Augmented and non-augmented HAVE
Rose-Marie Déchaine* / Teun Hoekstra* / Johan Rooryck*
*University of British Columbia/ #HIL - Leiden University

1. Introduction
This paper deals with the variety of uses of the verb HAVE in English, Dutch and French. In each of these languages, HAVE displays different usages. However, in English, HAVE has uses not found in the other two languages. This HAVE we shall refer to as augmented HAVE, a label that brings out the essential ingredient in the account of the difference between English HAVE and its Dutch and French congers.

We defend the following claims:

a. HAVE (both augmented and non-augmented) is “partitive”. This partitive nature is determined by one of the elements out of which HAVE is composed, viz. a reflexive element, represented throughout as SE. The presence of this element is responsible for the “anaphorization” requirement imposed on HAVE's complement.

b. The complement of HAVE may be DP or TP. A DP complement correlates with intrinsic possession. A TP complement correlates with contingent possession or happenstance. Moreover, TP complements are a kind of Small Clause, inasmuch as they are not headed by C°, and hence do not allow morphological Tense. We examine the full range of possibilities for the complement structure of abstract TNS.

c. Augmented HAVE is the result of incorporating a dynamic P.

In English, the dynamic P is to. Lack of such an augment in Dutch and French accounts for the unavailability of the interpretations involving augmented HAVE.¹

2. Non-dynamic possessive structures.
2.1. Inherent and non-inherent possession
All HAVE-languages appear to feature two distinct types of stative possessive structures: alienable and inalienable. Simple alienable possessive structures are restricted to animate subjects (Belvin 1993), yielding the contrast between (2a) and (2b):

(1) a. the table has four legs
   b. John has a big nose

(2) a. *the table has a lamp
   b. John has $5

This animacy effect disappears in the case of complex complements as in (3c), which we propose to analyze as small clause (SC). We argue that the well-formedness of (2b) reflects the (independently motivated) availability of animate pro.

The patterning of the inalienable possessor structures in (1) - (3) establishes that, in certain environments, there is an animacy effect, more or less in the terms of Belvin. Inalienable possession is inherently internal, but the complement is external and so must be “internalized” via an anaphoric element contained in the complement of HAVE, cf. the pronouns it and him in (3). Granting this, two questions arise:

a. What is the source of the “internality” requirement?

b. In the absence of an overt anaphoric relation, as in (2b), how is the “internality” requirement satisfied?

In order to answer the first question we follow (1992) and others by assuming that HAVE results from the incorporation of an oblique element into BE. We also follow Postma (1993) who identifies BE as a SE-morpheme.² We therefore assume the following structure and derivation:

² As is clear from the structure in (4), we slightly depart from kayne's proposal, the Dative phrase originates internal to a stative preposition.
Relevant to us is the $SE$-part in $HAVE$: its anaphoric nature gives an immediate account of the partitive relationship that exists between the subject of $HAVE$ and its complement, as it would for the same partitive relationship that holds for $BE$-constructions ($John$ is ill means that being ill is among John's properties, just as John has a big nose means that the nose is a part of John). The difference between $HAVE$ and $BE$ resides in the availability of accusative Case in $HAVE$ constructions, which requires a Case-dependent DP in the complement. Hoekstra (1993) argues that $HAVE$ inherits its Case-licensing potential from the incorporated P.

This analysis of $SE$ is fairly close to Kayne's (class lectures) analysis of a simple reflexive $SE$-construction such as Jean se voit ‘John SELF-sees’, as in (5):

\[(5) \quad \text{Jean}_i \quad \text{SE}_j \quad \text{voit}_k \quad [\text{VP} \quad \text{PRO}_j \quad t_k \quad t_i] \quad i=j\]

where Jean is moved from the object position, $SE$ is base-generated in some functional head-position. The external argument is $PRO$. $SE$ is linked to $PRO$ for the same reason as in (6), i.e. in order to be licit vis-à-vis the principle of Full Interpretation (FI). The $i=j$ identity comes about through the manner of head-spec agreement in a way which need not concern us at this point.

The $SE$-component of $HAVE$-sentences can be thought of as a partitive operator: it is bound by the subject, but in order to have an interpretation, it must bind a variable in its scope, as required by FI. This analysis thus automatically yields the “internality” requirement, as is clear from (6), where $SE$ must bind a pronoun inside XP.

\[(6) \quad \text{DP}_i \quad \text{P}+\text{SE}_i \quad [\text{XP} \quad \text{PRO}_j \text{---} \quad \text{---}] \]

The operator status of $SE$ is confirmed by examples such as (7), where it binds two pronominal variables at the same time:

\[(7) \quad \text{a. John has his hands on his back} \]
\[(7) \quad \text{b. John has his money in his pocket} \]

We now turn to the question b., viz. how the “internality” requirement is satisfied. The first step is to recognize that, in principle, a pronominal variable may arise in a number of different ways. The second step is to distinguish simple DP complements from Small Clause complements, each associated with a distinct interpretive effect:

\[(8) \quad \text{a. HAVE DP permanent} \]
\[(8) \quad \text{b. HAVE [SC DP PRED] happenstance} \]

In (8a), we are dealing with inalienable possession, which is satisfied by an argument of the noun heading the only relational nouns occur in this position. The position in the NP represents the inherent possession:

\[(9) \quad \text{John P}+\text{SE}_i \quad [\text{DP} \quad \text{---} \quad \text{a} \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{---}] \]

A body part such as nose is a relational noun,\(^3\) in the sense of Williams (1981), there is an experiential pro$_i$ in (9), which acts as a variable bound by pro$_i$ at this point with the precise internal structure of cases may be entirely identical to (5), if the experiencer of (9), i.e. to the position of John in John's SE-part in (9) hence is as in (10). We return to the relation moved Experiencer pro$_i$ now has the status of (1991) in the assumption that PRO is a locally licit in the given configuration because of the ab-

\[\text{The property of being a relational noun is context-dependent, but nevertheless syntactically represented. Obviously, relational, e.g. fold or part. Others vacillate. A clear use is relational, or, when in opposition to adjectives, cases are more subtle. Running water is non-relational, clearly relational in hotel rooms, where it is dependent on an infrastructure. Hence, it is possible to say This room has running water, i.e. running water is relational. Yet a further example is part of the larger family where the dog is domesticized, but a non-relational relationally, e.g. adult dog never syntactically represented. Obviously, some nouns will always be relational, e.g. fold or part. Others vacillate. A clear example is running water, i.e. running water is relational. Yet a further example is part of the larger family where the dog is domesticized, but a non-relational relationally, e.g. adult dog never syntactically represented. Obviously, some nouns will always be relational, e.g. fold or part. Others vacillate. A clear example is running water, i.e. running water is relational. Yet a further example is part of the larger family where the dog is domesticized, but a non-relational relationally, e.g. adult dog never syntactically represented. Obviously, some nouns will always be relational, e.g. fold or part. Others vacillate. A clear example is running water, i.e. running water is relational. Yet a further example is part of the larger family where the dog is domesticized, but a non-relational relationally, e.g. adult dog never syntactically represented. Obviously, some nouns will always be relational, e.g. fold or part. Others vacillate. A clear example is running water, i.e. running water is relational. Yet a further example is part of the larger family where the dog is domesticized, but a non-relational relationally, e.g. adult dog never syntactically represented. Obviously, some nouns will always be relational, e.g. fold or part. Others vacillate. A clear example is running water, i.e. running water is relational. Yet a further example is part of the larger family where the dog is domesticized, but a non-relational relationally, e.g. adult dog never syntactically represented. Obviously, some nouns will always be
parallel to the conditions in infinitival clauses.

(10)  John P+SEi [DP PROi a [NP pro nose ti] ]<1,2>

Turning now to the Small Clause structure in (8b): it involves a predication, and hence denotes an eventuality, i.e. a state of affairs which is temporally limited. We represent such small clauses not just as projections of lexical categories, but claim that they contain independent functional superstructure, in particular an abstract tense-position (Déchaine 1993). It should be noted that the happenstance or contingent character of these clausal complements is independent of the nature of possession. This is evident from the examples in (7), where (7a) involves two inherently possessed body parts and (7b) involves two non-inherently possessed entities, but in either case the happenstance interpretation arises. Specifically, in (7a), the particular relationship between John's hands and John's back is not inherent, but temporally limited. If it were not, then it would denote a state of affairs where John always has his hands on his back.

We now have established how the "internality" requirement is satisfied in cases of inherent possession (via a PRO experiencer), and SC complements (via overt pronouns). Yet to be accounted for is (2b), an instance of non-inherent (contingent) possession, but without an overt pronoun. We now turn to this problem.

2.2. The animacy effect

The ill-formedness of (2a) is predicted by our analysis: lamp is not a relational noun (cf. note 3). Hence, it does not provide a pronominal variable for SE to bind, and the structure is ruled out by FI on account of SE having no interpretation.

What is surprising is the well-formedness of (2b): dollar is not a relational noun, and does not provide a pronominal variable for SE to bind, leaving SE without an appropriate interpretation, violating Full Interpretation. We conclude that something else must be at play in the licensing of (2b). Observe that this is an instance of contingent possession. On independent grounds, we have proposed that contingent possession is to be represented as TP-complementation. These considerations lead us to postulate the structure in (11), with a pronominal variable contained in the complement of T.

(11)  John P+SEi [TP $5j T [SC ti ... proi]]

Simply introducing an empty pronominal is not sufficient to capture the contrast between (2a) and (2b). We must also ensure that this empty pronominal does NOT get introduced in (2a). Belvin (1993) notes that such cases of what he calls "external possession" are limited to animate subjects. Note that an animacy contrast is found elsewhere, as evidenced in (12)-(13):

(12)  a. There is a hat on the table/*John

b. John has a hat on (him)

c. The table has a lamp on *(it)

(13)  a. Ik zet een hoed op de tafel/*Jan

b. Ik zet Jan/de tafel een hoed op

I put John/the table a hat on

These examples show that animates in certain kinds of environment relevant for these structures complement of P. Instead, we find an empty complement of P. However, there remains a difference: in (12) and (13) the animate pro occurs as the complement of an overt P, but in (11)/(2b), no such P is evident. We propose that the relevant P in (11) is the preposition of Hale (1986). This preposition is distinct from other prepositions in the language. It is close to the meaning of with as in John has $5 on him, but nevertheless we take it to be the hyperonym of with and on.4 The animacy requirement manifests itself in a very similar following contrast:

(14)  a. John has his/the window open

b. The house has its/*the window open

The choice of his/its is unproblematic: the pronoun for SE. We make the further assumption that, at least in English, PRO is not allowed in [Spec,DP] if it is headed by the:5

4 The existence of an animate pro can easily range of phenomena across various languages, e.g. English does feature this use of the definite determiner in prepositional contexts of the type I hit John on the nose. We have no insights.

5 This assumption is compatible with the inherent possession never feature a definite determiner, *the house has the (beautiful) window. The nature of Hale (1986). This preposition is distinct from other prepositions in the language. It is close to the meaning of with as in John has $5 on him, but nevertheless we take it to be the hyperonym of with and on.4 The animacy requirement manifests itself in a very similar following contrast:

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(14b) with the, but raises the question why (14a) is grammatical with the. It can’t be the DP the window which is satisfying SE’s requirement since the prevents there being a bindable PRO in [Spec,DP], so this implies that there must be another available bindable site. This would be the case if the structure of (14a) were as in (15):

\[
\text{HAVE} \rightarrow \text{TP} \rightarrow [\text{the window}]_i \rightarrow \text{T} \rightarrow [\text{PP} \rightarrow [\text{AP} \rightarrow \text{open}] \rightarrow \text{Pe} \rightarrow \text{proj}]_j
\]

where proj provides the required pronominal variable, and at the same time accounts for the animacy effect.

The structure in (15) presents a structural option not yet considered, viz. one in which the subject of the small clause is not occupied by DP, but by a clausal constituent, in this instance an AP-small clause. We shall consider these more complex structures below (section 3.3).

3. Dynamic HAVE

In this section we turn to a use of HAVE which is limited to English, and which we have dubbed dynamic HAVE, in contradistinction to the HAVE-structures discussed so far, which are all stative. Dynamic HAVE structures occur in a number of types. They all involve non-inherent (contingent) relationships, and so by hypothesis are to be analyzed as (abstract) TPs.

3.1. Light verb HAVE

Let us start with the simplest case, viz. light verb HAVE-constructions:

\[
\text{(16) a. Mary had a baby}
\]

(i) but she doesn’t anymore (stative)

(ii) Mary is having a baby (eventive)

b. Mary had a cup of tea

(i) but she used it all up (stative)

(ii) Mary is having a cup of tea (eventive)

c. Mary had a shower

(i) but now she has a bathtub (stative)

(ii) Mary is having a shower (eventive)

These sentences are ambiguous between a stative and a non-stative (eventive) reading. Under the stative reading, the only one available for their Dutch and French counterparts, they assert that Mary was in the possession of an object, be it a baby, a cup of tea, or a bathtub. The systematic ambiguity of light verb HAVE is seen from tense-effects simple present only in a quantificational environment of adverbs of quantification such as often and usually verb HAVE has the interpretive properties of shown in (17a) and (17b). In the absence of a quantifier, it is ambiguous: on the eventive construal, (17c) is akin to

\[
\text{(17) a. Mary often has a shower in the morning}
\]

b. When Mary has a shower, she usually sings

c. Mary has a shower

It is not the tense effects themselves which determine meaning is available for HAVE. Rather, it is the dynamic HAVE being dynamic that yields these tense effects. The availability of these dynamic readings in English is through potential contributions of the semantics of tense and adverbs of quantification in (17a/b) would contribute the dynamicity of HAVE (but cf. note 5). The eventive nature of HAVE-sentences also explains the range of structures. An eventive interpretation is available and be associated with a plausible activity. As an adverb easily conceivable, so that in (2a) John has a book from his mother

\[
\text{Of whom have you that had}
\]

(ii) a. Marie a eu un bébé = (ia)

b. Il a eu un livre de sa mère

He has had a book of his mother

“Has he got a book from his mother”

These constructions are qualitatively different from the they are limited to perfect tense, and are also less restrictive choice of object. The inchoative reading derives from the interpretation of the participle.
We are left with two related questions:

a. What is the structure of eventive light verb constructions?

b. What is the source of their eventivenes/dynamism?

As a first step in providing an answer to these questions, note the dynamic character of (18):

(18) John had himself a cup of tea

Observe also that even without the overt presence of himself the sentence has a reflexive interpretation. This reflexivity is obligatory, as evidenced by the ill-formedness of (19a). In this respect, the have-construction contrasts with get, which may be, but need not be, reflexive, as shown in (19b).

Consistent with this difference, in the absence of an an reflexive, the get-construction is not necessarily reflexive in its interpretation, as in (19c).

(19) a. *John had a cup of tea
    b. John got Mary/himself a cup of tea
    c. John got a cup of tea

The basic ingredient of our HAVE-analysis is that there must be an anaphoric link between the subject of HAVE and an A-position contained in the complement of HAVE. Hence, both (16) and (18) must contain a bindable site. As a first approximation, the structure of (18) is as in (20):

(20) \text{HAVE} (=\text{P+SE}_i) [\text{TP} \text{ T} [\text{XP} [\text{DP} \text{ a cup of tea}] \text{ pro}_i \text{ ... }]]

Let us run through the arguments for this partial representation. First, the relationship between John and a cup of tea is not inherent. Hence, the complement of HAVE must be TP. Second, there must be a pronominal element to satisfy HAVE’s binding requirement. This element is himself in (18).

We assume that himself is generated in the complement of to in the predicate position internal to XP. From there it is moved to [Spec,TP] in the manner argued for by den Dikken (1992) for double object constructions. He argues that this is an instance of locative preposing, i.e. predicate preposing by which the DP a cup of tea, its subject, receives case. After movement of to himself to [Spec,TP] to is in a position from where it may be incorporated into HAVE. At LF, himself is further moved to [Spec,AGRoP]. This gives (21a) as the ultimate underlying structure, with its derivation (21b):

(21) a. \text{HAVE} [\text{TP} \text{ T} [\text{PP} [\text{DP} \text{ a cup of tea}] \text{ to himself}]]

---

8 Zribi-Hertz (p.c.) points out the existence of a non-dynamic complement of HAVE, as in (i), which differs in meaning from (ii).

(i) John had the room to him*/self/*Mary
(ii) John had him*/self/*Mary a room

Does (i), with a ‘stative’ to, underly ‘dynamic’ (ii)? Kayne’s assumption that only pronouns exist as arguments of the indicative local binding. Underlying (ii), then, we have rather (iii), parallel to (iv):

(iii) John had a room to him
(iv) John had $5 on him*/self

The problem with (i), therefore, is why the pronoun itself assumption is that an invisible local antecedent is present.

(vi) John had [\text{SC} \text{ the room [\text{XP} e, ... to himself,]

We are thus led to ask what the nature of XP is. The proposal to make, but the idea would be that the preposition prohibits incorporation of to in this case. The semantic property is comparable to that of other restrictive predicates, e.g. with:

9 There is a clearly directional preposition naar in Dutch. That is not dynamic, as is the French preposition à. This is observable: A train to London or This train is to London is hence dynamic, whereas Un train à Paris or La gare à Paris is not.

The difference between aan/à and te is also visible in French. These prepositions appear to have quite different properties from the other prepositions mentioned (to, in this case). The preposition aan/à is directional, whereas à is not.
beslissing is aan Jan, La décision est à Jean, where apparently a stative preposition is used. English must stativize to in this case, by adding up, as in The decision is *(up) to John.

3.2. Causative HAVE

In addition to the light verb dynamic HAVE discussed in the previous section, English HAVE has a further dynamic use, which is also absent in Dutch and French, viz. so-called causative HAVE (cf. Ritter & Rosen 1991), illustrated in (22).

(22) a. John had me dance with Sandy
   b. John had Bill kissed by the Mafia

Again applying the logic developed so far, we are led to postulate the structure in (23):

(23) HAVE [TP .... T [SC [IP ....V...]] [P to] pro]]

The reasoning goes as follows:
- Causative HAVE is contingent. By hypothesis, this means that its complement is TP.
- The SE component of HAVE requires the presence of a pronominal variable, which must be contained in a prepositional predicate
- The prepositional predicate must be headed by to, the incorporation of

extraction is not possible in the case of naar: it requires that the adverb toe is added, cf. (iiic):

(i) a. Ik ben op het dak geklommen
   I am on the roof climbed “I have climbed on the roof”
   b. Het dak waar ik op geklommen ben
   The roof where I on climbed am
(ii) a. Ik ben naar school gelopen
   I am to school walked “I have walked to school”
   b. De school waar ik naar *(toe) gelopen ben
   The school where I NAAR to walked am

Secondly, while locational prepositions allow for the formation of “postpositional” constructions, as in (iiib), this is excluded with naar.

(iii) a. dat ik in de tuin wandel
   that I in the garden walk
   b. dat ik detuin in wandel
   that I the garden in walk
(iv) a. dat ik naar de winkel wandel
   that I NAAR the shop walk
   b. *dat ik de winkel naar wandel
   that I the shop NAAR walk

This might be taken to constitute independent evidence for the impossibility to incorporate this directional preposition. A parallel fact concerning French vers is that whereas various prepositions in various dialects allow for some form of stranding (e.g. dedans “inside”, dessus “on top”, as well as J’ai voté pour “I voted in favor _”), cf. Zrabi-Hertz (1984), no such stranding is ever allowed by vers.

which is responsible for the dynamic character of HAVE. Recall that with light verb HAVE it is possible to express causative relation overtly, by means of a reflexive, as in (24), possible with causative HAVE:

(24)a. *John had+[to] [TP [ti himself]] T [SC [IP [P to] pro]]
   b. *John had+[to] [TP [ti himself]] T [SC [IP [P to] pro]]

An obvious difference between light verb HAVE and causative HAVE is in the nature of the lower SC subject: it is DP in (24), but in (23) it is an IP. This points to a Case theoretic contrast. In (18), given the structure in (21), himself allows the DP subject of the SC to share an LF with itself (following den Dikken 1992). However, in (24), itself the subject of the SC, but rather it is contained in a larger constituent. Therefore, this DP must itself move to [Spec,TP] in order to get Case. If locative preposing were to apply, the reflexive does not have an appropriate explicit pronominal is animate pro.)

If this account of the ill-formedness of (24) is correct, this implies that Case violation would result. (As before, if locative preposing were to fill these higher Spec’s, a Case violation would result. (Before, to apply, the reflexive does not have an appropriate explicit pronominal is animate pro.)

Hence, this leaves the following question: how can we raise to the SC in order to express causative HAVE? This leaves [Spec,TP] as a landing site for the DP. Thus, to-incorporation is licensed in one of two ways: as in (21) or via locative head movement in (24), but impossible if the subject of the SC is complex, i.e. if the Case needing DP is contained in a larger constituent.

This reasoning also accounts for why there are sentences like *John had me dance with Mary nasty, with a structure like

(25) HAVE [TP .... T [SC [IP DP ....] AP]]

Predicate preposing is inapplicable in this instance because the DP is embedded in the subject of the SC. This DP must remain in the LF in order to be able to reach the available Spec, a Case fact. Therefore, an option that is not available in the subject of the SC, but in the DP, the option of head movements is available either. The assumption that P may, but A may not move to T is therefore, this DP must itself move to [Spec,TP]. But this leaves the following question: given that causative HAVE does not involve incorporation after movement of APs, a Case violation would result. (As before, if locative preposing were to fill these higher Spec’s, a Case violation would result. (Before, to apply, the reflexive does not have an appropriate explicit pronominal is animate pro.)

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A simple control structure: the external argument of the embedded verb is head's binding requirement is satisfied via the pro in the complement of the P argument not bound by (29) are distinct. (28) has a causative interpretation, with the external argument pronominal bound by (29) have to be able to move to [Spec,TP] to be Case-licensed, and this is incompatible with locative preposing (which is the ultimate source of the reflexive).

At this point, one might ask how (26) differs from a perfect construction, such as (27):

(27) John had examined Bill

(27) does not involve dynamic HAVE. Under our assumptions, this means that there is no to incorporation. (27) does involve a TP-complement, but in this case, the TP is the participial structure itself. The structure of (27) is as in (29), while that of (26) is as in (28):

(28) HAVE [TP ... T [SC [TP ... T -en [VP pro V Bill]]] to pro]]

(29) HAVE [TP ... T -en [VP pro V Bill]]

In (28), the preposition to incorporates into HAVE, yielding causative HAVE (i.e. dynamic HAVE with an event denoting complement). The (covert) pronominal complement of to satisfies the binding requirement imposed by SE, accounting for the “reflexive beneficiary” interpretation. The pronominal external argument of V is not bound by SE, but remains free. The object Bill raises to the inner [Spec,TP], as is usual in passives, and further raises to the dominating [Spec,TP] at LF in order to be able to reach [Spec,AGR0P]. (The same LF movement was postulated in connection with (25).

The much simpler construction in (29) instantiates a real T, i.e. a past, which is interpreted as a secondary tense (i.e. Aspect), situating the time of the event denoted by the VP in the past relative to the temporal anchoring point of the tense of HAVE (cf. Guérón & Hoekstra 1994). V (or its participial form) raises to T. The binding requirement imposed by SE is now satisfied through the external argument pro. As in the case of inherent possession (cf. (10)), the argument pronominal bound by SE is moved to the position of [Spec,TP], i.e. to a PRO-compatible position. The object Bill is moved to the matrix [Spec,AGR0P] to satisfy the case provided by HAVE. This movement is postponed until LF.

Consistent with our analysis, the interpretations of the structures in (28)-(29) are distinct. (28) has a causative interpretation, with the external argument not bound by SE (and hence not bound by the matrix subject). SE’s binding requirement is satisfied via the pro in the complement of the P head to, which is itself incorporated into HAVE. (29), on the other hand, is a simple control structure: the external argument of the embedded verb is bound by SE, and hence bound by the matrix subject.

### 3.3. Experiential HAVE

In this section we turn to the experiential HAVE-constructions. We analyze it as an instance of non-dynamic HAVE, an instance of complex happenstance construction. In constructions the binding requirement of SE is imposed on the pronominal element, him in this example. Belvin (1993) notes experiential constructions are subject to an additional requirement in the same way as other cases of complement presence of this internal anaphoric link, forced by the presence of these examples is therefore (31):

(31) John has a bee sting him on the nose

We analyze it as an instance of non-dynamic HAVE, an instance of complex happenstance construction. The structure of such examples is therefore (31):

(31) John, HAVE [TP ... T [VP a bee sting him on the nose]]

In addition to having bare infinitives as causative complements, we also find structures such as (27):

(27) John had examined Bill

In this section we turn to the experiential HAVE-constructions. We analyze it as an instance of non-dynamic HAVE, an instance of complex happenstance construction. The structure of such examples is therefore (31):

(31) John, HAVE [TP ... T [VP a bee sting him on the nose]]
Suppose that these binding relations establish a (derived) chain, and that the binding requirement on *himself* may be satisfied within this chain, e.g. in the manner of reconstruction or a copy-analysis (cf. Chomsky 1993). For our purposes, we may take *only himself* to also be present at the position of \( t_i \), as a full copy which is not spelled out at PF, and that licensing of *himself* may be satisfied from this position. This licensing involves as per Chomsky (1992), SELF movement to INFL, as well as a suitable binder in the Spec of INFL. These requirements are met in the structure in (34), where INFL is present and PRO serves as a local binder.

In other contexts, a *himself* subject of the with-construction cannot be licensed under these assumptions: SELF movement must be to INFL, the only INFL available is external to the with-phrase. As with-phrases are adjuncts and hence islands for movement, SELF movement is blocked, and the reflexive is therefore illicit.

This approach carries over to our happenstance structures in (32). By hypothesis, happenstance structures are TPs. The structure of (32) is as in (36):

(36) John \( \text{HAVE} \ T \ [\text{SC} \ \text{himself} \ X] \)

This \( T \) (INFL) provides the local attachment site for SELF-movement, thus preventing SELF from moving any further.\(^{10}\) This then accounts for the island effect, parallel to the islandhood of with-constructions. A further condition on the licitness of SELF is the presence of a suitable binder in the local Spec. This condition is not fulfilled in the happenstance structures: [Spec,TP] serves as an intermediate landing site for the residu of *himself* on its way to [Spec,AGR\( \text{O}_{3} \text{P} \)] at LF. Only (32d) is allowed, as here again reconstruction into the infinitival structure is possible as discussed.

Complements to causative \( \text{HAVE} \) do permit a reflexive, as shown in (37).

(37) John had himself dance with Mary

There is however a notable difference in the derivation of these structures.

Compare (36) with (23), repeated here as (38), now with *himself* as the subject of IP:

(38) \( \text{HAVE} \ [\text{TP} \ T \ [\text{SC} \ \text{himself} \ .. \text{V}..] \)

In (38), SELF-movement will attach *himself* to T. Hence the requirement satisfied in this structure? Recall that *himself* undergoes successive head-movement, resulting in (39). If the complement of *to*, which functions as an antecedent required by HAVE, moves to [Spec,TP], then a local INFL is present and PRO serves as a local binder. This derived structure then is as in (39), with a suitable antecedent of SELF.

(39) \( \text{HA}_1 \+ [\text{TP} \ \text{PRO} \ T \+ \text{self}_k \ [\text{SC} \ [\text{IP} \ [\text{him}_k \ .. \text{V}..] \])]

One might ask whether the presence of PRO in [\text{Spec},TP] makes \( \text{self}_k \) the Case-licensing of *him* (the residue of \( \text{SELF} \) in the case of (24), the Case needy DP is not a bound variable embedded in its subject. The crucial difference is that the reflexive following \( \text{happ} \) in (18) is unproblematic: the DP \( \text{him}_k \) receives Case in the manner discussed above, while *himself* is sitting in [Spec,TP], and hence the matrix provide an attachment site for SELF-movement.

4. Conclusion

Our analysis of a large number of \( \text{HAVE} \)-constructions in our program, we have argued that many of \( \text{HAVE} \)'s properties can find a ready explanation if the hypothesis of \( \text{SELF} \) is adopted. It is the presence of a \( \text{SE} \)-component which is required between the subject of \( \text{HAVE} \) and a position in the complement of \( \text{HAVE} \):

(40) \( \text{NP}_1 \ P \+ \text{SE}_1 [\text{XP} \ \text{pro}_1] \)

The anaphorizing effects all follow from this single postulate an animate pro, for which independent support is readily available. The second assumption we made is that inherent pro's are represented by distinct categories. Inherent pro's are head of a DP complement, headed by a relational noun which functions as the pronominal variable which is ultimately licensed as a PRO in a reflexive.

(41) \( \text{NP}_1 \ P \+ \text{SE}_1 [\text{XP} \ \text{pro}_1] \)

Contingent possession correlates with a Small Clause or null Tense position. At this point, it is appropriate to look at the possibilities. If the Small Clause is headed by a relational noun which is restricted to animate subjects. The anaphorizing effects all follow from this single postulate an animate pro, for which independent support is readily available. The second assumption we made is that inherent pro's are represented by distinct categories. Inherent pro's are head of a DP complement, headed by a relational noun which functions as the pronominal variable which is ultimately licensed as a PRO in a reflexive.
from the presence of animate pro, complement to Pe:

(42) NP₁ P+SE₁ [TP [T [SC DP [pp Pe pro ]]]]

Happenstance HAVE is associated with essentially the same structure, except the Small Clause (usually) contains an overt pronoun: (43a) John had a bee sting him on the nose. (43b) The house has its windows open, and (43c) The table has a lamp on it.

(43) a. NP₁ P+SE₁ [TP [T [SC VP]]]
    b. NP₁ P+SE₁ [TP [T [SC AP]]]
    c. NP₁ P+SE₁ [TP [T [SC PP]]]

The postulation of animate pro also captures the subtle contrasts in (14) that occur with happenstance HAVE, and which we analyze as instances where the prepositional Small Clause has in its subject/specifier position something other than a DP, as in (44). This corresponds to examples like John has the window open, possible only with animate subjects.

(44) NP₁ P+SE₁ [TP [T [SC AP [pp Pe pro ]]]]

Yet another environment where pro satisfies the binding requirement imposed by the SE-component of HAVE is in the perfective, where the subject of the embedded VP is pro (e.g. John had examined Bill):

(45) HAVE [TP ... T -en [VP pro [V Bill]]]

Taken together, (42), (43), (44) and (45) constitute non-augmented HAVE.

We furthermore presented an account of the differences in the use of HAVE between English on the one hand and Dutch and French on the other. The essential ingredient is the availability of a dynamic preposition in English, whose incorporation into HAVE yields augmented HAVE. To-incorporation arises either through locative preposing of the dative predicate, or through cyclic head-movement of to, each correlated with distinct syntactic effects. Locative preposing yields (eventive) light verb HAVE, whose bindable site may be a covert animate pro (46a), e.g. John had a cup of tea, or an overt reflexive (46b), e.g. John had himself a cup of tea.

(46) a. NP₁ P+SE₁ [TP [T [SC DP [pp to pro₁ ]]]]
    b. NP₁ P+SE₁ [TP [T [SC DP [pp to himself₁ ]]]]

Finally, causative HAVE arises when the specifier/subject of the Small Clause headed by to is an IP (rather than a DP), as in (47). This accounts for not only bare-in infinitive complements (John had me dance with Sandy), but also for participial complements (John had Bill examined).

(47) NP₁ P+SE₁ [TP [T [SC IP [pp to pro₁ ]]]]

There is one use of HAVE which we have not considered in this paper, viz. the modal HAVE-construction. It occurs in all three languages, which suggests that it instantiates non-augmented HAVE:

(48) a. John has to do that
    b. Jan heeft dat te doen
    c. Jean a à faire cela

We shall not try to provide an account of this construction, but want to raise the hypothesis that HAVE in this case is a covert animate pro, which makes its status rather distinct from the instances which constitute the focus of our paper.

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Rose-Marie Déchaine
Department of Linguistics
University of British Columbia
C-369 - 1866 Main Mall,
Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z1 Canada
dechaine@unixg.ubc.ca

Teun Hoekstra/ Johan Rooryck
Leiden University,
P.O. Box 9515,
2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
hoekstra@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
rooryck@rullet.leidenuniv.nl