Muslim Opposition to Logic and Theology in the Light of the Works of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505)
Muslim Opposition to Logic and Theology in the Light of the Works of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505)

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. P.F. van der Heijden,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op dinsdag 4 november 2008
klokke 10:00 uur

door
Mufti Ali
Geboren te Serang (Banten), Indonesië
in 1972
Promotiecommissie

Promotor: Prof. dr. P. S. van Koningsveld
Referent: Prof. dr. H. Daiber
Overige leden: Dr. M. Ghaly
              Prof. dr. M.S. Berger
              Prof. dr. R. Kruk
Tanda kenangan
untuk yang tercinta
dan tersayang
Anita,
Mehrunnisa, dan
Mahira Mujahida
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Preface

Well-known place names and terms, for instance Mecca, Madina, Jerusalem, Damascus, Bagdad, Islam, Sunna, Koran are transcribed in their English spellings. Less common place names are transliterated. Technical terms are translated wherever possible, but those such as umma, fatwā, shari‘a, kalām, shaykh, ḥāfiż, āthar, taṣawwuf and ḥabar are retained in their Arabic form.

With the exception of page 67-79, the words in square brackets represent my own insertions. I also used parentheses for equivalent Arabic terms taken from al-Suyūṭī’s texts.

For the Koranic verses cited, I have constantly depended on Bell’s translation. In cases where the Koranic verse is not completely quoted by the author, the completion based also on Bell’s translation is given in the notes when it appeared necessary for the understanding of the text. When identifying individuals mentioned in al-Suyūṭī texts, I have sometimes also used notes of the first edition of SM and those of SU, when I deemed it necessary. These I marked respectively with the letters N (for al-Naṣṣār, the editor of SM) and H (for Ḥamdān, the editor of SU).

The transliteration system that I follow is:

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Acknowledgements

First of all, my departure to the Netherlands in November 2001 would not have been possible without the official permission of Prof. Dr. H.M.A. Tihami, M.A., the Rector of the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) ‘Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin Banten’ and without my wife’s sacrifice to be left by her husband to take care of our beloved daughters, Mehr and Mahira with the assistance of my beloved mother, Hj. Siti Aminah and my respectable parents-in-law, H. Alih Ajalih and Hj. Oniwati.

This research was made possible thanks to the financial support of INIS (Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies). At INIS, I sincerely thank Prof. Dr. W.A.L. Stokhof, Dr. N.J.G. Kapteijn, Dijk van der Meij, Jantien Delwel, Marise van Amersfoort, and Josien Stremmelaar.

When dealing with the rich oriental collections and abundant research references in the Leiden University Library, I was always helpfully assisted by its staff. Arabic manuscripts from Cairo, Damascus, Dublin and Berlin were rendered accessible to me through the assistance of Dr. Nursamad Kamba (the Indonesian Educational Attaché of the Indonesian Embassy in Cairo), Ust. Farouk, Madame Usaima and Mrs. Kim Duistermaat (Damascus), Carla William (Dublin), and Dr. Hans Kurio (Berlin).

Let me also express my special gratitude to Mr. Drs. Ed Walbeehm, my landlord, who made me familiar with social-cultural life of the people in Leiden and whose help was indispensable. Many thanks are also due to the Family of Eman Sulaeman Yasin in The Hague and to Pak Timur Pradopo in Jakarta. My brothers and sisters: Siti Solehah, Siti Hasanah, Siti Aisah, Muhdi, Mukhlis, Mumin Muaddib, Mansur, Khudri, Andi also deserve to be mentioned here.

My early love for the study of Arabic was instilled by my beloved and reverend father, the late Aslihuddin (d. 1993) who already taught me šarīf and nahw when I was ten. His patient and stimulating Arabic lessons enabled me to memorize al-‘Awāmil and al-‘Ajurumiyya (basic texts for Arabic grammar commonly used in Indonesian Religious Schools) when I was thirteen. His difficulties in understanding al-Waraqāt fi Uṣūl al-Fiqh by Abū al-Ma‘āli al-Juwaynī, due to which he spent almost half of his life learning Arabic, in one way or another, motivated me to make an attempt at ‘conquering’ its complexities as well. My understanding of the advanced level of Arabic grammar was made possible thanks to the fatherly guidance of K.H. Bahruddin Afif and the late Drs. H. Tohir Sariq. Classical Arabic became a spoken language to me with the assistance of Ust. Ahmad Ardani, Mahsun, Suwondo, Murtadla, Anwar Mukassah, and others.

My interest in Islamic Studies was instigated by my teacher in Junior High School, the devoted Drs. Ade Mahmuddin whose inspiring lessons brought to my knowledge celebrated figures such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afgānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida, Shakib Arselan, etc, the knowledge of whose ‘relation’ with classical Islam became clearer only six years later thanks to Dr. Saeful Anwar, my academic supervisor in IAIN, who always opened his house to satisfy my curiosity regarding al-Gazāli, al-Ḥallāj, al-Juwaynī, Ibn Taymiyya, Niẓām al-Mulk and the modern sources dealing with them. The latter’s drawing my attention to the works of the orientalists, such as L. Massignon, I. Goldziher, G.H.A. Juynboll,
Snouck Hurgronje, W.B. Hallaq, and others provided me with the ‘inner energy’ to learn several European languages.

My understanding of some French, Dutch and German sources would not have been possible without the work of my language teachers, affiliated to the Goethe-Institut Rotterdam and Murnau (Munich), the Alliance Francaise The Hague and the Regional Opleiding Centrum (ROC, Leiden). Their systematic teachings helped me to learn French, Dutch and German.

My discussions with several individuals in Indonesia also helped me to continue my study in the Netherlands: Prof. K.H. Wahab Afif, MA, Drs. Huriyyudin Humaidi, my uncles, Abdul Aziz, MA and Kabir Rifa’i, Ir. Pram Rahmat, Dr. H. Ilzamuddin Ma’mur, MA, Drs. H. Zakaria, M.Pd, Prof. Dr. H. Utang Rauwijaya, the late Drs. K.H. Mutawali Waladi, Prof. Dr. H. Fauzul Iman, Drs. H. Syibli Sarjaya, L.M.L., Drs. Habudin, Hudairi, Kak Uus, Kak Mahyudi, and others. Colleagues Hafid Asad, Beben, Wowo Suharyono, Imam Muslih, Maman, Aria, Imam Masruhi, the late ust. Hashim, Kak Iik, Buhari, Arifin, Hidayatullah, Hasan Basri, Soni Ahdiant, and others are also worthy of being mentioned here.

My friends in the ‘Laboratorium Bantenologi’ and the ‘Banten Heritage’ should also be mentioned here, respectively: Helmi, Ade, Ayat, Ibnu, Yanwar, Asti, Kak Ali Fadilah, Mas Budi, Nely, Dadan, Ruby. Some individuals and my colleagues in Leiden, Dato’ Prof. Dr. Saleh Yamaha, Prof. Dr. Haron Daod, Dr. Teuku Iskandar, Zulkifli, Nur Ichwan, Amr, Ghaly, Anwar, Didin, Euis, Muslih, Arif Subhan, Jajat, Dahlan, Euis, Mbak Yuni Ch., Suryadi, Noerhaidi, Mujiburahman, Bunyan, Tonang, Johny Tjia, and Syaifudin Zuhri deserve my gratitude.

My zeal for learning will never be satisfied, even if ‘the collection of the UB’ would be transferred to my hometown in Banten. What I have been attempting to do forms only a single footnote to the rich oriental collections and the studies undertaken by the scholars of both the Western and the Muslim World.

Mufti Ali,
Leiden 2008
Abbreviations

ASP: Arabic Sciences and Philosophy
AEL: Arabic-English Lexicon
BO: Bibliotheca Orientalis
BSOAS: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Study
BW: Bugyat al-Wu‘āt fī Ṭabaqāt al-Lugawiyin wa ‘l-Nuḥāt
DK: al-Dūrāt al-Kāmina fī A‘yān al-Mi‘ā al-Thāminā
DL: al-Daw‘al-Lāmi’ fī Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsi‘
DhK: Dhamm al-Kalām wa Ahlih
DTH: Kitāb al-Dhayl ‘alā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila
EI¹: The Encyclopaedia of Islam, the first edition
EI²: The Encyclopaedia of Islam, the new edition
EQ: the Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān
FW: Fawāt al-Wafayāt
GAL: Geschichte die Arabischen Literatur
GAS: Geschichte des Arabischen Schriftum
HM: Ḥusn al-Muhādara fī Āḥbār Miṣr wa ‘l-Qāhirā
IAH: Al-Istiṣār li Ahl al-Hadith
IJMES: International Journal for Middle Eastern Studies
ILS: Islamic Law and Society
IS: Islamic Studies
IT: Ibn Taymiyya
IU: Iḥyā‘ Ulūm al-Dīn
JB: Jāmi‘ Bayān al-Īlm wa Fādlih
JQ: Ḥaḥd al-Qariḥa fī Taḥrid al-Naṣīḥa
JIS: Journal of Islamic Studies
JRA: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
KA: al-Kunyā wa ‘l-Ansāb
KWS: al-Kawākbī al-Sā‘ira bi A‘yān al-Mi‘ā al-‘Āshira
MB: Manāḥiḥ al-Baḥth ‘ind Mutākkirīn ‘l-Islām
NAI: Naṣīḥat Ahl al-Īmān fī ‘l-Radd ‘alā Manṭiq al-Yūnān
NU: Naẓm al-‘Iqān
QM: Al-Qawl al-Mushriq fī Tahṣīl al-Ishtigāl bi ‘Ilm al-Manṭiq
QQ: Qūt al-Qulūb
REI: Revue des Études Islamiques
RHR: Revue de l’Histoire des Religions
SAH: Sharaf Ashāb al-Hadith
SAN: Siyar A‘lām al-Nubalā‘
SI: Studia Islamica
SM: Sāwn al-Manṭiq wa ‘l-Kalām ‘an Fannay al-Manṭiq wa ‘l-Kalām
SU: Sharḥ Uṣūl I’tiqād Ahl al-Sunnah wa‘l-Jamā‘a
TH: Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥuffāz
TI: Taʿrīḥ al-Islām
TM: Ṭabaqāt al-Muṭassīrin
TMM: Tartīb al-Madārik wa Taqrib al-Masālik li Maʿrifat A‘lām Madhhab Mālik
TSK: Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi‘iyya al-Kubrā
WW: al-Wāfi bi‘l-Wafayāt
ZDMG: Zeitschrift für Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft
Introduction

Several works of the Egyptian polymath, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī (d. 911/1505) invite us to take a fresh look at the much debated issues of the origins and status of theology and logic in Islam. As a staunch defender of the prophetic Sunna, al-Suyūtī discussed these issues at several stages of his intellectual development. The result was a rich documentation of the history of the opposition to theology and logic in Islam, which deserves to be taken into account fully by modern scholars studying these issues.

Modern scholarship on the origin of Islamic theology can be divided into six views, respectively asserting: (1) the Hellenistic influence on the origin of Islamic theology; (2) Islamic theology mainly as the result of an internal development; (3) Christian influence on Islamic theology; (4) Jewish contributions to Islamic theology; (5) Persian features in Islamic theology; and (6) Indian elements in Islamic theology.

In addition to the origin of Islamic theology, modern scholarship also more specifically deals with the opposition to logic and theology. Goldziher, Madkour, Hartmann, al-Nashshār, al-Ṭabarānī, Hallaq, Endress, Van Koningsveld, and Griffl have discussed the Islamic opposition to logic, while Makdisi, Daiber, Pavlin, Abrahamov, Juynboll and al-Hashshash have dealt with the Muslim opposition to theology (kalām) and the mutakallimūn. The following passages will be devoted to discuss modern views on the origin of Islamic theology (1) and on the Islamic opposition to logic and theology (2). In the third section attention will be paid to al-Suyūtī’s four works on these issues (3). On the basis of these discussions, we shall formulate our research question and explain the composition and the scope of the present study.

1. Modern Views on the Origin of Islamic Theology

Discussion on the origin of Islamic Theology occupies an important position in the works of modern scholars. Dealing with the question of how Islamic theology originated and developed, they propose at least six views. Some of them associate the development of Islamic theology with the importation of Greek sciences through the movement of translation, which introduced the Hellenistic tradition into the Islamic world. Some scholars point to the influence of Christianity and Judaism. Some emphasize an internal development independent of foreign influences; while others ascribe its origin to the Indian and Persian intellectual tradition which was introduced into Islam through cultural contact.

1.1. Constant Elements of Hellenistic Influence in Old and Contemporary Views

So far, the origin and the development of Islamic philosophical theology, kalām as fostered by Muslim contact with Hellenism, has become the dominant view of modern scholarship. Generally speaking, the conceptions of this idea are founded on several patterns of arguments: (i) terminological; (2) chronological; (3) ontological; and (4) logical/philosophical.
Without a single reference to al-Suyūṭī’s SM, works dealing with this issue, like those by Goldziher,¹ Laoust,² Watt,³ Gibb,⁴ Von Grunebaum,⁵ Fakhry,⁶ Madjid,⁷ and Van Koningsveld⁸ either explicitly or implicitly associate the origin of the theological speculative movement in Islam with the importation of Greek works into the Muslim world. Their approaches in dealing with this topic, aim at, to borrow Cerić’s words, ‘construing origins and development of Islamic theology in the context of Muslim political and philosophical development,’ as reflected in their discussion of the ‘historico-political milieu of a particular period,’ and ‘the introduction of Greek philosophy into the Muslim world in the end of 2nd century of Hijra.⁹

The transmission of Greek philosophy and sciences into the Islamic world through the translation movement in the eighth and ninth century has played a major role in accelerating the Hellenizing process in the Islamic world. The emergence of scholastic theology (kalām), Islamic Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism (falsafa) in the Islamic world is to be considered, in Madjid’s opinion, the direct cultural influence of such a process.¹⁰

This whole marvellous process of cultural transmission which lead to the emergence of a rationalistic movement in the Islamic world was by no means a matter of coincidence or chance. History tells us about the systematic attempt undertaken by al-Ma‘mūn (d. 216/833), who, being fascinated by the practical use of Greek philosophy and sciences, had issued the explicit policy of the state to promote the significance of the adoption of the ‘foreign culture’. According to

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¹Based on the study of Horovitz and Horten, Goldziher underlines that the philosophy of kalām should be seen within the context of the Greek philosophical tradition through “the paths of the pre-Aristotelian philosophers of nature, and in particular those of the atomists among them.” See Goldziher, I., Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law (transl. By A. and R. Hamory (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 1110-112.


³Watt, M. remarks: “…this was because kalām, in addition to using rational arguments, introduced and discussed non-Qur’ānic concepts, mostly taken from Greek science and philosophy.” See The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), p. 183.


¹⁰Madjid, op. cit., p. 221.
Fakhry, al-Ma'mūn himself, the seventh Abbasid Caliph, being influenced by Greek philosophy, composed a number of treatises on theological questions in a speculative spirit. The speculative tendency in his theological thought, Fakhry says, led to the promotion of popular interest in scholastic theology and the support of the cause of the theological party (the Muʿtazilites), which had sought to apply the categories of Greek thought to Muslim dogmas.11

As the result of such an explicit policy of the state, the people's interest to learn about the 'new culture' culminated in a great number of Greek treatises and books on philosophy and sciences being translated into Arabic and commentaries upon them being compiled. Al-Ma'mūn and his proponents, who were exemplified in legendary stories about this process by, borrowing Van Koningsveld's term, the 'Ma'mūn cycle',12 represented the Muslims with the inclusive cultural perception that was necessary to find the epistemological assistance of elements derived from other cultures. Thus, they represented the group of Muslims who did not regard their cultural achievements as self-sufficient and therefore needed to learn something from the outside.

This kind of cultural perception paved the way for Muslims to be provided with, according to Von Grunebaum, (a) “rational forms of thought and systematisation,” (b) “logical procedures,” (c) “methods of generalization and abstraction” and, with (d) “principles of classification.”13

Such an inclusive attitude of Muslims towards a foreign culture provoked fervent criticism from the side of Muslims who regarded their cultural achievements as self-sufficient and those who needed nothing to learn from outside'.14 These groups of Muslims were represented in the already mentioned legendary stories by the ‘Umar cycle’, who had a hostile attitude towards ‘things foreign’.

History since then witnessed the consecutive disputes between those with an inclusive attitude towards foreign culture and those who regarded Islamic culture as self-sufficient and having nothing to learn from the outside. If the former were represented by the rationalist group of Muslims, the most extreme of which were represented by the Muʿtazilite group, the latter were represented by the traditionalists, the most extreme of which, borrowing Abrahamov's classification, were found among the Ahl al-Ḥadīth.15 This dispute culminated in the event of the miḥna, the Inquisition by the Caliph al-Ma’mūn. This led to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who did not recognize the createdness of the Koran, a major doctrine of the Muʿtazilite's creed, risking his life.16

12Van Koningsveld, op. cit., p. 345-370.
13Von Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 25.
14Gibb, op. cit., p. 82-98.
15Abrahamov, op. cit., p. ii-x, 1-12.
16It is plausible that Ahmad b. Ḥanbal rejected the concept of createdness of the Koran, because, according to Wensinck, he understood the doctrine as 'the very heart of the question of the qualities. We [viz. Wensinck] may suppose, therefore, that his rigorous defence of the eternity of the Koran had its root in the feeling that this dogma followed from the unique nature of the Holy Book, whereas the Muʿtazilite view in his eyes tended to lower the position of the words of Allah.' See Wensinck, A.J., The Muslim Creed, Its
Therefore, it is plausible if one concludes that the ‘fruit’ of Hellenism, i.e. scholastic theology (kalâm), Islamic Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, (falsafa) have met with opposition from a great number of Muslims since their inception in the Islamic World in the eighth and ninth century. The inclusion of a number of logical concepts into juridical works, such as the theory of definition (al-ḥadd) and syllogism (al-burhān), which were included by al-Gazālī in his al-Mustaṣfā on legal theory, is an obvious example of an attempt by a Muslim scholar to protect himself from the threat of the traditionalists. The incineration of a great number of books of Muslim philosophers is another discernable example of traditionalists’ fervent opposition to falsafa.

Like Islamic Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism (falsafa), kalâm, being considered as a part of the Hellenistic tradition, also became the target of the opposition of a great number of traditionalists. This is reflected firstly, in their prohibition of engaging in kalâm, including the breaking off relations with, and banishment of, the Mutakallimûn; and secondly, in their refutation of the Mutakallimûn’s tenets.

1.2. Internal Development

Before delving into a discussion of this view, it is worthwhile to note that the view asserting that Islamic theology was rather the result of an internal development was not introduced explicitly into modern scholarship until 1975, when two German orientalists, Van Ess and Daiber published their works. This is in marked contrast with modern scholars’ assertion of foreign elements in Islamic theology, which had been proposed since the first half of nineteenth century.

The advocates of this view, however, are of the opinion that the development of kalâm in the Muslim world was not only triggered by an external factor closely associated with the translation movement of Greek writings but also by an internal factor, namely the need for the art of debate in defending their views against their adversaries. This view is shared, for instance, by Amin, Gardet and Anawati.

Amin is of the opinion that the internal factor for the development of kalâm can be discerned in the fact that some Koranic verses were revealed to encounter various sects and pagans and to refute their religious views. The external factor, he argues on the other hand, is closely related to their being occupied with Greek philosophy in order to construct arguments in defence of

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1. Al-Gazālī’s adoption of Aristotelian logic, which is reflected in the fact that he included it in his work on legal theory, drew fervent criticism from a number of scholars of the traditionalist group, such as Abū Ishāq al-Marginānī (d. 513/1119), al-Qushayrī, al-Ṭūrūṭshī (d. 520), al-Mazīrī, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ and al-Nawawi. See al-Nashshār, Manāhij, op. cit., p. 143-4.


3. Abrahamov, op. cit., p. 27.


their views. In other words, the internal factor represents the polemical side, while the external factor shows the apologetical aspect.

Likewise, Gardet and Anawat argued that the ‘seed’ of rational tendencies had grown up as early as the time of the Companions. Ibn ‘Abbās, Ibn Mas‘ūd and ‘Ikrima, for instance, applied rational methods in interpreting Koranic verses through the process of *ijtihād* or a personal rational elaboration of certain meanings of the Koran. Although the term *kālim* did not yet exist in this period, according to them, this rational tendency played a decisive role in the orientation of *kālim*.

However, the most explicit contention of the indigenous development of *kālim* can only be found in the works of two German orientalists: Joseph van Ess and Hans Daiber. Van Ess shares the view that the *kālim* movement was produced ‘internally’ due to the politico-theological discussion originating from the debate on who was really entitled to succeed the Prophet after he died. This view was also affirmed by Nasution who was of the opinion that the theological movement which arose in Islam originated from political issues.

Van Ess regards the emergence of Islamic theology, *kālim* and speculative sciences as coming from within. The contents of theology in the realm of Islam, Van Ess argues, are not identical with those in Latin or Greek, as ‘knowledge about God,’ but rather named after its style of argumentation: one ‘talks’ (*takallama*) with the adversary by posing questions and reducing his position to ‘meaningless alternatives.’ He develops his view by abolishing the commonly shared conviction that the art of theology is of foreign bearing. This is clearly indicated in his words: “The thesis we want to defend – that Muslim civilization did not slowly develop the art of theology and especially of *kālim*, but rather grew up with it – sounds too radical to be established by these isolated items. We are too accustomed to the idea that the Arabs ‘of the desert,’ masters of poetry and language but uncultivated in all occupations of an urban society, including theology, started their culture as it were from a vacuum and only gradually severed their inherited predilections. We adhere too stubbornly to the conviction

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23 Gardet and Anawat, op. cit., p. 46-93.
that literature in Umayyad times was mainly transmitted orally so that it is hard for us to accept readily the possibility of immediate theological production.”

Based on his enormous study of the formation and the development of Islamic theology especially in the second and third centuries A.H, Van Ess argues that each Muslim thinker seems to have developed an approach of his own when dealing with a number of theological issues. This is due to the fact that these two centuries, Van Ess asserts, formed ‘a period of enormous creativity and imagination,’ in which some original approaches were formulated by Muslim theologians themselves to deal with problems of theology. One of the approaches developed by Muslim thinkers was that dealing with the concept of atomism by which Dirār ibn ‘Amr, who formulated an atomistic approach to reality, preceded the Mu’tazilite scholar who first introduced atomism into his system, Abū l-Hudhayl.

Van Ess criticizes the arguments of the scholars who related the development of the concept of atomism to Indian or Greek influence as founded merely on ‘terminological and topological criteria,’ and not on ‘epistemological structures and their underlying axioms.’

The view that kalām developed from within is also stressed by Hans Daiber. In his study of Mu’ammad b. ‘Abbād al-Sulamī, he identifies the development of kalām as an “innerislamische Entwicklung.” According to Daiber, theological discussions had thrived in Islam since the beginning, especially in the situation of a coexistence of Muslims, Christians and Jews. This indigenous development, in turn, he maintains, fostered the readiness of Islam to open up to foreign (viz. Greek) influence.

The most recent view affirming this view was proposed by Haleem, who concludes that kalām ‘originated completely in the Islamic environment.’ Asserting his argument, Haleem argues that the earliest concept of kalām is to be found in the Koran itself, which deals with theological issues supported by rational proofs. He further maintains that the emergence of theological sects was chiefly the result of differences among Muslims in understanding the Koran and the way their views related to the Qur’anic position. However, Haleem does not reject the influence of foreign elements on the later development of Islamic

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27Ibidem.
1.3. Christian Influence

The influence of Christianity on the development of Islamic theology has been dealt with by several Orientalists as early as Von Kremer,32 whose emphasis on the key role of Christianity for the formation of Islamic theology was followed by a number of scholars: Goldziher,33 De Boer,34 MacDonald,35 Shedd,36 Becker,37 Guillaume,38 Bell,39 Sweetman,40 Tritton,41 Gardet and Anawati,42 Seale,43 Allard,44 Davidson,45 and Nagel.46 Before delving into this topic, it should be noted here that most of the works asserting the influence of Christianity on Islamic theology date back to the nineteenth century or the twentieth century in the period before or shortly after the Second World War, seemingly suggesting some bias within the context of the political relation between Muslim countries and the West.

39 Bell, R., the Origin of Islam in its Christian Environment, (London: Macmillan, 1926)
41 Tritton in his “Foreign Influences on Muslim Theology” (BSOAS, vol. 10, 4 (1942), p. 837-842, esp. 842) says that ‘the lists of [divine] attributes given by John [of Damascus] and Muslim theologians are practically identical...It is notorious that the founder of Islam owed much to other religions; those who built up its theology were equally in their debt’.
42 Gardet and Anawati, op. cit., p. 5, 26, 31-2, 35-7, 41, 45.
43 Seale, Morris, Muslim Theology, a Study of Origins with Reference to the Church Fathers, (London: Luzac & Co. Ltd, 1964)
Generally speaking, when discussing the influence of Christianity on Islamic theology, these scholars focus on the five following topics: (1) Christian theologians, as the main link in the intellectual and theological encounter between Christianity and Islam, whose works and ideas influenced some Muslim theologians; (2) Some Islamic theological doctrines, which were claimed to have a parallel with, to be influenced by, or even be borrowings from, Christian theological dogmas; (3) Muslim theologians believed to have adopted Christian theological teachings; (4) Adoption of some celebrated Christian figures into the administration of the Umayyad caliphs and their literary, medical, scientific as well as philosophical relation with some Umayyad Caliphs; (5) Damascus which was formerly the Christian capital, where many Christian monasteries were located and the home of several great Church Fathers, became the capital city of the Umayyad dynasty.

To begin with, when dealing with the influence of Christianity on the development of Islamic theology, most of the modern works focus on the role played by prominent Christian theologians, the chief among whom were John of Damascus (d. 749) and his disciple Theodore Abu Quarra (d. 826). These theologians were regarded as the main link in the Christian influence on Islam.

John of Damascus and his disciple, Theodore Abu Quarra, were always associated by modern scholars to the Christian scholars whose works have influenced the Muslim theologians, especially when discussing the question of qadar and the createdness of the Koran, two topics dealt with extensively by John of Damascus and Theodore Abu Quarra.47

Modern scholars also discuss certain concepts in Islamic theology believed to have been derived from Christian theological ideas. De Boer, for instance, highlights four theological doctrines: (1) free will, (2) the eternity of the Koran, (3) divine attributes and (4) the relation of God to man and the world.48 This is confirmed by Becker,49 Seale,50 and Wolfson.51

Von Kremer and Seale also mention certain Muslim thinkers who were claimed to have made close contact with, and read Christian polemical works: Ma'bad al-Juhaní, Jahm ibn Safwan, Wāsil ibn Aṭā, Ja‘d ibn Dirham, Gaylān al-Dimashqi, Aḥmad ibn Ḥābib, Faḍl Ḥarbi, Aḥmad ibn Mānūs.52 Von Kremer records three Mu‘tazilite scholars who, according to him, had borrowed from Christianity the concept of justice, which is well reflected in the teaching of Aḥmad ibn Ḥābib, Faḍl Ḥarbi and Aḥmad ibn Mānūs, who accepted the incarnation of the divine logos in a Messiah, from which concept they

48De Boer, op. cit., p. 43.
49Becker, op. cit., p. 432-5.
51Evaluating Christian influences on Islamic theology through seven concepts: (1) the eternity of the Koran, (2) free will, (3) predestination, (4) attributes, (5) atomism, (6) causality, and (7) creation. Reading this work, Wolfson seems to suggest that of these seven issues dealt with in Islamic philosophical theology, the first four (nos. 1, 2, 3, 4) were developed by Muslim thinkers under the influence of Christianity, while the issues of atomism and causality, and the creation of the world derived from Hellenism; Judaism shared free will and predestination with Islam. See Wolfson, H.A., The Philosophy of Kalam (London, Massachusetts & Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) p. 304-719.
52Von Kremer, Geschichte, 32-3.
formulated the pagan doctrine of incarnation. Seale added a number of Muslim scholars who were believed to have adopted certain concepts of Christian dogmas, especially on the predestination and free will. He argued that ‘the first to open discussions at Baṣra on free will was Maʿbad al-Juhanī.’ Ibn Ṭākir mentions that a Christian convert, Sūsān, was the first who discussed qadar. Maʿbad al-Juhanī derived from him and Gaylān from Maʿbad who was executed in 699 in Damascus. The first to play a key role in the development of the Muʿtazila was Jahm ibn Ṣafwān, who was elaborating Greek Christian theology as taught by the Church Fathers in Alexandria.53

Christian influence on Islamic theology was also seen from two other perspectives: (1) the Umayyad Caliphs’ relation with the Christians in a variety of ways: as administrative advisors (e.g. the family of Maṣūrs), as ‘admirals’ in the newly built Muslim fleet, as poets, such as Akhṭāl, tutors of the princes such as Cosmas the Sicilian, and artists;54 (2) the move of the capital city of the Muslim empire by the Umayyad early caliph from Madīna to Damascus, a Christian city and the home of very prominent Christian theologians, such as Clement, Origen, Timothy, John of Damascus, Theodore Abū Qurra, etc.55

1.4. Jewish Contributions

The view of Jewish contributions to Islamic theology was proposed explicitly for the first time by Geiger in his provocative work of 1833. We also find this view expressed by Neumark in his Geschichte of 1928.56 In addition to Koranic exegesis and Tradition,57 modern scholars also identified Jewish influence on Islamic theology. Their discussion on this issue, according to Wolfson, revolves mostly around three problems: (1) Anthropomorphism and anti-anthropomorphism; (2) the eternal or created Koran; (3) the dilemma between predestination and free will.58

To begin with, when dealing with this issue, Geiger highlighted certain theological concepts of Islam, which according to him, were borrowings from Judaism, such as the concept of tawĪl, the one-ness of God, reward and punishment, the creation of the Earth and the Heaven in seven days, the concept of resurrection of the bodies in the Hereafter, revelation through the angel Gabriel, the notion of the heavenly book, the merit of certain ascetic practices, etc.59

53Seale, op. cit., p. 7, 12;
54Gardet and Anawati, op. cit., p. 35; Sahas, op. cit., p. 25.
55Gardet and Anawati, op. cit., p. 35
57See the discussion on this issue by modern scholars: Munk, S., Melanges de philosophie juive et arabe, (Paris: Franck, 1859); Speyer, Heinrich, Die Biblischen Erzählungen im Quran (Gräfenhainichen: Druck von C. Schulze & Co. GMBH, 1931); Torrey, Ch. C., The Jewish Foundation of Islam (New York, 1933); Katsh, Abraham L., Judaism in Islam (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1954).
58Wolfson, op. cit., p. 68.
According to Schreiner, the Mu'tazilites owed their two principle doctrines to Judaism, i.e. the concept of the unity of God and that of His Justice. He argued 'Hingegen lassen sich die Hauptpunkte der mu’tazilitischen Anschauungen in der voraufgegangenen jüdischen Literatur nachweisen und es gibt bestimmte Daten bei arabischen Geschichtsschreibern, welche die Lehren der Mu’taziliten auf das Judenthum zurückführen. Die Hauptpunkte der Lehre der Mu’taziliten bezogen sich auf die Einheit und Gerechtigkeit Gottes.' Schreiner rejects the view that the concept of anthropomorphism, as commonly discussed among the Mu’tazilites, was of Jewish origin. He maintained that anthropomorphism was generally avoided in Judaism (notwithstanding a number of drastic instances in the Babylonian Talmud), as is witnessed by numerous written Jewish sources, from the Tikkûnë sófèrim until the latest targums.

Neumark asserted the influence of Judaism on two important doctrines of Islamic theology which were treated philosophically by Muslim theologians: (1) the eternity of the Koran; and (2) predestination. For the first doctrine, he says that the controversy in Islamic theology over whether the Koran was created or not arose under the influence of the controversy in Judaism over the eternity of the Torah. Like Schreiner, Neumark also argued that the introduction of the concept of free will which led the controversy among Muslim theologians took place under the influence of Judaism.

1.5. Persian Features

The advocates of Persian influence on Islamic theology highlighted the cultural contact between Islam and the Persian people after the Arab conquest in the first half of the seventh century.

60Schreiner, M., “Der Kalâm in der jüdischen Literatur,” Bericht über die Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums in Berlin 13 (1895), p. 3.  
62According to Zipor, Tikkûnë sófèrim literally means ‘corrections of scribes.’ This term is used to signify the ‘eighteen’ biblical phrases ‘the root of which go back to tannaitic authorities, where, according to the tradition found in Masoretic notations, the biblical text has been ‘improved’ because of the reverence for God. See Zipor, Moshe A., “Some Notes on the Origin of the Tradition of the Eighteen Tikkûnë Sòperèm,” in Vetus Testamentum XLIV, 1 (1994), p. 77-102.  
63Schreiner, op. cit., p. 3. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. J. Kromph, of Leiden University, for his explanation of the concept of Tikkûnë sófèrim and his translation of Schreiner text on this issue.  
64Neumark, David, Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters nach Problemen dargestellt (Berlin: Reimer, 1907-1928), I, 84, 115; Wolfson, op. cit., p. 69-70.
According to Stepaniants, the Persian imprints on Islamic theology can be seen chiefly in the concepts of dualism and eschatology, concepts which also had a profound influence on Judaism and Christianity. When explaining the influence of Zoroastrianism on Islamic theology, Jackson mentions several narrative accounts from Muslim heresiographers quoting the Prophet as having condemned the Qadarites for their free will doctrine, calling them the Magians of this people. Another account he mentions was recorded by al-Isfara’ini, who reported that ‘the Prophet applied the name of Magians to the upholders of free will, rightly enough. For the Magians ascribe a part of the things decreed to the Will of God, and another part of it to that of the Devil; and if you are to believe them, the decrees of God come to pass at one time, and at another time those of the Devil.’

 Those narratives, Jackson argued, reflect the view prevailing among the 11th and 12th century Muslims, representing their association of the Qadarites with the Zoroastrians. Further Jackson cites statements from a Persian mystical work of the thirteenth century denouncing free will believers as Magians (fire worshippers) and ‘Jabars’, names referring to the Zoroastrians.

 However, he admitted that the main link of the association with zoroastrianism of Qadarites by the opponents of the free will doctrine was Ma‘bad al-Juhani (d. 699), who learned the doctrine of qadar from Abu Yûnus Snsëy dh or Sinbûya, a man of Persian origin called al-Aswâri. According to Jackson, the attribute of al-Aswâri was referring to the party called asâwîrat, ‘who had come from Fârs in Persia and settled in Basra after having lived in Syria.’

 While dismissing direct Indian influence on Islamic cosmological theories due to a lack of reliable historical data, Haq asserts the role of Persian dualism in the formation of certain fundamental cosmological and theological doctrines of kalâm, such as the concept of atomism, God’s creation ex nihilo, His justice and attributes, the relation between reason and revelation, etc. In his opinion, this Persian influence was made possible through an early contact between the Mutakallimûn and the Manichaean dualists of Persia. This contact, in turn, led to the emergence of many polemical kalâm writings against dualist ideas, as can be obviously read in Kitâb al-Agânî of Abu ‘l-Faraj al-Iftahânî (d. 357/957), who reported that several disciples of al-Hasan al-Baṣrî (d. 110/728) held debates with those who were accused of disseminating Manicheism. This contact, according to Haq, was also well recorded by a great number of Muslim theologians such as ‘Abd al-Jabbâr (d. 415/1025), al-Mâturîdî (d. 331/942), Ibn al-Nadîm (d. 385/995) and al-Shahrastâni (d. 548/1145). In addition, accounts on the

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67Jackson, op. cit., 237.
69Jackson, op. cit., p. 239.
Arabic translations of Manichaean tracts, including the books of Mānī himself, were made by many other Muslim historians and bibliographers.\textsuperscript{70}

1.6. Indian Elements
The marks of Indian influence on the origin and the development of kalām have been hinted at for the first time by Schmölders, who argued that several Muʿtazilite leaders were well versed in a number of Indian works, especially those composed by the sect of the Summanites, which he ascribes to a certain social group of the Chārvākās in India. The Muʿtazilite leaders were also exposed, Schmölders adds, to works of another Indian sect, beside that of the Summanites.\textsuperscript{71} The conjecture on the Indian influence in 1842 made by Schmölders, who was still unsure of the origin of the sect of the Summanites,\textsuperscript{72} had been left vague but in 1910 Horten explicitly confirmed that the Summanite sect originated in India. His argument was based on his study of a report by Ibn al-Murtaḍā, who recorded that ‘Jahm and Mu‘ammar held a debate with Summanites in India and also that another debate was held in India between a Summanite and a Muslim’.\textsuperscript{73}

The introduction of the idea of Indian influence on Islamic theology into modern scholarship by Schmölders had significant influence on later studies on this issue. In 1895, Mabilléau in his study of the history of atomism, one of the central issues in Islamic theology, asserted that atomism did not originate from the Greek concept of atomism, but had come from India.\textsuperscript{74} Forty-one years later (in 1936), Pines, following Horten, confirmed Mabilléau’s study on the Indian origin of atomism. Pines argued that the concept of atomism in kalām contains features that cannot be found in Greek atomism.\textsuperscript{75} These features, Pines maintains, lie in Indian atomism, especially in relation to the view that atoms have no extension.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{70}Haq, Syed Nomanul, “the Indian and Persian Background,” in Nasr, op. cit., I, p. 56-70.
\textsuperscript{72}‘On dit que la secte des Somanîtes derive de l’Inde, et, bien qu’il ne soit pas aisé de prouver quant à présent la vérité de cette assertion, je ne crois pourtant pas qu’on puisse la révoquer en doute...’ See Schmölders, op. cit., p. 114.
\textsuperscript{73}Horten, Max, “Der Skeptizismus der Sumanija nach der Darstellung des Razi, 1209”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, xxiv (1910), 141-66, esp.142-3, 144, n.6;idem, “Indische Gedanken in der islamischen Philosophie,” Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie (1910),vol. 34, p. 310; idem, Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1912); Wolfson, op. cit., p. 69-70.
\textsuperscript{74}Mabilléau, Léopold, Histoire de la philosophie atomistique (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1895), 328; Wolfson, op. cit., p. 69-70.
\textsuperscript{75}The conclusion by Pines that the concept of atomism derives from Indian philosophy is diametrically opposed to that of Pretzl who maintained that the early concept of atomism in Islam stemmed from the Greek concept of atomism. See Pretzl, Otto, “Die frühislamische Atomenlehre: Ein Beiträge zur Frage über die Beziehungen der frühislamische Theologie zur griechischen Philosophie,” Der Islam, 19 (1931), p. 117.
\textsuperscript{76}Pines, S., Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomenlehre (Berlin: 1936), p. 102.
Despite the refutation of this view by Massignon in 1910, who remarked that the Indian influence on kalām was only based on ‘similarities and isolated coincidents,’ and by Haq in 1996, who questioned such influence due to the lack of reliable historical data, this theory is still upheld by some scholars, even up to this time. Referring to Herman Jacobi’s article on ‘Atomic Theory (Indian),’ and Keith’s on ‘Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon,’ Macdonald argued in 1928 that some aspects of kalām atomism reveal elements of a theory developed by the Indian Buddhist sect of Sautrāntikas, which flourished in the first and second century B.C. According to Macdonald, this Buddhist school formulated a doctrine of time atomism, signifying that time is not ‘infinitely divisible but rather consisted ultimately of discrete atomic moments which cannot be further divided.’

According to several modern scholars, the Indian influence on Islamic theology can also be seen in the concept of ma‘nā. According to Horten, as quoted by Wolfson, Mu‘ammar’s theory of ma‘nā was formulated under the influence of the Vaiśeṣika category of inherence in Indian philosophy. Horten’s opinion on this issue was confirmed by Nader, who argued that ‘Indian influence in other branches of knowledge is certain so it is not surprising to find it in philosophy, even if indigested.’

In addition to the theory of ma‘nā, Islamic theology was said to owe also to India the concept of reincarnation, which was developed by Ibn Ḥā’īṯ (d. 870), Ḥadathī (d. 870) and Ibn Ayyūb (d. 870) out of the concept of kumūn (concealment), under the influence of India. According to this theory, all the living beings had been created perfectly. The good among them were angels; the bad were devils; while those sitting in the middle were sinners, who, through their atonement, followed a series of existences, firstly as animals, then as humans, subsequently as prophets, and finally becoming angels. This chain forms the long development of the souls from the state of concealment.

In 1997, a favourable view asserting this element was expressed by Madjid Fakhry, who argued that the influence of Indians on Islam was not limited to their astronomical and medical ideas, but also included some of their theological contentions. This becomes clear, he argued, from al-Bīrūnī’s (d. 1048) Taḥqīq mā li ‘l-Hind min Ma‘qula (the Truth about the Beliefs of the Indians). According to

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8Haq, op. cit., p. 52-70.
Fakhry, in this work al-Biruni referred to a writer of the ninth century, Abu 'l-'Abbâs al-Irânsbahrî, who was well-acquainted with Indian religious doctrines.85

It is al-Iransbahrî, Fakhry maintains, who influenced the great philosopher-physician Abû Bakr al-Râzî (d. 925), especially in the latter’s concepts of space and time and the atomic composition of bodies. He further argued that even some aspects of Indian atomism appear to have been at the basis of the atomism of kalâm, one of the cornerstones of Islamic theology.86

In 2002, Van Ess evaluated Pines’ Beiträge, which asserted the Indian elements of Islamic atomism.87 Van Ess objected to Pines’ conclusion, which was merely based on ‘terminological and topological criteria,’ and not on ‘epistemological structures and their underlying axioms.’88 According to Van Ess, the concept of atomism did not develop from India and Greece and neither was it Qur’anic. It developed rather from the creative internal discourse of the second and third centuries, in which each Muslim theologian ‘seems to have experimented with an approach of his own.’89 The first Muslim thinker who had something of an atomistic approach to reality, according to Van Ess, was Dirâr ibn ‘Amr, the predecessor of the scholar who first introduced atomism into his system, Abû ‘l-Hudhayl.90

2. Modern Views on Islamic Opposition to Logic and Theology

In marked contrast to the abundance of modern literature on the history of theology and logic in Islam, we can only find a few works dealing with the history of the Muslim opposition to logic and theology. Usually, these works mainly focus either on the opposition to logic or on the opposition to theology. In the following passages, I will deal chronologically with the views of modern scholars who discuss the opposition to logic and theology respectively.

2.1. Modern Views on the Islamic Opposition to Logic

2.1.1. Goldziher (1916)

Goldziher was the first of the modern writers to draw our attention to the Muslim opposition to logic.91 He underlines that logic was already condemned by a scholar as early as Ja‘far al-Šâdiq, the seventh imâm of the Shi‘ite Ithnâ

86Ibidem.
90Ibidem.
'Ashariyya (d.148/764), to whom the following words are ascribed: “People will occupy themselves with logic until they even question the belief in God. If you hear something of that kind, say: ‘there is no god except the unique One; there is nothing like unto Him.’”

According to Goldziher, al-Ṣādiq was hostile to logic because he understood that Aristotle’s method of proof on ‘the validity of religious doctrines’ would result in grave evil.

He then enumerated a number of scholars of various denominations, who opposed “the sciences of the ancients” in general or logic in particular: The Shafi’ite al-Mawardi (d. 450/1059), Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā (d. 790/1389), the Sufi al-Suhrawardi (d. 584/1184), the Shafi’ite al-Dhahabi (d. 748/1348), the Shi’ite Hasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbaṭ (d. c. 310/922), the Shafi’ite Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ al-Sahrazūr (d. 643/1246), the Shafi’ite Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1370), the Hanbalite Ibn Taymiyya (d. 729/1329) and the Shafi’ite Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 999/1595).

According to Goldziher, antagonism to the study of logic increased after al-Gazālī (d. 505/1111).


However, Goldziher’s argument on this issue is challenged by el-Rouayheb, who examines Goldziher’s argument, confirmed by Makdisi, that opposition to logic was already manifest in the 2nd/8th century and increased in intensity in the 7th/13th and 8th/14th centuries, when al-Shahrazūr and Ibn Taymiyya composed works in which they censured it. El-Rouayheb rejects Makdisi’s suggestion that opposition to logic was facilitated by the establishment of madrasas that were opposed to Greek learning. El-Rouayheb also questions...

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94Madkour seems to have based his view on the fact that al-Suhrawardi had composed Kashf al-Fadā‘īh al-Yūnāniyya to condemn Greek philosophy. This view is also confirmed by Goldziher, op. cit., (1981) p. 188 and ‘Ali Ḥusayn al-Jābirī (see al-Fikr al-Salafi ‘īnd al-Shī‘a al-Ṯānā‘ ‘Ashariyya Dirāsa Tahīliyya li Mawqif al-Fikr al-Salafi ‘īnd al-Ṯānā‘ ‘Umūman wa ‘Ind al-Thānā ‘Ashariyya ‘alā Wajh al-Ḥusūs min Mantiq wa Falsafat al-Yūnān (Beirut: Manshūrāt ’Uwaidāt, 1977), p. 127. n. 1). In contrast, Hartmann argues that this work was composed by al-Suhrawardi as politico-religious propaganda in favour of the Abbasid Caliph, al-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh against “ärgste Staatsfeinde geltenden Philosophen” and against the Muslims who were occupied by the philosophy. However H. Ritter, according to Hartmann, suggests that this work was composed to serve al-Nāṣir’s propaganda against the Isma’ilites. See Hartmann, Angelika, an-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh (1180-1223): Politik, Religion, Kultur in der späten ‘Abbāsidenzeit (Berlin & New York: Walter de gruyter, 1975), p. 250-4.
Goldziher’s suggestion that hostility to logic was found predominantly among Sunni scholars, ‘at least between the endorsement of the discipline by Abû Hāmid al-Gazâlî (d. 505/1111) and the rise of the Salafiyya in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.’

El-Rouayheb bases his argument on discussions concerning the status of logic by Sunni scholars in the period between 1500 and 1800. He argues that ‘hostility to logic was a minority position in scholarly circles throughout this period.’ Since ‘many of the scholars of this period regularly invoked earlier authorities in support of their position,’ el-Rouayheb argues, Goldziher’s suggestion that hostility to logic was a predominant view amongst Sunni scholarship, especially between the 12th and 14th centuries, is no longer tenable.

As far as the opposition to logic is concerned, Madkour suggested that logic, i.e. the logic of Aristotle, was subjected to the objections of scholars of various backgrounds. Two grand savants, Madkour argues, one a mystic and the other a traditionist, al-Suhrawardi (d. 584/1190) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 729/1329), can be considered as fervent critics of logic who aimed at deconstructing its foundation. Ja’far al-Šâdiq (d.148/764) is also referred to by Madkour as having opposed theological speculation based on logic. Al-Shâfi’î (d. 203/820), Ibn al-Šalâh (d. 641/1245) and his disciple al-Nawawî (d. 674/1277) are highlighted as having an unfavourable attitude toward logic as well. At last, Madkour asserts the influence of the great Shi’ite thinker of the tenth century, Ḥasan b. Mūsâ al-Nawbahtî (d. ca.310/922) on Ibn Taymiyya in the latter’s aim of demolishing the principles of Aristotelian logic. In discussing the opposition to logic of certain scholars, Madkour frequently refers to Šawn al-Manṭiq by al-Suyūṭî (4 times) and Manâhij al-Baith by ‘Ali Shâmi al-Nashshâr, the editor of Šawn al-Manṭiq (twice), A’yân al-Shî’â by al’-Amîli (once), al-Radd ‘ala ‘l-Manṭiqiyin by Ibn Taymiyya (8 times) and Ǧathâwâ Ibn al-Šalâh (once).

2.1.3. Hartmann (1975)
In her discussion of “the Measures against any occupation with Greek Philosophy,” Hartmann shows how the 34th Abbasid caliph, who was generally...
known as mujtahid and muhaddith, al-Nāsir li ‘l-Dīn Allāh (d. 623/1225), took at least three measures against Greek philosophy by (1) exterminating philosophical literature; (2) burning libraries housing Hellenistic works; and (3) denouncing the prominent figures claimed to be occupied by Greek learning. Al-Nāsir issued an order to burn libraries which housed works of Ibn Sinā. Due to their collections of Hellenistic works, according to Hartmann, a private library of Rukn al-Dīn ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlī, a nephew of a prominent Ḥanbalite scholar, ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlī, was burnt. The works believed to be preserved in the library, according to Hartmann, were those of Ibn Sinā, i.e., Kitāb al-Shifā’, Kitāb al-Najāt, the Encyclopaedia of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’,106 works on philosophy, logic, astronomy, treatises on nītrāniyāt (trick and talisman) as well as guides for worshipping the stars.107

Several notable scholars during al-Nāsir’s rule, according to Hartmann, also lost their professorial chair in the state-funded institution of learning, due to their covert occupation with philosophy. Hartmann mentions the Faqīh al-Mujir (d. 595/1198), who was forced to leave the Nizāmiyya college and Baghdad for Damascus and Ḥurāsān.108 Another prominent scholar who lost his official position, according to Hartmann, was al-Fār Gulām ibn al-Munā, known as Ibn al-Māshiṣa (d. 610/1213), who was intensively occupied with Greek learning. According to Hartmann, Ibn Māshiṣa in his work, Nawāmis al-Anbīyā, claimed that the prophets were men knowledgeable of Greek philosophy.109

Hartmann also dealt with the hostile attitude of Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar al-Suhrawardi al-Shāfī’i (w. 632/1234), the chief judge appointed by al-Nāsir himself. Al-Suhrawardi’s unfavourable attitude toward logic was well known for his condemnation of the pantheist Ibn ‘arabī, who established an epistemological relation between the doctrine of ṭaṣawwuf and some elements derived from Greek philosophy. Besides, al-Suhrawardi (d. 632/1234) was said to have composed a polemical work against Greek sciences and philosophy, Rasḥṭu ‘l-Naṣāʾīḥ al-Īmāniyya wa Ḳaṣḥṭu ‘l-Ｆaḍāʾīḥ al-Yūnāniyya, in order to refute apologetico-dialectical arguments of theology and falsafā along with their Greek sources.110

Under the commission of al-Nāsir, Hartmann says, al-Suhrawardi even sunk volumes of Ibn Sinā’s works.111

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107 Hartmann refers to this term as “trick und talismane.” For elaborate discussion on this term, see Ullmann, Manfred, Die Natur- und Geheimwissenschaften im Islam (Köln & Leiden: EJ Brill, 1972), hal. 360;
111 Ibidem.
According to Hartmann, the hostility toward things ‘Greek’ did not stop at the period of al-Nāṣir but continued under the rule of the Caliph al-Mustanjid (d. 884/1479) who also issued an order to burn Ibn Sinā’s works and the Epistles of the Iḥyāʾ al-Ṣafā.*)

2.1.4. Al-Nashshār (1978)
A discussion of how Greek logic, i.e. Aristotelian logic, was rejected by Muslims can be found in al-Nashshār’s Manāhij.** Al-Nashshār started his discussion with the problem whether Greek logic and philosophy were ‘made to enter’ (idhā’) or ‘entered themselves’ (duḥūḥ) into the Islamic world. Based on his own view that the inner structure of Islamic culture had no need whatsoever of Greek logic and philosophy, he maintained that Greek logic and philosophy were ‘made to enter’ into the Islamic world,† where one finds that the mutakallimūn and the jurists of the first generation did not accept Aristotelian logic, which was also opposed by the traditionalists.

Rejecting the idea that the legal theories of the usulists were influenced by Aristotelian logic, al-Nashshār suggests that the principle of the usūl was based on al-qiyās al-lugawi, whose most important authorities were al-Ḥalīl and Sibawayhi.‡ In formulating his legal theory, al-Shāfīʿi, for instance, did not get any benefit from Aristotelian logic. He says, this was because of his conviction that Aristotelian logic was based on the particular characteristics of the Greek language, which, according to him, were totally different from those of Arabic.§

Al-Nashshār also interestingly discussed how logic was opposed not only by the Traditionalists, but also by the “Rationalist” group of Muslims, i.e. the mutakallimūn. The hostile attitude of the traditionalists towards logic was represented by the fact that when al-Gazālī adopted Aristotelian logic in his legal theory, he was criticized severely by a number of prominent figures, such as Abū Ishāq al-Marjānī, Abū al-Wafā’ b. ‘Uqayl (d. 513/1119), al-Qushayrī, al-Ṭurtūshī (d.520/1127), al-Māzīrī, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1246) and al-Nawawī (d. 631/1234).|| The rejection of the mutakallimūn of Aristotelian logic was reflected by their conviction that it contained certain metaphysical premises, which were substantially against the teaching of the Koran, and certain physical premises, which could not be accepted whatsoever by the Muslims.***(

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**|| Al-Nashshār identifies al-usūl as having two significances; a narrow and a broad one: The narrow significance refers to “manḥaj al-baḥth ’ind al-faṣīḥ aw huwa māntiq masāʿilih;” while the broad one is “gānūn ʿaṣim līdhihn al-faṣīḥ min al-ḥaṭaʿ fi ’l-istidlāl ʿala ʾl-ḥaṭām.” Al-Nashshar, op. cit., p. 65.
**§§Al-Nashshār, op. cit., p. 68.
**|| Al-Nashshār, op. cit., p. 70.
**|| Al-Nashshār, op. cit., p. 143-4.
*** Al-Nashshār, op. cit., p. 79.

As far as the opposition to logic by each of the scholars mentioned above is concerned, referring to Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd, al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī, first of all, discussed al-Nawbaṭī’s criticism of shakl al-qiyās (form of analogy). According to al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī, the logical dispute between al-Sirāfī and Mattā b. Yūnūs.\(^{123}\) He then recorded the logical dispute between Ibn Sīnā, the philosopher, and Abū Sa‘īd Abū l-Hayr al-Mihānī, the Sūfī, who criticized Ibn Sīnā’s use of rational sciences for finding the truths.\(^{124}\) Criticizing the epistemological foundation of logic, al-Mihānī, according to al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī argued: inna ‘l-burhān al-aqlī la tībārā la hā hān yuthbit butṭānāh min tāriq al-burhān al-aqlī wa hādīhā al-shakl min al-istidālātā laya min ma tād al-burhān ba l hū wa su rā wādīhā min al-mugālātā (rational demonstration is nothing, since its invalidity is confirmed by way of rational demonstration. This kind of deduction is not a result of (proper) demonstration but represents clearly its confusion).\(^{125}\)

According to al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī, al-Fāriḍ’s opposition to logic, as discussed in Kasr al-Ma’nīq, lies in the concept of analogy which ‘neither gives us any new knowledge nor unravels the complexity or reveals a secret from its covert form.’\(^{126}\) Ibn Taymiyya’s systematical criticism of logic was discussed comprehensively by al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī as well.\(^{127}\) Finally, al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī’s discussion of the opposition to logic ended up with his account of Ibn Ḥaldūn’s criticism toward logic asserting: al-ma’nīq aw al-aqlī fī ‘l-ulāmā al-ilāhīyya là yufḍu shay’ān wa la ‘sti’mālā lah fī majālīhā (logic or reason made use of in religious sciences does not bear any benefit nor is there any need to use it in the scope of their study).\(^{128}\)


123 Al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī, op. cit., p. 32-33.


125 Al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī, op. cit., p. 71-80.

126 Al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī, op. cit., p. 76.


129 Al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī, op. cit., p. 117-125.
Hallaq argues that Ibn Taymiyya fought against everything that directly or indirectly derived from what was termed the "ancient sciences" (‘ulūm al-awā’il), especially Aristotelian logic. Ibn Taymiyya criticized logic because, Hallaq maintains, ‘it brought under its wings not only Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Ibn Sīnā and the rest of the Arabic philosophers, but also the pantheistic Sufis, the Shi‘is, and the speculative theologians (ahl al-kalām).’ Ibn Taymiyya’s unrelenting attack against the philosophers, i.e. logicians, Hallaq says, was, however, double edged. On the one hand, by refuting philosophical logic, he advanced his critique of the metaphysical doctrines of falsaṭā, and, on the other, by undermining logic in general and the realist theories of essences and universals in particulars, he sought to shake the dogmatic foundation of mystical pantheism. Hallaq interestingly maintains that despite Ibn Taymiyya’s intense disapproval of Greek logic, he insisted on the proposition that the categorical syllogism was formally impeccable.

Determining what was Ibn Taymiyya’s real attitude towards logic, Hallaq conclusively states that for Ibn Taymiyya the challenge facing the logicians lies not in an investigation of forms, figures, and moods but rather in arriving at the truth and certainty of propositions. The truth and certainty of propositions, as it is stated by Hallaq in his concluding passages, could not be established by simple human minds but should be based on revealed knowledge, which is conveyed to mankind by the prophets.

Hallaq also mentions that a number of scholars of various theological denominations have written treatises to refute either entirely or partially formal logic and to condemn the logicians. He says that the Mu’tazilite poet and thinker Abu ‘l-‘Abbās al-Nāshī’ al-Akbar, known as Ibn al-Shirshīr (d. 293/905), was the first who refuted logic. The Shi‘i thinker Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbaṭī (d. ca. 310/922), the author of Kitāb al-ʿArā’ wa ʾl-Dīyānāt and al-Radd ʾalā Ahl al-Mantiq, which is no longer extant, was another scholar mentioned by Hallaq as a fervent opponent to logic. The grammarian Abū Sa‘īd al-Šarīfī (d. 368/979) was cited as the one who launched an attack against the philosopher-logician Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940). Besides, he suggests that the Ash’arite theologian Abū Bakr al-Baqqillānī, in his treatise al-Daqā’iq, is said to have argued against the philosophers’ logic. At last, Hallaq indicates the unfavourable attitude of Ibn al-Šalāḥ (d. 643/1245) with his well-known fatwā, and that of the unknown Abū al-Najā al-Farīḍ (?) in one of his treatises.

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2.1.6. Hallaq (1993)
The opposition of a particular historical figure, i.e. Ibn Taymiyya, against logic is the central issue in Hallaq’s introduction of his translation of al-Suyūṭī’s Jahd al-Qariha fi Tajrid al-Nasiha (the Exertion of Effort in Divesting the Nasiha) [113]. Hallaq argues that Ibn Taymiyya fought against everything that directly or indirectly derived from what was termed the “ancient sciences” (‘ulūm al-awā’il), especially Aristotelian logic. Ibn Taymiyya criticized logic because, Hallaq maintains, ‘it brought under its wings not only Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Ibn Sīnā and the rest of the Arabic philosophers, but also the pantheistic Sufis, the Shi‘is, and the speculative theologians (ahl al-kalām).’ Ibn Taymiyya’s unrelenting attack against the philosophers, i.e. logicians, Hallaq says, was, however, double edged. On the one hand, by refuting philosophical logic, he advanced his critique of the metaphysical doctrines of falsaṭā, and, on the other, by undermining logic in general and the realist theories of essences and universals in particulars, he sought to shake the dogmatic foundation of mystical pantheism. Hallaq interestingly maintains that despite Ibn Taymiyya’s intense disapproval of Greek logic, he insisted on the proposition that the categorical syllogism was formally impeccable.

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2.1.7. Endress (1987)

As has been mentioned elsewhere, Goldziher associates the alleged decline of Muslim civilization with Muslim resistance to the ‘Greek sciences,’ one of which was, of course, logic; Makdisi equates the resistance to logic with the emergence of madrasas. Similarly, Endress, according to Brentjes, attributes the decline of Muslim civilization after the 13th century to four factors which implicitly reflect a resistance to logic: (1) the dichotomy between the ancient ‘rational’ sciences and religious and legal sciences; (2) the marginal position of the ancient sciences in the Muslim world; (3) the rejection of innovation as a positive value for Muslim society and the insistence on social practice based on authoritative learning; and (4) the replacement of philosophy by ‘the canon of religious duties as the ideal of salvation.’

In her discussion of the relation between power and the madrasa vis a vis orthodoxy and ‘the ancient sciences,’ Brentjes challenges Endress’ thesis in the spirit of Goldziher and Makdisi by claiming that the negative and hostile attitudes toward philosophy and logic ‘did not dominate the intellectual atmosphere from the 5th/11th century onwards.’ Referring to Chamberlain, Brentjes also rejects the madrasas as ‘the core institution of Muslim legal education which possessed a formalized curriculum and excluded the ancient sciences and rational theology’.


Van Koningsveld proposes a new interpretation of the dream of al-Ma’mūn and of the stories of the importation of Greek books from Byzantium. The interpretation of this dream and stories by Muslim historians, biographers, and jurists give birth to two Muslim literatures showing two tendencies representing their opposite attitude toward Greek sciences: (1) the ‘Ma’mūn cycle,’ representing a favourable attitude to Greek sciences, and (2) the ‘Umār cycle,’ showing hostility to Greek sciences.

The opposition to logic, Van Koningsveld suggests, is reflected in certain aspects by the hostile attitudes of religious scholars of early Islam to Greek

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[Brentjes, op. cit., p. 7.]

[Brentjes, op. cit., p. 4.]

[Van Koningsveld, op. cit., p. 355-366.]
sciences in general and to philosophy and logic in particular. Though indirect, their opposition to logic can be associated, he suggests, with their exhortation of the destruction of the “ancient books” which contain the “ancient sciences”, among which are logic and philosophy. In sum, he says that the unfavourable attitude of some of the early authorities in Islam toward logic was closely connected to their opposition to things Greek, which was specifically reflected by their “suspicion and overt enmity” toward the “Books of the Infidels” (the Books of the Greeks).

Relying on, among others, Iḥtīʿāl al-Fuqahāʾ by al-Ṭabarī and al-Miʿyar al-Muʿrib waʾl-Jāmiʿ al-Mugrib by al-Wanshārī, several early leading scholars are listed by Van Koningsveld to have opposed the “Books of the Infidels”: Al-Awzāʾī (d. 159/774), Mālik b. Anas (d. 178/795) and al-Shāfiʿī (d. 203/820). Referring to Tabaqāt al-Umām by Ṣaʿīd al-Andalusī, Van Koningsveld also deals with al-Maḥsūr b. Abī ʿĀmir’s (d. 392/1002) incineration of the books of philosophy and logic.


Griffel’s discussion of the opposition to logic focuses on the notorious fatwā of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d.643/1245), who maintained that being occupied with learning and teaching logic is not allowed by the Law-giver, by the Companions, the Followers and by the leading scholars qualified to undertake ijtihād. Griffel understands the issuance of this fatwā from the context of the Muslim opposition to the influence of Greek philosophy on the works of Muslim scholars. Griffel further argues that this fatwā not only forms evidence of the existence of the study of philosophy in the first half of 8th/13th century, but also constitutes the peak of the opposition to the philosophers, which had already been undertaken by al-Gazālī with his Tahāfut al-Falāsifa more than one hundred-fifty years earlier.

Interestingly, Griffel also proposes another fatwā of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ as illustrative of his unfavourable attitude toward logic in particular and Greek philosophy in general. Referring to al-Qalʿājī’s second edition of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s fatwā, Griffel records the fatwā as follows: “Es ist die Pflicht des Herrschers, die Muslime vor dem Übel dieser Peripatetiker zu beschützen, sie aus den Medresen zu entfernen und zu verbannen und die Beschäftigung mit ihrer Disziplin zu bestrafen. Um den Brand, den diese Leute legen, zu löschen und die Überreste der Philosophie und der Philosophen zu vertilgen, soll der Herrscher alle, die öffentlich ihr Bekenntnis zu den Glaubensüberzeugungen der Philosophen kundtun, unter das Schwert tun oder sie dazu auffordern, zum Islam überzutreten. (…) Wer diese Pflicht zu erfüllen anstrebt, der muß jene, die von den Leuten der Philosophie in den Medresen als Lehrer tätig sind und über Philosophie schreiben und sie rezitieren, ihres Amtes entheben, sie dann einsperren und ihnen seinen Standpunkt aufzwingen. Für den Fall, daß jemand behauptet, er glaube nicht an ihr Bekenntnis, und dabei der Lüge überführt wird, so ist der (beste) Weg, ein Übel auszureißen, indem man es seiner Wurzel ausreißt.
According to Griffel, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s adamant criticism of logic is well reflected in his ḍaṭwā, which prohibits people from using philosophical terms, such as-ḥadd (definition) and al-burḥān (demonstration). Ibn al-Salāḥ even condemned, Griffel maintains, those who read a work of Aristotelian bearing, like Kitāb al-Shifā’ of Ibn Sīnā. Muslims scholars (‘ulamā’) and Sufis will lose their authority as soon as they read Ibn Sīnā’s works.  

2.2. Modern Views on the Islamic Opposition to (Philosophical) Theology

A penetrating analysis of how “philosophical theology” was opposed by the Traditionalists was given by Makdisi in several of his works. In his opinion, the opposition against theology was embodied by a form of scholastic movement, “a movement of schools, guild schools of legal science,” which was prepared by the efforts of two leaders, al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 203/820) and ʿĀmmād b. Ḥanbal (d. 245/855), whose influence against kalām and philosophy remained throughout Muslim history. This movement was brought into existence, he states, by the movement of juridical theology against the theology of kalām, in which al-Risāla was composed by al-Shāfi‘ī as its religious manifesto. Like al-Shāfi‘ī, the first champion of the traditionalists whose “career signaled the first triumph over rationalism and whose life was imbued with a deep sense of submission to the Koran, the Word of God, the hadith and the deeds of the Prophet,” Ṣāḥīḥ b. Ḥanbal with his resistance against the Great Inquisition signaled the second defeat of Rationalism.

The traditionalist triumph over Rationalism does not end up with ʿĀmmād b. Ḥanbal, it continues through two other landmarks, the defection of al-Ash’ārī (d. ca. 324/935) from Mu‘tazilism to Hanbalism and the promulgation of the Traditionalist creed by the Caliph al-Qādir (381-422/991-1031). The rise of legal studies and institutions such as Mosque-Inn (masjid-ḥān) college and Madrasa, in which they were taught and in which kalām and philosophy were not admitted as part of the curriculum, is associated by Makdisi with the effort by the Traditionalists in their respective “guilds of law,” the rise of which was the effect of the rise of such institutions, to preserve their dominance over the Rationalists.

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147Griffel, op. cit., p. 354.
150The contents of this creed, according to Makdisi, was directed against the anthropomorphists, the Karramiya, the Shi’a, the Ash’āriyya and the Mu‘tazila. The Rise, op. cit., p. 8.
Although, with the passage of time, Makdisi suggests, the Traditionalist institutions were not immune to Rationalist infiltration, as is illustrated by the fact that the Ash'arite movement, in search of a home, infiltrated into the Shafi‘ite school like the Mu‘tazilite did into the Hanafite, the Traditionalists had succeeded in their attempt to exclude the Rationalists from their institutions.

The defeat of the Mu‘tazilites in the political arena, on the other hand, forced them to make use of usūl al-fiqh as an intellectual vehicle to maintain the rational influence with which they had introduced some of the problems of philosophical theology and legal philosophy. The character of usūl al-fiqh changed from purely traditionalist, in the sense that al-Shāfi‘ī does not treat a single problem of kalām, to rationalist, in the sense that it deals with philosophico-theological problems. Usūl al-fiqh, which was founded by al-Shāfi‘ī in opposition to kalām, acquired authors whom al-Shāfi‘ī himself had previously called ‘the Partisans of Words’, Mutakallimūn. The intellectual effort of the Rationalist camp, Makdisi suggests, gained their success. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that many eminent scholars of Shafi‘ite or Hanbalite juridical denomination have dealt with the inroads made by other sciences into the field of usūl al-fiqh.

The result of such infiltration brought about the phenomenon by which a Sunni Muslim, a member of a Rationalist movement, could also become a member of a Sunni guild of law. Setting examples, Makdisi then enumerates a number of scholars knowledgeable of the ‘foreign sciences’, such as the Shafi‘ite al-Gazālī (d. 505/1111) with the Ash‘arite theological tendency with his introduction of logic into usūl al-fiqh, Sayf al-Dīn al-Amidī (d. 631/1233), who was sacked from his chair of law of the ’Aziziyya Madrasa for teaching philosophy and philosophical theology, and Ibn ‘Aqīl whose al-Wādi‘ī fī Usūl al-Fiqh was receptive to a Rationalist instrument of methodology, dialectics.

Examining his Rise, his five articles and one book-chapter, which I can only mention briefly here, Makdisi can be said to have discussed the opposition of a number of personalities to kalām: such as Abū al-‘Íasan al-Karajī (d. 532/1138), Abū Shāma al-Dimashqī al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 665/1268), Abū Sulaymān al-Ḥaṭṭābī al-Bustī (d. 388/999), al-Samā‘ī (d. 562/1166), Abū Ḥāmid al-Idarāyini (d. 406/1016), Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083) and his Hanbalite colleague, the Shari‘ Abū Ja‘far...
the Hanbalite Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 729/1329), al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), who listed Abu 'l-Hasan Al-Ḥammāmī (d. 417/1026), 'Abd al-Gāni Sa‘īd (d. 409/1018), Abū 'Abd al-Rāḥmān al-Sulāmī (d. 412/1021), Abū 'Amr b. Darrāj (d. 421/1030), Ibn al-Bawwāb (d. 413/1022), the Sultan Maḥmūd b. Sabuktakīn (d. 421/1030), and the Hanbalite Ibn al-Qayyīm al-Jawzīyya (d. 751/1350).

Besides, Makdisi exhaustively discusses the hostile attitude toward kalām of the "celebrated doctor of the Hanbalite theologico-juridical school", Muwaffaq al-Dīn b. Qudāma. In the introduction of his translation, Ibn Qudāma’s Censure of Speculative Theology, Makdisi says that Ibn Qudāma in this work not only specifically condemns Ibn ‘Āqīl, but also censures those who indulge in speculative theology, i.e. those who apply allegorical interpretation of the revealed text with regard to the divine attributes. Ibn Qudāma, Makdisi reiterates, opposes all manner of speculation in matters of religious belief because such speculation is unorthodox.

According to Ibn Qudāma, Makdisi says, speculative theology (kalām) was prohibited not only because of the fact that the pious ancestors did not practise it, but also for its inherent danger, i.e. that speculative theology leads to the use of allegorical interpretation (ta’wil) whose principal evil is that it leads to the practice of stripping God of the attributes which He attributed to Himself and of those which He did not.

Representing the Traditionalists i.e. in defence of the Hanbalite school against the accusation of anthropomorphism, Ibn Qudāma, Makdisi argues, advocates the unreserved acceptance of the Koranic expressions and the traditions on the divine attribute as they stand and as they were handed down from the Prophet without attempting any interpretation. A rationale of Ibn Qudāma’s advocating this principle is that only God knows their intended meaning. This principle is what distinguishes, according to Ibn Qudāma, the pious believers, the followers of the pious ancestors, from the error-laden partisans of allegorical interpretation, the speculative theologians.
2.2.2. Daiber (1981)

The position of Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223) regarding heresy and the heretics became clearer when Ibn Qudāma’s Creed (‘Aqidah al-Imām al-Maqdisi) was edited and given a succinct commentary by Daiber, who discussed very comprehensively not only the sources to which Ibn Qudama referred but also how his Creed would become an important reference for his disciples as well as scholars of later generations, who opposed all rationalistic tendencies.\(^{167}\) According to Hans Daiber, this text 'turns out to be a typical product of the Ḥanbalite school', and appears to depend on the writings of Ibn Ḥanbal.\(^{168}\)

According to Daiber, the sources to which Ibn Qudama referred in his Creed were the Creed of Ibn Baṭṭa al-Ukbari, (d. 387/997) al-Sharâ' wa ‘l-Ibāna ‘an Uṣūl al-Sunna wa ‘l-Diyâna; and I’tiqād Aḥl al-Sunnah wāḥid al-Dīn of Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 240/855). Ibn Qudama also shares his theological ideas with the Creeds (‘aqīḍa) of some Ḥanbalites of the 5th/11th century, like Abū ‘Ali al-Hāshimi and al-Barbahārī.\(^{169}\) Daiber also deals with several scholars who referred to Ibn Qudama in their staunch criticism of the theologians with rationalistic tendencies. In his opinion, the historian al-Ṭabarî’s Ṣarīr al-Sunnah and Abū Bakr al-Ajurri’s Kitāb al-Sharīʿa record articles of faith which can also be found in the Creed of Ibn Qudama and can be traced back to common Ḥanbalite sources.\(^{170}\)

Because of his unfavourable attitude toward the Ashʿarite school of his time, according to Daiber, Ibn Qudama, when defining īmān, avoids to use taṣdiq, a term commonly used by the Ashʿarites. For his staunch criticism of the scholars who made use of the rationalistic methods of the Muʿtazilites, such as Ibn ‘Aqīl (d. 513/1119), Ibn Qudama, Daiber argues, composed Taḥrīm al-Naẓar fī Kuttub Aḥl al-Kalām. Ibn Qudama’s opposition to kalām also inspired his disciple, Abū Shāma, to compose a work against heresy, Kitāb al-Bāʾith ‘alā Inkār al-Bīda’ wa ‘l-Ḥawādith.\(^{171}\)

2.2.3. Pavlin (1996)

Pavlin also draws our attention to the history of the Muslim opposition to speculative theology.\(^{172}\) He identifies the theologians as those who were engaged in disputes on theological controversies, such as the nature of God and His attributes. Their theological disputes are closely connected to their attempt to interpret allegorically certain obscure verses concerning the Attributes of God. In this light, speculative theology, Pavlin suggests, had already become subjected to the attack by its opponents as early as the Companions of the Prophet who

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maintained a belief in the clarity of the Koranic verses, shunning allegorical
interpretation. Following this principle, individuals such as Mālik b. Anās (d. 179/795), Ahmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 245/855), al-Buhārī (d. 256/870), and Ibn Qudāma
al-Maqdisī (d. 620/1223) are listed by Pavlin as those who had an intense hatred of
speculative theology. 273

2.2.4. Abrahamov (1998)
The opposition to theology and the theologians is extensively and systematically
dealt with by Abrahamov in his study which focuses on the trend and direction
of the dispute between the “Rationalists” i.e., the heralds of speculative reasoning
and logical reasoning in matters of faith, and the Traditionalist i.e., the heralds of
the tradition. 274 Abrahamov presents several identifications of the Traditionalists,
viz. (1) those who avoided the dispute between philosophy and tradition, whereas
they put forward arguments in the dispute between speculative theology and
tradition; (2) those who usually do not practice theological speculation in their
works or those who minimize the use of speculative arguments; (3) those who
maintain that the first foundation of traditionalism is strict adherence to the
teachings of the Koran, the Sunna and the consensus mainly of the first
generations of scholars; (4) when disputing with the “Rationalists”, the
Traditionalists, such as Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, sometimes combine traditional and
rational proof in their arguments; (5) the Traditionalists sometimes make use of
the technical terms of their adversaries to prove that the latter contradict their
own arguments. Abrahamov argues convincingly that Traditionalism is not a
monopoly of the Hanbalite scholars, but can also be found among the adherents
of the Shafi’ite, the Malikite and the Hanafite schools. Those who employ reason
in their arguments, like Ibn Taymiyya, are referred to by Abrahamov as the
Mutakallimû Ahl al-Ḥadîth (the speculative theologians of the people of
Tradition). 275

According to Abrahamov, the issue against which the Traditionalists
launched their criticism is the use of rational arguments by the “Rationalists” as
reflected in their use of independent rational interpretation (tafsîr bi ’l-ra’y), and
the use of analogical reasoning (qîyās) in deducing law from the Koran and the
Sunna. Their hostile attitude toward the rationalists, Abrahamov argues, is
reflected in two forms: (1) Their prohibition of engaging in theological dispute,
including breaking off relations with the mutakallîmûn, (2) the refutation of the
“Rationalists” tenets. 276

2.2.5. Juynboll (1998)
Objections 277 against theology can also be found in Juynboll’s Sunna, 278 his
Excursus, 279 and his review of Van Ess’ Theologie und Gesellschaft. 280 Although

\[273\]Ibidem.

\[274\]Abrahamov, B., Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh:

\[275\]Abrahamov, op. cit., p. 1-11.

\[276\]Ibidem.

\[277\]Here, I was confronted with G.H.A. Juynboll’s personal suggestion that he prefers to use
the term ‘objection’ rather than the term ‘opposition.’ I am indebted to him, who, at

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the whole passage is mainly concerned with a discussion of the development of the term *sunna* from the *Jāhiliyya* until the third century of Islam. Juynboll’s discussion of the objection to theology can be found in his description of certain historical personalities, figuring in his writing, when discussing the appellative *Sunna, Ahl al-Sunna* as well as *Ṣāḥib (Aṣḥāb) al-Sunna*. The motive of their opposition to *ahl al-bida‘* is illustrated by their arguments against their opponents among whom are theologians (*Mutakallimûn*).

2.2.7. Al-Hashshash (2000)
Finally, the discussion of more than two centuries of opposition to theology by Muslim scholars ranging from Ahmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 245/855) till al-Harawi (d. 481/1089) was dealt with by al-Hashshash in his discussion of “*Die Hanbaliten in der Zeit zwischen der Miḥna Ibn Ḥanbals und der Miḥna des al-Anṣārî*.”

Based on his study of *Dhamm al-Kalām* by al-Harawi (d. 481/1089), al-Hashshash underlines the Hanbalites’ struggle against theology. According to al-Hashshash, Ahmad b. Ḥanbal constitutes a key figure in the opposition to the theologians. His fervent attitude against theology caused him and his followers, during more than two centuries and in various regions of the Islamic world, to be repressed by the ruling authorities. Such repression was not only felt by Ahmad b. Ḥanbal and his contemporary followers, upon whom al-Ma‘mûn (198-218/813-833) had afflicted the *miḥna* (the “Inquisition”), but also by the Hanbalites of later generations, including al-Harawi himself.

3. Al-Suyūtî’s Position

3.1. Al-Suyūtî’s View on the Origin of Islamic Theology
As far as the position of al-Suyūtî is concerned, it can be said here that his view is strikingly parallel with the view of certain modern scholars who asserted that the development of *kalām* is not only due to an external factor, i.e. the translation movement of Greek writings, but also to an internal one, i.e. the need of an art of debate for religious argumentation.

In his SM, al-Suyūtî discusses a number of topics regarding the origin and the foundation of logic, its introduction into the religious community of Islam,

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and scholars who connected the works on *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *uṣūl al-dīn* to logic, as well as its diffusion among later scholars. \(^{183}\) Al-Suyūṭī gives weight to the importation of the books of Greekdom and the translation movement through the mediation of al-Ma‘mūn’s explicit policy in favour of foreign sciences. In dealing with the origin of logic and that of Islamic theology *vis a vis* Greek influence, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have distinguished two different orientations between logic and theology. Logic was first made use of by Muslims after their cultural and intellectual contact with Hellenism. Logical speculation, according to al-Suyūṭī, was closely associated with the translation movement, as mentioned briefly above, whereas the origin of *kalām* arose out of the need for an art of debate on religious issues which had been practiced since the time of the Prophet and the Companions.

However, in dealing with *kalām*, al-Suyūṭī’s view can be said to come close to that of Van Ess and Daiber, mentioned earlier. Al-Suyūṭī provides a lot of data concerning disputes of early Muslims on matters pertaining to the Islamic creed. These disputes had been practiced by the Muslims long before the importation of Greek books and the translation movement. Referring to al-Harawi, al-Buḥārī, al-Lālakā’ī, al-Ājurrī and al-Sam‘ānī, al-Suyūṭī holds the view that the opposition to *kalām*, *jadal*, *naẓar* and *marā‘* had already started with the Prophet, who said that “the perishing of those before us happened because of their frequent questions (posed to) and their arguments with their prophets,” and who prayed: “O God, I ask your protection against knowledge which has no significance…” According to al-Suyūṭī, the opposition to *kalām* was also performed by the Companions. 'Umar b. al-Ḥaṭṭāb, for instance, lashed Ṣābīq because of a question posed by him concerning a variant reading of the Koran till the blood run from his back. Likewise, 'Ali b. Abī Ṭalib warned people that at the end of time there would be a people whose speech and arguments were not known by the adherents of Islam. They would be inviting the people to adhere to their message. If one meets them, one is to kill them. When he was encountered with a question of *kalām*, 'Ali b. Abī Ṭalib even prepared himself for fighting.

However, al-Suyūṭī argues that logic and *kalām* have intricate relations, which implies that logic, to a certain extent, can be identified with *kalām* and *vice-versa*. The intricate relation between them is clearly indicated, for instance, when he speaks of the (legal) reasons (*ʿilāh*) why they were both prohibited. According to al-Suyūṭī, these reasons are: *First*, the Pious Ancestors were not concerned with them; *secondly*, they lead to dissension and error.

Al-Suyūṭī seems to have seen that speculative and rational argumentation (*naẓar*, *marā‘*, *jadal*, *kalām*, etc), which had already been practiced since the time of the Prophet, were provided with a sophisticated method borrowed from Greek culture, when the Muslims encountered the Sciences of the Ancients. This is clearly reflected in his remarks: “…that the Sciences of the Ancients had reached the Muslims in the first century when they had conquered the lands of the non-Arabs. But they had not spread among them widely and had not become generally known among them since the ancestors had prohibited [us] from being engrossed in them. However, [the Greek sciences] became popular in al-Barmakī’s period, while their spread increased in the period of al-Ma‘mūn because of the

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\(^{183}\) For an elaborate discussion of this issue see Chapter 3, p. 88-90.
innovations he stimulated and the occupation with the sciences of the Ancients as well as the extinguishing of the Sunna he promoted.\textsuperscript{184}

The fate that befell this ‘indigenous’ art of debate through this cultural encounter is clearly indicated by al-Suyūṭī, who includes ‘ilm al-ḥalām as one of the sciences of the ancients, “whose origin was found among the materialist philosophers.”\textsuperscript{185} Saying this, al-Suyūṭī seems to give the impression that the rudimentary practice of takallama needed to be refined through the adoption of a foreign sophisticated science, viz. the ‘ilm al-ḥalām (discursive theology). He purposely used the term ‘ilm al-ḥalām, which implies such a development, was referred to by Gardet and Anawati as that of ‘la période de fermentation.’

3.2. Al-Suyūṭī’s Contributions to the Study of the Islamic Opposition to Logic and Theology

Our understanding of the Muslim opposition to logic and theology may be furthered by the study of the four works on these subjects written by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī. These works are, in the historical order of their composition:

3.2.1. Al-Qawl al-Mushriq fī Tahrim al-Ishtiqāl bi ‘Ilm al-Manṭiq

Of the four works against logic by al-Suyūṭī, QM can be said to have been composed first, i.e. in 867 or 868/1465 or 1466. This is clearly indicated in the introduction of SM, which states: “Long ago, in the year 867 or 868 [H] I composed a book on the prohibition of being occupied with the art of logic, which I named “al-Qawl al-Mushriq” into which I included the statements of the learned men of Islam to condemn and prohibit it.”\textsuperscript{186}

In this work al-Suyūṭī discusses either explicitly or incidentally the opposition of more than 40 leading scholars of various law schools to logic by referring to more than 28 works which deal either explicitly or incidentally with the same issue.

Despite the fact that Brockelmann has given adequate reference to it in his celebrated Geschichte,\textsuperscript{187} it may be said here that not a single reference to QM has been made by modern scholars. This is presumably due to the fact that QM has not been published yet in a printed edition.

3.2.2. Jahd al-Qariha fī Tajrid al-Naṣīḥa

As can be clearly read in the introduction of SM, al-Suyūṭī abridged Ibn Taymiyya’s Nasīḥat Ahl al-Imām fī ‘l-Radd ‘alā Manṭiq al-Yūnān in 888, after QM and before SM. The scope of this work comprises al-Suyūṭī’s discussion of IT’s attempt to unravel the main theses on which the logicians founded their logic: (1) \textit{Al-taṣawwur lā yunālu ʿillā bi ʿl-hadd} (no concept can be formed except by means of definition); (2) \textit{Al-ḥadd muṭfīd taṣawwur al-ashyāʾ} (definition leads to the conception of things), (3) \textit{Al-taṣdiq lā yunālu ʿillā bi ʿl-qiyās} (judgement cannot be

\textsuperscript{184}SM, op. cit., p. 44-5.
\textsuperscript{186}See al-Suyūṭī’s introduction of SM, op. cit., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{187}GAL, II, 189.
formed except by means of analogy), and (4) Al-burhān yuṭīd al-‘ilm bi ‘l-taṣdiqāt (demonstration leads to certain knowledge of judgements).

First of all, it should be noted that this work has been translated and introduced by Hallaq, in his *Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians*. This work has also been referred to by modern scholars for more than one purpose. Al-Nashshār in his *Manāḥij*, for instance, exhaustively refers to JQ when dealing with Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion against logic, and with the attitude of the jurists (fuqahā‘) toward logic. Likewise, al-Ja'bīrī relies on JQ when discussing the attitude of the Ithna 'Ashariyya Shi‘ites toward Greek philosophy and logic. Al-Zayn and Abū Zahra also make use of it when dealing with Ibn Taymiyya’s logic and intellectual method and with the biography of Ibn Taymiyya.

### 3.2.3. Ṣawn al-Māntiq wa ‘l-Kalām ‘an Fannay al-Māntiq wa ‘l-Kalām

SM was the third work which al-Suyūṭī composed in order to deal with the opposition to logic and theology. Like JQ, this work was composed in 888 when some of al-Suyūṭī’s contemporaries rejected his claim for *ijtihād*, since he allegedly lacked the knowledge of logic which was claimed to be one of its prerequisites. This work revolves around the history and origin of logic, its introduction into the Muslim world, the reaction of leading Muslim scholars against it, its connection to theology and the reaction of Muslim scholars against theology and the refutation against one who introduced logic into grammar.

Like JQ, SM has also been referred to by modern scholars, for more than one purpose. Regarding SM as the most complete encyclopaedia dealing with the criticism of Greek logic, al-Nashshār in his *Manāḥij* relied on it when dealing with (1) the history of the introduction of Aristotelian logic to the Muslim world, (2) the attitude of the Uṣūlists, i.e. the scholars of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, and the theologians (mutakallimūn) toward Aristotelian logic, and (3) the attitude of the jurists (fuqahā‘) toward logic. Likewise, SM has been frequently referred to by al-Ja'bīrī in his discussion of the attitude of the Ithna ‘Ashariyya Shi‘ites.

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189 Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
190 Al-Ja'bīrī's reference to SM can be found in his work, *op. cit.*, in p. 52, 58, 84, 90, 93, 96, 119, 121, 123; to JQ in p. 101, 121, 131-2, 140, 142.
195 Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 69, 70.
196 Al-Nashshār, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
toward Greek philosophy and logic, and by Abrahamov especially when discussing the attitude of the partisans of Tradition toward the partisans of Reason, as well as by Fodah in his critical survey of the early Muslim opponents of logic. The first five printed-pages of SM in which al-Suyūṭī discusses his motive for composing SM have also incidentally been referred to by Sartain in her study of al-Suyūṭī’s biography, by Van Ess, by Hallaq in the introduction to his annotated translation of Ibn Taymiyya’s Nasīḥah, and by Geoffroy, when dealing with al-Suyūṭī’s condemnation of Hellenistic logic. Along the same line, SM was also consulted by Madkour when discussing Aristotle’s logic among the Mutakallimūn and its influence on the Arab world, and by al-Rouayheb when dealing with the Sunni Muslim Scholars’ attitude towards Logic.

3.2.4. Al-Suyūṭī’s Fatwā

The fatwā was the fourth work composed to prohibit logic. That this work was composed after JQ and SM is clearly indicated in a passage which says that he abridged IT’s Naṣīḥah, i.e. JQ, and composed a volume to condemn logic, i.e. SM. Like any other fatwā, this fatwā starts with a question on the issue of logic, and is then followed by al-Suyūṭī’s prohibition in reference to 43 scholars whom he claims to have prohibited logic.

As far as the fact whether this work has been referred to by modern scholars is concerned, it should be said that only Brunschwig relies on it when he discusses the attitude of Ibn Ḥazm, al-Gazālī and Ibn Taymiyya toward Greek logic.

4. The Scope of the Present work

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198Al-Jābirī’s reference to SM can be found in his work, op. cit., in p. 52, 58, 84, 90, 93, 96, 119, 121, 123; to JQ in p. 101, 123, 131-2, 140, 142.
199Abrahamov’s extensive reference to SM can be found in his Islamic Theology, op. cit., p. 23, 65, 69, 73-4, 77, 80-1, 83, 84-5, 91.
200Fodah even devotes one chapter to an examination of al-Suyūṭī’s attitude toward logic and kalām and an analysis of several sources on which al-Suyūṭī relies in his discussion in SM. See Fodah, Saeed, TadÝm a l-ManÔiq: Jawla N aqdiyya m aÝa ‘l-MuÝÁriÃÐn l i Ý Ilm a l-ManÔiq mina ‘l-Mutaqaddim n (Amman: DÁr al-RÁzÐ, 2002), esp. p. 114-181.
201Sartain, op. cit., p. 69; see also her note, no. 144.
203Hallaq, op. cit., p. xlix; see also his note no. 180.
204Geoffroy, E., “al-Suyūṭī,” EI², IX, 915.
206Al-Rouayheb, op. cit. p. 213-32.
The purpose of the present work is to deal with the following research-question:

What can we learn from al-Suyūṭī’s four works against logic and theology about the history of Islamic thought concerning the condemnation of logic and theology, in addition to the light shed on this subject by modern scholars quoted earlier?

In dealing with this research-question, I will discuss in the first chapter al-Suyūṭī’s earliest contribution to the history of the opposition to logic, entitled al-Qawl al-Mushriq fī Tahrim al-Ishtigāl bi ‘Ilm al-Manṭiq, written by him when he was still a student of 18 years old. I will deal with the manuscripts and the edition of QM (1.1), the date and purpose of its composition (1.2), as well as with an analysis of its contents (1.3). In my conclusion, I shall evaluate this work as a source for the history of Muslim opposition to logic (1.4).

In chapter two, I will discuss al-Suyūṭī’s abridgement of IT’s Naṣiḥa, entitled, Jahd al-Qarīḥa fī Tajrīd al-Naṣiḥa, a work composed when his knowledge of logic was doubted by some of his contemporaries. I will deal with the date (2.1) and purpose of his abridgement (2.2). I will also assess the contribution made by al-Suyūṭī in rendering IT’s Naṣiḥa more comprehensible. Elements of IT’s religious viewpoints against logic and theology in JQ will also be discussed (2.3). Some pages are devoted to deal with the question how al-Suyūṭī selected IT’s viewpoints against logic in his JQ (2.4). In the conclusion, I shall analyse the rationale of al-Suyūṭī’s selection of IT’s arguments in it (2.5).

Chapter three will discuss al-Suyūṭī’s work that was composed twenty years after QM, when his call for ijtihād was refused by some of his contemporaries who doubted his ability to comply with an alleged precondition for ijtihād, i.e., the knowledge of logic. I will deal, first of all, with the manuscript and the edition of SM (3.1), with the date (3.2) and the purpose of the composition of this work, i.e. Sawān al-Manṭiq (3.3). An analysis will also be given of the content of this work (3.4). In my conclusion, I shall again evaluate this work as a source for the history of Muslim opposition to logic and theology (3.5).

In chapter four, I will discuss al-Suyūṭī’s Fatwā against logic. In so doing, first of all, I will deal with its manuscript (4.1). I will give an analysis of the content of this Fatwā (4.2) and evaluate this sources on which al-Suyūṭī relies when issuing this Fatwā (4.3).

In the conclusion, I will try to answer the research-question formulated above by synthesizing the last paragraphs of each of the four chapters of this study.
Chapter One

\textit{al-Qawl al-Mushriq fī Tāhārīm al-Ishtigāl bi 'Ilm al-Manṭiq}: Its Manuscripts, the Date and Purpose of its Composition as well as its Content and Sources

This chapter will deal with the manuscripts and the edition of QM (1.1), the date and purpose of its composition (1.2), as well as with an analysis of its contents (1.3). In the conclusion, I shall evaluate this work as a source for the history of Muslim opposition to logic (1.4).

1. 1. The manuscripts

Only two manuscripts of QM are known: the first was kept at Ḥizānāt al-Kutub al-Āṣafiyya in Haydārābād (the Ms is now preserved at Andhra Pradesh Government Oriental Manuscripts Library and Research Institute),\(^{208}\) and the second is a transcript made by a Moroccan librarian, the late Muṣṭafā Nājī, from a manuscript of QM in a private collection, which was heavily damaged. This transcript is at Van Koningsveld’s disposal. The transcript consists of 18 pages (of A4 paper). Each page which comprises 30 lines is replete with lacunas. Obviously, the original from which the copy was made, was in a very deplorable state of preservation. The script, however, is clear, with diacritical signs for ambiguous words. Alternative readings are also provided at occasional doubtful passages.

1. 2. The Date and Purpose of the Composition of QM

In his Kitāb Bahjat al-ʿĀbidīn bi Tarjama ʿĀrīf Jalāl al-Dīn,\(^{209}\) al-Shādhilī\(^{210}\) quoted al-Suyūṭī as having said: “…Generally speaking, I think little of logic. Then I came across the statements by leading scholars censuring it and a ḥāfiz of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ against it. In sum, I became averse to it completely. Therefore, I wrote a quire [of a work] which I entitled \textit{al-Gayṭh al-Mugriq fī Tāhārīm al-Manṭiq}.”\(^{211}\) From this statement, one might hastily conclude that al-

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\(^{208}\) GAL, S. II, 189. After having been informed by a staff of the Oriental Collection at the Leiden University Library that the microfilm of the catalogue of Ḥizānāt al-Kutub al-Āṣafiyya, \textit{Fihrist-i Arabi, Farsi wa Urdu Maḥzūna Kutub Kana-i Āṣafiyya-i Sarkar-i Ali Kutub Kana-i Āṣafiyya-i Sarkar-i Ali} (Haydarābād, 1332-1347/1914-1928) 3 vols, was lost, I had to confirm myself here to the other Ms; According to Khalidi, in 1975 all the Mss of the Āṣafiyya were transferred to the Andhra Pradesh Government Oriental Manuscripts Library and Research Institute, in Osmania University Campus. See Khalidi, Omar, “A Guide to Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu Manuscript Libraries in India,” in MELA Notes 75-76 (Fall 2002-Spring 2003), esp. 8-9.

\(^{209}\) MS, Chester Beatty Library, Dublin, 4436, 10, 4574 (2). I would like to express my gratitude to Carla Williams of Chester Beatty Library who provided me with this manuscript.

\(^{210}\) Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad al-Shāḥīlī was one of al-Suyūṭī’s biographers and closest disciples, who was given by the latter the birqā. See Sartain, op. cit., p. 34, 49.

\(^{211}\) …\textit{fa ṣadaraṭu al-manṭiq jumlatan thumma waqfatu ‘alā kalām al-ʿulāmā’ fī dhimmihī wa mā aftā bihi ibn al-ṣalāḥ fāmlītu ‘an al-manṭiq kulla ‘l-mayl fā allaftu kurrāsatān al-
Suyūṭī had composed another work in his early age besides QM. However, it should be noted here that al-Gayth al-Mugriq is identical to QM, based on obvious reasons. First, al-Suyūṭī has neither listed a writing by him with the title al-Gayth al-Mugriq in his autobiographical work, al-Taḥadduth, nor in his earlier historical work, Ḥusn al-Muḥāḍara, where he also provided a list of his own writings, nor has he referred to it in other works dealing with the same issue. In the introduction to SM, al-Suyūṭī (born in 849/1448) indicated however: "Long ago, in the year 867 or 868 [H] I composed a book on the prohibition of being occupied with the art of logic, which I named “al-Qawl al-Mushriq” in which I included the statements of the learned men of Islam to condemn and prohibit it." Although without any indication concerning its title, a work against logic al-Suyūṭī composed when he was eighteen years is mentioned in a statement of his, quoted by al-Shādhili, which reads: “... If one fabricates lies to you [about me], know that since I grew up I have been destined to love the Sunna and Tradition, to abhor the sciences of the ancients i.e., philosophy and logic. I composed [a work] to condemn logic when I was eighteen years old...” Based on al-Suyūṭī’s clear indication in SM, as described above, it is obvious that a work composed by him when he was eighteen refers to QM, because he was born in 849/1448. Al-Gayth al-Mugriq might simply be either an alternative title of the work or a copying mistake by al-Shādhili, who was one of al-Suyūṭī’s disciples and a copyst of the latter’s works.

Al-Suyūṭī’s objective in composing QM is clearly indicated by his words, which say: “Therefore I composed a work in which I collected the statements of the Pious Ancestors asserting [my] conviction that [logic was prohibited.”

1.3 The Content

Although al-Suyūṭī neither divides his QM into chapters and sub-chapters nor gives any titles, based on his usage of certain expressions, like wa ba’du in the introductory passage which is then followed by fa-allaftu, and fa-aqūlu which is followed by fa-qāla al-Nawawī, wa qāla Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, wa hakā, etc, the structure of his arguments in QM can be drawn as follows:

(A.) Introduction (p. 1)
(B.) Al-Suyūṭī’s Discussion of his Predecessors’ Attitude toward Logic (p. 1-12)
(C.) Legal cases which can be relied on for the prohibition of logic (p. 13-18)
(D.) Reasons why logic was prohibited (p. 18)
In arranging his QM, al-Suyūṭī apparently did not follow any particular method of division. He simply seems to have listed a great number of predecessors and discussed their statements against logic. This is presumably closely connected to, first of all, his speed of writing and composition, as reported by his biographer and pupil, al-Dāwūdī: “I have seen the shaykh write three quires in one day, both composing and writing down, as well as dictate hadith and answer opponents.” In turn, when describing people or events, he just collected “any relevant anecdotes or oral reports,” and wrote them down “without any attempt to connect them into a coherent chronological narrative to show cause and effect.”

(A) Introduction and Reason for Composing the Book

The background against which al-Suyūṭī composed QM can be understood from his introduction, which the present author paraphrases as follows: When the falsity was widespread, the age regressed. The partisans of innovation were on intimate terms with the partisans of the Sunna and the Koran. Then they conjured up their being occupied with logic and with other philosophical sciences before the eyes of the latter. They also declared to them that with the help of logic, different kinds of knowledge could be obtained; any goal and purpose could be achieved. Unfortunately, no one who was occupied with it was distinguished in the science of the Sharia and able to comprehend the primary and secondary aims of the religious sciences. Moreover, their Shaykhs, who spent their whole lives studying logic were not able to respond even to insignificant questions posed to them, for instance, concerning the istinjā’.

Responding to this state of affairs, al-Suyūṭī exclaims: “Praise the Lord! This does not show that putting the obligatory in higher priorities than this science would be correct. I consider it a matter of religious sincerity to make it known that it is prohibited to occupy oneself with it. Moreover, the leading scholars of Islam have explicitly prohibited it. No one has allowed it except al-Imām al-Gazālī as found in a statement by him, from which, however, he withdrew as several leading scholars have also reported.”

The reason for composing this work becomes clear from his statement which reads: “Therefore I composed a work in which I collected the statements of the Pious Ancestors on that matter.”

(B.) Al-Suyūṭī's Discussion of his Predecessors' Attitude toward Logic

Before delving into the discussion of QM, two things should be noted. First of all that al-Suyūṭī (b. 849/1445) was eighteen years old when he composed QM in 867/1463, but had already been given ijāzah by al-Bulqūnī, one of his teachers, by which he was allowed to teach fiqh and to pronounce legal opinions according to the Shafi’ite school of law. Yet he continued to attend the lessons of al-Shumūnī on ḥadīth, Arabic language and rhetoric. In composing QM, al-Suyūṭī merely listed himself among the scholars who opposed logic, for which what he did first and foremost in this intellectual exercise was to marshal each statement against logic by his predecessors.

As can be read in the following discussion, al-Suyūṭī contends that the prohibition of logic had a strong basis not only in the Shafi’ite circle but also in the Malikite, Hanbalite and Hanafite as well. To prove this point, he refers to authors very well-known in their respective circles as those who prohibited logic. However, al-Suyūṭī also amazingly refers to al-Gazālī, the unparalleled authority and renewer of Islamic Sciences of the sixth/eleventh century whose favourable attitude towards logic was almost undisputed, as one who prohibited logic.

Referring to al-Mustaṣfā, al-Suyūṭī quotes al-Gazālī as having said: “ḥādhīhi muqaddimat al-ʿulūm kullihā wa-man lā yuḥūṯu biḥā fa-lā thiqata lahū bi ʿulūmīhī aṣlān.” (“[Logic] is the introduction to all sciences. One who is not well-versed in it, his authority in the sciences is not reliable at all.”) Basing himself on Naṣīḥat al-Musliḥ al-Musṭaṣfī, he quotes al-Gazālī as having said: “ḥādhīhi muqaddimat al-ʿulūm kullihā wa-man lā yuḥūṯu biḥā fa-lā thiqata lahū bi ʿulūmīhī aṣlān.”

Referring to al-Mustaṣfā, al-Suyūṭī quotes al-Gazālī as having said: “ḥādhīhi muqaddimat al-ʿulūm kullihā wa-man lā yuḥūṯu biḥā fa-lā thiqata lahū bi ʿulūmīhī aṣlān.”

[Full footnotes and references omitted for brevity.]

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by Sirāj al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 750/1349), 229 al-Suyūṭī, however, convincingly argues that al-Gazālī had retreated from this opinion. 230

Furthermore, al-Suyūṭī refers to Ḣāfiz ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, 229 insisting that there are some passages in it where al-Gazālī censured logic. 232 Al-Suyūṭī even relates that he composed two quires summarizing passages of Ḣāfiz ‘Ulūm al-Dīn which dealt with the censure of logic. 231

Without having referred to other works of al-Gazālī dealing with logic, such as Tahāfūt al-Falāsīfā, Mizān al-‘Amaḥ, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, Miḥakk al-‘Naẓār, 233 al-Suyūṭī maintains that it is true that al-Gazālī once exhorted people to master logic, but then, al-Suyūṭī suggests, he changed his opinion to censuring logic. Al-Suyūṭī then argues that if a scholar has two different opinions, it is the second one which is to be referred to, while the first is to be regarded as one from which he had withdrawn. 235

Furthermore, al-Suyūṭī marshalled the argument of al-Nawawī, who was considered the highest authority in Shafi‘ī circles, 236 and whose work, Sharḥ al-Muḥaddhdbāḥ, was the most important reference in the Shafi‘ī school. 237 According to al-Suyūṭī, al-Nawawī (676/1277) 238 in his Óabaqāt 239 said that al-

229 Sirāj al-Dīn ʿUmar b. ʿAlī b. ʿUmar al-Qazwīnī was born in 683/1285 and died in 750/1349. Al-Suyūṭī referred to him as the great Ḣāfiz and the traditionist of Iraq. See al-Suyūṭī, TH, 526.


231 This work has been published several times and subjected to several studies, which need not to be enumerated here.

232 “… thumma inna fī ʿl-ḥiyāʾ mawādīʾ lā tuḥsā ṭaddāluʾaʾalaʾ l-ḥaṭṭ ʿalayhi…” “wa annahu taqawwalaʾalayhi bimā lam yaqul aw qalāhu wa rajaaʾaʾ anḥū…” QM, p. 4 (l. 11-12).

233 “mā ṭaḥṣā ṭaddāluʾaʾ inna minhu wa ḥuwa ṭahā ṭammā ṭanfahū wataṭrūṣūdī allattī fī ʿl-ḥiyāʾ min-mā yaḍdūluʾaʾalaʾ l-ḥaṭṭ ʿalayhi.” QM, p. 4, l. 14-5.


236 Heffening, W., “al-Nawawī” EI II, 1041.


239 Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahāʾ, according to Wüstenfeld, is an extract from a work by Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ. In this biographical dictionary, which deals only with a very limited group of figures, al-Nawawī not only gives biographical information on less known scholars but also on their teachers. Wüstenfeld, op. cit., p. 55-6; Muḥtaṣar Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahāʾ; ed. ʿĀdīl ʿAbd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Muʿassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfīyya, 1995). According to the editor, this work is a fair copy made by al-Mizzī, who made a fair copy of Muḥtaṣar Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahāʾ by al-Nawawī, who had died before having completed it. 238
Gazâlî’s attempt to mix logic with usûl al-fiqh was considered a heresy.\textsuperscript{240} Al-Suyûtî then quotes other statements of al-Nawawi, saying that the selling of books of logic and philosophy was not allowed. Such books should be destroyed instead.\textsuperscript{241} In another passage, al-Suyûtî also records al-Nawawi’s quotation of al-Shâfi’î’s celebrated statements against kalâm: (1) “Any affliction by God, except al-shirk, is better for man than being afflicted by Him through kalâm;” (2) “running away from kalâm is like running away from a lion;” and (3) “my opinion on the people of kalâm is that they should be beaten with the lash, and be paraded along the markets while summoning the people that this is the consequence of neglecting the science of shari’a, for being occupied by ‘ilm al-kalâm.”\textsuperscript{242}

Al-Suyûtî then quotes Ibn al-Šâlah’s (d.643/1245)\textsuperscript{243} fatwâ in which the latter maintained that being occupied with learning and teaching logic is not allowed by the Law-giver, by the Companions, the Followers and by the leading scholars qualified to undertake ijtihâd.\textsuperscript{244}

Basing myself on the Fatâwá\textsuperscript{245} and al-Suyûtî’s abridgement of some passages of it in QM, it should be noted that the response of Ibn al-Šâlah is

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{240}] “wa laqad atâ bi ḥulūthi ‘l-manṭiq bi usūl al-fiqh bid’atān fi ǧâmmu shu’mihā ‘ala ‘l-manṭiq ‘a ḥattâ kathara ba’dā da ḥālika fahm ǧaṣṣafa wa ‘l-lâh al-mustāʾān.”QM, p. 2, l. 9-11.
  \item[\textsuperscript{241}] “... lá yajâzu bay’ kutub al-manṭiq wa ‘l-ḥâsafa jazman bal yajibu itlāfuhā...” in QM, p. 2, l. 13.
  \item[\textsuperscript{242}] “la an yulqiya ‘l-lâh al-Ýabd bikulli dhanbān mā ḥalâ al-shirk ḥāyun lahū min an yalqāhū bi shay’in min ‘ilm al-kâlam, wa qawluhā firra min ‘ilm al-kâlam fīrārakā mina ‘l-asad, wa qawluhū ra’yi fi ahl al-kâlam an yujraḥū bihi fī ‘l-aswāq wa yunādiya ‘alayhim ḥâḏḥa jazâ’u man yatrukū ‘ilm ‘l-shari’ā’ wa yashtagilu bi ‘ilm al-kâlam...”QM, p. 3, l. 19-23.
  \item[\textsuperscript{243}] Ibn al-Šâlah was born in 577/1181 in Irbîl and died in Damascus in 643/1245. His Muqaddimât Ibn al-Šâlah fi ‘l-Úlam al-Ḥadîth was considered the standard work on the science of the Tradition, and was considered by al-Suyûtî himself as one of the most knowledgeable persons of his time on Exegesis, Tradition and Jurisprudence. See al-Suyûtî, TH, 500.
  \item[\textsuperscript{244}] “wa laysa ‘l-ishtigāl bi ‘ilmihā wa ta’limihā mimāma abâhahu ‘l-shari’ā... al-ṣâhâba wa ‘l-tâbi’in wa ‘l-la’imma al-mujtahidin wa ‘l-‘ulamā’ al-‘ārifîn wa sâ’ār man yuq(tābād bihi mn an ‘ilm al-milla... qad barā’u ‘l-lâh al-jami’il min ma’arrati dhâlika wa adnāsihām wa ṣâhrahhum min awdârīhā wa amma ‘st’īl al-ṣâhīḥat al-manṭiqiyā fī mabâḥithi ‘l-kalâm al-shar’īyya fā-mīn... al-mustashnīn wa laysa bi ‘l-ḥākim al-shar’īyā wa ‘l-ḥamd li ‘l-lâh rīṭqār ila ‘l-manṭiqiyyā ṣâlahīn fī mā za’amahū al-manṭiqī li ‘l-manṭiqī fī amr al-ḥuṣaja wa ‘l-burhān fā-qāqī fī qad ġā’līh ‘anāhī bi ‘l-ṭarīqī al-aqwām wa ‘l-sâbil al-ḥulma kullu muslim al-zuhd... falsely nazariyyāt al-‘ulām al-shar’īyya fī qad tammat al-ṣâhāra al-ṣâhāra fī al-μūlahū wa ḥâdha fī biḥār al-ḥaqaqīq fī ‘l-qāqā’īq ‘ulamā’... lā manṭiqīq wa lā falsafāta wa man za’amahā yashtagilū bi ‘l-manṭiqū bi ‘l-falsafā ḥi’ fā’idā za’amahā faqād ḥasira... wa dukhir bihi. Fa ‘l-wâjîb ‘alā ‘l-sulṭān a’zzahu ‘l-lâh wa a’azza bihi ‘l-islām wa ahlāhū an yadda t’a’ an al-muslimîn sharrā hâ’ulā’... min al-madârîs wa... wa yu’ridu min zāhr minhu i’tiqād ‘aqā’il al-falāsîfā ‘alā ‘l-ṣayyîf aw al-islām li taḥmîda nārîhum wa tannâhī āthârîhum yassara ‘l-lâh dhâlika wa ajâlalâhū min awjdâl al-wâjîb ‘ażlū man kâna muddarîs maddasat min ahl al-falsafa wa ‘l-tâṣîfî fîhā wa ‘l-‘iqrâ’ bihihā... wa... ‘ntisâb mithlîhu muddarrant mina t’a’qâ’il wa sijnûhū wa ilâmahū ṣâlah fī mā yaqîNUM fīlîhā... ‘l-ṭarîqî fī qā’t ‘al-sharr gâl’u uṣulîhū wa ‘l-lâh...” QM, p. 2, l. 14-26.
\end{itemize}
succinct but very fervent and harsh against logic and those who study and make use of it. Before delivering his response to questions posed to him, Ibn al-Ñalāḥ starts with his value judgment on philosophy and logic. In his opinion, philosophy is the basis of stupidity and disintegration, a source of confusion and error, and a stimulus of deviation and heresy. Logic, according to Ibn al-Ñalāḥ, is an introduction to philosophy. Logic, Ibn al-Ñalāḥ infers, is as evil as philosophy because an introduction to evil is also evil.

Then Ibn al-Ñalāḥ declares that being occupied with studying and teaching logic is not legally justified. Not a single individual, he maintains, of the Companions, the Followers, the Pious Ancestors and the leading scholars who undertake ījāḥād have deemed it permissible to be occupied with the study of logic and teaching it. As far as the use of logical terms in formulating divine laws is concerned, Ibn al-Ñalāḥ says it is one of the reprehensible actions and new stupidities.

Without giving any further reason, Ibn al-Ñalāḥ asserts the superfluousness of logic and philosophy for the formulation of the divine laws, saying that those who hold that logic and philosophy must be studied for their benefits, must have been deceived by the Satan and led astray by Him. Logic and philosophy lead them to nothing but deprivation and banishment.

Finally, Ibn al-Ñalāḥ recommends the Sultan to protect the people from the evil of those who are occupied with studying and teaching logic by taking certain measures: Banishing them from their schools, punishing them according to the degree of their involvement, and even killing them, if they have already come to a degree of knowledge comparable to that of philosophers.

This fatwā, according to Griffel, is not only evidence of the existence of the study of philosophy in the first half of 8th/13th century, but also constitutes the peak of the opposition to the philosophers, which had already been taken up by al-Gazālī with his Tahāfut al-Falāsifa more than one hundred fifty years earlier. In Chamberlain’s view, this fatwā is, however, an instrument of political competition, employed by Ibn al-Ñalāḥ to gain the ruler’s favour.

Furthermore, al-Suyūṭī mentions the Shafiʿite al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) who said in his Zagal al-ÝIlm:

“...The benefit of logic is minute, while its harm is...”

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246 Fatāwā, op. cit., p. 35.
247 Ibidem.
248 Ibidem.
249 Ibidem.
250 Ibidem.
251 Ibidem; QM, p. 2, l. 16-26.
254 Shams al-Dīn Abū `Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. `Uthmān b. Qaymāz b. `Abd Allāh al-Turkmānī al-Fārīqī al-Dimashqī al-Shāfi`ī was born in ca. 673/1274 and died in Damascus in 748/1348. He specifically excelled in three fields of research: Tradition, canon law and history. Al-Suyūṭī referred to him as the “traditionist of the age” and “the seal of the ḥāfīẓes” and considered him “al-Imām al-Ḥāfīẓ, Muḥaddith al-ʾAṣr, wa Ḥātimat al-Ḥuffāẓ, wa Muʿarriḥ al-Islām, wa Fard al-Dahr, wa ’l-Qā’im bi a’bā’ ḥādhihi al-
great. Logic is not one of the sciences of Islam. Hide the truth which is deduced from [logic] in your soul, and avoid any triviality which is born in it.256

According to al-Suyūṭī, al-Dhahabi reported in his Mu'jam,257 that Kamāl al-Dīn Abu 'l-Qāsim 'Umar b. Ilyās b. Yūnus al-Marāgī al-Šūfī (d. ca. 730/1330)258 used to sit next to the Shi‘ite scholar Ḥwājā Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274)259 [and to attend the lessons of 'Aṭfī al-Dīn al-Tīlimsānī (d. 690/1291)].260 Then al-Marāgī read al-mawāqīf (by al-Niffārī, d. 354/965)260 to al-Tīlimsānī. Then he reached a passage which was against the Sharī‘a. So [to know his attitude,] I asked al-Ṭūsī. He replied: “If you want to know the science of the people (‘ilm al-qawm), you must take the Sharī‘a, the Book and the Sunna and throw away [the Mawāqīf] and discard it.” [Al-Marāgī then said:] “From then on, I hated him and stayed aloof from him.”262 Dealing with the Hanbalite Taqī al-Dīn 'Abd al-Šātīr (d. 679/1281),263 according to al-Suyūṭī, al-Dhahabi said in Siyar al-Nubalā‘:264 “He

255This work was published under the title Bayān Zagal al-ÝIlm wa ‘l-Óalab (Damascus: Ma‘bāyat al-Tawfīq, 1347/1929), ed. M.Z. al-Kawthārī.
256"... al-māntiq nafṣuh qalīl wa qabaruh wabīl, wa [laysa] huwa min Ýulūm al-islām... wa l-Îaqq min kāmin fā-nafṣ... wa l-bāṭīl minhu fa ‘hrib minhu”. QM, p. 2, l. 27-9.
259Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who was born on 11 Jumādā I 597/17 Feb. 1201 and died in Bagdad on 18 Dhu ‘l-Hijja 672/25 June 1274, according to Daiber, was the most important and influential Shi‘ite scholar in the fields of mathematics, geometry, astronomy, philosophy and theology. He was referred to by scholars of later generations as al-mu‘allim al-thālīth, “the third teacher” after Aristotle and al-Fārābī. Daiber, H. [Ragep, F.J.], “al-Ôūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn,” EI2, X, 746-752.
261According to Arberry, Muḥammad ’Abd al-Jabbār b. al-Ḥasan al-Niffārī was born in Nīffār, one of the provinces of al-Árṣa. Kitāb al-Mawāqīf, his work dealing with the spiritual positions, was edited by A.J. Arberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935) and translated into French by Mohamed Oudaimah (Paris: Arfuyen, 1982).
262Jālastu ḡwāja naṣīr al-dīn al-tūsī wa qara‘tu ‘alayh fi ‘l-mawāqīf fājā‘ mawādī yuhālīta al-shar’ fāḥṣāqquḥū fa-qāla anta turidu an ta‘rīf īlm al-qawm fā-ḥuḍd al-shar‘ wa ‘l-kitāb wa ‘l-sunnā fālāthā wa ‘ṭrāhā fā-maṣḥūṭūḥ wa ‘nqā’ta‘tu min dhālīka ‘l-jaww. QM, p. 4, l. 22-4; the text of this report can also be read in Ibn Ḥajar’s DK (III, 232, l. 10-4) in the biography of al-Marāgī, on the basis of which I could render the text more comprehensible.
263’Abd al-Šātīr b. ‘Abd al-Ḥāmid b. Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. Māḏī al-Maqdīsī, Taqī al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad was born ca. 600/1204 and died in 679/1281. He studied
who reads *Kitāb al-Shīṭā* by Ibn Sinā becomes a heretic as also he who studies alchemy becomes bankrupt. He who does not fear his God, will not gain any benefit from his knowledge.

Al-Suyūṭī then refers to Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (d. 463/1071), whose censure on logic can be found in his statement: “The sciences of the ancients are a malady for religion. No single clue of guidance, reward, present life and hereafter can be found in them,” and then to Ibn Daqīq al-Id (d.702/1302), who said that evil originates from five things, one of which is the sciences of the ancients.

Taqi al-Din al-Subki (d. 756/1355) is also referred to as having opposed logic. When he was asked about the study of logic, al-Suyūṭī reports, al-Subki said: “Being occupied with the Book, the Sunna and the

Jurisprudence under Taqi al-Din b. al-Izz and learned Tradition from Mūsā b. ‘Abd al-Qādir, Ibn al-Zubaydi, Muwaffaq al-Din, etc. He was accused of being an anthropomorphist who feuded against the Ashʿarītes in favour of the Hanbalites. See Ibn Rajab, DTH, II, 298-9.


*Kitāb al-Shīṭā* (book of the healing [of the soul] is one of the two principle works besides *al-Qanūn fi al-Tibb* (canon of medicine) of Ibn Sinā which made him an undisputed master in medicine, natural science and philosophy. (Goichon, “Ibn Sinā, EI², III, 941-7). According to Yāsin, the book was written because of (1) the urge of Ibn Sinā’s disciples who asked him to write a comprehensive encyclopaedia in philosophy; (2) the defence of the intellectual dispute in which he was engaged; and (3) his inclination to and keenness on being occupied with Greek sciences. See Yāsin, Ja’far ‘Ali, *Faylasūf ‘Alīm: Dirāsa Ta‘līliyya li Ḥayāt ibn Sinā wa Fikrih al-Falsafī* (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1984/1404) 1st ed., 74-5.

This is in line with the words of Ibn Haldūn that “*man talaba al-kīmiyā’ talaban snā’iyyan dayyā’a mālahū wa ‘amalahū…*” Muqaddima Ibn Ḥaldūn (Dār al-Fikr), p. 530. Wiedeman has collected the arguments by leading scholars against the study of alchemy, one of whom was ‘Abd al-Latīf, who said: “Verily, most men have been ruined by the work of Ibn Sinā and by alchemy.” See Wiedeman, E., “al-Kīmiyā’ in EI1, II, 110-17; Anawati, G.C., “Arabic Alchemy,” in EHAS, III, ed. Roshdi Rashed (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 853-885.

The greatest traditionist in Al-Andalus, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr was born in Cordoba on 24 Rabī’ II 368/30 November 978 and died on 29 Rabī’ II 463/3 February 1071. GAL, I. 368, S. 1, 628.

*ulūm al-awā’il maraḍ fi al-din ..., wa laya tiḥā ḥudā wa lā ajr wa lā dunyā wa lā ʾāhira.* QM, p. 3, l.2-3.


*innamā dahāla’ ala ’l-nās al-āfāṭ min ḥamsat ashī’a’ wa ’adda minḥā ’ulūmā ’l-awā’il.* QM, p. 3, l.6-7.

Jurisprudence is of greater importance than being occupied with logic."⁴²⁷ Jure to al-Suyūṭi, al-Subki had said in his Ţabaqāt⁴²⁸ that Abu 'l-'Āla' al-'Aţtār (d. 569/1174),⁴²⁹ whose surname was 'Aqhibited, was asked whether it was allowed to be occupied with logic. He answered: “Logic has nothing to do with imposition (kallun)⁴³⁰ and belief. It is better that one is not occupied with it, as it may lead one into something which is superfluous.”⁴²⁷

Al-Adfuwī’s (d. 748/1347)⁴³¹ censure against logic is recorded in his Kitāb Farā’id wa Maqāsid al-Qawā'id⁴³² in which he, according to al-Suyūṭi, reported the attitudes of two authorities against logic: Abu 'l-'Abbās b. al-Munayyar al-Iskandarī (d. 803/1401)⁴³³ and Ibn Taymiyya. According to al-Adfuwī, al-Iskandarī had composed a work against logic. Without identifying Ibn Taymiyya’s individual works against logic,⁴³⁴ al-Adfuwī stated that Ibn Taymiyya had composed two such works. According to al-Suyūṭi, in their respective works, al-Iskandarī and Ibn Taymiyya upheld the idea that logic was not an introduction to philosophy.⁴³⁵


⁴²⁸ According to al-Suyūṭi, al-Subki had composed more than 250 works, among which al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā, Sharḥ Muḥāṣar ibn al-Ḥājib and Sharḥ al-Minhāj. See al-Suyūṭi, BW, op. cit., p. 149; Al-Suyūṭi, TH, 521-2.


⁴³⁰ “... al-manāqī lā yata'allaqu bihi kallun wa lā imānun. Wa 'l-awālā an lā yushtagala bihi, li annahū lā yamanu li ha'dī fihi an yajurrahu ilā mā lā yanbagī...” QM, p. 3, l.7-8; Another fatwā by al-Subki against logic can be found in Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, Fatāwā al-Subkī (Beirut: Dār al-Ma’rifa, 1980), 644-5; Its translation can be found in Rosenthal, F., Das Fortleben der Antike im Islam (Zürich and Stuttgart: Artemis Verlag, 1965), 115-117.

⁴³¹ The celebrated philologist and jurist who studied under the supervision of Ibn Daqīq al-Īd and Abū Ḥayyān al-Garnātī, al-Adfuwī was born in 685/1286 and died in 748/1347 in Cairo. GAL, II, 31.

⁴³² “wa qāl al-mantiq lā yata’allaqu bihi kallun wa lā imānun. Wa 'l-awālā an lā yushtagala bihi, li annahū lā yamanu li ha’dī fihi an yajurrahu ilā mā lā yanbagī...” QM, p. 3, l.7-8; Another fatwā by al-Subki against logic can be found in Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, Fatāwā al-Subkī (Beirut: Dār al-Ma’rifa, 1980), 644-5; Its translation can be found in Rosenthal, F., Das Fortleben der Antike im Islam (Zürich and Stuttgart: Artemis Verlag, 1965), 115-117.

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⁴³⁴ According to Brockelmann, this work deals with the obligation (al-fard), as a foundation of al-furū’ī. It is a commentary on the unknown Muqaddima by al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277). See GAL, II, 31.

⁴³⁵ According to al-Suyūṭi, al-Subki had said in his Ţabaqāt that Abu 'l-'Āla' al-'Aţtār (d. 569/1174), whose surname was 'Aqbidden, was asked whether it was allowed to be occupied with logic. He answered: “Logic has nothing to do with imposition (kallun) and belief. It is better that one is not occupied with it, as it may lead one into something which is superfluous.”⁴²⁷

⁴³⁶ Ibn al-Munayyar is Nāṣir al-Dīn Abu 'l-'Abbās Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Mańskīr al-Iskandari, who was referred to by al-Suyūṭi as one of the leading scholars qualified to undertake ijtihād. He was born in 620/1224 and died in Alexandria in 803/1401. Al-Suyūṭi, HM, I, 316-7.


In his *al-Tawakkul fi al-Radd ila 'l-Amr al-Awwal*\(^{283}\) Abū Shāma al-Dimashqi (d.665/1268)\(^{284}\) said that it is better to avoid the destructive effects and the logical complexities of *kalām*, which drive people away from virtues.\(^{285}\)

In his *Nasīhat al-Muslim al-Mushfiq liman Ubtuliya bi Ḥubb 'Ilm al-Manṭiq* Sirāj al-Dīn al-Qazwī (d.750/1349) has warned people not to be fascinated by logic.\(^{286}\) Al-Suyūṭī also reports that al-Qazwī in his book *al-Ḥaṭṭ 'ala 'l-Manṭiq* described an event where the leading scholars, jurists, lecturers and literary men gathered in a circle in the presence of the Sultan and were occupied with something which harmed them much. Furthermore, one who claimed himself to be closest to the Sultan and the most knowledgeable maintained that one of the conditions to be *muṭahād* was the knowledge of logic. He then said that this view belonged to al-Gazālī. The people were silent and no one had the audacity to refute him. Finally, one of them awoke and voiced his idea in reference to a view which he claimed to belong to Imām al-Gazālī, who rejected logic. Censuring logic, in the last passage of his report, al-Qazwī concluded that one had ascribed to al-Gazālī a view which the latter did not hold.\(^{287}\)

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\(^{285}\)wa qad nabhā ṣāḥirun yara wna anna 'l-awlā al-iqṭīṣār 'alā nukath ḥilāfīyya waḍaʿāthā wa ashkāl manaṭiqīyya alāfahā aʿraḍāḥ an al-maḥāṣīn wa sammū ṣuqāhā aʿlā-madhdhab kawādīn wa ḥālikā min 'alāmātī ḥāḏīlān naʿādhu bi 'l-lāh min tādīrī al-alamān fī 'l-ṣiṣdāl wa 'l-mara wa nas'ālūhū al-thabāt aʿlā 'l-tamassuk bi ḥāḏīlā.QM, p. 3, l. 24-6.

\(^{286}\)This is taken from what the title of his work suggests: “naṣīḥat al-muslim al-mushfiq liman ubtuliya bi Ḥubb 'ilm al-manṭiq.”QM, p. 1, l. 23.

\(^{287}\)hādh ĥuṣūr ġama ṣuṭaḥā fī ḥāḏīhī 'l-awrāq li-mā ḥadatha mina 'l-ḵalām fī majlisīn ijtamaʿa fī ḥamāma wa 'l-ulama wa 'l-mudārīsūn wa 'l-ṣuqāhā fī ḥadhrat sūlānīn fī jamā'ah fī ḥāḏīhī.QM, p. 3, l. 24-6.
Then follows al-Silafī (d. 576/1180)288 who said that: (1) logic is a reprehensible art289 and (2) the transmission [of religious knowledge] by one who is occupied with logic cannot be accepted.290 These two statements are quoted by al-Suyūṭī from Mu’jam al-Safar.291

When Ibn Rashīd (d. 721/1322)292 travelled to Egypt, according to al-Suyūṭī, he found that the scholars of Tradition avoided Sayf al-Dīn ‘Īsā b. ‘Ali al-Ḥawārizmi al-Bagdādī (d. 705/1306),293 because the latter was engaged in the sciences of the ancients and distinguished in Logic, which was considered by the people as a disgusting and abominable art.294

Then follows Abū Ḥāyyān al-Garnāṭī (d. 745/1344),295 whose al-Nuṣūr was referred to by al-Suyūṭī as a work which was composed to report his early beginnings, his activities, his teachers and his flight from Granada.296 The most notable reason why Abū Ḥāyyān fled from Granada, as recorded in al-Nuṣūr, was that the scholar Muḥammad b. ‘Īsā al-Asadī who was well-versed in logic, arithmetic and geometry had said to the Sultan: “I have become an old man. I am worried about my death. Thus, I should like to teach these sciences to some disciples [of mine] to follow [my footsteps] so that the Sultan might [also] benefit from them after my death.”297

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288 One of the most outstanding pupils of Imām al-Ḥaramayn, Abū Ḥāhir al-Silafī was born in Ifshāhn in 472/1078-9 and died in Alexandria on 5 Rajab 2576/28 August 1180. See Gilliot, “al-Silafī, EI², IX, p. 607-9., Al-Safadī, WW, VII, 351-6, Al-Silafī, Abū Ṭāhir, Mu’jam al-Safar, ed. Dr. S.M. Zaman (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1988), p. 32.

289 “al-manṭiq fannun madhmūmun wa qalla man yashriḥ fih wa yaslam min alsinati ’l-nās wa man yuridī ’l-lāh bihā Ḣayrān awqafah li ’l-‘ulūm al-mardīyya al-diniyya.” QM, p. 4, l. 16.

290 “… lā tuqbalu riwāyahū...” QM, p. 17, l. 18.

291 This work was published in Islamabad in 1988 and edited by S.M. Zaman.


293 Sayf al-Dīn ‘Īsā b. ‘Ali al-Ḥawārizmi al-Bagdādī was born ca. 630/1231. He was the teacher of al-Ṣubkī and Ibn al-Akṭāfānī, when he was appointed a professor at al-Madrasa al-Ẓāhiriyah. He was well-versed in logic. He died in 705/1306. Ibn Ḥajar, DK, III, 281-2.

294 “...daḥaltu lā maṣṣa, fawajadtu biḥā sayf al-dīn ’Īsā b. ’āli al-ḥawārizmi al-bagdādī shayh...fa-lam... shay‘an... li anna ahl al-ḥadīth aṣḥābūhū kānā lahum nufūr ‘anhu li’ukūṭihī ’ala ’l-‘ulūm al-qadīma wa tamayyuzih biṣīnā ’at al-muṣṭiq allati jama’at ’în al-‘āmmat bishār ‘at ’l-‘ism wa shanā‘at ’l-‘awm.” QM, p. 4, l. 18-21.

295 The most distinguished Arab grammarian of the first half of the 14th century the Malikite Abū Ḥāyyān was born in Granada, Shawwāl 654/November 1256, and died in Cairo, in Ṣafār 745/July 1344. See Glazer, S., “Abū Ḥāyyān al-Gharānī,” EI², 1, 126; al-Ṣafadī, WW, V, 267; Al-Suyūṭī, BW, 121-3.


297 “taqaddama fi ’l-ulüm ’l-awā’il mina ’l-muṣṭiq wa ’l-ḥisāb wa ’l-handasa fā qāla li ’l-suṭlān inni shayḥun kabīrūn wa qaḍī an yashtagila ’alayya ṣalabatun bi ’l-‘ulūm li
According to al-Suyūṭī, the Shaykh Abū Ḥayyān in his al-_DAYS also stated about Ibn Rushd (d. 592/1198), the philosopher, that he was avoided by the people and that no one wanted to transmit on his authority. This was because of the fact that he was occupied by the sciences of the ancients, either philosophical or logical. He had been attacked by Abū ‘Āmir b. Rabi‘ and other scholars who had induced al-Manṣūr (d. 595/1199) to be against those who were occupied with these sciences, among whom were Ibn Rushd and Abū Ja‘far al-Dhabābi al-Balānī. The anger of al-Manṣūr, according al-Suyūṭī, was reflected by the fact that the former incinerated the books of logic and philosophy.

Based on the story found in al-_DAYS by Abū Ḥayyān, al-Suyūṭī remarked that one of those who had induced al-Manṣūr to commit such an act and had sided with the latter against Ibn Rushd (d. 592/1198) et. al. was Abu ‘l-Íasan MuÎammad b. Jubayr al-Kinānī (d. 614/1217) whose verses against the sciences of the ancients were recorded by al-Suyūṭī in his QM as follows:

Our Caliph – may God reward you for your reconciliation [to the Will of God] and your noble action
With regard to a fight which you undertook against them, finally you achieved great victory
You distinguish mankind with the excellence of … and by following the straight way
He fought against the people who have gone astray from the way of the Shari‘a due to the ‘old science’
And incinerate their books in the East and the West because in those books there existed the most evil of the sciences
Which creeps into the believes … if … the poison … the believes were like swords
People like them, unless …. The sword is the antidote

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298 “… wa agrÙ’ bihi ‘l-manÒÙr faÎariqa kutuba ‘l-manÔiq wa ‘l-falsafa…”QM, p. 4, l. 25-6.
299 AbÙ YÙsuf YaÝqub b. YÙsuf b. ÝAbd al -Mu’min al-ManÒÙr was the third ruler of t he Mu’minid Almohad dynasty. He reigned from 580/1184 till 595/1199. See Miranda, A . H., “AbÙ YÙsuf YaÝqub,” in EI², I, 165-66.
301 Abu ‘l-Íasan MuÎammad b. Jubayr al-Kinānī, an Andalusian traveler and writer who was born in Valencia in 540/1145, hailed from a family which had settled in Spain in 123/740. He was the author of Ribla which is, according to Pellat, the first and one of the best of the works of this kind which served as a model to the later authors, one of whom was Ibn BaÎùÔÔÙÔa. He died in Alexandria on 27 Sha‘bān 614/29 November 1217. Pellat, Ch., “Ibn Djubayr,” EI², III, 755. Ibn Jubayr’s harsh judgment on logic, according to Goldziher, was closely connected to his contact with orthodox circles in the East. Reffering to FutÙÎat al-Makkiyya by Ibn al-‘Arabī, Goldziher also suggests the presence of Ibn Jubayr, who behaved in a very dignified way at the funeral of Ibn Rushd. Goldziher, op. cit., p. 201, 214.
302 “ÌalÐfatunÁ jazÁka ‘llÁh Ìayran Ýan a s Ám wa ‘l- a yi ‘l-karÐm; naÎwa jihÁdihÐ jÁhadta fh mm ilÁ an fuzta bi ‘l-fatÎ al-ÝaÛÐm; wa mayyazta ‘l-ÁnÁm biÎusn hÁdhih …  wa nahj a
According to al-Suyūṭī, Ibn Jubayr then said:

Caliph of God you are right, withdraw from happiness with the best of your encouragement
You protected religion against one who abandoned it and against every one who wishes a rupture in it
God informed you about the secret of the people who were unhappy due to their being heavily covered with hypocrisy
They pretended to be philosophers and claimed [to master] sciences whose master himself is miserable in the Hereafter
They disdained the Shari‘a and scorned it shamelessly and stupidly
You heap curse and shame on them; and you say: away with them and to hell with them!
So stay for the religion of God … because as long as you stay, it will remain as well

In another passage, he also said:

Pass judgment by executing those who philosophized their [religious] tenets heretically
With logic they were occupied. So it can be said in a true manner that the trial was represented by logic
A sect has come forth in our age, a bane to it, [saying]
In religion follow only the creed of Ibn Sinā or Abū Naṣr
Danger to Islam from a sect which busies minds with folly;
It has cast the true religion behind its back and claims to possess wisdom and philosophy.
In another passage, al-Suyūṭi reports that Abū Hayyān, when talking about the biography of Muḥammad b. ʿĪsām al-Asadī in his al-Nūdār, said that al-Asadi was occupied with teaching his students the sciences [of the ancients] through which they could serve the Sultan.305 But with the passage of time, he felt disgusted to have been occupied with those sciences.306

Al-Suyūṭi refers to Sharaf al-Dīn al-Dimyāṭī (d. 705/1306)307 who had said that if kalām (lit: "speaking" or "disputing") and logic necessitate evil, being silent is a virtue,308 and to al-ʿAsnawi (d. 772/1371)309 who remarked in his al-Muḥimmāt that books of logic and philosophy can be used during the istinjā'. According to al-ʿAsnawi, books of logic and philosophy had no sacred value.310 Al-ʿAsnawi’s attitude towards logic, al-Suyūṭi argues, was affirmed by al-Adhrāʾi (d. 603/1205)311 and the Shaykh Walī al-Dīn Abū ʿĀmīr a b. ʿĀbd al-ʿRaḥīm al-Wazīr al-ʿIrāqī (d. 826/1423),312 as can be read in Muḥtasar al-Muḥimmāt wa Nukatih,313 and by Chief Judge Sharaf al-Dīn al-Bayāwī (d. 716/1316) in Ḥāshiyat Sharḥ al-Bahja.314

The poem of Zayn al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 735/1335)315 against logic is also referred to by al-Suyūṭi in his QM:

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305 According to Watt, the reason why the Caliphs exhort scholars to master Greek sciences, especially medicine and astrology, has to do with practical reasons, i.e. to serve the medical and astrological interests of the Caliphs. See Watt, W.M., Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962), p. 44.

306 QM, p. 5, l. 25-8.

307 During the last third of the 7th/13th century, al-Dimyatī was one of the most important figures in the field of the handing down of traditions. He was born on the island of Tūnā, between Tinnās and Damietta in 613/1217 and died in 705/1306. See Vajda, G., “Sharaf al-Dīn al-Dimyāṭī,” EI², II, 292; cf. al-Suyūṭi, TH, p. 512.

308 “wa ma ʾl-ḥayr illā ʾti sukūt yaʿqūbu wa ma ʾl-sharr illā ʾti kalām wa maʿniq.” QM, p. 5, l. 30.


311 Probably this name refers to the Shafiʿite ʿUṣūfī b. ʿĪbrāhīm b. ʿĀbd Allāh al-Jamāl al-Adhrāʾi al-Dimashqī and al-Ḥalābi. He was appointed a qāḍī in Tīzin where he died in 702/1303. Al-Sahawi, DL, X, 2.

312 The Shafiʿite Wali al-Dīn Abū Zurʿa ʿĀḥmad b. al-Ḥāfīz Abū ʾl-ʿFarḍ al-ʿIrāqī, who was born in 762/1362, was referred to by al-Suyūṭi as al-ʿĪmām al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥāfīz al-ʿAṣūfī, the author of Sharḥ al-Bahja, Muḥtasar al-Muḥimmāt, Sharḥ Jamʿ al-Jawāmīʾ, etc. He was also a qāḍī in Egyptian provinces, who died in 826/1423. Al-Suyūṭi, HM, I, 363.

313 As the title suggests, this work is an extract of al-ʿAsnawi’s al-Muḥimmāt.

314 Al-Bahja was composed by Ibn al-Wardī. This work, according to Sartain, was a versification of al-Qazwīnī’s al-Ḥāwī al-Šāgīr. Its commentary, Sharḥ al-Bahja was written by Abu Zurʿa ʿĀḥmad b. ʿĀbd al-ʿRaḥīm al-Wazīr al-ʿIrāqī. See Sartain, op. cit., p. 28.

315 Aqāṣī ʾl-ʿQuḍāt (the most qualified among the jurists) Zayn al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿĀbd al-Kāfī b. ʿĀli b. Tammām al-Subkī was born in Egypt in 659/1262 and died on Tuesday, 9 Shaʿban 735/1335. See al-Subkī, TS, X, 89.
"We cut our friendship with those stricken by the malady of *Kitāb al-Shifā*. They died as the adherents of the religion of Aristotle, while we die in the religion of the Chosen."  

Al-Suyūṭī then records the verses in the meter rajaz against logic, composed by Abū Ḥabīb Jābir b. Muḥammad b. Yahyā al-Mālaqī (d. 640/1243):

Listen to the advice of a counselor who is concerned with you
If you used to heed to the advice of one who is concerned ...

As a matter of fact, trial is represented by logic.

When dealing with the biography of *al-Shayḥ al-Imām Abū Iṣḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Jaʿfari* in *Ṭabāqāt al-Shaʿrānī*, Ṣayr al-Dīn b. Jāmāʾa (d. 767/1366) related what he was told by al-Qāṣī Dīyaʾ al-Dīn al-Munāwī, who said: "I went to a book bazaar. I bought a book on logic. Then I put it in my sleeve. I had an idea to attend a religious lecture of al-Shayḥ Burhān al-Dīn al-Ḥanafī, whom I had never met before. I came to see him after having bought the book – which is in my sleeve...Then the Shaykh, as usual, walked through the audience advising them. He then approached and grasped my head saying: 'We are not in need of books on logic. We are occupied with a thing other than that.'"

Furthermore according to al-Suyūṭī, Ibn Jāmāʾa (d. 767/1366) stated in his *Âawā' al-Shams fī Usūl al-Nafs*: "Know my brother - may God guide me and you - I am one of those who render a service to the sciences and practice them and who know those who love and hate them. So I advise you not to be occupied with..."
rational sciences other than *uşūl al-ḥiṣb*, grammar and *al-maʿānī*. For philosophers, logic is the science pleasing them most. If you do not receive my request willingly, you do not turn your back, you do not occupy yourself with [any] other thing than Exegesis, Tradition and Jurisprudence. However, the fate (*al-maqdūr*) cannot be avoided and the destiny (*al-mastūr*) cannot be resisted."

Logic, according to al-Suyūṭī, was also subjected to Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 729/1329) criticism. Though indirect, his criticism of logic was represented by his statement, which reads: "I do not think that God will forgive al-Maʿmūn for what he has committed against his community by his introduction of the philosophical sciences among its people." By referring to *Sharḥ Lāmiyat al-ʿĀjam* of al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ṣafāḍī (d. 746/1345) al-Suyūṭī gives a reason why Ibn Taymiyya had such an attitude toward al-Maʿmūn. "It is told that al-Maʿmūn, when he had concluded a truce with a king of the island of Cyprus, wrote a letter asking from him the library of the Greeks. They were collected there in a house to which no one could enter. The king gathered his advisors and consulted them about it. All of them advised him not to supply the books to him, except for one patriarch. He said: ‘Supply the books to them, these sciences have not entered any religious state without destroying it and ensnaring its scholars.’" The books meant here, according to al-Suyūṭī, were those of logic, natural sciences, metaphysics, etc.

According to al-Suyūṭī, when Ibn al-Muqri (d. 837/1434) was asked a question posed in a verse which reads:

“What is the opposite of the negative [proposition], o ye my dear fellow [!]; or the particular [section] of them in verse (al-niʿâm) [?]”

He replied:

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324Al-Suyūṭī, TH, 516.

325“mā aẓunnū ʿlāh yagīrīlū liʿl-maʿmūn mā faʿalāhū māʿa ḥādhīh ʿl-umma min idḥāl al-ʿulūm al-falsāfiyya bayn ahlihā.” QM, p. 6, l. 24-5; this story was also dealt with elaborately by al-Suyūṭī in his SM, op. cit., p. 41-2.


327Al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ṣafāḍī, Salāḥ al-Dīn Abū al-Ṣafā Ḥalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafāḍī the Shāfiʿī who died in 746/1345. He was the author of the celebrated *al-Wāḥi bī ʿl-Watayāt*.

328QM, p. 6, l. 25-7; This has been discussed elaborately by Van Koningsveld, in “Greek Manuscripts,” op. cit., p. 345-70; This story can also be found in SM, op. cit., p. 41.

329wa ḥādhīhī ʿl-kutub hiya ʿl-manṭiq waʿl-ṭabiʿīyy waʿl-ilāhiyy wa ʿayra dhālik.”QM, p. 6, l. 28.
“The opposite of the negative [proposition] which you asked me is [an entrance to] the prohibited knowledge.\textsuperscript{330}

Al-Suyūṭī then refers to Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashi (d.794/1392),\textsuperscript{331} who stated in his work, \textit{Sharḥ al-Minḥāj}\textsuperscript{332} in the chapter of al-\textit{iḥāra} (leasing): “One is not allowed to get paid for teaching logic,”\textsuperscript{333} and to Wālī al-Dīn al-Malāwī (d. 841/1438),\textsuperscript{334} who reported that the \textit{Shaḥīḥ al-Allāma} Shams al-Dīn al-Īsḥāhānī (d.678/1279)\textsuperscript{335} ran courses on Islamic sciences in Damascus. When he wanted to travel, the \textit{Shaḥīḥ al-Allāma} al-Šālīḥ Zayn al-Dīn b. al-Murāḥhil (d. 738/1338)\textsuperscript{336} deputized for him. When the latter gave the course, he found that among the people there was someone who studied logic. One of the audience said to him that Ibn al-Šalāh condemned logic. Ibn al-Murāḥhil said: “We should discuss this question and have a talk on it” So, one of them said: “We should discuss a thing on which no traditional account (\textit{naqḥ}) is found? However, this question has already been stipulated.” Moreover: is it forbidden to quote the \textit{fātāwā} of Ibn al-Šalāh? Ibn al-Murāḥhil replied: “This man either knows logic or not. If he knows it, he must know as well that there is no need to prohibit it. If he does not know it, this is ignorance.” The audience dispersed. One of the habits of Ibn al-Murāḥhil was that when he took part in a funeral procession, he paid a visit to Ibn al-Šalāh’s grave and invoked God. When this event happened, he went out for a funeral procession. Then he tried to pay a visit again to Ibn al-Šalāh’s grave. But he did not know its location. [Something] happened… as a matter of a fact he was worthier of a mistake…the Shaḥīḥ Ibn al-Šalāh. [Ibn al-Murāḥhil] has attempted to do something to that effect [to find out Ibn al-Šalāh’s grave,][but he could not find it. He then asked God’s forgiveness and [tried again] to seek Ibn al-Šalāh’s grave. Finally, he knew it and paid a visit to it as he used to.\textsuperscript{337}

\textsuperscript{330}wa mā ‘aks al-sawālibī yā murajjā ayyāl [al-juz‘ī]; mishā fi [‘l-niẓām];” “wa ‘aks al-sawālibī tas‘alūnī [fadhāka muqaddam] al-‘ilm al-ḥārām.” QM, p. 7, l. 1-5. The words in the square brackets is taken from al-Suyūṭī’s discussion of this verses in his \textit{al-Īlāwī ‘l-Fatāwā} (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1993), vol. I, p. 273; In QM, the verses read as follows: \textsuperscript{334}wa mā ‘aks al-sawālibī yā murajjā ayyāl al-ṣāliḥī minḥā fi ‘nīṣām;” “wa ‘aks al-sawālibī tas‘alūnī fa-tīlka… al-‘ilm al-ḥārām.”

\textsuperscript{331}Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ‘abd Allāh b. Bahādir al-Zarkashi was born in 745/1345. Al-Suyūṭī, BM, I, 437.

\textsuperscript{332}Sharḥ al-Minḥāj here is a work of Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashi who gave a commentary of \textit{Minḥāj al-Ṭālibīn} by al-Nawawī. In his autobiographical work, al-Suyūṭī also mentions another \textit{Sharḥ al-Minḥāj} which is a work of al-Damīrī, for which al-Suyūṭī wrote a supercommentary, entitled \textit{Hādī al-Muṭāʿālī}. See al-Suyūṭī, \textit{al-Taḥadduth, op. cit.}, p. 136.

\textsuperscript{333}lā yajūz al-isti‘ār li tadrīs al-mantiq.” QM, p. 7, l. 6.

\textsuperscript{334}Probably he was Abū Bakr b. ‘abd Allāh b. Ayyūb b. Ahmad al-Malāwī al-Šādhiḥī who was born in 762/1361 and died in Egypt in 841/1438. Al-Suyūṭī, BM, I, 529.

\textsuperscript{335}The Shaḥīṭe Muhammad b. Maḥmūd b. ‘abd al-Kāfī was born in Ḩāfā in 661/1220. He excelled in \textit{uṣūl al-fiqh} and was well-versed in grammar and belles-lettres, but had little knowledge of \textit{fiqh} and Tradition. He was appointed as a judge of Manbaj and became a lecturer in Egypt. He was the author of \textit{Shaḥīḥ al-Maḥṣūl, al-Fawā‘id fi ‘l-‘Aṣlāyn al-Ḥilāl wa ‘l-Mantiq}, etc. He died in Cairo on 20 Rajab 678/1279. See al-Suyūṭī, BW, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{336}Zayn al-Dīn b. al-Murāḥhil Muḥammad b. ‘abd Allāh b. ‘umar, according to al-Safādī, was specialized in \textit{fiqh} and its \textit{uṣūl}. He became vice Chief Judge assisting ‘Ālam al-Dīn al-Aḥnā‘ī in Damascus. See al-Safādī, WW, VII, 374-5.

\textsuperscript{337}‘āla ‘l-šayḥ al-‘allāma al-šālīḥ waliy al-dīn al-malāwī anna al-šayḥ al-‘allāma shams al-dīn al-īṣbāhānī kanat laḥū durūs bi dimashq fasāfāra wa ‘stanāba al-šayḥ al-‘allāma al-
Al-Suyūṭī found in a majmūʿ in the possession of Taqi al-Dīn al-Shumunnī (d.872/1468), without knowing who had composed it, a chapter on the reprehension of those occupied with logic. According to al-Suyūṭī, it also stated that “what is prohibited to them is the study of ʾilm al-fuḍūl (“the science of superfluous matters”), their being occupied with reason, their being removed from Tradition and their adherence to Logic.”

Al-Suyūṭī incorporated the celebrated debate between Abū Sa`īd al-Sīrāfi who was born at Sīrāf ca. 289/902 and died in Bagdad on Rajab 2, 368/ Febr. 3, 979 and Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940). He abridged this debate from Mu`jam al-Udabā’ by Yaqūt al-Ḥamawī (d. 624/1229). The abridgement occupies one fourth of QM. This debate is also incorporated by al-Suyūṭī in his SM.

According to Mahdi, the Nestorian Christian Abū Bishr Mattā, the defender of logic, was a famous translator and one of the acknowledged masters of the new philosophic school that centered on the study of, and commentary on, the Aristotelian corpus. Mahdi maintains that “the new tradition gave an important place to Aristotle’s Organon in the program of philosophic studies, translated those parts of it that had not already been translated and placed special emphasis on the importance of the scientific method.” This was caused by the significant role, Mahdi goes on asserting, which philosophical sciences, especially logic, came to play in the thinking and teaching of the members. Abū Sa`īd al-Sīrāfi, on the other hand, was a much younger dialectical theologian, jurist and philologist who

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339 "wa ra`aytu fī majmūʿ ʿinda shayṭa`na ʾimām taqī al-dīn al-shumunnī a`azzāhu ʾllāh ta`ālā mā nassāhū wa ṣi`a`lūna fī ilm al-munkar bī ṣayīfībīn wa inna min al-amr al-munkar ʾllāh huwa fī ilm al-munkar al-ma`lūf fi ilm al-fuḍūl fi ilm al-munkar fi ilm al-fuḍūl fi ilm al-munkar...


341 The text of this debate can be read in SM, op. cit., p. 243-255; See QM, p. 8, l. 3 – 12, l. 6.

342 SM, op. cit., 243-255.

had studied in that city and gained high repute as an expert in philology and the religious sciences.\footnote{Ibidem.}


This debate was started by al-Sirāfī’s question to Mattā about the meaning of Logic. The latter answered that “Logic is an instrument whereby sound speech is known from unsound, and wrong sense from right: Like a balance, for thereby I know overweight from underweight, and what rises from what sinks”.\footnote{QM, p. 8, l. 12-13.} Rejecting the idea that logic can distinguish one sound thing from another, al-Sirāfī stated “Say, you know the overweight from the underweight by the balance, whence are you to know whether what is weighed is iron, gold, copper, or lead? I find that you, after having learnt the weight, are still in need to know the substance of what is weighed, its value, and a number of other qualities which take too long to be enumerated here. This being so, the weight on which you insist, and which you are so anxious to know precisely, will benefit you only a little, and on one point only, whereas many other points remain. Moreover, a point here has escaped you. Not everything in the world admits of being weighed. For some things dry measure is employed, for others lineal measure, for others surface measure, for others rough estimate. And if this be so; with visible bodies, it is also the case with nonumena that are the product of reasoning; for the senses are the shadow of intelligences, which they imitate, sometimes at a distance, sometimes nearer, retaining all the time their resemblance and similarity. But forget it! If Logic be the inventions of a Greek made in the Greek language and according to the descriptions and symbols which should attend to it, and make it umpire to decide for them or against them, and judge between them... so that they must accept what it attests and repudiate what it disapproves.”\footnote{QM, p. 8, l. 14-25. For this translation, I rely fully on Margoliouth’s translation, ibidem.}
Al-Suyūṭī finally cites the (legal) opinions of his teachers Sharaf al-Dīn al-Munawwī (d. 757/1354) who said that being occupied with logic is prohibited, and ‘Alam al-Dīn al-Bulqīnī (d. 868/1461), whom al-Suyūṭī asked to write a work in which he prohibited logic. Then the people gathered around him and asked him not to write the work against it. Keeping his dignity (jāh), al-Bulqīnī did not write his prohibition of the study of logic. Al-Suyūṭī’s narration of al-Bulqīnī’s prohibition of the study of logic can also be found in Kitāb Bahjat al-‘Abidīn bi Tarjamat Hātīz al-‘Aṣr Jalāl al-Dīn by al-Shādhilī, who quoted al-Suyūṭī as having said: “…Generally speaking, I think little of logic. Then I came across the statements by leading scholars censuring it and a fatwā of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ against it. In sum, I became averse to it completely. Therefore, I wrote a quire [of a work] which I entitled al-Gayth al-Mugriq fī Ta‘rīm al-Manāiq. One of our Shaykh al-Bulqīnī’s students wrote it out, and it went round the town. A clamour arose and much wrath was kindled. So I asked our Shaykh al-Bulqīnī, ‘What is your opinion about logic?’ He said, ‘It is forbidden by God (ḥaram),’ and he withdrew from what he had said.”

The arguments against logic by two Shafi‘ite scholars, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, son of al-Sayyid ‘Afīf al-Dīn al-Makkī (d. 855/1452) and Kamāl al-Dīn b. ʿImām al-Kāmilī (d. 874/1470), were also recorded in QM. Their censure can be seen, according to al-Suyūṭī, in the facts that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn had composed verses in which the latter condemned the study of logic, and that Kamāl al-Dīn always avoided

349 His biography can be read in al-Suyūṭī’s BW, op. cit., 259; Ibn Ḥajar, DK, I, 17.
350 “. . . falladh naţtaqiduh wa najzimu b hā anna ‘l-htigāl bihā ḥarām.”QM, p. 12, l. 9-10.
351 Sartain, op. cit., p. 28.
354 I failed to find ‘Alā al-Dīn’s biographical information. However, based on that of his father, his wife and his disciples, his biographical information can be described as follows: He was a son of al-Sayyid ‘Afīf al-Dīn al-Makkī who was born in 790/1389 and died in 855/1452 (Al-Suyūṭī, NU, 162-3). He married a daughter of his uncle, Ḥābib Allāh b. al-Ṣafī ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh Umm al-Faḍl Ibnat al-Sayyid al-Ḥusaynī al-ʿlī who died in 895/1490 (al-Ṣaʿwī, DL, XII, 19). Among his disciples were Jibrīl al-Kurdi, who died in 930/1524 (al-Gazzi, KWS, I, 172), Abū Bakr al-Ḥabīshi, who died in 930/1524 (al-Gazzi, KWS, I, 113) and ‘Alī b. Muḥammad al-Maqdīsī (al-Gazzi, KWS, II, 191).
355 Kamāl al-Dīn, who was born in 808/1406, studied under a number of scholars, among whom were Walīy al-Dīn al-ʾIrāqī, al-Ḥāṣīṭī, Ibn al-Jazārī, Shams al-Dīn al-Barmawī, Sharaf al-Dīn al-Subkī, etc. He was the author of a number of works, among which Muḥtaṣar Taṣāfī‘ al-Bayḍāwī, Sharḥ Muḥtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥāṣīb, Sharḥ al-Waraqāt. He died in Egypt in 874/1470. Al-Suyūṭī, NU, 163; According to Sartain, Kamāl al-Dīn was the one who gave al-Suyūṭī an ijāza to bestow the ḥiraq on whomever he wished. Sartain, op. cit., p. 34.
356 naţamtu ti ‘l-ḥaṭṭ ‘alayyh ābyātan lā taḥdurūnī ‘l-ān.” QM, p. 12, l. 16-7.
studying and teaching logic. When teaching the *Muhtasar* by Ibn al-Hajib\(^{357}\) to his disciples, he avoided reading its introduction.\(^{358}\) Al-Suyūṭī also reports the attitude toward logic of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s uncle, Șafi al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ġi. According to al-Suyūṭī, al-Ġi repeatedly condemned logic and withdrew himself from its study.\(^{359}\)

When attending the lesson of al-Shumunni, al-Suyūṭī quoted the former as having said that Abu ‘l-ʿAbbās ʿĀḥmad b. Yusuf al-Tuwaynī had told us... if your words are as follows: “Medicine is also a part of the sciences of the ancients, so what is your aim of saying that studying it is a social obligation?” I replied: “Medicine is not an invention of the ancients. It is rather a science which God has revealed to some prophets... Learning logic is superfluous. Learning medicine is, in contrast, exhortated, useful and a social obligation.”

According to al-Suyūṭī, Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1370)\(^{360}\) stated that the study of logic might be allowed on the condition that one first mastered the religious sciences and that one had reached a reputation as a faqīh or muftī.\(^{361}\) According to Goldziher, al-Subkī, however, stated that for those who are less schooled in the religious sciences, the study of logic must be declared prohibited (ḥaram).\(^{362}\) This opinion was also held by Ibn al-Muqrī (d. 837/1434).\(^{363}\) However, the prohibition of logic is declared, al-Suyūṭī says, not only to those who are immersed in it, but also to those who are occupied by a minute part of it. The rationale behind this argument, according to al-Suyūṭī, can be traced to common

\[^{357}\]According to Vadet, Jamāl al-Dīn Abū ‘Uṯmān b. ʿUmar b. Abī Bakr b. ‘l-Ḥājib was born in Asnā, a village in Upper Egypt, after 570/1174-5. His reputation is founded on his being a Mālikī jurist and a grammarian. His fame was contributed by his two works, *al-Šāfiyya* (for ʃərīf, morphology) and *al-Kāfiyya* (for ʃaːrīf, syntax). His *Muhtasar al-Muntahā‘ fi ʿl-Uṣūl* was an extract from *Muntahā al-Suʿāl wa ʿl-Amal wa ʿl-Jadal* a treatise on the sources of law according to the Malikite school. See Vadet, J.C., “Ibn ‘l-Ḥājib,” *EI²*, III, 781-2.

\[^{358}\]“...yanfiru ʿyanḥ, wa idhā qaraʿa muḥtasar ibn al-Ḥājib yamtaniʿu min iqraʾ muqaddimatiḥ.” See QM, p. 12, l. 19.


\[^{360}\]“fa-in qulta al-ʿĪbāb ayādan min ʿulūm al-awāʾil fāma bālukum qultum annahū min ʿarād kitāyā...qultu al-ṭīb bāyā min waḍʾ al-awāʾil bal huwa ʿilīm awhāḥu ʿlāḥ taʿalā ila baʿdi ʿl-ṭībāyā...wa ayādat fā innaḥū nāʿu maḥḍ fā yajurru ilā dararīn bi ḥilāf al-maṭīq.” QM, p. 13, l. 14-17.


\[^{362}\]QM, p. 13, l. 20-3; According to Goldziher, al-Subkī had softened his prohibition against the study of logic in deference of authorities like al-Gazālī, whom he defended against Ibn al-Naṣīr. Goldziher, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

\[^{363}\]Goldziher, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

convention, which says that if any prohibition is declared to a big portion of something, this also holds true for a little portion of it.

When concluding his discussion of the arguments against logic, al-Suyūṭī interestingly refers to al-Rawḍā66 of al-Nawawi (d. 676/1277), who said that one is not allowed to issue fatwās when one is not well-versed in fiqh. Such a person is rather exhorted to ask for a fatwā, when something happens to him.67 In reality, he thereby wanted to warn people not to develop a (legal) opinion exhorting the study of logic if their authority in Islamic sciences was not reliable. Rather, they should follow what has been prescribed by leading authorities, viz. that the study of logic is prohibited, as enumerated in his QM.

Furthermore, al-Suyūṭī asks the readers: “What is your opinion on someone who starts with studying logic or the like, and with studying al-ma‘āni and al-bayān? Will you oppose those leading scholars, the pillars of Islam, the guides of mankind, the scholars of the laws, and the guardians of the Sunna of the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace.” Al-Suyūṭī continues his discussion of his predecessors’ statement against logic by saying: “It has been mentioned before that all the leading scholars have prohibited logic. Not one of them even pretends to master it.”68

Al-Suyūṭī then complains that most of his contemporaries were occupied by the study of logic. They gave priority to it over the sciences of the sharī‘a.69

(C.) Legal cases which can be relied on for the prohibition of logic

Al-Suyūṭī then enumerates thirty-five rules of jurisprudence censuring logic and the individuals occupied with it. In discussing these propositions, he sometimes refers to other scholars and reports their ideas, but sometimes expresses them independently: (i) Referring to al-Muhimmāt by al-Asnawī (d.772/1370) and al-Tanbihāt (probably by Ibn al-Ṣadr al-Balbisi, d. 904/1499),70 al-Suyūṭī says that

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67This work was published under the title, Rawḍat al-Tālibīn (Damascus: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1966), 9 juzs.

68wa qad sabaqa fi kalām man naqalnā ‘anhu... ‘al-taṣrīḥ bi anna akābira... kānū yamma‘ūna minhu ḥattā lam yakun aḥadu yasīru ‘ala ‘l-tażāḥur bihi...”QM, p. 14, l. 3-4.

69wa inkāna ahl al-‘Aṣr al-yawm ja‘alūh... darasahum laylan wanahāran, waqaddāmāh ‘alā ‘ulūm al-sharī‘a.” QM, p. 14, l. 5-6.

70I was confronted with two al-Tanbihāt: first, al-Tanbihāt al-Muḥammala ‘ala ‘l-Mawādī‘ al-Mushkila by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Ḥalīl b. Kaykaldi b. ‘Abd Allāh al-‘Aţā‘ al-Dīmashqī al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 761/1359, GAL, S. II, 68) and second, al-Tanbihāt ila ‘l-Taḥqīqāt, a summary of Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s al-Waraqāt, by Cairene Shafi‘ite ‘Umar b. Ahmad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Muhammad al-Sirāj b. al-Ṣihāb b. al-Shams b. al-Ṣadr al-Balbisi who died in 904/1499. I confined myself to the latter since he was closely affiliated to the “al-Nawawi circle,” for which he composed Sharih al-Arba‘in al-Nawawīyya (al-Salāhi, DL,VI, 72). By the “al-Nawawi circle,” I refer here to those scholars whose works were
making use of books on logic during \textit{istinjâ’} is justified.\footnote{Referring to \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî and \textit{Sharh al-Minhâj} by al-Asnawi, al-Suyûtî says (7) that selling a book of logic is not allowed.\footnote{If one buys a book of logic and that of any science other than logic at the same time, the transaction for the book of logic is illegal, but the transaction of the book of any science other than logic is valid.\footnote{Whoever buys a book which is well-known as dealing with logic, such as \textit{al-MuÌtaÒar} (by Ibn al-ÍÁjib), thinking that, \textit{it is not} … there is no doubt that he has no choice \{to return the book and ask the proceeds thereof back,\} because \{such a book\} deserves obliteration.\footnote{The proceeds gained from selling a book on logic are like the proceeds gained from selling alcoholic beverages or a dog.\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.\footnote{comparative studies, super commentaries, compendiums, etc of al-Nawawi’s works. These works were most frequently referred to by al-Suyûtî in his \textit{QM}.}}}}}}\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.\footnote{Referring to \textit{al-Rawãa} and \textit{Sharh al-Muhadhdhab} by al-Nawawî (d. 676/1277), al-Suyûtî remarks that one is obliged to destroy them by means of burning, washing, etc.\footnote{If one destroys books on logic, one is told not only to destroy their covers, but to destroy them completely.}}}}}}}}}}}}
Basing himself on Sharḥ al-Minhāj by al-Zarkashi, al-Suyūṭī remarks that one is not allowed to ask for a salary for teaching logic,\(^{384}\) (14) that paying one who copied a book of logic is not justified,\(^{385}\) (15) a抄写ist deserves his salary only if he leaves out passages well identified as containing logical discussion.\(^{386}\)

(16) According to the Shayḥ Walī al-Dīn Abū Zur‘a ʿAlīnah b. ʿAbd al-ʿRahīm al-Wazīr al-ʿIrāqi in his Muḥṭasar al-Ummahāt [probably: al-Muḥimmāt], giving books on logic as waqf is not allowed.\(^{387}\)

Based on al-Sharḥ al-Ṣagīr\(^{388}\) (probably by al-Rāfiʿī, d. 623/1226),\(^{389}\) al-Suyūṭī also notes (17) that giving waqf to one who is occupied with logic is not allowed;\(^{390}\) (18) that the religious endowment (al-waqf) cannot be distributed to one who is knowledgeable of logic;\(^{391}\) (19-21) “the status of the will (waṣīyya) [a] dealing with books of logic and [b] being declared to those who are occupied with it, as well as [c] to its scholars, is like that of the religious endowment (waqf) as mentioned before;”\(^{392}\) (22) that one fifth of the booty is not to be endowed to one occupied with logic;\(^{393}\) (23) that alms are not to be given to him, who is occupied with logic, while he is still able to earn his daily expenses;\(^{394}\) (24) that one who is occupied with logic has no authority to marry one who is under his authority;\(^{395}\) (25) that the marriage does not become concluded due to one who is occupied with logic.\(^{396}\) (26) …;\(^{397}\) (27) and that one is required to pay a dower and food

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384 “lā yaṣiḥū al-istāqā lā yaṭārṣīhū.”QM, p. 16 (l. 30) – 17 (l. 1).


387 “lā yasiḥhū waqf kuttubihū.”QM, p. 17, l. 3-4.


389 Although al-Suyūṭī does not mention the author of al-Sharḥ al-Ṣagīr, I confirm myself that this work was composed by the Shāfiʿite Abuʾl-Qāsim ʿAbī ʾl-Qāsim Imām al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Abī Sa‘īd Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Rāfīʿī, born at Qazwīn in 555/1160 and died there in 623/1226, whose work, Kitāb al-Muḥarrar was a main source for al-Nawawī in the composition of his celebrated Minhāj al-Ṭalīḥīn. See Arioli, A, “al-Rāfīʿī,” EI², VIII, 389.

390 “waqf ‘alā yaṣtāqūlu biḥī lām yasīḥhā...”QM, p. 17, l. 4-6.

391 “waqf ‘alā... annaḥhū lāma yaṣtāqūlu li ʾl-ālim biḥī.”QM, p. 17, l. 6.

392 “al-waṣīyya bi-kuttubihū waḥilam yaṣtāqūlu biḥī wa li ʾl-ulumām” kamā dhukīra lā waqf.”QM, p. 17, l. 6-7.

393 “lā yaṣtāqūlu ilā aḥlīhi min ʾhumūs al-ganīma alladhī yusārū ilā ʾl-ulumām.”QM, p. 17, l. 7-8.


395 “lā yaliṣīkāw mawliyyātīhī.”QM, p. 17, l. 10.

396 “lā yanʿāqīdu biḥī al-nikāḥ.”QM, p. 17, l. 10.

397 Lacunae. QM, p. 17, l. 11.
to the person occupied with studying shari‘a, but not to one occupied with logic.\(^{398}\)

(28) Based on al-Rawādi of al-Nawawī, al-Suyūṭī says that one’s marriage is not valid if the dower is in the form of teaching the Tora, the Bible, or logic.\(^{399}\)

(29) Saluting one occupied with logic is disapproved.\(^{400}\)

Based on the Riḥla\(^{401}\) of the Malikiite Ibn Rashīd al-Sibṭī (d. 721/1322) and Mu’jam al-Safar of al-Silafi, al-Suyūṭī also remarks (30) that the testimony of one occupied with logic is not reliable, unless he has repented;\(^{403}\) (31) that the report of one occupied with logic is not accepted;\(^{403}\) (32) that one occupied with logic cannot be given a wilāya, the condition for which is ‘adāla, the authority to pass judgment (al-qādā');\(^{404}\) and (33) that everyone is required to reject and oppose one occupied with logic.\(^{405}\)

Referring himself to the Imām Abu ‘l-Faraj (d. 597/1201),\(^{406}\) and to al-Rawādi by al-Nawawī, al-Suyūṭī maintains (34) that the hand of one who has stolen books on logic needs not be cut off;\(^{407}\) and that (35) a vow to study logic should not be fulfilled, because the fulfillment of it is a violation.\(^{408}\)

(D.) Reasons why logic was prohibited

Al-Suyūṭī then turns to discuss the reason why logic should be prohibited. In response to the proposition which says that logic would prevent one from a mistake when developing a viewpoint, al-Suyūṭī proposes five answers: (i) That logic prevents the mind from making a mistake is totally wrong. This is reflected by the fact that leading scholars are unagreed on numerous questions. They rather
propose different opinions on one and the same issue.\textsuperscript{409} (2) If the proposition was sound, all those who undertake \textit{ijtihād} would always come to a correct legal opinion. But this is not the case. This is based on the words of the Prophet that those who undertake \textit{ijtihād} might make a mistake: “if a jurist makes an effort to deduce a legal opinion and makes a mistake, he deserves single recompense” (\textit{idhā 'jtahada 'l-ḥākim wa aḥṣa'a falahū ajr}).\textsuperscript{410} (3) Most logicians themselves dispute against each other, whereas the truth is one and not numerous.\textsuperscript{411} (4) The inventors of logic among the philosophers hold, for instance, a belief in the sempiternity of the Universe and other beliefs which are against the creeds of the shari'ā.\textsuperscript{412} (5) Based on their intellect and guided by their logic, they are of the conviction that the earth is round. This is in contrast with what God has stated in the Koran: “wa ḫalā li ḫarīṣ...”\textsuperscript{413} This verse, according to the interpreters, among whom is the Shayḥ Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī (d. 864/1459),\textsuperscript{414} is a refutation of the astronomers.\textsuperscript{415}

From his words mentioned in no. 4 above, it follows that al-Suyūṭī identifies philosophers who maintain the eternity of the world with logicians. In other words, al-Suyūṭī seems to assert that philosophers and logicians are identical.

1. 4. Conclusion: Evaluation of QM as a source for the history of the opposition to logic

In his discussion against logic, al-Suyūṭī refers either directly or indirectly to 44 scholars of various law schools, beginning with al-Shāfi’ī (d. 203/820) and ending with the Shafi’īite Ibn al-Ñadr al-Balbīsī (d. 904/1499), as well as to 28 works which deal either explicitly or incidentally with the opposition to logic. Nevertheless, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have limited himself in his discussion to the Sunnite

\textsuperscript{409} “anna da‘wā ‘ismat al-fikr ḥaṭṭa šūrā‘ wa qad ra‘aynā ‘uzamā‘ al-‘imma iḥtalāfū tī ‘iddat masā‘īl wa ajāba kullun minhum bihišār qawl al-ḥar, atatarā anna kullān min al-jawābiyyn al-muḥtaliyyin ka ‘l-ḥill wa ‘l-hurma... shay‘ wāḥid.” QM, p. 18, l. 4-8.

\textsuperscript{410} “annahū law saḥḥa dhālika lakāna kull muṭjahid muṣīban walayṣa kadhālīk, faqad aḥbara ʿallāh ʿalāyhi ʿalāṣay waṣallam bi anna min al-muṭjahīdīn man yuḏī’tu ḥayṭ qāla idha ‘jtahada ‘l-ḥākim wa aḥṣa’a falahū ajr.” QM, p. 18, l. 4-8.

scholars, most of which were of the Shafi’ite school of law, in spite of the fact that some scholars of non-Sunnite theological affiliation had opposed logic as fervently as the Sunnite scholars. This is substantiated by the fact that al-Suyūṭī in his discussion against logic does not make a single reference to, for instance, the Zaidite Ibn al-Wazîr al-Ṣanā’ī (840/1374), who had composed Tarjîh Asâlib al-Qur‘în ‘alâ Asâlib al-Yûnûn, in which he fervently condemned Greek logic and philosophy. Accordingly, the systematic opposition to logic by the Mu’tazilite Ibn al-Shirshâr (d. 293/905) and the Shi’ite thinkers, Ḥasan b. Mūsâ al-Nawbahṭî (d. ca. 310/922), the author of al-Radd ‘ala ‘l-Mantîq and Abû al-Najî al-Farîd, the author of Kâsr al-Mantîq, receive no attention from al-Suyūṭî at all.

The written sources on which al-Suyūṭî relies in QM can be delineated chronologically as follows:

1. ItÎÁf al-NubalÁ’ by Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (d. 463/1071)
2. a. Ihyá’ Ulûm al-Dîn
   b. al-Mustaßra by al-Gazâlî (d. 505/1111)
3. Mu‘jam al-Safar by al-Silâfi (d. 576/1180)
4. Al-Sharh al-Ṣâgîr by al-Râfî‘î (d. 623/1226)
5. Fatâwâ by Ibn al-Ṣâlah (d. 643/1254)
6. Al-Tawakkul fi al-Radd ila ‘l-Amr al-Awwal by Abû Shâma (d. 665/1268)
7. a. Tabaqât
   b. Sharh al-Muhadhdhab
8. Ḥâshiyat Sharh al-Bahjâ by al-Baydâwî (d. 716/1316)
9. Al-Rîhîla by Ibn Rashîd (d. 721/1322)
10. Al-Tabaqât al-Kubrâ by Taqî al-Dîn al-Subkî (d. 732/1332)
11. Al-Nudâr by Abû Ḥâyyân al-Garnâṭî (d. 745/1344)
12. Sharh Lâmiyat al-‘Ajâm by al-Ṣâlah al-Ṣafâdî (d. 746/1345)
13. a. Zagal al-Ilm

416 Madelung suggests that the great savant and the independent Mujtahîd Ibn al-Wazîr al-Ṣanā’î played a significant role in moderating the Zaydite teachings in order to render them acceptable to the Sunnites. His voluminous al-Awâsîm wa ‘l-Qawâsîm represented his defence of the Sunnite school doctrine, criticizing the Zaydite teachings. Likewise, Ibn al-Wazîr, Madelung says, had accepted the Sunnite canonical collection of ḥadîth as authoritative on in religion. The attempt of Ibn al-Wazîr to favour the neo-Sunni school was to accommodate the religious views and sentiments of the majority of the people under the control of the Zaydite Imamate. The long lasting Zaydite rule in Yemen lasting until the modern time (1382/1962) is said to have owed much to Ibn al-Wazîr’s merit. See Madelung, W., “Zaydiyya,” EI², XI, 477-81.
417 The complete title of this work, according to Brockelmann, is ItÎÁf al-NubalÁ’ bi aÌbÁr al-thuqlÁ’. See GAL, G. II, 154; S. II, 192
418 This work refers to al-Sharh al-Ṣâgîr ‘ala ‘l-Wajîz li ‘l-Gazâlî. GAL, G. I, 393.
419 GAL, S. I, 551.
420 Brockelmann refers to this work as Tabaqât al-Fuqahá’ al-Shâfi‘iyya. GAL, G. I, 397.
421 GAL, G. I, 397; S. I, 684.
422 GAL, G. I, 396; S. I, 753, II, 286.
423 GAL, S. II, 344.
425 GAL, S. II, 47.
The indispensability of this work for an understanding of the history of the opposition to logic lies, first of all, in the fact that al-Suyūṭī makes use of works which deal exclusively with the opposition to logic, i.e. al-ÍaÔÔ Ýala 'l-ManÔiq and NaÒÐÎat al-Muslim al-Mus hfiq liman Ubtuliya bi Ïubb ÝIlm al-ManÔq (15a and 15b), which are (presumably) no longer extant. It should be stated here that modern author(s) have never referred to them. The author of GAL, Brockelmann, for instance, remains silent about these works.

Although the sources which al-Suyūṭī relies on when discussing the opposition to logic are fiqh book(s), its commentary and super commentary (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13a, 14, 17a, 17b, 18, 19, 20), biographical dictionaries and/or works on history (1, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13b, 13c, and 13d), and autobiography (16), as well as works dealing with theologico-juridical and/or mystical discussion (2a and 2b), they are also, important sources for the history of the opposition to logic, since they deal with this issue as well. With the exception of FatÁwÁ by Ibn al-ÑalÁÎ, IÎyÁ' and al-MustaÒfÁ by al-GazÁlÐ, not a single reference to the above sources has been made by the modern authors when discussing the opposition to logic, despite the fact that some of them, such as SharÎ al-Muhadhdhab, RawÃat al-ÓÁlibÐn, al-RiÎla, SharÎ LÁmiyat al- Ajam, etc, have been published.

Another reason why QM can be regarded as an indispensable source for the history of the opposition to logic is that al-Suyūṭī in his QM has drawn our

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426Ta'rÐÌ al-DhahabÐ, Ta'rÐÌ al-IslÁm, ed. ÝUmar ÝAbd al-SalÁm TadmurÐ (Beirut: DÁr al -Kutub al-ÝArabÐ, 1987), 47 vols. According to ÝAwwÁd, this book is the greatest work of the author since it summarizes a number of historical books. Thus it became a reference of great importance for historians such as al-ÑafadÐ, Ibn ShÁkir al-KutubÐ, al-SubkÐ, al-Asnawi, Ibn Kathír, Ibn Rajab, al-FayyÙmÐ, Ibn DaqmÁq, al-Sibt b. al-Jawzi, al-Sahuwi, Ibn 'Abd al-ÑadÐ and al-SuyÙÔÐ. See MaÝrÙf, BashshÁr ÝAwwÁd, a -DhahabÐ wa M nÎÁjuhÙ fi KitÁbihÐ Ta'rÐÌ al- IslÁm (Cairo: MatbaÝat ÝÏsÁ al-BÁbÐ al-ÍalabÐ wa ShirkÁhu, 1976), p. 9-17.

427GAL, G. II, 48, S. II, 47.

428GAL, G. II, 91.

429This probably refers to what Brockelmann lists as al-Tanq Î  ÍÁs hiya ÝalÁ  TaÒÎ ÐÎ al TanbÐh. GAL, S. II, 107.

430This probably refers to what Brockelmann lists as TawÃÐÎ al-MinhÁj. GAL, G. II, 92, S. II, 108.

431GAL, S. II, 71.
attention to *al-Nuḍār* composed by Abū Ḥayyān al-Garnāṭi to report his early beginnings, his activities, his teachers and his flight from Granada. The indispensability of this work lies in the fact that it could shed light not only to the history of the opposition to logic, (because of which Abū Ḥayyān, al-Suyūṭī reports, fled from Granada), but also to the study of the history of Muslim Spain.

The indispensability of QM as a new source for the history of the opposition to logic is also reflected by the fact that in QM al-Suyūṭī draws our attention to various arguments against logic, which have not (yet) been referred to by any modern scholar. When discussing Ibn Jubayr al-Kinānī's attitude toward logic, Rescher, for instance, refers to Tritton's *Materials*, which records only four verses composed by Ibn Jubayr against logic, whereas al-Suyūṭī in his QM records twenty verses.

In this light, one might suggest that QM can be regarded as an important source for the history of the opposition to logic, since it provides us with rich data concerning Arabic writings dealing explicitly or incidentally with the opposition to logic.

As for the authorities whose arguments against logic are discussed in QM, they take the following order:

1. The Shafi‘ī ‘Abdur Ra‘ūf al-Gazālī (d. 505/1111)
2. The Shafi‘ī al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277)
3. The Shafi‘ī Ibn al-Salāḥ al-Sahrazūrī (d. 643/1254)
4. The Shafi‘ī Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Dhabahī (d. 748/1348)
5. The Maliki Abū ‘Umar b. al-Barr (d. 463/1071)
6. The Shafi‘ī Taqi al-Din b. Daqīq al-Īd (d. 702/1302)
7. The Shafi‘ī Taqi al-Din al-Subkī (d. 744/1344)
8. The Shafi‘ī al-Adfuwī (d. 747/1347)
9. The Shafi‘ī Abū Shāma al-Dimashqī (d. 665/1268)
10. The Ḥanafī Sirāj al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 750/1349)
11. The Shafi‘ī Abū Tahir al-Silafī (d. 576/1180)
12. The Maliki Ibn Rashīd al-Sibṭī (d. 721/1322)
13. The Maliki Abū Ḥayyān al-Garnāṭī (d. 745/1344)
14. The Shafi‘ī Sharaf al-Dīn al-Dimyāṭī (d. 705/1306)
15. The Shafi‘ī Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī (d. 772/1371)
16. The Shafi‘ī Zayn al-Dīn Abū l-Kāfī al-Subkī (d. 735/1335)
17. The Maliki Abū Ḥabīb al-Malāqa (d. 640/1243)
19. The Ḥanbalī Taqi al-Dīn b. Taymiyya (d. 729/1329)
20. The Shafi‘ī Ibn al-Muqri (d. 837/1434)
21. The Shafi‘ī Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashi (d. 794/1392)
22. The Mystic Wali al-Dīn al-Malāwī (d. 841/1438) who discusses the attitude of Zayn al-Dīn b. al-Murāḥḥīl (d. 738/1338)
23. The Ḥanafī Abū Sa‘īd al-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979)
24. The Shafi‘ī Sharaf al-Dīn al-Munāwī (d. 757/1357)
25. The Shafi‘ī ‘Alam al-Dīn al-Bulqīnī (d. 868/1461)

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(27) The Shafi’ite Kamal al-Din b. Imam al-Kamil (d. 874/1470)
(28) The Malikite Taqi al-Din al-Shumunni (d. 872/1468)
(29) The Shafi’ite Taj al-Din al-Subki (d. 771/1370)

Although the eponym of the Shafi`ite school of law, al-Shafi`i, was referred to in QM as one who pronounced words against theology, he can be regarded here also as one who opposed logic, for obvious reasons. Al-Suyuti, as can be read in SM, identifies theology with logic and vice-versa, because of their intricate connections.

As can be seen from the scheme above, in his discussion of logic al-Suyuti referred to 29 scholars of various legal schools, five of whom are Malikite, two Hanafite, and one Hanbaliite, while the rest are Shafi`ites. Among those scholars, there are five scholars (no: 2, 7, 9, 15, 19) whom al-Suyuti qualifies as mujtahids, three (no. 1, 6 and 11) as mujaddids (renewers of the religion), four scholars whom he referred to as Chief Judge (qadi al-qudat) (18, 24, 25, 28), one as agdā al-qudat (no. 16), one (no. 22) as mystic, while the rest are referred to by al-Suyuti and/or by the biographers as belonging to the most knowledgeable persons of their time in Ta`alit, Tradition and Jurisprudence (no. 3), the “seal of the Ash`arites” (no. 4), the greatest traditionist in Al-Andalus (no. 5), the great Hafiz and the traditionist of Iraq (no. 10), a leading scholar of Yemen (no. 20), etc. Three members of the Subki family (no. 7, 16, 29) who were considered by Laoust to be among the most eminent representatives of Shafi`ism and Syro-Egyptian Ash`arism, are referred to by al-Suyuti at one and the same time.

In his argument against al-Gazali, al-Suyuti not only refers to the scholars of generations later than al-Gazali, but also to a few of the latter’s predecessors (no. 5 and 22). In marshalling the arguments of his own predecessors against al-Gazali, al-Suyuti does not follow any chronological order. He rather starts his discussion with al-Nawawi (d. 676/1277), followed by Ibn al-Salah (d. 643/1254) and Taj al-Din al-Subki (d. 771/1370) and ending with al-Nawawi again.

Six of his predecessors’ arguments against logic are in the form of legal opinions (fatwas, see, no. 2, 3, 7, 24, 25, 28); three of them in the form of poetry (no. 16, 17, 25); the rest merely consist of opinions against logic quoted from the authors’ works (no. 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 21) and from other works which recorded the discussions of these scholars against logic (no. 19, 23). Al-Suyuti also refers to an argument against logic by a scholar who reported others to have had opposed logic as well (no. 8, 22).

Geographically speaking, the scholars whom al-Suyuti refers to spent their careers in different regions. Eight of them were residents of Damascus and its

434 Sartain, op. cit., p. 65.
435 Al-Suyuti, al-Tahadduth, op. cit., p. 218, 222.
436 Al-Suyuti, BW, p. 25-7; Al-Suyuti, TH, 531; QM, 12,
437 Al-Subki, TS, X, 89.
438 Al-Suyuti, TH, 500.
439 Al-Suyuti, TH, 517.
440 GAL, I, 368; Al-Suyuti, TM, 808-9.
441 Al-Suyuti, TH, 526.
surrounding cities (no. 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 16, 19, 29); three of them were from Muslim Spain (no. 5, 13, 17); twelve were inhabitants of Egypt (no. 6, 8, 11, 14, 15, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28); three were Iraqis (no. 10, 11, 24); one was from Fas (no. 12); one from Yemen (no. 20) and one from Mecca (no. 26).

The indispensability of QM also lies in the fact that, with the exception of al-Gazālī, al-Nawawi, Ibn al-Salāḥ, Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī and Ibn Taymiyya, most of the authorities to whom al-Suyūṭī refers in QM have never been referred to by modern scholars as opposing logic. Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī with his celebrated Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi‘īyya, who is often referred to by modern scholars as a scholar who played a role in consolidating the members of the Shafi‘ite schools and not as one who opposed logic, is referred to here by al-Suyūṭī as one of the prominent jurists who were against logic. This also holds true for Ibn Daqīq al-Īḍ and al-Silāḥī, who only have been referred to by modern scholars as mujaddids of the seventh and eighth century of Islam and not as opposing logic. According to al-Suyūṭī they also have a hostile attitude toward logic.

Although the authorities listed in QM are very few, due to their being prominent scholars who composed works dealing with the opposition against logic, QM can be said to have shed light on the history of this issue.

Al-Suyūṭī’s censure against logic in QM has drawn criticism from a number of scholars, one of whom was al-Maghīlī. This can be clearly followed in a letter by him to al-Suyūṭī, which can be found in Tarjamat al-Suyūṭī by al-Dāwūdī al-Malikī, who stated in his Tarjama that al-Maghīlī wrote this letter in verse that expressed his wonder concerning the fact that al-Suyūṭī had composed a book to condemn logic and to prohibit people from being occupied with it. In the letter, al-Maghīlī suggests that logic (manṭiq) essentially leads one to the truth and guides the ignorant in order to find it. Likewise, logic examines the truth

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444 Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maghīlī al-Tilimsānī, identified by Hunwick as a reformist faqīḥ of Tlemcen and widely famed for his persecution of the Jewish community in the Algerian Sahara, was born in Tilimsān in 842/1440 and studied under a number of scholars, such as ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Thā‘alībī (d. 875/1470) and Yaḥyā b. Yaḍir al-Tadallīsī (d. 877/1477). He died in 909/1504. He was the author of twenty-six works, mainly on fiqh and tawḥīd. According to Hunwick, he was also interested in studying formal logic (manṭiq) in favour of which he composed Minhāl al-Wadhāb fī Radd al-Fikr ‘alā al-Ṣawāb, which was widely studied in West Africa. See Hunwick, J.O., “Al-Maghīlī,” EI², V, 1165-6.

445 Wetzstein (abbr. WE) I 20, fol 70b-72a in Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Hans Kurio of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, who provided me with this manuscript which comprises 31 lines. The manuscript is written in readable script and contains no lacunae. It is an undated copy of a later date. This poetic correspondence on the legal status of logic can be found in Ahmad Bābā al-Tinbukṭī, Nayl al-Ībīthāǧ bi-Ṭatrīz al-Ḍībāj, which is printed on the margins of Ibn Farḥūn, al-Ḍībāj al-Mudhahhab fī Ma‘rīfāt A’yān al-Madhhab (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Sa‘āda, 1329/1911), p. 320-2.

446 Al-Dāwūdī is one of al-Suyūṭī’s biographers and closest students, and was once commissioned by al-Suyūṭī to be in charge of his books and to be responsible for any lending in the Mosque of al-Azhār, at the time of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt. See Sartain, op. cit., p. 72, 111.


448 WE, fol. 71a.
with regard to each speech and constitutes proof which can be made use of in argument. One is not able to find sound proof anywhere, al-Magili continues, but in logic.\textsuperscript{449} Al-Magili is aware of the fact that logic is foreign to Muslims and borrowed from the Greeks, who are infidels. However, due to its benefit in reasoning, logic is a thing the Muslim should make use of.\textsuperscript{450}

\textsuperscript{449}Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{450}Ibidem.
Chapter Two

*Jahd al-Qariha fi Tajrid al-Nasihah: al-Suyuti’s Abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s Nasihat Ahl al-Iman fi al-Radd ‘ala Maniq al-Yunan*

2. 1. The Date and Purpose of Abridgement of *Nasihah*

The fact that JQ was not composed in the same year as QM, but rather twenty years after the latter i.e. in 888/1482, was mentioned by al-Suyuti in the introduction of SM: “I related in it [QM] that the Shaykh al-Islam, one of the scholars who has reached the degree of ijtihad, Taqi al-Din b. Taymiyya composed a book to undo its foundations, which I had not found at that time. Twenty years had passed by without me having found it. Then when this year had come, and I had told of what God endowed upon me in attaining the rank of independent legal investigation, someone mentioned that one of the conditions for legal investigation was the knowledge of the art of logic, claiming that this condition lacked in me. The poor fellow did not understand that I knew it better than those who claim to know it and who defend it. I know the principles of its foundations, as well as the insights based thereon equally well as the leading logicians of today, with the exception of only our very learned teacher, Muhyi al-Din al-Ka’faji [d. 879/1475]. Thus I sought for Ibn Taymiyya’s book, till I found it. I saw that he had entitled it *Nasihat Ahl al-Iman fi al-Radd ‘ala Maniq al-Yunan* [forthwith called: NAI]. In it, he expressed excellently his intention to undo its foundations one by one, while explaining the depravity of its principles. So I summarized it in a little composition which I entitled *Jahd al-Qariha fi Tajrid al-Nasihah*.”

2. 2. The Contribution Made by al-Suyuti in Presenting IT’s Arguments more Comprehensible

JQ is an abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI. Al-Suyuti has abridged NAI, which, according to Hallaq, approximately consists of 138,000 words, to one third of its length, viz. approximately 32,000 words. In summarizing this work, al-Suyuti did not try to reformulate Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas or give comments on them. “In other words, his abridgement is not paraphrastic: he simply left the logical parts intact and deleted the greatest part of metaphysical digressions.” However, according to Hallaq, al-Suyuti can be said to have succeeded in providing a more readable NAI to the readers, and in making it a succinct treatise. Besides, al-Suyuti’s omission of Ibn Taymiyya’s metaphysical discussions in NAI and his cleansing of a good deal of the repetitions from the logical discussions, Hallaq argues, rendered “the sequence of ideas” of JQ, “superior to that found in” NAI.

In sum, Hallaq maintains that “the overall result of al-Suyuti’s abridgement is a more effective critique of logic than that originally formulated.

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452JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. liv-v.
453JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. lv.
454JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. liv.
by IT.\textsuperscript{455} This is in line with al-Suyūṭi’s own remark when he concluded his work, JQ: “This is the end of what I have abridged from Ibn Taymiyya’s treatise. I have conveyed his words 	extit{verbatim}, mostly without any change. I have omitted much of his treatise, which consists of twenty fascicles. However, I have deleted nothing of value; what I did delete was not pertinent to the main argument. The deletions are either digressions or replies to metaphysical and other queries, or repetitions, or refutations of some logicians’ views that do not have bearing upon any universal principle in logic, etc. \textit{Those who read this abridgement of mine will benefit more from it than they would should they take up the original work, for the latter is complex and difficult to use.”}\textsuperscript{456}

2. 3. Elements of IT’s Religious Viewpoints Against Logic and Theology in JQ

Although most of the passages of this work are replete with IT’s concrete scientific criticism of each of the logical principles,\textsuperscript{457} there are some passages that can be regarded as direct expressions of IT’s \textit{religious} attitude toward logic, reflecting his censure, condemnation and legal prohibition of the study of logic. The following passages will be devoted to IT’s viewpoints against logic in particular or against the sciences of the ancients in general, such as philosophy inasfar as they have been maintained in the abridged work of al-Suyūṭi, viz. JQ.\textsuperscript{458}

The first of these statements is very interesting, since it represents a cultural attitude shared by many religious scholars regarding the sciences of the ancients in general, and against logic in particular. The statement says: \textit{fā innī kuntu đā’īmanâ l’ālamu anna ’l-manāṣib al-yūnānī lā yaḥṭāju ilayhi ’l-dhakā wa lā yantāsī ’u bīhi ’l-balid} (I have always known that Greek logic is neither needed by the intelligent nor of any use to the dullard).\textsuperscript{459}

IT’s oppositional attitude toward logic is also clearly indicated in his harsh criticism of the philosophers who adopted the principles of Aristotelian logic. Accordingly he remarks that “even the [pre-Islamic] polytheistic Arabs possessed remnants of the religion of Abraham and were thus better than the polytheistic philosophers who adopted the principles propounded by Aristotle and his likes.”\textsuperscript{460}

IT’s opposition to logic can be seen in the words in favour of al-Sīrāfī’s position maintaining that Arabic is the most noble language: “When Mattā complimented logic and claimed that intelligent people need it, Abū Sa’īd

\textsuperscript{455}JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.}, p. liv.

\textsuperscript{456}For this translation, I rely fully on Hallaq’s translation of JQ. See JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{457}IT’s epistemological criticism of logic is reflected in his aim to deconstruct four main theses which the logicians upheld: (1) \textit{al-tasawwur lā yunāšu illā bi’l-ḥadd} (no concept can be formed except by means of definition), (2) \textit{al-ḥadd mufd taṣawwur al-ashyā}’ (definition leads to the conception of things), (3) \textit{al-ṭadīq lā yunāšu illā bi’l-qiyās} (the judgement cannot be formed except by means of analogy), and (4) \textit{al-burḥān yufid al-‘ilm bi’l-ṭadīqāt} (syllogism leads to the certain knowledge of judgements). The translation of these logical concepts are quoted from JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3-174.

\textsuperscript{458}In discussing these, I fully rely on Hallaq’s translation of JQ.

\textsuperscript{459}JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{460}JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 68.
responded that there is no need for it, and that the need is rather for learning the
Arabic language; for meanings are instinctive and intellectual, and in need of no
special convention, while Arabic is needed in order to understand meanings that
must be learned. That is why learning the Arabic language – upon which the
understanding of the Quran and the traditions depends – is, unlike logic, a
religious obligation whenever such obligation can be fulfilled by the individual
Muslim."  

Ibn Taymiyya can also be said to have pronounced as his legal opinion
that the study of logic should be prohibited. This can be inferred from the
following words: “The argument of the more recent scholars that the study of
logic is a religious obligation incumbent upon those who are able to undertake it,
and that it is one of the conditions which must be met in order to interpret the
Law, is indicative of both their ignorance of the Law and the uselessness of
logic.”

IT’s opposition to logic is also reflected in his condemnation of the
society among which logic was founded, i.e. the Greek. According to IT, “the
Greeks were polytheists and worshippers of stars and idols, much worse than the
Jews and Christians even after the latter had abrogated and distorted their own
Scripture.”

According to IT, “Muslim thinkers continue to denounce the logicians’
method and expose its weaknesses, errors, intellectual inadequacy, and
inarticulateness. They have shown that such a method is more likely to corrupt
the rational and linguistic faculties than to set them straight. They are not willing
to adopt it in their own reasoning or in their scholarly disputations, whether
these disputations are conducted against a friend or a foe.”

In another passage, IT identifies the logicians with those whose knowledge
is limited and those who have no skill in formulating concepts and clear
expressions. This can be read in the following remarks: “The stronger the
intellectual faculty and its conception are, the richer its expression becomes. But
if the intellect and its expressions and concepts are feeble, the person possessing
that intellect will be as if he were the prisoner of his own mind and tongue. Such
is the case with the Greek logicians: you find them to be the most limited in
knowledge and learning, the weakest in formulating concepts and clear
expressions. This is why intelligent people who follow the path of the logicians
when treating of the sciences employ methods that are prolix, compressed,
affected, and arbitrary. All they do is to explain the obvious and clarify the
intelligible. This may lead them to fall into all kinds of sophistry from which
God has saved those who do not follow their path.”

IT’s hostile attitude towards logic is also reflected in his dealing with an
authority to whom he himself refers explicitly as the first who mixed logic “with
Islamic principles (bi usûl al-muslimîn),” i.e. al-Gazâlî. This is clearly indicated
in IT’s words: “those who introduced this [essential definition] are the ones who

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461JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 100.
462Ibidem.
463JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 103.
464JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 111.
465JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 87; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., 166-7.
466JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 154; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 194-5.
wrote on the principles of religion and law after Abū Hāmid [al-Gazālī] - towards the end of the fifth century - and it is they who have discoursed on definitions according to the doctrine of the Greek logicians. Scholars of all other denominations - the Ashʿarīs, Muʿtazīlīs, Karrāmīs, Shiʿīs, and others - hold that the function of definition is to distinguish between the definiendum and other things. This is well known in the writings of Abu ‘l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, al-Qāārī Abū Bakr [al-Bāqillānī], Abū Ishāq [al-Isfārāʾīnī], Ibn Fūrak, al-Qāārī Abū Yaʿlā, Ibn ‘Aqīl, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, Nasafī, Abū ‘Ali [al-Jubbāʾī], Abū Hāshim [al-Jubbāʾī], ‘Abd al-Jabbār, al-Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥayṣam, and others.”

Furthermore, it is also reflected by his reference to al-Gazālī as the one responsible for spreading the logicians’ method through his including “in the beginning of his work al-Mustaṣfā, an introduction to Greek logic, and as the one who alleged that the learning of those who do not know this logic is not to be trusted.”

His criticism of al-Gazālī is also reflected by his identifying the latter as the proponent of a logical concept upheld by the logicians: al-ḥadd mutid tasawwur al-ashyāʾ (definition leads to the conception of things), a logical postulate which is opposed by, IT says, almost the majority of Muslim theologians, from among the Ashʿarītes, Muʿtazīlītes, Karamites and Shiʿītes, who oppose this postulate as can be seen in the works of Abu ‘l-Ḥasan al-Asʿarī, Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, Abū Ishāq, etc.

Opposing this postulate and arguing against its proponents, IT then puts forward a number of arguments maintaining that definition does not lead to the conception of things: First, “a definition is merely a statement and claim of the definer. The statement ‘man is a rational animal’ is a declarative proposition (qādiyya ʿabariyya) and a mere claim devoid of proof. Therefore the hearer may know the truthfulness of this proposition before hearing it. This can be a proof that definition is not needed when one acquires the knowledge.” Secondly, “if the definer is not able to prove the truthfulness of the definition, the hearer fails to know the defined thing. Therefore there is no need for definition. Conceptualizing the thing defined with the definition is not possible without the knowledge of the truthfulness of the saying of the definer. The truthfulness of his saying is not known by a mere definition. Thus, the defined thing cannot be known by the definition.” Thirdly, “definition is not needed, because to form a concept necessitates the examination of the validity of the definition. Consequently apprehending the definiendum should be preceded by apprehending of that which defines it.” Fourthly, “the use of definition depends on whether the hearer knows or not that the definiendum possesses the attributes by means of which the logicians define the definiendum. If he does not know, he will not be able to form a concept of it. If he does, he will form a concept of it without definition. Therefore, definition is not needed.”

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467 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 12-3.
468 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 111-12.
469 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 13.
470 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 15.
471 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 16.
472 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 17.
473 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 18.
would not seek them, thus they need no definition. In short, it is awareness which is more useful than definition when one seeks and enquires a concept, since the act of seeking and enquiring presupposes awareness.”\textsuperscript{474} \textbf{Sixthly}, “their understanding of the concept of definition is based on two invalid principles: First, a quiddity has a permanent reality, other than its own existence, subsisting outside the mind. This argument is similar to the one espoused by those who hold the non-existent to be a thing. Second, the distinction between what is a necessary concomitant to quiddity and what is essential to it. This principle has no truth in it. Understanding this principle would be tantamount to saying ‘the existence together with its necessary attributes’.”\textsuperscript{475} \textbf{Seventhly}, “in a complete definition, the logicians require that a concept be formed of all its essential attributes common with other things. This means that all the attributes must be included. That is impossible.”\textsuperscript{476} \textbf{Eighthly}, “requiring that definition must include distinguishing specific differences (\textit{fu\textsuperscript{a}l mumayy\textsuperscript{a}iza}) along with their distinction between what is essential and what is accidental, is impossible.”\textsuperscript{477} \textbf{Ninthly}, “definition is impossible, because its argument involves circularity: the apprehension of the essence will depend on the apprehension of what the essential qualities are, and the apprehension of the essential qualities will depend on what the apprehension of the essence is. Thus, if the definiendum cannot be known without definition, and definition is impossible, then the definiendum cannot be known. This reflects the falsity of their doctrine.”\textsuperscript{478} \textbf{Tenthly}, “the disagreement amongst them concerning definition cannot be resolved in terms of [their] principles; and what entails the equalization of evidence (\textit{tak\textsuperscript{a}fu\textsuperscript{a} al-adilla}) [against and for the truth] is invalid.”\textsuperscript{479}

IT then asserts how al-Gazālī’s introduction of logic into Islamic sciences has led many scholars to follow the latter in thinking that logic was the only existing method. Furthermore, IT remarks that “little did these thinkers know that intelligent and learned Muslims and others have denounced and decried it. Muslim thinkers have written many works about logic, and the majority of Muslims denounce it categorically because of what they have observed of its [damaging] effects and attendant consequences, which show the logicians views to be contrary to sound knowledge and faith, views that led them to all sorts of ignorance, heresy, and error.”\textsuperscript{480}

IT, however, argues that al-Gazālī, as reflected in the books he wrote towards the end of his life, changed his views and maintained that the logicians’ method is false and leads to uncertainty. According to al-Gazālī, IT says, logic led him nowhere, “and has removed none of the doubt and perplexity which possessed him. To him logic was to no avail.”\textsuperscript{481}

Another typical remark by IT that can be regarded as having served religious ground for the opposition to logic is found in his following words:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{474}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 22.
\item \textsuperscript{475}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 23-4.
\item \textsuperscript{476}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 27-8.
\item \textsuperscript{477}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 28-9.
\item \textsuperscript{478}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 29.
\item \textsuperscript{479}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 30.
\item \textsuperscript{480}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 112.
\item \textsuperscript{481}Ibidem.
\end{itemize}
“What Muslim thinkers have shown in their discussions of the Greek logic attributed to Aristotle is that the forms of the syllogism and the subject-matter that the logicians have elaborated with great efforts are of no use in the acquisition of knowledge.”

Furthermore, he remarks “Muslim thinkers have held that logic does not lead to the knowledge sought after, and may constitute an obstacle in the way of attaining that knowledge because logic is tedious for the mind.”

In another passage, IT remarks that “Muslim scholars continue to write in refutation of the philosophers’ logic, and to expose the errors in their discourse concerning both definition and syllogism. They also continue to expose the philosophers’ errors in metaphysics and other matters. No Muslim scholar has attached importance to their method; in fact, the Ash’aris, Mu’tazilis, Karrâmis, Shi’is, and speculative thinkers in other groups have condemned their method and exposed its falsehood. Muslim scholars have since discussed logic at too great a length to be mentioned here. The refutation of the logicians is set forth in many a theological work. In Abû Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Mūsâ al-Nawbaṭī’s work al-Ārâ’ wa l-Diyârāt there is a useful chapter (faṣl) of such refutation.”

In condemning logic, IT also refers to Ibn al-Qushayrī’s hostile verses condemning Ibn Sinā’s al-Shifā’:

“We severed the ties of brotherhood with those stricken
By the malady of the book of al-Shifā’
How often have I said to them
You are about to be swept away by the book of al-Shifā’
When they made little of our warning
We turned to God and He was sufficient
They then died while following the religion of Aristotle
And we lived according to the Religion of the Chosen.”

In opposing logic, IT also reports the event which occurred when al-Ḥunajī was dying. According to IT, “those who were present at the deathbed of Ḥunajī, the chief logician of his time, reported that just before his death he said: ‘I die knowing nothing except that the possible presupposes the necessary.’ He then added: ‘And presupposition is a negative attribute, so I die knowing nothing.’”

In another passage, IT even condemns explicitly Ibn Sinā, the fervent follower of Aristotle. This becomes clear from his words: “What is meant here is that Ibn Sinā said in his autobiography that his family, his father, and his brother were heretics whom he used to hear discuss the intellect and the soul, and because of this he occupied himself with the study of philosophy. Nonetheless, despite the obvious heresy and inner disbelief of those Muslims with whom he is affiliated, their belief in God is greater than that of the ancient philosophers, such as

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482JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 132.
483Ibidem.
484JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 152-4.
485JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 173.
487JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 132-3.
Aristotle and his followers, whose knowledge of God is surpassed even by the [pre-Islamic] polytheistic Arabs."488

In the same line, IT’s hostile attitude toward philosophers is clearly indicated in his remarks “Therefore the goal of the philosophers - if God leads them into some guidance – is the start of the Jews and infidel Christians, not to speak of the Muslims, the followers of the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - (wa lihādhā kānat nihāyat al-falāsifa – idhā hadāhum allāh ba’ḍ al-hidāya – bidāyat al-yahūd wa ’l-naṣāra al-kuffār, faḍlan ‘an al-muslimin ummati muḥammad salla ‘llāh ‘alayh wa sallama.)”489

Along the same line, IT’s denunciation of the philosophers can also be found in his words: “Thus, the views of those philosophers became widespread among people lacking in reason and religion, such as the Karmatians and the Bāṭinīs, whose doctrine combines the philosophy of the Greeks with the religion of the Magians, although outwardly they adhere to the religion of Rāfī. Of the same stock are the ignorant mystics and speculative theologians. Being heretics and hypocrites, they find fertile ground in an ignorant (jāhilīyya) environment which is far from knowledge and faith. They also find wide acceptance among hypocritical heretics as well as among the polytheistic Turks. They always find acceptance among the heretical and hypocritical enemies of God and of His Messenger.”490

In concluding his discussion of logic, IT fervently attacks the philosophers (logicians), revealing the falsity of their logic. This is clearly illustrated by his words: “From the foregoing it has become clear that restricting the methods for the acquisition of knowledge to those which they have stipulated in logic is false, both in content and form. It has also become clear that they have excluded from the valid sciences those which are more sublime, more imposing, and more numerous than those they have subscribed to, and that the methods they have prescribed lead to only a few contemptible sciences that are neither noble nor numerous. Such is the level of these people – in their knowledge and practice they are the lowest of all humans. In many ways, the heretical Jews and Christians are more noble in their knowledge and practice. The entirety of philosophy does not even elevate its follower to a degree equal to that of the Jews and Christians after the latter have abrogated and distorted [their own Books], let alone prior to their doing so.”491

2. 4. How did al-Suyūṭī select IT’s viewpoints against logic in this Abridgement?

Hallaq is right that al-Suyūṭī in abridging NAI left the logical parts intact and deleted the metaphysical digressions in IT’s discussion.492 Comparing JQ and NAI, it appears that the repetitive arguments of IT and his digressive discussion on metaphysical issues, which al-Suyūṭī deleted in JQ, however, contain relevant elements of IT’s religiously-based viewpoints against logic, the logicians, the
philosophers, Aristotle, the *Mutakallimūn*, etc. The following are some typical examples:

To begin with, IT, for instance, says that “those who deal with definition (*al-ḥudūd*) after al-Gazālī are those who deal with them following the Greek logical method.”

IT’s criticism of the *Mutakallimūn* can be found for instance in his remarks that a specific group of the *Mutakallimūn* argue against the falsity of the arguments of the philosophers with false and invalid arguments. Accordingly, he also condemned the *Mutakallimūn* for their arguing with the philosophers in a number of questions, such as the novelty of the Universe (*ḥudūth al-ʿālam*), the attestation of the existence of the Creator (*iṭḥāb at-ṣānī*), and prophecies (*al-nubuwwāt*), by means of a false method which deviates from the Divine law (*al-sharāʾ*). As well as from reason (*al-ʿaqīq*).

IT’s criticism of both the *Mutakallimūn* and the philosophers is clearly voiced when he speaks of “the mistake which the philosophers committed when dealing with metaphysical questions, prophecies, the hereafter and divine laws,” which, according to IT, was “graver than that of the *Mutakallimūn*. As for what they opine concerning physical and mathematical sciences is that the philosophers are more often sound than those among the *Mutakallimūn* who argue against them. Most of the opinions of the *Mutakallimūn* concerning these issues are not based on knowledge, reason, and divine rule.” (wa *l-ḥaḍa* ʾīma taqwawwalah al-mutafalsīfā fi *l-ilāhīyyāt wā *l-nubuwwāt wā *l-ṣāda, wā *l-sharāʾī*iʾ aʿzam min ḥaḍaʾ al-mutakallimūn. Wa ammā ʾīma yaqūlūnah fi *l-ʿulūm al-ṭabiʿīyya wā *l-iṣrādiyya faqad yakūn ʿawāb al-mutafalsīfā akhthara min ʿawāb man radda ʾalayhim min al-kalām fa ʿinna akhthara kalām ʿawāb al-kalām fi ḥadīthi al-umūr bīlā *ʾilm wa ʿaqīq wa ḥāṣar*).

In another passage, IT identifies the philosophers with the ones most ignorant of God, the Lord of the Universe, and with those whose belief is similar to that of the hypocrites who adhere to the Islamic tenet only superficially, refusing inwardly what has been prescribed by the Prophets. IT then illustrates their error in refusing the knowledge of God and His Attributes.

Referring to al-Gazālī, IT also anathematizes the concepts of the philosophers dealing with the fact that God does not know the particulars, with the sempiternity of the Universe and with the rejection of the hereafter (*inkār al-maʿād*).

Typical characteristics of IT’s digressions can be represented by a number of cases:

Case 1:

(1a) When dealing with a subject, IT usually treats it in detail. When he discusses definition (*al-ḥadd*) and syllogism (*al-qiyyās*), by which a concept and

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493 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 15.
494 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 105.
495 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 105.
496 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 311.
497 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 394.
498 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 459.
499 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 462.
500 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 523.
judgement are respectively formed, he explains the definition of al-ḥadd and its being identified with its species: al-ḥaqīqī, al-rasmī and al-lafzī and that of al-qiyās and its being identified with its species: al-jadāli, al-shi‘rī, al-sufasī. IT then deals with each of the species of al-ḥadd and al-qiyās, the discussion of which occupies more than two printed pages of NAI.501

However, IT’s viewpoints on this issue, which al-Suyūṭī abridges in JQ, are very concise. This can obviously be found in the following abridgement: “You ought to know that they have founded logic upon the theory of definition and its species, and upon demonstrative syllogism and its species. They have held that, inasmuch as knowledge is either a concept (taʿwūr) or a judgement (taʿdīq), the means by which a concept is formed is a definition, and that by which a judgement is formed is a syllogism. To this we say that the discussion revolves around four points, two negative and two affirmative. The first of the two [negative points] concerns their doctrine that no required concept can be formed except through a definition; and the second of the two that no required judgement can be known except by means of a syllogism. The other two [affirmative points] concern their doctrine that [1] definition leads to the knowledge of concepts, and [2] the prescribed syllogism or demonstration leads to the knowledge of judgements.”502

It is clear that when al-Suyūṭī encountered IT’s lengthy discussions of subjects, he dealt only with the most essential passages and avoided the details thereof.

(tb) This also holds true for IT’s lengthy discussion of the fact that definition can be challenged by means of refutation (naqḍ) and by introducing another, opposing definition (muʿāraḍa), the explanation of which takes up a couple of pages in NAI.503 Al-Suyūṭī, however, abridges it in one paragraph: “Tenth, they argue that the opponent is entitled to challenge definition by means of refutation (naqḍ) – through Coextensiveness (ṭard) and Coexclusiveness (ʾaks) – as well as by introducing another, opposing definition (muʿāraḍa). If the hearer can invalidate the definition at times by Refutation and at others by Opposition, and since neither is possible without first forming a concept of the definiendum, then it becomes clear that the concept of the definiendum can be formed without definition. And this is what we sought to prove.”504

(tc) The same pattern applies to IT’s argument against the postulate that “definition leads to the conception of things.” According to IT, this postulate is not only upheld by many scholars, among whom al-Gazālī, but also opposed by many others, among whom Abu ’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr [al-Baqqillānī], Abū ʾIsḥāq [al-Isfāraʾīnī], Ibn Fūrak, al-Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā, Ibn ʿAqīl, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, Nasafi, Abū ʿAlī [al-Jubbāʾī], Abū ʿAlī [al-Jubbāʾī], Abū Hāshim [al-Jubbāʾī], Abū al-Jabbār, al-Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Hayṣam, etc. Furthermore, IT deals with the viewpoints of these prominent scholars on this issue, which occupies seven printed pages of NAL.505 Finally, he comes up with his refutation of al-Gazālī’s viewpoints on this issue, to which purpose he devotes more than four printed

501NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 4-7.
502JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 5-6.
503NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 11-3.
504JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 10-11.
505NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 16-22.
As reflected in his JQ, al-Suyūṭī dealt with this issue only in two paragraphs, covering eleven printed-pages. There are many passages which can be regarded to have followed this typical example: par. 22, 23, 29, 30, 33, 34, etc.

Case 2:
As suggested by Hallaq, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have altered the text of NAI. This is typically illustrated by the fact that al-Suyūṭī, Hallaq argues, “speaks of the four eponyms representing the surviving legal schools, whereas IT in al-Radd [NAI] does not limit them to four, but speaks of madhāhib in a general sense, including the madhāhib of lesser mujtahīdūn. Thus, in addition to Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), Mālik (d. 179/795), Shāfi‘i (d. 204/820), and Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), he mentions Ḥishāb b. Rāhawayhi (d. 238/852), al-Layth b. Sa‘d (d. 157/773), al-Awzā‘i (d. 158/774), and Dāwūd b. ʿAlī al-Ẓāhirī (d. 270/884).”

Case 3:
In this case, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have omitted lengthy passages of NAI without giving a reason. This is clearly indicated by the following example: When arguing for the fact that “a syllogism must include a universal premiss; but the universality of the proposition cannot be known unless it be ascertained that all the particulars under that universal share one common factor, and this is done by means of analogy,” IT proposes fourteen considerations, the ninth of which is omitted altogether by al-Suyūṭī in his JQ. This omitted passage (NAI, p. 396-437), however, records IT’s lengthy discussion “against the logicians who maintained that widespread (mashhūrāt), and to a lesser extent estimative (wahmiyyāt), propositions do not lead to certain knowledge,” and his references to the viewpoints of Ibn Sīnā and al-Ṭāzī on this issue.

Case 4:
Al-Suyūṭī has deleted IT’s metaphysical digressions. This is clearly exemplified by the fact that al-Suyūṭī omitted 27 printed pages of NAI (p. 474-500) in which IT

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506 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.22-7.
507 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 12.
508 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 15-6; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.32-3.
509 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 16; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.33-7.
510 Al-Suyūṭī in this passage records only IT’s indication that al-Gazālī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Ṭāzī, al-Šuhrawardi and others admitted “that definitions (ḥudūd) and names (asma‘) have the same defining functions,” without dealing with their individual viewpoints on this issue. JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 20-1; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.40-49.
511 In this regard, al-Suyūṭī avoids dealing with IT’s detailed discussion about the knowledge of definitions (ḥudūd) being derived from Religion. Accordingly, he also left out IT’s linguistic discussion of al-ḥudūd al-lafțiyya in relation to their legal and theological, as well as exegetical significance. JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 21-2; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.49-61.
512 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 44-5; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 64-6.
513 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 25; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.66-9.
514 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 169, n. 310 (i); NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.443-5.
515 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 142-172; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.299-472.
516 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 167.
deals with a number of metaphysical topics: the celestial soul’s (*nafs fālakīyya*) knowledge of earthly events (*al-ḥadīth fi l-ʿard*), the falsity of the claim that a Sufi could be informed about the content of *al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ* (the Well-Preserved Tablet), *intiqāsh al-ʿilm fi l-ḥiss al-mushtārik* (extracting knowledge of the celestial soul by the common perception of earthly beings, vision (*ruʿya*)), the Prophet’s knowledge of the events of the past and the future, the difference between the angel and the genie and between philosophical analogy and mystical fantasy, etc.¹⁶⁷

This also holds true for the last 44 pages of NAI, in which IT deals with the following questions: the acquisition of the knowledge of the angels and the genie by the Prophets by means of their souls,¹⁶⁸ the perplexity of the astronomers on *kaʿba*,¹⁶⁹ Divine and evil inspiration,¹⁷⁰ the refutation of the view that the knowledge of the unseen (*al-gayb*) is not obtained through the intermediary of the Prophets,¹⁷¹ the difference between the theologians’ methods and those of the philosophers (the logicians) in the acquisition of knowledge,¹⁷² reprehensible and praiseworthy perdition (*al-fanʿaʾ al-madhūm waʾl-fanʿaʾ al-maʿmūd*),¹⁷³ the anathemized concepts of the philosophers on the sempiternity of the Universe, the refutation of God’s knowledge of the particulars and of the hereafter,¹⁷⁴ etc.

In response to these questions, al-Suyūṭī has made IT to deal with them only in two paragraphs (par. 319 and 320 of JQ)¹⁷⁵ the first of which reads: “From the foregoing it has become clear that restricting the methods for the acquisition of knowledge to those which they have stipulated in logic is false, both in content and form. It has also become clear that they have excluded from the valid sciences those which are more sublime, more imposing, and more numerous than those they have subscribed to, and that the methods they have prescribed lead to only a few contemptible sciences that are neither noble nor numerous. Such is the level of these people- in their knowledge and practice. The entirety of philosophy does not even elevate its follower to a degree equal to that of the Jews and Christians after the latter have abrogated and distorted [their own Books], let alone prior to their doing so…”¹⁷⁶ While paragraph 320 reads: “Someone may argue: ‘Some of the logicians’ views with regard to confining the methods of acquiring knowledge [to what they have prescribed] are found in the discourse of Muslim theologians. Some of the latter even espouse it *verbatim* or with changes in terminology.’ We answer: not all the doctrines of the speculative theologians are true. However, all that which the messengers have brought down is true. Whatever in the views of the speculative theologians and others corresponds to what the messengers have brought down is true; whatever does not conform is false. The forefathers’ and the

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¹⁶⁷JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 172; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.473-500.
¹⁶⁹NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 502-5.
¹⁷¹NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 509-511.
¹⁷²NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 511-523.
¹⁷⁴NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 523.
¹⁷⁵JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 173-4; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.500-545.
¹⁷⁶JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 172-3.
leading scholars’ condemnation of the heretically innovative speculative theologians is well known.”

Al-Suyūṭi also deleted IT’s lengthy discussion of a number of other questions: the polytheism of Aristotle and the Greeks,528 the roots of polytheism,529 the belief of the Sabi’ites in Harrān,530 the conversion of the residents of Harrān to Christianity through the mediation of Constantine,531 the fact that all the prophets are Muslim,532 remarks on the statement of Abraham: “this is my Lord (ḥādhā rabbī),”533 the philosophers’ views that the souls are essentially identical,534 the attestation of the prophethood (ithbāt al-nubuwwa),535 the acquisition of knowledge by the soul after its being free from the body during sleep,536 the philosophers’ attestation of the prophethood,537 the philosophers’ view that the sainthood is more noble than prophethood,538 the arrival of the angel in the form of a human being,539 the philosophers’ interpretation of the angel and the revelation,540 the task of the angels,541 etc.

2.5. The rationale of al-Suyūṭi’s selection of IT’s arguments in JQ

What is the rationale of al-Suyūṭi’s selection of arguments in JQ? Why did he, in his JQ, record some of IT’s arguments and delete others?

Al-Suyūṭi states that the arguments he has deleted in JQ take the form of “digressions or replies to metaphysical and other queries, or repetitions, or refutations of some logicians’ views that do not have bearing upon any universal principle in logic, etc.” He then added that what he “deleted was nothing of value” and “was not pertinent to the main argument.”542

There are, however, other cases that cast a different light on the process of abridgement. To begin with, al-Suyūṭi can be said to have purposely limited IT’s frequent references to al-Gazālī. This is clearly reflected by the fact that NAI records more than 28 references by IT to al-Gazālī as the one who upheld the principle of the logicians,543 whereas JQ records only six references to him.544 This

527 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 173.
528 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.283-4.
531 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.289.
532 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.290-3.
533 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.304-7.
534 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.304-7.
535 Ibidem.
536 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.483.
537 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.486-7.
538 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.485-6.
539 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.487.
540 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.490-1.
541 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.496-499.
542 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.499-500.
543 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 174.
545 Actually in JQ al-Gazālī is referred to more than nine times, 6 of which mention him as one who upheld the principle of the logicians. Four references to al-Gazālī are made by al-
remarkable phenomenon may be closely related to al-Suyūṭī’s earlier assertion, as recorded in his QM, that al-Gazālī changed his view in favour of logic and became one of its fervent opponents. This also becomes clear from the other works we discuss in this study: i.e. SM and the Fatwā.

Given the fact that some of IT’s arguments deleted by al-Suyūṭī in JQ deal with theological questions, such as the attributes of God, His Oneneness (al-tawḥīd), the visio beatifica (al-ru’ya), etc, it appears that al-Suyūṭī has adapted IT’s NAI so as to deal exclusively with concrete scientific criticism of logical principles and with the latter’s religiously-based viewpoints against logic. It is thus clear that in abridging IT’s NAI, al-Suyūṭī purposely avoided IT’s discussion of theological matters. Here, attention may be drawn to the fact that al-Suyūṭī provided a separate work later, i.e. SM, in which he extensively dealt with theological problems and their relation to logical ones, as will be discussed in chapter three.

It is true that JQ records IT’s references to the theologians more than twenty-four times. The references in JQ, however, only deal with IT’s criticism of them and do not discuss their theological views as such.

This also holds true for the fact that al-Suyūṭī, in his JQ, has deleted IT’s discussion of questions dealing with fiqh and its uṣūl, such as question of the qibla, and that of ta’lîl al-ḥukm (legal justification).

In sum, the rationale of al-Suyūṭī’s selection of certain arguments proposed by IT in NAI was closely associated to al-Suyūṭī’s purpose to know IT’s scientific criticism of logical principles, as well as his rejection of theology and (certain) theologians, and not to his theologico-legal discussions, since these discussions were to be dealt with by al-Suyūṭī separately in a work composed later (i.e. SM).

Finally, it should be said here that al-Suyūṭī’s attempt at selecting only utterances related to logic, and not those related to theological-legal as well as metaphysical discussions, was closely connected to his objective of abridging NAI, i.e. to demonstrate his familiarity with logic, and with its principles and his competence at differentiating theological and metaphysical subject matters from those purely logical, to those who questioned his knowledge of logic as one of the conditions to undertake ijtihād. By composing this work, al-Suyūṭī’s own claim for ijtihād and tajdid would be acknowledged by his contemporaries.

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Suyūṭī as one who “wrote treatises and tracts in refutation of sectarian and other groups” and as one who maintained “that the sciences of the philosophers are either truthful but futile or false suppositions that are not to be trusted,” as well as one who withdrew himself from being occupied with logic, since it leads him to uncertainty. See (index of) JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 12, 20, 46, 48, 111, 154.

548NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.214-224.
547NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.236-8.
545NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.260.
544NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.236-8.
Chapter Three

Šawn al-Manṭiq wa ‘l-Kalām ‘an Fannay al-Manṭiq wa ‘l-Kalām: Its Manuscript, the Date and Purpose of its Composition as well as its Content and Sources

Reading al-Suyūṭī’s discussion in QM and JQ as dealt with in chapter one and two, one is impressed by the amount of materials he succeeded to process. However, in his work to be discussed now, Šawn al-Manṭiq wa ‘l-Kalām ‘an Fannay al-Manṭiq wa ‘l-Kalām, al-Suyūṭī was almost a systematic historian drawing our attention to the fact that logic and theology were opposed by Muslims of various generations and even from the earliest period of Islamic history. In his discussion of the Muslim opposition to logic, al-Suyūṭī, for instance, systematically arranges his topic as follows: First he deals with the foundation of logic; then he discusses its introduction into the religious community of Islam; furthermore he discusses the historical connection between the books of uṣūl al-fiqh and uṣūl al-dīn to logic and the beginning of its spread among later scholars. Finally, he enumerates chronologically the scholars who opposed logic, beginning with al-Shāfi’ī (d. 203/820) and ending with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 729/1329). The same pattern holds true, when dealing with the Muslim opposition to kalām.

3.1. Manuscript and Edition of SM

SM has been edited twice: First in 1947 by ‘Alī Sāmī al-Nashshār, who used the single manuscript of SM found in Dār al-Kutub al-Azhariyya (Majmū‘ 204) as a base for his edition;350 and secondly in 1970 by Su‘āda ‘Abd al-Ra‘īq, who used al-Nashshār’s edition as a starting point. Although al-Nashshār was mentioned as co-editor in the 1970 edition of SM, according to Hallaq, al-Nashshār in reality did not participate in any collaborative work with Su‘āda ‘Abd al-Ra‘īq in preparing the second edition. He only provided her with his 1947 edition.351

Based on the scribe’s own statement found at the end of the manuscript, which reads: “tamma min ḥaṭṭ muṣannifih bi-ÁÌir yawm al-ithnayn al-ÎÁdiy wa ‘l-ÝishrÐn min shahr ramaÃÁn al-muÝaÛÛam sanat tis a wa thamÁnÐn wa thamÁn mi’a, [the copying of the autograph was completed at the end of Monday, 21st of the Glorified RamaÃÁn, of the year 889],”352 one is convinced that the manuscript is not an autograph, but a copy made directly by a scribe354 from an autograph by al-
Suyūṭī who finished writing it in 888. The script of the manuscript is tiny and dense but neatly arranged. Each folio is fully covered with about 52 lines and almost no lacunae are found on the pages. According to al-Nashshār, the paper of the manuscript is of one and the same type.

The present author was only able to consult the printed editions of SM. The single manuscript of SM which is preserved in Dār al-Kutub al-Azhariyya is no longer accessible to the public. This was the information obtained by Dr. Nursamad Kamba, the Educational Attaché of the Indonesian Republic at Cairo, from the authorities of the Azhar Library, as he confirmed in a letter to Dr. N.J.G. Kapteijn, the Director of the Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) in Leiden. Furthermore, the manuscript as downloaded from the website www.alazharonline.org, which is provided by the Maktoum Project for preserving the manuscripts at the Azhar University, consists only of pictures of negative photographs. Though the downloaded negative images of the manuscript were converted into positive ones by a specialist in photographic and digital services at Leiden University, the result was vague and extremely difficult to decipher.

According to al-Nashshār, the edition of SM was undertaken after Shayb Muṣṭafā ‘Abd al-Rāziq had come across the manuscript and asked al-Nashshār’s assistance in preparing of it for publication. Due to the former being appointed as a Minister of Waqf, al-Nashshār then did the work alone.

As acknowledged in his first edition of the manuscript, al-Nashshār attempted to correct some grammatical and linguistic mistakes found in the text, to make clear some difficult expressions, and also to add some missing phrases in square brackets. For these corrections, al-Nashshār referred to Qūṭ al-Qulūb by Abū Ṭālib al-Makki (d. 383/994), Jāmi’ al-Bayān by Abū ’Umar Yūsuf b. ‘Abd al-Barr al-Nimarī (d. 463/1071), Fayṣal al-Tafrīqā bayn al-Ìmān wa ’l-Zandaqa and Iḥyā’ Ulūm al-Dīn by al-Gazālī (d. 505/1112) as well as Mu’jam

scribe most probably refers to ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Shādhilī, who was known as al-Suyūṭī’s pupil, biographer and one of the most important copyists of his works. This was reflected in a number of facts, one of which states that the Syrians sent him a present, because they were so pleased with his accuracy. They also requested that he alone should copy al-Suyūṭī’s works for them. Sartain, op. cit., p. 34, 36, 49.

Al-Suyūṭī indicates this information indirectly in his introduction of SM, by explaining that twenty years after he had completed al-Qawl al-Mushiq in 867 or 868, he composed SM, due to the fact that he was challenged by his opponents to prove himself well-versed in logic and, hence deserving to undertake ijtīḥād. See SM, op.cit., p. 33.


Dated November 18, 2003.

For the forewords of the Shayb Muṣṭafā ‘Abd al-Rāziq and those of ‘Alī Sāmī al-Nashshār, See the introduction of SM, op. cit.

Qūṭ al-Qulūb, which was referred to by al-Nashshār, was published in Cairo by al-Maṭbā‘a al-Munirīyya in 1932. See SM (1947), op. cit., p.125, n. 2.


In his note, al-Nashshār confirmed to have referred to two editions of al-Tafrīqā. First, the edition of al-Ḥānjī (1343/1924), and secondly, that of what he referred to as the edition of Cairo (1353/1934). See SM (1947), op. cit., p. 183, n. 2.
al-Udabā’ by Yaqūt al-Hamawi (d. 624/1229). Al-Nashshār also identifies a great deal of prominent figures (al-a’lām) featured in the text of SM in the annotations and makes references to the Koranic verses cited in the text.

Being commissioned by Dr. ‘Abd al-Halīm Maḥmūd, General Custodian of Majma’ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyya to present to the readers with the new edition of SM in a new and elegant form provided with references based on three works abridged in SM, respectively al-Ri’āya by al-Muḥāsibi (d. 243/858), Kitāb al-Shari’a by al-Ājurri (d. 360/972), and Kitāb Ḥalq Aṭ’āl al-ʾIbād by al-Buḥārī (d. 256/870), which were published after the publication of the 1st edition of SM, Su’āda ‘Abd al-Rāzīq prepared the second edition of SM. Her contribution consisted in collating al-Nashshār’s edition with the three works mentioned before. This was reflected in the fact that she added on the basis of these works a total number of seven notes in which she proposed corrections to the SM edition of 1947. Furthermore, she redivided the text into smaller paragraphs.

Apart from two no-longer-extant works against kalām, al-Gunya ‘an al-Kalām by al-Ḥaṭṭābī (d.388/988) and al-ʾIntiṣār li Aḥl al-Ḥadīth by ʿAbū al-Muẓaffar al-Samʿānī (d. 562/1166), all works abridged in SM have been published. The following are the abridged works in SM, which were not used by them due to the fact that these had either not been edited or were not at their disposal at the time they edited the text: Dhamm al-Kalām wa Ahlih by ʿAbū Ismāʿīl b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Anṣārī al-Ḥarawī (d. ca. 481/1089), Sarih al-Sunnah by al-Ṭabārī (d. 310/923), Sharḥ Uṣūl ʾĪtīqād Aḥl al-Sunnah by ʿAbū ʾl-Qāsim Hībat Allāh b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Manṣūr al-Ṭabarī al-Lālakāʾī (d.418/1028), and Sharaf Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth by al-Ḥaṭṭīb al-Bagdāḍī (d. 463/1071).

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562 The Iḥyāʾ which was referred to by al-Nashshār here was that published in 1302/1885 (al-Ṭabāʾa al-Azhariyya al-Miṣriyya). See SM (1947), op. cit., p. 188, n. 7.
563 When editing the text of the Debate between al-Sirāfī and Mattā, al-Nashshār confirmed to have compared the text which was recorded in Muʿjam al-Udabāʾ as edited by Margoliouth (JRAS, London: 1905, p. 79-130). See SM (1947), op. cit., p. 190, n. 2.
564 In the introduction of SM, op. cit.
566 Suʿāda confirmed to have referred to Kitāb al-Shariʿa, which was edited by al-Shaykh Muhammad Ḥāmid al-Faqī (1369/1950). See SM (1970), op. cit., p. 168, n. 2.
567 Kitāb Ḥalq Aṭʿāl al-ʾIbād, referred to by Suʿāda, was that published in India (in 1305/1888). See SM (1970), op. cit., p. 131, n. 2.
568 For the forewords of Dr. ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd, General Custodian of Majma’ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyya and the introduction of the editor, see SM, op. cit., p. 5-10.
569 This work was published in Beirut by Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī in 1994 and edited by Dr. Ṣarīḥ Dugaym based on Mss. preserved in the British Museum in London (reg. 1751: 27520).
570 This work was edited by D. Sourdel in “Une Profession de Foi de l’Historien al-Ṭabarī,” in Revue des Etudes Islamique (1968) XXXVI, fasc. 2.
571 Sharḥ Uṣūl ʾĪtīqād Aḥl al-Sunnah waʾl-Jamāʿa (Riyāḍ: Dār Ṭayyiba, 1985), ed. Dr. ʿĀḥmad Saʿād Ḥamdān.
3.2. Date of Composition of SM

The date of composition of this work can be found in its introduction, in which al-Šuyūṭī says: "Long ago, in the year 867 or 868 [H] I composed a book on the prohibition of being occupied with the art of logic, which I named "al-Qawl al-Mushriq" into which I included the statements of the learned men of Islam condemning and prohibiting it. I related in it that the Shaykh al-Islām, one of the scholars who has reached the degree of ijtihād Taqī al-Dīn b. Taymiyya composed a book to undo its foundations, which I had not found at that time. Then, twenty years passed by without finding it. Then when this year had come, and I had told of what God endowed upon me in attaining the rank of independent legal investigation, someone mentioned that one of the conditions for legal investigation is the knowledge of the art of logic claiming that this condition lacked in me. The poor fellow did not understand that I knew it better than those who claim to know it and who defend it. I know the principles of its foundations, and on that basis I derived therefrom the insights as well as the knowledge rendered by the leading logicians of today, with the exception of only our very learned teacher Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Kāfīyā. Thus I sought for Ibn Taymiyya's book, till I found it. I saw that he had entitled it Naṣīhat Ahl al-İmān fi 'l-Radd 'alā Manṭiq al-Yunān. In it, he expressed excellently his intention to undo its foundations one by one and explain the corruption of its principles. So I summarized it in a little composition which I entitled Jahd al-Qarāf f, Tajrīd al-Naṣīha. Then, many of the charlatans, who are far removed from real scholarship, eagerly said: What is the argument to prohibit it? On what sources did Ibn al-Nailāl rely for his legal decision to that effect? And other expressions of a similar nature. Surprisingly, they defend logic but they do not master it, and they are busying themselves with it but they do not use it in their inquiries, they go about...

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573 Ijtihād, according to Schacht, is the use of individual reasoning, obtained by means of analogy, which is applied to the Koran and the custom of the Prophet. Schacht, J., "Ijtihād," in EI², III, 1026.
574 "... wa man lā yuḥṣū biḥ bi thiqata laḥū bi 'ulūmīhi aṣlān..." The first who heralds this - as generally claimed - is al-Gazālī, in the introduction of al-Mustaṣfā, Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Cairo: Al-Maṭba‘a al-Amīriyya, 1322/1904), I, 10.
575 This probably refers to one of al-Šuyūṭī’s chief opponents, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Mun‘im al-Jawjarī, one of his rivals ever since they had been in the Hijaz together as students in 869/1464-5. Al-Jawjarī, according to Sartain, called a meeting for a formal debate in the presence of the sultan, emirs and other notables. Being responsive to the calling, al-Šuyūṭī, Sartain narrates, requested the presence of two other mujtahīds besides himself - one to debate with him and the other as a referee - since he could not debate with any individual of inferior status. See Sartain, op. cit., p. 59.
it at random like the weak-sighted she-camel that beats the ground with her forefeet and they only follow the right direction in discussion and deduction in blindness.

Some of those who spent their life [studying] logic met me. When they saw the statement of Ibn al-Ñalāh regarding his legal opinions: *Wa laysa al-îshîgâl bi ta’allumih wa ta’limih mimmâ abâhahu ‘l-îshâri wa la ‘stibâhahû aḥad min al-ṣâhâba wa ‘l-tābî’în wa ‘l-a’imma al-mujtahidûn wa ‘l-salaf al-ṣâlihin* (studying and teaching logic is not allowed by the Law-giver, by the Companions, the Followers and by the leading scholars who are qualified to undertake *ijtihâd*, nor by the Pious Ancestors), they said: This is a testimony to the contrary, which is not accepted. Thus, I said: By God, you neither followed the course of the scholars of religious law nor relied upon that of the logicians!

Thus, I decided to compose an elaborate book [to prohibit it] following the course of a comprehensive independent legal investigation and deduction, revealing the truth, in which I explain the correctness of what Ibn al-Ñalāh claimed in relating the negation of the permission [of being occupied with logic] to the mentioned people.

When I had begun [to compose the book], and was obliged to mention the statements of the leading scholars in the prohibition of the study of theology, because of the intricate connection between the two, I entitled the book *Ṣawnt al-Mantîq wa ‘l-Kalâm ‘ân Fannay al-Mantîq wa ‘l-Kalâm* (to Defend [Islamic] Logic and Theology against the Art of [Greek] Logic and Theology), but only God enables us to reach our goal.

From the passages above, it becomes clear that SM was composed in 887 or 888/1484, twenty years after QM, which was composed in 867 or 868/1464.

Neither is there any doubt that SM was composed after JQ. This is based on al-Suyūṭî’s own report in SM, as mentioned before, that he had summarized Ibn Taymiyya’s *Naṣîḥa* in a little composition which he entitled JQ. But many of the charlatans, i.e. his opponents, al-Suyūṭî complains, eagerly asked him what the argument was to prohibit logic; on what sources did Ibn Šalâh rely for his legal decision, etc.

Evidently, in his SM al-Suyūṭî can be said to have sometimes relied on JQ. He, for instance, quotes verses by Ibn al-Qushayrî, which were cited by Ibn Taymiyya in his *Naṣîḥa*:

“We cut off our friendship with those stricken by the malady of *Kitâb al-Shî’î*. They died as adherents to the religion of Aristotle, while we died in the religion of the Chosen.”

### 3.3. Background and Purpose of the Composition of SM

Before we can understand al-Suyūṭî’s purpose for the composition of SM, we should grasp the context in which this work was composed. In his work, *The Gate of Ijtihâd*, Hallaq suggests that the first incident in Islamic legal history in

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577The original sentence is cut off here. Perhaps it is *ti tahrimih* to prohibit it.
579SM, p. 33.
580JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 173; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 510-511.
which the muqallids openly opposed the claims of a mujtahid concerned al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505). This is closely related to al-Suyūṭī’s claim for ijtihād and tajdid, as can be read in several of his treatises and fatwās. As described in his al-Radd ‘alā man Aḥlada ila ‘l-Ard wa Jahila anna ‘l-ijtihād fi kull ‘asr fard, al-Suyūṭī, for instance, argues that the task of ijtihād should be fulfilled by the Muslim community because it was a collective duty (fard kifāya). If there were no Mujtahids, al-Suyūṭī maintains, the community would have agreed upon an error.

According to Hallaq, al-Suyūṭī’s claim for ijtihād was contested by the majority of his contemporaries, not because he had not fulfilled the qualifying conditions to be mujtahid, but because of ‘immense self-confidence’ and ‘boastfulness.’ For instance, it was asserted by al-Suyūṭī himself that he had attained “the rank of ijtihād in al-ahkām al-sharʿiyya, in prophetic Tradition and in the Arabic language, an achievement unequalled by anyone since the time of Taqi al-Dīn al-Subki (d. 756/1355), who was the last scholar in whom these three kinds of ijtihād were united.” According to Sartain, al-Suyūṭī in his treatises and fatwās often condemned his adversaries as fools. In al-Lafẓ al-Jawhari fī Radd Ḥubūt al-Jawhari (the jewelled statement in refutation of al-Jawhari’s ravings), for instance, Sartain argues, al-Suyūṭī condemns al-Jawhari, who has disgraced the former’s position as one of the ‘ulamā’.

In light of the arguments mentioned above, it can be said that the purpose of the composition of SM is closely connected to al-Suyūṭī’s claim for ijtihād. Since logic, as claimed by his opponents, was a necessary pre-condition to gain the appellation of mujtahid, al-Suyūṭī felt urged to prove to his opponents that he was well-versed in logic and its basic principles. However, following the course of his predecessors, who negated the permission of being occupied with logic, by composing the work, al-Suyūṭī also proved to be an independent scholar prohibiting logic.

Admittedly, by composing SM, al-Suyūṭī not only wanted to prohibit the study of logic, but also put forward the statements of the leading scholars who prohibited the study of theology, for which he abridged a dozen of the works by his predecessors, ranging from al-Riʿāya by al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/858), al-Gunyaʿ an al-Ḥaṭṭābī (d. 388/988) to al-Intiṣār li Ahl al-Ḥadīth by al-Samʿānī (d. 562/1166).

3.4. The Contents of SM
Examining SM at a glance, one might hastily conclude that in arranging his material, al-Suyūṭī did not use any particular method of division. He simply introduces the work and then begins to discuss one subject after another. But if one pays more attention to the structure of the book, one becomes aware that al-Suyūṭī is almost a systematic historian who draws our attention to the fact that

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582 Hallaq, ibidem.
583 Sartain, op. cit., p. 61-3.
logic and theology had been subjected to Muslim opposition during various generations. Based on the 1970 edition of SM, al-Suyūṭī’s arrangement of his arguments against logic and theology can be clearly seen. The following are the topics of discussion:

[1]. Introduction, the Reason for Composing the Book p. 33-36
[2]. Discussion on the Origin and the Foundation of Logic, on its Introduction into the Religious Community of Islam, and those who connected the Books of Uṣūl al-Fiqh and Uṣūl al-Dīn to Logic, as well as its Spread among the Later Scholars p. 36-46
[3]. Discussion on the Leading Scholars of the Muslims who condemned or Prohibited Logic explicitly p. 47
[4]. Discussion on the Statement of al-Īmām al-Shāfi’ī dealing with the Prohibition of Logic p. 47-50
[5]. The First to ask about the Ambiguous Passages of the Koran was ‘Abd Allāh b. Šābig p. 50-51
[6]. The Prohibition to study Theology of al-Shāfi’ī p. 52-55
[7]. Discussion of a Reason for Innovation p. 55-63
[8]. Discussion of the Reasons why al-Shāfi’ī and other leading Scholars Prohibited Kalām and the Philosophical sciences p. 64-67
[9]. The Statements of Leading Muslim Scholars on the Prohibition of Kalām
   [a]. Dhamm al-Kalām wa Ahlī by al-Harawī p. 68-126
   [b]. Al-Ri‘āya by al-Muḥāsibī p. 126-130
   [c]. Kitāb Ḥaṣq Aţ‘al al-Ibād by al-Buḥārī p. 131-132
   [d]. Ṣarīh al-Sunna by al-Ṭabarī p. 133-137
   [e]. Al-Gunya ‘an al-Kalām by al-Ḥaţṭābī p. 137-147
   [f]. Sharḥ Uṣūl I‘tiqād Ahl al-Sunna by al-Lālakā’ī p. 148-168
   [g]. Kitāb al-Shari‘a by al-Ājurri p. 168-173
   [h]. Qūt al-Qulūb by Abū Ṭālīb al-Makki p. 173-181
   [j]. Sharaf Aṣḥāb al-Hadīth by al-Ḥaṭīb al-Bagdādī p. 192-197
   [k]. Al-Īnīṣār li Ahl al-Hadīth by Ibn al-Sam‘ānī p. 198-236
   [l]. The Statement of Imām al-Ḥaramayn p. 236-237
   [m]. al-Tawrīqa bayna ‘l-Islām wa ‘l-Zandaqa by al-Gazālī p. 237-241
   [n]. Iḥyā’ Ulūm al-Dīn by al-Gazālī p. 241-243
   [o]. The Debate between Abū Sa‘īd al-Sirāfī and Mattā b. Yūnus p. 243-255
   [p]. Discussion on the Refutation by the Learned Men of one who introduced Logic into Uṣūl al-Fiqh p. 255
   [q]. Discussion on the Refutation of One who Introduced Logic into Grammar p. 255

[1]. Introduction, Reason of Composing the Book

In this Muqaddima, referring to Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, al-Suyūṭī, as discussed before (see above sub-chapter no. 3.2.), explains the background of his composing SM and indicates the reason why he entitled his work as such.
[2]. Discussion on the Origin and the Foundation of Logic, on its Introduction into the Religious Community of Islam, and on those who connected the Books of \textit{Uṣūl al-Fiqh} and \textit{Uṣūl al-Din} to Logic, as well as on its Spread among the Later Scholars

In this chapter, al-Suyūṭī attempts to answer systematically a number of questions revolving around the questions: (1) who was the founder of Logic and how it was founded; (2) When Logic was first introduced into the community of Islam; (3) Who undertook the pioneering attempt to connect the books of \textit{uṣūl} to logic; and (4) Who was responsible for the spread of logic among the later scholars.

Referring to Ibn Taymiyya, al-Suyūṭī maintains that the first to found Logic was Aristotle, a Greek who first proposed the idea of the sempiternality of the universe, one of those who are “atheists” and “infidels.” He also remarks: “The foundation of logic was initially derived from geometry. They expressed it in figures similar to the figures of geometry. They named them limits (\textit{ḥudūd}) because of the limits of those figures, in order that they were able to shift from a sensibly perceived form to an intellectual form. He [viz. Ibn Taymiyya] said that this was due to the weakness of their intellect and their failure to know them except by means of a far-fetched method. But God paved the way for Muslims to obtain such a degree of knowledge, eloquence, good deeds and faith that they excell by it all kinds of the species of man.”

Basing himself on al-Íujja Ý alÁ T Árik al-MaÎajja [the Argument against one who Abandons the Maḥajja (the Proved Way) by al-Shaykh Naṣr al-Maqdisi (d. 490/1098) and on Sharḥ Lāmiyyat al-ÝA am by al-ÑalÁÎ al-Ñaf ad (d. 746/1345), al-Suyūṭī convincingly argues that Logic first entered the religious community of Islam when the caliphate was removed from the Umayyads and fell to the Abbasids whose dynasty was based on the support and the rule of the Persians, who bore in their hearts “infidelity” and hatred towards the Arabs and the dynasty of Islam. The exact process of the introduction of logic into the Muslim world took place, according to al-Suyūṭī, through the importation of the books of Greekdom to the world of Islam. Furthermore, regarding the process of the translation of the Greek books and the methods thereof, al-Suyūṭī comes with lengthy remarks: “The first of their innovations was the importation of the books of Greekdom to the world of Islam. They were translated into Arabic, and thus became widespread among the Muslims. The man responsible for the importation of the books from Byzantium into the Lands of Islam was Ya Ṣâyá b. Ḥālid b. Barmak. There were books of Greekdom in Byzantium; the King of Byzantium feared that if the Byzantines would study the books of Greekdom, they would leave Christianity behind and return to the religion of Greekdom. Thus, they would start to quarrel and their unity would be broken up. Therefore, he collected the books in a place on which he built a construction which was covered by stones and gypsum in order that no one had access to it.

\begin{itemize}
\item[585] SM, op. cit., p. 36-7.
\item[586] SM, op. cit., p. 38.
\item[587] SM, op. cit., p. 39.
\item[588] Ya Ṣâyá b. Ḥālid was appointed wazīr by Hārūn al-Rashid. He was appointed Governor of Azarbâyţân in 158/775. In 161/778 he became a secretary tutor to Prince Hārūn, and he remained in office for 17 years, from 170/786 to 187/803. See Sourdel, D [W. Barthold], “al-Barāmika,” in EI², I, 1033-6.
\end{itemize}
When the command of the dynasty of the Abbasids fell to Yahyā b. Hālid, who was an atheist, he received news about the books in the edifice in Byzantium. So he bribed the King of the Byzantines of his time with presents, without asking from him anything in return. When he had sent him many presents, the King of Byzantium collected his patriarchs, saying: This man, the servant of the Arab has given me a lot of presents, but without asking anything from me in return. But I am convinced that he desires something. I fear that his need will bring me difficulties. Thus, I am worried. Then, when Yahyā’s envoy came to him, he asked him: Tell your friend that if he has a need, he should mention it. When the envoy told Yahyā, he answered him: What I need is that the books which are under the building, will be sent to me. I will take out from them some that I need, and send back the rest to him. When the King of Byzantium had read his [Yahyā’s] letter, he danced with joy. Then he gathered the patriarchs, the bishops and the monks, declaring before them: I have told you that the servant of the Arab did indeed have a need. He has expressed it and it is very trivial to me. I have an idea to which you will listen. If you acquiesce with it I will decide upon it; if you have a different view, we will consult together, till we share the same opinion. They asked [the King]: What is it? He answered: He wants to have the Greek books. He will take what he likes and return the rest. Then they said: What do you think? He said: I know that our ancestor only constructed the building because he feared that if the books would fall into the hands of the Christians, who would read them, this would lead to the corruption of their religion and the demolition of their unity. So I decided to send them, asking him not to send them back, in order that they will be afflicted by them, while we get rid of their evil! Because I am afraid that someone after me will dare to spread them among the people, so that what frightens the Christians will happen to them. Then they said: Yes we agree, King! Please, execute this plan!

Thus he sent the books to Yaḥyā b. Ḥalid. When the books came to him, he gathered all the heretics and philosophers. When he took out the book Hadd al-Manṭiq [on the definition of logic], Abū Muḥammad b. Abī Zayd said: There have been few to read this book, that have been saved from heresy. He said: Then Yaḥyā organized discussions and debates in his house concerning unappropriate subjects. Every adherent of a religion spoke about his belief and discussed it while his [personal] safety was secured.

I say the implication of these words is that it took place in the Caliphate of al-Rashīd, as al-Barmakī was his minister. During his life, he fell out of favor. He was murdered in 187 [H].

In his Sharḥ Lāmiyyat al-Ājām al-Šalāḥ al-Šafādī said: It is told that al-Ma’mūn, when he had concluded a truce with a Christian king- I think that he was king of the island of Cyprus- wrote a letter asking from him the library of the Greeks. They were collected there in a house which no one could enter. The king gathered his advisors and consulted with them about it. All of them advised him not to supply the books, except for one patriarch. He said: Supply the books to them, these sciences have not entered any religious state without destroying it and ensnaring its scholars.

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589Al-Rashīd bi 'llāh, Abū Ja’far al-Ma’nī, the thirtieth ‘Abbasid Caliph, the son of al-Mustarshid, was born ca. 501/1107-8. He was appointed caliph after his father’s death in 529/1135. He died in 532/1138. See Hillenbrand, C., “al-Rashīd,” in EI², VIII, 439-40.
A reliable man told me that al-Shayh Taqi al-Din b. Ahmad b. Taymiyya - may God have mercy upon him - used to say: I do not think that God will overlook [the sins of] al-Ma'mun. He certainly will retribute him for what he has done to this community by his introduction of these philosophical sciences among the people. Or words to that effect.

Then al-Ṣafadî said: Actually, al-Ma'mun was not the first to translate and arabicize [foreign books], but there have been many [scholars] who translated them before him. Thus, Yahyâ b. Ḥâlid arabicized a lot of Persian books, like Kalila wa-Dimna, and for his sake the Almagest, one of the books of the Greeks, was arabicized. It is generally known that the first to translate the books of the Greeks was Ḥâlid b. Yazid b. Mu'awiya, since he was extremely fond of the books of chemistry.

The translators followed two methods: The first was the method of Yūhannâ b. al-Bītrîq, Ibn al-Nâ'ima al-Ḥimsî and others, namely that one examine every single Greek word and its meaning, and then proposes a single Arabic word synonymous in meaning with the Greek one, thereby to explain it. One then moves to the next word and does the same, until he completes what he wanted to translate. This method is bad for two reasons: The first is that one cannot find Arabic synonyms for each and every Greek word. Hence, it often happened that Greek words were rendered by Arabic ones signifying the opposite. Secondly, the peculiarities of [Arabic] construction and syntax do not always match their correlatives in another language. Besides, many mistakes may occur when metaphors are used, which is frequently the case in all languages.

(The second method of translation) is the method of Ḥunayn b. Ishāq [d. ca. 260/873], al-Jawhari [d. 393/1002] and others, namely that one examines a

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590 Kitâb al-Majistî, to the Arab astronomers, was the name of the great astronomical work by Ptolemy (the great compilation). Al-Ya'qûbî says in his historical work (written in 278/891, ed. M. th. Houtsma, Leiden 1883, p. 151): "The book al-Madjistî treats of the science of the stars and their movements; the meaning of al-Madiṣṣî is 'the greatest book'”. See Suter, H., "al-Magest,” in EI1, I, 313.

591 An elaborate discussion of this issue can be found in Van Koningsveld’s “Greek Manuscripts,” op. cit., p. 345-372.

592 Yūhannâ b. al-Bītrîq was a younger contemporary of Ḥunayn b. Ishāq with whose aid he translated De Antidoto. It is related that he was the physician of al-Muwaffaq Talha (d. 276/891) brother and mainstay of the weak Ḥâlîf al-Mu'tamid. His son Bītrîq b. Yūhannâ was a physician to the Caliph al-Muqtadir and al-Râḍî. He died in 329/941. See Meyerhof, Max, "New Light on Hunain b. Ishāq and his Period," in ISIS: International Review Devoted to the History of Science and its Civilisation (1926), VIII, 685-724.

593 Ḥunayn b. Ishāq Abû Zayd died in ca. 260/873. He was the masterhead of the well-known school of translation. He lived in Bagdad during the reigns and partly at the court of ten Caliphs, viz. Al-Amîn (809-813), al-Ma'mûn (d. 216/833), al-Mu'tasîm (d. 225/842), al-Wathiq (d.231/847), al-Mutawakkil (d.245/861), al-Muntasîr (d. 246/862), al-Musta'în (d. 250/866), al-Mu'tazz (d. 254/869), al-Muhtadî (d.254/870), and al-Mu'tamid (870-892). See Meyerhof, op. cit., p. 685-720.

594 Perhaps this refers to Abû Naṣr Ismâ'il b. Hammâd al-Jawhari, a celebrated Arabic lexicographer of Turkish origin who died in ca. 393/1002-3. His fame was related to his
sentence and understands its meaning. One should then express its meaning in a correlative sentence in the other language, regardless of the fact whether or not the words correspond exactly. This method is more appropriate. Because of this, the books of Ḥunayn b. Ishāq need no revision, except for [his works] on mathematics, because he did not master [this field], contrary to the works on medicine, logic, physics and theology. The works he translated in these fields do not need correction. As for Euclid, it was revised by Thābit b. Qurra al-Harrānī [d. 288/901], and the same holds true for the Almajest and the intermediate works between the two.\textsuperscript{598}

At the end of his discussion in these passages, al-Suyūṭī comes to the conclusion “that the sciences of the Ancients had reached the Muslims in the first century when they had conquered the lands of the non-Arabs. But they had not spread among them widely and had not become generally known among them, since the ancestors had prohibited one to become engrossed in them. However, [the Greek sciences] became popular in al-Barmakī’s period, while their spread increased in the period of al-Ma’mūn because of the innovations he stimulated and the occupation with the sciences of the Ancients as well as the extinguishing of the Sunna which he promoted.\textsuperscript{599}

Dealing with the third question, al-Suyūṭī quotes Ibn Taymiyya as having said: “Never had anyone of the Muslim thinkers paid attention to the method of the logicians. Nay, the Ashʿarites, the Muʿtazilites, the Karramites, the Shiʿites and the other denominations condemned logic and asserted its corruption. The first who mixed logic with the usūl of the Muslims was Abū Ḥāmid al-Gazālī. Muslim scholars disputed about him, so frequently that it would take too long to enumerate them all here.\textsuperscript{600}

With respect to the fourth question, relying on Ibn Kathīr, al-Suyūṭī points to al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) who “made the astronomical laboratory” and “a House of Wisdom in which there were philosophers. Each of them earned three dirhams per day. There was also a House of Medicine for the medical doctors, who earned two dirhams. To each Muḥaddith who worked in Dār al-Ḥadīth, half a dirham was paid per day. From that time, the occupation with philosophical sciences became widespread and prominent.”\textsuperscript{601}

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\textsuperscript{598}Euclid is one of the most well-known mathematicians. His name has been synonymous with geometry up until the twentieth century. He lived after the pupils of Plato (d. 397 BC) and before Archimedes (d.287 BC). He taught in Alexandria. Euclid's fame rests preeminently upon the Elements, written in thirteen books. According to Bussard, a translation of Elements was made by Ishāq b. Ḥunayn (d.295/910) son of the most famous of the Arabic translators, Ḥunayn b. Ishāq. See H.L.L. Busard, “the First Latin Translation of Euclid's Elements commonly ascribed to Adelard of Bath,” in Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, (1983), p. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{599}According to Busard, Thābit b. Qurra (d. 288/901) was a scholar who prepared the second recension of Euclid's Elements. He was a scholar who in his own right holds a major position within the history of Islamic mathematics. See Busard, op. cit, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{600}SM, op. cit., p. 39-43.

\textsuperscript{601}SM, op. cit., p. 39-43.

\textsuperscript{601}Ibidem.
This chapter can be regarded as a testimony to the fact that al-Suyūṭī was well-versed not only in the history of logic, but also in that of its introduction to the community of Islam, through the importation of Greek books and the translation movement.

[3]. Discussion of the Leading Muslim Scholars who Condemned or Prohibited Logic Explicitly
Having provided a historical overview of logic, and its inception in the Muslim world, al-Suyūṭī introduces a number of depreciatory views on logic, the first of which is al-Shāfi‘ī’s. The reason why al-Suyūṭī came with these topics is explicitly stated in his following remark: “There is no doubt that a scholar who has reached the degree of ʻijtihād is not allowed to fabricate a statement never expressed by any scholar before, or to put forth an opinion which has not been expressed before. Hence, one of the preconditions for an independent legal investigation (ʻijtihād) is the knowledge of the statements - both unequivocal and controversial - of scholars from among the Companions and after them. In order not to undermine the agreement concerning the view he chooses, he is obliged to mention the sayings of the scholars which are relevant to this subject before establishing the proof, so that the book is composed following the method of ʻijtihād.

Therefore I say: As for the Companions - with whom God may be well-pleased - the Followers, and their Followers, no declaration of any sort concerning it has reached us from them, because it did not exist in their time. It only started at the end of the second century, as mentioned before. In that time, al-ʻImām al-Shāfi‘ī - with whom God may be well-pleased - was alive, so he discussed it. He was the oldest of whom I found that he expressed a depreciatory view concerning it.”

[4]. Discussion of the Statement of al-ʻImām al-Shāfi‘ī dealing with the Prohibition of Logic
From the passage above, it is clear that the reason why al-Suyūṭī should deal first with the statement of al-Shāfi‘ī against logic is due to two facts (1) that al-Shāfi‘ī, according to al-Suyūṭī, was the oldest to express a depreciatory view concerning logic; and (2) that no one from among the Companions, the Followers and their Followers before al-Shāfi‘ī condemned logic.

In this chapter, al-Suyūṭī provides us with some information concerning al-Shāfi‘ī’s attitude towards logic. Referring to al-Tadhkira by the Shafi‘ite ʻIzz al-Dīn b. Jamā‘a (d.767/1366), al-Suyūṭī quotes al-Shāfi‘ī as having said that the ignorance of the people and their controversies are only caused by the fact that they left behind the language of the Arabs and developed a preference for the language of Aristotle. Al-Shāfi‘ī went on asserting, according to al-Suyūṭī, that the people’s neglect of the language of the Arabs and their preference for the language of Aristotle brought about the emergence of the dispute on the createdness of the Koran, the negation of the divine vision and other innovations. In al-Suyūṭī’s words, al-Shāfi‘ī also maintained that the people should not interpret the Arabic texts in accordance with the language of the

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602SM, op. cit., p. 47.
603SM, op. cit., p. 48.
604Ibidem.
Greeks and the logic of Aristotle which follows a certain system different from that of the language of the Arabs. According to al-Shāfi‘i, the Koran and the Tradition used the terminology of the Arabs and their thoughts, not the terminologies of the Greeks.\footnote{Ibidem.}

Referring to al-Shāfi‘i, al-Suyūṭi argues that whoever shifts from the tongue of religion, namely Arabic, to another tongue and renders the existing religious texts in accordance with it, is ignorant and goes astray. Then al-Suyūṭi mentions an example of how his teacher, al-Kāfajī, was criticized by Hanafite jurists, because he did not apply the basic rules of argumentation of the fiqh (qawānīn al-fiqh), but those of logical deduction.\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 49.}

Furthermore, al-Suyūṭi remarks that “the aim of this discussion is the explanation of the statement of al-Shāfi‘i - with whom God may be well-pleased - namely that whoever renders the Koran, the Sunna and the Shari‘a according to the requirements of the principles of logic, will not attain the goal of the (divine) laws; if he applies [those logical principles] to solve derivative cases (al-\textit{fūrū‘}), he will be accused of an error; while if he applies them to solve the principal ones (al-\textit{uṣūl}), he will be accused of an innovation. This is the weightiest argument for the prohibition of this art, because it is the cause of fabrication and innovation, contrary to the Sunna as well as the aim of the legislator. It suffices [us] therefore as proof, derived from the words of al-Shāfi‘i - may God be pleased with him! Corresponding to [the above-mentioned prohibition] is the prohibition of speculating about the ambiguous [passages] of the Koran out of fear of distortion and dissension. The two Shaykhs\footnote{This appellation belongs to al-Buḥārī and Muslim.} and others related about ‘Ā‘isha that she said: the Messenger of God - may God bless him and grant him peace - recited this verse: ‘He it is who hath sent down to thee the Book: in it are clearly formulated verses; these are the essence of the Book: other (verses) are ambiguous. Now as for those in whose hearts is an inclination to stray, they follow the ambiguous parts of it, out of desire of dissension, and seek their explanation, though no one knows their explanation except Allāh: No one takes warning but those of insight.”\footnote{Àli ‘Imrān (III) : 5, Bell, I, 44-5.}

Concluding this chapter, al-Suyūṭi suggests that one of the foremost reasons why al-Shāfi‘i prohibited logic is the fact that it is the cause of fabrication and innovation, contrary to the Sunna and the aim of the Legislator.\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 49.}

\textbf{[5]. The First who asked about the Ambiguous Passages of the Koran was ‘Abd Allāh b. Ṣābīg}

Why did al-Suyūṭi discuss the question of the ambiguous passages of the Koran? And what is its relation to his discussion on the prohibition of logic, theology and philosophical sciences as well as the sciences of the ancients? The answer to the first question was given by al-Suyūṭi in his following remark: “For this very reason, al-Shāfi‘i - may God be pleased with him – prohibited the study of
theology. Al-Harawi produced in his book on the Condemnation of Theology (Kitāb Dhimm al-Kalām), through his chain of transmitters going back to al-Shāfi‘i, that he said: It was narrated concerning the theologians and ‘Umar [b. al-Ḥaṭṭāb]’s verdict of Ṣabīg that this [verdict] from him indicates that the effective reason for him to prohibit the study of theology was his fear for its stimulation of confusions and its leading to innovations. Thus he forbade it, based on an analogy with the prohibition of speculating about the ambiguous passages of the Koran. This analogy is sound.”

The answer to the second question can be found in al-Suyūṭi’s assumption founded on al-Gazālī’s view that “philosophy is not a separate science, but it comprises four parts: The first is geometry and calculation; the second is logic; the third is theology; and the fourth is physics.”

Refering to the Ta’rīkh by Ibn Kathīr (d. 744/1345) and that by Ibn ‘Asākir (d. 571/1176) and the Musnad by al-Dārimī (d. 282/895), al-Suyūṭi narrates the story of Ṣabīg through various chains of transmission. In the story it was stated that ‘Umar b. al-Ḥaṭṭāb punished Ṣabīg by means of a lashing with date stalks and by ordering people to banish the latter and stop his payment and sustenance, because of his questions, dealing with: (1) a variant reading (ḥarf) of the Koran, (2) the ambiguous passages of the Koran and (3) difficult passages of the Koran.

Some other examples of theological issues following those raised by Ṣabīg are related to questions on (1) qadar, (2) the attributes of God and (3) the dispute on accidents and substances. According to al-Suyūṭi, al-Harawi added the following words from al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad b. Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddiq, who passed by the people discussing qadar “Talk about what you heard from what God has mentioned in His Book, and refrain from a thing from which God has refrained!” When asked about the nature of innovations, Mālik b. Anas identified them with the dispute on the names of God, His attributes, His speech, His knowledge and His

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610 In al-Qāmūs al-Muhiti, Ṣabīg, according to al-Nashshār, is identified with Amīr b. ‘Asil who used to seek to confuse people with ambiguous words and questions. See SM, op. cit., p. 50, n. 4 (N).
611 SM, op. cit., p. 45.
613 SM, op. cit., p. 50-1.
614 This term refers to God’s decree, the question of which, according to Gardet, was one of the most frequently debated, right from the first centuries on. This term is always combined into the expression al-qādā wa’l-qadar which constitutes, according to Gardet, a kind of binary technical term of ‘ilm al-kalām. These two words also signify both the Decrees of God, the eternal decree (the most frequent meaning of qādā’ and the decree given existence in time (the most frequent meaning of qadar). Those who centered their discussions around the question of qadar are identified with the Qādirītes. Gardet, L., “Qādā wa’l-Kadar,” in EF², IV, 365-7.
616 SM, op. cit., p. 92.
Likewise, when asked about the accidents and the substances, Abū Ḥanīfa said that they both were the affair of the philosophers.  

[6]. Al-Shāfī‘ī’s Prohibition of the Study of Theology  
According to al-Suyūṭī, al-Shāfī‘ī’s prohibition of theology was based on an analogy with the prohibition of speculating about the ambiguous passages of the Koran, as already condemned by Ḥumāyūn b. al-Ḥaṭṭāb.  

This also holds true, according to al-Suyūṭī, for the prohibition of logic. He further argues: “This very effective cause can in fact be found in logic as well, as mentioned by al-Shāfī‘ī. So the evidence for the prohibition of the study of it is deducted analogically from the original case to which theology was compared, namely the ambiguous [verses of the Koran] which it is explicitly forbidden to speculate about. This is a valid analogy which is weakened neither by a contradiction nor an objection. Maybe, the opponent [of this kind of analogy] refutes the existence of the effective cause mentioned in logic, but this kind of refutation is [a kind of] contention. No attention should be paid to it, because induction and deduction invalidate it.”  

Emphasizing al-Shāfī‘ī’s prohibition of theology, Al-Suyūṭī suggests that the scholars of the ancient generation condemned the study of theology, because its origin was to be found among the materialist philosophers.  

Al-Suyūṭī then explains how two ambiguous passages of the Koran and one prophetic tradition became the object of baseless interpretation by one of the leading scholars in the rational sciences (a’immāt al-ma‘qūlāt). One of these verses reads: “If there were any gods in the two of them except Allah, they would both go to ruin….” In his view, this verse is dalāl iqtīṣād (convincing argument), as he interpreted it according to the principles of logical deduction (qawā‘id al-istidāl al-ma‘ṣīqiṣ). However, the Arabs and the Muslims after them, to whom the Koran was revealed, followed the authorities in the science of rhetoric (balāqā) who saw this verse as a specimen of a special stylistic feature of the Koran which they called “speculative argumentation” (al-iḥtiṣāj al-nazārī). Thus they considered this verse on those linguistic grounds as one of the weightiest arguments for the unity of God. Furthermore al-Suyūṭī suggests that “logic does not lead [us] to anything good. Whoever pays attention to it, is far removed from grasping the objectives of the Sharī‘a. Thus there is a grave distance between him and the religious truths.”  

Al-Suyūṭī also mentions another Koranic verse which became the object of their arbitrary interpretation: “They will ask thee about the new moons …” until the end of the verse. The same man’s interpretation of this verse, according to al-Suyūṭi, is reflected by his words: “They [viz. the inquirers

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617SM, op. cit., p. 96.  
618SM, op. cit., p. 102.  
619SM, op. cit., p. 52.  
620Ibidem.  
621SM, op. cit., p. 53.  
623SM, op. cit., p. 53.  
624SM, op. cit., p. 54.  
625Al-Baqara (II): 185, Bell, I, 26.
mentioned in the verse above] asked about the crescent why it first appears slightly and then increases gradually until it is full. They were answered with an explanation of the wisdom therein, while he avoided to answer what they had asked about [viz. the crescent], because they did not belong to those who were [able] to obtain information about the details of astronomy easily.\textsuperscript{626}

According to al-Suyūṭī, this answer was wrong, for several reasons: “First, the Occasions of the Revelation indicate that they [viz. the inquirers mentioned in the verse] asked about the \textit{ḥikma} not about the person referred to. Secondly, it is unworthy to suspect of the Companions - may God be pleased with them! - who had a deeper understanding than all non-Arabs and than the whole \textit{umma}, that they did not belong to those who investigate the details of astronomy easily, while individuals among the later non-Arab [scholars] have investigated them. Thirdly, [because according to him], it was beyond the Divine omnipotence to convey that to their minds through an expression which they could comprehend. Fourthly, the Companions - may God be pleased with them - have studied many details of religious jurisprudence, difficult parts of the laws of inheritance, as well as of the acts of the soul. What is the science of astronomy in comparison to that? It is more despicable and contemptible, even if it was based on a principle which deserves to be taken into consideration. No doubt, most of it is baseless and not supported by any argument. In contrast, arguments derived from Prophetic traditions and reports point to the contrary, as I [viz. al-Suyūṭī] explained in a separate composition. The author of the treatise [I am quoting] was daring enough to try to plunge through it and through similar other works on the philosophical sciences and the fascination of intellectual abstrusenesses, with the result that he even thought that it would only be easy for him and for his equals and that it would be impossible for anyone [else] to grasp them easily, even the Companions! But to Allah we belong, and to Him is our return!”\textsuperscript{627}

[7]. Discussion of a Reason for Innovation

Emphasizing al-Shafi‘i’s view that the reason for innovation is the ignorance of Arabic, al-Suyūṭī then turns to exemplify how the ignorance of Arabic has misled people in the interpretation of Koranic verses. Those ignorant of Arabic are referred to by al-Suyūṭī, who relies on \textit{al-Ta’rīh al-Kabīr} by al-Buhārī, as being in accordance with what al-Hasan al-Baṣrī has said: “The only thing destroying them was their lack of Arabic!”\textsuperscript{628}

Al-Suyūṭī refers here to \textit{Ta’wil Mushkil al-Qur‘ān} by Ibn Qutayba (276/889)\textsuperscript{629} who stressed that “the only person who knows the excellence of the Koran is the one who often studied it and has a broad knowledge [of it] and understands the ways of expression of the Arabs, the influence on the styles [of

\textsuperscript{626}SM, op. cit., p. 54.
\textsuperscript{627}SM, op. cit., p. 54-5.
\textsuperscript{628}SM, op. cit., p. 57.
\textsuperscript{629}Ibn Qutayba, Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh b. Muslim al-Dīnawari, born at Kūfā in 213/828, was “one of the great Sunnī polygraphs of the 3\textsuperscript{rd}/9\textsuperscript{th} century, being both a theologian and a writer of \textit{adab}.” He died in Bagdad in 276/889. His \textit{Ta’wil Mushkil al-Qur‘ān} was published in Cairo in 1373/1954 and edited by Ahmad Şaqr. See Lecomte, G., “Ibn Kutayba,” in EI², III, 844-7.
expressions] as well [the points by which] God has distinguished the language of the Arabs from all the [other] languages.\textsuperscript{630}

Concluding his discussion, al-Suyūṭī asserts that “the Koran was revealed in accordance with all these rules. Therefore no one of the translators was able to translate it into any of the languages like the \textit{Injil} was translated from the Syriac language to the Abyssinian and Greek. The Torah, the Book of Psalms and the other books of God -the Exalted and the Eternal- were translated into Arabic, because the metaphors of the non-Arabs are not of the same extensive range as those of the Arabs.”\textsuperscript{631}

As has been discussed before, the speculation on the ambiguous verses of the Koran was the original case from which the prohibition of theology was deduced analogically. The effective cause for both the prohibition of the speculation on the ambiguous verses of the Koran and of theology is the stimulation of confusion leading to innovations. Because this effective cause is also found in logic, philosophy and some of the sciences of the ancients, al-Suyūṭī argues, studying them is also forbidden.

In this chapter al-Suyūṭī asserts that the reason why people speculated about the ambiguous verses of the Koran was their lack of sufficient Arabic. An imperative which can be understood from al-Suyūṭī’s argument enumerated in this chapter and in earlier chapters is the fact that it is necessary for people to master Arabic well, rather than to be occupied with speculations which stimulate confusions and lead to dissension.

Al-Suyūṭī concludes: “the reason for the prohibition of the study of theology is the fact that there is no command [to make use of it], which can be found in the Koran and the Sunna. No discussion about it can be found among the ancestors. This is also the case with logic, namely that there is no command [to make use of it] to be found in the Koran and the Sunna; there is no discussion by the ancestors about it, contrary to Arabic the study of which is commanded in the Tradition and the discussion about which can be found among the ancestors.”\textsuperscript{632}

As mentioned before, al-Suyūṭī stated the reason why al-Shāfi‘ī prohibited the study of theology, i.e. the latter’s fear that theology stimulates confusion and leads people to innovations. In this chapter, al-Suyūṭī adds two more reasons why theology was prohibited by al-Shāfi‘ī. According to al-Suyūṭī, the second reason was the fact that there is no command to make use of theology to be found in the Koran and the Sunna. No discussion about it can be found among the ancestors. The third reason is the fact that the style of theology is different from that of the Koran and the Sunna. Refering to al-Harawi on the authority of Abū Thawr, al-Suyūṭī quotes al-Shāfi‘ī as having said: "My judgement of theologians is that they should be beaten with a palm-branch, put on a camel, displayed around the communities and tribes and their offences publicly announced: ‘This is the punishment for those who have neglected the Koran and the Sunna and approached theology.’”\textsuperscript{633}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{630} SM, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 56.
\bibitem{631} SM, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 62.
\bibitem{632} SM, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 64.
\bibitem{633} SM, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 64-5.
\end{thebibliography}
According to al-Suyūṭī, al-Shāfi‘ī not only condemned logic and theology, but also philosophy. This is reflected in the latter’s statement which was reported by al-Harawi: “If you hear a man saying that the name is not identical to the object [named] and that a thing is identical to nothing, then testify against him that he is a heretic!”

[8]. Discussion of the Reasons why al-Shāfi‘ī and other leading Scholars Prohibited Kalām and the Philosophical sciences

Abū Ḥanīfa also explicitly condemned philosophy. This is reported by al-Harawi, who says: “Tayyib b. Ahmad told me - Muhammad b. al-Ḥusayn told us - Abu ‘l-Ḥasan b. Mātawayh told us that Hāmid b. Rustam related to us that al-Ḥasan b. al-Muṭṭī that Ibrāhīm b. Rustam on the authority of... said: I said to Abū Ḥanīfa: What do you comment on the disputes people innovated about the forms and bodies? Then he said: [these are] the utterances of the philosophers. You have to follow the tradition and the course of the ancestors, beware of any novelties because they are innovations. This was also produced by Ibn al-Samʿānī in Kitāb al-Intiṣār [li Ahl al-Ḥadīth], who said: ‘a reliable man from among our friends related to us that al-Shaykh Abū Abd al-Rahmān al-Sulamī related to us that Abū al-Qāsim b. Mātawayh told it to us.’”

Referring again to al-Harawi, al-Suyūṭī also mentions Mālik b. Anas as having censured theology: “Abd al-Rahmān b. Mahdī has said: I came to see Mālik, whom was being asked a question by a man. He said: Maybe you are one of ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd [d.ca. 144/761]’s adherents. God has cursed ‘Amr, because he fabricated the innovations of theology. If theology was a [real] science, the Companions and the Followers would have discussed it, as they have discussed the religious rules and laws.”

[9]. The Statements of Leading Muslim Scholars on the Prohibition of Kalām

Consistent with his model of argumentation against his opponents, in chapter [9] al-Suyūṭī incorporated into the work we are discussing the texts which he abridged from twelve works of predecessors he considered opponents of kalām. Al-Suyūṭī’s motive for abridging the works of his predecessors can be inferred from the general introduction of his abridgement: “I lam anna aimmata ahl al-Sunnā mā’ zālā’ ‘yuṣannifūn al-kutub fi dhamm ‘ilm al-kalām, wa ‘l-inkār ‘alā muṣta’ātih (know that the leading Muslim scholars of the People of the Sunna and the Jāmā‘a have continuously been composing books to condemn the science of kalām as well as to refute its partisans)”

[a]. Kitāb Dhamm ‘Ilm Kalām wa Ahlih by al-Harawi

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634SM, op. cit., p. 65.
635SM, op. cit., p. 66.
636Amr b. ‘Ubayd, according to Watt, was one of the first members of the Muʿtazilite school of al-Ḥasan al- Başrī. His reputation rests on his asceticism. One of his famous followers was Bishr b. al-Muʿtamir (d. 210/825). See Watt, W.M., “‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd,” in EP², I, 454.
637SM, op. cit., p. 67.
638SM, op. cit., p. 68.
Under the title *Nusûs al-A'imma fi Taḥrim al-Kalām*, al-Suyūṭī first discusses *Kitāb Dhamm al-Kalām wa Aḥlih* by Shayh al-İślām İsmā’īl al-Harawī. His reason to put the abridgement of the work of al-Harawī at the very beginning becomes clear from his following remark: "Wa ajallu kitāb ullifa fi dhālika ki tāb dhamm al-ka ĭlām wa aḥlih li shayh al-İślām Abī İsmā’īl al-Harawī. Wa huwa mujalladun kulluhū muḥraj bi ’l-asānīd, wa anā’ ʿaḥāḥiṣu ḥunā jamī’a maqaṣidīḥī talḥiṣān ḥasanān (The most excellent work in that respect [to condemn kalām and its authors] is *Kitāb Dhamm al-Kalām wa Aḥlih* of Shayh al-İślām Abū İsmā’īl al-Harawī. The format of this book is a bound volume. All information is given with the chains of transmission, and here I abridge all its purposes adequately").

Beaurecueil has qualified this work as "a principal source for the history of the struggle against rational theology in Islam." As-Suyūṭī’s abridgement of DhK occupies approximately one fourth (60 printed pages) of SM (of 227 printed pages).

According to al-Suyūṭī, al-Harawī’s complete name was Abū İsmā’īl ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Anṣārī al-Harawī. He was a Hanbalite scholar, a Ḥāfiz of tradition, an expert in language, a prominent figure in *tasawwuf*, a great savant who established the Sunnah and rejected innovations, and the author of *Kitāb Manāzil al-Sā’irīn*. According to Brockelmann, al-Harawī was born in Kuhendiz in the citadel of Herat on the 2nd of Sha‘bān 396/4th of May 1005. His father, Abū Mansūr Muḥammad, whose genealogy goes back to a Companion, Abū Ayyūb Hālid b. Zayd Hāzrajī, who accommodated the Prophet Muḥammad during his arrival in Madīna, was a devotee merchant who taught his son to be puritan and to love science. His father was also a šūtī who practiced the mystical teaching rigorously. Regarding his mother, no information can be found in any biographical dictionaries.

He studied *ḥadīth* and *tafsīr* in early age under the supervision of Abū Mansūr al-Azdī and Yahyā b. ‘Ammār. In 417/1026, he went to study in Nishāpūr, where he became a disciple of al-Ąṣamm. On the way to Mecca for a pilgrimage, he stayed in Bagdad for some time to attend the lectures of Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥalal. When he returned from the pilgrimage, he met Abu ’l-Ḥirqānī, who would have a decisive influence on his mystical career.

Although al-Harawī had followed the supervision of Shafi’ite teachers during the early stages of his studies, he adopted Hanbalism with enthusiasm due to its devotion to the Koran and the Sunnah.

He was appointed professor by Niẓām al-Mulk in the end of 480/1087, several years after having been given the title of Shayh al-İślām, bestowed upon him by al-Muqtadir bi ’llāh in 474/1081, because of his high position in the Hanbalite school. He died in the city of his birth, on the 22nd of Dhu ’l-Ḥijja 481/8th of March 1088.

According to Brockelmann, the manuscripts of DhK are preserved in two places:

1. In Maktaba al-Zāhirīyya (the manuscript is now preserved in Maktaba al-Asad) in Damascus (reg. 1138)
2. In the British Museum in London (reg. 1571: 27520)

The manuscript of the Asad library, registered no. 1138, consists of 149 folios. Each folio consists of two pages, each of which has twenty lines. The manuscript is not an authograph. It is rather a copy made in the eighth century of the Hijra. It is mentioned at the end of the manuscript that it was copied on Thursday, 24th of Dhū ‘l-Qā‘da 747/1347.


The DhK was, according to Beaureceuil, the fruit of al-Harawi’s labour against the partisans of Ash‘ārism and Mu‘tazilism due to which he was “threatened with death on five occasions.” However, al-Hashshash has indicated that the motivation for al-Harawi to compose this work was that he wanted to give to the partisans of hanbalism the necessary principles to find the truth by means of obeying the Koran and the Sunna and avoiding *kalām*.

To understand in which way al-Suyūṭī used *Dhamm al-Kālam* by al-Harawi as the chief source for his discussion of the opposition against *kalām*, it is significant to see how al-Harawi organizes his argument in his work. Based on the edition of Dr. Samīḥ Dugaym (1994), the organization of the contents of this work can be seen in following table:

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647 GAL, I, p. 433.
648 Mss. Fol. 149 b.
649 This edition is at my disposal.
650 Al-Hashshash, *op. cit.*
651 Beaureceuil, EI², I, 515.
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65 Even though, there was no difference in the early history of the Koranic exegesis between ta’wil and tafsîr, most scholars distinguish them. The former is based upon reason and personal opinion (ra’y), whereas tafsîr is based upon materials derived from the Prophet himself or his Companions or the Successors in the form of ḥadîth. Hence, ta’wil is popularly identified with tafsîr bi ’l-ra’y, and tafsîr with tafsîr bi ’l-ma’thûr. See Poonawala, I, “Ta’wil,” in IE², X, 390-392; McAuliffe, however, says: “although apparently synonymous in the earliest period, the significations of tafsîr and ta’wil began to diverge as the Qur’ânic sciences developed in the classical period. Tafsîr remained the term of more limited denotation, often restricted largely to philological exegesis, while ta’wil connoted hermeneutical approaches that sought to uncover deeper meanings in the text or to align the text with particular theological or philosophical orientations.” See McAuliffe, Jane Dammen, Qur’ânic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 18, n. 15.
transgressors are cursed

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</table>

It is clear that some chapters (which are highlighted in bold) were left unabridged. The reason for this was presumably that al-Suyūṭī deemed these chapters redundant to his argument against the Mutakallimūn. Moreover, the last chapter discussing the statement of al-Ashʿārī cannot be used as a ‘weapon’ against the Mutakallimūn, since it contains arguments in favour of theology by the eponym of Ashʿarite theology. (2) In his abridgement of DhK, al-Suyūṭī has cut all long chains of transmission, mentioning only the closest authority to the source. (3) He has left out long digressive discussions and variant readings of traditions, as well as information of a similar nature repeated by al-Harawi. (4) At several occasions, al-Suyūṭī also paraphrases al-Harawi’s discussion against kalām. Al-Suyūṭī, for instance, says: “The author [al-Harawi] said: I found that this statement belongs to Abū Maṣūr al-Albānī al-Bustī who said: I saw Yaḥyā b. ‘Ammār reprehending the people of kalām on the pulpit [so frequently] that I could not count the times.” In reality, however, al-Harawi says in his DhK: “I saw Yaḥyā b. ‘Ammār on many occasions, one of which was on his pulpit anathematizing and cursing the Mutakallimūn, as well as testifying the heresy of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿārī.”

As the result of this abridgement, al-Suyūṭī succeeded in presenting al-Harawi’s arguments against the Mutakallimūn more comprehensible and more penetrating.

The Image of the History of the Opposition to Kalām Contained in DhK as abridged by al-Suyūṭī in SM

Upon reading DhK as abridged in SM, one finds that the explicit view of al-Harawi is that the opposition to scholastic theology (kalām, jadal, naẓar and marāʾ) goes back to the earliest period of Islamic history. Enumerating a number of traditions, al-Harawi asserts that the opposition to kalām already started with the Prophet, who censured speculation (kalām) and the usage of the method of reasoning (al-naẓar) as well as the use of critical questioning on some religious tenets, believes or practices. In a number of traditions with various chains of transmission, the Prophet, for instance, indicated that “the perishing of those before us happened because of their frequent questions and their arguments with their prophets.”

According to al-Harawi, speculation is superfluous and thus should be regarded as an innovation, because God has revealed religion to the Prophet in a perfect way and completed His blessing through him. This is, al-Harawi argues, in

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654 Al-Harawi, op. cit., p.280.
655 “… innamā halaka man qablukum bikathrati suālīhim wa ʿḥiṭārīhim ʿalā anbiyāʿīhím.” Al-Harawi mentions some traditions pertaining to this question in his DhK, op. cit., p.25.
line with the last words of God revealed to His Prophet: “Today I have perfected your religion for you.”

What had been started by the Prophet with respect to the opposition to *kalām*, al-Harawi maintains, was obviously followed by his successors, whom he classifies into nine generations:

1. The First Generation: The Companions of the Prophet

Al-Harawi maintains that the Companions condemned those who question certain religious articles. Umar b. al-Hashāb, for instance, had lashed Șabiq al-Kufī because of a question concerning a variant reading (ḥarf) of the Koran until the blood gushed from his back. On another occasion, ‘Umar also said: “Your discussion is the worst while your speech is also the worst ...” Along the same line, ‘Ali b. Abī Ṭalīb, according to al-Harawi, warned people that “at the end of time, there will be a people whose speech and arguments are not known by the adherents of Islam. They are inviting the people to adhere to their message. If one meets them, one is to kill them.”

Other Companions, such as Ibn ‘Abbās, ‘Ikrima, Mu‘awiya, Ibn Mas‘ūd, Ubayy b. Ka‘b, Mujāhid, al-Nazzāl b. Sabarah, Mu‘ādh b. Jabal and Tawús, are said to have rejected *kalām* as well. Their criticism of *kalām* revolve around: (a) Speculation on certain verses of the Koran; those involved in it were considered to be people who argue about the religion of God; those who speculate on these verses were associated to the satans of the Sea-islands; (b) That those who subject His religion to *ṣiyās*, will stay in confusion forever, deviating from the right way and plunging into distortion; (c) That God will make those who were engaged in dispute deaf and dumb; (d) Ascribing ignorance to those who disseminate reports which are not in the Book of God; (e) The adherents of heresy are to be inflicted with an uncurable disease, etcetera.

2. The Second Generation: the Forerunners of the Jurists from among the Followers

From this generation, al-Harawi records the statements against *kalām* by a number of prominent figures, the most prominent of whom is Ibn Ṭawús (d. 132/750). Al-Harawi, for instance, narrates the attitude of Ibn Ṭawús towards the Mu’tazilites. For this purpose, al-Harawi “followed from the strand of ‘Abd al-Rāziq [d. 211/827] who said that Mu‘ammar [d. 153/771] had related to us the

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656 Al-mā’īda (V) : 5. Bell, I, 94.
657 See al-Suyūṭī’s discussion of al-Harawi’s narration of the censure against *kalām* by the Companions in his SM, op. cit., p. 87.
658 SM, op. cit., p. 88.
659 Ibidem.
660 Ibidem.
661 Ibidem.
662 Ibidem.
663 SM, op. cit., p. 89.
664 Ibidem.
665 His complete name is ‘Abd Allāh b. Ṭawús b. Kaṣās al-Yamani. He died in 132/750. See al-Lālākā’ī, op. cit., p. 36, n. 2 (H). According to al-Nashshār, his real name was Dhakwān; Ṭawús was his *iqab*. See SM, op. cit., p. 88, n.1 (N).
6661 Abd al-Rāziq al-Ṣan‘ānī died in 211/827. See SM, op. cit., p. 91, n.3 (N).
words: Ibn Ṭawūs sat down. A man from the Muʿtazilites then came and started to argue [about religious matters]. So, Ibn Ṭawūs inserted his fingers into his ears and said to his son: O, my son! Insert your fingers into your ears! Close them up and do not listen to anything in his speech. Muʿammad said: This means that the heart is weak. ‘Abd al-Rāziq said - Ibrāhīm b. Yahyā’ said to me: I see that the Muʿtazilites among your group are numerous. He replied: I said: yes. So, they think that you are one of them. He said: Would you please enter this shop with me so that I can speak to you. I replied: No. [He said: why?] 668 I replied: Because the heart is weak and my religion is not for someone who is subdued. 669

3. The Third Generation
Al-Harawai enumerates the censures of kalām by a number of personalities, the most prominent among whom was ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Azīz (d. 101/719-20), 670 who was regarded by al-Suyūṭī as the mujaddid of the 1st/7th century. 671 For this purpose, al-Harawai records a number of narrations based on the authority of ʿUmar.

To begin with, he (viz. al-Harawai) took "from Abū al-Ṣalt Shihāb b. Ḥurāsh [d. ca. 200/816] 672 the words: 'Umar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz sent a letter to a man, which read: Peace be upon you, to start with, I advice you to fear God, to observe his command, to follow the Sunna of His Messenger - may God bless him and grant him peace - and to abandon what the innovators innovated later on. His Sunna has been established to save them the trouble to look for anything else… Therefore, you have to observe the Sunna which constitutes, by the Will of God, a shield for you." 673

Furthermore, al-Harawai narrates that ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz sent a letter to his son, ʿAbd al-Malik, saying: "Let your knowledge be that of God who has sent it down on His prophet! Through it He indicated the things He loves and reprehends. He also informed the people by means of it about His command. He called them to His Book and guided them into His blessing. By it, He protected them from His punishment. By it, He obliged Himself to please them. Due to it, He placed them in the most virtuous place among His creatures. This is the knowledge, through which, one will not be ignorant; and by being ignorant of which, one will not be knowledgeable. Give it preference beyond anything else! Refrain from observing his prohibitions. That is necessary for one who knows it and [also for one who pursues] to obey God in accordance with what he was exhortated. 674 That is the light of God which was revealed and by which the saints

668This is taken from the MS of the Damascus DK (fol. 86b).
669SM, op. cit., p. 91.
670The Umayyad caliph ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Azīz (d. 101/719-20), the mujaddid of the second century of Hijra, was considered by Juynboll as the first who singled out the sunna of the Prophet from the sunnas of others. See G.H.A. Juynboll, “Sunna” in EI², IX, 878-881; Cf. W.B. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” in IJMES, 16 (1984), 3-41.
671Al-Suyūṭī, al-Taʿadduth, op. cit., p. 216.
672Abū al-Ṣalt Shihāb b. Ḥurāsh b. Ḥushab al-Shaybānī al-Wasaṭī died ca. 200/816. See SM, op. cit., p. 93, n.3 (N).
673SM, op. cit., p. 93-4.
674The copying error also occurs here. The phrase in the MS of the Damascus DK (fol. 90b) reads fa inna dhālika yuḥiqqu ‘alā man ‘alimah wa ‘tataba’u tā-at-llāh tīma ʿisīya bih. Whereas in SM, the phrase reads “fa inna dhālika yuḥiqqu ‘alā man ‘alimah wa ‘tataba’u
of God are also guided. Whoever has no portion of it, does not benefit anything from it. He will remain in the darkness for the rest of his life in his present world.\textsuperscript{675}

Al-Harawi also quotes ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s words: “If you hear arguing, neglect it.”\textsuperscript{676}

4. The Fourth Generation

Al-Harawi lists a number of persons included in this generation. One of them to be mentioned here is Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/796).\textsuperscript{677} According to al-Harawi, Mālik b. Anas said: “Beware of the innovations! It was said: O, Abū ‘Abd Allāh, what are the innovations?’ He replied: ‘The people of the innovations who speak about the names of God, His attributes, His speech, His knowledge and His will. They are not silent about a thing on which the Companions and the followers to whom belong the beneficience were silent.’

He also takes from Mālik the words: “Whoever seeks for the religious truth with the help of kalām, becomes a heretic.” In the same line, al-Harawi refers to ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Mahdī (d. 117/736)\textsuperscript{678} as having said: “I came to see Mālik. He was with a man who asked him about the Koran. He answered: You might be one of ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd’s friends. God has cursed ‘Amr, because he made these innovations of kalām. If kalām was knowledge, the Companions and the Followers must have made use of it, as also they have done in the laws and the religious rules. But [kalām] is a falsity which indicates falsity.”

He then quotes Mālik as having said: “Tradition decreased among the people only when the heresies arose among them. The number of learned men also decreased after the aversion arose among the people.” He also based upon Mālik the words: “Tradition is like Noah’s ship, he who gets aboard, is safe and he who holds back from it, drowns.” Finally he also transmitted from Mālik the words: “Every person coming to me who interprets the Book of God while being ignorant of the languages of the Arabs, is given a warning by me.”\textsuperscript{679}

5. The Fifth Generation

A number of persons considered to have opposed kalām are included by al-Harawi in the fifth generation: One of them is Abū Ḥanīfā (d. 150/767).\textsuperscript{680} Al-

\textsuperscript{675}SM, op. cit., p. 94.

\textsuperscript{676}Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{677}Mālik’s full name was Abū ‘Abd Allāh Mālik b. Anas b. Mālik b. Abī ‘Amīr b. ‘Amr b. al-Ḥārith b. Gaymān b. Ḥuthayn b. ‘Amr b. al-Ḥārith al-ʿAṣbāhī. He was an imam of dār al-bihra (Madīna), where the school of the Malikite was located. He wrote a number of works, the chief among which is al-Muwāṭṭa. He was born in 90-97/708-16 in Madīna and died 179/796. See al-Lālakā‘ī, op. cit., p. 34, n.7 (H); Cf. J. Schacht’s “Mālik b. Anas” in EI², VI, 262-5.

\textsuperscript{678}‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Mahdī b. Ḥassān al-Ḥanbalī Abū Sa‘id al-Baṣrī died in 117/736. See SM, op. cit., p. 96, n.3 (N).

\textsuperscript{679}SM, op. cit., p. 96.

\textsuperscript{680}Abū Ḥanīfā al-Nu‘mān b. Thābit was a theologian and a religious lawyer, the eponym of the school of the Ḥanafīs. He was born in 80/699 and died in 150/767. See J. Schacht, “Abū Ḥanīfā al-Nu‘mān,” in EI², I, 123-4.

\textsuperscript{681}at-ʾllāh tīma ʾūsā bih.” The pronoun I used in SM, in this regard, however is not congruent with the context of the discussion in this passage.
Harawi quotes Nūḥ al-Jāmi‘ (d. 173/790) as having said: “I said to Abū Ḥanifa: What is your opinion on kalām with respect to the accidents and the bodies, which people innovated? He replied: [Those are] the concepts of the philosophers. You have to follow the tradition and the way of the pious ancestors. Beware of any fabrication, because it amounts to an innovation.\(^{684}\)

Al-Harawi narrates that when Abū Ḥanifa was asked about a‘rād (accidents) and ajsām (substances), he said that they both were the concern of philosophers. Abū Ḥanifa went on asserting that one is to follow the tradition and in the footsteps of the ancestors and ought to beware of any innovation. Accordingly, in the words of Muhammad b. al-Hasan, Abū Ḥanifa prohibited people from studying kalām. Abū Yūsuf al-Qādī (d. 182/798) put forth the same censure as Abū Ḥanifa. The former narrated that one who seeks for religion by use of kalām, becomes an atheist and that knowledge of dispute and kalām is ignorance.\(^{685}\) Ibn al-Mubārak’s (d. 181/798)\(^{686}\) criticism of kalām was rather soft. He associated dispute to the Mu’tazilites, lying to the Rafidites\(^{687}\) and religion to the scholars of tradition.\(^{688}\)

Abd al-Ra‘ūmān b. Mahdā held the same opinion as the preceding two scholars mentioned. He stated that kalām leads the person immersed in it to atheism. In line with the idea of the scholars mentioned above, Ṭalḥa b. ‘Amr (d. 152/770)\(^{689}\) held that one was not to dispute heretics, because they had a madness

\(^{681}\)Nūḥ’s full name was Nūḥ al-Jāmi‘ b. Abī Maryam; his kunya was Abū ‘Īsām al-Marwazi al-Qurashi. He was also called al-Jāmi‘, because of his expertise in many forms of knowledge. He died in 173/789. SM, op. cit., p. 99, n.7 (N).

\(^{682}\)Most of the Historians of Muslim philosophy and theology are of the opinion that a‘rād (pl. a‘rād) originated from an Aristotelian term, which is mostly translated into English as ‘accident.’ This term is always defined, according to Rahman, as that which cannot subsist by itself but only in a substance of which it is both the opposite and the complement. See Rahman, F., “‘Ara’d,” in EI², I, 603.

\(^{683}\)Jism (pl. ajsām), a term sometimes rendered in English as ‘body’ and sometimes as ‘substance’ was the term about which the opinions of the Muslim theologians, according to al-Ash‘ārī, differs. Dirār b. ‘Āmir b. Ismā‘īl, Kitāb Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyān wa ʿIlālāt al-Muṣallīn (Istanbul: Maṭba‘at al-Dawla, 1929) ed. H. Ritter, p. 301-6, 2 vols.

\(^{684}\)SM, op. cit., p. 99-100.

\(^{685}\)SM, op. cit., p. 100.

\(^{686}\)Ibn al-Mubārak was ‘Abd Allāh al-Marwazi to whom al-Nashshār referred as ‘Ālim ʿurūsān wa muḥaddithuhā. He was originally Turkish died in 181/798. SM, op. cit., p. 100, n. 2 (N).

\(^{687}\)According to Kohlberg, the Rafidites are the members of the theological denomination, which points to the Proto-Imāmiyya (consequently the Twelver Shi‘a) and also to any members of Shi‘a sects. Al-Ash‘ārī, he maintains, identified these groups with those who had by the 3rd/9th century adopted Mu‘tazilites ideas about God’s unity and about the createdness of the Koran. See Kohlberg, E., “al-Rafīḍa”, in EI², VIII, 386-9.

\(^{688}\)SM, op. cit., p. 100.

like that of the scabby camel.\(^{690}\) Al-Fudâyil b. ‘Iyâd exhorted that one is not to sit beside a heretic, because that will bring about God’s wrath. In the same line, he held that the author of an innovation will not smell the fragrance of Paradise. The last censure of \textit{kalâm} of the scholars of the fifth generation is that of Ḥâlid b. al-Ḥârîth al-Hujaymi (d. 186/803).\(^{691}\) He stated that the worst people are those who dispute and altercation.\(^{692}\)

6. The Sixth Generation

One of the personalities mentioned by al-Harawi in this generation is Muḥammad b. Idrîs al-Shâfi‘î. Al-Harawi’s discussion of al-Shâfi‘î’s statements against \textit{kalâm} is quoted extensively by al-Suyûṭî in his SM, this is due to the fact that al-Suyûṭî, as discussed before, regarded al-Shâfi‘î as the first to condemn logic and \textit{kalâm} explicitly. Here I quote al-Suyûṭî’s reference to al-Shâfi‘î’s remarks against \textit{kalâm} in his SM \textit{verbatim}:

He [viz. Al-Harawi] then adduced al-Karâbis’s words: “Al-Shâfi‘î said: ‘Everyone speaking about the Book and the Sunna is serious and speaking about anything other than that is nonsensical.’ ” He then transmitted from Yûnus b. ‘Abd al-A‘lâ the words: “Al-Shâfi‘î said: ‘It is not said concerning the sources [the Koran and Sunna], why and how. In that respect, one rather has to submit.’ ” He then adduced the words of Abu ‘l-Qâsim Uthmân b. Sa‘îd al-Anmâṭi who said: “I heard that al-Muzânî\(^{693}\) said: ‘I used to be involved in \textit{kalâm} before the arrival of al-Shâfi‘î. When he arrived, I came to him and asked him a question related to \textit{kalâm}.’ He then asked me: ‘Do you know where you are now?’ I replied: ‘Sure, I am in the Grand Mosque (al-Masjid al-Jâmi‘) in Fusûṭ.’\(^{694}\) He then said to him\(^{695}\): ‘No, you are in Târân.’\(^{696}\) Abu ‘l-Qâsim said: ‘Târân is a place in the Red Sea (ba‘îr al-qulzum)\(^{697}\) from which hardly a single ship is safe.’ He then posed a question of jurisprudence. And I responded to it. He then put forth something to demolish my answer. So I replied with another thing. He proposed again something demolishing my answer. So when I started to answer with something to demolish his answer, he said to me: ‘This is jurisprudence which involves the Book and the Tradition. [The demolishing is only related to] the opinions of the people. So

\(^{690}\)SM, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 101.


\(^{694}\)Fusûṭ, old Cairo which was built firstly by the Muslim conquerors. It was located on the east bank of the Nile, alongside the Greco-ptic town of Babylon. See Jomier, J., “al-Fusûṭ,” in \textit{EI²}, II, 957-9.

\(^{695}\)The copying error also occurs in this place. In SM, is “he then said to him”. But in the MS of the Damascus DK (fol. 113a), it is “he then said to me.”

\(^{696}\)Târân is an Island in the Red Sea, which is situated between Quzum and Wa‘ayla. The inhabitants of Târân were called Banû Jaddân. They relied for their food much on the sea and lived in ships as their houses. According to al-Yaqût, Târân had a reputation for its being the dirtiest place in the Sea of Quzum. \textit{Jacuts, op. cit.}, vol. I, 811.

\(^{697}\)According to al-Hamawi, \textit{ba‘îr al-qulzum} (the Red Sea) is the part of Indian oceans. Its eastern coast is Berber, while its northern one is Yemen. Another part of its coast stretches out to the city of Quzum nearby Egypt. \textit{Jacuts, op. cit.}, p. 503, vol. I.
how to speak about the Lord of the Universe, a mistake which can imply an infidelity." [From then on] I left kalām and turned towards jurisprudence."

He then adduced the words from 'Abd Allāh b. Āhmād b. Ḥanbal the words: "I heard that Muhammad b. Dāwud [d. 296/910] had said: 'In the time of al-Shāfī‘i, nowhere was it recorded, related or even known that he [al-Shāfī‘i] spoke about futilities while he detested the Mutakallimūn and the innovators.'"

He then adduced on the authority of 'Abd Allāh b. Āhmād b. Ḥanbal the words from his father: "Whenever al-Shāfī‘i was convinced of the veracity of a report, he followed it. His best property was that he did not desire theology. His only concern was fiqh."

He then put forth from al-Muzānī that someone asked him about a matter related to kalām. He replied: "I detest this. I even prohibit it just as al-Shāfī‘i did. I heard al-Shāfī‘i saying: 'Mālik was asked about kalām and al-tawhīd. So he answered: 'It is absurd for us to think of the fact that the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - taught his Īmmā the istinjā‘; but did not teach them al-tawhīd. Al-tawhīd is what the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - remarked: I was ordered to kill the people until they say there is no God but Allah. No blood and property could protect the truth of al-tawhīd.'"

He then adduced from al-Karābīsī the words: "I saw al-Shāfī‘i. Then Bishr al-Mūrisi came to him. So he said to Bishr: 'Tell me what you are propagating! A crystal-clear book, postulated suppositions or established prophetic traditions concerning which you found from the ancestors both a study and a question?' Bishr replied: 'No, but I am not able to oppose [that view] whatsoever.' Al-Shāfī‘i then said: 'You confirmed your own mistake. So what is your position with respect to the discussion on jurisprudence and narratives (aḥbār)? People would follow you and learn that?' He replied: 'We have (scanty) contributions (nubadh) to it!' When Bishr went away, al-Shāfī‘i said: 'He will never succeed.'"

He then adduced from Abū Dāwūd and Abū Thawr (d. 240/854) the words: "We heard al-Shāfī‘i saying: 'No one who was occupied with kalām, would succeed.'" He also adduced from al-Ḥusayn b. Ismā‘il al-Muḥāmīlī (d. 330/943) the following words: "Al-Muzānī said: I asked al-Shāfī‘i about a question related to kalām. He replied: Ask me about something of which I can say, when I make a

698SM, op. cit., p. 103.
700The copying error also occurs in this place. In the MS of the Damascus DK (fol. 113b), the phrase reads “… aqrarta binafsik ‘alā al-ḥaṭa’…” while in SM, it reads “… aqrarta binafsik ‘alā al-ḥaṭa’ tīḥ…” SM, op. cit., p. 104.
701SM, op. cit., p. 104.
702This probably refers to Abū Thawr Ibrāhīm b. Ḥālid b. Abī ‘l-Yamān al-Kalbi who died in Baghdad in 240/854. Abū Thawr, according to Schacht, was a prominent jurisconsult and founder of a school of religious law. Due to his stay in Iraq one generation after al-Shāfī‘i, Abū Thawr, Schacht argues, "seems to have been influenced by al-Shāfī‘i’s methodological insistence on the authority of the hādith of the Prophet, without, however, renouncing the use of ra’y as had been customary in the ancient schools of law." See Schacht, J., “Abū Thawr,” in EI2, I, 155.
mistake in it: I made a mistake. Do not ask me about something of which, when I make a mistake, I say: I became an infidel.”

He then adduced the words from Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Ḥakam (d. 286/900): “Al-Shāfi’i said to me: O, Muhammad, if someone asks you about something related to kalām, do not respond to him. Because when he asks you about diya, you reply: [that amounts to] one dirham or one daniq;” he says: You made a mistake. But if someone asks you about something related to kalām, and you make a mistake, he says: ‘You became an infidel.”

He then adduced from al-Rabî’ b. Sulaymān (d. 270/884) the words: “I heard al-Shāfi’i saying: ‘The arguing on religious tenets makes the soul cruel and stirs up animosity.’” He also adduced from al-Rabî’ the words: “Al-Shāfi’i said to me: O, Rabî’! Accept from me three matters: [first,] do not enter into discussion about the Companions of the Messenger of God - may God bless him and grant him peace, because the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - will be your opponent on the Day of Resurrection; [secondly,] do not occupy yourself with kalām, because I found that some Mutakalimān are in a favour of al-ta’til, and [thirdly] do not busy yourself with astrology, because it draws you to al-ta’til.”

He then adduced from al-Muzănâbī the words: “The established view of al-Shafi’i is abhorrence of the occupation with kalām.” He also adduced from al-Karābīsī the words: “Al-Shāfi’i was asked about something related to kalām. So he became angry. He then said: ‘Ḥaṭ al-Fard [d. 205/820] and his companions already asked about this [question] before. God abased them.’”

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705 According to Kinder, diya signifies blood money or money paid in compensation for life. This term originates from a verse of the Koran (al-nisā': 92), which reads diyatun musallamatun ilā ahlīhā (blood money is to be paid to his kin). This verse, Kinder maintains, lays down the law of accidental homicide for which the perpetrator must emancipate a slave or fast for two months and give diya to the victim’s family if the victim was a mu’min or dhimmī (protected people). The amount of diya for a free male muslim is set at 100 camels. See Kinder, R., “Blood Money,” in the Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān ed. Jane Dammem McAuliffe (Leiden-Boston-Köln: E. J. Brill, 2001), vol. I, p. 239.
706 Dirham is a silver coin whose weight is six dawāniq. Lane, op. cit., I, 876.
707 Dāniq (pl. dawāniq) is the sixth part of a dirham. Lane, op. cit., I, 920.
709 Ta’til, divesting God of His attributes, according to Van Ess, is equivalent with tanzhīl, “transcendentalism,” a term which is always combined with its opposite term tashbih, “anthropomorphism.” Ta’til and its derivative mu’attīl or mu’attīla (denoting a person or a group practising ta’til) are used here in polemical language as a derogatory term for the adversaries of al-Rabî’ b. Sulaymān, implying that he along with al-Shāfi’i form the group who practice tashbih, and oppose those who practice ta’til, the Mu’tazilites. On tashbih wa ‘l-tanzih, see Van Ess, Joseph, “al-Tashbih wa ‘l-Tanzih,” in EP², X, 341-4.
710 Ḥaṭ al-Fard was a great polemictic of the Murjī’ite denomination who wrote Kitāb fī ‘l-Maḥlūq ‘alā Abī ‘l-Hudhayl against Abu ‘l-Hudhayl al-Allāf, who also composed the polemical works, Kitāb al-Maḥlūq ‘alā Ḥaṭ al-Fard and Kitāb ‘alā Dirār wa Ḥām wa Abī Ḥanīfā wa Ḥaṭ fī ‘l-Maḥlūq. For the study of jurisprudence, he enjoyed the supervision of Abū Yūsuf, a disciple of Abū Ḥanīfā. According to al-Suyūṭī, for the study of theology he was a disciple of Bishr al-Murāsī the Mutakallim and much influenced by Dirār b. ‘Amr.
He then put forth from Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Ash‘ari, al-Shāfi‘i’s friend, the words: “Al-Shāfi‘i said: ‘My established view on the Mutakallimūn is that their heads should be veiled by the whips and that they should be banished from the land.’” He also adduced from al-Karābīsī (d. ca. 245/860)714 the words: “Al-Shāfi‘i said: ‘My (legal) judgment on the Mutakallimūn is like ‘Umar’s on Šābih.’” He further put forth the words from Ṭāhir b. Ḥalīd al-Ḥallāl (d. 247/862): “I heard that al-Shāfi‘i had said: ‘I did not debate with someone, of whom I know that he clings continuously to innovation.’”

He also adduced from Abū Thawr, al-Karābīsī [d. ca. 245/860] and al-Za‘farānī [d. 260/875]714 the words: “We heard that al-Shāfi‘i had said: ‘My legal opinion on the people of kalām is that they should be beaten with date-stalks and be escorted on the camel which then could bring them around the clans and tribes while summoning the people that this is the consequence of neglecting the Koran and the Tradition, for being fascinated with kalām.’”

He then transmitted the words from al-Za‘farānī (d. 260/875): “I heard al-Shāfi‘i saying: ‘I never debated with someone on kalām, except once. I asked God’s forgiveness for it.” He also adduced from Yūnus b. ‘Abd al-A‘lā: “I heard al-Shāfi‘i saying: ‘If you hear that someone says that the name is not identical to the object [named], be sure that he is a heretic!’” He also took from al-Rabī’ the words: “I heard al-Shāfi‘i saying in Kitāb al-Waṣīyya: ‘If someone bequeathes his books of knowledge to other people, while among them are theological books, those theological books should not be included in the waṣīyya, because [kalām] is not regarded as knowledge.’” He also adduced from al-Muzanī: “I heard al-Shāfi‘i saying: ‘Kalām curses the Mutakallimūn.’”

He then adduced from al-Rabī’ [the words]: “I heard al-Shāfi‘i getting off the stairs, while people were discussing theological [questions.] So he shouted at them saying: ‘Be our friendly neighbours, or stay away from us!’”715

He also adduced the words from Abū Thawr (d. 240/854): “I said to al-Shāfi‘i: ‘Write something on kalām.’ So he replied: ‘whoever is occupied with kalām, will never succeed.’” He then adduced from al-Za‘farānī the words: “Al-Shāfi‘i used to detest kalām and to stay far from it.” He also adduced from al-Rabī’ the words: “One day al-Shāfi‘i came to us, while in the house there were people discussing something related to kalām. So he said: ‘Be our friendly

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When he was in Baṣra, he became a disciple of Abū ‘l-Ash‘ath the Philosopher. Among his opponents, he was often called Ḥaṣf al-Qīrād, Ḥaṣf the Monkey. Al-Shāfi‘i sometimes called him Ḥaṣf al-Munfarīd, the Lonely Ḥaṣf or Ḥaṣf the Single fighter. He died in Egypt in 205/820. Van Ess, TG, op. cit., II, 729-735.

711SM, op. cit., p. 105.

712Al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Ali b. Yazid al-Bagdādī al-Karābīsī was referred to by al-Dhahabi as Faqīh Bagdādī who studied jurisprudence under Imām al-Shāfi‘i. He was the author of many works. He died in ca. 245/860. Al-Dhahabi, SAN, XII, 79-82.

713Al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Ali b. Yazid al-Bagdādī al-Karābīsī was referred to by al-Dhahabi as Faqīh Bagdādī who studied jurisprudence under Imām al-Shāfi‘i. He was the author of many works. He died in ca. 245/860. Al-Dhahabi, SAN, XII, 79-82.


715SM, op. cit., p. 106.
neighbours, or stay away from us!' He also adduced from al-Muzani the words: “Al-Shāfi‘ī used to forbid one to enter into discussion concerning kalām.” He then adduced from Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Ḥakam the words: “I heard al-Shāfi‘ī saying: ‘If people know what kalām comprises, they will certainly flee from it, just as they flee from a lion.’” He also adduced from Yūnus b. ‘Abd al-‘A’lā (d. 264/877) the words: “Al-Shāfi‘ī’s mother said: ‘He refused that Ḥafṣ al-Fard sits with him.’” Al-Sājī said: “She always accompanied him. He took her wherever with him.” He also adduced from al-Shāfi‘ī the words: “Al-Murisi’s mother said to me: ‘Advise Bishr to avoid kalām!’ So I advised him. But he invited me to kalām.”

He then adduced from al-Rabī’ the words: “Someone asked al-Shāfi‘ī [who then said] that this [matter] leads to kalām. We will not answer a question related to kalām.”

He then transmitted from Ibn Ḥuzayma: “I heard Yūnus b. ‘Abd al-‘A’lā saying that al-Shāfi‘ī said: ‘Any affliction by God, except al-shirk, is better for man than being afflicted by Him with kalām.” He also adduced from al-Rabī’ the words: “Al-Shāfi‘ī said to me: ‘If I wanted to compose a big book against any adversary, I would have done it. But kalām is not my interest. I do not want to be associated with it, as well.’”

He then adduced from al-Za‘farānī [d. 260/875] the words: “Al-Shāfi‘ī used to wear a big turban as if he was a desert dweller (a‘rāb), while his hand held a cane. He had the sharpest tongue among the people. If speculation (kalām) was being practiced in his circle, he prohibited it. He would then say: ‘We are not practitioners of kalām.”

He then adduced from Abū Ḥātim the words: “Some of al-Shāfi‘ī’s companions said: Al-Shāfi‘ī attended [a circle held] in the Grand Mosque.” Then someone debated with him on a question. The debate lasted very long. The man brought up a question related to kalām. Finally, al-Shāfi‘ī said to him: Leave this! Because it is related to kalām.” He also adduced from al-Rabī’ the words: “Al-Shāfi‘ī recited a poem to us censuring kalām:

The people go on fabricating innovations in religious [matters] with their own opinions with which the messengers were not sent

Until, most of them hold God’s religion in low esteem

716According to Bosworth, Yūnus b. ‘Abd al-‘A’lā was “the leading Egyptian muḥaddith and authority on the kīrā‘āt.” See Bosworth, C.E., “al-‘abar,” in EI², X, p. 11.
717This sentence is taken from “wakānat ma‘ah yahmiluhā ilā kull mawḍū‘” of the MS of the Damascus DK (fol. 116a). In SM, this sentence reads “wa kānat takūnū ma‘ahū yahmiluhā ‘ma‘ahū ilā kull mawḍū‘.” SM, op. cit., p. 107.
719Ibidem.
721Muḥammad b. Idrīs b. al-Mundhir al-Ḥanḍalī Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī was referred to by al-Dhahabi as shayḫ al-muḥaddithīn, who was one of the contemporaries of al-Ḥaḍārī. Among his disciples were Yūnus b. ‘Abd al-‘A’lā, his son, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abū Ḥātim, al-Rabī’ b. Sulaymān, Abū Zūr‘a al-Rāzī, Abū Zūr‘a al-Dimashqī, etc. He died in 277/891. See al-Dhahabi, SAN, XIII, 247-263; SM, op. cit., p. 107, n. 1 (N).
722The copying error also occurs in this place. In SM, this phrase reads “al-Shāfi‘ī attended (ḥaddārī al-shāfī‘ī),” whereas in the MS of the Damascus DK (fol. 116b), the phrase reads “I invited al-Shāfi‘ī (ḥaddārtu al-shāfī‘ī).
But it deserves more engagement to be involved in [the matters of] the ancestors’.  

This is all of what al-Harawi narrated with chains of transmission from al-Shafi’i’s texts. Most of these [quotations] are adduced in the manāqib of al-Shafi’i by Ibn Abi Ḥātim, al-Sājī and al-Bayhaqi.  

7. The Seventh Generation
The censures and the attitudes toward kalām of the people of this generation are described by al-Harawi in the following narratives. When Abū ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Būshanjī was asked about al-imān (the faith), he said that it is obligatory for all scholars and ahl al-İslām to follow the Koran and the Sunna, as well as to consider the foundations (al-uṣūl) laid down by the Koran and the Sunna as the aims of their intellects. In other words, they are not to consider their intellects as the aims of the foundations laid down by the Koran and the Sunna.  


Accordingly, Ayyūb al-Saḥṭiyānī said that one is not to dispute with people about a matter one does not know, because that leads one to corruption. Justifying his censure of kalām, Yūnus b. ‘Abd al-Aḥlām repeated al-Shafi’i’s opinion that there is no sin worse than infidelity, except that of one who is engaged in kalām. For the same purpose, he goes on narrating that al-Layth b. Sa’d used to say: “If one sees one of the ahl al-kalām walking on water, do not trust him.” Concluding his words, Yūnus quoted al-Shafi’i’s attitude towards the mutakallimūn, namely they should be hit on the head with palm-stalks and expelled to their homelands.  

In the same line, al-Harawi added from ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Ḥātim (d. 327/940) the statement that the latter’s father (viz. Abū Ḥātim) and Abū Zur’ā...
(d. ca. 264/879) refrained from befriending the Mutakallimūn and to study their writings. In al-Harawi’s words, both of them said that the author of kalām will never be happy. They both refused to compose works based on reason without relying on athār and tried to urge people to shun the one who is engaged in it.

One is able to find a mild censure of kalām in al-Zujjāj al-NaÎwī’s words. He stated that one who spends his life engaged in disputes, will find no convenient shelter. Accordingly, al-Haytham b. Kulayb (d. 335/947) quoted a poem of Qutaybi stating: “Leave alone one engaged in it.” A warning against kalām can be found in the words of Ja‘far al-Fargānī (d. 317/930). He stated that the least danger of theology, is the disappearance of the fear of God. Yet, if the heart is empty of the fear of God, that means that it is empty of the faith, as well.

Other censures of kalām can also be found in the words of Sahl b. ÝAbd Allāh (d. 283/896). Interpreting the verse: “wa ta‘āwanū ‘ala ’l-birri wa ’l-tagwa’ walā’ ta‘āwanū ‘ala ’l-ithmi wa ’l-Ýudwān, Sahl associates al-birr (righteousness) and al-tagwa’ (piety) with faith and the Sunna, and al-ithm (sin) and al-Ýudwān (rancour) with infidelity and innovation. Sahl’s censure of kalām seems more vehement in his statements that if one shuns al-zÁhir (explicit meaning) and proceeds to the allegorical meaning (al-bÁÔin), one converts, in fact, to zandaqa (atheism). Other censures of kalām can also be found in the words of Sahl b. ‘Abd Allāh (d. 335/947).

This name probably refers to ÝUbayd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Karim b. Yazid b. Farrūḥ, Abū Zur‘a al-Rāzī, to whom al-Dhahabī refers as sayyid al-ÎuffÁÛ and muÎaddith al-rayy. He was born in ca. 200/810. He is said to have attended the circle of AÎmad b. Íanbal and to have memorized two hundred thousand prophetic traditions. He died in ca. 264/879. Al-Dhahabi, SAN, XIII, p. 65-85.

Interpreting the verse: “wa ta‘āwanū ‘ala ’l-birri wa ’l-tagwa’ walā’ ta‘āwanū ‘ala ’l-ithmi wa ’l-Ýudwān, Sahl associates al-birr (righteousness) and al-tagwa’ (piety) with faith and the Sunna, and al-ithm (sin) and al-Ýudwān (rancour) with infidelity and innovation. Sahl’s censure of kalām seems more vehement in his statements that if one shuns al-zÁhir (explicit meaning) and proceeds to the allegorical meaning (al-bÁÔin), one converts, in fact, to zandaqa (atheism).
A censure of kalām in a rather different tone can be found in the definition of innovation by Abū Ḥaṣ. When he was asked about innovation, he defined it as neglecting the laws, scorning the traditions and following personal opinion, as well as shunning of authority (al-ittibā‘).\textsuperscript{743}

Al-Harawī then turns to the censure of kalām by Abū ‘Ali al-Jūzajānī. In his words, when al-Jūzajānī was asked about the way in which the Sunna should be followed, he said that it means avoiding innovations, following the consensus of the first generation of Muslim scholars and remaining far from studies of kalām and from its scholars, as well as observing the way of al-iqtīdā‘ and al-ittibā‘.\textsuperscript{744}

Al-Harawī also describes the censures of other people. First, according to ‘Abd al-Ra‘ūm Ábī Ḥātim, his father (viz. Abū Ḥātim) and Abū Zur‘a used to say: “He who seeks for religion through kalām, goes astray.” Secondly, when he was asked about the oneness of God, Abu ‘l-ÝAbbas b. Surayj said that it is shahāda, bearing witness that there is no god but Allāh and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allāh. However, the witnessing to the Oneness of God by the people of falsehood involves engagement in accidents (al-a‘rād) and substances (al-ajsām). The Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - was sent to reject it. Thirdly, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad has said that dispute for the cause of victory is preceded by a debate and disputation (ṣiyāḥ), followed by an inclination to dominate others and concluded by hatred and anger.\textsuperscript{745} Fourthly, when Abū Bakr b. Bistām asked Abū Bakr b. Sayyār about being engaged in kalām, he prohibited him to do so.\textsuperscript{746} Fifthly, Abū ‘Amr b. Ma‘ār (d. 360/972)\textsuperscript{747} said that when Ibn Ḥuzayma was asked about the names and the attributes in kalām, he said that it was an innovation in which the leading Muslim scholars and the founders of the schools such as Malik, Su‘yān, al-Awzā‘i, al-Shāfi‘i, Aḥmad, Ibrāhīm, Ya‘ya b. Ya‘ya, Ibn al-Mubārak, Muḥammad b. Ya‘ya, Abū Ḥanīfa, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan and Abū Yūsuf had not been engaged. They refused to have anything to do with it and led their friends to the Koran and the Sunna.\textsuperscript{748}

8. The Eighth Generation

In this generation, al-Harawī describes an interesting narration on the authority of Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥākim, who stated: “I heard Abū Zayd al-Faqīh al-Marwāzī [d. 371/982]\textsuperscript{749} saying: I met Abu ‘l-Ḥasan al-Asḥā‘arī [d. ca. 320/933]\textsuperscript{750} in Baṣra. I

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\textsuperscript{742}SM, op. cit., p. 117.
\textsuperscript{743}SM, op. cit., p. 117.
\textsuperscript{744}SM, op. cit., p. 117.
\textsuperscript{745}SM, op. cit., p. 118.
\textsuperscript{746}SM, op. cit., p. 119.
\textsuperscript{748}SM, op. cit., p. 119.
\textsuperscript{749}Abū Zayd Muhammad b. Ahmad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Marwāzī was referred to by al-Dhahābī as al-shaykh al-imām al-muṭṭa al-ṣudda al-zāhid and shaykh al-ṣāḥīf iyya.
learnt a bit of kalām from him. So I dreamt in my sleep that I was blind. I then related it [this dream] to an interpreter [of dreams]. He said: [This happened] because you acquired knowledge due to which you are led astray. Hence, I refrained from seeing al-Ashārī. He then saw me in the street and said to me: O ye Abu Zayd! Do you like to return to Ḥurāsān while you are knowledgeable of the branches (al-furūʿ) but ignorant of the roots (al-uṣūl). I then told him my dream. He said: Do not divulge it here! 

9. The Ninth Generation

In this generation, al-Harawī ascribes statements against kalām to a number of authorities. He refers, for instance, to Abū Manṣūr al-Albānī al-Bustī as having said: “I saw Yahya b. ‘Ammār [d. 422/1032] reprehending the people of kalām on the pulpit [so frequently] that I could not count the times.” I also saw ‘Umar b. ʿĪrahīm and our professors doing the same; [and]: I heard al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbī Usāmā al-Makkī [saying]: I heard my father saying: “God cursed Abū Dharr, i.e. ‘Abd b. ʿĀhmād al-Harawī [d. 434/1043].” Because he was the first who introduced kalām to al-Ḥaram [viz. Mecca] and the one who spread it among the Maghribīs.”

Al-Harawī also mentions that Manṣūr b. Ismāʿīl had said: “I heard al-Ḥusayn b. Shuʿayb [d. 432/1040] the jurist saying to Yahya b. ‘Ammār: I heard Ṣālim saying: He who did not learn kalām, did not subject his religious belief to


751 Abū lʿ-Ḥasan al-Ashārī was the Great Imām Ismāʿīl b. Abū Bishr, the founder of the Ashārītī theological school. He was born in 260/875 and died in Baghdad in ca. 320/933. SM, op. cit., p. 119, n. 5 (N); see also Watt, W.M., “al-Ashārī, Abu lʿ-Ḥasan,” in EI², I, p. 694-5.

750 Abu lʿ-Ḥasan al-Ashārī was the Great Imām Ismāʿīl b. Abū Bishr, the founder of the Ashārītī theological school. He was born in 260/875 and died in Baghdad in ca. 320/933. SM, op. cit., p. 119-120.

752 The copying error also occurs in this place. Abū Manṣūr al-Albānī al-Bustī (fol. 130b) is mistakenly copied as Abū Manṣūr al-Mālinī al-Bustī.

753 Al-ʿĪmām al-Muḥaddith al-Wāʿīz Yahyā b. ‘Ammār b. alʿ-ʿAnbās was referred to by al-Dhahabī as shayxī sījamān, who studied under the supervision of Ḥāmid b. Muḥammad al-Rāfāʾiʿ, ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Adī b. Ḥāmduwayh al-Ṣāḥūnī, etc. The most prominent among his disciples was Shayḫ al-Īslām Abū Ismāʿīl ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Harawī. He died in 422/1032 in Herat. Al-Dhahabī, SAN, XVII, 480.


755 Abū Manṣūr b. Ismāʿīl b. ʿUmar al-Tamīmī was well known as Abū lʿ-Ḥasan. He died in 306/918. SM, op. cit., p. 122, n. 4 (N).


In another passages, al-Harawi also quotes Tāhir b. Muḥammad al-Albānī as having said: “I saw al-Dīnārī [d. 407/1017] being asked by Abū Sa‘d al-Zāhid to repent. I never saw him in such a baseness like on that day. I also knew that the seminar of Sālim in the Mosque was cleaned at the time of Yaḥya b. ‘Ammār [d. 422/1032] and ‘Umar b. Ibrāhīm [d. 425/1036]761 on the basis of consultation. I heard Mansūr b. Ismā‘il the jurist praising God for that account. Sālim then came repenting. So Yaḥya b. ‘Ammār said to the chamberlain (al-Ḥājib)762: Tell him to bring the books of kalām in order that we burn them in the fire. But he did not permit him [to do that].”763

[b.] Al-Ri‘āya by al-Ḥārith al-Muhāsībī (d.243/857-8)

Biography
Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Ḥārith b. Asād al-Muhāsībī was born in 165/783 into a family that lived in Basra. According to most of his biographers, the name of al-Muhāsībī was given to him because of his habit of self-examination. However, this notion was rejected by Aṭṭār, Smith says, stating that it was due to the fact that he made no statement without previous reflection. His nisba of al-Anāzī indicates his tribal affiliation to the Beduin tribe, Anāzā.764

Al-Muhāsībī was the son of a man who, according to Ibn Ḥallīkān, professed the doctrine of man’s free will.765 His father was considered a heretic and described variously as a Qadārite, Rāfīḍite and a Māgian.766 According to

757The copying error also occurs in this place. “‘Isā b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī” (fol. 130b) is mistakenly copied as “‘Ali b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī.”
758Here the editor of SM, al-Nashshār seems to have misidentified Abu ‘l-Jūd758 al-Asadī the Ṣafī‘ite, with al-Ḥārith b. ‘Amr who died ca. 100/719 (SM, op. cit., p. 123, n. 2 (N)). All the figures cited by al-Harawi in this generation, including al-Jūdī were contemporaries, and some of them were even teachers, of al-Harawi.
761Umar b. Ibrāhīm b. Ismā‘il, a cousin (ḥāh) of Shaykh al-İslām Abū ‘Uthmān al-Ṣābūnī was referred to by al-Dhahabi as al-ḥāṭīf al-qudwa wa al-zāhid. Like Yahyā b. ‘Ammār, he was also teacher of Abū Ismā‘il al-Harawi. He died in 425/1036. Al-Dhahabi, SAN, XVII, p. 448-9.
762According to Sourdel, this term can be translated approximately as chamberlain. It is “used in Muslim countries for the person responsible for guarding the door of access to the ruler, so that only approved visitors may approach him.” See Sourdel, D., “Ḥājib,” in EP2, III, p. 45.
763SM, op. cit., p. 123.
766Smith, Margareth, in the introduction of al-Ri‘āya, p. xv.
most of al-Muḥāṣibī’s biographers, due to his father’s heresy, al-Muḥāṣibī refused to inherit seventy thousand dirhems from him, insisting that ‘persons of different religions cannot inherit, one from the other.’\textsuperscript{767} According to al-Subki, al-Muḥāṣibī even asked his father to divorce his mother.\textsuperscript{768}

That al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāṣibī is stated to have been a student under Imām al-Shāfī‘ī is controversial among the biographers. According to al-Ṣuyūṭī, Abū Maṣūr al-Tāmirī had included al-Muḥāṣibī in the first generation of the companions of al-Shāfī‘ī\textsuperscript{769} and considered him one of the followers of al-Shāfī‘ī. Abū Āṣim al-Ibādī, conversely, only considered him one of al-Shāfī‘ī’s contemporaries. Al-Ibādī maintained that despite being one of the followers of the Shafi‘ite school, al-Muḥāṣibī was not reported to have been one of those who met al-Shāfī‘ī.\textsuperscript{770}

The authority of al-Muḥāṣibī in a number of traditional sciences was recognized by most of his biographers. Ibn Ḥallikan considered him one of those who possessed both the science of the exterior and the science of the interior.\textsuperscript{771} Al-Subki, for instance, maintained that al-Muḥāṣibī was a leading scholar in \textit{tasawwuf}, Tradition, \textit{Kālām} and Jurisprudence. His writings, which were reported to have amounted to twenty-one, seventeen of which are known to be extant,\textsuperscript{772} constitute authoritative sources for the scholars of Mysticism, Tradition, \textit{Kālām} and Jurisprudence of the later generation. His authority was always referred to by most of the \textit{Mutanakkilīmi al-Ṣifātīyya}, the theologians on the Attributes of God.\textsuperscript{773} The most recognized authority of al-Muḥāṣibī, however, lies in his sufistic teachings.\textsuperscript{774}

Al-Muḥāṣibī’s speculative thoughts and his use of dialectics in support of his views aroused criticism from his contemporaries. According to his biographers, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal was reported to have banished al-Muḥāṣibī’s writings and prohibited people to read them. It was reported that \textit{al-Ḥāṭīb} Sa‘ād b. ‘Amr al-Barza‘ī saw Abū Zur‘ā asked Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal about al-Muḥāṣibī and his works. Abu Zur‘ā was told to avoid al-Muḥāṣibī’s works because they were full of innovations.\textsuperscript{775}

Although the blind reaction of the Sunnites against al-Muḥāṣibī owes to their misunderstanding of his use of dialectical reasoning in opposing the Mu‘tazila,\textsuperscript{776} the opposition of the Sunnites against al-Muḥāṣibī and his eccentric thoughts, according to Arnaldez, however, seem to have been so ubiquitous that it forced him to live in exile in a small town far from Baghdad. That this opposition of his adversaries did not decrease was reflected in his burial ceremony. Most of his biographers reported that when he died in 243/857-8, only four persons attended his funeral.

\textsuperscript{767} Ibn Ḥallikan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 365.
\textsuperscript{768} Al-Subki, TSK, II, 38.
\textsuperscript{769} SM, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{770} Al-Subki, TSK, II, 37.
\textsuperscript{771} Ibn Ḥallikan, \textit{op. cit.} p. 365.
\textsuperscript{772} Smith, \textit{op. cit.}, p. xvi.
\textsuperscript{773} Al-Subki, TSK, II, 38.
\textsuperscript{774} Smith, ibidem.
\textsuperscript{775} Al-Dhahabi, \textit{Mīzān}, \textit{op. cit.}, I, 174.
\textsuperscript{776} Arnaldez, \textit{op. cit.} p. 467.
Al-Muḥāsibī’s masterpiece, al-Ri‘āya

Al-Ri‘āya has been edited several times, first of which by Margareth Smith (London: 1941) and then by ‘Abd al-Qādir Ahmad ‘Aṣā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 4th ed). According to Smith, al-Muḥāsibī has written twenty-one works representing his authoritative work in Juriprudence, Tradition, taṣawwuf and Kalām. Of these only seventeen were known to be extant. Considered as al-Muḥāsibī’s masterpiece, al-Ri‘āya, however, was his most authoritative work on Mysticism. Written in the form of counsels, given to a disciple in reply to his questions, al-Ri‘āya represented its author as willing to help the believers to find the way of life in which they could render to God the service which He is due.\footnote{Smith, op. cit., p. xvii.}

Al-Muḥāsibī’s hostile attitude towards debate and argumentation is reflected in his discussion found on several pages in chapter LIX, which deals with self-delusion in relation to God.\footnote{Al-Muḥāsibī, al-Ri‘āya, op. cit., p. 458-461; SM, op. cit., p. 126-130.} In this chapter, al-Muḥāsibī discusses the self-delusion of the people by debate and argumentation as well as by the refutation of the adherents of different religions. Then he classifies people deluded by debate and disputation into two main groups: First, those who are led astray and lead others astray. Secondly, those who save themselves by following the guidance and the sunna of the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace. In concluding his discussion, al-Muḥāsibī adresses his own attitude. He tells us how he prefers to follow guidance rather than being occupied with debate and argumentation. His after-life concerned him so much that he never allowed himself to be occupied with debate and disputation.

According to al-Muḥāsibī, the people who have been deluded by debate and disputation propose different ideas reflecting their course of life. The first category of people maintain that one will not act soundly until one has a sound belief. They also state that no one knows God better than they do. These people can be divided into two groups.

The first group are the ones who have been led astray and have led others astray. Al-Muḥāsibī identifies this group with a number of characteristics: (1) They are not aware of their being led astray due to their sophisticated expertise in argumentation and to their knowledge of complicated theological concepts as well as their apt arguments against their adversaries. (2) They refer to themselves as the ones who uphold the truth revealed by God, and as the ones who oppose all error (ḍalāla).\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 126-7.}

Furthermore, al-Muḥāsibī identifies the second group with the following characteristics: (1) They are deluded by debate and skilful in argumentation. (2) They claim that they uphold the truth and do not follow anything else than it. (3) They are of the opinion that an idea can be regarded sound only if it is formulated through examination and reasoning. They spent their time being occupied with debate, far away from God’s guidance, by which they become blind to their sins and mistakes.\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 127.}

According to al-Suyūṭī, al-Muḥāsibī suggests that this group of people are not free from making mistakes in their interpretation and conception. However,
they deny being deluded by debate and argumentations, claiming that they are knowledgeable of the fact that the Koran has both clear and ambiguous verses. Al-Muḥāsibī then emphasizes their uncountable mistakes in interpretation (taʾwīl).

The second group of people who uphold the truth and who are deluded by debate and disputation, being far removed from God and from what is worthier, al-Muḥāsibī argues, negate their being deluded by argumentation. Although most of them are well-acquainted with heretics and the innovators, they do not spend their lives in dispute and do not make religion the subject of their disputation. They attempt to exercise self-reflection and prepare for the life in the Hereafter. They speak the truth and avoid committing mistakes against God. Therefore they refute one falsity with another one. They keep doing that.

Demonstrating his real attitude against debate and argumentation, al-Muḥāsibī states that he does not feel secure to argue through allegorical interpretation (taʾwīl) and analogy. One may think that one’s arguing is a guidance (right way), whereas it is actually a falsehood and deviation. In another passage, al-Muḥāsibī explains that he used to argue, but since he came to know its danger, he gave up argumentation.

Concluding his discussion against debate and argumentation, al-Muḥāsibī exhorts people not to be occupied with these things. Debating and arguing, al-Muḥāsibī suggests, make people forget about their life in the Hereafter. Once one is occupied with debate and argumentation, al-Muḥāsibī goes on arguing, one returns to God without having repented.

Al-Muḥāsibī has devoted only one out of sixty-two chapters to his discussion on being deluded by debate and argumentation. A question to be raised here is why did al-Suyūṭī include al-Muḥāsibī in his list of the opponents of kalām? An answer that can be proposed immediately is that al-Suyūṭī regards al-Muḥāsibī as belonging to the first generation of followers of al-Shāfiʿī and as a savant in several Islamic knowledges: “wa ʾl-ḥārith ḥādhā qad ʾaddahu ʾl-ustādāb ʾābū maṃṣūr al-tamīmī fī ʾl-ṭabaqa al-ʿulā miṃ ashāb al-shāfiʿī...īmām al-muslimīn fī ʾl-riba wa ʾl-taṣawwuf wa ʾl-ḥadīth wa ʾl-kalām wa ʾl-ṣuḥd wa ʾl-warāʾ wa ʾl-maʿrifatā.”

By incorporating al-Muḥāsibī on his lists against kalām, his adversaries may have been led to the impression that kalām had been opposed by many Shafiʿite savants, some of whom had even been occupied with kalām before and then repented, like al-Muḥāsibī.

Having compared al-Riʿāya with the edition by ʿAbd al-Qādir Ṭāhir ʿAtā, it can be concluded that al-Suyūṭī did not abridge or paraphrase it. He rather incorporated it fully into his SM, presumably because of the fact that all the arguments of al-Muḥāsibī dealing with the censure of debate and contention are penetrating arguments without any digression whatsoever.

[c.] Kitāb Ḥalq Afʿāl al-ʿĪbād (forthwith called: KH) of al-Buḥārī, the Author of al-Ṣaḥīḥ (d. 256/870)

781Ibidem.
782SM, op. cit., p. 128.
783SM, op. cit., p. 129.
784SM, op. cit., p. 130.
785SM, op. cit., p. 126.
786Al-Riʿāya, op. cit., p. 458-461.
There could have been three reasons why al-Suyûṭi incorporated KH into SM: the first two are obvious, and the third is an assumption. First, the contents of al-Buhârî’s KH explicitly condemn kalâm. Secondly, there is the all-important fact that al-Buhârî was referred to by al-Suyûṭi as one of those who entitled to undertake ītiḥâd. Thirdly, the fact that al-Subki has included al-Buhârî among the Shiʿîte faqîhs, in spite of the refutation of the affiliation of al-Buhârî to the Shafiʿite law school by some modern scholars.

This work was published for the first time in India in 1306/1889 and was re-published in Cairo in 1988 in an edition of Abû Muḥammad Sâlim b. ‘Abd al-Hâdî al-Salafi et al.

In his KH, al-Buhârî as a traditionist, provides a number of narrations censuring debate, argumentation and kalâm: “He said in his work [KH]: What is known on the authority of Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] and the scholars is that they hate discussion and examination of obscure things. They also avoid the Mutakallimûn. They only discourse and dispute on a matter concerning which there is [traditionally established] knowledge [available], and which the Messenger - may God bless him and grant him peace - has explained. God the Almighty said: ‘And if ye quarrel about anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger...’”

Then he adduced the ḥadîth: “The Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - heard some people quarrelling. He said: ‘Those who were before you perished only because of this. They contrast certain verses of the Book of God with other ones. The Book of God was revealed only in order that certain verses of it justify other ones. Do not contrast certain verses with other ones. Whatever you know, say [it]; and what is difficult for you [to know], ask it from one who knows it.’”

He also adduced the ḥadîth of the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace: “Whatever you disagree on, refer it to God and to Muḥammad - may God bless him and grant him peace.”

He also adduced the tradition of ʿĀ’isha: “He who performs [a religious] practice to which our command does not point, [his reward] is denied.”

He [al-Buhârî] said: “‘Umar ordered that the ignorant should refer to the Book and the Tradition.” Likewise, al-Buhârî said: “He who does not know that God’s Kalâm is not created, he [should] know and avoid his ignorance by referring to the Book and the Tradition. He who rejects it [i.e. the uncreatedness of the Koran] after having known of it, is a transgressor.” God the Almighty said: “Allah is not one to lead a people astray after He has guided them until He makes clear to the m what they should guard against...” He then said: “But he who

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787 SM, op. cit., p. 131.
788 Robson, for instance, rejects the idea of al-Buhârî being affiliated to the Shiʿīte law school, since the latter did not consistently subscribe to the doctrine of any particular school. See Robson, J., “al-Bukhârî,” in EI², I, 1296-7.
790 Published by Maktaba al-Turâth al-Islámî.
791 This name “Aḥmad” appears repeatedly in KH. This probably refers to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who vehemently refuted the createdness of the Koran, the discussion of which occupies several pages of KH.
splits off from the Messenger after the Guidance has become clear to him, and follows any other way than that of the believers, We shall consign him to what he has turned to, and roast him in Gehenna- a bad place to go to!"  

Furthermore, al-Buhārī remarked: “whenever one is encountered with something ambiguous, he/she is to infer about [that matter] with one who knows it [well].” The tradition of Ibn 'Amr says: “One is not to enter into discussion of the ambiguities, except of what is clear to him.” Finally, al-Buhārī then adduced the tradition of 'Ā'isha concerning [the Prophet’s] saying: “If you see those who follow what is ambiguous, [you must know that] they are the ones who preoccupy God. So, beware of them!”

Concerning the way al-Suyūṭī deals with KH for his discussion against kalām, it can be said that he selected only some of the relevant discussions (viz. one and a half pages out of 180 printed pages).

[d.] Šariḥ al-Sunna (forthwith called: SS) of Ibn Jarir al-Ṭabarī

Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad b. Jarir al-Ṭabarī was born in Amul, the capital city of Ṭabaristān at the end of 224 or the beginning of 225/841. Like other scholars of the time, he specialized in three fields: history, legal theory and Qur’anic science. Besides, al-Ṭabarī was credited with exceptional learning in a variety of disciplines. He was well-versed in grammar, lexicography and philosophy. He was also well-acquainted with exact sciences and his great interest was medicine.

According to Bosworth, he was mostly famous as “the supreme universal historian and the Qur’ān commentator of the first three or four centuries of Islam.” He died in 310/923.

In spite of its shortness, al-Ṭabarī’s biographical information provided by al-Suyūṭī in SM reveals the reason why al-Suyūṭī incorporated data from SS: al-Ṭabarī was a mujaddid of the third Islamic century, whose biography was cited extensively in Ṭabaqāt al-Mufassirīn. Referring to al-Subkī in Ṭabaqāt, al-Suyūṭī says that al-Ṭabarī was an independent mujtahid, who studied jurisprudence under the guidance of al-Shāfī‘i and then under that of al-Ja‘farānī and al-Rabī’ī al-Murādī. Another relevant fact was of course that al-Ṭabarī was a fervent critic of the Mutakallimūn. This is confirmed by Gilliot, for instance, whose study of the influence of theological views on al-Ṭabarī’s linguistic approach in his exegesis, lead him to suggest that although al-Ṭabarī has made use of certain arguments and methods of kalām in his exegesis, he, as reflected in his works, shares the ideas upheld by other traditionalists, such as Ahmad b. Hanbal, al-

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796 KH, op. cit., p. 61, 63.
799 Al-Suyūṭī provides some biographical information about al-Ṭabarī in his introductory remark on Kitāb Šariḥ al-Sunna, SM, op. cit., p. 133.
800 SM, op. cit., p. 133.
Buhrā, al-Dārimi, etc. Setting the position held by al-Ṭabarî in his exegesis, Gilliot further argues that the group which al-Ṭabarî attempted to attack was the one which strictly upheld qadarite theological views as well as the Jahmites.

According to Rosenthal, SS was known as al-Ṭabarî’s creed, in which he explains his theological views as well as religious theory and practice in the service of God. This work has been edited on the basis of the Istanbul manuscript and translated by D. Sourdel, “Une profession de foi de l’Historien al-Ṭabarî” in Revue des Études Islamiques XXXVI Fas. 2, 1968 in 7 printed pages.

In the work under discussion Al-Ṭabarî narrates some events that occurred after the death of the Prophet, such as the dispute among the umma about who was most entitled to the leadership and the caliphate among them, the dispute on “the deeds of the worshippers, both their obedience and their violations; whether [the deeds of the worshippers] are determined by the qadā’ of God and His qadar or the affair respecting this question is given to the people;” then follows the dispute on the Koran, viz. whether it was created or not, and on the Divine vision of the believers in the Day of Resurrection. Al-Ṭabarî considered all these disputes as stupidities which only occupied people of stupidity and enmity. Furthermore, he quotes Ahmad b. Ḥanbal as having said: “He who says that my pronunciation of the Koran is created, is a Jahmite; and he who says that the Koran is not created, is an innovator.”

Concluding his discussion, he states: “Not a single saying in that respect is allowed to us to express except his saying: If we do not have a leader in [the discussion on the createdness of the Koran], we look for another person with whom [we are] pleased and satisfied. He is the leader to whom one adheres (al-īmām al-muttaba’). The discussion on the name: whether it stands for a thing or for nothing is one of the recent stupidities about which not a single tradition to be followed was transmitted. Neither has an opinion from an īmām been transmitted. Thus, being occupied with [such a discussion] is a disgrace, whereas, being silent of it is a grace.”

Based on the comparison of Sourdel’s edition of SS, which comprises 7 printed pages, and the SS incorporated into SM which consists of three and a half printed pages, two things are worthy of noting: First, it is obvious that Sourdel does not refer to SM when editing SS (in 1968), in spite of the fact that SM was edited much earlier (in 1947). However, a lacuna in Sourdel’s edition of SS could have been filled in on the basis of SM. Likewise, some words in the text of SS in Sourdel’s edition could have been corrected and rendered more comprehensible. Secondly, al-Suyūṭī left some pages unabriged due to their

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802 Nous avons déjà vu que Tabari avait eu maille à partir avec des ḥanbalites qui l’accusaient d’hérésie…’ Gilliot, op. cit., p. 208-210.
803 ‘Tabari s’en prend surtout aux groupes d’obédience qadarite.’ Gilliot, op. cit., p. 207.
806 A lacuna on p. 193, l. 6 of Sourdél’s edition, where al-Ṭabarî says: “al-ḥamdulillah mutliḥ al-ḥaqq wa nāṣiruh…” can be filled in with more than two pages of SS recorded in SM (p. 1345). See Sourdel, op. cit., p. 193.
807 Just to give a brief example, in Sourdél’s edition (p. 194 and 198), ḥamaqāt (stupidities) was rather copied as jama‘āt. This can be clearly read, for instance in a phrase which reads: “wa amma ‘l-qawl `ti ‘l-ism ahuwa al-musammā am huwa gayr al-musammā fā-īnnaḥū mina
being merely further explanations of major theological issues revolving around (1) the *imāma*, (2) the action of man in relation to God’s ordinance, (3) the status of belief (*imān*) whether it is determined by words (*qawl*) or action or by both of them, (4) the vision of God, (5) the createdness of the Koran and (6) the words of the Koran (*al-fāz al-qur’ān*).

[c.] *Al-Gunya ‘an al-Kalām* of Abū Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ḥaṭṭābī

At the end of the summary of *al-Gunya*, al-Suyūṭī provides some biographical information about al-Ḥaṭṭābī. He was a leading scholar in the field of jurisprudence, language, etc. and died in 388/988. According to Günther, al-Ḥaṭṭābī was a Shafi’ite traditionalist who was born in 319/931 in Bust (now Lashkargāh), a city in Southern Afghanistan. Among his important teachers were Abū Sa’īd b. al-‘Arabī (d. 341/952) and Ibn al-Najjād (d. 348/959) and one of his prominent disciples was the Shafi’ite Abū Ḥāmid al-İsfarā’īnī (d. 406/1015-6) who was the teacher of al-Gazālī. Al-Ḥaṭṭābī was the author of nine works, six of which have been edited. According to Brockelmann, the way in which al-Ḥaṭṭābī used to discuss was very critical and argumentative.

Apart from the fact that it was quoted by Ibn Taymiyya in *Majmū‘at al-Rasā‘īl al-Kubrā*, almost no information can be found about *al-Gunya*. When discussing al-Ḥaṭṭābī’s opposition to the Ash’arite *kalām*, Günther, for instance, mentions only that it was written to anathemize *kalām*, without dealing with its content in spite of the fact that this work was incorporated into *SM*. Likewise, Makdisi suggests that “this work is not extant.”

Al-Ḥaṭṭābī’s censure of *kalām* is clearly stated in his remarks: “You have established your own opinion, my brother, may God protect you in a fair manner. You have [also] portrayed your attitude to us with respect to the heretical views of the *Mutakallimūn*, to the occupation of those who are involved in vain discourse with [those heretical views], to the tendency of some followers of the Sunna towards them and their being deceived by them. [You are also well-informed of] their pretension that *kalām* is a protection for tradition…”

Al-Ḥaṭṭābī then remarks: “You asked me to help you with knowledge and evidence which could support us in establishing the truth and refuting the...
conception of those people [viz. the Mutakallimûn] with the use of argument and demonstration.\footnote{Ibidem.}

Furthermore, he expresses his concern saying: “Then I thought of this affair. In it, I found the greatest reason that the Satan, today, started, with the help of his subtle deceit, to seduce every one who claims to possess a broad knowledge, excellent intelligence and sagacity. The Satan makes him dubious [with the following dilemma:] If for his religious practice and his school, he is only pleased to adopt the literal meaning of the tradition (al-sunna) and will be satisfied with taking clear evidence out of it, he becomes an example for the laymen and will be considered one from the mass of the people (al-jumhûr) and one among many only!\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 139.}

In another passages, he criticized the Mutakallimûn saying: “When they [viz. the Mutakallimûn] saw the Book of God the Almighty speaking against what they argue and testifying against the falsity of what they believe, they contrasted some of its verses with other ones and interpreted them according to what exists in their minds. However, [the Book] stands directly against the principles which they established. They then oppose the traditions (âhûrî) of the Messenger of God - may God bless him and grant him peace - and his Sunna which is adduced from him. They left them [viz. al-âbûrî] out. But they transmitted the speech in an evil manner. [Therefore, the Pious Ancestors] were prejudiced against them and accused them of having committed heresy."\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 140.}

Condemning the Mutakallimûn, al-‘aÔÔÁbÐ reveals the proper attitude of the Pious Ancestors with respect to kalâm. According to al-‘aÔÔÁbÐ, the Pious Ancestors “understood well that they had [good] knowledge of the Book and its wisdom and of the apprehension of the Sunna and the evidence deduced therefrom, being in no need of anything else than both of these.”\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 140-1.}

Responding to the accusation of the Mutakallimûn that al-‘aÔÔÁbÐ rejected the use of rational evidences on which the soundness of principles of religion is founded, he remarks: “We neither refute the rational evidences nor their competence to lead us to the knowledge. But when using them, we do not follow the method which you applied during the establishment of the argument with the help of the accidents and by referring these accidents to the essences as well as the transformation of these accidents into the essences for [understanding] the creation of the Universe and the existence of the Creator. We dislike the use of such a method [by turning to] something which has the clearest evidence and soundest demonstration. Because that is a matter which you take from the philosophers and due to which you followed them. The philosophers apply this method, only because they neither affirm the prophethood nor believe that the truth has been already born in [their prophethood]. The strongest thing in the argumentation affirming these affairs, in their opinion, is what they deduced from these things.”\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 140-1.}

Asserting that kalâm is an innovation, al-‘aÔÔÁbÐ argues: “If some people from among the Companions adhere to the opinion of those [who are occupied

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\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{816}}Ibidem.  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{817}}SM, op. cit., p. 138-9.  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{818}}SM, op. cit., p. 139.  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{819}}SM, op. cit., p. 140.  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{820}}SM, op. cit., p. 140-1.}
with kalām and debate, they would have been regarded as belonging to the group of the Mutakallimūn. The names of the Mutakallimūn among them would have been known to us as also the names of the jurists, the reciters and the sufists among them. If not, that means that they were not involved in kalām.\(^{821}\)

Concluding his discussion, al-Ḥāṭṭābī says: “If someone says: ‘Thus, it is necessary to respond to this [kind of] proposition that you put forward, [by stating that] the belief in God and the knowledge of His oneness were obligatory for one who possesses the intelligence only after the Messenger has been sent to him. If [the Messenger was not sent to him], avoiding to [believe in God] does not bring down any punishment and chastisement on him,’ the following words should be said [to him]: ‘We are also of the opinion that this is in line with what God - the Majesty – has said: ...We have not been accustomed to punish until We have sent a messenger.’ \(^{822}\)


Al-Lālakāʾī was born in Ṭabaristān and died in Baghdad in Ramadān 418/1028. He was an expert in tradition, and thus known as al-Ḥāʾizī. He studied jurisprudence under the guidance of Abū Ḥāmid\(^{823}\) and wrote several books. The work to be discussed has been edited by Ahmad Saʿd Ḥamdān (Riyāḍ: 1985).\(^{824}\)

Like other scholars of tradition, al-Lālakāʾī condemns innovation, heresy, and argument. His Sharḥ is replete with censures against dispute and kalām. In one passage, al-Lālakāʾī states that it is obligatory to refrain from innovations and from listening to what is innovated by those who lead people astray.\(^{825}\) In another, he states that the first innovation to appear in Islam was the dispute on al-qadar, concerning which ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar was asked. He then produces the narration on the authority of the Prophet who commanded people to confirm the qadar, to believe in it and to refrain from disputing about it. The same question, according to al-Lālakāʾī was also posed to Ibn ʿAbbās, Abū Saʿīd al-Ḥudri and many other scholars.\(^{826}\)

Al-Lālakāʾī’s harsh criticism of those who befriend and discuss with a heretic and an innovator is clearly indicated by his remark: “No crime perpetrated by Muslims is bigger than having a discussion with an innovator. No abasement and

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\(^{821}\)SM, op. cit., p. 142.


\(^{823}\)According to Makdisi, Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfarāʾīnī was a Shafiʿite professor who was severely critical of the Ashʿarites and took every opportunity to dissociate himself from them. He was the author of a Taʿlīqa on uṣūl ʾtiqāḍ, a commentary of Shafiʿi’s risāla. In this work, Abū Ḥāmid put forth the doctrine of Shafiʿi and the Shafiʿites regarding the Koran as uncreated, and declared those who disagree (i.e. Ashʿarites among others) to be unbelievers. See his article “The Non-Ashʿarite Shafiʿism of Ghazzali” in REI, (1986), p. 239-257.


\(^{825}\)SM, op. cit., p. 148.

\(^{826}\)SM, op. cit., p. 151.
vileness can be worse than their negligence of the pious ancestors’ method of dealing with heretics.\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 153.}

Furthermore al-Láliká’i quotes ‘Ali b. Abí Tálib as having said: “There will be people who [are coming to] debate you. So, encounter them with the help of the traditions! The adherents of the traditions are more knowledgeable of the book of God.” He also quotes the words of Ḥalil b. Ahmad\footnote{Al-Halíl b. Ahmad al-Faráhídí was born approximately in the first century of Hijra. He was a teacher of Síbawayhi and the founder of prosody (‘ilm al-‘aráḏ). He was the author of Kitáb al-‘Ayn who died ca. 175/792. SM, op. cit., p. 165, n. 1 (N).}, “It happens very often that a debate is followed by another one which abolishes it.” An interesting quotation dealing with the censure of kalám by al-Láliká’i can also be found in Ḥarím b. Ḥayyán’s\footnote{According to Caskel, Ḥarím b. Ḥayyán was “one of the earliest pietist of Islam and a forerunner of al-Íasan al-Bárí. See Caskel, W., “Ýabd al-¬ays,” in EI², I, p. 72-4.} remark: “An author of kalám finds himself in one of two positions: When he is ignorant of it, he is defeated [by his opponent]; but when he is deeply rooted in it, he sins.”\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 165.}

Al-Suyúṭí’s discussion of al-Láliká’i’s unfavourable remark on kalám is concluded with the latter’s reference to Súfýán b. ‘Uyayna (d. 196/811)\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 157} who used to recite the lines of Ibn Shubruma (d. 144/761):\footnote{Ibn Shubruma, ‘Abd Alláh b. Shubruma b. al-Ṭufayl al-Dabbi was referred to by his biographers as a traditionist, jurist and qáḍí of Kúfa. His grandfather, Shubruma was a Companion of the Prophet. According to Vadet, “the Ḥanbalis and the Medinens were more indulgent towards him than the ruling orthodox (e.g. ‘Abd Alláh b. Mubárák, who taught from 141/758, especially Ibn Sa’d, who mocks Ibn Shubruma severely in the portrait he gives of him”). He died in 144/761. See Vadet, J.C., “Ibn Shubruma,” in EI², III, p. 938.}\footnote{The word in the square bracket is taken from SU (p. 149).}

“If you say: Make every effort in religious service and be patient # Persist [in doing it!] they then say: [‘no’],\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 167-8.} argumentation is more preferable.

That is an opposition to the Companions of the Prophet and also an innovation # they are the blindest and the most ignorant in [observing] the course of truth\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 161-5.}.

A great number of persons from the Ahl al-Sunna listed by al-Láliká’i in his SU are also incorporated by al-Suyúṭí in SM, apparently giving the impression that those individuals can be also regarded as opponents of kalám. These people are classified into (1) the first generation, the Companions of the Prophet, (2) the second generation, the Followers, (3) the third generation, the Followers of the Followers, and (4) people from among the residents of Mecca, Syria/Palestine (Shám), Mesopotamia, Egypt, Kúfa, Başra, Rayy, Mosul, Ḥurasán, Bagdad and Ţabarístán.\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 165.}

As far as the abridgement of SU by al-Suyúṭí in SM is concerned, it is instructive to note several points: First, al-Suyúṭí only chose a number of
arguments against *kalām* by al-Lālakā‘ī, which are scattered over pages 9-49, 114, 129-130, 146, and 148-9 of the first volume of the Ḥamdān edition, which covers 369 pages (the 2nd volume comprises 305 pages) and summarized them on only 20 printed pages of SM (p. 148-168). Secondly, al-Suyūṭī notes at the end of his abridgement that al-Lālakā‘ī was the Shafi‘ite *ḥāfiz* and jurist who was given a certificate of jurisprudence by Abū Ḥāmid al-Īsafarīnī, “a Shafi‘ite professor who was severely critical of the Ash‘arites and took every opportunity to disassociate himself from them.”

Although al-Suyūṭī does not explicitly mention a reason why he incorporated *SU* into his SM, it is to recall the suggestion of Ḥamdān that this work exercised very important influence on what he calls the ‘Salafi school’ (*al-madhhab al-salāfi*). This work, he argues, constitutes a significant reference which sheds lights on the knowledge of the religious doctrines (*‘aqā‘id*) of the scholars among the Pious Ancestors.


837 See the introduction of *SU*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

838 GAL, I, 164, S.I, 274.


842 Van Ess says that according to the Isma’ilite Abū Hātim al-Razi, the Naṣibites (*nawāsib*) is a nickname for the Murji‘ītes. Van Ess, *TG*, vol. IV, p. 685, n. 15.

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**[g.] Al-*Sharī‘a* by the Imām Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ājurrī**

Al-Ājurrī was born in Ajur, a district in the west-side of Bagdad. He was a Shafi‘ite judge and the author of many monographs on Tradition, such as *al-Arba‘ūn al-Ājurrīyya, al-Sharī‘a fi ‘l-Sunna, Aḥāq al-Ulamā‘*, etc. In 330/942, he embarked on a pilgrimage to Mecca and stayed there until his death in 360/970.838 His *Sharī‘a* has been edited by Mu‘ammad Ḥāmid al-Faqī.839

The passages of his work abridged by al-Suyūṭī concern the censure of debate and argumentation in matters of religion by his predecessors. First of all, he quotes al-Ājurrī as having adduced from Ma‘ān b. ‘Īsā the words: “A man suspected to be a Murji‘ī came to Mālik b. Anas. So he said: ‘O Abū ‘Abd Allāh! Hear from me about a thing, about which I talk and dispute with you.’ He replied: ‘If you overcome me?’ He said: ‘If I overcome you, you must follow me.’ He asked: ‘What if another man comes, and he talks with us and then defeats us?’ He replied: ‘We will follow him.’ So, Mālik said: ‘O ‘Abd Allāh, God delegated Muḥammad - may God bless him and grant him peace - to propagate one religious mission. But I see you converting from one particular faith to another one.’ ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz said: ‘He who makes his religious tenet(s) the object of disputations, always changes [his faith].’”

Furthermore al-Suyūṭī quotes another interesting remark of al-Ājurrī on the heretics in the following words: “Anyone who upholds Tradition is admonished to abandon all the heretics including the Kharijites, Qadarites, Murji‘ītes, Jahmites, Mu‘tazilites, Rafidites, Naṣibites842 and anyone whom the leading scholars of the Muslims identify with an author of a misleading innovation. One is not admonished to talk to him, to greet him, to befriend him, to pray behind
him, to give [his daughter] to him in marriage, to get married to him, to accompany him, to deal with him, to argue with him and to debate with him. One is rather to humiliate him. If you meet him on the street, take another road if it is possible.  

According to al-Suyuti, al-'Ajurrî also refers to 'Ali b. Abî Tâlib as having vexed the heretics and said:

When I hear a saying that is reprehensible # I light my fire and I then call [Qanbara]  

By including this poetry, al-Suyûti may have wanted to give the impression that when 'Ali b. Abû Tâlib was encountered with a question of kalâm, he prepared himself for a fight, for the purpose of which he called his mawla', i.e. Qanbara to bring to his master all the fighting equipment, such as armor, sword, etc.

In his concluding passages, al-'Ajurrî reports that 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azîz sent a letter to 'Adî b. Arûtât (d. 102/820-1) about the Qadarites: "I request them to repent. Unless they repent, you must hit their necks." Hishâm b. 'Abd al-Malik is also referred to by al-'Ajurrî as having hit Gaylân on his neck and crucified him. The emirs after them used to afflict punishment to the heretics depending on the [evil] viewpoint(s) that they [viz. the heretics] expressed. The learned men do not refuse [this fact]. Then he adduced from Mu'âdh b. Jabal the words: "The Messenger of God - may God bless him and grant him peace - said: 'If innovations occur among my umma, the learned is told to proclaim his knowledge. He, among them, who does not do so, upon him is God's curse, the angels' and all of the people's curse.' "

No other explicit reason can be found in SM to explain why al-Suyûti incorporated al-Shari'a into his SM than the fact that several pages of the work explicitly deal with the condemnation of kalâm. However, Brockelmann's reference to al-'Ajurrî as a prominent Shafiîite jurist who composed several important works and whose authority is, according to Ismá'il, extensively cited by more than fifteen biographers can be regarded as a major reason.

[h.] Qût al-Qulûb of Abû Tâlib Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Hâritî al-Makkî
Some biographical information on Abû Tâlib al-Makkî is provided by al-Suyûti at the end of his summary. Referring to al-Dhahabi in al-'Ilbar, al-Suyûti narrates

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843 SM, op. cit., p. 172.
844 A copying error also occurs in this place. The correct word for qanîr is qanbara which points to a former slave of 'Ali b. Abî Tâlib. See Sharh Nahj al-Balâgha by Ibn Abî al-Ḥadid (Cairo: Dâr Iḥyâ'i 'l-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1959), vol. II, p. 70.
845 'Adî b. Arûtât al-Fazari, Abû Wâthla, according to Bearman, was a governor who was appointed by 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azîz in place of Yazid b. al-Muḥallab. He received the order from 'Umar to arrest the sons of al-Muḥallab. He was killed by Mu'âwiya b. Yazid in 102/820-1. See Bearman, P.J., "'Adî b. Arûtât," in EI², XII, p. 41.
846 Gaylân b. Muslim al-Dimashqî al-Qibti (probably al-Nabâzî) was killed in the era of Hishâm b. 'Abd al-Malik, who reigned from 105 to 125/724-743. See "Hishâm," in EI², III, 493-5.
848 GAL, I, 164, S.I, 274.
849 This is mentioned by the editor of al-Faqî, the editor of al-Shari'a. See the introduction of al-Shari'a, op. cit., p. 6.
that one of the leading Malikite scholars, Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. ‘Atiyya al-Hārithī al-’Ajami, was resident of a mountainous area in the surroundings of Mecca. He studied tafsīr and wrote a Sufi book.\textsuperscript{850} Massignon provides additional biographical information about al-Makki. According to him, al-Makki was a traditionalist and mystic, well-known as the head of the dogmatic school of the Sālimiyya. \textit{Qūt al-Qulūb} is his chief work, whole pages of which were copied by al-Gazālī (d. 505/1111) in his \textit{Ihya‘}. He died in Bagdad in 386/998.\textsuperscript{851}

In his discussion of \textit{kalām}, in his \textit{Qūt al-Qulūb}, al-Makki starts with the history of the composition of books and other collected materials. In his opinion, the first and second generation did not compose any books. The composition occurred only after 120/739, after the death of all the Companions and the Old followers. Furthermore he remarks: “the first books composed in Islam were: Kitāb ibn Jurayj on āthār and various works on tafsīr by ‘Ata’, Mujāhid and the companions of Ibn ‘Abbās in Mecca. Then followed a work by Mu‘ammār b. Rāshid al-Ṣan‘ānī, in which he collected scattered traditions and classified them into [several] chapters. Then followed Kitāb al-Muwattā by jurisprudence by Mālik b. Anas, in Madina. Likewise, Ibn ‘Uyayna composed Kitāb al-Jāmi‘ wa‘l-Tafsīr dealing with the variant readings in the science of the Koran, and with the variations of traditions (al-aḥādith al-mutafarriqa). In the meantime, Sufyān al-Thawri also composed his works. So, these five books are the first ones which were composed after the death of al-Ḥasan, Sa‘īd b. al-Musayyab and the chosen Followers as well as after 120 or 130 H.\textsuperscript{852}

“After 200 years and after the passage of three centuries, i.e., in the following fourth century,” the composition of books on \textit{kalām} was started by the \textit{Mutakallimūn}, who based their arguments on reason, heresy and analogy. Due to this composition, al-Makki goes on, some grave conditions came into being. He reports, for instance, that “(then after that the period mentioned above had passed by) the affair became confused at this moment. In time, the \textit{Mutakallimūn} were called learned men. Story-tellers were named knowledgeable men. Likewise, transmitters and narrators were called learned men,\textsuperscript{853} despite the absence of an understanding of religious rules and of religious truth.”\textsuperscript{854} Therefore, “[people] chose rational [knowledge] and common sense in preference to the literal significances of the Koran and the āthār.”\textsuperscript{855}

Furthermore, al-Makki laments that “at the end of the world, there will be learned men to whom the door of religious practice is closed and to whom the door of debate is opened.” Like other scholars of tradition, al-Makki, by referring to a number of leading scholars, such as Mālik b. Anas, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, etc, devotes a long passage to censure the scholars of debate, argumentation and

\textsuperscript{850}SM, op. cit., p. 181.
\textsuperscript{852}SM, op. cit., p. 174-5.
\textsuperscript{853}This is rendered from the phrase in QQ (p. 37), which reads “wa ‘l-ruwwāt wa ‘l-naqala yuqālu ‘ulamā’…” In SM, it reads “wa ‘l-ruwwāt al-naqala ‘ulamā’ min gayri fiqhīn fī dinīn…”See SM, op. cit., p. 175.
\textsuperscript{854}SM, op. cit., p. 175.
\textsuperscript{855}SM, op. cit., p. 179.
*kalām*. One of his censures, for instance, reads that scholars of *kalām* are atheists.\(^86\)

Concluding his discussion of al-Makki’s condemnation of *kalām*, al-Suyūṭī quotes the former as having reported that “a companion of al-Shāfi’i [d. 203/820] left Abū Thawr [d. 240/854], when he spoke in response to an innovator concerning the rejection of the attributes.” Asserting his argument, al-Makki quotes another example: “When asked about the tradition that God has created Adam in accordance with His image, Aḥmad [b. Abū Du‘ād, d. 239/854]\(^87\) became angry. Hence, Abū Thawr shranked from [the debate] and apologized [for it].”\(^88\)

Concluding his discussion, al-Makki, according to al-Suyūṭī, remarked: “So, this was the course of life of the pious ancestors. They neither listen to an innovator nor argue against him with the help of debate and argumentation. Because that is an innovation. They rather advice them about the traditions. They [must] shrink [from debate], otherwise they [must] apologize for their innovation and abandon it because of God.”\(^89\)

QQ, which the present author consulted, consists of two volumes, each of which comprises two parts. Al-Suyūṭī may have wanted to incorporate QQ into his SM for two reasons: *First*, in order to use al-Makki’s critical remarks against *kalām* and the *Mutakallimūn* as quoted above; and *secondly*, because of al-Makki’s prominence. This is obviously indicated by al-Suyūṭī’s reference to the former as one of the leading Malikite scholars and as the author of many works, as can be read in al-Suyūṭī’s concluding remarks in the last passage.\(^90\)

As far as the abridgement of QQ by al-Suyūṭī into SM is concerned, al-Suyūṭī re-arranges al-Makki’s arguments in QQ. He quotes al-Makki’s discussion of the history of knowledge first, after which follows the latter’s discussion of the censure of debating. In QQ, the order of the arguments is opposite. *Secondly*, al-Suyūṭī only chose a number of al-Makki’s arguments against *kalām*, which are scattered over pages 6-50 of the 2\(^{nd}\) part of the first volume of his work, and summarized them in only 8 printed pages of SM. Al-Suyūṭī can be said to have succeeded in presenting al-Makki’s arguments against *kalām* in a more penetrating manner.

[i.] Ḫāmī Bayān a m wa Faḍlliḥ (fothwith called: JB) of Abū ‘Umar Yūsuf b. ‘Abd al-Barr al-Nimār\(^{\text{[i]}}\)

al-Nimār was born in Cordoba on 24 Rabi II 368/30 November 978. He studied under the supervision of Abū ‘Umar Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Mālik b. Ḥāshim in Cordoba and became the greatest traditionist in the Magrib. At the very


\(^{87}\)This probably points to Ahmad b. Abī Duʿād al-lyāḍī, Abū ‘Abd Allāh, Muʿtazilite *Qādī*, who was born in Basra in ca. 160/776 and referred to by Zetterstéen as a fervent follower of the Muʿtazilite doctrine and as being appointed as Chief *Qādī* during the reign of al-Muʿtaṣim. The notorious merit which is always ascribed to him by his biographers is that he played an important role in the examination of Ahmad b. Ḥanbal during the Inquisition. He died at the end of 239/May-June 854. See Zetterstéen, K.V., “Aḥmad b. Abī Duʿād,” in EI², I, 271.


\(^{89}\)ibidem.

\(^{90}\)ibidem.
beginning he was a Zahirite, then a Malikite, and at last he became a follower of
the Shafi‘ite school of law. He was appointed Qādi of Lisbon and Santarem
during the reign of the Aftasid ruler, al-Mu‘azzafar. He died on 29 Rabi‘ II 463/3
February 1071.\(^{861}\) His work has been edited by Ahmad b. ‘Umar al-Mahmasānī
al-Bayrūtī al-Azhārī and published in Cairo, in 1902.\(^{862}\)

In the work, as abridged by al-Suyūṭī, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr discusses two topics:
The hatefulness of debate and argumentation;\(^{863}\) and the censuring of specula
tion on matters of belief in God based on personal opinion and analogy without
referring to textual foundations.\(^{864}\) Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr began his discussion by
referring to the tradition of the Pious Ancestors. According to him, the Pious
Ancestors prohibited dispute on the Nature of God and His Attributes. In
contrast, they allowed dispute and argumentation in jurisprudence and this
is knowledge concerning the rules to be derived from principles.\(^{865}\)

Like other traditionalists, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr discusses the censure of debate,
argumentation and kalām by his predecessors which revolves around the
following points: (a) That one who subjects his religion to altercation, is likely to
move from one religion to another (which implies ridda). (b) That one has to
avoid argumentation, because it foils religious practices; (c) Kalām on matters of
religion is rejectable. (d) The scholars of tradition and jurisprudence reached a
consensus that the scholars of kalām are innovators and cheaters.

Interestingly Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr associates the debate on the attributes of God
with the destruction of the world and that of the safety of the umma. This is
clearly indicated by the words of Ibn al-Hanafiyya, which al-Suyūṭī quoted: “The
world comes to an end, not before they dispute on [the attributes of] their God.”
The same holds true for the words of Ibn ‘Abbās: “The affair of this umma
remains almost the same, until they speak about al-wildān\(^{866}\) and qadar.”\(^{867}\)

Furthermore, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr incorporated the famous poetry of Ishāq b.
Abī Isrā‘il,\(^{868}\) who refused to be occupied with debate and argumentation:

> "Do I need to lay in wait after my bones trembled # while death is closest of what is
adjacent to me

To debate with any opponent # also rendering his religious belief a target of mine
and abandoning what I have already known due to an opinion of one other than me #
while personal views do not resemble absolute knowledge (al-‘ilm al-yaqūnī)\(^{869}\)

\(^{861}\)GAL, I, 368, S. I, 628.
\(^{862}\)The complete title is Jāmi‘ Bayān al-Ý-Ilm wa Fadlih wa mā Yanbagi fī Riwāyatih wa Ḥamlih.
\(^{863}\)SM, op. cit., p. 182-188.
\(^{864}\)SM, op. cit., p. 189-191.
\(^{865}\)SM, op. cit., p. 182.
\(^{866}\)This points to the question on the fate of the children of the infidels, who die before
reaching the adult age, whether they will be among the inhabitants of Paradise.
Responding to this question, the scholars, according to Wensink, are divided into three
groups: First, the majority of scholars maintain that the children, like their parents, will
 go to Hell; the second group hold off to give any opinion; the last ones are of the opinion
that the children will go to Paradise. Wensink, A.J., The Muslim Creed, Its Genesis and
\(^{867}\)SM, op. cit., p. 183.
\(^{868}\)Ishāq b. Abī Isrā‘il b. Kāmihr al-Marwazi, whose kunya was Abū Ma‘yūb, died in
In my opinion, dispute is nothing but an ambiguity which moves freely from the left to the right.

The upright traditions have been established for us [the debater] rather errs in his argument in any direction.

To the truth does not belong any secrecy which deceives like the blaze of a clear star.

For us, the method of Jahm cannot replace the method of Son of Amina the Trustworthy.

What I know suffices for me and what I ignore, let it stay away from me!

I am not one who considers a person who prays an infidel and I do not harm you if you consider me an infidel.

We were brothers, together we reproach so let us reproach every suspicious skeptic.

Thus, mannerism still exists. If it reproaches us by one case, all cases can be split up.

So, a pillar of a house is about to fall down likewise, one relative is separated from the other.

Concluding this chapter, he then recites a poem which reads: 

“[When] people get offended, they fabricate innovations in religious tenets with the help of reason for the sake of which the Messengers were not dispatched. So, most of them value God’s religious teachings lightly They are rather busy with a matter which drags them away from their religion.”

Then follows another topic in which Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr quotes ‘Awf b. Malik al-Ash’i as having said: “The Messenger of God - may God bless him and grant him peace - said: ‘My umma will split into seventy one denominations, the greatest of which is a fascination. People judge religious [ordinance] with the help of their ra’y. They prohibit what God permitted. They also permit what God prohibited.’” Then, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr quoted the words of ‘Umar b. al-Hashtab: “You have to refrain from authors of personal opinions, because they are enemies of the Sunan”. Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr also asserts that once expressing a personal opinion, one is led astray and leads others astray.

The rest of the passages are replete with censures and condemnations of the use of personal opinion and analogy.

In discussing Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr’s arguments against kalām, al-Suyūṭī does not directly refer to JB. He rather relies on its abridgement by al-Qurtūbī, to whom al-Suyūṭī refers as the Imam al-ÝAlláma Abù ÝAbd Alláh MuÎammad b. AÎmad b. AbÐ Bakr al-AnsÁrÐ al-ÝazrajÐ, a popular author who died in Upper Egypt in 659/1262.

To know in which ways al-Suyūṭī abridges JB and presents Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr’s arguments against kalām in SM, it is imperative to refer to JB, since the MuÌtaÒar by al-Qurtûb is no longer extant. Al-Suyūṭī only took two chapters, covering 32 printed pages in JB, out of 74 chapters consisting of 492 printed pages. He

869 This probably points to the Prophet MuÎammad, a son of ÝAbd Manáf.
870 This is rendered from the phrase in SM, which reads “wa lam ujrimukum an takfurùn.” In JB (p. 365), it reads “wa mÁ uÎarrimukum an takfu Ùn.” SM, op. cit., p. 184.
872 SM, op. cit., p. 189.
874 SM, op. cit., p. 192; Abù ‘Abd Alláh Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abî Bakr al-AnsÁrÐ al-ÝazrajÐ al-AndalusÐ, according to Arnaldez, was a Malikite scholar, an expert in hadîth, who was known for his commentary on the Koran. He was born in Spain and died in Upper Egypt in 671/1272. See Arnaldez, R., “Al-Kurtûb,” in EI², V, 512-3.
abridged those two chapters in merely 10 printed pages of SM. This is obviously the result of the fact that al-Suyūṭī has cut the long chains of transmission of the prophetic narrations and/or arguments of leading scholars, which deal with the censure of kalām. On several occasions, al-Suyūṭī mentions only the transmitter closest to the sources themselves.

[j.] Sharaf ʿAbd al-Hadīth (fouthwith called: SAH) by the Ḥāfīz Abū Bakr ʿAbd al-Mahdī al-Ḥāṭīb al-Bagdādī

Al-Ḥāṭīb al-Bagdādī was born in Bagdad in 392/1002. He was one of the leading scholars in the field of Tradition, jurisprudence and usūl al-fiqh. Like his father, he was a Hanbalite at first, then converted to the Shafiʿite madhhab. According to Sellheim, al-Ḥāṭīb’s fame was based on his biographical encyclopaedia of more than 7800 scholars and other personalities, among whom were included women, connected to the cultural and political life in Bagdad. He became an authority on Ḥadīth because of his profound erudition in this field. His works on Ḥadīth, Sellheim maintains, have made him the great critical systematiser of Ḥadīth methodology.

SAH was edited by M.S. Hatiboğlu and published in Ankara in 1971, based on five Mss which are respectively preserved in Istanbul (Mss ‘Āṭīf Afandī), Cairo (Dār al-Kutub), Madina (Maktaba ʿĀrif Ḥikmat), Tubingen, and Damascus (Dār al-Kutub al-Ūāhiryya). The edited work comprises only one volume which consists of 138 printed pages. From this work, al-Suyūṭī abridged the relevant arguments of al-Ḥāṭīb al-Bagdādī against kalām, which occupies only five and a half printed pages in SM.

As the title of his work suggests, in SAH al-Bagdādī interestingly identifies the partisans of Tradition with a number of virtues in relation to their attitudes toward debate, reason and argumentation which occupied the Mutakallimūn. Before doing so, he starts by identifying some characteristics of the authors of innovation and their personal opinions: (1) that they scorned the adherents of the Sunan and Athār, refused to study the laws contained in the Koran, discarded the arguments derived from clear verses of the Koran and neglected the Sunna; (2) that they legislated in matters of religion by making use of their personal opinions; (3) that the young among them are greedy of words of love, while the old are fascinated by kalām and debate; (4) they subjected their religion to disputation; (5) that they are the enemies of the Tradition; (6) that they seek [religious] truth with the help of kalām.

876SAH, op. cit., p. 2.; GAL, ibidem.
877This is rendered from the phrase in SA (p. 4) which reads “fa ʿl-ḥadath minhum manhūm bi ʿl-gazal…” In SM, it reads “fa ʿl-ḥadath minhum mathūm bi ʿl-ʿadl…” SM, op. cit., p. 192.
878SM, op. cit., p. 192.
880SM, op. cit., p. 194.
881Abū Yūsuf is reported to have said these words. SM, op. cit., p. 194.
Al-Bagdādī also identifies them by quoting the poetry of Abū Muzāhīm al-
Ḥaqānī (d. 325/938)882 censuring the Mutakallimūn:

“The Mutakallimūn and the authors of opinion have been deprived of # the knowledge of
Tradition with which one is safe
If they know the āthār they do not turn away # from them toward [a thing] other
than them; nevertheless, they are ignorant”883

By referring to a number of authorities, al-Bagdādī furthermore identifies the
traditionists with a number of characteristics which can be summed up as follows:
(1) They reprove debate on religious ordinances.884 (2) They can understand
religious tenets only with the help of the āthār and not with the help of al-ra’y.885
(3) They regard the Book as their outfit and Tradition as their argument, and the
Prophet as their affiliation and reference.886 (4) They are trustworthy, just and the
protectors of religion and its preservers as well as the bearers of knowledge and its
custodians.887 (5) The truth is always ascribed to them.888 (6) “Manliness is in the
traditionists, kalām is in the Mu’tazilites and cheatfulness is in the Rafidites.”

The arguments against kalām by al-Bagdādī which al-Suyūṭī incorporated
in his SM are scattered over several pages of his work (3-9, 32-34, 78-79). When
dealing with al-Bagdādī’s arguments against kalām, al-Suyūṭī cuts the long chains
of transmission. He mentions only the authority closest to the source. On several
occasions, he even only mentions the author of an opinion. Al-Suyūṭī only
quotes the relevant narrations. Al-Bagdādī in his SAH, for instance, quotes Abū
Yūsuf as having said: “Whoever seeks part of a [religious] truth with the help of
kalām, commits heresy; and whoever seeks garīb al-ḥadīth, lies; whoever looks for
wealth with the help of alchemy, loses his money (atlasa).”889 The last two
sentences are not quoted by al-Suyūṭī in his SM.890

The topics which are not abridged by al-Suyūṭī revolve around (1) the
exhortation to convey a revealed message (al-tablíq), (2) the discussion of the usage
of isnád for gaining knowledge, (3) general virtues of the partisans of Tradition
and of befriending them as well as of the writing of Tradition, (4) the exhortation
(for the young) to learn Tradition and to memorize as well as to spread it (5) the
auspicious dream on the partisans of Tradition, etc.

[k.] Al-Intiṣār li Ahl al-Ḥadīth (forthwith called: IAH) by Abū Sa’d ‘Abd al-Karīm
b. Abī Bakr Muḥammad b. Abī al-Muẓaffar al-Maṣūr al-Tamīmī al-Marwazi al-
Shaḥīfī, known as Ibn al-Sam‘ānī

882 Abū Muzāhīm Mūsā b. ‘Ubayd Allāh b. Yahyā b. Ḥaqān was considered by al-Dhahabī
as al-imām al-muqri’ al-muṭaddith. His father and brother were ministers during the
reigns of al-Mutawakkil and al-Muṭamid. He died in 325/938. Al-Dhahabī, SAN, XV, 94-
5.
883 SM, op. cit., p. 197.
884 These words are adduced on the authority of Mālik b. Anas. SM, op. cit., p. 193.
885 Suṭyān al-Thawrī is reported to have said these words. SM, op. cit., p. 193-4.
887 SM, op. cit., p. 195.
888 These are al-Walīd al-Karābīsī’s last words to his son. SM, op. cit., p. 197.
889 Hārūn al-Rashīd is reported to have said these words. SM, op. cit., p. 197.
890 SAH, op. cit., p. 5.
891 SM, op. cit., p. 194.
Ibn al-Samʿāni was born in Marw on 21 Shaban 506/10 February 1113. His father was an authority in the field of Shafiʿi law. His great biographical works on the Traditionists are Kitāb al-Ansāb and Kitāb al-Taḥbīr fīʿl-Muʿjdam al-Kabīr. His literary production centred on the prophetic traditions and their transmission. He died on the 1st of Rabiʿ I 562/26th of December 1166.\footnote{Sellheim, R., “al-Samʿāni,” in EI², VIII, p.1024-5.} That he was affiliated to Shafiʿi law school is clearly reflected by the fact that al-Subki devoted 5 printed pages to deal with his biography.\footnote{Al-Subki, TS, IV, p. 21-26.}

Hajji Ḥalifa’s Kashf al-Ūunūn, according to al-Nashshār, does not record any information about this work.\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 198, n. 1 (N).} Likewise, Sellheim does not indicate the fact that Ibn al-Samʿāni has composed IAH.\footnote{Sellheim, op. cit., p.1024-5.} Hence, al-Suyūṭi’s abridgement of al-Samʿāni’s arguments against kalām, which occupies thirty-eight and a half printed pages out of 224 printed-pages in SM,\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 198-236.} is of special value to understand at least part of this work by Ibn al-Samʿāni.

Based on the edition of SM, the present author organizes al-Samʿāni’s discussion in IAH as follows:\footnote{Al-Suyūṭi does not give any title for al-Samʿāni’s discussion in the first one and a half printed pages (SM, p. 198-9) preceding chapter (one). In this discussion, the present author refers to it as the introductory passages. The second editor of SM, Suʿāda, inserts a new sub-title, ‘The Statements of Leading Scholars Censuring Kalām,’ (SM, p. 200) presumably due to the fact that al-Samʿāni starts his discussion in this passage with “wa nadhkuruʿl-āna mā waradaʿ anī l-aʿīmma fī dhamm al-kalām…” The present author does not include this new title in the table above.} The numbers in the second column are the page numbers of SM, the 2nd edition.

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In his introductory passages, al-Samʿāni explains that there are two groups who condemned the adherents of traditions: The people of kalām and people of personal opinions. These two groups used to associate the partisans of traditions with ignorance and a complete lack of knowledge. According to him, they, in fact, are themselves associated with these two qualities.\footnote{SM, op. cit., p. 198.}
[1] Chapter (báf) on the Exhortation to the Sunna and the JamÁÝa, Towards Observance and on the Abhorrence of Disunity and Innovation

Referring to several Koranic verses, he exhorts the Sunna and the JamÁÝa and stresses the need for observance (al-ittibÁÝ) as well as his abhorrence of disunity and innovation. Relying on DhK by al-Harawi, he also asserts that a number of traditions and aÌbÁr of the Companions have been produced to command people to follow Tradition and to avoid innovation. Furthermore, he asserts the principle of the followers of the Sunna with respect to the usage of reason as follows: “the course of belief (al-dÐn) is revelation (al-samÝ) and tradition (Áthar); the course of reason and referring to it as well as establishing the sam’iyyÁt on it is legally reprehended and prohibited. We are discussing the position of reason in the Shari’a and the proportion of its usage, which was requested by the Shari’a, as well as the prohibition of trespassing that [proportion].”

To strengthen his conviction that kalÁm was prohibited, Ibn al-SamÝÁnÐ, as an apologetic, felt urged to refer to a good number of leading scholars among his predecessors who had argued against it. In so doing, he interestingly lists al-ShÁfiÝÐ first. He then also adduces the views of SufyÁn al-ThawrÐ, AÎmad b. Í anbal, ÝAbd al-RaÎmÁn b. MahdÐ, SaÝÐd b. ÍamÐd, AbÙ Bakr b. AbÐ DÁwud al-SijistÁnÐ, al-Íasan al-BaÒrÐ, IbrÁhÐm al-NuÌaÝÐ, Ibn Ýumar, and IshÁq b. IbrÁhîm al-ÎanÛalÐ.

[2] Chapter (faÓl) on the Censure of Debate and Disputation in Religious matters

Reported of them and their Abhorrence of these matters

Although al-SamÝÁnÐ acknowledges that there are a number of (prophetic) traditions and narrations on this topic, which have been dealt with by al-Harawi
in his DhK, and also some that have not been dealt with in it, it is less significant, however, to deal with them here, since the arguments against kalām that al-Samʿānī proposes have also been dealt with in other works abridged by al-Suyūṭī in his SM. The following passages deal only with arguments by al-Samʿānī not to be traced in other sources.

To begin with, four chief heresies are identified by al-Samʿānī to have emerged at the end of the time of the companions: al-qadar, al-irjāʿ and the doctrine of the Harurites (al-ḥarūrīyya) as well as that of the Rafidites. Then follows the debate on the belief and disputations in the period of the Followers and that of those who came after them. This happened, he argues, due to the fact that “lies came into view; false testimonies were widespread; ignorance became public; matters pertaining to Tradition became obliterated.”

Al-Samʿānī presents a number of narrations dealing with the question on qadar posed to some prominent figures, such Ṣaʿd b. Abī Ḥayyān, Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Ṭalib, etc., and with their unfavourable answer to it.

[3] A Question posed by the Mutakallimūn
In this chapter, al-Samʿānī records the polemics between the opponents of kalām and its proponents. Al-Samʿānī makes use of the plural form qālū: the proponents of kalām who oppose the ideas of their adversaries with the introductory words inna qawlakum, referring to the opponents of kalām. Al-Samʿānī represents himself as an opponent of kalām, while explicitly referring to the theological views of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī as a proponent of kalām.

The polemic starts with the refutation of the partisans of kalām of the view of their adversaries that “the early generation of the Companions and the Followers did not occupy themselves with introducing rational evidence and with referring to reason for the knowledge of religious [doctrine]. However, they regarded this kind of kalām as an innovation, because, they [viz. the Companions and the Followers] were not occupied with it, nor by undertaking ijtihād on derivative cases (al-furūʿ) or seeking the legal status of novel cases (al-ḥawādith). None of the...
analyses, opinions and reasons to which the jurists paid particular attention was
ascribed to them. This has emerged only after the time of the Followers of the
Followers...”

Defending their contention that kalâm is of great significance for matters of
religion, they based their argument on the following points: the Prophetic
tradition that reads “Anything which the Muslims regard as agreeable is also
agreeable in God’s view; and anything which is regarded as bad by the Muslims, is
also bad in God’s view. This is one of the matters which the Muslims regarded as
agreeable, so it is agreeable in God’s view.” This is then asserted by al-Ḥasan al-
Baṣrî’s logical arguments which reads as follows: Innovation is divided into two
sorts; Bad and good innovation. Al-Ḥasan al-Aṣbâḥi said: Narratives [viz. on the
prominent figures, places, etc] are innovations. In this case, they are allright.
Many people benefit from them. [Likewise,] many calls are responded to, and
many requests are fulfilled. Some [scholar related] that he was asked about praying
at the end of the recitation of the Koran, as the people want to do at this
moment. He replied: It is a good innovation. How could this kind of practice not
be regarded as agreeable, when it comprises the refutation of the apostates, the
heretics and the proponents of the opinion on the sempetirnality of the universe
as well as of the partisans of all heresies from this umma! If philosophical
speculation and reflection are not available, neither can truth be distinguished
from falsity, nor goodness from badness.

By means of this knowledge, ambiguity has been removed from the hearts
of the apostates, and belief of the Muwahhidûn [viz. those who affirm the
oneness of God] has become firm. If you refute rational evidences, what do you
believe concerning the sound principles of your religion. Which way do you
follow to know their truths. All [the people] have known that the truth of the
book is known, and the trustworthiness of the Prophet - may God bless him and
grant him peace - is affirmed only with the help of reason. But, you have refused
that fact. If evidence is not available, the meaning is unavailable too.”

The answer of al-Sam‘âni is clearly that kalâm is prohibited, not only because
of that which has been claimed by their adversaries, as mentioned above, i.e. that
the Companions and the Followers had not been occupied with it, but also
because God has said: “Today I have perfected your religion for you...” If He
[viz. God] has already perfected and completed it, they argue, a Muslim should
believe in it and rely on it. Asserting their contention, they remark: “So, why does
one need to refer to rational evidence and their propositions? God by His virtue
makes it superfluous and unnecessary to him. He did not introduce [man] to
something, due to which one is seized by ambiguity and vaguenesses, and which
leads one to destruction and troubles. Man strayed, perished and deviated only
because of ideas and rational thoughts and his following the opinions of the past
and the present. Man was safe only because he followed the traditions of the
Messengers and the leading scholars among the early ancestors, who guide people
to the right course.” Re-emphasizing his hostile attitude to kalâm, he then

908Al-Mâ‘īda (V): 52. Bell, I, p. 94.
quotes the prayer of the Prophet: “O God, I ask your protection against knowledge which has no significance…”

[4] Chapter (faṣḥ) on the Response to their Opinion maintaining that Aḥbār al-āḥād are not accepted as means to acquire knowledge

His response to this question is clearly indicated in his words: “This is [the opinion of] a chief of the innovators in his refutation of the aḥbār, and in establishing evidence by means of speculation and reflection.” Then he points to the Qadarites and the Muʿtazilites, who issued this opinion and whose purpose it was to refuse the aḥbār. Furthermore he discusses how each group (Qadarites, Murjiʾites, Ḥarījites) tries to argue in favour of the soundness of what they uphold with the help of al-ḥabar al-wāḥid with respect to many theological issues such as al-wildān.

With regard to this, Ibn al-Samʿānī criticized the attitude of every denomination concerning whether Aḥbār al-Ḥadith in matters which are commonly known could be accepted or not. Based on innovations, each sect, Ibn Samʿānī argues, claims that what they believe is in accordance with the Tradition of the Prophet; and that it is part of the shariʿa of Islam. To them, he directs the following critical remarks: “none of denominations search for religion by using a single method. For, they consult their reason, minds and personal opinions. So, they search for religion with the help of these. If they hear something from the Book and the Tradition, they examine it according to their rational standard. If it is right, they accept it. On the contrary, if it is not in line with their rational criterion, they refuse it. If they are compelled to accept it, they corrupt it with the help of far-fetched interpretations, and objectionable significances (al-maʿānī al-mustankira). Therefore they deviate from the truth, and turn away from it. They throw religion away. They also discard Tradition.”

Ibn al-Samʿānī then rejects these claims. According to him, the truth and the true belief, as God ordained, exclusively belong to the people of Tradition and the ʿathār, because they followed the footsteps of the Pious Ancestors whose belief was inherited from the Prophet.

[5] The Root of Religion is Observance

In this chapter, al-Samʿānī evaluates the view of his adversaries that “God, in the Koran, censures unquestioning imitation and entrusts humans with rational examination and deduction and also commands people to reflect and debate against the infidels with the help of rational evidences.” Al-Samʿānī, on the other hand, maintains that “unquestioning imitation of which we are ignorant, [should be] used for something related to the reports (aḥādīth) and the sayings (aqwāḥ) of the [pious] ancestors. As far as religious doctrine is concerned, the Book and the Tradition exhorted [us] to observance. They have said: Imitation is accepting [one’s opinion] without argument.” In sum, he suggests people to obey what God has prescribed in the Koran.

911A tradition which goes back to a single authority. See EI², Glossary & Index, to vol. 1-viii (1997), op. cit., p. 166.
913SM, op. cit., p. 223.
[6] Chapter (faṣūl) The Significance of Reason and its Position in Religion according to the Partisans of Sunna (Ahl al-Sunna)

In this chapter, al-Sam‘ānī evaluates the significance of reason. For him “reason neither ascribes any duty to a person, nor exempts anything from him. It has no authority in determining things as lawful or unlawful. Likewise, it cannot determine things as good or bad. If no single tradition is produced, no duty is imposed on anyone.” With respect to the attitude toward reason of his adversaries, al-Sam‘ānī makes the following critical remarks: “Know that what distinguishes us from the innovators is the question of reason. They base their faith on rational thought. They made observance (al-ittibā’) and tradition follow rational thought. The adherents of Tradition, on the contrary, said: “The foundation of faith is observance (al-ittibā’), and reason (al-‘uqūf) is subordinate to it. If the foundation of faith is built on rational thought, creatures may regard revelation and the prophets - may God bless them - as superfluous. The significance of command and prohibition becomes worthless.”


Al-Juwaynī was born at Bushtanikan, a village on the outskirts of Nishāpūr, on 18 Muḥarram 419/17 February 1028. He was connected to the school of ʿilm al-kalām inaugurated by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī at the beginning of the fourth/tenth century. The title Imām al-Haramayn resulted from four years of teaching in Mecca and Madina. His scholarly research was divided between usūl al-fiqh and ʿilm al-kalām. His two principle works on usūl al-fiqh are al-Waraqāt fī usūl al-fiqh and al-Burhān fī usūl al-fiqh. According to Brockelmann, it is in the role of doctor in kalām that al-Juwaynī made his deepest impression on Muslim thought. Unfortunately, his great work, al-Shāmil, has not been published. He died in the village of his birth on 25 Rabi‘ II 478/20 August 1085.

The Madrasa Niẓāmiya of Nisabur in which the Shafi‘ite jurist al-Juwaynī became a professor, as Makdisi maintains, was a college of law which was established to produce doctors of law. One of his students was Abū Ḥanīfī al-Gazālī. Kalām was not admitted as part of the curriculum. Therefore it can be implied that al-Juwaynī’s professorship was one of Shafi‘ite law. This could be one of the reasons why al-Suyūṭī incorporated al-Juwaynī into his list of the opponents of kalām.

In summarizing the words of al-Juwaynī against kalām, al-Suyūṭī relies respectively on three authorities: First, Ibn al-Sam‘ānī in his Taʿrīḥ in which he quotes al-Juwaynī as having said: “When I go about my bussiness, I do not turn to, and occupy myself with, kalām;” Secondly, al-Asnawi (d. 772/1371) who in his Ṭabaqāt quotes Abu ‘l-Ganā‘im b. Ḥusayn al-Urmawī, who had attended the circle of Imām al-Haramayn. The latter had asked al-Juwaynī “to read for him something pertaining to the knowledge of kalām. He, however, prohibited him to

914SM, op. cit., p. 231.
915SM, op. cit., p. 235.
do so, and said: When I go about my affair, I do not turn to [it], and I do not teach it;” Thirdly, Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597/1201) who quotes al-Juwaynî in Talbis al-Iblîs as having said: “I had abandoned the authorities of Islam and their knowledge. I then travelled over the greatest sea. Each time I sought the truth and fled from unquestioning imitation, I was choked [by the water]. Then I returned from all these things to the word of the truth: You must follow the faith of the old men (din al-ajâ'iz). So, if the truth does not come to me by [God’s] grace, I will die with the faith of the old men. You impose upon me my affair with sincere words. So, woe unto Ibn al-Juwaynî!” Regretting with the fact that he had been occupied with kalâm, Abu l-Ma‘âli al-Juwaynî, according to Ibn al-Jawzi, repented and lamented: “Do not be occupied with kalâm! So, if you would know how kalâm occupied me up to its highest point, you would not be occupied with it!”

[m.] al-Taṣrīqā Bayn al-Imān wa 'l-Zandaqa99 and Iḥyā‘ ʿulūm al-Dīn99 by Ḥujjat al-Islām Abū Ḥāmid al-Gazālī

Al-Gazâlî was born in Tūs in 450/1058. There he studied under the supervision of Imām Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Radāhānî. In 470/1077, he went to Nishāpūr and studied under the supervision of al-Juwaynî for two years. In 484/1091 he was appointed professor in the Niẓāmiyya College. He died on the 14th of Jumāda II 505 in Tūs, his birthplace.921

The reason why al-Suyūṭī included al-Gazâlî into the list of predecessors who were against kalâm and why he abridged his work in SM, is presumably, first of all, that he was a professor and a great authority of Shafi‘ite law in the Niẓâmiyya College, where kalâm and philosophy, according to Makdisi, were not admitted as part of curriculum.

Secondly, al-Suyūṭī even regarded al-Gazâlî as the mujaddid of the 4th/10th century.922 Al-Suyûṭî defends him against his opponents, who accused him of being influenced by the theological creeds of the Mu‘tazilites and indebted to their logical instruments. According to al-Gazâlî’s opponents, al-Suyûṭî, says, Mu‘tazilite influence was reflected in his work, Tamhîd al-Arkân.923 Asserting that al-Gazâlî had spent his life refuting the Mu‘tazilites and other sorts of innovations, al-Suyûṭî felt the urge to demolish such false accusations. In so
As suggested by Makdisi, al-Gazālī, moreover, was one of those who censured kalām vehemently. This was reflected by his words in al-Tafriqa: “The most excessive and extravagant people are a group among the mutakallimūn who accuse the laymen of the Muslims of being infidels. They claim that whoever does not know kalām, the way they do, and whoever does not know the evidence of the shari‘a together with the evidence which they have drawn up, is an infidel.”

Furthermore, al-Gazālī remarks “If we would abandon hypocrisy and observe the side effects [of being occupied with kalām], we could declare that the involvement in kalām is prohibited because of a lot of evil, except for one of two persons: [The first person] is one to whom befalls doubt which will not leave his heart with the help of simple words (kalām qarīb) or with a tradition related from the Messenger... The second person is one possessing perfect intelligence, rooted belief in [his] religious faith, which has become firm due to the lights of the soul. He is desirous to deal with this occupation, so as to heal sickness, when doubt befalls him, and to silence the innovator – when the latter comes [to argue against] him. He is also to protect his belief, when an innovator intends to tempt him.”

However, al-Gazālī concludes by saying: “Therefore it is known that a mutakallim who comes close to the present life and fights desperately for it, does not obtain the truth of the ma‘rifā. If he obtains it, he must certainly have shunned dār al-gurūr.”

Al-Suyūṭī also quotes some passages from Ihyā‘ which comply with his own agenda. The passages quoted, for instance, read: “The purpose of kalām is nothing but to protect the believes which the adherents of the sunna transmitted from the [pious] ancestors.” However when al-Gazālī became aware of its danger for the (common) people, he warned them not to be occupied with it, saying: “They regarded [kalām] as a defense of the faith and protection for the Muslims. But, actually it corrupts creatures and establishes innovation in their souls.”

As far as the pages of al-Tafriqa and Ihyā‘ which have been incorporated into SM are concerned, one thing is worth mentioning here: Al-Suyūṭī took only three printed pages (p. 202-4) of the 85 printed pages of FT in the Dunyā edition (1962);
while he took only one printed page from the 1400 printed pages of the *Ihya* in the 1885 edition.

[10]. The Debate between Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus (256-328/870-940) and Abū Saʿīd al-Sirāfī (280-368/893-979)

Al-Suyūṭī must have understood well that he was making use of the summary of the debate to illustrate the conflict between the proponents of Logic, an inheritance of the Greeks, and the partisans of the language of the Arabs. He must have adumbrated that Mattā represented his opponents,932 while al-Sirāfī represented the position he was defending in the face of his opponents. Judging from the contents of the debate, al-Suyūṭī found in al-Sirāfī a personality who presented himself as the champion of the truth of language, as well as one concerned with the fact that the instrument of the truth is ordinary language and the power of reasoning available to all men willing to apply themselves, and not Mattā’s logic. The apparent motive of al-Suyūṭī to incorporate this summary of the debate between Mattā and al-Sirāfī is similar to that of the vizier Ibn al-Furāt, who asserted in his opening statements that Mattā’s view of logic was contrary to religion as well as to the truth.

Furthermore, al-Suyūṭī quoted the whole text of the debate which he had already incorporated in his much earlier work, QM.


Before concluding his discussion, al-Suyūṭī put forth the remarks that Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1254), Abū Shāma (d. 665/1268), al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 729/1329)933 refuted the introduction of logic into usūl al-fiqh. Because of fact that al-Suyūṭī had discussed this before in his QM and JQ, he does not deal with their arguments against logic in this chapter.

In QM, however al-Suyūṭī deals either, directly or indirectly, with their refutation of al-Gāzalī’s introduction of logic into usūl al-fiqh. According to al-Suyūṭī, in his Ṭabaqāt al-Nawawī (676/1277), for instance, said that al-Gāzalī’s attempt to mingle logic with usūl al-fiqh was considered a heresy.934 Likewise, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1254) was of the opinion that as far as using “logical terms in formulating divine laws is concerned, it is one of the reprehensible actions and of new stupidities.”935

Abū Shāma’s implicit refutation of al-Gāzalī’s introduction of logic into usūl al-fiqh is found in al-Suyūṭī’s quotation of his words in Abū Shāma’s al-Tawakkul fi al-Radd ila ’l-Amr al-Awwal, namely that it is better to avoid the

932 Contextually speaking, to the best of my knowledge, al-Suyūṭī’s opponents were the ones who claimed that mastering logic is one of the requirements of ijtihād.

933 According to al-Nashshār, al-Gāzalī’s adoption of Aristotelian logic in his work on legal theory drew fervent criticism from a number of scholars of the traditionalist group, such as Abū ʿIṣḥāq al-Marginānī (d. 513/1119), al-Qushayrī, al-Ṭurṭūshī (d. 520/1127), al-Ḥāzīri, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1246) and al-Nawawī (d. 631/1238). See al-Nashshār, op. cit., p. 143-4.


935 Ibidem.
destructive effects and the logical complexities of *kalâm* which drive people away from virtues.\(^9\)

Ibn Taymiyya’s refutation of al-Gazālī’s introduction of logic into *uṣūl al-fiqh* is discussed in al-Suyūṭi’s *Qīn*. This is clearly indicated in IT’s words, as quoted by al-Suyūṭi: “Those who introduced this [essential definition] are the ones who wrote on the principles of religion and law after Abū Ḥāmid [al-Gazālī] - towards the end of the fifth century - and it is they who have discoursed on definitions according to the doctrine of the Greek logicians. Scholars of all other denominations - the Ash’aris, Muʿtazilīs, Karrāmīs, Shi‘īs, and others - hold that the function of definition is to distinguish between the definiendum and other things. This is well-established in the writings of Abu ‘l-Ḥasan al-Asḥarī, al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr [al-Baqillānī], Abū Iṣḥaq [al-Isfarā’īnī], Ibn Fūrak, al-Qāḍī Abū Ya‘lā, Ibn ‘Aqīl, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, Nasafī, Abū ‘Ali [al-Jubbā’ī], Abū Hāshim [al-Jubbā’ī], ‘Abd al-Jabbār, al-Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Hayṣam, and others.”

Accordingly, it is also reflected by IT’s reference to al-Gazālī as the one who was responsible for spreading the logicians’ method, through his inclusion in the beginning of his work *al-Mustaṣfā* of an introduction to Greek logic, and as the one who alleged that the learning of those who do not know this logic is not to be trusted.\(^9\)

[12]. The Refutation of those who Introduced Logic into Grammar

Al-Suyūṭi then concludes his SM by discussing the refutation against those who introduced logic into grammar. In this regard, he refers to *Kitāb al-Masā’il* of the Imām Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Sid al-Ṭālīyāwī (d. 531/1137).\(^9\) Apart from a minute quotation, al-Suyūṭi does not elaborate his discussion of *Kitāb al-Masā’il*. According to al-Suyūṭi, al-Ṭālīyāwī stated: “A discussion on grammatical questions occurred between him and a literary man. He started mentioning incessantly an accident (*al-maṭāla*) a substance (*al-maw야t*) and the logical expressions [which were related] to him: Metaphors and euphemisms are used in the art of Grammar but not by the logicians. The philosophers have said: It is obligatory to categorize every art according to the rules practiced by its experts. They have also been of the opinion that the mixing of one art with another is the result of the ignorance of the *mutakallim* or bears the purpose of

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\(^9\) *Q* (Hallaq), *op. cit.*, p. 12-3.

\(^9\) *Q* (Hallaq), *op. cit.*, p. 111-12.

\(^9\) Al-Suyūṭi gives al-Ṭālīyāwī’s (b. 444/1053) biographical account in his BW, *op. cit.*, p. 218; According to Lévi-Provençal, al-Ṭālīyāwī was “a celebrated Andalusian grammarian and philosopher,” who composed more than twenty works. He was born in Badajoz (Baṭalaywants) in 444/1052 and died in the middle of Rajab 521/end of July 1127 in Valencia.” Lévi-Provençal, however, does not mentions *Kitāb al-Masā’il*. GAL also remains silent about it, in spite of the fact that it deals with *Risāla fi Rūʿus Masā’il al-Falsafāh*. However, attention to it has been drawn by al-Nashshār, who said that *Kitāb al-Masā’il* is *al-Masā’il al-Mantūra fi ‘l-Nāhwa*. See GAL, I, 427, S. I, 758; Lévi-Provençal, E., “al-Baṭalaywisi,” in EP, I, 1092; SM, *op. cit.*, p. 255, n. 3 (N).
making an error and ease, by the transference from one art to another when the
discourse against them is cornering them.”

3.5. Conclusion

3.5.1. Analysis of the Sources

Two interesting things should be noted here with respect to al-Suyūtī’s
composition of SM. First, that he was a historian who arranged his topics very
systematically. Secondly, that he attempted a prosopographical approach
(borrowing Humphrey’s and Van Ess’ term) to the sources he claimed to oppose
logic and/or theology, in order to establish as many facts as possible about all
those seemingly connected to a particular subject, and then to convert these facts
into a collective portrait of this subject. The aim of a prosopographical
approach is closely connected to what Van Ess calls an attempt to provide ‘ein
statistisches Bild.” What al-Suyūtī attempted in SM was to explain to his readers
that theology and/or logic had been subjected to opposition by many leading
scholars whose works he incorporated into SM.

However, the sources to which al-Suyūtī refers as the opponents of logic
and/or theology cannot be accepted at face value. Using Makdisi’s words, one
‘cannot dispense with a critical analysis of the prejudices of the sources.”

Based on the death of their authors, the (written) sources which al-Suyūtī
made use of in composing SM can be set in the following chronological order:
1. Al-Ri‘āya by al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/858)
2. a. Al-Tā‘rīḫ al-Kabīr
   b. Kitāb Ḥalq Al‘al al-Ibād by al-Buḥārī (d. 256/870)
3. Tā‘wil Mushkil al-Qur’ān by Ibn Qutayba al-Dinawarī (d. 276/890)
4. Musnad by al-Dārīmī (d. 282/895)
5. Sarḥ al-Sunnah by al-Taḥārī (d. 310/923)
6. Kitāb al-Shari‘a by al-Ajurri (d. 360/972)
7. Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr by al-Ṭabarānī (d. 360/971)

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941Humphreys, Islamic History, op. cit., p. 198.
943Makdisi exhorts scholars to be critical about the prejudices of the sources. Because this,
according to him, is a fundamental principle of historical methodology, especially ‘when
dealing with authors who belong not only to a religious movement but also to a particular
group within this movement.’ Makdisi, ‘Hanbalite Islam,’ op. cit., p. 228.
945Brockelmann refers to this work as Mushkilāt al-Qur’ān. GAL, G. I, 120, S. I, 186.
946Brockelmann registers this work as al-Musnad al-Jāmi‘. GAL, G. I, 164, S. I, 270.
947GAS, I, 328.
948GAL, S. I, 279.
949Abū ‘l-Qāsim Sulaymān b. Ayyūb b. Muṭṭāyyir al-Ḥāmi al-Ṭabarānī, one of the most
important traditionists of his age, became well-known for his three works on Tradition:
was also the author of a number of other works: Manāṣik Kitāb al-Sunnah, al-Radd ‘ala l-
Mu‘azīlā, Musnad Shu‘ba, Kitāb al-Nawādir, Kitāb Dalā‘il al-Nubuwwa, etc. See Fierro,
8. The Debate between Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) and Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940)
10. Qūṭ al-Qulūb by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 383/994)
11. Taʾrīḫ Misr by Ibn Zūlāq al-Laythī (d. 387/997)
12. Al-Gunyāʾīn al-Kalāmīn by al-Ḥaṭṭābī (d. 388/988)
13. Al-Baʿṭh wa ʿl-Nushur by Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī al-Nisabūrī (d. 458/1067)
14. Sharḥ ʿAlāʾ al-Ḥadīthī by al-Ḥāṭib al-Bagdādī (d. 463/1071)
15. Jāmīʿ al-Bayān by Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr al-Nimārī (d. 463/1071)
16. The Shafiʿīite al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085)
17. Dhāmm al-Kalām wa Aḥlīhī by Abū ʿĪsāʾī al-Anṣārī al-Harawi (d. ca. 481/1089)
18. Al-Gunyāʾīn al-Kalāmīn by al-Ḥaṭṭābī (d. 490/1099)
19. Al-Ḥujja ʿalā Tārik al-Maḥājīna by the Shaykh Naṣr al-Maqdisī (d. 490/1099)
20. a. Ḥiyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn
   b. al-Taʾrifqā bayna ʿl-Īslām wa ʿl-Zandaqa by al-Gazālī (d. 505/1112)
21. Kitāb al-Masāʾiḥ by Abīn Allāh b. al-Sīd al-Baṭṭalwāsī (d. 531/1138)
22. Al-Mīlāl wa ʿl-Nihāl by al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1154)
23. a. Dhayl Taʾrīḫ Bagdādī by Ibn al-Samān (d. 562/1166)
   b. al-Inṣār li Aḥl al-Ḥadīth by Ibn al-Samān (d. 571/1176)
24. Taʾrīḫ Madīnat Dimashq by Ibn ʿAsākir (d. 643/1245)
25. Taḥlīl al-Iblīs by Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201)
26. Fatāwā by Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 676/1277)
27. Taḥāqāt al-Fuqāḥāʾ by al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277)
29. Taḥdīkāʾī by the Shafiʿīite Badr al-Dīn b. Jamāʿa (d. 733/1333)
30. Taḥdīkāʾī by Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 744/1344)
31. Sharḥ Lāmiyat al-Ājamī by al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ṣafādī (d. 746/1345)

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95GAL, G. I, 149.
95GAL, S.I, 250.
95Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. al-Laythī, born in 306/919 and died in 386/996, was an Egyptian historian, the author of a number of biographical, historical and topographical works on Egypt in the time of Iḥṣāṣid and early Fatimids. See Lewis, B., et. al., “Ibn Zūlāq,” in EP, III, 979.
95GAL, G. I, 165.
95GAL, S.I, 618-9.
95GAL, G. I, 367.
95GAL, G. I, 433.
95This work was edited by Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Hārūn as part of his thesis in the University of Madīnah in 1409/1988.
95GAL, G. I, 427, S.I, 758.
96GAL, G.I, 330.
96GAL, G. I, 331.
96Brockelmann refers to this work as Taḥāqāt al-Fuqāḥāʾ al-Shafiʿīyya. GAL, G. 1, 397.
96 Tadhkīrat al-Sāmiʿī: GAL, G. II, 75, S. II, 81.
32.  a.  Al-Mızân
b.  Ta’rīh al-Islām

c. al-Ibar
33.  TAbaqqât al-Shāfi’īyya by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawi (d. 772/1371)
34.  Ta’rīh by Ibn Kathîr (d. 774/1373)

The Arabic sources against logic and theology, some passages (or pages) of which are incorporated into SM, can be classified in two categories: First, the works which deal incidentally with the opposition to logic and/or theology; and secondly, those which deal explicitly and elaborately with that issue. No. 1, 2b, 5, 6, 10, 13, 15, 16, 20a, and 20b are works against theology, which can be classified into the first category. In these works, the censure of theology occupies only several paragraphs and/or a few pages. No. 12, 18, and 23b are the works in which the authors deal explicitly and elaborately with the opposition to theology.

The following works dealing explicitly with the opposition to logic are cited in SM: The discussion between Abû Sa’îd al-Sirâfî (d. 368/979) and Mattâ b. Yûnus (d. 328/940) (no. 8),97 and Naṣîha (no. 28). The Fatâwâ (no. 26) only deals incidentally with the opposition to logic.

Why did al-Suyûtî, in building up his arguments against his opponents in SM, only base himself on the works mentioned above? Why did he not, for instance, use Tarjîh Asâlib al-Qur’ân ‘alá Asâlib al-Yûnân (against logic) by the Zaidite Ibn al-Wâzîr al-Ñanî (d. 840/1436) who, according to al-Nâshshâr, was influenced much in his composition by Ibn Taymîyya;971 al-Radd ‘alá Ahl al-Kalâm by al-Sulâmî (d. 412/1022) and Tahrim al-Nâzar fî Kutub Ahl al-Kalâm by Ibn Qudâma al-Maqdisî (d. 620/1224) (both against theology);972 Miftâh Dâr al-

966 GAL, G. II, 46.
967 GAL, G. II, 47.
968 GAL, G. II, 91.
969 Probably this refers to the most important of Ibn al-Kathîr’s works on the history of Islam, al-BidÁya wa ‘l-Niháya. On Ibn Kathîr, see Loust, H., “Ibn Kathîr,” in EI², III, 817-8; GAL, G. II, 49, S. II, 48.
971 ManÁhij, op. cit., p. 223
972 I failed to obtain information concerning the fact why al-Suyûtî, when discussing the censure against kalâm, did not refer to the Hanbalîte Ibn Qudâma al-Makdisî with his Tahrim al-Nâzar fî Kutub Ahl al-Kalâm, in spite of the fact that he dealt with Ibn Qudâma’s biography in his TH (p. 504). However, one may speculate about the fact that al-Suyûtî could have regarded Tahrim only as Ibn Qudâma’s personal criticism against his fellow muslim, a member of his own school, Ibn ‘Aqil, as confirmed by one of the three titles for Tahrim, i.e. Kitâb fîh al-Radd ‘alá Ibn ‘Aqil, (Makdisî, op. cit., p. xi) and, hence, it is plausible that al-Suyûtî thought it unsignificant for his discussion.

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by the Hanbalite Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1351) and Kasr al-Mantiq by the Shi‘ite Abu ‘l-Najā al-Farid (both against logic)?

One might suggest two answers to this question: First, that al-Suyūṭī did not have at his disposal any other works against logic and/or theology than the ones discussed in SM, presumably as a result of their limited circulation. Secondly, as an apologist, al-Suyūṭī had to refine his arguments by selecting his sources in such a manner that he would convince his opponents. Probably, it is the second answer which deserves more affirmation for two obvious reasons.

First of all, in his autobiographical work, al-Ta‘ādduth bi Ni‘mati ‘llāh, al-Suyūṭī maintains that all the mujaddids of preceding centuries, apart from ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-Azīz, were of the Shafi‘ite juridical school: Al-Shāfi‘i, Abu ‘l-‘Abbās b. al-Suraṣi, Abu Ḥāmid al-Isfārā‘īni, Abu Ḥāmid al-Gazālī, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn b. Daqīq al-‘Īd and Sirāj al-Dīn al-Bulqīnī. This is confirmed by Hallaq, who suggests that nearly all of the jurists bearing the task of taqdid were Shafi‘ites. In the second place, attention should also be paid to the fact that eleven out of thirteen authors whose works were abridged in SM were affiliated to the Shafi‘ite juridical school, despite the fact that al-Suyūṭī mentions only their being prominent leading figures (a‘īmma).

By composing SM, Al-Suyūṭī demonstrated to his adversaries that he was deeply knowledgeable about the origin and the foundation of logic, the history of its introduction into the religious community of Islam, the origin of the connection to logic of the books of ʿulūl al-fiqh and ʿulūl al-dīn, and the beginning of its spread among later scholars. He also wanted to tell his adversaries that not a single science could escape his attention, including logic, because he was “the greatest scholar of his time,” thereby proving that he possessed the necessary conditions to fulfill his ambition to be qualified as a renewer (mujaddid) of tenth/sixteenth century. Finally he showed that all the preceding

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973 Although al-Suyūṭī did not mention this work in SM, he deals with it in his biographical work, Buqyat al-Wu‘ūt when discussing its author. See al-Suyūṭī, BW, (Cairo: Maṭba‘a al-Sa‘āda, 1326/1908), 1st ed., p. 25.

974 In asserting the central role of Shafi‘ism among the revivers, al-Suyūṭī suggests that ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-Azīz, as the first reviver, shares al-Shāfi‘i’s being a member of the Prophet’s family (min al ʿaṣr al-ṣul al-ḥāfy). See al-Ta‘ādduth, op. cit., vol. II, p. 217.


977 The two who are of non-Shafi‘ite denomination are al-Harawi (Hanbalite) and ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-Barr (Malikite).

978 SM, op. cit., p. 68.

979 Sartain, op. cit., p. 69.

980 In the last two chapters of his books, respectively mā an’amā ‘llāh bihi ‘alayya min al-tabahḥuri fī‘ir‘ūm wa bulūğī ṭabrati ‘i‘jīthād wa ḍhikr al-mabū‘ūthin ‘alā ra‘si kullī mi‘ā, one can clearly find al-Suyūṭī’s explicit ambition to be qualified as mujaddid of the tenth century of Hijra. This is reflected in his last words in this book: “qultu wa qad
mujaddids, and the Shafi’ite madhhab in general, fiercely opposed logic and kalâm.

3.5. 2. Al-Suyû’ti’s Sources against Kalâm

Although al-Suyû’ti’s motivation to compose SM was markedly to prove that he mastered logic better than his opponents, his discussion also emphasizes kalâm. He incorporates in it twelve works he claimed to be against kalâm. It seems, however, that the apologetic nature of SM lies in the sense that it was intended to defend his claim to be the mujaddid of the tenth century of Hijra in the face of his adversaries, who questioned his expertise in logic. Thus, the accuracy of the identification of particular historical figures as being in favour of al-Suyû’ti’s claims apparently was not always so important as the prominence of these historical figures themselves. Especially when questioning al-Suyû’ti’s inclusion of al-Juwaynî, who was deeply connected to the school of ʿilm al-kalâm inaugurated by Abu ’l-Ḥasan al-Asbâ’i and whose deepest influence on Muslim thought was due to his role in kalâm, one finds one more indication of the apologetic nature of SM.

Nevertheless, SM remains an important source which enables us to find clues for the development of the ideas of the opponents of kalâm.

Referring to a number of (written) sources, in SM al-Suyû’ti discusses how speculative reasoning, kalâm, was rejected and opposed by Muslims since the period of the Companions, the forerunners of the Jurists among the Followers, the third generation, such as ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz, Mûsîm b. ʿAbd al-Malik, Abû ʿAbd Allâh b. Mûsîm b. al-ʿUmar, Abu ʿl-Qâsim b. Manûr b. al-ʿÂjlûkî, and others. He also discusses the censure of kalâm by a number of prominent historical figures ranging from al-Shâfi’î, Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, Mâlik b. Anas, ʿAbd Allâh b. al-Baghdâdî, Imâm al-Nâfisî, al-Ḥamdînî, Abû Bakr Muḥammad b. al-ʿÂjlûkî, Abu ’l-Qâsim b. Manûr al-Lâlî, Abu Ta’lik al-Ḥârîthî b. al-Makki, Abû ’l-Qâsim b. Manûr b. al-ʿÂjlûkî, Abû Ṭalîb al-Ḥârîthî b. al-Makki, and others. He also discusses the censure of kalâm by a number of prominent historical figures ranging from al-Shâfi’î, Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, Mâlik b. Anas, ʿImâm al-Buḥîrî, Ibn Ḥamîd al-Tabarsi, al-Ḥârîthî al-Muḥâsibî, Abû Ṭalîb al-Baghdâdî, Abû Ṭalîb al-Ḥârîthî al-Makki, and others.

Discussing the names of the opponents of kalâm mentioned above, al-Suyû’ti also tells us about the variety of their arguments concerning kalâm. He explains to us, for instance, how the authors of kalâm in the first generation, the

\[\text{sahha qawlîhû: } \text{“yahtamîlu an yabqâ tâsî’ } \text{‘alâ ra’si } \text{‘l-tâsî’a...”}, \text{fânhûnu } \text{l-ān fi sanat sitta wa tis’în wa thamami mi’ā wa lam yaji’ al-mahdî wa lā } \text{‘isâ wa lā ashraṭa dhálîka. Wa qad tarajjû al-faṣîr min fâdi} \text{‘l-lâh an yun’ama } \text{‘alayhi bikawnihî} \text{huwa al-mujaddid } \text{‘alâ ra’si } \text{‘l-} \text{mi’ā wa ma dhálîka } \text{‘ala } \text{‘l-lâh bi’ azîz.” See al-Suyû’ti, al-Tahadduth, op. cit., p. 227.}\]

\[\text{96b} \text{This was asserted by al-Suyû’ti himself in the introduction of SM. See SM, op. cit., p. 33-}\]

Companions of the Prophet, were excluded from the community and no one was allowed by the authorities to befriend him. Abridging al-Harawi’s work, al-Suyūṭī also leads us to understand how the authors of the innovations in the second generation, the forerunners of the jurists among the Followers, were considered to be the followers of the Dajjāl and found themselves living with Jews and Christians. In the following generation, the third one, the authors of kalām are said to have been avoided because they were exercising evil influence on others and lead them astray. In the fourth generation, the authors of kalām were identified by its opponents with those who had been destined by God to commit evil and from whose hearts the light of Islam had been blotted out. In the following generation, the fifth one, the argument posed by the opponents of kalām against the authors of kalām was interestingly exemplified by the story of Abū Ḥanifa who was asked about aʾrād (accidents) and ajāmā (substances) and said that both of them were the affair of philosophers. It was further interestingly exemplified by Abū Yūsuf’s identification of the author of kalām with atheists. An interesting tendency of the arguments against kalām in the following generation, the sixth one, was embodied in al-Shāfiʿī’s fervently hostile attitude against kalām, which was reflected by his words that the heads of the authors of kalām should be beaten with a palm-stalk, and that they should be driven away from their homeland. The arguments which seem to represent the basic foundation of the opponents of kalām can be discerned in the members of the seventh generation of the opponent of kalām, especially in Ayyūb al-Saḥtiyānī’s statements that one is not to dispute with people on a matter one does not know about, because this leads one to corruption. The diversity of the arguments of the opponents of kalām in the eighth generation can be seen in the identification of kalām with astrology, in the sense that they both lead to ignorance. The arguments of the ninth generation of the opponents of kalām was marked by the words of Yahyā b. ʿammār, stating that the books on kalām should be burnt.\footnote{Ali, op. cit., p. 13.}

In his attempt to give his readers the impression that kalām was also subjected to fervent opposition from a great number of prominent individuals, al-Suyūṭī incorporates a number of works against kalām in his SM. The first is Kitāb Dhamm ʿIlm al-Kalām wa Ahlih by al-Harawi. Arnaldez concluded that this works is al-Muḥāsibī’s masterpiece, as it is the longest and most comprehensive of his writings.\footnote{Suyuti, op. cit., p. 68.} This work discusses the eagerness of the people to debate and to argue as well as to refute the adherents of different religions. The author, according to al-Suyūṭī, was a leading scholar in the field of jurisprudence, tasawwuf, tradition, kalām, zuhd, waraʾ and maʿārif. He was included by al-ʿUstādī Abū Maṣūr al-Tamīmī in the first generation of the companions of al-Shāfiʿi.\footnote{Arnaldez, “al-Muḥāsibī,” in EI², VII, p. 124.}
Kitāb Ḥalq al-ʿal ʿal-ʿIbād by al-Buhārī is also indispensable for the identification of the opponents of kalām. This work provides a number of narrations censuring debate, argumentation and kalām. This is exemplified in the narration of Ahmad b. Ḥanbal and other scholars, who appear to have hated inquiring and scrutinizing ambiguous matters of faith and did not mingle with the mutakallimūn.\(^{987}\)

Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s Sarih al-Sunna is likewise referred to by al-Suyūṭī in his discussion against kalām. In this work, al-Ṭabarī relates some events that occurred after the death of the Prophet, such as the dispute among the umma about those who among them is most entitled to the leadership and the caliphate, the dispute on whether [the deeds of the worshippers] are determined by the qadā’ of God and His qadar or whether this question is determined by the people; then follows the dispute on the Koran, viz. whether it was created or not, and on the Divine vision of the believers in the Day of Resurrection. Al-Ṭabarī considered all these disputes as stupidities which only occupied people of ignorance and enmity. In concluding his discussion, he quotes the words of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal stating that he who says that the Koran was created is a Jahmite; and he who says that it is not created, is an innovator.\(^{988}\)

Al-Ḥāṭābī’s al-Gunya ‘an al-Kalām (which is no longer extant) also discusses the opposition to kalām: “We neither refute the rational evidence nor its competence to lead us to knowledge. But when using them, we do not follow the method which you applied during the establishment of the argument with the help of the accidents and in referring these accidents to the essences as well as in the transformation of these accidents into the essences for [understanding] the creation of the Universe and the existence of the Creator. We dislike the usage of such a method [by turning to] something for which the clearest evidence and soundest demonstration exist. Because that is a matter which you take from the philosophers and according to which you followed them. The philosophers apply this method, only because they neither affirm the prophethood nor believe that the truth has already been born in [the prophethood]. The strongest argument affirming these affairs, in their opinion, is what they deduced from these things.”\(^{989}\)

Sharḥ Usūl Iʿtiqād Ahl al-Sunna waʾ Jamāʿa by al-Ḥāṭābī is replete with the condemnation of dispute and kalām. Al-Ḥāṭābī, for instance, states that it is obligatory to refrain from innovations and from listening to what is innovated by those who lead people astray. Elsewhere, he states that the first innovation was the dispute on al-qadār about which ‘Abd Allāh b. ʿUmar was asked. The Prophet commanded people to confirm the qadār, to believe in it and to refrain from disputing on it.\(^{990}\)

In his Sharḥ, al-Ḥāṭābī also lists a great number of persons whom he considered to belong to the Ahl al-Sunna. That number includes the first generation (the Companions of the Prophet), the second generation (the Followers), the third generation (the Followers of the Followers), as well as people

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\(^{987}\)SM, op. cit., p. 131-2.

\(^{988}\)SM, op. cit., p. 136-7.

\(^{989}\)SM, op. cit., p. 140-1.

\(^{990}\)SM, op. cit., p. 148-150.
from among the residents of Mecca, Syria and Palestine (al-Shām), Mesopotamia, Egypt, Rayy, Mosul, Kūfa, Baṣra, Bagdad and Ṭabaristān.\textsuperscript{991}

_al-Sharīʿa_ by al-ʿAjurrī is also replete with the condemnation of debate and argumentation in matters of religion. The author, first of all, provides a number of traditions and words of the Ancestors, who condemned _kalām_, debate and argumentation. He then lists a number of personalities who censured _kalām_: Maʿān b. Ṣaʿd, Ḥishām b. Ḥasan, ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jazarī, Ayyūb al-Sahiyyānī, al-Ḥasan b. ʿAli b. ʿAbd ʿAlī, ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz.\textsuperscript{992}

In his _Jāmiʿ_ al-Bayān, Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr discusses two topics: the hatefulness of debate and argumentation; and the condemnation of speculation about matters of belief in God based on personal opinion and analogy without a textual foundation. Like other scholars of tradition, Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr discusses the censure of debate, argumentation and _kalām_ by his predecessors which revolves around the following points: (a) That one who subjects his religion to altercation, is likely to move from one religion to another (which implies _tidda_); (b) that one has to avoid argumentation, because it nullifies the religious practices; (c) _Kalām_ on matters of religion is rejectable; (d) The scholars of tradition and jurisprudence reached a consensus that the scholars of _kalām_ are innovators and cheaters. He then lists a number of personalities who condemned debate, argumentation and _kalām_: ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, Muʿāwiyah b. ʿAbd, ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAmir, ʿAbd al-ʿAmir, Ṣafīd b. Ṣafīd, Maḥmūd b. Ṣafīd, Ṣafīd b. Ṣafīd, ʿAbd al-Raʿūf b. Ṣafīd, etc.\textsuperscript{993}

_Sharaṭ Aṭhāb al-Ḥadīth_ of al-Ḥaṭīb al-Bagdādī was incorporated in SM because it could serve al-Suyūṭī’s objective in his mission against _kalām_. Al-Bagdādī discusses the condemnation of _kalām_ by a number of scholars: Ṣaʿd b. Ṣaʿd, ʿAlī b. Ṣaʿd, ʿUmar b. Ṣaʿd, Ṣafīd b. Ṣafīd, Maḥmūd b. Ṣafīd, ʿAbd al-Raʿūf b. Ṣafīd, Maḥmūd b. Ṣafīd, ʿAbd al-Raʿūf b. Ṣafīd, al-Maṣūḥī, Ṣafīd b. Ṣafīd, ʿAbd al-Raʿūf b. Ṣafīd, ʿAbd al-Raʿūf b. Ṣafīd, Maḥmūd b. Ṣafīd, ʿAbd al-Raʿūf b. Ṣafīd, etc. He quotes, for instance, the words of Ṣafīd b. Ṣafīd on _kalām_ that the authors of _kalām_ are atheists. He also explains the attitude of Ṣafīd al-Thawrī towards _kalām_, as it is exemplified in his statement saying: ‘you should be in line with _athār_, and beware of dispute on God and his Attributes.’\textsuperscript{994}

The last main sources, incorporated by al-Suyūṭī into SM, are some passages of _al-Tafriqa_ and _Ihya_ by al-Gazālī. These works reflect al-Gazālī’s deep-seated distrust of the art of disputation. In speaking against _kalām_, Makdisi maintains, al-Gazālī marshals evidence of its harmful character from the dicta of the great leaders among the doctors of the law: Shāfiʿī, ʿAlī b. Ṣaʿd, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Mahdī, etc. He quotes, for instance, cites the second Caliph ʿUmar b. al-Ḥaṭīb and ʿAlī b. Ḥanbal as those who closed the gate of _kalām_ and dispute.\textsuperscript{995}

\textsuperscript{991}SM, op. cit., p. 161-5.
\textsuperscript{992}SM, op. cit., p. 170-1.
\textsuperscript{993}SM, op. cit., p. 182-8.
\textsuperscript{994}SM, op. cit., p. 200-1.
\textsuperscript{995}Makdisi, “The Non-Ash’ arite…,” op. cit., p. 239-257.
Interestingly, al-Juwaynī is also referred to by al-Suyūṭī as the one who repented from his occupation with *kalām*. Despite al-Suyūṭī’s reference to Ibn al-Sam‘ānī’s *Ta’rīh*, Ibn al-Jawzī’s *Talbis Iblis* and al-Asnawi’s *Tabaqāt*, al-Juwaynī’s argument(s) against *kalām* are incorporated in SM and treated in the same way as al-Suyūṭī does with the arguments of the scholars whose works are explicitly directed against *kalām*. 
Chapter Four
Al-Suyūṭi’s *Fatwā* against Logic: Its Manuscript and its Content as well as its Sources

Of the four works against logic and theology, al-Suyūṭi’s *Fatwā* was composed the last. This is clearly indicated by a passage which says “…and [then followed] al-Taqi b. Taymiyya who composed a big volume to condemn logic and undo its foundations, entitled *Naṣīḥat Dhawī ʾl-ʾImān fi ʾl-Radd ʿalā Maṭṭiq al-Ŷūnān* which I have summarized in one third of its length. [Also] I have composed a volume to condemn logic, in which I collected the statements against it of the learned men…” The abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s *Naṣīḥat* to one third of its length mentioned above is QA; and the volume which was composed by al-Suyūṭi against logic, of course, points to no other work than SM, in which al-Suyūṭi marshalled the arguments against logic of more than 36 scholars of various juridical denominations.

This chapter will deal with the manuscript of the *Fatwā*, al-Suyūṭi’s legal opinion discussed in it and the evaluation of the sources on which al-Suyūṭi relies in his discussion against logic.

4.1. The Manuscript of the *Fatwā*
Although Brockelmann lists this manuscript under the title *al-Qawl al-Mushriq fī Tahrīm al-Ishtigāl bi ʾl-ʾImān al-Muṭṭiq*, the present author refers to it as al-Suyūṭi’s *Fatwā*. This is based on a colophon found at the end of QM which reads: “waṣqaṭu ʿalā fatwā bi-nafṣ al-ism [i.e. *al-Qawl al-Mushriq*] fī kitābīh al-ḥāwī li ʾl-fatāwā. Aftā biḥā baʾda kitābīb ḥādīthī al-misāla wadhakarāhā liḥā ṭabāyyana li anna tasmiyatahā bīnās al-tasmiya gālāt min ʾaḥad al-nussāḥ. Fāhiya la ṭujādu kadḥālīka fī jamiʿ al-nussāḥ al-maḥṣūṭa li ʾl-ḥāwī.”

The manuscript of this *Fatwā* is preserved at the Egyptian National Library (Dār al-Kutub, Majāmīʿ Qawwāla 25). It consists of three pages. Each page consists of 27 lines, each of which has about 8-9 words. This manuscript, as stated at the end of the passage, was copied by al-Sayyid Maṁūd on Friday 24th of Jumāda I 1115/1704.

This *fatwā* has been edited and published in a collection of *fatwās* by al-Suyūṭi, entitled *al-Ḥāwī liʾl-Fatāwī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʾIlmiyya, 1993).

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995I am grateful to Dr. N.J.G. Kaptein, the Director of INIS (Indonesian-Nederland Cooperation in Islamic Studies) in Leiden and Dr. Nursamad Kamba, the Educational Attaché of the Indonesian Republic in Cairo, for providing me with a copy of this manuscript.
997Also because al-Suyūṭi himself refers to QM as a *kuḥrās*. SM is a small volume.
998Sartain, *op. cit.* p. 220.
4.2. The Contents of the Fatwā

Reading al-Suyūṭī’s own statement, one understands that this treatise was written in answer to a question about the study of logic and the status of the knowledge of logic as a condition of undertaking ‘ijtihād. This can be obviously understood from al-Suyūṭī’s words: “…wa’l-ḥāsil anna hādhā al-rajal alladhi ẓadarat ‘anhu ḥādhihi al-maqāl rajulun galaba ‘alayh al-jahl wa ’l-ḥamq, wa ’l-fisq fā ’lwajib ‘alā al-maḥtāṭ liḍinih an yahjurah fī ‘llāh ta’ālā…”

a. The Question

Without giving any information about the identity of the questioner, al-Suyūṭī opens his fatwā with the recital of al-basmalah. He then says that the question he wants to answer concerns the statements by al-Gazālī who claimed to be a faqīh, which revolve around the fact that (1) declaring the oneness of God depends on the knowledge of logic, (2) the study of logic is an individual obligation, (3) studying every detail of the science of logic brings about ten virtues (ḥasanāt), (4) the issuing of a legal opinion without knowledge of logic is not valid.

b. The Answer

Before responding to the statements attributed to al-Gazālī one by one, al-Suyūṭī first of all states that logic is an evil and censured art (fan ḥabīth madhmūm); that being occupied with it is prohibited; that logic leads one into philosophy and heresy; and that it bears no religious benefit at all. Furthermore, he proceeds to say that one who states that logic is an individual obligation, should take into account that studying the sciences of interpretation (tafsīr) and Tradition (ḥadīth), which are the most virtuous sciences, is not an individual but a social obligation. The view that logic is an individual obligation must belong to an infidel or an innovator. While the opinion that confessing of the Oneness of God depends on the knowledge of logic is the worst lie of all.

Al-Suyūṭī then adds that one who believes that logic is useful and bears any truth must be ignorant of it. He should be taught that the demonstrations (barāhīn) of logic are built on the generalities (kullīyyāt) which do not exist in reality and do not denote the existence of any particularity.

Then al-Suyūṭī maintains that a person who says that confessing the Oneness of God depends on the knowledge of logic, in spite of his own ignorance of logic, must be considered an infidel. Al-Suyūṭī then argues that to be a believer does not necessarily mean to know the principles of logic, because in one’s conscience or heart is imprinted the ability to imply or observe the fact that the stars, the day and the night, for instance, belong to the Creator. Even the imitators (muqallidūn) know this fact automatically without having to know the principles of logic.

All these derogatory remarks on logic have been ascribed by al-Suyūṭī to a number of leading scholars whom he himself grouped into the following juridical schools:

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1001"wa inna lata’allumahù bikulli ḥarf ‘ashr ḥasanāt…” p. alif.
The Shafi'ites

1. Al-Shafi'i (d. 203/820)
2. Abū Naṣr b. al-Qushayrí (d. 469/1077)
3. Ibn al-Ñabbâg (d. 477/1085)
4. Al-Juwaynî (d. 478/1085)
5. Naṣr al-Maqdisî (d. 490/1098)

The Malikites

28. Abū Ṭalīb al-Makki (d. 383/994)
29. Ibn Abī Zayd (d. ca. 386/997)
30. Abū al-Ḥasan b. al-Ḥāṣṣār (d. 392/1003)
31. Abū 'l-Ḥasan b. al-Ḥabīb al-Nisabūrī (d. 406/1016)
32. Abū al-Walîd al-Bāji (d. 474/1081)

The Hanafites

40. Abū Sa'īd al-Sirāfî (d. 368/979)
41. Sirāj al-Dīn al-Qazwînî (d. 750/1349)
42. Ibn al-Jawzî (d. 597/1201)
43. Sa'd al-Dīn al-Ḥārîthi (d. 710/1311)
44. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 729/1329)

The Hanbalites


1003 Abû Naṣr, a son of al-Qushayrî, the author of al-Risāla, was referred to by al-Subkî as Imām al-A'imma wa Wâsi' al-Amr. He studied under his father, ‘Abd al-Karîm al-Qushayrî, and then under Imām al-Ḥārîthi. He became a lecturer in Niẓâmiyya College. He died on Friday 18 Jumâda II 469/1077. See al-Suyûtî, TS, III, 149-50; Halm, H., “al-¬ushayrî,” EI², V, 527.


1005 The Chief Judge Sa'd al-Dīn Abû Muḥammad Mas'ûd b. Abî al-Ḥârîthi al-‘Irâqi was born in Irak in 652/1255 and died in 710/1311 in Egypt. See al-Suyûtî, HM, I, 358.
1006 According to al-Subkî, Ibn al-Sabbâg was the kunyâ of Abû Naṣr ‘Abd al-Ṣayyid b. Abî Ṭâhir Muḥammad b. Abî al-Wâhid b. Muḥammad al-Bagdadî, who was born ca. 400 and died on Tuesday 13 Jumâda I 477/1085. He studied under the Qâdî Abû al-Ṭayyib and the Shaykh Abû ʾIshâq. In 499/1068, he was appointed professor at Niẓâmiyya college (al-Subkî, TS, II, 39-40). According to al-Qummi, he was the author of a number of books, al-Shāmil, the best book in jurisprudence in which references and evidence are highly reliable, Tadhkirat al-’Alîm, al-Ṭarîq al-Salîm, etc (al-Qummi, KA, I, 330-1).


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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>al-Gazālī (d. 505/1111)</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Ibn ‘Asākir (d. 571/1176)</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>al-Silāfi (d. 576/1180)</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>‘Īmād al-Dīn b. Yūnus (d. 608/1212)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Ibn Bundār (d. 622/1226)</td>
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<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Abū Bakr al-Ṭūrṭūshī (d. 520/1127)</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-‘Arabī (d. 543/1148)</td>
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<td>35.</td>
<td>Abū Ḥabīb al-Mālaqī (d. 640/1243)</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>Abū ‘Ámir b. Rabi’ (d. 610)</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>Ibn Abī Ḥāmza (d. 695/1296)</td>
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1010 According to Dunlop, Abu ‘l-Walīd Sulaymān b. Ḥalaf al-Bājī, born in 403/1012 in Beja (now in South of Portugal), was famous as a distinguished theologian and literary figure in the 11th century of Spain. He was the author of a number of works, among which the following were held in high estimation: *Sharḥ al-Muwaffa* and *Risāla fi l-Wudū*. He died at Almeria in 474/1081. See Dunlop, D.M., “al-Bājī,” *EI*, III, 54-5; al-Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ, TMM II, 434-4.


1012 The Shāfi‘ite Abu ‘l-Qāsim ‘Alī b. al-Ḥasan b. Hibat Allāh b. al-Ḥusayn al-Dimashqī, born in 499/1106, studied tradition under the supervision of his father. For his study, he then travelled to Baghdad, Kūfah, Nishābūr, Merv, Herāt, etc, where he frequented 1300 leading scholars. He was the author of more than 10 works, among which *Ta’rīḥ Dimashq, Aṭrāf al-Sunan al-Arbā’a, ‘Awālī Mālik, Fadl Aḥṣāb al-Ḥadīth, Manāqib al-Shubbān, Ta’rīḥ al-Miṣja*, etc. Al-Suyūṭī regarded him as *imām all-Kabīr fi a-Shām*. He died on 11 Rajab 571/1176. See al-Suyūṭī, *TH*, 474-5.

1013 Ibn al-‘Arabī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Ma‘āfīrī was “a traditionist belonging to Seville.” He was born in 468/1076 Seville and died in Fez. His reputation as a qāḍī lies in his “severity towards evildoers and kindness towards humble people.” He was the author of a number of works, among which is *‘Arīḍa al-ḥawdāhī*, “a commentary on al-Tirmidhī’s collection of traditions.” See Robson, J., “Ibn al-‘Arabī,” *EI*, III, 707.


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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>al-Ṭibī (d. 624/1228)</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233)</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Ibn 'Abd al-Salām (d. 632/1235)</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1254)</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Abū Shāma (d. 665/1268)</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277)</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Ibn Daqīq al-ʿId (d. 702/1302)</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>al-Adhraʿi (d. 703/1303)</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>al-Sharaf al-Dimyāṭi (d. 705/1306)</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>Burhān al-Dīn al-Jaʿbīrī (d. 732/1332)</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745/1344)</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>al-Dhahābī (d. 748/1348)</td>
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1017 Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿd b. Abī Ḥamza, the author of Muḥtaṣar Ṣahīḥ al-Buhārī, according to al-Qummī, died in 695/1296 in Caire. See al-Qummī, KA, I, 187; GAL, I, 372.

1018 Abū ʿl-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Raʾūmān b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. al-Qāsim, was born in 563/1168 and died in Nafar 624/1228. See al-Suyūṭī, BW, 71-2; al-Subkā, TS, IV, 65.

1019 According to al-Suyūṭī, ʿIzz al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. al-Athīr Abī al-Kiram b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Shaybānī al-Jazārī was born on the Island of Ibn ʿUmar in 555/1161. He studied Tradition under the supervision of ʿAbd al-Munʿīm b. Kulayb. He was the author of Tāʾrīḥ al-Mawṣīl, which he did not complete. He died in Shaʿbān 630/1233. See al-Suyūṭī, TH, 492.

1020 Ibn al-Munayyar was laqab of Nāṣr al-Dīn Abū ʿl-Aḥbāb Ahmad b. Muḥammad b. Maṣfir al-Iskandarānī who was referred to by al-Suyūṭī as one of leading scholars qualified to undertake ijtihād. He was born in 620/1224 and died in Alexandria in 803/1401. See al-Suyūṭī, HM, I, 316-7.


1022 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ṭabarīm b. ʿUmar b. ʿIrāhīm Burhān al-Dīn al-Jaʿbīrī al-Shāfīʿī, according to al-Kutubī, was born in Jaʿbar. He studied in Bagdad and then in Damascus where he stayed for 40 years and where he composed many works. He died in 732/1332. Ibn Shākir al-Kutubī, FW, I, 39-41.
23. Sharaf al-Din al-Munawî (d. 757/1357)

24. al-Asnawi (d. 772/1371)

25. Wali al-Din al-'Iraqi (d. 826/1423)

26. Sharaf al-Din b. al-Muqrî (d. 837/1434)

27. al-Malawi (d. 841/1438)

4.3. Evaluation of the sources

Which of the sources listed in the table above had been referred to in three earlier works of al-Suyûṭî can be seen in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QM</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>8</th>
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<tr>
<td>QM&amp;SM</td>
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</table>

From the table above, it is clear that some of the authorities against logic listed in the Fatwâ had been referred to by al-Suyûṭî in his QM and SM. However, there are 19 individuals which were only dealt with by al-Suyûṭî in his Fatwâ.

Although more than half of the opponents of logic mentioned by al-Suyûṭî (23 scholars) lived between the 7th-8th/13th – 14th century, logic has also been subjected to opposition in various other centuries: Respectively by 4 scholars in the 9th and 4th; by 5 scholars in the 6th, by 7 seven scholars in the 5th and by one scholar in the 3rd century. The list starts with al-Shâfi’i (d. 203/820) and ends with al-Malawi (d. 841/1438). Logic has been opposed in various regions (extending between Mali, Fas, Mecca, Irak, Aleppo and Muslim Malaga (Muslim Spain)). However, the most significant opposition to it took place in Egypt and Syria. Most of those who opposed logic were Shafi’ites (27), in spite of the fact that the Malikites (14), the Hanbalites (4) and the Hanafite (1) have also opposed it.

It is important to study the contents of this fatwá not only because few many studies have been devoted to it before, but also because of the fact that al-

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1023 Abû Zur’a Ahmad b. Abi al-Faḍl ‘Abd al-Rahîm b. al-Ḥusayn, born in Dhu ’l-Ḥijja in 762/1362, studied under his father’s superintendence. Then he followed courses under the supervision of several scholars: Al-Bulqînî, al-Burhân al-Abnâśî, Ibn al-Mulqîn, al-Ḍiyâ al-Qazwînî, etc. He was the author of a number of works, among which Shârîṣ Sanad Abî Dâwud, Shârîṣ al-Bahîja, Muḥtaṣar al-Muhimmât, al-Nukât ‘alâ ‘l-Hâwi wa’l-Tanbih wa ‘l-Minhâj, Shârîṣ Jam’ al-Jawamî’, etc. He was referred to by al-Suyûṭî as al-imâm al-ḥâṭîf al-faqîh al-ṣâlîlî. He was appointed Chief Judge of Egypt deputizing for al-Jâlal al-Bulqînî. He died in 17 Sha’ban 826/1423. See al-Suyûṭî, TH, 543.

1024 This name probably points to Abû Bakr b. ‘Abd Allâh b. Ayyûb b. Ahmad al-Malawi, who was born in 762/1361 and died in 841/1438 and to whom al-Suyûṭî referred as the Shayh Zayn al-Din. Al-Suyûṭî, HM, I, 529.
Suyūṭī, when issuing the *fatwā*, referred to two works: *al-Shāmil* by Ibn al-Ṣabbāg and *al-Risāla* by Ibn Abī Zayd, which he did not list before, as well as to a great number of authorities of various juridical denominations, nineteen of whom, as listed in the table above, had not been dealt with in his QM, JQ and SM.

As far as the relation between the *Fatwā* and QM, JQ and SM is concerned, it should be pointed out that in his *fatwā* al-Suyūṭī states that before deducing a legal opinion on a certain subject matter, a *Mutif* should be knowledgeable of the opinions of the leading scholars on the same issue.  

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1025 So far only Brunschwig has referred to it, when dealing with the attitude of Ibn Hazm, al-Gazālī and Ibn Taymiyya towards logic. See Brunschwig, op. cit., p. 176.

1026 “...innamā waṣīfātuhū an ṣayūra fi ʿaqwāl man taqaddamah wa yahṭār mā qāma al-dalīl ʿindahū ʿalā ṭajāḥātih...” See the *Fatwā*, fol. 423a.
Chapter Five
Conclusion

5. 1. QM, JQ, SM and the Fatwā as Sources for the History of the Opposition to Logic and Theology

QM is an indispensable work for the history of the opposition to logic for three obvious reasons: First, QM records a number of arguments against logic by more than 40 prominent jurists, most of which have not been dealt with by modern scholars. Secondly, al-Suyūṭī makes use of works which deal exclusively with the opposition to logic, i.e. al-Haṭṭ ‘alā ‘i-Mantiq and Naṣīḥat al-Muslim al-Mushfiq liman Ubtulīya bi Ḥubb ‘Ilm al-Mantiq, which are (presumably) no longer extant. He even mentions Abū Ḥāyyān al-Garnāṭī’s al-Nuḍār, which could help us to understand not only his own biography, but also the history of Muslim Spain. Thirdly, in QM al-Suyūṭī draws our attention to various arguments against logic, which have not (yet) been referred to by any modern scholars. When discussing the attitude of Ibn Jubayr al-Kinānī toward logic, Rescher, for instance, refers to Tritton’s Materials which records only four verses composed by Ibn Jubayr against logic.\(^{1027}\) Whereas al-Suyūṭī records twenty verses in his QM. (See Chap. 1)

However, as a work composed by al-Suyūṭī when he was 18 years old, QM still represents his knowledge at a non-advanced level. This is justified with a number of facts: (1) The explicit words against logic by the eponym of the Shafi‘ite school to which al-Suyūṭī and most of the sources relied on in QM were affiliated, amazingly escaped al-Suyūṭī’s attention; (2) it does not contain a historical discussion of logic. It is true that when composing QM, al-Suyūṭī, according to Sartain, had studied Al-Īsāgūṭī by Porphyry and the commentary on it, but as al-Suyūṭī himself admitted, he was still under the supervision of several scholars, among whom are al-Kāfyājī and Ibn al-Hūmām.\(^{1028}\) (See Chap. 1).

Although most of the passages in JQ are replete with IT’s concrete scientific criticism of each of the logical principles, there are some passages that can be regarded as direct expressions of IT’s religious attitude toward logic, reflecting his censure, condemnation and legal prohibition of the study of logic. (See Chap. 2)

Hallaq is right that when abridging NAI, al-Suyūṭī left the logical parts intact and deleted the metaphysical digressions in IT’s discussion. Comparing JQ and NAI, it appears that the repetitive arguments of IT and the digressive discussion on metaphysical issues which al-Suyūṭī deleted in JQ, however, contain relevant elements of IT’s religiously-based viewpoints against logic, the logicians, the philosophers, Aristotle, the Mutakallimūn, etc. (See Chap. 2)

Although JQ records IT’s references to some prominent Shafi‘ite scholars, such al-Juwaynī and al-Gazālī, they are closely related to the fact that they used (a certain principle) of logic as an instrument of thought, and not to the fact that they issued legal opinions against logic, as claimed by al-Suyūṭī in QM, SM and the Fatwā. (See Chap. 2)

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\(^{1027}\) Rescher, op. cit., p. 60; Tritton, op. cit., p. 172.
\(^{1028}\) Sartain, op. cit., p. 32.
The data in SM are much richer than those in QM. This is clearly indicated by the fact that al-Suyūṭī provides rich arguments for each part of his topic. The sources he referred to are much more extensive, i.e., the opponents of logic from other professional backgrounds: theologians, historians, and grammarians, while those in QM only include the jurists and traditionists. SM also records the fact that al-Suyūṭī was not only content with censuring those occupied with logic to obtain knowledge, but also offers them a solution, advising them to deepen their knowledge of Arabic which is relatively self-sufficient. (See Chap. 3)

When composing SM, al-Suyūṭī was influenced by IT’s arguments. This is indicated at least by two facts: philological and historical. Philologically speaking, al-Suyūṭī incorporates more than one and a half printed pages of IT’s arguments recorded in JQ. He repeatedly refers to Ibn Taymiyya, when discussing several issues revolving around the origin of logic and the role of al-Ma’mūn in introducing it into the Muslim world, as well as concerning the first scholar who combined it with the books of usūl, etc. (See Chap. 3)

The historical influence of Ibn Taymiyya on al-Suyūṭī is also confirmed by al-Suyūṭī’s change of attitude, for instance, towards al-Gazālī to whom he had repeteadly referred in QM as a scholar who changed his opinion in favour of logic. In SM, however, al-Suyūṭī stated that al-Gazālī was the first scholar who introduced logic into the sciences of usūl.1029 Another explicit historical influence can also be traced in al-Suyūṭī’s fatwā against logic, in which he asserts his view, which has a certain parallelism with that of IT, concerning the superfluousness of logic in obtaining the truth and understanding the oneness of God, maintaining that in each human heart and conscience is imprinted the ability to infer that to each creature belongs a Creator without having to know the principles of logic.1030 (See Chap. 3)

This development, however, cannot be separated from the context which surrounds the composition of SM, which can be delineated in the following words. Hallaq suggests that the first incident in Islamic legal history where the Muqallids openly opposed the claims of a mujtahid happened to al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505).1031 This is closely related to al-Suyūṭī’s claim for ijtihād and tajdid as can be read in several treatises and fatwās. As described in his al-Radd ‘alā man Aблalda ila ‘l-Ard wa-Jahila anna ‘l-Ijtihād fi Kull ‘Aṣr Fard, al-Suyūṭī, for instance, argues that ijtihād should be fulfilled by the Muslim community because it is a collective duty (fard kitāya). If there were no Muṭahāds, al-Suyūṭī maintains, the community would have agreed upon an error.1032 (See Chap. 3)

Al-Suyūṭī’s claim for ijtihād was contested by the majority of his contemporaries, not because, according to Hallaq, the former had not attained the qualifying conditions to be mujtahid, but because of his ‘immense self-confidence’ and ‘boastfulness.’ Al-Suyūṭī, for instance, asserted that he had attained “the rank of ijtihād in al-aḥkām al-shar‘īyya, in prophetic Tradition and in the Arabic language, an achievement unequalled by anyone since the time of

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1029SM, op. cit., p. 45-6.
1030Fatwā, fol.2b.
1031Hallaq, W.B., The Gate of Ijtihād: A Study of Islamic Legal History (University Microfilms International, 1983), p. 76-8; Sartain, op. cit., p. 62-3..
1032Hallaq, op. cit., p. 76-8; Sartain, op. cit., p. 62-3..
Taqi al-Din al-Subki (d. 756/1355), who was the last scholar in whom these three kinds of *ijtihad* were united.

As evident, according to Sartain, in his treatises and *fatwa*, al-Suyuti often condemned his adversaries as fools. In *al-Lafaz al-Jawhari fi Radd Hubat al-Jawhari* (the jewelled statement in refutation of al-Jawhari's ravings), for instance, al-Suyuti, Sartain reports, condemns al-Jawhari, who had disgraced the former's position as one of the leading *'ulama*.

Despite his thorough knowledge of logic and its opponents as well as partisans among the Muslim scholars, al-Suyuti was a jurist whose concern was much more related to legal problems than logical ones. This is reflected in a work later than SM, i.e. the *Fatwa* in which he listed 44 prominent jurists of four legal schools, starting with the eponym of the Shafiite law school, Imam al-Shafi'i (d. 203/820) and ending with the Shafiite al-Malawi (d. 841/1438). By composing this *Fatwa*, al-Suyuti, as a Mufti whose inherent duty it is to give religious legal advice, seems to argue that his being well-versed in logic and its history as well as its partisans and opponents does not bother him to prohibit people to be occupied with its study as also his predecessors had done.

Although in his *Fatwa* al-Suyuti merely lists the individuals whom he claimed to have opposed logic and does not provide us with their prosopographical information, his merit should be acknowledged here, because he has added significant new data indispensable for further prosopographical study, through which one will be able to gain further knowledge of the history of the opposition to logic. Besides, the list of scholars against logic incorporated in this *Fatwa* can be made use of as a guideline to understand the movement against logic by consulting biographical dictionaries, so that one may possibly come to know the intellectual biography of these scholars, as well as their works.

In sum, although QM, JQ, SM and the *Fatwa* mainly convey the shared normative message of their author as a legal prominent scholar, i.e., that logic is prohibited whatsoever, these works at the same time guide us to rich prosopographical data which shed light on the history of logic and theology in the Islamic world as well as of the opposition to both.

### 5.2. Prosopographical Data against Logic in the Works of al-Suyuti

It could be said that al-Suyuti made use of, borrowing Humphrey's and Van Ess's term, a prosopographical approach attempting to establish as many facts as possible concerning all those who seem to have been connected to a particular subject, and then to convert these facts into a collective portrait of this subject. The aim of using a prosopographical approach is closely connected to what Van Ess calls as an attempt to provide 'ein statistisches Bild.' All al-Suyuti attempted in his four works was to present to his readers the fact that logic as well as theology had been subjected to opposition by many leading scholars whose arguments he dealt with in his texts. Here follows a chronologically arranged survey of the scholars concerned.

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1033 Sartain, op. cit., p. 61-3.
1034 Sartain, op. cit., p. 59.
1035 Humphreys, R.S., *Islamic History*, op. cit., p. 198.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of Death</th>
<th>Legal Aff.</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Work(s) Cited</th>
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<td>150/768</td>
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<td>203/820</td>
<td>The Eponym</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Abū Sa‘id al-Sirāfī</td>
<td>368/979</td>
<td>Hanafite</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>The debate</td>
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<td>Malikite</td>
<td>Mecca</td>
<td>Qūt al-Qulūb</td>
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<td>Nishapur</td>
<td>Al-Shāmil</td>
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<td>Muʿjam al-Safar</td>
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<td>Qazwīn</td>
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<td>Al-andalus</td>
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<td>Fez</td>
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<td>d. 738/1338</td>
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<td>46.</td>
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<td>47.</td>
<td>Taqi al-Dîn al-Subkî</td>
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<td>Abû Ḥayyân al-Garnâţî</td>
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<td>Shafi'ite</td>
<td>Granada</td>
<td>Al-Nuḍâr</td>
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<td>49.</td>
<td>Salâh al-Dîn al-Şafâdî</td>
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<td>Shafi'ite</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>Sharh Lâmiyat al-ʻAjam</td>
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<td>51.</td>
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<td>Siyar, Mu‘jam and Ta‘rih</td>
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<td>Hanafite</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Al-Hatt, Naṣîhat al-Muslim</td>
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<td>53.</td>
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<td>54.</td>
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<td>55.</td>
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<td>56.</td>
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<td>58.</td>
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<td>803/1401</td>
<td>Shafi'ite</td>
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<td>59.</td>
<td>Wâlî al-Dîn al-‘Irâqî</td>
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<td>al-Malawî</td>
<td>841/1438</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>62.</td>
<td>ʻAlam al-Dîn al-Bulqînî</td>
<td>868/1461</td>
<td>Shafi'ite</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>
The following facts can be inferred from the table above: First, although more than half (37 scholars) of the opponents of logic and/or theology lived between the 7th-8th/13th – 14th centuries, these disciplines have also been subjected to opposition in various other centuries: Respectively by eight scholars in the 9th and 5th; by 7 scholars in the 6th, by 3 scholars in the 4th, by 2 scholars in the 3rd, and by one scholar in the 10th century. The list starts with Abù Êan-Dafā (d. 150/768), followed by al-SháfiÝÐ (d. 203/820) and ends with al-SuyÙÔ’s contemporary, al-Bálbís (d. 904/1499). Secondly, logic has been opposed in various regions (extending between Fas, Mecca, Irak, Aleppo and Valencia). However, the most significant opposition took place in Egypt and Syria. Thirdly, most of those who opposed logic were SháfiÝite (43), in spite of the fact that the Malikites (14), the Hanbalites (4) and the Hanafite (1) were also opposed to it. Forthly, most of the written sources which al-SuyÙÔ relies on for discussion of the opposition to logic are fiqh books, their commentaries as well as super-commentaries (11, 24, 29, 30, 32, 39, 51 and 66) and biographical dictionaries (works on history) (8, 18, 19, 22, 48, 49, 51 and 56). However, he also relied on works dealing specifically with the refutation of logic (41 and 52), and on those to which modern scholars refer as dealing with theologico-juridical and/or mystical issues (4, 14 and 20). Al-SuyÙÔ even mentions two works (which are presumably no longer extant, no. 52) that deal exclusively with the opposition to logic. Fifthly, there are some scholars (no: 30, 32, 41, 47, 56) whom al-SuyÙÔ qualified as mujtahids; three (no. 14, 19 and 33) as mujaddids (renewer of the religion); four scholars whom he referred to as Chief Judge (qÁÃÐ al-quÁÃt) (54, 53, 62, 63); one as aqÁÁl-quÁÃt (no. 44); one (no. 61) as a mystic, while the rest are referred to by al-SuyÙÔ and/or by the biographers as belonging to the most knowledgeable persons of their time in Tafsïr, Tradition and Jurisprudence (no. 29), the “seal of the ÍÁfiÛs” (no. 51), the greatest traditionist in Al-Andalus (no. 16), the great ÌÁfiÛ and the traditionist of Iraq (no. 52), a leading scholar of Yemen (no. 60), etc. Three members of the Subki family (no.

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1037 Sartain, op. cit., p. 65.
1038 Al-SuyÙÔ, al-Tahadduth, op. cit., p. 218, 222.
1039 Al-SuyÙÔ, BW, p. 25-7; Al-SuyÙÔ, TH, 531; QM, 12.
1040 Al-Subkî, TS, X, 89.
1041 Al-SuyÙÔ, TH, 500.
1042 Al-SuyÙÔ, TH, 517.
1043 GAL, I, 368; Al-SuyÙÔ, TM, 808-9.
1044 Al-SuyÙÔ, TH, 526.
44, 47, 55) who were considered by Laoust to belong to the most eminent representatives of Shafi’ism and Syro-Egyptian Ash’arism,\(^\text{1046}\) are referred to by al-Suyūṭī in his discussion against logic in QM at one and the same time.

*Sixthly*, al-Suyūṭī has also drawn our attention to a number of Andalusian sources against logic (no. 8, 22, 48), one of which is *al-Nuḍār*, indispensible not only for the biography of its author, al-Garnāṭī, and his opposition against logic, but also to gain an understanding of the history of Muslim Spain. This work, according to al-Suyūṭī, discusses al-Garnāṭī’s early beginnings, his activities, and his teachers as well as his flight from Granada.

From the table above, it is crystal-clear that in his discussion al-Suyūṭī has limited himself to Sunnite scholars, most of whom were of the Shafi’ite school of law, in spite of the fact that some scholars of non-Sunnite theological affiliation had opposed logic as fervently as the Sunnite scholars. This is substantiated by the fact that not a single reference was made by al-Suyūṭī in his discussion against logic, for instance, to the Zaidite Ibn al-Wazīr al-Ṣan‘ānī (840/1374) who had composed *Tārijh Asālib al-Qur‘ān ‘alā Asālib al-Yūnān*, in which he fervently condemned Greek logic and philosophy. Accordingly, the systematic opposition against logic by the Mu’tazilite Ibn al-Shirshâr (d. 293/905) and the Shi’ite thinkers, Hasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbāḥī (d. ca. 310/922), the author of *al-Radd ‘ala ‘l-Manṭiq* and Abū al-Najā al-Farād, the author of *Kasr al-Manṭiq*, received no attention from Al-Suyūṭī either.

5. 3. Al-Suyūṭī’s Changing Views on al-Shāfi’ī, al-Gazālī and al-Juwaynī in QM, JQ, SM and the Fatwā

QM, JQ, SM and the Fatwā record interesting patterns in al-Suyūṭī’s reference to certain authorities: (i) al-Shāfi’ī, (ii) al-Gazālī, and (iii) al-Juwaynī.

1. Al-Shāfi’ī

In a work explicitly composed to prohibit the study of logic, i.e. QM, al-Shāfi’ī is not referred to as having prohibited the study of logic, but amazingly as the one to prohibit *kalām*: “Any affliction by God, except al-shirk, is better for man than being afflicted by Him through *kalām*;” (2) “running away from *kalām* is like running away from a lion;” and (3) “my opinion on the people of *kalām* is that they should be beaten with the lash, and be paraded along the markets while summoning the people that this is the consequence of neglecting the science of *shari‘a*, for being occupied with *‘ilm al-kalām*.\(^{1047}\) In SM, al-Shāfi’ī is quoted by al-Suyūṭī as having said that the ignorance of the people and their controversies are only caused by their abandoning the language of the Arabs and their inclination to the language of Aristotle.\(^{1048}\) While in the Fatwā, al-Suyūṭī only lists al-Shāfi’ī as one of those who prohibited logic.

With regard to the written sources relied on by al-Suyūṭī in representing al-Shāfi’ī’s arguments against logic and/or theology, the following can be said: In QM, al-Suyūṭī refers to *Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab* by al-Nawawi, in SM, he refers to

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\(^{1046}\)Laoust, H., “Ibn Taymiyya,” EI², III, 954.

\(^{1047}\)QM, p. 3, l. 19-23.

\(^{1048}\)SM, op. cit., p. 48.
**2. Al-Gazālī**

In a work composed when al-Suyūṭī was 18 years old, i.e. QM, he repeatedly asserts that al-Gazālī withdrew from his opinion in favour of logic. Through his abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI, i.e. JQ, al-Suyūṭī was led to believe that al-Gazālī made use of definitions to obtain knowledge following the logicians, and also was guided in the idea that al-Gazālī had composed *Kitāb al-Mīyār* for such a purpose. In SM, he likewise refers to al-Gazālī as the first to combine the books of *uṣūl* with logic. However, in the *Fatwā*, he turns to the opinion that al-Gazālī had prohibited logic in the end of his life.

For the view that al-Gazālī had changed his favourable attitude towards logic, al-Suyūṭī refers to *Naṣīḥat al-Mushfīq liman Ubtulīya bi Ḥubb ‘Ilm al-Manṭiq* by Sirāj al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī. While for his opinion that al-Gazālī was the first to combine the books of *uṣūl* with logic, al-Suyūṭī refers to NAI (*al-Radd*) by Ibn Taymiyya. In the *Fatwā*, however, he does not refer to any written sources at all.

Attention may be drawn to the way in which al-Suyūṭī represents IT’s reference to al-Gazālī. Here, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have purposely limited IT’s frequent references to al-Gazālī. This is clearly reflected by the fact that NAI, as discussed in chapter three, records more than 28 references by IT to al-Gazālī as one who upheld the principle of the logicians, whereas its abridged version, viz. JQ, records only six references to him. This remarkable phenomenon may be closely related to al-Suyūṭī’s earlier assertion, as recorded in his QM, that al-Gazālī had changed his favourable view on logic and had become one of its fervent opponents.

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3. Al-Juwaynī

JQ, SM and the *Fatwā* record al-Suyūṭī’s reference to al-Juwaynī in the following unique manner. Although JQ is an abridged version of IT’s *Naṣīḥa*, it can inform us of the fact that al-Suyūṭī was led to believe that al-Juwaynī was a member of the Ashʿarite theological schools, acknowledging the benefit of definition (*al-ḥadd*) to distinguish an object (*al-maḥdūd*), i.e., one who makes use of logic as a means to be led to certainty. However, a work composed soon after JQ, i.e., SM, tells us the opposite, which we leads us to believe that al-Suyūṭī convincingly argued that al-Juwaynī repented from his occupation with *kalām*. Interestingly, the fact that al-Juwaynī abandoned logic is not recorded by al-Suyūṭī in his SM, but in a work composed later, i.e. in the *Fatwā* in which he explicitly included al-Juwaynī in his list of scholars who prohibited logic.

For the fact that al-Juwaynī was an Ashʿarite who made use of logic as means of obtaining knowledge, al-Suyūṭī was guided by his abridgement of IT’s

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\[\text{1049}Q\text{M, p. 1, l. 22-23.}\]
\[\text{1050}JQ, \text{ op. cit., p. 212.}\]
\[\text{1051}SM, \text{ op. cit., p. 45-6.}\]
\[\text{1052}JQ, \text{ op. cit., p. 206.}\]
\[\text{1053}SM, \text{ op. cit., p. 236-7.}\]
\[\text{1054}Fatwā, \text{ fol. 1b.}\]
NAI. While the fact that the former had abandoned *kalām*, relied on Ibn al-
Sam'ānī’s *Tā'īrīh*, al-Asnawi’s *Ṭabagāt* and Ibn al-Jawzi’s *Tahlīs al-Iblīs*. 
Conversely, for the fact that al-Juwaynī had prohibited logic, al-Suyūṭī does not 
give a single reference.
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Samenvatting

In de Introductie behandel ik de moderne wetenschappelijke discussie omtrent de oorsprong van de Islamitische theologie, en het standpunt van al-Suyūṭī met betrekking tot dat onderwerp. Het modern wetenschappelijk onderzoek omtrent dit onderwerp kan worden onderverdeeld in zes verschillende stromingen, die respectievelijk uitgaan van: (1) de Hellenistische oorsprong van de Islamitische theologie; (2) Islamitische theologie als voornamelijk het resultaat van een interne ontwikkeling; (3) Christelijke invloeden op de Islamitische theologie; (4) Joodse bijdragen aan de Islamitische theologie; (5) Perzische elementen in de Islamitische theologie; en (6) Indiase elementen in de Islamitische theologie. Hoewel ieder van deze visies zijn eigen belangrijke pleitbezorgers heeft, moet worden onderstreept dat de visie van de Hellenistische invloed op de oorsprong en ontwikkeling van de Islamitische theologie nog steeds de belangrijkste positie inneemt in de moderne wetenschap.

Daarnaast behandel ik de moderne wetenschappelijke discussie omtrent de geschiedenis van het Islamitische verzet tegen de logica en de theologie. Van de moderne zienswijzen die specifiek betrekking hebben op het Islamitische verzet tegen de logica, behandel ik Goldziher, Madkour, Hartmann, al-Nashshār, al-Ṭabāṭaba’ī, Hallaq, Endress, Van Koningsveld, en Griffel. Wat betreft het Islamitische verzet tegen theologie (kalām) en de mutakallimūn, bespreek ik de denkbeelden van Makdisi, Daiber, Pavlin, Abrahamov, Juynboll en al-Hashshāsh.

Over de positie van al-Suyūṭī kan worden opgemerkt dat zijn visie opvallende overeenkomsten vertoont met die van enkele moderne wetenschappers, die van mening zijn dat de ontwikkeling van kalām niet alleen te wijten is aan een externe faktor, nl. de vertaal-beweging van Griekse geschriften, maar ook aan een interne faktor, nl. de behoefte aan een vorm van debateerkunst voor discussies van religieuze aard.

Deze studie probeert een antwoord te formuleren op de vraag wat men kan leren van al-Suyūṭī’s vier geschriften tegen de logica en de theologie omtrent de geschiedenis van de Islamitische veroordeling van logica en theologie, in aanvulling op wat de moderne wetenschap hierover heeft te zeggen. De volgende werken van al-Suyūṭī zijn voor deze studie geraadpleegd: (1) al-Qawl al-Mushriq, (2) Jahd al-Qariha, (3) Šawn al-Manṭiq, en (4) de Fatwā tegen de logica.

Het eerste hoofdstuk behandelt de manuscripten en de editie van al-Qawl al-Mushriq (QM), het tijdstip waarop het werd geschreven en het doel waarvoor, en geeft tevens een analyse van de inhoud. QM werd in 868/1466 geschreven, toen al-Suyūṭī pas 19 was. In dit werk bespreekt al-Suyūṭī, direct of indirect het verzet tegen de logica van meer dan 40 vooraanstaande geleerden van verschillende faculteiten in de rechten door te verwijzen naar meer dan 28 werken die, direct of indirect het zelfde onderwerp behandelden. Dit hoofdstuk bepleit tevens dat dit werk een onmisbare bron vormt voor de geschiedenis van het Islamitische verzet tegen de logica. In zijn betoog tegen de logica verwijst de auteur direct of indirect naar 44 geleerden van verschillende rechten-scholen, te beginnen bij al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 203/820) en eindigend bij de Shafi‘īet Ibn al-Ṣadr al-
Balbisdî (d. 904/1499), en daarnaast naar 28 werken die, direct of indirect, handelen over het verzet tegen de logica.

Het tweede hoofdstuk bespreekt het tweede geschrift tegen de logica dat al-Suyûtî samenstelde, nl. *Jahd al-Qariha*, een samenvatting Naṣîha. *Jahd al-Qariha* van Ibn Taymiyya, geschreven in 888/1488 toen al-Suyûtî 38 jaar oud was. In dit werk bespreekt al-Suyûtî de poging die in IT wordt ondernomen om de belangrijkste stellingen te weerleggen waarop de logica is gefundeerd, namelijk: (1) *Al-taṣawwur lâ yunâlû illâ bi 'l-Îadd* (een concept kan niet anders worden bepaald dan door definitie); (2) *Al-Îadd mufîd taṣawwur al-ashyâ* (definitie leidt tot de conceptualisering van dingen), (3) *Al-taṣdiq lâ yunâlû illâ bi 'l-qiyâs* (een oordeel kan niet anders worden gevormd dan aan de hand van analogie), en (4) *Al-burhân yufîd al-Ýilm bi 'l-taṣdiqât* (aanootbaarheid leidt tot zekere kennis omtrent oordelen).

Het derde hoofdstuk bespreekt al-Suyûtî's *Šawn al-Manṭiq*, dat in 888 werd geschreven, hetzelfde jaar als *Jahd al-Qariha*, toen enkele tijdgenoten van al-Suyûtî zijn aanspraak op *ijtihad* afwezen, omdat het hem naar hun oordeel ontbrak aan de mate van kennis van de logica die hiervoor een van de voorwaarden was. Dit werk handelt over de geschiedenis en de oorsprong van de logica, haar introductie in de Islamitische wereld, de afwijzende reactie van vooraanstaande geleerden, haar verwantschap met de theologie, de afwijzing van de theologie door Islamitische geleerden en de weerlegging van degenen die de logica binnen de grammatica hadden geïntroduceerd. Voorts vindt men in dit werk een bespreking, samenvatting en beschrijving van 12 werken door voorgangers van al-Suyûtî die *kalâm* en de mutakallimûn veroordeelden. Daarbij verzamelt al-Suyûtî in dit werk ook nog de argumenten tegen de logica van meer dan 36 geleerden van verschillende stromingen.

Naast het manuscript van de *fatwâ*, behandelt het vierde hoofdstuk ook de inhoud van al-Suyûtî's *fatwâ* tegen de logica. Net als andere *fatwâs* begint deze met een vraagstelling, over het onderwerp van de logica, en hierop volgt dan het antwoord van al-Suyûtî, die de logica verbiedt en hiervoor verwijst naar 43 geleerden die volgens hem eveneens de logica afwezen. Deze *fatwâ* vormt een onmisbare bron voor de geschiedenis van het Islamitische verzet tegen de logica, en wel om de volgende reden: bij het uitvaardigen van de *fatwâ* verwijst al-Suyûtî naar twee werken: *al-Shámîl* van Ibn al-Šâbîbâg en *al-Risâla* van Ibn Abî Zayd, welke hij nog niet eerder had genoemd, en voorts naar een een groot aantal autoriteiten van verschillende juridische stromingen, waarvan hij er negentien nog niet had behandeld in zijn QM, JQ en SM.

Na de werken tegen de logica en theologie van al-Suyûtî te hebben vergeleken met de moderne wetenschap omtrent dit onderwerp, concludeer ik dat deze vier werken een rijk historisch document vormen van het Islamitische verzet tegen logica en theologie, waarvan moderne wetenschappers die dit onderwerp bestuderen zich terdege rekenschap dienen te geven. In zijn vier geschriften poogt al-Suyûtî zijn lezers ervan te overtuigen dat de logica door 68 vooraanstaande geleerden werd veroordeeld. Een analyse van de inhoud van deze vier werken wijst er op dat een afkeer van de logica een belangrijk element werd in het Sunnitische
traditionalisme, met name gedurende de 13e, 14e en 15e eeuw. Een prosopografische analyse van de tegenstanders van de logica die door al-Suyūṭī worden genoemd wijst uit dat de logica werd afgewezen door vooraanstaande Sunni geleerden in Valencia, Fez, Aleppo, Irak, and Mekka, en met name ook in Egypte and Syrië.

Bij bestudering van een recent ontdekt manuscript van QM en van de fatwā van al-Suyūṭī wordt de juistheid bevestigd van de beschrijving die al-Nashshār in 1947 gaf van een van de werken van al-Suyūṭī die hier worden besproken, namelijk SM: “waḥādha ’l-kitāb yuʿabar awṣāṭ fīmā naʿlam fī mawḍūʿ naqḍ al-maṣṭiq al-yūnānī,” om te kennen te geven dat al-Suyūṭī’s SM de meest complete encyclopedie vormt m.b.t. de [Islamitische] kritiek op de Griekse logica.
Mufti Ali was born in Banten in August 6, 1972. He graduated from Islamic High School (al-Madrasa al-‘Aliyya al-Sa‘āda) in 1992. In 1993-1998, he followed Islamic Studies’ courses at the Faculty of Islamic Law at the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) ‘Sultan Gunung Djati’ in Serang (Banten). In September 1998, he started his post-graduate courses on Islamic Studies within the framework of the Indonesian-Netherlands Co-operation for Islamic Studies (INIS) at the Leiden University. He obtained the degree of M.A. in Islamic Studies at Leiden University from both the Faculty of Arts and of Theology, with his thesis, Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti against Logic and Kalam: Analysis and Significance of Saww al-Mantiq wa ‘l-Kalam ‘an Fannay al-Mantiq wa ‘l-Kalam. In November 2001, he was accepted as Ph.D. fellow at the INIS-program at Leiden University. Currently, he is staff lecturer at the Faculty of Theology in the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Banten, Indonesia. During his study at the Leiden University, he has also published a number of articles:
