrily to one’s offer, however, one may assume that this offer is disadvantageous to him or her. Expressions of anger may thus signal that one has high limits and alert opponents to possible negative consequences (e.g., conflict escalation, an unprofitable impasse), which may lead them to concede. In order to avoid costly impasse it may thus be necessary to place lower demands and make larger concessions to an angry opponent than to a happy opponent. Thus, the information that emotions provide can trigger strategic considerations that may overrule the powerful affective tendencies discussed above. In support of this notion, Van Kleef et al. (2004a) showed that negotiators who were confronted with an angry (as opposed to a happy) opponent became angry themselves, but decided to give in because they inferred that the other had ambitious limits (meaning that standing firm would jeopardize agreement). In other words, in a negotiation context expressions of anger may signal higher limits than expressions of happiness, and this may in turn guide negotiators’ behavior.

The present study

As we have seen, previous research has yielded inconsistent findings regarding the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on negotiation behavior, with some studies showing that anger (as opposed to happiness) elicits competition (e.g., small concessions), and other studies showing that anger elicits cooperation (e.g., large concessions). We suggest that these inconsistent findings may in part be reconciled by considering the focus or target of the emotion, and concomitantly, the prominence of the strategic information that is provided by negotiators’ emotions. One of the defining characteristics of emotions is that they are directed at a particular target or object, most often a person or a situation (Frijda, 1986). This intentionality or object-directedness is especially relevant in relation to the information-providing functions of emotions. If we accept that emotions regulate social interactions by providing information (Keltner & Haidt, 1999), it becomes relevant to consider the focus or target of the emotion. That is, the meaning and interpretation of an emotion may differ as a function of whether the emotion is directed toward a person or a situation. Specifically, in a negotiation setting anger and happiness may carry different information depending on whether they are directed toward a negotiator’s behavior or toward the negotiator as a person.

We argue that the former type of emotional expression, which we will refer to as behavior-oriented emotion, carries clear strategic information. That is, a counterpart’s anger or happiness are likely to be interpreted as signaling (dis)satisfaction with one’s offer, which negotiators can use to track the counterpart’s limits (Pruitt, 1981) and modify their bargaining behavior accordingly. Thus, when the opponent’s emotions are directed toward the focal negotiator’s offers or demands, we expect the focal negotiator to
react strategically by conceding more to an angry opponent than to a happy one.

In contrast, when the opponent’s emotion is directed toward the focal negotiator as a person (person-directed emotion), the strategic implications of the emotion are much less clear in the sense that the emotions are not readily attributable to the focal negotiator’s behavior. As a result, negotiators cannot use the opponent’s emotion to track his or her limit (Pruitt, 1981; Van Kleef et al., 2004a) and they may therefore be less likely to strategically modify their behavior in accordance with the other’s emotion. As the diagnostic value of the emotion is thus impaired, we expect the negative effects of anger (see Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006) to become more apparent, resulting in negotiators conceding less to an angry counterpart than to a happy one.

Based on the above, we advance the following predictions. First, we predict that participants who are presented with behavior-oriented emotional expressions will make smaller demands to an angry opponent than to a happy one (Hypothesis 1a). In contrast, participants who are presented with person-directed emotional expressions are expected to make larger demands to an angry opponent than to a happy one (Hypothesis 1b). Further, based on the assumption that behavior-oriented emotions provide more diagnostic information than person-directed emotions, we hypothesize that participants’ appraisals of the opponent’s limits will be affected by the former type of emotional expression but not by the latter. Specifically, we predict that participants who are presented with behavior-oriented emotions will judge the opponent’s limits to be higher when the opponent expresses anger rather than happiness, whereas we do not expect to find such an effect for person-directed emotions (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we expect participants’ appraisals of the opponent’s limits to mediate the relation between the opponent’s emotion and concessions for behavior-oriented emotions but not for person-directed emotions (Hypothesis 3).

Methods

Participants and experimental design

Eighty-seven undergraduate students at Leiden University (n = 18 male and n = 69 female; aged M = 19.16 years, SD = 3.43) participated in the study for monetary compensation (6€, equivalent to 8 US$ at the time of the experiment). The design included the opponent’s emotion (anger vs. happiness) and the target of the emotion (behavior-oriented vs. person-directed) as between-participants variables and demands as the dependent variable. Additional dependent variables included appraisals of the opponent’s limits and manipulation checks. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions using a double-blind procedure.

Procedure

Upon arrival, participants were welcomed to the experiment and seated in separate cubicles in front of a computer, which presented all instructions. Participants read that the purpose of the experiment was to study negotiation in a situation where the negotiating parties could not see each other, and they were led to believe that they would engage in a computer-mediated negotiation with another participant (whose behavior was in fact simulated by the computer).

Negotiation task

The negotiation task was an adapted version of the one used by Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b; see also De Dreu and Van Lange, 1995; Hilty and Carnevale, 1993), which captures the main characteristics of real-life negotiation (i.e., multiple issues differing in utility to the negotiator, information about one’s own payoffs only, and the typical offer-counteroffer sequence). In the current version, participants learned that they would be assigned the role of seller of a consignment of cell phones, and that they had to negotiate the price, the warranty period, and the duration of the service contract of the phones. Participants were then presented with a payoff chart (see Table 1) that showed them which outcomes were most favorable to them, and were told that their objective was to earn as many points as possible. As can be seen in Table 1, level 9 on price yielded 0 points and level 1 ($150) yielded 400 points. For warranty period, level 9 (nine months) yielded 0 points, and level 1 (one month) yielded 120 points. Finally, for duration of service contract, level 9 (nine months) yielded 0 points, and level 1 (one month) yielded 240 points. The payoff table for the opponent was not shown, and participants were told only that it differed from their own.

To enhance involvement, participants were informed that points would be converted to lottery tickets, and that the more points earned, the more lottery tickets one would obtain, and the greater would be one’s chance of winning a prize of 30€ (approximately 40 US$). To emphasize the mixed-motive nature of the negotiation, participants were told that reaching an agreement is a prerequisite for participation in the lottery. Thus, on the one hand there was an incentive to earn as many points as possible, whereas on the other hand there was an incentive to reach agreement.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Price of phones</th>
<th>Warranty period</th>
<th>Service contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Price</td>
<td>Payoff</td>
<td>Warranty (months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$145</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$140</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$135</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$130</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$125</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>$120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>$115</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>$110</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Prices in Euro were converted to US dollars and rounded to the nearest US $5.
Participants were told that the buyer (i.e., the opponent) would make the first offer and that the negotiation would continue until an agreement was reached or until time ran out. Just before the negotiation started, participants learned that an additional goal of the study was to examine the effects of having vs. not having information about the opponent’s intentions. They read that the computer had randomly determined that they would receive information about the intentions of the opponent without the opponent knowing it, and that the opponent would not receive information about their intentions.

Participants then received a first offer from their alleged counterpart (the computer). Over the negotiation rounds the buyer proposed the following levels of agreement (for price – warranty – service): 8-7-8 (Round 1), 8-7-7 (Round 2), 8-6-7 (Round 3), 7-6-7 (Round 4), 7-6-6 (Round 5), and 6-6-6 (Round 6). Research has shown that this preprogrammed strategy has face validity and is seen as intermediate in cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). A demand by the participant was accepted if it equaled or exceeded the offer the computer was about to make in the next round. After the sixth round, the negotiation was interrupted regardless of whether participants had reached an agreement (cf. De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Following Tripp and Sondak (1992), participants who reached an agreement before Round 6 (n = 6) were excluded from the analyses. (Retaining those participants did not change the pattern of results reported below.)

Manipulations

After the first, third, and fifth negotiation round, participants received information about “the intentions of the buyer,” which contained the manipulations of the buyer’s emotion (anger vs. happiness) and of the target of the emotion (behavior-oriented vs. person-directed). Participants waited while the opponent was supposedly asked to reveal what he or she intended to offer in the next round, and why. Shortly afterwards, participants received the answer supposedly given by the buyer, which was presented in a separate box, in a different font, and which contained some typing errors to enhance experimental realism. The buyer’s intentions were held constant across conditions and contained the buyer’s intended offer for the next round. That is, after Round 1 the buyer wrote “I think I will offer 8-7-7,” which would indeed be the buyer’s next offer. The buyer’s intention also contained an emotional statement which constituted the experimental manipulation.

After the first negotiation round, participants in the angry opponent conditions received the following information: “This [offer/person] makes me really angry.” In the happy opponent conditions, participants read “I am happy with this [offer/person].” As can be seen from these examples, the target of the emotion was also manipulated in the emotional statements by focusing the opponent’s emotion either on the participant’s offers and behavior (“This offer makes me really angry”) or on the participant as a person (e.g., “This person makes me really angry”). The statements were adapted from Van Kleef et al. (2004a) and are listed in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>After round 1</th>
<th>After round 3</th>
<th>After round 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>This [offer/person] makes me really angry, I think I will offer 8-7-7</td>
<td>This [behavior/person] is really getting on my nerves. I am going to offer 7-6-7</td>
<td>I am going to offer 6-6-6, because this [negotiation/guy] pisses me off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>I am happy with this [offer/person], I think I will offer 8-7-7</td>
<td>This [behavior/person] pleases me. It is going pretty well so far. I am going to offer 7-6-7</td>
<td>I am going to offer 6-6-6, because I feel good about this [negotiation/guy]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Statements were adapted from the original Dutch statements used by Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b). Words in brackets before the slash were used in the behavior-oriented emotion condition. Words in brackets after the slash were used in the person-directed emotion condition. The opponent’s intended offer corresponded with the actual offer in the next round.
limit; see Table 1). Appraisals of the opponent’s limits on the three issues were highly correlated and were therefore averaged into a single index ($\alpha = .82$).

To check the manipulation of the opponent’s emotion, participants were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale how angry, irritated, happy, and satisfied they thought their opponent had been during the negotiation. The items designed to measure perceived anger and irritation correlated substantially ($r = .85$) and were averaged into an index of perceived anger. The items pertaining to happiness and satisfaction were combined into an index of perceived happiness ($r = .89$).

To check the manipulation of the target of the opponent’s emotion, we asked participants to indicate on 9-point scales (1 = strongly disagree to 9 = strongly agree) how much they agreed with two statements, namely “The emotions of the buyer were directed at me personally” and “The emotions of the buyer were directed at my behavior.” The ratings were strongly negatively correlated ($r = -.71$), so we recoded the latter and averaged both ratings into one index of perceived person-directedness of opponent’s emotion.

**Results**

**Manipulation checks**

We submitted the participants’ ratings of their opponent’s anger and happiness to a 2 (opponent’s emotion: anger vs. happiness) $\times$ 2 (target: behavior vs. person) ANOVA, the latter variable being a within-participants factor. Results showed the predicted interaction between the opponent’s emotion and the participants’ perception of the opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 77) = 443.76, p < .001$ ($\eta^2 = .85$). Participants in the angry opponent condition rated their opponents as significantly more angry than did participants in the happy opponent condition ($M = 7.30, SD = 1.71$ vs. $M = 2.26, SD = 0.90$). Similarly, participants with a happy opponent rated the opponent as happier than did participants with an angry opponent ($M = 6.96, SD = 1.15$ vs. $M = 2.14, SD = 0.97$). Further, paired-sample $t$ tests revealed that ratings within the different emotion conditions were higher for the intended emotion than for the other emotion: Participants in the angry opponent condition rated the opponent as more angry than happy, $t(39) = 5.16, p < .001$, and those in the happy opponent condition rated the opponent as more happy than angry, $t(40) = 4.71, p < .001$. There were no effects of the target manipulation. Together, these results indicate that the manipulation of the opponent’s emotion was successful.

To check whether the target manipulation was successful, we submitted the index of person-directedness of the opponent’s emotion to a 2 (emotion: anger vs. happiness) $\times$ 2 (target: behavior vs. person) ANOVA. A main effect of target revealed that our target manipulation was successful, $F(1, 77) = 29.35, p < .001$ ($\eta^2 = .28$). Participants in the behavior-oriented emotion condition reported less person-directedness of their opponents’ emotions than did participants in the person-directed emotion condition ($M = 2.62, SD = 1.26$ vs. $M = 4.65, SD = 2.00$). There were no effects of the emotion manipulation.

**Demands**

A 2 (emotion: anger vs. happiness) $\times$ 2 (target: behavior vs. person) ANOVA on demands showed no main effects (both $F$s $< 1.3, n.s.$). However, results did reveal the predicted interaction between the opponent’s emotion and the target of the emotion, $F(1, 77) = 12.45, p < .001$ ($\eta^2 = .14$). The means and standard deviations reported in Table 3 reveal a pattern of interaction which is consistent with our predictions. In line with Hypothesis 1a, simple-effects analysis revealed that behavior-oriented anger elicited larger concessions (lower demands) than did behavior-oriented happiness, $F(1, 77) = 8.14, p < .01$ ($\eta^2 = .16$). Conversely, and consistent with Hypothesis 1b, person-directed anger elicited smaller concessions (higher demands) than did person-directed happiness, $F(1, 77) = 4.59, p < .05$ ($\eta^2 = .12$).

**Appraisal of the opponent’s limits**

We hypothesized that behavior-oriented—but not person-directed—emotions would affect participants’ appraisals of the opponent’s limits. In line with this prediction, a 2 (emotion: anger vs. happiness) $\times$ 2 (target: behavior vs. person) ANOVA revealed a two-way interaction on appraisal of the opponent’s limit, $F(1, 77) = 6.76, p < .02$ ($\eta^2 = .08$). Supporting Hypothesis 2, simple-effects analyses revealed that in the behavior-oriented emotion condition anger was associated with more ambitious limits than happiness, $F(1, 77) = 5.43, p < .03$ ($\eta^2 = .16$). When directed towards the person, however, anger and happiness were not associated with different limits, $F(1, 77) = 1.83, n.s.$ ($\eta^2 = .04$). Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demands and appraisal of opponent’s limits as a function of the opponent’s emotion and the target of the emotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent measure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraisal of the opponent’s limits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Means not sharing the same subscript differ at $p < .05$. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Mediation analysis

So far we have shown that the opponent’s emotions affected the focal negotiator in predicted ways (Hypotheses 1a and 1b), and that the opponent’s emotion influenced participants’ appraisals of the opponent’s limits in the behavior-oriented emotion condition but not in the person-directed emotion condition (Hypothesis 2). We performed two sets of mediated regression analyses to test our final prediction, namely that the effects of the opponent’s emotion on demands are mediated by appraisals of the opponent’s limits in the behavior-oriented emotion condition but not in the person-directed emotion condition (Hypothesis 3). To support this prediction, we should find mediation of appraisal of opponent’s limits in the behavior-oriented emotion condition, but not in the person-directed emotion condition.

To establish mediation, the following conditions should be satisfied (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, the independent variable (opponent’s emotion) should affect the dependent variable (demands). Second, the independent variable should affect the proposed mediator (appraisal of opponent’s limit). Third, the mediator should be associated with the dependent variable. Fourth, to establish full mediation, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable should become non-significant when controlling for the mediator, and this reduction should be significant.

In the behavior-oriented emotion condition, we found a significant effect of the opponent’s emotion on demands, $\beta = .40, p < .01$, and a significant effect of the opponent’s emotion on appraisal of the opponent’s limit, $\beta = -.40, p < .01$. Adding appraisal of the other’s limit to the equation produced a significant effect of appraisal of the opponent’s limit on demands, $\beta = -.58, p < .001$, and reduced the formerly significant effect of opponent’s emotion on demands to non-significance, $\beta = .17, ns$. A Sobel test revealed that this reduction was significant, $Z = 2.29, p < .03$. In keeping with Hypothesis 3, these data indicate that, in the behavior-oriented emotion condition, the effect of the opponent’s emotion on demands is fully mediated by appraisal of the opponent’s limit. In the person-directed emotion condition, in contrast, the effect of the opponent’s emotion on appraisal of their limit was not significant, $\beta = .19, ns$, and accordingly appraisal of the opponent’s limits did not mediate the effect.

Discussion

Recent studies have shown that emotions play a crucial role in negotiations. However, previous results are ambiguous regarding the nature of the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness—some studies indicate that expressions of anger may be effective in eliciting concessions (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b), whereas other studies suggest that expressions of anger may actually reduce concessions (e.g., Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006). We propose to differentiate between behavior-oriented emotions (i.e., emotions directed toward a negotiator’s offers and behavior) and person-directed emotions (i.e., emotions directed toward the negotiator as a person) to gain more understanding of the complex interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations. As predicted, we found that negotiators conceded more when their counterpart expressed behavior-oriented anger rather than happiness, whereas they conceded less when the counterpart expressed person-directed anger rather than happiness.

The findings also speak to an underlying process. We reasoned that negotiators’ natural tendency to respond competitively to a counterpart’s expressions of anger (e.g., Allred et al., 1997; Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006) may be overruled by strategic considerations when the emotion contains clear strategic information. Indeed, we found that behavior-directed emotions had more clear-cut strategic implications than did person-directed emotions. More specifically we found that behavior-oriented anger (as compared to happiness) raised negotiator’s estimates of their counterpart’s limits and thereby elicited concessions. In contrast, person-directed anger did not have an effect on appraisals of the other’s limits, and consequently negotiators conceded less rather than more to a counterpart’s person-directed anger. It appears that when anger has clear strategic implications, as is the case when it is behavior-oriented, it may help negotiators to extract concessions. If the strategic implications of the anger are unclear, however, as is the case when the anger is person-directed, the anger may provoke competitive responses.

The finding that the target of an emotion moderates its interpersonal effects has important implications for theorizing about the social effects of emotions. Van Kleef (in press) recently introduced the Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model to account for the interpersonal effects of emotions in social interaction. The model posits that emotional expressions may exert interpersonal influence through two distinct paths, one involving affective reactions, and the other involving strategic considerations. The model predicts that anger is more likely to elicit concessions to the extent that it is perceived as appropriate and observers have a high information processing motivation, whereas it is more likely to elicit competition when it is deemed inappropriate and observers have a low information processing motivation. In the former case, people are more likely to act on the strategic information they distill from the anger, whereas in the latter case they are more likely to act on their competitive tendencies. The present study suggests that the target of the emotion should be considered as well, because it may determine the usefulness and diagnosticity of the information that is carried by the emotion.

More generally, the present findings stress the role of context in determining the social effects of emotions. Depending on the social context, emotional expressions may become more or less diagnostic. Extrapolating the current findings to other characteristics of emotional expression, it can be expected that, for instance, anger may have
different effects depending on when it is expressed. When anger is expressed directly after an incidence of unjust treatment, for example, it is likely to be attributed to that incidence, whereas if the anger is expressed considerably later it may be connected to another event, such as a broken elevator. Observers’ (behavioral) responses to the same expression of anger may thus depend critically on the connection they make between the anger expression and the situation.

Finally, from a practical perspective it is important to realize that expressing anger or happiness can have tremendously different effects in a negotiation, depending on the target of the emotion. Expressing anger can pay off, but only when the anger is directed at a negotiator’s behavior. When the anger is directed at the negotiator as a person, it is likely to elicit competitive reactions. In this light, Fisher and Ury’s (1981) recommendation to “separate the people from the problem” seems especially relevant when negotiations evoke negative emotions. A negotiator who experiences positive emotions, in contrast, would be better advised to express them in a way that does not differentiate between the problem and the people. Happy negotiators who follow this advice may reap the benefits in various ways. If negotiators direct their happiness at their counterpart as a person, they (1) do not give away strategic information about their negotiation position, and (2) they may be rewarded with reciprocal cooperation.

The main objective of this study was to show that emotions have different effects on negotiation behavior depending on whether they are targeted at a negotiator’s offer or at the negotiator as a person. A limitation of this approach is that the effects cannot be clearly attributed to either anger, or happiness, or both. The present study lacks a non-emotional control condition, as the distinction between behavior-oriented and person-directed emotions cannot be made when no emotions are expressed. Previous research that did not distinguish between the two targets of emotion has included non-emotional control conditions and has consistently found these conditions to fall in the middle of the anger and happiness conditions (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b).

Participants in the present study did not engage in face-to-face interaction. We decided to test our predictions in a computer-simulated negotiation task because it allowed us to vary the target of the opponent’s emotional expressions in a clear and systematic way, without compromising the experimental control that we deemed necessary to obtain a carefully controlled test of our hypotheses. Previous research has shown that this task yields data that are similar to data obtained in field settings (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006) and face-to-face negotiations (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006), so we are confident in the generalizability of the findings. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to investigate how the dynamics uncovered in the present study play out in face-to-face negotiations. This issue could be addressed in future research.

Recent research has shown that other emotions besides anger and happiness also exert powerful interpersonal influence in conflict and negotiation. For example, Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2006) showed that negotiators concede more value to disappointed or worried counterparts than to guilty or regretful ones. It would be interesting to extrapolate the current exercise to these and other emotions. It is conceivable, for instance, that saying “I am disappointed by your last offer” has different effects from saying “I am disappointed in you.” Future research could examine this and other possibilities.

In conclusion, we showed that behavior-oriented anger elicited more cooperation than behavior-oriented happiness, whereas person-directed anger elicited less cooperation than person-directed happiness. This reversal could be attributed to the strategic value of the emotional expression, which was higher in the behavior-oriented condition than in the person-directed condition. These findings demonstrate that the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiation depend critically on the target of the emotion—a conclusion that has important implications for the understanding of the role of emotions in conflict and negotiation, and for the social effects of emotions in general.

References
