Chapter 5
Political territoriality and European (dis)integration

...territorial political structuring is unlikely to remain geared to the state units.
Stefano Bartolini

5.1 Will the European Union survive until 2024?
Who expected in 1988 the Soviet empire would disintegrate a few years later? Before 1988 the possibility of its disintegration had been sometimes discussed in academic circles, but the fall of the Soviet empire took most analysts and politicians by surprise. Could the European Union face a similar fate? The former president of the European Commission Jacques Delors estimated the chance of European disintegration to be 50% after its 2004 enlargement, while the former president of the European Convention Valéry Giscard d’Estaing anticipates the end of the union in the event of Turkish accession. Perhaps, Delors and Giscard d’Estaing are representative of the contemporary French inclination towards déclinisme, yet concerns for the EU’s future are more broadly shared. European governments have put more emphasis on the EU’s capacity to absorb new member states. While this absorption capacity initially referred to the EU’s administrative capabilities to cope with an increasing diversity of socio-economic systems, nowadays it seems to refer to the EU’s incapacity to expand without serious disintegrative responses from within. Jörg Haider’s Bündnis für die Zukunft and the UK Independence Party already expressed their desire to organise referendums

on the EU membership of Austria and the United Kingdom, respectively. Moreover, it was found that a large share of the Finnish would vote against EU membership in 2005 if asked again.\(^3\) Despite these potentially disintegrative tendencies, theories on when or how the European Union may fall apart are still scarce.

The mood of the day often determines the content of political analysis. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War books appeared such as *Der Aufgang des Abendlandes*, claiming Europe would again play an important role in great power politics after fifty years of American tutelage. Pessimistic treatises on the EU’s future soon followed, however, because of its inability to stop the Yugoslav wars. This chapter on disintegration seems to mirror the gloom felt in the EU after the no vote against the European Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch electorate in the spring of 2005. However, it only theoretically maps possible paths of integration and disintegration. It is by no means a normative plea for less or more European integration – that is something politicians and not political scientists should decide. Instead, the subject of this chapter stems from the fact that the issue of disintegration has not been dealt with thoroughly, in spite of the call from the eminent integration theorist Ernst Haas in 1967 to do so.\(^4\) Confronted with concerns about a potential collapse of the EU among eminent Euro-politicians, political scientists should at least be able to discuss the question, paraphrasing Amalrik’s book written in 1969 on the Soviet Union’s fate, ‘Will the European Union survive until 2024?’

It is hard to predict the survival of any polity. For instance, federalism expert William Riker expected in the late 1980s that the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would remain stable, because of the strength of centralised federations.\(^5\) A few years later, he was proven wrong. The history of French integration (see Chapter 4) has also shown how improbable the survival of a certain polity is. The focus in this chapter is therefore only on the morphology and patterns of European (dis)integration.

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\(^3\) Euobserver.com (30 December 2005), Finns would spurn EU a New Poll shows.


John Ruggie has argued that a systemic change is occurring in the political order of the European Union, going beyond Westphalia. Whether that claim holds true requires an exploration of whether the European Union is indeed a temporary anomaly in a world of Westphalian states.

For the sake of parsimony, a good theory of European integration should also include hypotheses on (the morphology of) disintegration. Thus far, only the realist John Mearsheimer has put forward a theoretical explanation of how the European Union might again fall apart. However, his state-based assumptions necessarily limit the prospect of European disintegration: (warring) Westphalian states. That may be an empirical outcome, but other non-state options should not be excluded in advance. In Section 5.2 it will be explained in more detail how political realism and other theories often suffer from a territorial bias by taking the state for granted as the necessary outcome of disintegration. Evidence from integrating and disintegrating multi-national political systems could also be of analytical value. Federalism studies on the sustainability of a composite polity, as well as on secession, and on separatism may therefore shed light on under what conditions (dis)integration may occur. Not fitting in the territorial divide between national and international politics, studies of empires and world systems may also offer lessons for European (dis)integration (see Section 5.3). The problem is that these studies often do not show how the multiplicity of actors and factors in the processes of (dis)integration are linked, which hinders forming a view of the potential patterns of fragmentation.

In combination with the logic of territoriality, Rokkan’s ideas on polity-formation can shed the necessary light on the (territorial) morphology and patterns of polity-reformation and polity-deformation, avoiding a Westphalian bias while systematically linking the various actors and factors of political (dis)integration. Section 5.4 offers a Rokkanian reading of the history of European integration. This historical overview will be followed by

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an inventory of propositions,\textsuperscript{7} partly inspired by Stefano Bartolini’s elaborations of Rokkan’s notions, mapping the potential relationships between causes and effects of changing political territoriality in the processes of European (dis)integration since the 1980s. This inventory is not only the basis for reflection upon the findings in the following empirical chapters, but also for the future development of a full-fledged theory of political territoriality. This chapter ends with a tentative discussion of the prospect of the significance of political territoriality in the present political morphology of Europe.

5.2 The territorial bias in theories of European integration

5.2.1 Realism

In 2003, a German journalist asked the author of the Economist column Charlemagne who proposed to abandon the European constitutional treaty, “But what’s your alternative to a compromise – that we go back to killing each other?”\textsuperscript{8} The Dutch government used the same argument in its campaign for the European Constitutional Treaty in the spring of 2005. John Mearsheimer’s theoretical attempt to explain European disintegration also focuses on the prospect of a conflict-prone future.

In his well-known 1990 article Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, Mearsheimer contemplated what might happen if the Cold War would be completely over.\textsuperscript{9} Based on neo-realist reasoning, he claimed that the departure of the superpowers would allow again for instable relationships in multipolar Europe. The bipolar, nuclear stalemate between the United States of America and the Soviet Union had prevented European wars from breaking out. No longer restrained and pacified by these superpowers, minor powers like France, Great-Britain, a unified Germany and reformed states of the former Soviet Union face a more insecure future.


\textsuperscript{8} Charlemagne (5 July 2003), ‘Après EU, le Déluge? Is the European Union all that stands between the Old Continent and War?’, in The Economist.

This multipolar Europe confronts them with more potential enemies, while hampering the effective organisation of alliances and deterrence to counterbalance aggression. Thus, the end of Cold War makes an imbalance of power in Europe much more likely. In an insecure environment, Mearsheimer considers nuclear proliferation as “the most likely scenario” for Europe, starting with a unified Germany. Moreover, he suggests that “hyper-nationalism” would be re-introduced by national leaders to mobilise their citizenry to fight for national defence in mass armies. Distrust among national governments would likely undermine any attempt of enduring European co-operation, and only temporary coalitions would be formed to counter aggression by, for example, Germany, Russia, or nationalistic movements in Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe. Thus, Mearsheimer offers an explanation of both European integration and disintegration. Western Europe has integrated economically thanks to and within the US security framework counter-balancing the Soviet block, partly by adopting the former aggressor West-Germany in a transatlantic military alliance. The end of the Cold War between the US and the SU would unleash intra-European distrust, and the low politics of economic integration would disappear.

Mearsheimer’s critics argued that European integration would still continue after the Cold War. They point out that with the passage of time governments and peoples have learned to work together and that European institutions have become sufficiently influential to prevent the EC/EU from disintegrating into national states. While Mearsheimer perspective is long-term, it does not seem to fully reflect the reality on the ground in the short period after the end of the Cold War. However, the basic problem of Mearsheimer’s argument is not empirical. Even if his argument is empirically vindicated, its neo-realist content makes it analytically too limited. It assumes that world consists of states, and therefore its expectation of European (dis)integration is biased. As was pointed out in Chapter 4, every neo-realist argument suffers from the territorial trap because it takes the territorial state for granted. It is imprudent for a theory of European disintegration to exclude the prospect of a non-state Europe, in which societies and authority are not bound by state borders.
5.2.2 Federalism

Notwithstanding its theoretical limitations, the neo-realist focus on security should not be abandoned immediately when theorising political (dis)integration. In William Riker’s research on federalism, he found states may opt for “military-diplomatic unity” if the costs of common protection and federal participation outweigh the costs of independence.\(^\text{10}\) After striking the “federal bargain”, the survival of a federal system subsequently depends on the centralisation of tax and armies, the guarantees of the partial autonomy of the constituent units, the growing federal loyalty of the individual citizens, and most crucial, the uniting force of cross-level organised political parties.\(^\text{11}\) If these conditions are not present, disintegration into territorial states would likely be a federation’s fate.

In 1975, William Riker did not expect the European Community to become a federal system, because it lacked a security threat.\(^\text{12}\) However, Riker has been criticised for being theoretically too limited and empirically incorrect in his focus on security threats, in part because economic and identity threats can also unite states into a federation.\(^\text{13}\) In addition, Riker’s notions on the sustainability of federations need further elaboration to explain the survival and dissolution of federations in the past.\(^\text{14}\) Federalism theorists have argued that federations’ survival is facilitated if institutional arrangements foster cooperation between regional elites and national elites, knowing that in the long run the regions profit from cooperation. Moreover, these arrangements also tend to stimulate national elites to protect the interests of citizens in all regions.

Another federalism expert Thomas Franck has argued, drawing on cases of failed federalism in Latin-America, Asia and Africa, that an external threat or institutional arrangements are not crucial for establishing federal

\(^{11}\) Idem, p. 136.
\(^{13}\) McKay, D. (2004), supra note 5.
\(^{14}\) Idem.
unity: “The principal cause of failure, or partial failure (…) can only be found in the absence of a sufficient political-ideological commitment to the primary concept or value of federation itself.”\textsuperscript{15} Yet, an external threat may be advantageous for charismatic leaders to create that commitment. According to Franck, connecting infrastructure and the perspective of economic prosperity can facilitate federalism too, for instance in the United States and Canada with the east-west railways and the idea of the frontier ahead. Nevertheless they are secondary when considering the significance of federal commitment in explaining failed federalism, defined as “the discontinuation of constitutional association” plus “the end of negotiations designed to produce a constitutional arrangement.”\textsuperscript{16} The same holds for factors like social, linguistic, or cultural diversity, or differences in standards of living among and within the participating units: they are influential but not decisive factors in (failing) federalism.

Riker and Franck mention various factors on integration and disintegration of federative systems. They rank factors differently, leaving the mutual dependence of those factors fairly indeterminate. The main problem is that they assume federations will disintegrate only into states. Theories of secession also suffer from that bias, defining disintegration as falling apart into states.\textsuperscript{17} That indicates the breadth and depth of the institutional norm of interterritoriality in federal studies, but it should not be dismissed in advance that the European Union will end up in a non-state situation.

\textbf{5.2.3 (Neo-)functionalism}

Functionalism was one of the first theoretical approaches to specifically address European integration. It basically considers rising transnational interdependence and supranational (functional) bodies as driving forces of integration. According to David Mitrany, the father of functionalism, “state

\textsuperscript{16} Idem, p. 170.
fixation” would hamper the otherwise automatic political reformation of states into functional organisations. Similar to (neo-)realism and federalism, the only option in functionalism for disintegration (or failed integration) is the state. Next to this state bias, functionalism lacks any explanation of how and when ‘state fixation’ may occur. Thus, the neo-functionalist Ernst Haas, partly in response to the De Gaulle period of European (dis)integration, regretted the lack of “a theory of integration supple enough to take account of (…) disintegrative phenomena.” Haas mentioned, for example, a lack of European loyalty among the mass public, and dissatisfaction with the output of the Euro-polity, as potentially disintegrative causes. In addition, the lack of an ideological commitment to sustain the transactional contacts among the constituent units in the Euro-polity would have potentially disintegrative effects. The technocratic and incremental nature of the Euro-polity and the pragmatic interests of market creation make it hard to construct an identity necessary to keep the Euro-polity together, while the “hidden political implications” and “covert economic choices” at the heart of the common market policies will one day or another be confronted with national preferences.

Neo-functionalism before De Gaulle was perhaps too much positively oriented on cooperation, excluding the potentialities of conflict in the processes of integration and possible ensuing disintegration. Neo-functionalists delivered soon after a concept explicitly referring to disintegration: spill-back, referring “to a situation in which there is a withdrawal from a set of specific obligations. Rules are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed. The scope of Community action and its institutional capacities decrease.” Spill-back occurs when member states no longer want to deal with a certain policy issue at the European level. Due to changed or diminished interest in certain policy issues, previous interest coalitions among member states shift, undermining the deals and commitments underlying European rules. The relevance for member states to demand

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20 Idem, pp. 327-331.
solutions from the European political system is thus crucial for the sustainability of European integration. If the “demand flow” would dry up, then European integration shrinks.

Even though this might be an important theoretical building block for analysing European (dis)integration, neo-functionalism seems to assume European integration would spill-back to states. European integration may, however, have changed the political configuration in the EU area to such an extent, that states will not be the only possible end result of disintegration. Sub-national and cross-border regions should not be theoretically excluded, particularly because neo-functionalism emphasizes the significance of interdependence and demand flow: the interdependence in trans-national border regions may be too strong for any full-scale return to national states, while the demand flow from sub-national regions towards ‘Brussels’ may increase at the expense of national capitals.

Another insight taken from neo-functionalism regards the definition of the basic concept at hand: disintegration. Neo-functionalists discussed at length whether European integration referred to a process, an outcome or both. Ernst Haas has defined European integration as follows: “political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”22 It immediately appears that European disintegration is not the same as the process of European integration reversed, because political actors do not necessarily direct their loyalties, expectations and political activities back to the national states but could shift these instead to (trans-national) regional authorities. Thus, disintegration is not necessarily a choice between states or Europe. This territorial trap should be avoided; a definition and theory of European (dis)integration should therefore include (the process towards) multi-layered, multifaceted political constructions.

Stanley Hoffmann criticized neo-functionalists for only focusing on intra-European developments to explain European integration and argued

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that the exogenous context is also of significance. Following a more realist line of reasoning, he perceived the security framework provided by the USA in the western world as fundamental for European integration. A theory of European disintegration should therefore take into account both the developments within and outside the EU.

5.2.4 Transactionalism
Karl Deutsch emphasises the importance of transactions, communications and social exchange for the establishment of international political communities, in addition to the compatibility of values, a certain commonality in identity and loyalty, and some joint rewards for the participant units. Deutsch based his observations on his study of many instances of (dis)integration such as the United Kingdom, the Anglo-Irish Union, the union between Sweden and Norway, Italy, Germany, the United States of America, Switzerland, and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Successful amalgamation of the member units particularly depends on the variation and salience of cleavages cross-cutting the borders previously separating these member units. Popular involvement and support, pluralism, propaganda, and the guarantee of some autonomy for the member units, are also effective methods to promote political amalgamation. An “amalgamated political community”, such as a federation or an empire, is however more difficult to establish and maintain than a so-called “pluralistic security community”. The latter requires only compatible values of the participating units, mutual predictability, and non-violent communication to preserve peace. An amalgamated community must also cope with the demands from (parts of) the member states for participation and (military) burden-sharing, the organisation of the necessary political administrative structures for central decision making and implementation, and the need for a stronger attachment to support the entire community. Rapid integration into an amalgamated community may thus bear the seed of destruction: the inability

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23 Hoffmann, S. (1966), ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation state and the Case of Western Europe’, in Daedalus. Vol. 95, no. 3, pp. 862-915.
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of the European political system to process input and output properly and lacking wide support may foster the de-alignment of its members.

Deutsch’ approach is useful when constructing a theory of European disintegration. A particularly valuable insight of Deutsch is that European (dis)integration could be analysed by lessons derived from historical examples of (dis)integration. Thus, the EU is a comparable political system. However, Deutsch’ transactionalism does not explicate the potential morphology and patterns of disintegration. Neither does the new strand of transactionalism developed by Wayne Sandholtz and Alexander Stone Sweet, although it should be emphasised that this was not the aim of their theory. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet consider the expansion of trans-national activity as a “catalyst of European integration.”25 Trans-national activity stimulates a demand for trans-national rules from supranational organizations to solve cross-border problems, generating pressure on member states to integrate. In contrast to neo-functionalism and Deutsch’ transactionalism, it leaves open whether loyalties and identities would (automatically) shift and change towards supranational centres of decision making. Apparently, a system of policy-making on the one hand and identity on the other hand do not necessarily coincide. As integration can be different in the political sphere from the cultural sphere, patterns of disintegration may differ also in various spheres of life. This potential differentiation theoretically excludes the possibility at least that disintegration will inevitably mean the regression to an all-encompassing state.

5.2.5 Communitarianism

Neo-functionalism and transactionalism both suggest that disintegration comes from less trans-national activity, which means less interdependence thereby diminishing the need for supranational rules among the member states. The question then becomes, what kind of trans-national activity would be essential to sustain European integration. The communitarian

Amitai Etzioni studied in the 1960s various examples of political unification across the world. In a newly added preface to a 2001 edition of the book on unification, he discussed the prerequisites for successful political unification. The first prerequisite is the legitimate control of the means of violence at the supranational level, edging over those of the member units. Second, member units should benefit from the supranational allocation of resources, and third, citizens’ political loyalties towards the supranational authorities should exceed those towards member units, at least in conflict situations.

According to Etzioni, only a full-fledged federation would meet these prerequisites. He maintained that “halfway integration” – in which member units are autonomous in some policy areas and supranational authorities in other policy areas – is unstable. In this respect Etzioni’s specifically refers to the European Community, in which European economic integration and national politics would cause unstable European integration. Instability also stems from the lack of EU-wide moral dialogues to build a European political community. According to Etzioni, particularly the mass public is particularly not engaged in those dialogues fundamental to any political community, defined as “group of people engage[d] in a process sorting out the values that should guide their lives.” According to his understanding, the increase in EU membership is rather “unfortunate” for building a political community. Etzioni’s notes that “moving from 15 to 27 nations may well be enough to severely threaten any supranational community already developed.” The increase in socio-cultural heterogeneity may foster a sense of alienation among the citizens in the EU. That makes citizens nostalgic for their place (regional or national) where they find more homogeneous values. The implication is that policy-making (or a political system in general) cannot be sustained without shared values. However important this sociological insight might be for a theory of European disintegration, it should include an explication of how enlargement and the heterogeneity of

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27 Idem, p. xxxii.
28 Idem, p. xxxvi.
values might exactly interact with, for example, loyalties and the policy-making process.

5.3 Theories of decline and fall of empires
The 2004 enlargement had been an important reason for concerns about the survival of the European Union. Contrary to what one might expect, however, until 2002 the theoretical notions on the (disintegrative) impact of the enlargement on the EU as a whole were barely developed.29 The focus was on the adaptation of the acceding members in Central and Southern Europe. Theoretical studies of the effects of enlargement were still limited in 2004, except for research on the impact of enlargement on formal decision making procedures in the EU.30 The borders and morphology of the European Union and differentiated or flexible integration also received some theoretical attention.31 However, most theoretical reflections were inward-looking, even though external actors and factors also shape the European Union.32 In the debate on the EU’s absorption capacity after French and Dutch voters said no to the European Constitutional Treaty in the spring of 2005, quite a few European politicians emphasised that the boundaries of the European Union are not based on geography, but on values.33 A value-based and expanding nature is one of the characteristics of an empire (see Chapter 3). Comparisons with other instances of enlarging polities were lacking until recently in the literature on enlargement.34 Even if the EU and empires are only remotely similar, the examination of empires may still provide important insights into the issues surrounding disintegration. An additional

advantage of the concept of empire is that it does not neatly fit with national or international politics, meaning that it in principal avoids the territorial bias.

Although many studies have been published on single cases of imperial decline and collapse, comparative and theoretical contributions on imperial (dis)integration have been relatively scarce.\(^{35}\) In one of the few comparative analyses of empires, Michael Doyle considers the external context important for the survival of empires.\(^{36}\) “Barbarian” attacks may signal and partly explain imperial decline and fall. However, most important is the passing of the so-called “Augustan threshold” to consolidate the empire. Passing this threshold depends on a strong, effective and efficient political and administrative system in the metropolitan centre to mobilise the necessary resources (armed forces, taxes, legitimacy) to maintain its control of the peripheries, as well as options of socio-cultural mobility, political participation and economic prosperity for individuals across the entire empire. Doyle also argues that a sense of empire-wide political unity would provide the necessary basis for both effective rule and its attractiveness. In addition, a militarily established empire should be capable of forming economic ties between the centre and the peripheries to consolidate its control and attraction, and an economically established empire should do so vice versa.\(^{37}\)

Next to Doyle, empire expert Alexander Motyl adds the necessity of effective and efficient flows of information and resources to keep an empire running. Particularly in an (expanding) empire, the load of information aggregation may become too heavy and the peripheral demand for more resources too large.\(^{38}\) Furthermore, the metropolitan centre should be able to divide the peripheries to avoid the disastrous situation in which they revolt simultaneously.


\(^{37}\) Idem, p. 128ff.

An empire can only exist if a periphery is available to be controlled. Competition among (potential) empires have thus limited the possibility of the establishment (let alone consolidation) of an empire in Western Europe. Habsburg, Napoleon and Hitler did not manage to establish a European empire because of intra-European feuds, and American and Soviet imperialism did not leave any space for a West-European empire during the Cold War. The present-day influence of Russia and the USA in Europe may prevent the EU from establishing and consolidating a full-fledged empire. The EU also lacks the military means to sustain its political and economic control of the former parts of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and still depends on the USA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The essential question is whether the EU member states and its peripheries accept a change from the union based on “Zwischenstaatlichen Vertragsfrieden” (treaty-based peace between formally equal states) to a system guided by “Imperialen Herrschaftsfrieden” (imperial peace like Pax Britanica). At minimum, the competitive challenge of other (potential) empires to the EU (such as Russia) may stimulate further centralisation, similarly to the centralisation into national states of imperialistic Portugal, Spain, Holland, Sweden, France, England, Turkey, and Germany. Competitive imperialism may thus strengthen the EU’s internal organisation, eventually. If both centre and periphery are economically, politically and culturally merged in a single unit, then the empire has also passed the “Caracallan threshold”, as Doyle phrases it. An empire can also expand beyond its capacity to maintain the internal order, leading to a situation of “imperial overstretch”, a concept developed by Paul Kennedy in his analysis of the rise and fall of great powers. If a great power is not able to keep economic superiority, it will eventually lose its capacity to sustain its political and military ability to defend its imperial interests. A combination of declining economic rank and

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39 Idem.
41 Münkler, H. (2005), supra note 40.
a threat to its position of power, would force a great power to spend more on its armed forces. The consequential underinvestment in economic productivity would result in less tax on incomes, forcing the centre to raise taxes to sustain their military operations, which would result in protests against taxation and less support for military enterprises. The latter would be detrimental to an empire, because it entices those in the peripheries to fight for the independence of their nation. While nationalistic ‘freedom fighters’ in the peripheries are willing to sacrifice their lives, citizens in the imperial core are harder to convince that there is a threat and it is necessary to combat these unknown terrorists, rebels or barbarians (or however they are called) far away. It is often claimed that nationalism is destructive to empires. But nationalistic rebellion is a permanent component of any empire. It is rather the ability of the imperial centre to provide the necessary resources (legitimacy, money, soldiers and weaponry) to prevent or combat irredentist attempts convincingly. The Habsburg Empire exemplifies this.

The Habsburg dynasty favoured enlargement of their empire for its domestic and foreign prestige and grandeur. The financial burden of military operations and the ensuing encroachment on their tax privileges (laid down in constitutional arrangements) provoked resistance among the nobility. The relative economic backwardness of the Habsburg Empire made things worse. Moreover, the nobility on the periphery (particularly on the Italian peninsula) felt excluded from honourable positions within the centralised administration, and gradually became more nationalistic. And thus, the Habsburg Empire effectively failed to pass the Augustan threshold of legitimate rule and effective resource control by the centre, and social mobility for the peripheries. Yet its collapse was not inevitable to its very end in 1918. But similarly to the Roman Empire, the resistance of the higher echelons to support the imperial policies was the death-blow to the Habsburg Empire.

Although the EU has not been expanding due to military conquest, and those in the peripheries join voluntarily, lessons may still be learned

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from the Habsburg experience for a theory of political (dis)integration. It is not only challenges from the periphery that could undermine its capability to survive, but also and in particular the ability of the centre to maintain the legitimacy and economic basis for its imperial policies. A big difference between the Habsburg Empire and the EU is that the latter consists of fully developed democratic welfare states. The resistance of the imperial core is thus not just a case of the higher echelons, but of the entire population. Any enlargement of the EU requires the consent of the approval of the electorate (or their representatives) to share their power, money, and labour with new members. Evidence from nation-states and federations suggest that the willingness to share power, money, and labour decreases, when racial or cultural heterogeneity increases.\textsuperscript{45} Think for example about the tensions of welfare distribution in the Netherlands (“autochtones” vs. “allochtones”), or other tensions in Belgium (Flanders vs. Wallonia), Italy (Padania vs. Mezzogiorno), and the EU (France, Germany, Austria vs. Polish plumbers). The democratic involvement of its welfare citizens may thus prevent the EU from pursuing imperial policies, at least if the EU does not want to lose their support. According to the German political philosopher Herfried Münkler, this is the crucial issue for a democratic empire: “Die Kostenfrage, also die mittelfristige Relation zwischen Nutzen und Lasten imperialer Politik, durfte das Hauptproblem eines demokratischer Imperiums sein.”\textsuperscript{46}

Theories concerning empires tend to focus on the empire’s internal functioning to sustain its efforts to expand its military power or civilisation’s reach. World system theories tend to concentrate on the position of a polity in its external economic environment. An empire’s economic fate is not only dependent on the (enforced) control of trade and surplus extraction within its areas to finance its survival. Accumulation of economic surplus is also dependent on the relative position of a hegemonic centre vis-à-vis other


\textsuperscript{46} Münkler, H. (2005), supra note 40, p. 244.
centres as loci of accumulation within an economic world system.\textsuperscript{47} Disintegration of the EU may therefore not be the result so much of its internal weakness, but the strength of external players attracting capital. However important it is to take external factors into account in an explanation of disintegration, world system theories yet leave the question open which (territorial) patterns of disintegration might occur in a polity. Explaining whether and how EU (dis)integration would be marked by territory is the focus of this chapter. The various theories discussed thus far suffer from a bias or are fairly vague regarding the significance of the factors and actors involved as well as the eventual morphology and patterns of disintegration. In combination with the logic of territoriality, the ideas of Stein Rokkan may, however, offer a fruitful way to explore the relationship between actors and factors of European (dis)integration and political territoriality.

5.4 European (dis)integration and political territoriality until the 1980s

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, Rokkan’s basic contention on polity-(re)formation is the mutual interdependence of a polity’s external consolidation (boundary maintenance) and its internal structuring and system-building. The history of polity-formation in Europe already showed that strong boundaries fostered polities’ internal structuring and system-building and vice versa. In addition, the Rokkanian reading of history shows that territorial boundaries are not a natural given, but are rather the outcomes of political struggles instead. Thus, a Rokkanian perspective avoids the territorial trap. Exit, voice and loyalty and their corresponding counterparts of boundary maintenance, internal structuring and system-building are the mechanisms linking the various factors and actors at play in the processes of (dis)integration. For example, loyalty has been mentioned in various ways by Franck, Deutsch and Haas, while voice structuring has been

emphasised by Riker (cross-level parties), Deutsch (cross-cutting cleavages), neo-functionalists (demand flows and interest coalitions), and federal and imperial studies (linking local and central elites).

Following Rokkanian thinking, the pattern of European (dis)integration is based on the mutual interdependence between external consolidation, internal structuring and system-building. A Rokkanian reading of the history of European (dis)integration until the 1980s is consequently separated into three episodes:

- the first episode, which will be presented in Section 5.4.1, involves the establishment and consolidation of boundaries and loyalties of the Euro-polity from the 1940s to the 1960s to allow for internal structuring and further system-building;
- Between 1969 and 1975, a first wave of external de-consolidation takes place, consisting of westward enlargement, a growing self-confident foreign policy of the West German government, weakening US protection, and international terrorism challenges system-building and the internal structuring of the Euro-polity. Section 5.4.2 presents the external de-consolidation and traces how actors responded and how the Euro-polity subsequently evolved. It looks at whether actors enhanced the internal loyalties and external boundaries, thereby strengthening external consolidation, or whether they limited their voice efforts and diminished their mutual loyalties, thus weakening the internal structuring and system?
- A second wave of external de-consolidation took place between 1979 and 1986, consisting of another round of enlargement, Cold War developments, and globalisation. Section 5.4.3 shows again how political actors and the Euro-polity responded to these challenges.

Section 5.4.4 specifically reflects on the nature of external consolidation. It examines to what extent political actors made use of territoriality and what were the implications of some of these territorial strategies on the functioning of the Euro-polity.
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The difficulty of a theory of European (dis)integration is to define what polity is exactly being discussed, in other words, how to define the Euro-polity. Here, European integration and Europeanisation are considered two sides of the same coin: the creation and maintenance of a Euro-polity through the processes of internal structuring, system-building and boundary-making. The Euro-polity includes the European Union and its manifold predecessors, but can also refer to the grouping of Western-European polities in the Council of Europe, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Economic Area, and the Western European Union, being formally or informally intertwined with the EU. Disintegration of this Euro-polity involves the boundary-weakening of the collective of Western-European polities, the de-structuring (i.e., the deterioration of voice structures) in the various groupings of Western-European polities, or the decline of loyalties among Western-European polities and their common institutions. This broader definition of the Euro-polity allows tracing the existence of loyalties and voice structures outside the formal institutions of the EU and its predecessors, which have had nevertheless a significant impact on the creation and consolidation of those institutions. The aim of the following Rokkanian reading of the history of the Euro-polity’s (dis)integration is to show the basic mechanisms behind European (dis)integration. It is therefore necessarily a selective reading of post-war European history.

5.4.1 From the 1940s until the 1960s: Establishing a Euro-polity
A new division in Europe emerged already during the Second World War, when the Western and Soviet powers mapped their respective spheres of influence at several conferences in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam. The spheres of influence of the governments of the US and USSR is an example of imperialism: (unintended) attempts to create an empire. Both governments sought to spread their values further across the European continent by military, economic or other means. Whereas the Soviet government gradually pressed the Eastern European polities into a position of subordination, the Western European polities maintained the formal freedom not to join the US-led sphere of influence and kept close mutual
contacts. Despite sharing a common civilisation of democracy, human rights, and free enterprise, and despite the predominance of the US government in monetary and military issues, the relationship between the US government and Western Europe could therefore be described at most as an “empire by invitation”, or voluntary imperialism. As is typical for imperial polities, the frontiers are somewhat vaguely defined. Romania on the one side, and Western Europe on the other side, did have political discretion from the imperial core. The buffer zone consisting of neutral Sweden, Finland, and Austria added to the relatively unclear delineation of both the spheres of influence. The face-to-face confrontation of the US and the USSR imperialist policies, however, resulted in a fairly strong boundary, partly consisting of a tight territorial border, the Iron Curtain. The stalemate between the two imperial territorialities thus provided a hard border in Europe, preparing the ground for the formation of the Euro-polity.

The imperial territorialities in Europe formed a layer of power next to the existing layer of state territorialities both in the East and the West. Nevertheless, the economic crisis in the 1930s, the Second World War, and the ensuing Cold War convinced Western Europe governments that national states would no longer be effective to control the economic sphere (through autarky or protectionism) and security (through national defence or neutrality). They were receptive to American ideas to create international and regional security and economic organisations, such as the United Nations (UN, 1945), the Bretton Woods system (1944), the Committee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC, 1947), the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947), and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO, 1949). In addition, Western governments themselves launched various international organisations to collectively prevent (German) military aggression and foster economic growth, such as the Benelux Treaty (1944), the Treaty of Dunkirk (1947), the Brussels Treaty Organisation (1948), and the Council of Europe (1949). Due to its intergovernmental character, the latter organisation did not become a very powerful organisation. Yet it helped to socialise an entire generation of politicians from Scandinavia to

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Italy, and from the United Kingdom to France with debates on European integration\(^9\) being part of system-building for a Euro-polity in the making.

The heart of the Euro-polity was located at the continent. During the Allied occupation of Germany, the leading German politician Konrad Adenauer convinced his predominantly Catholic counterparts in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands of his (reluctant) acceptance of a divided Germany and his desire to start supranational cooperation. Shared anti-communism, willingness for reconciliation across national borders as well as sheer self-interest to access the Ruhr and Saar industrial areas helped Adenauer to rehabilitate West Germany through the French initiative for a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951). The ECSC also provided a means to prevent West Germany to exit from its neighbours’ control, which was particularly feared by the French government because of the military revitalisation of West Germany pursued at American instigation.

The Scandinavian and British governments did not want to join this supranational organisation. Based on the resistance against the sometimes called corporatist, Catholic, and continental cartel\(^{50}\), the ECSC territory seemed to be socially defined, according to a common socio-cultural history. References to Charlemagne’s empire corroborated this social definition of the ECSC territory. Next to Catholic ideas and international networks, functional territoriality has also had a impact on the launch of the ECSC. Many contemporary politicians particularly in smaller ECSC member states underscored the decreasing effectiveness of national territory to support European integration, thus arguing in terms of functional territoriality. Several politicians therefore regretted that Scandinavia and the UK did not participate, among other reasons because their accession would have provided the Euro-polity a more effective scale for a new security and economic order.


Mutual loyalties within the infant Euro-polity did have their limitations. Particularly governments of small polities insisted on and eventually received a veto right for each Member State in the ECSC preventing the larger ones to dominate. Meanwhile, several politicians across Europe favoured the creation of a federal European Defence Community (EDC) and a European Political Community. The EDC had been formally proposed in 1950 by the French government to keep West Germany under the control of its neighbours, after the US government pushed for its further remilitarisation. The Eisenhower administration particularly supported European defence cooperation in order to share the burden of European security more equally. An organisation in which sovereignty would be shared on security issues did, however, overstretch the European loyalty of the French assembly. The assembly refused to put the EDC proposal on its voting agenda in 1954, effectively vetoing it. Instead, in 1954 the Brussels Treaty Organisation (renamed as the Western European Union, WEU) and in 1955 NATO encapsulated West Germany militarily. WEU and particularly NATO provided the necessary safeguard to West German aggression to continue European integration in other policy areas.

Sufficient trust yet existed among the six members of the ECSC to exchange resources: France obtained support for its agriculture, overseas territories, and atom energy programme, while accepting an internal market that did not fit in its mercantilist tradition. In this way, German industry did obtain easier access to the French market. In 1957, the six governments of the ECSC signed the treaties of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The agricultural subsidies in national programmes and the new European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) served to enhance the loyalty of the agricultural electorate to the respective national governments. Before the Second World War, the agricultural electorate had been inclined to support anti-establishment right-wing parties, so governments with these policies sought to limit such expressions of voice by enhancing loyalty. The further development of the European internal market offered an opportunity to siphon off protest voices against unemployment in Italy, since Italians labourers could find jobs abroad more easily. The market had also to provide
the necessary economic growth to establish and maintain welfare states in order to enhance the loyalty of (extreme) left-wing movements in the EEC Member States. Thus, the governments aimed at securing their legitimacy and their people’s loyalty through European cooperation.\textsuperscript{51}

A proposal from the British government in the late 1950s to create a free trade area for the entire Western Europe was turned down since it was believed that external de-consolidation could jeopardise the nascent EEC:

Community and member states officials feared that an early agreement between the Six and the Seven (i.e., the non-ECSC states in Western Europe, HV) would thwart proper implementation of the Treaty of Rome. Instead, they resolved to press ahead with closer Community integration…. \textsuperscript{52}

Keeping the boundaries closed, in other words keeping the EEC externally consolidated, provided the opportunity to strengthen the internal cohesion of the EEC. The possibility of British membership of the EEC remained, however, a challenge to the cohesion of the EEC. The French attempt to initiate intergovernmental European foreign and defence policy could be blocked by the Dutch government in particular, because it could argue to wait for the membership of the United Kingdom. If UK membership was out of the question, it would have remained much harder for the other five governments to deny political cooperation in the French way.

The actual British application for membership in 1961 encountered a flat refusal by the French president Charles de Gaulle in early 1963. According to De Gaulle, the United Kingdom was historically, geographically, economically and culturally too different to join the EEC, which indicates the extent of the imprint of organic territoriality on his thinking about the boundaries of the Euro-polity.\textsuperscript{53} It was thought that refusing British entry would prevent a potential weakening of the EEC, the Euro-polity’s core:


\textsuperscript{52} Dinan, D. (1994), supra note 49, p. 44.

...allowing Britain to join in the early 1960s would in all likelihood have thwarted the CAP, undermined the Community, and turned the customs union into a broad free trade area.\textsuperscript{54}

Thus, De Gaulle’s first refusal may have had a positive effect on the internal cohesion of the EEC. The fixed boundaries of the EEC clearly indicated with what governments’ deals had to be made, allowing deals to be crafted that were beneficial for all of them, even if the benefits were only enjoyed in the long run. The technocratic philosophy of policy-making facilitated the difficulties of trust-making between previously warring nations. Closed boundaries thus serve internal structuring and system-building. Too many exits and new entries can disrupt too much the establishment of a cohesive polity. As Hirschman argued on state formation:

Every state…requires for its establishment and existence some limitations or ceilings on the extent of exit or of voice or of both. In other words, there are levels of exit (disintegration) and voice (disruption) beyond which it is impossible for an organisation to exist as an organisation.\textsuperscript{55}

Indeed, the loyalties among the EEC governments could and did grow throughout the 1960s. De Gaulle opposed the prominence of the European Commission, and sought a decisive voice for his (and other) governments in European decision-making. And despite several severe conflicts, such as the Empty chair crisis (1965-1966), he and his government cautiously avoided a full collapse of the EEC, as did the other governments in response.\textsuperscript{56} The issue was “about how Europe should best be organised rather than whether Europe should organised at all.”\textsuperscript{57} Resolving the Empty chair crisis, the Luxembourg compromise (1966) indicated the willingness to remain together by agreeing to disagree. It allowed a government’s veto if vital interests were at stake notwithstanding formal decision-making procedures based on qualified majority voting. The merger of the institutions of EEC,

\textsuperscript{57} Idem, p. 72.
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EURATOM and ECSC in 1967 and the realisation of a customs union eighteen months before schedule in July 1968 also show the development of apparent loyalties to enhance internal cohesion. European institutions also strengthened the internal cohesion by establishing the direct effect and supremacy of Community rules, and the European Commission’s right to make international agreements.\(^{58}\) By doing so, the European institutions challenged the external consolidation of the EEC Member States. Citizens had a (indirect) new opportunity to voice their appeals to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against their national governments, and the ECJ offered those citizens increasingly exit opportunities to access and stay in other Member States.\(^ {59}\) Because of the extensive implementation of the Treaty of Rome, the 1960s can be seen as a period of consolidation in European integration.\(^{60}\)

5.4.2 1969-1975: the first wave of external de-consolidation

In 1967, the UK government applied again for EC membership. Using similar arguments as in 1963, De Gaulle refused UK access to the EC for a second time. Whereas those working for the European Commission shared his scepticism towards British membership in the EC in the early 1960s, by 1967 they had become much more sympathetic to the British because fears of enlargement disrupting European policies had largely disappeared.\(^{61}\) It was now up to the applicant rather than the EC itself to adapt.\(^{62}\) Nevertheless, the possibility of British EC membership weakened the internal cohesion of the EC. The governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy were restrained in deepening EC integration in order to limit the threshold for new applicants, in particular the UK.\(^{63}\) De Gaulle’s autonomous course put the mutual loyalties within the EC under pressure. After his resignation in 1969, British accession became more likely under the new French President George

\(^{61}\) Idem, p. 142
\(^{62}\) Idem, pp. 139-140
\(^{63}\) Idem, p. 155.
Pompidou. The application by the United Kingdom was soon re-activated, together with those of Ireland, Denmark and Norway.

The expected enlargement was not the only part of the first wave of external de-consolidation of the EEC. Its hard eastern border was also weakened due to West-German attempts to strengthen its engagement with Eastern Europe through its Ostpolitik. Both French and British politicians feared a (partial) exit of an increasingly economic and politically powerful West Germany from the Euro-polity:

In the UK, Prime Minister Harold Wilson used Ostpolitik to further his goal of EC entry by arguing that British accession would restrain German nationalist ambition. In France, Pompidou similarly cited Ostpolitik as a reason to enlarge the Community.64

American and Soviet imperial policies also weakened the external boundaries of the Euro-polity. A weak dollar and an unsuccessful war in Vietnam undermined the trust in the USA as provider of security in Europe. Soviet imperialist interventions in Czechoslovakia heightened tensions at the borders of the Euro-polity. America’s unconditional support for Israel in its wars with Arab neighbours also affected the external consolidation of the Euro-polity and its members. It confronted them with oil embargoes and international terrorism. Meanwhile, the governments of the EEC Member States faced increasing cross-border mobility of persons within the European internal market, hampering effective combat of both international and domestic terrorism (RAF; IRA; Action Directe; Brigade Rosse) as well as criminality at a national scale.

The governments of the EEC Member States initiated their response to this first wave of external de-consolidation at their summit in The Hague in 1969. They decided to foster the internal cohesion of the EEC to prevent it from weakening due to further enlargement and West German exit behaviour. The French government sought “achèvement, approfondissement, élargissement” (completion, deepening, enlargement) of the European community. The completion of the CAP before enlargement also meant

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securing the French share of the agricultural funds. The governments also decided to pursue cooperation on foreign policy (so-called European Political Cooperation, EPC) and monetary issues as well as start enlargement negotiations with the UK to help encapsulate West Germany more firmly in the Euro-polity. Moreover, the governments emphasised the “irreversibility” of being together, thus underlining the bonds of mutual loyalty.\textsuperscript{65} The UK and other new Member States had to incorporate the European treaties, secondary legislation and EPC agreements, in order to maintain the internal cohesion of the EC after enlargement. Whereas the British, Irish and Danish decided to join the EC, the Norwegian electorate decided to stay out of the EC, as they did not want to share their money, labour and power with their continental counterparts.

At their summit in Copenhagen in 1973, the governments of the nine EC Member States sought to make explicit the distinct values common to their European identity that underlies their loyalty. Meanwhile, West-Germany’s Ostpolitik also became locked in the newly established Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in which the governments of the EEC Member States, the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and its vassals, and the non-aligned and neutral European states came together to discuss the European order. The conference resulted in the 1975 Helsinki Act which accepted of post-WWII boundaries in Europe thereby decreasing the tensions at the eastern border of the Euro-polity. In addition, the governments of the EC Member States strengthened cooperation within Interpol, the Council of Europe, and TREVI (initially under the umbrella of EPC; see below) to cope with the effects of deconsolidation of mobile terrorists and criminals.

Beginning in 1974, the regular meetings of heads of states and prime ministers in the European Council aimed at enhancing their voice in the European Community next to the European institutions. Similarly, direct elections of the European Parliament since 1979 provided the then ‘peripheral’ citizens a voice in the European decision centre. Despite this internal structuring and system-building through enhancing mutual loyalty,\textsuperscript{65} Idem, p. 70ff.
the internal cohesion of the EC was seriously challenged by the first wave of external de-consolidation. In contributions to institutional debates on the EC, such as in the Tindemans Report, the concept of two-speed Europe (in other words, partial exits) emerged as a way to deal with the increasing differences among EC Member States after the first enlargement. Harmonisation of regulations particularly in social-economic issues became increasingly difficult. Taking its share of agricultural funds and holding a referendum on British accession and its share, the French government demonstrated their limited loyalty to the UK within the EC. Even though the expansion of regional funds expressed the EC’s financial loyalty to the UK, the discussion on the financial solidarity among old and new member states endured until 1984, when the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher secured a permanent reduction on the British EC contribution. The British loyalty to the continental project of European integration also had its limits, as indicated by the British partial exit from the EC by not joining in the European monetary system in 1979. The internal restructuring of the EC due to the first wave of external de-consolidation thus lost pace. In this period of Eurosclerosis, numerous reports on institutional reforms were written without immediate effect.

5.4.3 1979-1986: the second wave of external de-consolidation
A second wave of external de-consolidation constituted a new impetus for internal restructuring of the Euro-polity. Greenland’s preparations to exit in 1985 did not have much impact on its boundaries. However, the entry of Greece in 1981 to the EC and of Spain and Portugal in 1986 had more of an effect. Governments of old member states aimed at securing their share of EC funds and fishing rights before these two enlargements. Concerns on the capacity of the newcomers to implement EC legislation emerged. The increasing number of EC Member States raised doubts whether the EC would be able to avoid institutional deadlock, or would instead lose internal cohesion.

A freezing period in the Cold War weakened the eastern EC boundary, at least according to the governments of the EC Member States. A full-blown war between the US and SU empires would most probably hit Europe, even
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if the confrontation started in Central-America or Afghanistan. In addition to enlargement and a ‘warming’ of relations among Cold War participants, the second wave of external de-consolidation also included increased mobility of capital, goods, services, and more gradually of persons at a world-wide scale. The sustainability of economic systems at a national scale became increasingly questioned. Due to globalisation and the EC’s internal market, EC Member States were facing increasing number of gaps in their boundaries. Not only competing companies and labourers, but also terrorists, hooligans, and criminals challenged their external consolidation.

In response to the second wave of external de-consolidation, governments of the EC Member States decided to strengthen European Political Cooperation (EPC). Some governments also reactivated the dormant Western European Union (WEU) to follow a slightly more autonomous course from the US-led NATO. Both with the EPC and the WEU, governments from EC Member States aimed at keeping good relationships with the neighbouring Soviet empire, and thus attempting to consolidate the eastern EC boundary. Meanwhile, the enlargements induced a renewed effort to strengthen the internal cohesion of the Euro-polity through modest steps in centralisation and simplification of EC decision-making and policy-making in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. The SEA contained a series of legislative initiatives to create an internal market without frontiers at the European scale by January 1, 1993, offering, however, more exit options from EC Member States. Sustaining loyalty among governments to both enlargement and the internal market, the SEA also extended the structural funds for economically underdeveloped regions. Regional funding stimulated the idea that regional governments could bypass their national governments within a multi-level EC (using Rokkan’s terminology, an exit option for regional governments). The national governments, however, tried to keep the gates closed, dominating the decision-making and implementation of regional funds. The governments of the EC Member States also tried to keep control of the free movement of persons through measures taken in the UN, the Council of Europe, Interpol, and Trevi. In 1985, a group of governments also initiated enhanced
cooperation on border control, justice and police issues with the Schengen agreement (see further Chapter 6 and 7).

5.4.4 Political territoriality in Europe in the 1980s
State territoriality had continued to mark one layer of power throughout the years, being still broadly embedded and deeply engrained. For instance, history and geography text books helped to sustain images of states as geographically fixed, mutually exclusive and centralised entities. As their West-European counterparts, East-European governments also had a seat in the United Nations and other international organisations. Furthermore, Western European governments kept a formal veto on any military action of NATO, and territorial integrity and homeland defence remained imminent goals of NATO members. They also aimed at keeping a veto on decision-making in European institutions. Yet, governments accepted that the national state was no longer the effective scale for all functional policy choices, as the emergence of new layers of power after the Second World War indicated.

The stalemate between the Soviet and Western sphere of influence had provided the Euro-polity with a hard, relatively fixed eastern border. The Iron Curtain became not only broadly embedded in military, political, economic, administrative, legal, and police spheres, but also deeply entrenched in the ideas and behaviour of political actors in Europe. Geographical fixity and mutual exclusivity between East and West were the institutionalised implications of this form of territorial control. Yet, the logic of territoriality could not work to its full extent due to the imperial origin of the Iron Curtain. It was only a temporary barrier for the universal values of the US-dominated Western civilisation, a geographical stalemate between a Western liberal-capitalist civilisation on the one hand, and an Eastern communist civilisation on the other hand. Moreover, it was the legacy of state territoriality that still prevented full centralisation on both sides.

Yet another layer of power emerged within the Western civilisation, the Euro-polity. Although it consisted of state territories, providing the Euro-polity a territorial demarcation, the logic of territoriality remained fairly weak. Due to the functional (seeking economies of scale) and person-
based (uniting those valuing democracy and free enterprise) reasons to create a Euro-polity, it remained geographically relatively unfixed due to the various rounds of enlargements. Geographical inclusion/exclusion as well as centrality remained consequently weak. Other means of cohesion maintenance such as shared functional interests and person-based beliefs were therefore necessary.

The search for an efficient scale of organising security and economy at the European level (as well as at sub-national level since the 1970s) showed that arguments of functional territoriality were at play, undermining geographical fixity of state territory once more. The increasing mobility of capital, services, goods and persons induced adaptations of the geographical scale of polities in Europe. Based on the EC treaties, the European Court of Justice also gradually opened the territories of the Member States, limiting the centralised, all-encompassing and mutually exclusive containership of authority and policy-making within those territories. However, national governments kept a firm grip on decision-making in the Euro-polity, notwithstanding the weakening territorial format of organisation at the national level.

This mixture of imperial, functional and state territorialities resulted in a relative uncertainty about the boundaries of the Euro-polity. Every wave of external de-consolidation required efforts to maintain its internal cohesion, such as increasing financial solidarity, emphasising the mutual loyalties, and facilitating decision-making. The waves of external de-consolidation kept the logic of territoriality at bay in the Euro-polity. For example, enlargements hampered the geographical fixity of the Euro-polity. Non-geographical means such as person-based values (belonging to Western civilisation) provided the glue to maintain the internal cohesion of the Euro-polity. A third wave of external de-consolidation once more unsettled the Euro-polity, as the next section shows.
5.5 European (dis)integration and political territoriality since the 1980s

5.5.1 A third wave of external de-consolidation

The attempts by the new Soviet Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s to revitalise the Soviet Union through limited and guided liberalisation raised the attention of the EC and its members to what happened behind their eastern borders. The COMECON and EC issued a joint declaration in June 1988, establishing mutual recognition as well as the possibility of bilateral economic relationships between EC and individual COMECON members. A first Trade and Co-operation Agreement between the EC and Hungary followed in the same year. Until then, Soviet rule over Central and Eastern Europe remained yet largely unchallenged. Only one year later in 1989, the grip of Moscovian imperial centre loosened rapidly across Central and Eastern Europe. The dramatic decline of Soviet control over Central and Eastern Europe shook the Euro-polity to its foundations. Its solid eastern boundary suddenly disappeared in climate of individual freedom, democracy, rule of law, and national independence. It seemed the heydays of territorial sovereignty. However, governments of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) sought soon protection from Western organisations such as NATO and the EC, for they argued that they share the same values. The rhetoric of those organisations had always been that the Iron Curtain was only a temporary barrier to the spread of their values. Enlargement of both NATO and EC could therefore not be easily denied. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failed restorative coup d’état, even the Moscovian imperial centre under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin initially adopted the Western values of democracy and capitalism.

As the leader of the West, the US government soon got involved in a war in the Persian Gulf region in which it sought to spread Western values even further. The ensuing partial withdrawal of US troops from Western Europe raised concerns, as Soviet troops were still stationed in the CEECs. At first sight, the collapse of the USSR seemed to consolidate the Euro-polity’s external boundaries. The chance of a large-scale conventional or nuclear attack diminished significantly. However, the relatively unknown
governments of the newly independent countries of Ukraine and Kazakhstan also held nuclear weaponry. In addition, the Moscovian imperial centre could try to keep its influence in its near abroad out of resentment about the weakening of its imperial power by military, economic or energy means. After almost fifty years of a territorial stalemate between Western and Eastern imperialism, the boundaries of both spheres of influences would instead begin to continuously shift. The US government expected the EC and its Member States to take more responsibility for the financial, economic and military burden of spreading and protecting values of democracy and rule of law in the EC’s backyard such as in Yugoslavia. The prospect of NATO and EC membership could help prevent ethnic tensions in (Czecho)Slovakia and Rumania from turning violent. The idea of organic territoriality resulted, however, in violent ethnic cleansing in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. Continuous rifts between EC Member State Greece and Turkey regarding Cyprus, the Albanian crisis, and the Aegean Sea could also draw the Euro-polity in violent conflicts at its boundaries. At the end of the day, it turned out the US government and its military forces were still necessary to restore and maintain order at the (south)eastern boundary of the Euro-polity.

Meanwhile, the fall of the Iron Curtain offered the West German government a chance to merge West Germany with East Germany, even though ordinary West Germans seemed not very enthusiastic to share their wealth and power with East Germans. The governments of Germany’s neighbours feared it might escape from the control exercised through the EC, because it was also less bound by imperial control from the West and the East. After their initial resistance to the union of East with West Germany failed to work out, they sought to commit Germany even further to European integration.\footnote{Dinan, D. (1994), supra note 49, pp. 160ff.} Governments strengthened their mutual loyalty at the 1991 Maastricht Summit in a treaty establishing the European Union (EU). The Maastricht Treaty included steps towards a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) to lock in Germany as well as enhance its say in the EU’s backyard. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed German loyalty to European values, sacrificed the German currency to the common
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and thus softened fears in France and the United Kingdom. The Maastricht Treaty required a lot from ordinary citizen’s mutual loyalty to share more power, labour and money at the European level. This was considered too much in the case of Danish citizens. They preferred to keep a larger national voice in security and monetary issues, and received partial exit options (opt-outs) similar to the United Kingdom.

The fall of the Iron Curtain has had a long-lasting impact on the external boundaries of the Euro-polity, which were not addressed by merely strengthening the internal cohesion with the Maastricht Treaty. Its continuous expansion kept the EU externally unconsolidated. A fixed geographical image of the EU has therefore been lacking. The neutral governments of countries in the buffer zone between the East and the West applied for EU membership, even though their populations had reservations about sharing their wealth and power. Finland, Austria, and Sweden moved to join the EU. Governments of many of the CEECs also asked for EU membership. Foreign ministers of EU Member States predominantly agreed with the necessity to expand the EU to ensure peace, rule of law and democracy at a wider scale. Saying that their countries belong to Europe, the governments of CEECs emphasised these common values as reasons for acceptance. In contrast, many European Commissioners and national ministers of agriculture, trade and industry feared enlargement would undermine the internal structure of the EU, or diminish their share of EU power and wealth. As a compromise, the governments agreed upon a set of accession criteria at their 1993 Copenhagen Summit. Between 2004 and 2007, ten CEECs eventually joined the EU as well as Cyprus and Malta.

Together with Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, the EU established in the early 1990s the European Economic Area, while Switzerland bilaterally agreed on the arrangements for a (more limited) internal market. The Euro-polity, with the European Neighbourhood Policy, spilled over into a range of countries from Morocco and Lebanon, to Georgia and Ukraine. Its value-

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basis makes the EU in principle geographically unlimited, only to be stopped by the boundaries of another empire or internal resistance to expansion. The limited internal willingness to share power, money and labour with Turkey has particularly put the external boundaries of the EU firmly on the popular political agenda. The political issue has emerged of whether to define the EU according to the past spread of Christian civilisation, or according to the functional scale of organising security and the market. Meanwhile, the political clashes between the Western forces of NATO and EU on the one hand and Russia on the other hand concerning their influence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Moldova (including Transdniestria), and Georgia indicate roughly where their value-based, imperial frontiers meet, indicating the limits to the EU’s expansion.

The fall of the Iron Curtain and the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans resulted in mounting fears in the EU about the flow of migrant workers and of asylum seekers from Eastern Europe and from Asia and Africa arriving via Eastern Europe. The Iron Curtain no longer served as an almost impenetrable border for people seeking a better life in the Euro-polity. The free movement of persons within a single European market without frontiers reinforced the external de-consolidation of the EU Member States. Referring to the globalisation of trade and finance, the end of the territorially closed state was even proclaimed (see Chapter 1). Voices against immigration increased since the cultural identity of nations, and the national solidarity of welfare regimes were believed to be jeopardised by the flows of migrants and foreign organizations. Warnings against Eastern European mafia and organised crime were often heard. The increasing possibilities of human trafficking directly from Africa further added to the impression of weakening boundaries in the EU Member States. Suspicion towards any form of migration surged after Islamic terrorism received wide attention with the plane attacks in the USA in 2001. Worldwide information and communication technologies of Internet and satellite TV sustain the links between those among the Diaspora and their homeland. These links create uncertainty whether those among the Diaspora are fully bound to the EU and its Member States or maintain cross-border loyalties. Starting with the Schengen agreement, governments of Member States have attempted to
monitor and control the flows of migrants into the EU territory more effectively. The governments officially endorsed free movement of persons within the European Economic Area, but not full-heartedly, witness the reluctance to accept free movement of labour from most acceding countries after 2004. Thus, the mobility of criminals, terrorists and (illegal) immigrants are the last element of the third wave of external de-consolidation of both the EU and its Member States.

5.5.2 Propositions
As with the previous instances of external de-consolidation, enlargement and mobility are the two major challenges to the Euro-polity since 1989. These factors have weakened the boundaries of the European Union and its Member States in the third wave of external de-consolidation. Propositions are developed below concerning how the third wave of de-consolidation might be seen to have changed political territoriality in the Euro-polity since the 1980s. As mentioned in the introduction, concerns about European disintegration exist. The aim of the chapter is therefore to discern particularly the patterns of potential disintegration. The propositions are intended as structural guidelines for subsequent empirical explorations rather than hypotheses to be tested, reflecting the preliminary phase of theory development on changing political territoriality and political (dis)integration.

Proposition A: Enlargement keeps the logic of territoriality weak at the European level
The logic of territoriality requires a hard and relatively permanent border to leave its imprint on political systems. Because the (geographical) boundaries of the European Union continuously shift due to enlargement, the territorial demarcation of the EU does not penetrate deeply into the ideas and behaviour of political actors, and is less linked to other institutions. Even though the outer borders of the Schengen area are fairly strong, they have shifted quite a few times due to the expansion of the Schengen area. As a consequence, a geographical fixed image of the European Union (or Schengen for that matter) does not exist, particularly not at its south-eastern
and eastern boundaries, and people’s attachment to Europe is for the most part defined in non-territorial terms.\textsuperscript{68} Because of the fairly weak territorial institutionalisation of the EU borders, a geographical reification of the Europo- polity has not taken place yet. Instead, the Euro-polity’s system and boundaries are founded on non-geographical factors, such as person-based values (e.g., Christianity; Western values) or function (e.g., effective scale of security or provisions of wealth). Lacking hard borders, the confining effect of geography is weak in the Euro-polity. Boundaries are rather transition zones. A geographically based divide between outer and inner political life does therefore remain weak. The uncertain boundaries of the Euro-polity also seriously challenge the institutionalisation and the hierarchy within the Euro-polity.\textsuperscript{69} The stabilisation of behavioural patterns and social learning are difficult in a polity in which new members arrive one after another and others are expected to join. This hampers in the long run the development of the necessary trust for resource convertibility in the political centre of the Euro-polity. Parts of the Euro-polity refrain therefore from political exchange, opting for partial exits instead, such as the opt-outs of the North-western rim in defence and monetary policy. The growing scale of the Euro-polity also complicates the organisation of voice, because it is harder to organise a decisive voice in a weak centre, and to conclude satisfactory deals among an increasingly diverse membership.\textsuperscript{70}

\textit{Proposition B: A weak logic of territoriality stimulates geographically concentrated representation and mobilisation of voice in the EU}

The weak geographical centrality, fixity and exclusivity in European decision-making requires ‘voicers’ to seek representation and mobilisation at


\textsuperscript{70} Bartolini, S. (2005), supra note 1, p. 387.
the closest distance, geographically and socially. This argument is based on Rokkan’s analysis of voice structures in the process of state formation:

Functional oppositions can only develop after some initial consolidation of the national territory. They emerge with increasing interaction and communication across the localities and the regions, and they spread through a process of “social mobilization.”

As enlargement is de-consolidating the EU-territory, the expectation is that cross-Member State representation and mobilization of voice will remain limited. The opt-outs can be understood as citizens demanding a national say. The closest distance is generally conceived as the national state, but some sub-national entities seriously compete for this position. Think in this regard of Flanders, Catalonia and Scotland. Thus, the weak logic of territoriality and the resulting socio-geographical concentration of voice help explain the dominance of national governments in European integration. National governments have used membership as a facilitative addition to national citizenship to foster loyalty to the Member States. Steps towards sharing power, money and labour at a larger European scale can therefore flounder depending on the limited European loyalty of national citizens. Instead, they may urge their national governments to fight for their national interest in the Euro-polity. It is hard to convince them that the national voice would be heard in Brussels in an ever enlarging union. The call for withdrawal from the EU is not yet widely expressed; that may change after overstretching citizens’ loyalties with another round of enlargement or deepening integration. Secession of a Member State is, however, relatively easy from a geographical perspective, since the still geographically fairly fixed image of Member States clearly visualise what might secede. The ensuing competing territorialities at a national level would keep the logic of territoriality at the European level at bay, similarly to other multi-level systems like federations and empires (see Chapter 3).

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Chapter 5

Proposition C: The costs of exit from the EU are higher than of voice for Member States’ governments

Member States’ governments have tried to keep their final say in many policy areas, as exemplified by the Luxembourg compromise (1966) and existence of opt-outs. European institutions, however, closed these partial exits through the direct effect and supremacy of Community rules. Since the 1970s, policies to enhance the social and territorial cohesion of Europe – an instance of internal system-building – may have also kept (partial) exit at bay. This closure of exits is yet expected to result in the increase and further institutionalisation of voice from both national governments and (Eurosceptic) citizens demanding more intergovernmentalism or the preservation of prerogatives if they are dissatisfied with how the Euro-polity deals with their national concerns. The constitutionalisation of voice in the European Parliament and other intermediate organisations like the Committee of the Regions with the various Intergovernmental Conferences and the European Convention in the 1990s and early 2000s reflect this institutionalisation of voice. Apparently, the fairly young Euro-polity can now handle the growing say of other political actors than governments, which might have been too disruptive in its initial stages. Member States’ governments have still kept a tight grip on the most influential European institutions – they nominate most of the European Central Bank’s board, the European Commission, expert agencies, and steer Euro-policies through the European Council, the Council of the European Union, and its expert committees. The Members States’ governments have become so much involved in Euro-level politics, that an exit would be too expensive. This has been expressed by James Caporaso and Joseph Jupille, who write: “[t]he costs of exit, even selective, are high. This disciplining mechanism stands behind the institutionalization of Europe.” The (lacking) availability of other exit options other than opt-outs may also explain this mechanism. Regarding excludable goods non-membership is more costly than participation, even

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though the latter might encroach on national prerogatives.\(^7\) Partly depending on the locality of the Member States, governments can still seek (partial) exits to other trade and security systems, such as world trade systems, the Russian or American security system.

The exit and voice options of governments ties in with the notion in the above-mentioned imperial and federal studies of the crucial role for the opportunities of social mobility for lower-level elites to the European level. As long as it remains profitable for those elites (\textit{in casu}, the national governments) to invest in the Euro-polity, they remain loyal to it.\(^7\) The profitability depends not only on what the Euro-polity offers in terms of career and prestige, but also on the willingness of the national citizens to support their European activities. What would European integration do to the territorially contained democratic welfare regimes of the Member States?

\textit{Proposition D: The internal market and Schengen weaken the logic of territoriality in the Member States}

The dominance of the governments of Member States does not mean that the logic of territoriality at the national level remains unaffected by European integration. The European mobility regime impacts thoroughly on the territorial framework in which the governments of the Member States make their functional policy choices. The single European market and the Schengen agreement bring about the idea of open borders and the free movement of persons, capital, goods, and services (‘Europe without frontiers’), as well as the actual removal of physical and institutional territorial control of Member States. In other words, European integration offers exit options across Member States’ borders. These weaker borders result in a weaker logic of territoriality in Member States.

The territory of Member States becomes less institutionalised since its geographical fixity is undermined by the image and practice of cross-border

\(^7\) Bartolini, S. (2005), supra note 1, p. 125.
cooperation, which is expected to be most apparent among people living in regions bordering other Member States (so-called interface regions; see below). Instead of the impersonal, geographical reification of political relationships in Member States, other means such as person-based nationalism can be used to replace the territorial locking-in effect (see below). As the geographical locking-in effect is becoming less institutionalised, and the exit options are not evenly distributed among the political actors within the Member States, new cleavages may emerge within and across Member States’ territories (see below). The new cross-border exit options (and voice options for that matter) which are part of European integration also weakens the geographical centrality of Member States. Political actors may no longer invest in political structuring and exchanging political resources within the Member States, since they have other options to use. As a consequence, “balkanisation” of voice organisations and institutions may occur, as well as the weakening of the geographical centre of Member States in which political exchange and voicing have been concentrated.

The mechanisms of exit, voice, and loyalty are dependent on the social and geographical circumstances of a polity. And these differ among Member States; the loyalties in federal Belgium are quite different from the unitary Netherlands, exit options in landlocked Luxembourg differ from those in maritime Ireland, and output satisfaction differs in the richer northern Member States from the less rich south. The impact of European integration in weakening the logic of territoriality will therefore differ from Member State to Member State, from region to region, and from person to person.

Proposition E: When exit options pair with dissatisfaction and diminishing national loyalty, then actors seek cross-border satisfaction

European integration offers exit options to citizens within Member States. It allows citizens to choose among the services of the Member States (even without the necessity to migrate), where they were forced to make use of the services provided in their territorially closed states in previous times.

Political territoriality and European (dis)integration

Particularly because performance in the provision of economic and social policies is monitored, members increasingly know where to go to find better values, goods, and services. The growing economic, political, administrative and legal resemblance of EU Member States due to standardisation and penetration of European norms also lowers the costs of cross-border mobility. European integration also stimulates liberalisation and privatisation within the Member States. Through their policies, European institutions not only advocate and force Member States to make more choices in the provision of (public) services and goods through the market principle, but also exert pressures on the Member States’ governmental budgets. Privatisation is often adopted as a way to cut governmental budgets. Policies of choice and competition offer citizens exit options within domestic systems. Increasing choice in a European internal market provides also foreign exit options to national citizens.

As set out in the previous chapter, only if someone is dissatisfied, considerations how to express that dissatisfaction (exit or voice) emerge. As long as national citizens remain fairly satisfied, they are not expected to cross national borders to seek better value allocation, as research in 2000 by the European Commission also indicates:

[when we look at why 62% of European citizens haven’t moved house within the last ten years, we see that the people concerned reply above all that they are satisfied with where they live. Cited in 81% of cases, this is the principle reason for their sedentary lifestyle by a long way.]

As a matter of fact, the existence of exit options due to European integration can also provide an incentive for state authorities to improve the output and voice opportunities to prevent citizens from leaving. This would strengthen the internal structuring of a Member State. Hence, the opening of borders through European integration does not automatically lead to the further extension of a Euro-polity at the detriment of the Member States.

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Loyalty impacts on considerations regarding whether and how to express dissatisfaction. Attachments and citizenship are predominantly contained within Member States. The external consolidation of the Member States is thus still strong even though the geographical boundaries are weakening. In addition to the predominance of national loyalty, citizens and their (sub-national) representatives have limited opportunities to express their discontent in the Euro-polity. Member States’ governments have jealously guarded the gates to European decision-making. This dominance of those governments at the Euro-level is mainly the result of the EU being their vehicle to maintain the acceptance of their citizens. Hence, the dissatisfaction driving reform in the EU-area is primarily between the governments of Member States and their citizens. Therefore, integration has predominantly occurred within policy areas where state authorities require co-operation to maintain value provisions for their members (e.g., agriculture, economic growth). Issues in which state authorities could still individually gain prestige in their members’ eyes (e.g., security, foreign affairs and defence) have integrated much slower. When resources are available at the EU-level to buy loyalties, Member States still have the decisive or exclusive say (e.g., agricultural and structural funds). However, policy areas that are very sensitive to the relationship between governments of Member States and their citizens (e.g., health care; foreign affairs) are expected to be excluded from European integration. If governments see the EU no longer as an effective means to enhance their citizens’ loyalty, they may abandon it if better options are available to satisfy their citizens’ demands.

**Proposition F: A new cleavage between mobile and non-mobile members emerges**

Dissatisfied national citizens have few options to voice their discontent elsewhere in the Euro-polity, but they are offered an increasing number of exit options because of European integration. However, since the exit options are not evenly distributed, a new cleavage may emerge between the

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"dissatisfied-mobiles" and immobile citizens. Rich regions, labour-intensive companies and rich taxpayers may be given a greater internal voice if governments of Member States fear their exit within the internal market of the Euro-polity. Thus obtaining a bigger stake in the polity and being more socialised within the political centre, exit is more costly for the exit-prone. The exit options offered by European integration to those who are mobile may, however, weaken their incentive to invest in voice institutions within the Member State. European integration may thus foster desires for individual mobility, partly replacing place-bound social mobilisation. The immobile may regret the loss of their mobile fellow-citizens, since they might have been effective, affluent and eloquent defenders of their cause. Thus, the differentiated offer of exit options modifies the political exchanges within Member States between “nomadic”, “option-centred” mobiles and “standing”, “roots-centred” immobiles.

Proposition G: The weakening logic of territoriality in Member States stimulates nationalism

Preventing the rich, affluent or eloquent mobiles from leaving, immobile citizens and also governments of Member States depending on the vote of immobile citizens may opt for nationalism. Thus cultivating the non-geographical, person-based loyalties of nationalism, the (cultural) costs for leaving rise, which may convince the dissatisfied-mobile to stay for the benefit of the entire Member State. As has been argued before, nationalism is still a possibility in Rokkanian thinking. Electoral protest can be directed at the open boundaries within the EU. Less educated citizens and poorer regions have something to lose in international economic competition.

79 Bartolini, S. (2005), supra note 1, p. 11.
80 Idem.
81 Bartolini, S. (2005), supra note 1, p. 400.
without any national shelter. High-potential regions and mobile citizens can now shake off their burden, because the open borders in the EU/EEA offer the escape from the national obligation to share their money, labour and power.\(^{84}\) Meanwhile, strangers from other parts in the EU/EEA can compete for their jobs and benefits. So-called ‘territorialists’ therefore resist European integration (and globalisation) and urge the closure of national borders again, while defending national solidarity, national democracy and national identity.\(^{85}\) In contrast to past empires and the French state before 1789, those who do not benefit from open boundaries have still an option to voice their dissatisfaction through parliamentary elections.

Governments of Member States may recognize in advance that European integration offers exit options for certain mobile citizens and its electoral implications. Anticipating the exit of their citizens if dissatisfaction would occur, they can decide to enhance loyalty towards the state by, for example, emphasising the national culture in education and media or by offering more voice to the exit-prone. Governments of Member States can also choose to deliver more and better output (welfare benefits), or may cut taxes and premiums to remain relatively attractive to stay, and introduce punitive measures for those wanting to leave. Besides preventing exit, these loyalty-generating counter-measures may also diminish the voice of the dissatisfied. The renationalisation of public opinion in most EU-countries throughout the 1990s, including the old Member States provides empirical support for this Rokkanian contention.\(^{86}\) With the increased cultural exclusivity of the Member State, exit-prone citizens may be prevented from exiting and remain more loyal. Stopping value provisions to certain (newly arriving) members may convince exit-prone members that, in their eyes, their resources are no longer being squandered. This stricter circumscription of members would imply a shift to the delivery of resources based on the person rather than his/her residence. Thus, exclusivity and centrality in a

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84 Bartolini, S. (2005), supra note 1.
non-geographical membership space may eventually result in the weakening logic of territoriality in the EU Member States.

*Proposition H: Interface regions have more exit options than other peripheral regions*

The territorialisation of political systems in Europe have allowed for cross-regional representation and mobilisation of voice within states. The territorial gatekeepership of Member States’ governments resulting from its geographically central and exclusive position has become undermined by the weakening of the Member States’ borders. The weakening of the logic of territoriality within the Member States and the weak logic of territoriality at the Euro-level require the citizens of Member States to seek mobilisation and representation of voice at the closest distance, geographically and socially. The exit options offered by European integration tear state-wide interest groups apart. In addition, a clear centre where all decisions for a certain territory are made and can be held accountable for these decisions is vanishing. As a consequence of these two considerations, members would be less inclined to mobilise and seek representation across the state territories. Instead, they seek representation and mobilisation at a closer distance. Informational networks among metropolitan areas may form the basis for the construction of voice structures at social rather than geographical distance. \(^{87}\) Regional voices exemplify the organisation of voice at a closer geographical distance.

Governments of Member States may already have ceded, delegated, mandated, devolved, privatised, decentralised, federalised, or pooled certain responsibilities to avoid further blame for dissatisfactory output and any ensuing deterioration in acceptance:

Regional decentralisation could also have been a way to transfer problems from centre to periphery to avoid centre’s delegitimation. (…) \([\text{R]}\)egionalisation, by transferring powers and responsibility to local

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authorities at a time of rising demands and of budgetary squeeze renders them more vulnerable to popular hostility: responsibility has a price.  

If people’s dissatisfaction increased, they would then turn to these new sub-national authorities. Governments of Member States are expected to hesitate handing over tax competences to other authorities at whatever level, since these latter authorities can use the tax income to enhance their acceptance to the detriment of the former.

Assuming that the globalising and Europeanising economy urges economic systems to become more competitive, governments of Member States would rather invest in the high-potential sectors and regions. This reinforces a differentiation among the low-potential and high-potential regions. Dissatisfied (border) regions were always bound to turn to the central state government, but now they have the opportunity within transnational border regions to play state centres off against each other, or even outmanoeuvre these state centres all together by directly contacting EU-authorities. Moreover, peripheral regions may learn from meeting other regions across the EU that their respective governments mistreat them. European integration can develop relative dissatisfaction with the spread of comparative information. Peripheral regions in Europe may obtain independence by using the exit opportunities at the EU-level. However, “interface territories” are expected to gain most from a multi-level Europe. These territories have been “caught in the cross-fire between two or more dominant centres, and never fully integrated by any of them.” Most of these interface territories are in the Lotharingian city-belt such as Dutch Limburg, Belgian Flanders and Wallonia, and French Lorraine, Alsace and Nice. These regions can now play the political game not just at three governmental levels, but also at two different national levels by directing their dissatisfaction to the national capitals of the (bordering) Member States involved.

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89 Bartolini (2005), supra note 1.
90 Idem.
5.6 Europe’s morphology
This chapter sought to develop propositions on European (dis)integration with a particular interest in the potential patterns of disintegration, while avoiding the territorial trap of many theories on polity-formation. Rokkan’s ideas seem to explain better the stop-and-go nature of European (dis)integration. The ups and downs in the formation of the Euro-polity can be understood as a consequence of the tension between boundary-maintenance and boundary-transcendence. The motor of polity-formation and polity-change in the European Union and its Member States have been dissatisfaction, the weakening of external boundaries, and the weakening of the internal cohesion. Rokkan’s notions can also include the various factors at play in the processes of formation, reformation and deformation of a polity. Patterns of (dis)integration are not restricted to the framework of the territorial state. Instead, new cleavages among mobile and immobile actors and among regions may occur in a multi-level Euro-polity, in which nevertheless the national governments play a key role in its continuation. The patterns of integration and disintegration are not evenly distributed across the Euro-polity because of the differentiated distribution of exit and voice options at the regional, national and European levels, as well as the varying loyalty bonds to various polities within the Euro-polity, and the variegated concentrations of dissatisfaction. It seems therefore improbable that the European Union will again fall apart into Westphalian states in the foreseeable future.

But what about the expected morphology of the European Union? Is it only a temporary anomaly in the Westphalian era, and will it evolve soon towards a Waltzian state as Mearsheimer predicted? Or does the emergence of the European Union indicate a fundamental shift in political organisation, as Ruggie foresaw? An important consequence to be drawn from the Rokkanian sketch of the potential developments of the Euro-polity since 1989 is the distinction between governments and polities. The dominance of national governments within the Euro-polity should not be equated with the continuous significance of the territorial state. Even though they are still
called Member States, governments do and can use less political territoriality within the Euro-polity. The concept of intergovernmentalism should therefore be understood more literally. In other words, national governments may remain important, but not the territorial state.

Will the European Union survive until 2024? French politicians from De Gaulle, Jacques Delors, François Mitterrand to François Bayrou have been consistent in protecting the Euro-polity from disintegrative developments by resisting (quick) expansion to respectively Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey. Further widening may thus mean weakening of the Euro-polity. The expansionary nature of the Euro-polity may, however, soon be countered by the imperial politics of Russia and the United States. The geographical stalemate between these three polities with imperial traits can provide the hard borders and ensuing logic of territoriality in the Euro-polity. Until then, its basis of values, the inequalities due to opt-outs, national loyalties, balancing elites between the national and the European level, the cleavages between mobiles and immobiles, rivalries among regions and metropolitan areas, and an emphasis on exit instead of voice are factors which make the Euro-polity resemble an empire. The following chapters will empirically examine these claims and should provide the first indication whether these claims hold any truth. As the case of France has shown, a highly improbable outcome should not be excluded.