Propositions on the thesis ‘Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions’ Asnake Kefale

1. Ethnic federalism prevents the development of a country-wide overarching citizenship.

2. Restructuring multiethnic states into ethnic federations tends to generate intra-federal (violent) conflicts.

3. A constitutional guarantee for secession prevents the development of the political art of compromise and encourages separatist nationalism.

4. The federal restructuring of Ethiopia led to the thickening of the conflict landscape in the Somali region by engendering localised inter-clan ‘political’ conflicts.

5. The heterogeneity of the Benishangul-Gumuz region neither contributed to the development of regional as opposed to ethnic interests nor led to political socialization among the elite of the titular ethnic groups of the region.

6. The successes and failures of federations in their delicate task of balancing ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’ could be better explained by studying the contextual factors than institutional arrangements.

7. Federations imposed by external forces are more vulnerable to collapse than those that emerged out of domestic bargaining processes.

8. Ethno-nationalist conflicts in Ethiopia can be explained by contested state-formation processes – past and present.

9. Federalism cannot exist without democracy, while democracy can prevail without federalism.

10. The idea of a ‘nation-state’ remains impracticable to the large majority of the ‘nations’ of the world. But the ideology of the ‘nation-state’ remains a potent force provoking ethnic conflicts across the world.

11. Instead of helping reduce ethnic divisions, the process of globalization offered multidimensional incentives for ethnic mobilization.

12. If political science can only prosper in open societies where there is peaceful and democratic contestation for power, as was argued by one of the gurus of the discipline, then Political Scientists in Ethiopia must have nothing to do.