Morality and Volunteerism from Attachment Theory Perspective

Abstract

Research has emphasized the association between moral judgment and prosocial behavior. Recently new studies and theoretical writings have focused on the negative impact of attachment insecurities (anxiety, avoidance) on prosocial behavior such as volunteerism.

Our goal was to examine the hypothesis that moral judgment may interfere with the relation between attachment insecurities and volunteerism. The sample consisted of 139 Dutch undergraduates (74 women and 65 men, ranging in age from 19 to 33 years, M = 22 years). The findings show that avoidant individuals with low moral judgment report more egocentric reasons for volunteering (i.e., self-protection and self-enhancement reasons), while anxiously attached individuals show self centered reasons, regardless of their level of morality. The motivational mechanism by which attachment insecurities and morality affect volunteerism are discussed.

Introduction

Research has emphasized the relevance of moral judgment for prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et. al., 2005; Raviv, Bar-tal, & Lewis-Levin, 1980) and demonstrated its specific relation to volunteerism (Allen & Rushton, 1983). In recent theoretical writings, Mikulincer and Shaver (2005) have emphasized the relevance of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973, 1980) for the study of prosocial behavior, and Gillath, Shaver, Mikulincer, Nitzberg, Erez, and van IJzendoorn (2005) found that insecure patterns of attachment tend to counter altruistic motives for volunteering as
well as actual engagement in philanthropic activities. The purpose of the current study is to examine the possibility that moral judgment may serves as a mediator between attachment insecurities (anxiety and avoidance) to volunteering behavior. Specifically we are interested in the question of how insecure people would differ in their volunteerism activities and motivation for volunteerism in relation to their level of morality.

**Origins of Attachment theory**

Attachment is the unique affective relationship that forms between infants and their primary caretakers (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Bowlby, 1969). Bowlbys’ attachment theory (1969, 1973, 1979, 1980), focused mainly on the process through which infants and young children develop confidence in their caregivers’ protection. According to Bowlby, human beings have a biologically based predisposition to a system of behaviors that promotes physical and psychological proximity to a primary caregiver. These behaviors include for example crying, following and looking at the person who serves as a primary caregiver, proximity seeking etc. (Brisch, 2002)

Following Bowlby’s description of the universal aspect of attachment, an interest in individual differences in attachment emerged. On the basis of distinctive patterns of behaviors in the strange situation, Ainsworth (1978) developed her typology. She identified three basic patterns in infancy, called ‘secure’, ‘avoidant’, and ‘resistant’/‘ambivalent’ (Ainsworth, 1978; Van IJzendoorn & Kroonenberg, 1988). Mary Main, her student, found a fourth pattern, namely ‘disorganized/disoriented’ attachment.

Because of the primacy and depth of early attachment relationship between infant and caregiver, that bond is supposed by some students of attachment to serve as a prototype for later intimate relationships (Morris, 1982).
Adult attachment style

Bowlby (1979) himself viewed attachment processes as affecting human beings “from cradle to the grave”. But, in spite of intensive research, it was not until the 1980’s that the application of attachment theory to adult-adult relationships was made. Hazan and Shaver (1987) observed Bowlby’s ideas in the context of romantic relationships. They created a three-category measure of romantic attachment style; avoidant, anxious and secure – which were modeled on the three major patterns of infant-mother attachment described by Ainsworth et. al.(1978). Recently, researchers stated that it is more accurate to conceptualize and measure individual differences in attachment style dimensionally rather than categorically (Brennan, Clark & Shaver, 1998; Fraley & Waller, 1998). Brennan's findings (1998) suggest that there may be two fundamental dimensions with respect to adult attachment patterns: attachment-related anxiety and attachment-related avoidance (Brennan, Clark and Shaver, 1998). People who score high on attachment-related anxiety tend to worry whether their partner is available, responsive, attentive, etc. People who score on the low end of this variable are more secure in the perceived responsiveness of their partners. People on the high end of attachment-related avoidance dimension prefer not to rely on others or open up to others. People on the low end of this dimension are more comfortable being intimate with others and are more secure depending upon and having others depend upon them. A prototypical secure adult is low on both of these dimensions (Fraley & Waller, 1998)

Volunteerism

Volunteerism had been a subject of broad interest (Snyder & Clary, 2004). Penner (2002) defines volunteerism as long-term, planned, prosocial behavior, especially behavior intended to benefit strangers. Oliner (2002)
suggests that volunteerism can be defined as a non-spontaneous helping behavior for which one receives no material compensation. It can be parochial, meaning within one’s own social group, or nonparochial. Nonparochial volunteerism is a form of altruism in that it is directed at others beyond the parochial group and is accompanied by no external reward.

Clary et al. (1998) describe three basic groups of motives for volunteering, including “self-serving motives” (self-protection, self-enhancement, social approval, and career promotion), “altruistic motives” (genuine concern about other’s welfare even when helping is more costly) and the last group which is conceptually related to what Bowlby (1969/1982) called the “exploration” system (learning new things about oneself and the world).

Volunteerism and Attachment

Many studies have emphasized the relevance of attachment theory for understanding values that underlie reactions to others’ needs. Several studies were based on attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969; Ainsworth, 1978), which has already proven to be an important part in the study of various forms of love and kindness (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999).

Theoretically, people who have the benefits of secure social attachments should find it easier to perceive and respond to other people's suffering, compared with those who have insecure attachments. This is because compassionate reactions are products of what has been called the caregiving behavioral system, the optimal functioning of which depends on its not being inhibited by attachment insecurity - the failure of the attachment behavioral system to attain its own goal, safety and security provided by a caring attachment figure.
Mikulincer at al. (2001) found that self-serving orientation was related to high scores on the attachment anxiety dimension. Empathy moves a person beyond selfish motives to the wish to meet the needs of another person. Mikulincer et al. (2001, 2003) found that this altruistic orientation was inversely related to the avoidance dimension. Gillath et al. (2005) conducted a study to determine whether the two dimensions of attachment insecurity – anxiety and avoidance – are related to real-world altruistic volunteering. It was found that more attachment-anxious individuals are not less likely to volunteer to help others than secure individuals, but their reasons for volunteering are often tinged with self-enhancing motives. On the other hand, avoidant individuals apparently have less motivation to help others, and even when they do provide assistance, they seem to do so for reasons other than altruism or exploration.

Based on what has been established in the literature that volunteers score high on measures of moral development (Allen & Rushton, 1983) and the relevance of moral judgment to prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et. al., 1987, 1991; Raviv, Bar-tal, & Lewis-Levin, 1980), we would like to examine the possibility that moral judgment might moderate the relation between attachment insecurities (anxiety and avoidance) and volunteering behavior.

**Moral judgment**

Rest (1987) defines moral judgment as the process by which a person arrives at a judgment of what is a moral action to undertake in a moral dilemma. According to Rest (1987), moral judgments reflect a person's underlying organization of thinking about matters of right and wrong. It is agreed that both reasoning and compassion are necessary in formulating moral actions; however, it is the relative importance of each component that
distinguishes various theories of moral action. Two of the main theories of moral development, Kohlberg’s (1984) and Gilligan’s (1982), describe stages through which people grow into the ability to make complex moral judgments. The theories differ in the emphasis on how people make judgments. While Gilligan’s (1982) model is based mainly on empathic responses and sensitivity to others’ needs, Kohlberg’s (1984) theory focuses more on reasoning about principles of justice in a particular situation.

A neo-Kohlbergian approach was proposed by Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma (1999). This theory of moral reasoning development is based on Kohlberg’s (1984) fundamental ideas of moral development, yet takes into account some of its criticisms. Rest and colleagues (1999) explain the development of moral reasoning as a change in which more primitive ways of thinking are gradually replaced by more complex ways of thinking. These forms of thinking that can be “primitive” or “more complex” are conceptualized as moral schemas (Rest et al., 1999). Moral schemas, or frameworks, that exist in long-term memory, are formed through a person’s recognition of similarities and recurrences in his/her sociomoral experiences, much of which occurs through education. One of the key issues in neo-Kohlbergian moral development theory is the critical shift from rigid to flexible thinking; The ability to make a flexible shift from conventional thinking, in which one consults rules and norms for a solution, to post-conventional thinking, in which abstract principles are weighed and considered.

Rest et al. (1999) describe three qualitatively different moral schemas that form a developmental hierarchy: the “personal interest schema”, the “maintaining norms schema”, and the “postconventional schema”. The “personal interest schema”, considered as the most primitive schema, is presociocentric in that it lacks any concept of an organized society. This
schema relies on an egocentric and interpersonal perspective in which the person focuses on the personal stakes that the actor has in the dilemma and its consequences and also emphasizes concern for others with which the person has a close relationship. The “maintaining norms schema”, usually developed in adolescence, is characterized by a need for a society-wide system of cooperation; the uniform application of laws and social norms; and a duty, authoritarian orientation. The “postconventional schema”, which is the most complex of the three schemas, is characterized by the core belief that “moral obligations are to be based on shared ideals, which are reciprocal and are open to debate and tests of logical consistency, and on the experience of the community” (Rest et al., 1999, p. 307).

**Attachment, morality and prosocial behavior**

According to Kagan (1984), emotions are the basis for acquiring morality. Early maternal attunement described by Ainsworth (1969) and Stern (1985) is the basis for development of a personal identity, empathy for others and for development of a rule-based internal standard that becomes moral reasoning of right and wrong. Ainsworth et al. (1978) report that securely attached children are more likely to comply with family rules. Van IJzendoorn and Zwart-Woudstra (1995; Van IJzendoorn, 1997) suggested that autonomous attachment could be at the core of mature moral reasoning. Other studies emphasize the correlation between moral judgment and prosocial behavior Eisenberg et. al., 1987, 1991; Raviv, Bar-tal, & Lewis-Levin, 1980)

On the other hand, antisocial behavior is partially attributed to lack of a secure attachment bond in infancy, because of the resultant failure to develop a conscience (Magid and McKelvey, 1987). Tavecchio, Stams, Brugman, & Thomeer-Bouwens (1999) report that delinquent behaviour in
homeless youth appears to be caused by lack of stable social relationships, as well as by lack of moral internalization, with affect and cognition not being integrated.

To develop sensitivity to moral issues, children must understand rules and standards. Dunn (1987) described young children’s increasing understanding of social rules and explanations for consequences. During the second year of life, children regularly explore, experiment with, and violate rules. It is the emotional responsiveness of the parent, and the mutual interaction between parent and child that enable children eventually to modify behavior and incorporate the standards (Kagan, 1981). Hoffman (1994) argues that the experience of empathic feelings is important in the development of moral understanding. Parental explanations to children about the cause of others’ distress, especially if accompanied with a strong affective component, are effective in promoting their altruistic behavior.

Recently new studies and theoretical writings have focused on the negative impact of attachment insecurities (anxiety, avoidance) on prosocial behavior. Our goal was to examine the possibility that moral judgment contributes to the relation between attachment insecurities (avoidance and anxiety) and volunteerism.

Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma (1999) describe development in moral judgment in terms of acquiring new schemas as solutions for creating a society wide system of cooperation. These schemas require the development of empathic concern, genuine interest in others and attunement to their needs. Our hypothesis is that insecure attachment individuals with low moral judgment will show lower levels of general interest in others and of volunteerism: In previous studies (Gillath et. al., 2005) anxious attachment individuals were found to be involved in volunteering activities, mainly for self-focused reasons. In the current paper, we inquire the contribution of
morality to the relation between insecure attachment and volunteerism. Our assumption is that low moral judgment could be a moderator in this relation. We assume that insecure attachment (avoidant and anxious) individuals, with low morality level will show lower levels of volunteerism. In the case of avoidant individuals, the combination of their tendencies to withdraw from caring for others together with the reduction in their logical understanding of its moral importance, might lead to lower levels of volunteerism. As for anxious attached individual, low morality may counteract their self-centered motivation in volunteering, and by that contribute to low volunteering levels.

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 139 Dutch undergraduates from Leiden University (74 women and 65 men, ranging in age from 19 to 33 years, $M = 22$), who volunteered to participate in the study without any monetary reward. The participants were single. Statistical analyses revealed no significant gender differences in any of the measured variables or any significant interactions involving gender. Therefore, the results are presented without regard to gender.

Materials and procedure

Participants received a battery of four questionnaires in Dutch. Considerable care was taken in translating and back translating the questionnaires from English to Dutch. The questionnaire battery included scales assessing attachment dimensions, volunteerism, reasons for volunteering, and moral judgment. Participants completed the battery in
small groups of 5-15 participants. The order of the questionnaires was randomized across participants.

**Attachment:**

Attachment orientation was assessed with the Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR; Brennan, Clark & Shaver, 1998), a 36-item self-report instrument designed to measure attachment-related anxiety and avoidance. Participants were asked to think about their close relationships, without focusing on a specific partner, and rate the extent to which each item accurately described their feelings in close relationships, using a 7-point scale ranging from "not at all" (1) to "very much" (7). Eighteen items tapped attachment anxiety (e.g., “I worry about being abandoned,” “I worry a lot about my relationships”) and 18 items tapped avoidance (e.g., “I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down,” “I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close”). The reliability and construct validity of the two subscales have been demonstrated in a wide variety of samples and in different languages (e.g., Brennan et al., 1998; Mikulincer & Florian, 2000). In our samples, Cronbach alphas were acceptable for the 18 anxiety items (0.87) and the 18 avoidance items (0.90). Two scores were computed by averaging items on each subscale after appropriately reverse-scoring some of the items. The anxiety and avoidance scores were moderately associated ($r(137) = 0.17, p <0.05$).

**Volunteerism**

Volunteerism was assessed with the 26-item scale Volunteerism questionnaire (Gillath et al., 2005). Each item named a particular volunteer activity (e.g., teaching reading, counseling troubled people, providing health care to the sick), and participants were asked to indicate whether or not they
had engaged in it during the past year, and if so, how much time they had devoted to it. The time assessments were made on a 7-point scale ranging from “once a year” (1) to “almost every day” (7). For each participant, we computed two total scores: (a) Number of Volunteer Activities – the number of activities a participant marked in the list, and (b) Time Devoted to Volunteer Activities – the averaged time assessments across all the activities a participant marked. Since these two scores were highly correlated, \( r(137) = 0.75, p < .01 \), we computed a total volunteerism score by averaging the two scores (after being transformed into Z scores). Similar findings were revealed when statistical analyses were conducted separately on each of the two volunteerism scores.

To assess motives for volunteering, participants completed the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI; Clary et al., 1998), which consists of 30 items tapping six major motives or reasons for volunteering (5 items per motive). One scale taps altruistic reasons: Values – expressing values related to altruistic and humanitarian concern for others (e.g., “I feel compassion toward people in need,” “I am genuinely concerned about the particular group I am serving”). Another scale taps exploration-related reasons for volunteering (e.g., gaining new learning experiences and exercising one’s skills and abilities) and is called Understanding. Sample items include: “Volunteering lets me learn things through direct, hands-on experience” and “Volunteering allows me to gain a new perspective on things.” The other four scales assess what we consider to be more self-soothing or self-serving motives for volunteering: Career – enhancing one’s own career opportunities (e.g., “I can make new contacts that might help my business or career,” “Volunteering can help me to get my foot in the door at a place where I would like to work”); Self-Enhancement (which Clary et al., 1998, called “Enhancement”) – enhancing one’s own self-esteem (e.g.,
“Volunteering makes me feel important,” “Volunteering makes me feel better about myself”); Social – conforming to social norms and fitting in with friends (e.g., “People I’m close to want me to volunteer”); and Self-Protection (which Clary et al., 1998, called “Protective”) – escaping from negative feelings (e.g., “Volunteering is a good escape from my own troubles”).

Participants were asked to think about all of their volunteer activities, if they engaged in more than one, and then to read each VFI item and rate how important this reason for volunteering generally was to them. Ratings were made on a 7-point scale ranging from “not at all an important/accurate reason” (1) to “a very important/accurate reason” (7). Previous studies (e.g., Allison, Okun, & Dutridge, 2002; Clary et al., 1998) have shown that the VFI is reliable and have corroborated its six-factor structure. In our sample, Cronbach alphas for the six VFI scales were adequately high, ranging from 0.84 to 0.90. We therefore computed six scores for each participant by averaging items on each of the six motive scales. Higher scores indicate greater importance in accounting for a person’s volunteer activity.

**Moral judgment**

To assess moral judgment participants also completed the Defining Issue Test (DIT1; Rest et al., 1999). It is a multiple choice, group-administered measure that builds upon the Moral Judgment Interview (Kohlberg, 1984) but is a recognition test with excellent psychometric characteristics (Rest, 1986; Rest & Narváez, 1994). The participants are presented with six dilemmas: (a) “Heinz and the drug” (whether Heinz ought to steal a drug for his wife who is dying of cancer, after Heinz has attempted to get the drug in other ways); (b) “escaped prisoner “ (whether a neighbor ought to report an escaped prisoner who has led an exemplary life after
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escaping from prison); (c) “newspaper” (whether a principal of a high school ought to stop publication of a student newspaper that has stirred complaints from the community for its political ideas); (d)”doctor” (whether a doctor should give medicine that may kill a terminal patient who is in pain and who request the medicine); (e)”Webster” (whether students should go to the Vietnam war). Each dilemma is followed by a list of 12 considerations in resolving the dilemma, each of which represents different type of moral thinking. The participant’s task was to rate the response statements, and then rank the statements in terms of their importance.

Thoma, Narrvaez, et al. (1997) reported a new way of indexing DIT data. The N2 index had a superior performance on the seven validity criteria that have been used in testing the DIT, in comparison to the traditional P index, which has been used for over 25 years. In the current study we used the N2 score, and Cronbach’s alpha for the N2 score was 0.87. As reported by Rest et al. (1997) computation of the new scores (N2) has become so labor intensive that hand scoring is no longer an option, and the forms were computer scanned and analyzed by the “Center for Study of Ethical Development”, University of Minnesota.

Results

Bivariate analyses with Pearson correlations were conducted between reasons for volunteerism, and attachment and moral judgment variables and hierarchical multiple regressions examining the contribution of attachment dimensions and moral judgment to volunteerism variables were conducted (see table 1).

As expected, Attachment Avoidance and Volunteerism were significantly associated; the lower the avoidance the higher the volunteerism. Attachment avoidance was also negatively associated with the altruistic
reasons for volunteerism, with other regarding values and understanding respectively), but not with egocentric reasons. In contrast, attachment anxiety was not associated with altruistic reasons, but positively associated with egocentric reasons for volunteerism, in particular with Self Protection, Self Enhancement, Social reasons, and Career reasons. More attachment avoidance went together with less altruistic reasons for volunteerism, whereas more attachment anxiety was associated with more egocentric reasons.

Moral judgment was associated positively with one of the altruistic reasons for Volunteerism; Understanding (the higher the Moral Judgment the higher the Understanding). Moral judgment was not associated with any of the attachment dimensions.

We conducted hierarchical regression analyses examining the contribution of Attachment Anxiety, Attachment Avoidance and Moral judgment to Voluntarism, Altruistic Reasons for Volunteerism (Other-Regarding Values and Understanding) and Egocentric Reasons for Volunteerism (Self Protection, Self Enhancement, Social, Career), while controlling for age and gender (see table 2).

The results show that both Attachment Anxiety and Attachment Avoidance contributed uniquely to the prediction of Volunteerism ($\beta$s = 0.18, -0.40 all $ps < 0.05$): The higher the attachment anxiety the higher the voluntarism, the lower the attachment avoidance the higher the volunteerism.

While Attachment Anxiety contributed significantly to the prediction of all Egocentric Reasons for Volunteerism; Self Protection, Self Enhancement, Social and, Career (in all $p<0.01$) it did not contribute significantly to the prediction of Altruistic Reasons for Volunteerism; Other-Regarding Values and Understanding. In contrast, Attachment avoidance contributed highly significantly to the prediction of Altruistic Reasons for
Volunteerism; Other-Regarding Values and Understanding (in both $p<0.01$, negative association), and it did not contribute significantly to the prediction of the Egocentric Reasons for Volunteerism. In addition, Moral judgment contributed uniquely to the prediction of Understanding, which is one of the Altruistic Reasons for Volunteerism ($p<0.01$). Higher levels of moral judgment were associated with more altruistic reasons for volunteerism.

Gender played a role in the prediction of both Altruistic Reasons for Volunteerism (Other-Regarding Values and Understanding and Egocentric Reasons for Volunteerism (Self Enhancement, Social and, Career) (all $p<0.05$). Women engaged in volunteerism for more Altruistic Reasons and for the Egocentric Reasons of Self Enhancement, Social, and Career.

The interaction between Attachment Anxiety x Moral Judgment was not significant, but the interaction Avoidance x Moral Judgment was found to have a contribution to the dependent variables Self Protection and Self Enhancement (Egocentric Reasons for Volunteerism). Morality moderated the relation between Attachment Avoidance and Self Protection and Self Enhancement.

Regressions examining the source of the significant interaction between avoidance and moral judgment for endorsement of self-protection reasons revealed the following patterns of associations: Attachment avoidance made a significant contribution to the endorsement of self-protection reasons for volunteering when moral judgment was relatively low (one standard deviation below the mean), $b = 0.38$, $p < 0.01$, but not when moral judgment was relatively high (one standard deviation above the mean), $b = -0.14$. That is, attachment avoidance was positively associated with endorsement of self-protection reasons for volunteering mainly when participants scored low on moral judgment.

Regressions examining the source of the significant interaction
between avoidance and moral judgment for endorsement of self-enhancement reasons revealed the following patterns of associations: Attachment avoidance made a significant positive contribution to the endorsement of self-enhancement reasons for volunteering when moral judgment was relatively low (one standard deviation below the mean), $b = 0.28$, $p < 0.05$. However, attachment avoidance made a significant inverse contribution to the endorsement of self-enhancement reasons for volunteering when moral judgment was relatively high (one standard deviation above the mean), $b = -0.26$, $p < 0.05$. That is, for participants who scored relatively low on moral judgment, attachment avoidance was associated with the endorsement of more self-enhancement reasons for volunteering. However, for participants who scored relatively high on moral judgment, attachment avoidance was associated with the endorsement of less self-enhancement reasons.

**Discussion**

Researchers highlight the relevance of moral judgment for prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et al., 1987, 1991; Raviv, Bar-tal, & Lewis-Levin, 1980) and emphasize that volunteers score high on measures of moral judgment (Allen & Rushton, 1983). The current study examined the possibility that attachment insecurities (anxiety and avoidance), that were reported by Gillath et al. (1995) to inhibit volunteerism and altruistic motivation for volunteerism might be moderated by moral judgment. Taking into account the level of moral judgment, one can ask how two insecure people would differ if one has low moral judgment and the other has high moral judgment.

Our results show that morality influences the correlation between motivation for volunteerism and attachment avoidance but not with
attachment anxiety. Avoidant individuals with low moral judgment reveal more egocentric reasons for volunteering such as self-protection and self-enhancement reasons. Whereas anxious-attached individuals, regardless of their level of moral judgment, tend to hold more egoistic reasons for volunteering (as self-enhancement, social-acceptance, and self-protection). The findings imply that egoistic motives can actually encourage anxious attached individuals as well as avoidant attached people with low morality level to volunteer. It also supports previous findings that emphasize the personal inadequacy and needs for social validation and acceptance of anxious attached individuals (Gillath et. al., 2005; Gillath, Shaver, & Mikulincer, in press). This knowledge might serve programs which aim to broaden and encourage volunteerism behaviors by proposing also specific egocentric reasons for volunteering of those who are encouraged by self-centered reasons.

Another important understanding relates to the finding that moral judgment contributes to the general prediction of exploration reasons for volunteerism. This motivation is conceptually related to a central issue in attachment theory, which Bowlby (1969/1982) called the “exploration” system, which emphasizes the importance of attachment security to the ability of inquiring and learning new things about oneself and the world. That is, from our findings it appears that highly moral people appear to explore more and better understand what others’ needs are. This exploration ability and motivation for exploration, might serve as a one of the basis factors of the tight relation between morality and volunteerism.

Gender differences were also found. Women reported more altruistic, egocentric and exploration reasons for volunteering. This fits previous findings which show that women typically serve more as volunteers, providing care to the elderly, tutor youth and provide support following
disasters (Taniguchi, 2006).

To summarize, we were interested in the role of moral judgment in the relation between attachment insecurities and motivation for volunteerism. The findings suggest that lower levels of moral judgment in avoidant attached individuals are related to self centered reasons (self-protection and self- enhancement) while anxious attached individuals are showing self centered reasons regardless of their level of morality. Our conclusion should be taken with caution due to the reliance on self-report measures and the correlational design of our study. Further studies using interview-based measures and assessing actual volunteering are necessary for increasing our confidence in the validity and generalizability of the observed associations. The findings raise questions about other factors that might be involved in that relation, such as cognitive level, social values, and personality characteristics.
References


Rest, J.R., 1990. DIT manual., University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis, MN.


Table 1

Pearson correlations showing associations between age, gender, attachment dimensions, moral judgment and voluntarism measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Volunteer activities</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Understanding</th>
<th>Self-Protection</th>
<th>Self-Enhancement</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Career</th>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
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<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
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<td>0.40**</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
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<td>0.37**</td>
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<td>Moral Judgment</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
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Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; Gender: Female = 1, Male = -1; N=xxx.
Table 2

The unique contributions ($\beta$) of age, gender, attachment dimensions and moral judgment to volunteerism, altruistic reasons for volunteerism and egocentric reasons for volunteerism (7 regression models, in 2 steps)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background variables</th>
<th>Volunteer activities</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Understanding</th>
<th>Self-Protection</th>
<th>Self-Enhancement</th>
<th>Social</th>
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<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.19**</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
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<td>0.37**</td>
<td>0.39**</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
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<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>-0.27**</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety x Moral Judgment</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$