Chapter Two


2. 1. The Date and Purpose of Abridgement of Naṣīḥa
The fact that JQ was not composed in the same year as QM, but rather twenty years after the latter i.e. in 888/1482, was mentioned by al-Suyut'i in the introduction of SM: “I related in it [QM] that the Shaykh al-Islam, one of the scholars who has reached the degree of ijtihad, Taqi al-Din b. Taymiyya composed a book to undo its foundations, which I had not found at that time. Twenty years had passed by without me having found it. Then when this year had come, and I had told of what God endowed upon me in attaining the rank of independent legal investigation, someone mentioned that one of the conditions for legal investigation was the knowledge of the art of logic, claiming that this condition lacked in me. The poor fellow did not understand that I knew it better than those who claim to know it and who defend it. I know the principles of its foundations, as well as the insights based thereon equally well as the leading logicians of today, with the exception of only our very learned teacher, Muhyi al-Din al-Kāfya [d. 879/1475]. Thus I sought for Ibn Taymiyya's book, till I found it. I saw that he had entitled it Naṣīḥat Ahl al-İmān fı al-Radd ʿalā Manṭiq al-Yūnān [forthwith called: NAI]. In it, he expressed excellently his intention to undo its foundations one by one, while explaining the depravity of its principles. So I summarized it in a little composition which I entitled Jahd al-Qariha fı Tajrid al-Nasiha.”

2. 2. The Contribution Made by al-Suyut'i in Presenting IT's Arguments more Comprehensible
JQ is an abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s NAI. Al-Suyut'i has abridged NAI, which, according to Hallaq, approximately consists of 138,000 words, to one third of its length, viz. approximately 32,000 words. In summarizing this work, al-Suyut'i did not try to reformulate Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas or give comments on them. “In other words, his abridgement is not paraphrastic: he simply let the logical parts intact and deleted the greatest part of metaphysical digressions.” However, according to Hallaq, al-Suyut'i can be said to have succeeded in providing a more readable NAI to the readers, and in making it a succinct treatise. Besides, al-Suyut'i’s omission of Ibn Taymiyya’s metaphysical discussions in NAI and his cleansing of a good deal of the repetitions from the logical discussions, Hallaq argues, rendered “the sequence of ideas” of JQ, “superior to that found in” NAI.

In sum, Hallaq maintains that “the overall result of al-Suyut'i’s abridgement is a more effective critique of logic than that originally formulated

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452 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. liv-v.
453 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. lv.
454 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. liv.
by IT.\textsuperscript{455} This is in line with al-Suyūṭi’s own remark when he concluded his work, JQ: “This is the end of what I have abridged from Ibn Taymiyya’s treatise. I have conveyed his words \textit{verbatim}, mostly without any change. I have omitted much of his treatise, which consists of twenty fascicles. However, I have deleted nothing of value; what I did delete was not pertinent to the main argument. The deletions are either digressions or replies to metaphysical and other queries, or repetitions, or refutations of some logicians’ views that do not have bearing upon any universal principle in logic, etc. \textit{Those who read this abridgement of mine will benefit more from it than they would should they take up the original work, for the latter is complex and difficult to use.”}\textsuperscript{456}

2. 3. Elements of IT’s Religious Viewpoints Against Logic and Theology in JQ

Although most of the passages of this work are replete with IT’s concrete scientific criticism of each of the logical principles,\textsuperscript{457} there are some passages that can be regarded as direct expressions of IT’s \textit{religious} attitude toward logic, reflecting his censure, condemnation and legal prohibition of the study of logic. The following passages will be devoted to IT’s viewpoints against logic in particular or against the sciences of the ancients in general, such as philosophy inasfar as they have been maintained in the abridged work of al-Suyūṭi, viz. JQ.\textsuperscript{458}

The first of these statements is very interesting, since it represents a cultural attitude shared by many religious scholars regarding the sciences of the ancients in general, and against logic in particular. The statement says: \textit{fā innā kuntu dā’īman al-‘alamu anna ‘l-manṭiq al-yūnāni lā yaḥtāju ilayh ‘l-dhakār wa lā yantafī‘u bihi ‘l-balid} (I have always known that Greek logic is neither needed by the intelligent nor of any use to the dullard).\textsuperscript{459}

IT’s oppositional attitude toward logic is also clearly indicated in his harsh criticism of the philosophers who adopted the principles of Aristotelian logic. Accordingly he remarks that “even the [pre-Islamic] polytheistic Arabs possessed remnants of the religion of Abraham and were thus better than the polytheistic philosophers who adopted the principles propounded by Aristotle and his likes.”\textsuperscript{460}

IT’s opposition to logic can be seen in the words in favour of al-Shīrāzī’s position maintaining that Arabic is the most noble language: “When Mattā complimented logic and claimed that intelligent people need it, Abū Sa‘īd…

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.}, p. liv.}
\footnote{For this translation, I rely fully on Hallaq’s translation of JQ. See JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.} p. 174.}
\footnote{IT’s epistemological criticism of logic is reflected in his aim to deconstruct four main theses which the logicians upheld: (1) \textit{al-tašawwur lā yunālu illā bi‘l-ḥadd} (no concept can be formed except by means of definition), (2) \textit{al-ḥadd mufid tašawwur al-ashyā}’ (definition leads to the conception of things), (3) \textit{al-taṣdiq lā yunālu illā bi ‘l-‘aqīs} (the judgement cannot be formed except by means of analogy), and (4) \textit{al-burhān yufid al-‘ilm bi ‘l-taṣdiqāt} (syllogism leads to the certain knowledge of judgements). The translation of these logical concepts are quoted from JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3-174.}
\footnote{In discussing these, I fully rely on Hallaq’s translation of JQ.}
\footnote{JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.}
\footnote{JQ (Hallaq), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 68.}
\end{footnotes}
responded that there is no need for it, and that the need is rather for learning the Arabic language; for meanings are instinctive and intuitive, and in need of no special convention, while Arabic is needed in order to understand meanings that must be learned. That is why learning the Arabic language – upon which the understanding of the Quran and the traditions depends – is, unlike logic, a religious obligation whenever such obligation can be fulfilled by the individual Muslim.”

Ibn Taymiyya can also be said to have pronounced as his legal opinion that the study of logic should be prohibited. This can be inferred from the following words: “The argument of the more recent scholars that the study of logic is a religious obligation incumbent upon those who are able to undertake it, and that it is one of the conditions which must be met in order to interpret the Law, is indicative of both their ignorance of the Law and the uselessness of logic.”

IT’s opposition to logic is also reflected in his condemnation of the society among which logic was founded, i.e. the Greek. According to IT, “the Greeks were polytheists and worshippers of stars and idols, much worse than the Jews and Christians even after the latter had abrogated and distorted their own Scripture.”

According to IT, “Muslim thinkers continue to denounce the logicians’ method and expose its weaknesses, errors, intellectual inadequacy, and inarticulateness. They have shown that such a method is more likely to corrupt the rational and linguistic faculties than to set them straight. They are not willing to adopt it in their own reasoning or in their scholarly disputations, whether these disputations are conducted against a friend or a foe.”

In another passage, IT identifies the logicians with those whose knowledge is limited and those who have no skill in formulating concepts and clear expressions. This can be read in the following remarks: “The stronger the intellectual faculty and its conception are, the richer its expression becomes. But if the intellect and its expressions and concepts are feeble, the person possessing that intellect will be as if he were the prisoner of his own mind and tongue. Such is the case with the Greek logicians: you find them to be the most limited in knowledge and learning, the weakest in formulating concepts and clear expressions. This is why intelligent people who follow the path of the logicians when treating of the sciences employ methods that are prolix, compressed, affected, and arbitrary. All they do is to explain the obvious and clarify the intelligible. This may lead them to fall into all kinds of sophistry from which God has saved those who do not follow their path.”

IT’s hostile attitude towards logic is also reflected in his dealing with an authority to whom he himself refers explicitly as the first who mixed logic “with Islamic principles (bi usūl al-muslimin),” i.e. al-Gazālī. This is clearly indicated in IT’s words: “those who introduced this [essential definition] are the ones who

461JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 100.
462Ibidem.
463JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 103.
464JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 111.
465JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 87; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., 166-7.
466JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 154; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 194-5.
wrote on the principles of religion and law after Abū Ḥāmid [al-Gazālī] - towards the end of the fifth century - and it is they who have discussed on definitions according to the doctrine of the Greek logicians. Scholars of all other denominations - the Ashʿarīs, Muʿtazilīs, Karrāmīs, Shiʿīs, and others - hold that the function of definition is to distinguish between the definiendum and other things. This is well known in the writings of Abu 'l-Ḥasan al-Asʿarī, al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr [al-Bāqillānī], Abū ʿİsāq [al-Iṣfārāʾīnī], Ibn Fūrak, al-Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā, Ibn ʿAqīl, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, Naṣāfī, Abū Ḥāshim, etc. Moreover, it is also reflected by his reference to al-Gazālī as the one responsible for spreading the logicians’ method through his including “in the beginning of his work al-Mustaṣfā, an introduction to Greek logic, and as the one who alleged that the learning of those who do not know this logic is not to be trusted.”

His criticism of al-Gazālī is also reflected by his identifying the latter as the proponent of a logical concept upheld by the logicians: al-ʿadd mufḍīd taṣawwur al-ashyāʾ (definition leads to the conception of things), a logical postulate which is opposed by, IT says, almost the majority of Muslim theologians, from among the Ashʿarīs, Muʿtazilīs, Karrīmīs and Shiʿīs, who oppose this postulate as can be seen in the works of Abu ‘l-Ḥasan al-Asʿarī, Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, Abū ʿİsāq, etc.

Opposing this postulate and arguing against its proponents, IT then puts forward a number of arguments maintaining that definition does not lead to the conception of things: First, “a definition is merely a statement and claim of the definer. The statement ‘man’ is ‘a rational animal’ is a declarative proposition (qaḍīyya ḥabariyya) and a mere claim devoid of proof. Therefore the hearer may know the truthfulness of this proposition before hearing it. This can be a proof that definition is not needed when one acquires the knowledge.” Secondly, “if the definer is not able to prove the truthfulness of the definition, the hearer fails to know the defined thing. Therefore there is no need for definition. Conceptualizing the thing defined with the definition is not possible without the knowledge of the truthfulness of the saying of the definer. The truthfulness of his saying is not known by a mere definition. Thus, the defined thing cannot be known by the definition.” Thirdly, “definition is not needed, because to form a concept necessitates the examination of the validity of the definition. Consequently apprehending the definiendum should be preceded by apprehending of that which defines it.” Fourthly, “the use of definition depends on whether the hearer knows or not that the definiendum possesses the attributes by means of which the logicians define the definiendum. If he does not know, he will not be able to form a concept of it. If he does, he will form a concept of it without definition. Therefore, definition is not needed.”

467 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 12-3.
468 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 111-12.
469 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 13.
470 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 15.
471 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 16.
472 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 17.
473 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 18.
would not seek them, thus they need no definition. In short, it is awareness which is more useful than definition when one seeks and enquires a concept, since the act of seeking and enquiring presupposes awareness.\textsuperscript{474} Sixthly, “their understanding of the concept of definition is based on two invalid principles: First, a quiddity has a permanent reality, other than its own existence, subsisting outside the mind. This argument is similar to the one espoused by those who hold the non-existent to be a thing. Second, the distinction between what is a necessary concomitant to quiddity and what is essential to it. This principle has no truth in it. Understanding this principle would be tantamount to saying ‘the existence together with its necessary attributes’.\textsuperscript{475} Seventhly, “in a complete definition, the logicians require that a concept be formed of all its essential attributes common with other things. This means that all the attributes must be included. That is impossible.”\textsuperscript{476} Eighthly, “requiring that definition must include distinguishing specific differences (fusūl mumayyīza) along with their distinction between what is essential and what is accidental, is impossible.”\textsuperscript{477} Ninthly, “definition is impossible, because its argument involves circularity: the apprehension of the essence will depend on the apprehension of what the essential qualities are, and the apprehension of the essential qualities will depend on what the apprehension of the essence is. Thus, if the definiendum cannot be known without definition, and definition is impossible, then the definiendum cannot be known. This reflects the falsity of their doctrine.”\textsuperscript{478} Tenthly, “the disagreement amongst them concerning definition cannot be resolved in terms of [their] principles; and what entails the equalization of evidence (takāfu’ al-adilla) [against and for the truth] is invalid.”\textsuperscript{479}

IT then asserts how al-Gazālī’s introduction of logic into Islamic sciences has led many scholars to follow the latter in thinking that logic was the only existing method. Furthermore, IT remarks that “little did these thinkers know that intelligent and learned Muslims and others have denounced and decried it. Muslim thinkers have written many works about logic, and the majority of Muslims denounce it categorically because of what they have observed of its [damaging] effects and attendant consequences, which show the logicians views to be contrary to sound knowledge and faith, views that led them to all sorts of ignorance, heresy, and error.”\textsuperscript{480}

IT, however, argues that al-Gazālī, as reflected in the books he wrote towards the end of his life, changed his views and maintained that the logicians’ method is false and leads to uncertainty. According to al-Gazālī, IT says, logic led him nowhere, “and has removed none of the doubt and perplexity which possessed him. To him logic was to no avail.”\textsuperscript{481}

Another typical remark by IT that can be regarded as having served religious ground for the opposition to logic is found in his following words:

\textsuperscript{474} JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{475} JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 23-4.
\textsuperscript{476} JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 27-8.
\textsuperscript{477} JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 28-9.
\textsuperscript{478} JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 29.
\textsuperscript{479} JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 30.
\textsuperscript{480} JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 112.
\textsuperscript{481} Ibidem.
“What Muslim thinkers have shown in their discussions of the Greek logic attributed to Aristotle is that the forms of the syllogism and the subject-matter that the logicians have elaborated with great efforts are of no use in the acquisition of knowledge.”

Furthermore, he remarks “Muslim thinkers have held that logic does not lead to the knowledge sought after, and may constitute an obstacle in the way of attaining that knowledge because logic is tedious for the mind.”

In another passage, IT remarks that “Muslim scholars continue to write in refutation of the philosophers’ logic, and to expose the errors in their discourse concerning both definition and syllogism. They also continue to expose the philosophers’ errors in metaphysics and other matters. No Muslim scholar has attached importance to their method; in fact, the Ashʿaris, Muʿtazilis, Karrāmis, Shiʿis, and speculative thinkers in other groups have condemned their method and exposed its falsehood. Muslim scholars have since discussed logic at too great a length to be mentioned here. The refutation of the logicians is set forth in many a theological work. In Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbaṭī’s work al-Ārāʾ wa ʿl-Dīyānāt there is a useful chapter (faṣūl) of such refutation.”

In condemning logic, IT also refers to Ibn al-Qushayrī’s hostile verses condemning Ibn Sinā’s al-Shifā’:

“We severed the ties of brotherhood with those stricken
By the malady of the book of al-Shifā’
How often have I said to them
You are about to be swept away by the book of al-Shifā’
When they made little of our warning
We turned to God and He was sufficient
They then died while following the religion of Aristotle
And we lived according to the Religion of the Chosen.”

In opposing logic, IT also reports the event which occurred when al-Ḥunajī was dying. According to IT, “those who were present at the deathbed of Ḥunajī, the chief logician of his time, reported that just before his death he said: ‘I die knowing nothing except that the possible presupposes the necessary.’ He then added: ‘And presupposition is a negative attribute, so I die knowing nothing.’”

In another passage, IT even condemns explicitly Ibn Sinā, the fervent follower of Aristotle. This becomes clear from his words: “What is meant here is that Ibn Sinā said in his autobiography that his family, his father, and his brother were heretics whom he used to hear discuss the intellect and the soul, and because of this he occupied himself with the study of philosophy. Nonetheless, despite the obvious heresy and inner disbelief of those Muslims with whom he is affiliated, their belief in God is greater than that of the ancient philosophers, such as

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482JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 132.
483Ibidem.
484JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 133-4.
485JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 173.
486According to Hallaq, Afḍal al-Dīn ʿAlī Muḥammad b. Nāmāwar ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥunajī (d. 646/1249) was “a logician who belonged to the Shāfīʿī legal school.” JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 42, n. 57 1.
487JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 132-3.
Aristotle and his followers, whose knowledge of God is surpassed even by the [pre-Islamic] polytheistic Arabs.”

In the same line, IT’s hostile attitude toward philosophers is clearly indicated in his remarks “Therefore the goal of the philosophers - if God leads them into some guidance – is the start of the Jews and infidel Christians, not to speak of the Muslims, the followers of the Prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace – (wa līhādā kānat nihāyat al-falāsifa – idhā hadāhum allāh ba’d al-hidaya – bidāyat al-yahūd wa ’l-naṣāra al-kuffār, faḍlan ‘an al-muslimīn ummati muḥammad ʿalla ‘llāh wa sallama).”

Along the same line, IT’s denouncement of the philosophers can also be found in his words: “Thus, the views of those philosophers became widespread among people lacking in reason and religion, such as the Karmatians and the Bāṭinīs, whose doctrine combines the philosophy of the Greeks with the religion of the Magians, although outwardly they adhere to the religion of Rāfīḍ. Of the same stock are the ignorant mystics and speculative theologians. Being heretics and hypocrites, they find fertile ground in an ignorant (jāhilīyya) environment which is far from knowledge and faith. They also find wide acceptance among hypocritical heretics as well as among the polytheistic Turks. They always find acceptance among the heretical and hypocritical enemies of God and of His Messenger.”

In concluding his discussion of logic, IT fervently attacks the philosophers (logicians), revealing the falsity of their logic. This is clearly illustrated by his words: “From the foregoing it has become clear that restricting the methods for the acquisition of knowledge to those which they have stipulated in logic is false, both in content and form. It has also become clear that they have excluded from the valid sciences those which are more sublime, more imposing, and more numerous than those they have subscribed to, and that the methods they have prescribed lead to only a few contemptible sciences that are neither noble nor numerous. Such is the level of these people – in their knowledge and practice they are the lowest of all humans. In many ways, the heretical Jews and Christians are more noble in their knowledge and practice. The entirety of philosophy does not even elevate its follower to a degree equal to that of the Jews and Christians after the latter have abrogated and distorted [their own Books], let alone prior to their doing so.”

2. 4. How did al-Suyūṭī select IT’s viewpoints against logic in this Abridgement?

Hallaq is right that al-Suyūṭī in abridging NAI left the logical parts intact and deleted the metaphysical digressions in IT’s discussion. Comparing JQ and NAI, it appears that the repetitive arguments of IT and his digressive discussion on metaphysical issues, which al-Suyūṭī deleted in JQ, however, contain relevant elements of IT’s religiously-based viewpoints against logic, the logicians, the

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488 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 64.
489 NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 133.
490 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 104.
491 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 172-3.
492 JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. liv-v.
philosophers, Aristotle, the Mutakallimūn, etc. The following are some typical examples:

To begin with, IT, for instance, says that “those who deal with definition (al-ḥudūd) after al-Gazālī are those who deal with them following the Greek logical method.”

IT’s criticism of the Mutakallimūn can be found for instance in his remarks that a specific group of the Mutakallimūn argue against the falsity of the arguments of the philosophers with false and invalid arguments. Accordingly, he also condemned the Mutakallimūn for their arguing with the philosophers in a number of questions, such as the novelty of the Universe (ḥudūth al-ʿālam), the attestation of the existence of the Creator (īthbāt al-ṣānī'), and prophecies (al-nubuwwāt), by means of a false method which deviates from the Divine law (al-sharʿ) as well as from reason (al-ʿaqīl).

IT’s criticism of both the Mutakallimūn and the philosophers is clearly voiced when he speaks of “the mistake which the philosophers committed when dealing with metaphysical questions, prophecies, the hereafter and divine laws,” which, according to IT, was “graver than that of the Mutakallimūn. As for what they opine concerning physical and mathematical sciences is that the philosophers are more often sound than those among the Mutakallimūn who argue against them. Most of the opinions of the Mutakallimūn concerning these issues are not based on knowledge, reason, and divine rule.”

In another passage, IT identifies the philosophers with the ones most ignorant of God, the Lord of the Universe, and with those whose belief is similar to that of the hypocrites who adhere to the Islamic tenet only superficially, refusing inwardly what has been prescribed by the Prophets. IT then illustrates their error in refusing the knowledge of God and His Attributes.

Referring to al-Gazālī, IT also anathematizes the concepts of the philosophers dealing with the fact that God does not know the particulars, with the sempiternity of the Universe and with the rejection of the hereafter (inkār al-maʿād).

Typical characteristics of IT’s digressions can be represented by a number of cases:

Case 1:

(1a) When dealing with a subject, IT usually treats it in detail. When he discusses definition (al-ḥadd) and syllogism (al-qiyās), by which a concept and

493NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 15.
494NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 105.
495NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 105.
496NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 311.
497NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 394.
498NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 459.
499NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 462.
500NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 523.
judgement are respectively formed, he explains the definition of al-ṣadd and its being identified with its species: al-ḥaqiqi, al-rasmi and al-lafzi and that of al-qiyas and its being identified with its species: al-jadal, al-shi‘ri, al-sufas. IT then deals with each of the species of al-ṣadd and al-qiyas, the discussion of which occupies more than two printed pages of NAI.504

However, IT’s viewpoints on this issue, which al-Suyuti abridges in JQ, are very concise. This can obviously be found in the following abridgement: “You ought to know that they have founded logic upon the theory of definition and its species, and upon demonstrative syllogism and its species. They have held that, inasmuch as knowledge is either a concept (ta‘awwur) or a judgement (ta‘d), the means by which a concept is formed is a definition, and that by which a judgement is formed is a syllogism. To this we say that the discussion revolves around four points, two negative and two affirmative. The first of the two [negative points] concerns their doctrine that no required concept can be formed except through a definition; and the second of the two that no required judgement can be known except by means of a syllogism. The other two [affirmative points] concern their doctrine that [1] definition leads to the knowledge of concepts, and [2] the prescribed syllogism or demonstration leads to the knowledge of judgements.”502

It is clear that when al-Suyuti encountered IT’s lengthy discussions of subjects, he dealt only with the most essential passages and avoided the details thereof.

(tb) This also holds true for IT’s lengthy discussion of the fact that definition can be challenged by means of refutation (naqṣ) and by introducing another, opposing definition (mu‘arada), the explanation of which takes up a couple of pages in NAI.503 Al-Suyuti, however, abridges it in one paragraph: “Tenth, they argue that the opponent is entitled to challenge definition by means of refutation (naqṣ) – through Coextensiveness (ṭard) and Coexclusiveness (‘aks) – as well as by introducing another, opposing definition (mu‘arada). If the hearer can invalidate the definition at times by Refutation and at others by Opposition, and since neither is possible without first forming a concept of the definiendum, then it becomes clear that the concept of the definiendum can be formed without definition. And this is what we sought to prove.”504

(tc) The same pattern applies to IT’s argument against the postulate that “definition leads to the conception of things.” According to IT, this postulate is not only upheld by many scholars, among whom al-Gazali, but also opposed by many others, among whom Abu ’l-Ḥasan al-Ash‘ari, al-Qaḍi Abū Bakr [al-Bağillian], Abū Ḫishāq [al-Isfarā‘īni], Ibn Fūrak, al-Qaḍi Abū Ya‘lā, Ibn ‘Aqil, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, Nasafi, Abū ’Alī [al-Jubbā‘ī], Abū Ḥāshim [al-Jubbā‘ī], ‘Abd al-Jabbār, al-Ṭūsī, Muḥammad b. al-Hāyṣam, etc. Furthermore, IT deals with the viewpoints of these prominent scholars on this issue, which occupies seven printed pages of NAL.505 Finally, he comes up with his refutation of al-Gazali’s viewpoints on this issue, to which purpose he devotes more than four printed

501NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 4-7.
502JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 5-6.
503NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 11-3.
504JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 10-11.
505NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 16-22.
pages of NAI. As reflected in his JQ, al-Suyūṭī dealt with this issue only in two paragraphs, covering eleven printed-pages.

There are many passages which can be regarded to have followed this typical example: par. 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32, etc.

Case 2:
As suggested by Hallaq, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have altered the text of NAI. This is typically illustrated by the fact that al-Suyūṭī, Hallaq argues, “speaks of the four eponyms representing the surviving legal schools, whereas IT in Al-Radd [NAI] does not limit them to four, but speaks of madhāhib in a general sense, including the madhāhib of lesser mujtahidūn. Thus, in addition to Abū Ḥanifa (d. 150/767), Mālik (d. 179/795), Shafi‘i (d. 204/820), and Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), he mentions Ḥishāb b. Rāhawayhi (d. 238/852), al-Layth b. Sa‘d (d. 157/773), al-Awzā‘i (d. 158/774), and Dāwūd b. ‘Alī al-Żāhirī (d. 270/884).”

Case 3:
In this case, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have omitted lengthy passages of NAI without giving a reason. This is clearly indicated by the following example: When arguing for the fact that “a syllogism must include a universal premis; but the universality of the proposition cannot be known unless it be ascertained that all the particulars under that universal share one common factor, and this is done by means of analogy,” IT proposes fourteen considerations, the ninth of which is omitted altogether by al-Suyūṭī in his JQ. This omitted passage (NAI, p. 396-437), however, records IT’s lengthy discussion “against the logicians who maintained that widespread (mashhūrat), and to a lesser extent estimative (wahmiyya), propositions do not lead to certain knowledge,” and his references to the viewpoints of Ibn Sinā and al-Rāzī on this issue.

Case 4:
Al-Suyūṭī has deleted IT’s metaphysical digressions. This is clearly exemplified by the fact that al-Suyūṭī omitted 27 printed pages of NAI (p. 474-500) in which IT...
deals with a number of metaphysical topics: the celestial soul’s (nafs falakiyya) knowledge of earthly events (al-hawādith fi ‘l-ard), the falsity of the claim that a Sufi could be informed about the content of al-lawh al-maḥfūz (the Well-Preserved Tablet), intiqāsh al-‘ilm fi ‘l-hiss al-mushtarik (extracting knowledge of the celestial soul by the common perception of earthly beings, vision (ru’ya), the Prophet’s knowledge of the events of the past and the future, the difference between the angel and the genie and between philosophical analogy and mystical fantasy, etc.\textsuperscript{527}

This also holds true for the last 44 pages of NAI, in which IT deals with the following questions: the acquisition of the knowledge of the angels and the genie by the Prophets by means of their souls,\textsuperscript{518} the perplexity of the astronomers on ka‘ba,\textsuperscript{519} Divine and evil inspiration,\textsuperscript{520} the refutation of the view that the knowledge of the unseen (al-gayb) is not obtained through the intermediary of the Prophets,\textsuperscript{521} the difference between the theologians’ methods and those of the philosophers (the logicians) in the acquisition of knowledge,\textsuperscript{522} reprehensible and praiseworthy perdition (al-fanā’ al-madhmūm wa ‘l-fanā’ al-ma’mūd),\textsuperscript{523} the anathematized concepts of the philosophers on the sempiternality of the Universe, the refutation of God’s knowledge of the particulars and of the hereafter,\textsuperscript{524} etc.

In response to these questions, al-Suyūṭī has made IT to deal with them only in two paragraphs (par. 319 and 320 of JQ)\textsuperscript{525} the first of which reads: “From the foregoing it has become clear that restricting the methods for the acquisition of knowledge to those which they have stipulated in logic is false, both in content and form. It has also become clear that they have excluded from the valid sciences those which are more sublime, more imposing, and more numerous than those they have subscribed to, and that the methods they have prescribed lead to only a few contemptible sciences that are neither noble nor numerous. Such is the level of these people- in their knowledge and practice. The entirety of philosophy does not even elevate its follower to a degree equal to that of the Jews and Christians after the latter have abrogated and distorted [their own Books], let alone prior to their doing so…”\textsuperscript{526} While paragraph 320 reads: “Someone may argue: ‘Some of the logicians’ views with regard to confining the methods of acquiring knowledge [to what they have prescribed] are found in the discourse of Muslim theologians. Some of the latter even espouse it verbatim or with changes in terminology.’ We answer: not all the doctrines of the speculative theologians are true. However, all that which the messengers have brought down is true. Whatever in the views of the speculative theologians and others corresponds to what the messengers have brought down is true; whatever does not conform is false. The forefathers’ and the

\textsuperscript{517}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 172; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.473-500.
\textsuperscript{518}NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 501-2, 505-9,
\textsuperscript{519}NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 502-5.
\textsuperscript{520}NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 507-9.
\textsuperscript{521}NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 509-511.
\textsuperscript{522}NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 511-523.
\textsuperscript{523}NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 516-8.
\textsuperscript{524}NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p. 523.
\textsuperscript{525}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 173-4; NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.500-545.
\textsuperscript{526}JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 172-3.
leading scholars’ condemnation of the heretically innovative speculative theologians is well known.”

Al-Suyūṭī also deleted IT’s lengthy discussion of a number of other questions: the polytheism of Aristotle and the Greeks, the roots of polytheism, the belief of the Sabi’ites in Ḥarrān, the conversion of the residents of Ḥarrān to Christianity through the mediation of Constantine, the fact that all the prophets are Muslim, remarks on the statement of Abraham: “this is my Lord (ḥādhā rabbī),” the philosophers’ views that the souls are essentially identical, the attestation of the prophethood (iṭḥāḥ al-nuwwār), the acquisition of knowledge by the soul after its being free from the body during sleep, the philosophers’ attestation of the prophethood, the philosophers’ view that the sainthood is more noble than prophethood, the arrival of the angel in the form of a human being, the philosophers’ interpretation of the angel and the revelation, the task of the angels, etc.

2. 5. The rationale of al-Suyūṭī’s selection of IT’s arguments in JQ.

What is the rationale of al-Suyūṭī’s selection of arguments in JQ? Why did he, in his JQ, record some of IT’s arguments and delete others?

Al-Suyūṭī states that the arguments he has deleted in JQ take the form of “digressions or replies to metaphysical and other queries, or repetitions, or refutations of some logicians’ views that do not have bearing upon any universal principle in logic, etc.” He then added that what he “deleted was nothing of value” and “was not pertinent to the main argument.”

There are, however, other cases that cast a different light on the process of abridgement. To begin with, al-Suyūṭī can be said to have purposely limited IT’s frequent references to al-Gazālī. This is clearly reflected by the fact that NAI records more than 28 references by IT to al-Gazālī as the one who upheld the principle of the logicians, whereas JQ records only six references to him. This
remarkable phenomenon may be closely related to al-Suyūṭi’s earlier assertion, as
recorded in his QM, that al-Gazālī changed his view in favour of logic and
became one of its fervent opponents. This also becomes clear from the other
works we discuss in this study: i.e. SM and the Fatwā.

Given the fact that some of IT’s arguments deleted by al-Suyūṭi in JQ deal
with theological questions, such as the attributes of God,545 His Oneneness (al-
tawḥīd),546 the visio beatifica (al-ru‘ya),547 etc, it appears that al-Suyūṭi has adapted
IT’s NAI so as to deal exclusively with concrete scientific criticism of logical
principles and with the latter’s religiously-based viewpoints against logic. It is thus
clear that in abridging IT’s NAI, al-Suyūṭi purposely avoided IT’s discussion of
theological matters. Here, attention may be drawn to the fact that al-Suyūṭi
provided a separate work later, i.e. SM, in which he extensively dealt with
theological problems and their relation to logical ones, as will be discussed in
chapter three.

It is true that JQ records IT’s references to the theologians more than
twenty-four times. The references in JQ, however, only deal with IT’s criticism of
them and do not discuss their theological views as such.548

This also holds true for the fact that al-Suyūṭi, in his JQ, has deleted IT’s
discussion of questions dealing with fiqh and its uṣūl, such as question of the
qibla,549 and that of ta‘li‘l al-ḥukm (legal justification).550

In sum, the rationale of al-Suyūṭi’s selection of certain arguments
proposed by IT in NAI was closely associated to al-Suyūṭi’s purpose to know IT’s
scientific criticism of logical principles, as well as his rejection of theology and
(certain) theologians, and not to his theologico-legal discussions, since these
discussions were to be dealt with by al-Suyūṭi separately in a work composed later
(i.e. SM).

Finally, it should be said here that al-Suyūṭi’s attempt at selecting only
utterances related to logic, and not those related to theological-legal as well as
metaphysical discussions, was closely connected to his objective of abridging NAI,
i.e. to demonstrate his familiarity with logic, and with its principles and his
competence at differentiating theological and metaphysical subjects from
those purely logical, to those who questioned his knowledge of logic as one of the
conditions to undertake ijtihād. By composing this work, al-Suyūṭi’s own claim
for ijtihād and tajdid would be acknowledged by his contemporaries.

Suyūṭi as one who “wrote treatises and tracts in refutation of sectarian and other groups”
and as one who maintained “that the sciences of the philosophers are either truthful but
futile or false suppositions that are not to be trusted,” as well as one who withdrew
himself from being occupied with logic, since it leads him to uncertainty. See (index of)
JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 12, 20, 46, 48, 111, 154.
546NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.214-224.
547NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.238-241.
548JQ (Hallaq), op. cit., p. 8, 12, 14, 15, 33, 46, 50, 51, 51, 53, 62, 66, 70, 79, 86, 99, 104, 112, 131,
549NAI (al-Radd), op. cit., p.260.