Chapter 1
Making political territoriality variable

Europeanisation (...) challenges the unity of the territorial framework within which the functional policy choices were exercised.
Stefano Bartolini

Given [the] centrality of territory to the understanding of politics, it is perhaps surprising that territory has so often been neglected as a factor in the social sciences.
Michael Keating

1.1 Political territoriality beyond Westphalia

After the formation of states, nations, democracies and welfare regimes, regional integration heralds a new phase in Europe’s political history. European integration unfreezes state territoriality in which nations, democracies and welfare regimes have been largely contained, while it leaves the boundaries of the European Union (EU) relatively unfixed. Deviating from the fixed, territorial framework of the modern state, the EU has therefore been labelled the first “post-modern” political system going “beyond territoriality”.

This European challenge to the territorial framework of the EU Member States has raised some concerns.

A Europe without frontiers facilitates entry to and exit from state territories particularly through free movement of capital, persons, services, and goods within the internal market. Some fear that porous borders will undermine welfare states, since wealthy citizens and regions can less easily be forced to stay within the states’ territorial confines to share the welfare burden. Foreign ‘have-nots’ may enter the state territory to claim social security benefits to the detriment of domestic ‘have-nots’. Furthermore, the planning and provision of

---

public services may encounter serious logistical problems if anyone can leave and enter: “[i]n a system without clear borders it is difficult to envisage the
distribution of public goods in any organized manner”. In addition, territorially
bounded police patrol and penal law will be less effective, because criminals and
terrorists can easily flee across national borders. The challenge to their territorial
framework may not only jeopardise EU Member States’ control but also their
legitimacy. Underperformance in providing security and welfare may undermine
citizens’ acceptance of their states. Moreover, the unsettling of Member States’
territorial frameworks may also have serious implications for the popular
expression of legitimacy through democratic elections, because it has been
developed basically within those frameworks. The viability of democracy on a
non-territorial basis has been discussed, but questioned. Effective organisation
of welfare, democracy and security at an EU level would face similar problems
because of its loose territorial boundaries.

To determine whether these concerns are justified requires empirical
research tracing whether Europe is indeed going beyond territoriality, and if so,
this would bring about the worrying implications foreseen. Empirical research
requires a conceptual vocabulary, comparative tools, and analytical instruments
to explore political territoriality (in short the political use of territory) and its
implications for organising polities, politics and policies in Europe. Until
recently, however, the study of political territoriality has suffered from a lack of
attention by the social sciences, even though territory is fundamental to one of
the polities most discussed by social scientists, i.e. the state. The sociologist Max
Weber emphasizes this in his often quoted definition of the state:

[Der] Staat ist diejenige menschliche Gemeinschaft, welche innerhalb eines
bestimmtest Gebietes – dies: das ‘Gebiet’, gehört zum Merkmal – das Monopol
legitimer physischer Gewaltsamkeit für sich (mit Erfolg) beansprucht.

The Peace Treaties of Westphalia (1648) are commonly referred to as the
symbolic starting point of the modern state. Internal and external

---

Communities to Communities of Choice: Implications for Democracy’, in W. Streeck (ed.),
Internationale Wirtschaft, Nationale Demokratie: Herausforderungen für die Demokratietheorie.
Making political territoriality variable

acknowledgement of its monopoly of force provides the state sovereign rule within its territory, dividing the hierarchy of domestic politics from the anarchy in international politics. At least, that has often been the (implicit) assumption in the analyses of politics within states (Comparative Politics) and between states (International Relations). As a consequence, political territoriality is often understood only in its Westphalian guise of the fixed, contiguous and clearly demarcated territory of a sovereign state in which all policy-making is bundled. If political territoriality is explored at all, its Westphalian understanding has hampered reflection upon the changing use of territory. This Westphalian view of territoriality has come under severe criticism in recent years:

Academic scholars have been in a key position of the territory-centred outlook on the world and in shaping the practices and discourses through which the current system of territories is perpetually reproduced and transformed. Most of the literature simply assumes statehood, without identifying the basic elements of state, not to talk about challenging them.7

And

It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground that one is walking on.8

According to the political geographer John Agnew, this negligence is due to the “territorial trap” in political analysis, consisting of the assumption of territorial sovereignty, the separation of domestic and foreign realms of politics, and the designation of distinct societies by state borders.9 These spatial images underpinning theories in political science preclude outcomes deviating from the Westphalian state. As long as the political world is neatly carved up in sovereign states, the Westphalian assumption dividing Comparative Politics and International Relations would not be necessarily problematic. However, just establishing the fact that the political world is more or less ordered by Westphalian territoriality requires empirical investigation. In addition, it may well be that the use of territory even in a world of states is much more varied

---

across the world than is assumed. Territoriality can have different meanings and significance for failed states in Africa than for China or India.

Today, globalisation and above all European integration are said to challenge the Westphalian underpinnings of the state and its analysis all together. Some have even proclaimed the simultaneous end altogether of the political relevance of states, geography and political territoriality (see below). More modest claims speak of variable geometry in Europe. In a recent state of the art overview, political scientist Miles Kahler asks for a more refined empirical judgment of how globalisation and European integration are related to political territoriality in states and other political entities. He proposes therefore to perceive territoriality as an “institutional variable” of a political unit:

A taxonomy of institutional composites or bundles is required in order to define unit variation. (…)Territoriality is often identified as a core institutional feature of the modern state. It is also a key dimension of unit variation: most political organizations are territorial in some sense but their territoriality differed from contemporary practices and interstate conventions. (…) Modelling the institutions of territoriality, which are central in defining state and unit variation, should become a central part of the institutional research agenda on the state. (…)Treating the state and other units in world politics as composites of institutions has the attractive side benefit of providing International Relations and Comparative Politics with a common vocabulary and methodology.10

Making political territoriality a variable avoids the narrow focus on the question of whether Westphalian territoriality does or does not mark Europe. As this book seeks to show, a more refined concept of political territoriality is essential to understand politics, policies, and polities in Europe. The first challenge here is to develop the instruments to analyse variation in political territoriality. That involves a conceptualisation of political territoriality, followed by means to observe its variation as well as a classification of political units according to territorial variation. This challenge also includes developing analytical instruments to help understand why political actors use territory in certain situations, as well as explaining the perhaps unintended effects of using territory in politics, policies and polities. The second challenge is to obtain an empirical impression of varying political territoriality within the EU and its implications with the help of the analytical instruments developed. The intended aim is also

---

to help shed light on the concerns expressed above. Section 1.3 explains which empirical cases will be examined. The next section 1.2 provides a short, historical overview of the relative negligence of the issue of politics and territory in scholarly circles.

1.2 The golden age of territoriality theory?

The recent multidisciplinary exploration of territoriality has been discussed to such an extent that the author David Delaney speaks of a “Golden Age of territoriality theory.”¹¹ This claim may now be justified in comparison to the negligence of the theme thirty years ago. Until this time, “[g]eographers have discussed territoriality (...) but not developed the subject systematically.”¹² It was not until 1986, that the political geographer Robert Sack published his *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History.*¹³ This text is one of the first and few works offering an interdisciplinary understanding of political territoriality that is not exclusively informed by the Westphalian state.¹⁴ The conceptualisation of political territoriality in chapter 2 will therefore elaborate on Sack’s thorough analysis of territoriality, which he defines as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.”¹⁵ But what made political territoriality such a neglected issue for so long, even in political geography?

1.2.1 Research on politics and territory until the 1980s

The origins of research on the link between territory and politics go back to the evolution of states. The concept of political geography emerged in late 18th century’s France with the government’s mercantilist programme aimed at creating wealth in the French territory by centralised control, geographical planning, and statistical research.¹⁶ The late 19th century German Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) is traditionally seen as the founding father of political geography as

---

a distinct field of research. Previously, the relationship between politics and territory was considered part of the historical analysis of the origins of states and institutional development or of geographical research on how the natural environment impacts on mankind and his activities.\textsuperscript{17} A close link between earthly conditions and political activities also appeared in Ratzel’s work, although he shunned crude deterministic environmentalism. He launched an organic state theory, partly based on Social-Darwinist ideas, holding that historically people have required a diversity of resources in their living area for their survival. As a consequence, people in order to fulfil their full potential seek more living space to survive, absorbing peripheries to access necessary resources or workforce.\textsuperscript{18} According to the organic state theory, borders function as the state’s skin, moving outwards as the body politic grows. The Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922) further developed Ratzel’s organic views, introducing the concepts of geopolitics and autarky.\textsuperscript{19} In his view, geography is a fundamental factor in the worldwide power struggle of soil-bounded people next to economy, demography, society and politics.

After the First World War, border issues became of particular interest in German academia and politics. For instance, the Curzon line dividing Eastern Prussia from the rest of Germany received a lot of attention. In 1924, the German political geographer Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) launched an academic journal on political geography, expanding on the Social-Darwinist, and organic ideas of Kjellén and Ratzel, albeit from a rather geographically deterministic point of view.\textsuperscript{20} Particularly since 1933, contributions on the relationship between politics and geography have increasingly adopted a geographically deterministic, racial, and nationalistic undertone.\textsuperscript{21} Nazi ideologists used those ideas to justify claims for more space in Central and Eastern Europe.

Meanwhile in France, researchers in political geography like Paul Vidal de la Blache, Jacques Ancel, and Lucien Febvre focused more on the detailed description of regions and (colonial) states, disassociating themselves from the organic state theory, Social-Darwinism, and geographical determinism.

\textsuperscript{17} Hartshorne, R. (1935), ‘Recent Developments in Political Geography, I’, in \textit{American Political Science Review}. Vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 785-804.
\textsuperscript{19} Idem, p. 271.
\textsuperscript{21} Hartshorne, R. (1935), supra note 17.
Making political territoriality variable

connected to the many German contributions to political geography.\textsuperscript{22} In the view of these French political geographers before the Second World War, the geographic environment influences the possibilities for political action, but political actors also influence their geographic environment at the local, regional, national or international level. Even though French political geography kept its distance from certain German interpretations of political geography, scholarly attention to politics and geography largely waned after the Second World War partly due to its association with Nazi ideology.

Before the Second World War, organic ideas and environmental determinism were also present in the Anglo-American scientific communities. However, the prominent locus of politico-geographical research was in economics (UK) or in geology (USA). As a consequence, organic concepts gained less ground. Nevertheless, the Anglo-American communities brought about geopolitical analyses of the military sustainability of empires and states from a Social-Darwinist or organic perspective. To mention the most well-known exponents, Alfred Mahan (1840-1914) and Halford MacKinder (1861-1947) discussed respectively the geo-strategic advantages for empires and states to control the seas and the control of the Eurasian continent through the recently introduced railroads. Considering the imperial aspirations of Germany, it is no surprise Haushofer found inspiration from these sources in his considerations of great power politics.

After the Second World War, the association with Nazi ideology made explicit study of ‘the’ state in relation to geographical space less acceptable also in the Anglo-Saxon world.\textsuperscript{23} For instance, the International Geographical Union did not allow sessions on political geography at its conferences until 1964.\textsuperscript{24} Using a more functional approach to boundaries and territories, American political geographers, such as Richard Hartshorne, could avoid the organic and geographical determinism of pre-war research on politics and geography in Germany. Political geography kept a rather descriptive focus in the Anglo-American scientific community, taking the Westphalian state mostly for granted. The geopolitical perspectives nevertheless survived in American research on

\textsuperscript{24} Glassner & Fahrer (2004), supra note 18, p. 6.
International Relations due to the influence of European immigrants such as Nicholas John Spykman, Robert Strausz-Hupé, and Hans Morgenthau. Among other ideas, the competitive struggle for state survival, the geographical location of power resources, and containment strategies indicate the continuation of geopolitical thinking particularly in Realism.\textsuperscript{25} The former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger re-launched the concept of geopolitics in the 1970s. State territory remained fundamental in the ontology of geopolitics and Realism.

In summary, the Nazi legacy partly explains why political territoriality was neglected as a research subject until thirty years ago. Moreover, the prominence of states in politico-geographical/geopolitical analyses has left (state) territory relatively unquestioned. The focus was rather on geographical factors influencing state behaviour, than on variation in (state) territoriality. The close ties between political science and law studies until the 1960s may also have limited the understanding of territoriality to the legal principle of territoriality, thus neglecting variable use of territory in practice as a research issue.

Notwithstanding the predominantly Westphalian imprint on thinking about politics and geography after the Second World War, doubts were already expressed regarding the survival of territorial states in the 1950s. According to John Herz, state territory would no longer provide a safe shelter in the era of nuclear long-distance missiles.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, the ideological antithesis between capitalism and socialism during the Cold War glossed over Westphalian territoriality:

It is a characteristic of contemporary, so-called ideological politics that it deliberately tends to blur the difference between foreign and domestic territory, and between internal and external politics, weakening thus the status and importance of boundaries.\textsuperscript{27}

Indeed, the boundaries within the Soviet Empire between, for example, Romania and Ukraine were much weaker than the Iron Curtain between the western and eastern block of states. The collapse of colonial empires in the 1960s and the ensuing independence of African and Asian states however re-emphasised the significance of Westphalian territoriality. Herz has subsequently partly

\textsuperscript{25} Criekemans, D. (2007), supra note 20, ch. 3.
\textsuperscript{26} Herz (1957), ‘Rise and Demise of the Territorial State’, in World Politics. Vol.9, no.4, pp. 473-493.
Making political territoriality variable

withdrawn his earlier statement on the full demise of the territorial state. Although he later again expressed his doubts about the viability of the territorial state because of the worldwide scale of environmental problems.  

Contrasting with the materialist focus in political geography and geopolitics, the American foreign policy analysts Harold and Margaret Sprout have since the 1950s also emphasised the significance of the “psycho-milieu” of political actors next to the real situation in which they operate (“operational milieu”). The psycho-milieu refers to political actors’ perceptions of their social and geographical situation, whether or not they correspond to the real situation. This approach prepared the ground for questioning the perceptions, images and mental maps underlying the assumption of the Westphalian state in political science. The 1970s featured a revival of political geography and geopolitics both in America and Western Europe, among others personified by the American political geographer Peter Taylor. This revival also brought about attempts to theorise the relationship between territory and state-making, such as Significance of Territory authored by Jean Gottmann in 1973. The renewed attention to politics and (territorial) geography coincided with the growing attention to the social construction of reality. Led by the geographer Yves Lacoste, the newly established French journal on geopolitics Hérodote (1976) therefore increasingly focused on geographical representations in public opinion, not only of states but of political entities at various levels. This once more prepared the ground for exploring the perceptions, images and mental maps underlying the assumption of the Westphalian state in political science.

Meanwhile, de-colonisation gave a boost to comparative research on old and new states. Several times the state was brought back in and thrown out as an autonomous institutional arena vis-à-vis society, constraining and enabling political behaviour and outcomes in society and international politics. Pluralist, structural-functionalist and neo-Marxist explanations of development often neglected the institutional mould of territorial states as an independent factor. Particularly pluralists and structural-functionalisists often took inter-state society for granted, while neo-Marxists took the territorial state as the starting point of a history of (worldwide) class struggle in which it was supposed to disappear fully.

---

30 Criekemans, 2007, supra note 20, ch. 4.
Chapter 1

To avoid a simple yes/no discussion on the existence of ‘the’ state, Joseph Nettl proposed conceiving of the state as a “conceptual variable” (stateness) to give a more accurate impression of how states may differ in the extent to which they penetrate their society. Nevertheless, also other attempts to bring ‘the’ state back in discussions left Westphalian territoriality a rather unquestioned part of states’ variation.

Historical explorations of the origins of states were the exception. They particularly drew attention how differences in the (territorial) institutional mould of states effects their further development. Territory became less of a passive, neglected element, but an institutional framework determining the paths of regional and national politics. A volume edited by historical sociologist Charles Tilly stands out in this respect, particularly because it contains a contribution that deals with political territoriality by the political scientist Stein Rokkan. In this and his other writings on the emergence of states, nations, and democracies in Western Europe he presents theoretical notions on the maintenance and transcendence of boundaries without taking Westphalian territoriality for granted. Only for this reason, it would be worthwhile to elaborate on his ideas to understand how political territoriality has changed in Europe today. As will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4, recent interpretations of Rokkan’s work by political scientists Stefano Bartolini and Peter Flora have already underlined and expanded the richness of these ideas in analysing changing territoriality and its implications for politics in present-day Europe. Thus, after negligence in the decades following the Second World War, and despite the dominant attention to non-territorial issues in political science and International Relations, a few analytical building blocks have been developed since the 1970s to examine the relationship between politics and territory.

1.2.2 Politics and territory in International Relations: neo-realism and globalisation

In response to the neo-realist theory of international politics launched by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, historical research also emerged (again) as a subject in

---

Making political territoriality variable

the study of International Relations (IR). John Ruggie contested Waltz’ “ahistorical” assumption of the hierarchical Westphalian state, leading to Waltz’ thesis that the international system is anarchic and decentralised, effectively forcing them to survive as they are. Waltz’ theory would thus theoretically exclude the possibility of functional differentiation among political units as well as change of the international system itself.\(^{35}\) It could therefore not account for the transformation from the also anarchic Medieval Europe harbouring a wide variety of function-based guilds, territorial princedoms, person-based allegiance to feudal lords and popes towards the modern system of states.\(^{36}\) Neither could Waltz’ theory address the potential change of the international system beyond Westphalian territoriality, for example in the European Union, which is a more complicated issue for IR studies as a whole:

\[W\]e are not very good as a discipline at studying the possibility of fundamental discontinuity in the international system; that is, at addressing the question of whether the modern system of states may be yielding in some instances to postmodern forms of configuring political space. We lack even an adequate vocabulary; and what we cannot describe, we cannot explain.\(^{37}\)

Here also history provides a starting point to reflect upon Westphalia. Among others, Friedrich Kratochwil, Hendrik Spruyt, Alexander Murphy, and Daniel Deudney have explored historical examples (of the borders) of non-Westphalian polities, such as Mongol tribes, the Hanseatic League, and the Philadelphian confederacy.\(^{38}\) The more historically sensitive English School in International Relations also offered inspiration to reflect upon less and non-Westphalian politics. In an extensive comparative historical analysis, Adam Watson discussed the rather fluid and gradual distinctions between systems consisting of

---


\(^{36}\) Idem, ch. 5.


independent states, suzerain systems, and empires.\textsuperscript{39} Hedley Bull, another scholar considered to belong to the English School, presented the concept of neo-medievalism\textsuperscript{40}, which allowed “to free our minds from the confines of the modern state system, whose assumptions prejudice us to the degree that they obscure new developments.”\textsuperscript{41}

More recently, political scientists Benno Teschke and Andreas Osiander have discussed whether the Peace Treaties of Westphalia were actually Westphalian in the way that it has been understood later, and when the practice of political territoriality really did become closer to the ideal type of Westphalian territoriality.\textsuperscript{42} The last two questions particularly underline the need for a comparative toolkit for empirical research intended to prevent claims on the demise of the state and its territory being based on a fictive image of a Westphalian past. It will not possible to discuss and summarise the histories of (territorial) reconfiguration in Europe in this book in full detail. The focus will be on the development of analytical tools and their application to the European Union. There is not enough space here to address the subtleties, contradictions and contingencies of the histories of (failed) attempts of (territorial) polity-formation. However, the conceptualisation and explanation of changing political territoriality will be historically illustrated to understand its variation over time better.

In particular neo-realists have been since the 1980s increasingly criticised by others for confirming and thus legitimising existing power structures by taking the territorial state for granted. The social (de)construction of states and spaces thus became a research focus in International Relations.\textsuperscript{43} Inspired partly by the French journal \textit{Hérodothe}, the field of Critical Geopolitics explored the previously assumed geographical nature of international politics.\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
Making political territoriality variable

research and critical reflection have thus challenged in IR the assumed existence of Westphalian territoriality from 1648 until today, providing the building blocks of how to ‘de-Westphalianise’ thinking on changing political territoriality. Yet in 1996, IR scholar Tuomas Forsberg concludes that “although territoriality is often mentioned as a defining element of the international system it is usually just mentioned, not theorized.”

Concerns have been expressed that research just assuming Westphalian territoriality instead of reflecting on its institutional and historical origins would be detrimental for understanding international politics:

In a very real sense, our knowledge of international relations actually deteriorated between the 1960s and 1990s, as students accepted realist and neorealist norms, while rigorously limiting research to testable propositions or shaping it to use accessible data. At the same time, they increasingly accepted the world of their imagination as unchanging and ignored the historical roots of the present and the future.

In recent years, the expanding literature on territorial conflicts has made some attempt to unravel state territoriality; nevertheless Westphalian territoriality often remains a dominant assumption in these accounts of war. Critical Geopolitics also suffers from a lack of tools to analyse the relations between the material environment and the operational milieu of political decisions on the one hand, and on the other hand the understanding of geography and territory.

Thus, the call by Miles Kahler and John Ruggie to conceptualise and theorise political territoriality keeps its urgency.

The increase of cross-border economic transactions has contributed to the development of theories that claim the demise of the state and its territory is inevitable. However, functionalism and liberal-institutionalism soon re-included the state in their analysis, instead of expecting it to be replaced fully by functional international organisations and other non-state actors. Moreover, even if Westphalian territoriality would play less influence due to cross-border

---

Chapter 1

economic transactions, national governments may yet still remain the dominant political actors. The territorial state may be in decline as an institutional arena, but a national government can seek different, non-territorial, ways to keep a powerful position in a less Westphalian world. It would be interesting to know what would happen to the behaviour of governments and other politically relevant actors if the institutional arena is less marked by Westphalian territoriality, but that requires a distinction between the state as an institutional arena on the one hand and national governments as political actors on the other hand.

The last wave of claims on the inevitable demise of the state and territoriality emerged since the late 1980s with the onset of globalisation. It was claimed that among other things, information technology, footloose capital, worldwide pollution, and international migration would make borders porous and permeable, rendering territorial control no longer effective. More moderate claims were put forward on the expected non-congruence of financial, economic, political, and cultural systems with state territories, among others because fluid networks of cities connected through virtual reality would gloss over the static territorial states. The end of the Cold War also contributed to the idea that worldwide economic and political cooperation could rest on universal norms of liberalism and capitalism. Together with this end of history, the definitive end of the Westphalian state including the political relevance of territory, distance, geography, and frontiers were proclaimed. As the political scientist Klaus Schlichte somewhat cynically concludes in a review of another book claiming the end of Westphalian territoriality:

Resümiert man, was in den letzten Jahren alles sein Ende gefunden haben soll – von der großen Theorie bis zum Ost-West-Konflikt, vom Wohlfahrtsstaat bis zur Geschichte überhaupt – dann ist es nicht verwunderlich, daß auch die Territorialität nicht verschont bleiben darf.

The claim of the end to Westphalian territoriality may yet be somewhat premature. The end to the territorial state has been proclaimed before, and yet


the territorial state is still significant in world politics.\(^5^2\) For instance, after the cross-border ideological opposition between socialism and capitalism during the Cold War, Westphalian territoriality regained its appeal, as exemplified by the increasing number of political entities claiming territorial sovereignty in then Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. Present claims on de-territorialisation may be derived from a myopic view of the political world today, as Ian Clark argues:

Apart from a few isolated, and oft-repeated examples – such as the Internet and financial networks – most other human activities and relations appear to be steadfastly grounded, even if not wholly territorially enclosed. There is then the danger that ‘a borderless world’ focuses attention on a limited, and atypical, range of relationships: it might not be ‘wrong’, but can nonetheless distort by being unrepresentative.\(^5^3\)

Indeed, the protection of (intellectual) property rights and penal law are still reducible to state territories, despite the steep rise in cross-border transactions with the Internet.\(^5^4\) Surveillance capacity of states has been largely extended due to modern information technology, creating virtual city walls. National missile defence may even restore territory as an effective security shelter.\(^5^5\) In international law, territory is still considered a fundamental part in the international society of states. Political identification is still often expressed in territorial terms, even though people live in the diaspora. Globalisation is apparently not “antithetical” to territoriality.\(^5^6\) And even if Westphalian territoriality does leave a weaker imprint on political behaviour due to globalisation, this does not necessarily imply an end to political territoriality in general, but might instead be part of political “re-territorialisation” on a different scale and with different content.\(^5^7\) In other words, the end to the legal principle of territoriality does not mean territory is no longer used for political purposes.

Chapter 1

The potential impact of economic integration, whether regional or global, on (Westphalian) territoriality therefore requires more refined comparative tools and analytical instruments to map changing political territoriality empirically. Particularly because it seems unlikely that economic integration will affect all states and territories similarly and at the same time, comparative tools can show variations in the political use of territory and the implications of these variations on the functioning of political systems such as the European Union, an EU Member State, or a cross-border Euregion. Among others, the political geographers Peter Taylor and Anssi Paasi, as well as globalisation expert Jan Aart Scholte, have developed analytical instruments to map empirical development in the political significance of political territoriality. These instruments and methods will be discussed in Chapter 2. In the field of International Relations theorising regarding changing political territoriality remains problematic, not at least because IR as a field of research is based on the very existence of Westphalian territoriality (see further Chapter 4). IR still struggles to conceptualise and theorise non-Westphalian re-territorialisation. Instead, IR theories assume state territory will remain (Realism) or will disappear (globalisation studies), which then explains their neglect of variations in political territoriality as a research subject.

1.2.3 Politics and territory in other research fields
The field of Comparative Politics has not done much better in conceptualising and theorising political territoriality than IR. Comparative Politics scholars have equally neglected territory-related issues for a long time: “A territorial approach to politics (…) seemed to disappear from the academic lexicon after 1945.”\(^58\) This even holds in one of its most relevant sub-disciplines: “[t]he importance of territory has too often been neglected in studies of federalism.”\(^59\) In regionalism studies, the complaint about the absence of territory as a subject of study has also been heard.\(^60\) In the last several years the number of federalist and regional studies theorising about territory in politics are increasing. In addition, Ruggie’s call for conceptualising and theorising regarding territoriality has resounded in

\(^{57}\) Forsberg, T. (1996), supra note 45.
Making political territorality variable

new studies in Comparative Politics. Included among these is the volume *Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared* edited by Christopher Ansell and Guiseppe di Palma, in which Stefano Bartolini applies his Rokkan-inspired thoughts on peripheries in the European Union.\(^{61}\) Chapter 4 will discuss at greater length these ideas, and will also show the inappropriateness of both the Comparative Political and International Relations approach for dealing with political territoriality in the European Union since the EU neither fully resembles within-state politics nor between-states politics.

Exploring rather than assuming state borders has also emerged in the area of border studies in political geography. Whereas the focus has been on (conflicts at) state borders for a long time, a more differentiated approach to borders has been adopted today. Borders are no longer simply seen as of a fixed geographical or physical nature delineating states. Instead, borders can be mobile and do not necessarily bundle economic, cultural, political and social systems together.\(^{62}\) New political spatiality “beyond territoruality” is investigated\(^ {63}\), such as in the “network society” characterised by “spaces of flows” between metropolitan information networks across the world instead of the “spaces of places”.\(^ {64}\) Border studies have paid particular attention to the social construction of cultural identity and ensuing borders. This approach has also been adopted by some in IR studies.\(^ {65}\) Another dominant focus is on the tension between the transcendence of borders through globalisation and the resurgence of borders due to processes of securitization of national identity. The growing attention on borders notwithstanding, the bulk of political geography research has as yet only been descriptive and lacks thorough theorising. As the political geographer Neil Brenner and others have pointed out in a stock-taking volume of theories on states and spaces: “Much theoretical work is still needed on several key historical and/or contemporary aspects of state space. These include territoruality (...) and associated processes of state spatial restructuring, such as debordering,

---


\(^{64}\) Castells, M. (1996), supra note 50.

reterritorialization. They emphasise that political geography and geopolitics are still in need of more sophisticated theories and comparative studies dealing with space, political territoriality and politics.

The involvement of political scientists in border studies in comparison with anthropologists, sociologists and geographers still remains limited. In other words, the Golden Age of territoriality theory has yet to start in political science. As a “laboratory for thinking about the changing nature of borders” the European Union offers a good opportunity to conceptualise and theorise regarding border-making and territoriality further. European integration has until recently been somewhat neglected with respect to theorising about changing political territoriality. The very heartland of Westphalian territoriality should deserve more, also because the sociologist Manuel Castells presents the European Union as the foremost example of a network state in which spaces of flows supersede spaces of places. However, a link between border studies on the one hand and studies of European governance and Europeanisation on the other hand is still somewhat weak.

The formation of the European Union did bring about an avalanche of concepts predominantly referring to its alleged non-Westphalian nature, such as a concordance system, network governance, sui generis, confederate consociation, variable geometry, empire, neo-sumerian or multi-perspectival, post-modern polity. Notwithstanding the aesthetic value of some of these concepts, they do not always help in clarifying the differences and the similarities among previous and current types of political systems in Europe. For a better understanding of the EU and its Member States, a comparative catalogue of political systems with respect to political territoriality would be welcome to help limit this conceptual confusion. Chapter 3 presents a comparative catalogue of polity types according to political territoriality.

---

Making political territoriality variable

Studies of Europeanisation and European governance have resulted mostly in detailed empirical studies of (parts of) policy areas or sub-national regions within EU member states, while lacking theories on large-scale, systemic shifts in the territorial configuration of power.\(^1\) In recent years however there has emerged more conceptual and theorised, yet empirically founded, comparative accounts of cross-border co-operation in border regions within the European Union, as well as discussions of the political implications of the (empire-like) frontiers of Europe, Schengenland, and the European Union.\(^2\) More general contributions on the relationship between political territoriality and European integration have also been published.\(^3\) The various calls in political geography, International Relations and Comparative Politics to conceptualise and theorise political territoriality show however that still work has to be done, particularly in the case of the European Union. The first part of this book will be devoted to elaborating on the ideas of Robert Sack and Stein Rokkan in order to understand in what circumstances political actors make use of territory, and to explain what implications this may have for policies, politics, and polities. Following their ideas is also done with the conviction that often new concepts and theories tend to confuse rather than clarify our understanding of political reality, and ‘old’ concepts and theories should be fully examined for

---


Chapter 1

their usefulness before they can be dismissed. After conceptualising (Chapter 2) and theorising changing political territoriality in the European Union (Chapter 4), Chapter 5 will discuss in more detail the potential disintegrative tendencies in the European Union, to see what the changing political territoriality might do in the most-often cited example of a political system going beyond Westphalia.

Chapter 5 also presents “an inventory of propositions” mapping potential relationships between causes and effects of changing political territoriality, derived from contributions by Rokkan himself or inspired by him. This inventory serves as a necessary step towards the construction in the future of a more elaborate theory on changing political territoriality. Indicating the tentative nature of the propositions presented, they are used to reflect upon the outcomes of the ensuing empirical chapters rather than to be tested as hypotheses. Conceptualising and theorising political territoriality aims here at seeing through the histories of short term events and medium term cycles, discerning the structural impact of territoriality in politics, polities, and policies. Histories and case studies are therefore used as illustrations of how political territoriality continues to mark Europe.

1.3 An empirical impression of changing political territoriality

Studying the actual changing political territoriality in Europe includes several disciplines, specialist research fields, and political issues, from International Relations to Political Geography, from patient mobility to governance networks. These disciplines, research fields, and issues will not and cannot all be addressed in full detail in the empirical part of this book. The empirical case studies are rather chosen to examine: 1. the implications of changing political territoriality in two different, but important policy areas, i.e. security and health care; and 2. the potential of the analytical instruments and comparative tools developed in the first part of the book.

The first policy area under scrutiny is security. Globalisation and European integration are said to challenge the separation between security agencies focusing on domestic security (e.g., the police) and external security (e.g., the army). The focus will be on the European Union as well as on the Netherlands. At the crossroad of (former) great powers, and global and European trade infrastructure, the organisation of security in the Netherlands is

---

Making political territoriality variable

closely interlinked with its neighbours, as for instance regarding policing: “The degree of transnational police cooperation achieved in the Benelux region is probably unparalleled in the world, it certainly has not been surpassed.” Thus, the Netherlands is an excellent case for tracing changing political territoriality. Chapter 6 focuses on the construction of security boundaries in Europe and the Netherlands until the 1980s. The chapter argues against the rigid historical classification based on the presumed dominance of Westphalian territoriality between 1648 and 1989. Instead, it will show the variation in territoriality before 1989. A redefinition of threats has taken place since the 1980s. Chapter 7 subsequently traces European and Dutch developments in organising security to see whether the European Union obtains an empire-like morphology, as has been suggested by various authors and actors in the EU security policy community, and how Dutch security policies fit into this European security empire.

Some of the concerns expressed about the changing territorial political framework relate to sustaining solidarity. Surprisingly though, “…until recently the welfare state literature has not directly dealt with the issue of boundaries and the spatial dimension of politics (in both its territorial and its membership senses).” Moreover, the analysis of the impact of European integration on healthcare is only relatively recent, despite the fact that healthcare is often the largest sector of European welfare states today, and an important source for a government’s legitimacy. Chapter 8 explores the territorial underpinnings of healthcare systems in the European Union and the European challenges they face. Many experiments with cross-border patient mobility have been executed in the Dutch border regions. In Chapter 9, the effects of changing political territoriality on making policy choices in healthcare will be shown at the level of those Dutch border regions, as well as on the Dutch healthcare system and the European Union. Thus, the implications of changing political territoriality at the regional, the national and the European level can be examined.

Both cases of healthcare and security are studied approximately between 1985 and 2005. Drawing any conclusion on changing political territoriality over such a short time span is a daunting task because the territorial foundations of

political organisation at the European peninsula has been formed over the *longue durée*. Short-term events or medium term cycles may adversely influence the view on the structural implications of changing political territoriality. However, an historical-institutional analysis requires a careful reconstruction, based on a variety of sources. This variety of sources is necessary to prevent making (hi)story fit theory by a biased selection of ‘facts’. A larger time span would have made that impossible. A shorter time span facilitates control by experts and peers whether any bias in presenting ‘facts’ did take place.\(^78\) In addition, the introduction of the European single market, the end of the Cold War, and the ensuing EU enlargements all have taken place in the period studied. A comparison between 1985 and 2005 should therefore provide at least some evidence of how changing political territoriality affects the making of policy choices. The empirical case studies involves both understanding why political actors use territory more or less, as well as explaining the implications of political territoriality for healthcare and security. The qualitative data are largely derived from interviews (see Annex II for a list of interviewees), and legislative documents, and also secondary analysis of existing surveys on patient mobility and authoritative accounts of security and healthcare developments in the Netherlands and Europe.

The book ends with a first, tentative conclusion in Chapter 10 about how political territoriality is changing in the European Union and what implications that has had for exercising functional policy choices regarding healthcare and security. It will also reflect upon the relation between changing political territoriality and legitimacy. As previously mentioned, concerns have been raised that changing political territoriality will be problematic for effective security and solidarity policies. Declining performance in warfare or welfare may jeopardise output legitimacy in the European Union. In addition, it is claimed that the European Union is moving towards a flexible network of multi-level governance, characterised by spaces of flows, or towards a vaguely bordered neo-mediaeval empire comprising an amalgam of functionally, personally and territorially organised authorities. In such a complex web of authorities, democracy and clear


accountability would be seriously complicated. It would be rather difficult to determine who is to set priorities for whom, how authoritative allocation of values would take place, and who is sharing power, money and labour with whom. The implications of changing political territoriality for present arrangements of legitimacy are therefore discussed.

This book, in line with the historical-institutional, empirical, and comparative research approach of the University of Leiden Political Science institute, explores the variation in territoriality in political institutions and examines its implications for present-day politics and policies. In conceptualising and theorising changing political territoriality, it avoids the Westphalian bias, which has left a deep imprint in political science until today. Elaborating on the works of Robert Sack and Stein Rokkan, it seeks to develop a comparative toolkit to explore empirically the variations in political territoriality across time and place. It thus puts territory right at the centre of the understanding of politics, mapping how a changing territorial framework impacts on the making of functional policy choices in the European Union.

---

Chapter 1