ON Η ΔΙΑΣΑΦΗΤΙΚΟΣ AND PROPOSITIONS CONTAINING ΜΑΛΛΟΝ/ΗΤΤΟΝ

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0. Diogenes Laërtius 7.65 ff.1) provides us with a report of the Stoic theory of the axioma. In ch. 68 a distinction is made between ἀπλὰ (‘simple’) and οὐχ ἀπλὰ (‘non-simple’) axiomata; concerning the latter we find the following statement (ch. 69) ...έν...τοῖς οὐχ ἀπλοῖς ἀξιώμασι (sc. ἐστι) τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ παρασυνημμένον καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον καὶ τὸ διεξευγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰτιωδὲς καὶ τὸ διασαφῶν τὸ μάλλον καὶ τὸ διασαφῶν τὸ ἡττον (lacuna). Definitions and examples of these seven types of οὐχ ἀπλὰ ἀξιώματα are given in ch. 71 f. Every type is characterized by the presence of a certain conjunction—the axioma which is formed by means of εἰ is conditional/hypothetic, that which contains έπει is hypothetic/causal, in a copulative complex axioma (καί...)καί occur, in the disjunctive one ήτοι...η and in the causal one διότι. Then it is stated (ch. 72) that διασαφῶν....τὸ μάλλον ἀξίωμα ἐστί τὸ συνταττόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφῶντος τὸ μάλλον συνδέσμου καὶ τοῦ συμπεπλεγμένου, οἱον μάλλον ἠμέρα ἐστίν ἢ νύξ ἐστίν. διασαφῶν δὲ τὸ ἡττον ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν προκειμένων, οἱον ἡττον νῦς ἢ μέρα ἢ ἡμέρα ἐστίν (‘An axioma which makes it clear (that something is the case) ‘to a higher degree’ is the one construed by means of the conjunction which makes it clear that something is the case to a higher degree and by means of ‘ἡ’, which is placed in between axiomata, e.g. ‘it is more/rather day than night’. An axioma which makes it clear that something is the case ‘to a lesser degree’ is the one that is contrary to the former, e.g. ‘it is less/not so much night than/as (it is) day’.)

1) In this passage D L probably goes back to the work of Crinon (Eggl 1967, 13), who may have been a pupil of Diogenes of Babylon, term ἡ q Archedemus, cf Epict diss III 2,15
Perhaps ch. 72 should read τὸ συνταττόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφούντος μᾶλλον συνδέσμου. In that case the ‘diasaphetic composite axioma’ would be formed, like the copulative and disjunctive ones, by means of two corresponding conjunctions: καὶ...καὶ...; ἡτοῖ...ἡ; μᾶλλον (ἡττον)...ἡ. Characteristically, Stoic formalism would place both operators in front of the sentence over which their influence extends. The more usual position for μᾶλλον (= potus) operating on a whole sentence would be A μᾶλλον ἡ B, without μᾶλλον ἡ being separated by any other words, cf. KG II.2. 303 A. 3. Later grammatical theory takes it that μᾶλλον is an adverb and so does Apollonius Dyscolus (cont. 223.4 τὸ ἐπιτατικὸν ἐπίρρημα, λέγω τὸ μᾶλλον), who does, however, judge its case worthy of discussion, precisely because of its use in this construction (cont. 221,24 ff. — the discussion itself is now lost).

This paper will be concerned with the problem of meaning and function of the diasaphetic complex axioma.

1. The first question to arise pertains to the status of this list of molecular propositions. Ever since the value of Stoic logic has become recognized again after a long period of having been underestimated, interpreters have almost exclusively concentrated on those aspects which are relevant to the logic of propositions (in a narrow sense), i.e. the first, third and fourth items on our list. Actually, the synēmmena, sympeplegmena and diezeugmena were looked upon as the molecular propositions par excellence) even in Antiquity itself. This is undoubtedly caused by the fact that the five so-called anapodeiktai tropoi, the basic forms of Stoic propositional logic, are based on these three types of molecular propositions. Gradually, however, the view that Stoic logic should not be exclusively tackled through modern propositional logic has found wide acclaim: for

2) Another possibility, which is also attractive paleographically, would be to replace καὶ by ἡ (i.e. ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφούντος τὸ μᾶλλον συνδέσμου ἡ μέσου τῶν ἐξωμάτων τασσομένου)

3) Following the Stoa, C Phnus Secundus and Remmius Palaemon considered magis, potus and immo as conjunctions, which they characterized as relatiae ad aliquid sive comparatuae (cf. Dion GL I 416,27)

4) Cf S E AM VIII = Adv Log II 95, 108 ff , 124 ff. Ἑνέσται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦτων (sc the συνημμένα) καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ συμπεπλεγμένα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ διεζευγμένα κοινῶς ἐπὶ τῇ λοιπὰ εἰδὴ τῶν ὀχὺ ἄπλων ἐξωμάτων διαφάνειν
although such an approach is certainly illuminating on a number of issues, it also tends to obscure others and to introduce problems of its own\(^5\) For example, four out of the seven molecular propositions listed here are not truth functional according to modern criteria, even though D L does mention truth-conditions for some of them. Moreover, the truth-conditions of the \(\sigmaνημμένα\) were a hotly debated issue in Antiquity, so that we cannot simply credit ‘the Stoics’ with our modern views on this point without further specification. We have to ask ourselves what were the criteria the Stoics adopted in composing this list. In looking for these criteria we should realize that our conceptions about logic and the Stoic ones coincide only to a very limited extent. As Kahn (1969, 158 note 1) justly remarks ‘‘For the ancients formal logic was never an autonomous study, independent of a theory of knowledge, language and reality’’.

Problems also tend to arise if we try a linguistic instead of a logical angle in approaching the list. It cannot be meant as an exhaustive catalogue of \(\textit{syndesmoi—}\textit{a priori}\) this was unlikely, anyway. It is not the syndesmoi which are at issue, but the axiomata which have been construed by means of them. This explains the absence of \(\textit{e.g.}\) the erotematic or diaporetic/aporetic syndesmoi. syndesmoi such as these do not introduce axiomata, but \(\textit{ερωτήματα}\) or \(\textit{ἐπαπορητικά (πράγματα)},\) which belong to another type of speech-act (cf. D L 7 63 and 66 whereas an \(\textit{ερώτημα}\) is an \(\textit{αὐτοτελές λέκτον},\) it is \textit{not} an axioma, cf. also ch 68) The fact that no mention is made of the syllogistic (‘epiphonic/epiphoretic’, ‘prosleptic’) syndesmoi either is also to be explained by the fact that these conjunctions do not connect axiomata \textit{per se}, but (axiomata functioning as) parts of a syllogism (λόγος, D L 7 76), to wit λέμμα, πρόσληψις and \(\textit{ἐπιφορά\.}\) These syndesmoi belong, in other words, to an analysis of a higher level\(^6\)

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\(^5\) Long 1974, 142 f, Kahn 1969, 158 ‘‘in certain respects an ancient doctrine may be obscured rather than revealed by a reconstruction in terms of 20th century logic’’, Egh, 1978, 135

\(^6\) The whole passage in D L shows a hierarchical order. At each level smaller units are combined to form larger ones λέξεως \(\textit{στοιχεία}, (7,56), \textit{λέξις - μέρος λόγου} (57) \textit{λόγος/} (from 63) \textit{λέκτον ἐλλιπές - ἀξίωμα} \textit{οὐχ ἄπλ \textit{άξ} λόγος} \textit{Cf. Egh 1967, 56 f}
It seems best not to study the list within the framework of any specific modern theory. Seven types of ούχ ἀπλά αξιώματα are presented here that have been composed by means of those syndesmoi which can play a part at this level. The complex axioma thus generated have on the one hand a strictly logical function (e.g. the disjunction), but they can also be used to express relationships of a causality-like nature). For these axiomata which are not truth-functional in any modern sense of the word a Stoic may yet come up with truth-conditions (D.L. 7.74). Generally speaking, the nature of the connection between causality and conditionality is not logical (in the strict sense of the word), but metaphysical). Even in Antiquity Carneades reproached Chrysippus for confusing logical and causal necessity (Long 1974, 103). Long (ibid., 144) suggests as a possible Chrysippean defence that “in a universe governed by logos causal connexions are in a sense logical connexions and vice versa. It is the universal logos which is at work both in the connexion between cause and effect and between premises and conclusions”. Concerning the sympeplegmenon Brunschwig (1978, 59-86) has shown that this type of complex axiomata does not have a logical function only, but also serves as a model in ethics and physics. Such interrelatedness of the departments of philosophy need cause no surprise—the Stoa itself always claimed (and prided itself on) a substantial internal coherence for its system (cf. Forschner, 22 f; D.L. 7.40).

7) Note the careful formulation in 7,72 αἰτιώδες δὲ ἦστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ συντασσόμενον διὰ τοῦ ‘διότι’, οἷον ‘διότι ἡμέρα ἦστι, φῶς ἦστιν’ οἷονεὶ γὰρ αἰτίων ἦστι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δεύτερου Strictly speaking an axioma cannot be a ‘cause’ only somata can, cf. SVF II 119, 18 f οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντα τὰ αίτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ κατὰ Αξίως, καὶ οἴοι αἰτιωδός See Nuchelmans, 61

8) An instructive text in this respect is SVF II 272,37 ff (= Alex Aphr de fato cp 22, p 191,30 ff Bruns) φασίν δὲ τὸν κόσμον τὸν... ἐξελεγεν τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διοίκησαν αἴτιον κατὰ εἰρμόν τίνα καὶ τάξιν προούσαν, τῶν πρῶτων τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα γνωμένως αἰτίων γενομένων καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ συνδεομένων ἀλλήλους ἀπάντων, καὶ μήτε οὕτως τινὸς ἐν αἰτίῳ γεγομένῳ, ὡς μὴ πάντως ἐπακολουθεῖν αὑτῷ καὶ συνήφθαι ὡς αἰτίῳ ἐπακολούθεν τί, μήτε αὐτῷ ἐπεικονεύεν τοῖς ἀποδύσι οὕτω δυναμένου τῶν προγεγομένων, ὡς μὴ τίνι αἰτίων ἀκολουθεῖν ὡσεὶ συνδεομένον ἀλλὰ παντὶ τῇ τῷ γεγομένῳ ἐπίτροπὺ τὶ ἐπακολούθεν, ἡσυχεμένων (ἐξ) αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ πάν τὸ γεγομένον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὥς αἰτίῳ συνήφθεται (the famous chain of causality)
2.1. To return now to the specific problem of the diaphatic complex axiomata, a first difficulty is formed by the question of the exact meaning of the examples cited above: μᾶλλον ήμέρα ἐστίν ή νύξ ἐστίν, c.q. ήττον νύξ ἐστιν ή ήμέρα ἐστίν. In principle we may safely assume that obscurity could have been caused by the fact that all examples have been made to conform to a uniform pattern. All complex axiomata have been construed by combining two out of the three sentences ήμερα ἐστίν (‘it is day’), νύξ ἐστι (‘it is night’) and φῶς ἐστίν (‘it is light’) with one or two conjunctions. Mates translates (33): “More likely it is day than it is night” and talks about “propositions indicating greater probability”, maybe basing his interpretation on D.L. 7.75 (after a discussion of the criteria for the truth or falsity of synēmmena, parasyneμmenna and atoiōdē respectively, ch. 73 f.): πιθανόν δὲ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ ἄγνω εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, οἵον εἰ τις τι ἔτεκεν, ἔκεινη ἔκεινοι μήτηρ ἐστί. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἄριστος ὡς ὡς ἐστι μὴτηρ. (‘‘Probable’ is an axiom which leads to agreement, e.g. ‘if someone has given birth to something, she is its mother’. But this is false, because a bird is not the mother of an egg.’) The example given by D.L. (a synēmmenon-type sentence) makes it clear, however, that one need not necessarily think primarily in terms of molecular propositions containing μᾶλλον (هةττον)...ή in this case).

2.2. Assuming we do not have to do here with propositions indicating a greater or lesser degree of probability, we are left with the following possibilities, which I borrow from D.L. 9.75 ff. In this section D.L. discusses the sceptical method of reaching ἔποχη by rejecting the various dogmatic theories. First of all he treats the well-known sceptical adagio ‘οὔδεν μᾶλλον’, which could be used θετικῶς (οὔδεν μᾶλλον Α ή Β (‘in no respect more A than B’) = ὀμοίως Α καὶ Β (‘similarly A and B, A as much as B’)) or (by the Sceptics themselves) ἀναφερτικῶς (οὔδεν μᾶλλον Α ή Β = ‘A as little as B’))

9) I shall ignore the fact that all other molecular propositions can function as major of a syllogism (if necessary in combination with a negation), whereas the axiomata διασαφθεὶν τὸ μᾶλλον/هةττον cannot, at least not without stretching the imagination somewhat (Cf n 12.) As far as I know, the διασαφθεὶν do not have anything to do with the phenomenon of μονολήμματοι λόγοι (cf S E AM VIII 440 ff, 443, PH II 167, Alex in Arist Top (= SVF II 84, 17 ff))

10) Mates is possibly thinking of Aristotle’s Topica, cf § 2 2 I (the second topos)

11) I shall not here discuss the development of the use of the expression οὐ μᾶλλον in connection with the problem of knowledge. For an extensive discussion see DeLacy (passum), Decleva Carizzi 153 f., Goerler 1985, 324 ff
As a general addition, not specifically connected with any sceptical views, he then states: αυτό δε το μάλλον ποτε μεν συγκριτικώς ἐκφέρεται, ώστε οταν φόμεν μάλλον το μέλι γλυκύ ἢ την σταφίδα, ποτε δε θετικώς και ἀνακριτικώς, ώστε οταν λέγωμεν μάλλον ἢ ἀρετή ὑφελεί ἢ βλάπτει: σημαίνομεν γὰρ οτι ἢ ἀρετή ὑφελεί, βλάπτει δ' οὐ. (‘Mállon by itself is sometimes used comparatively, as when we say ‘honey is more sweet than raisins’, sometimes affirmatively and negatorily, as when we say ‘virtue is beneficial rather than harmful’. For (in this way) we indicate that virtue is beneficial, and (but) not harmful.’) In the following I will discuss both possibilities:

2.2.1. Συγκριτικώς: Propositions of the form $S_1$ to a higher degree-$P$ than $S_2$, which form part of the logic of relations, go back to the *Topica* of Aristotle (that is, as far as theoretical expositions are concerned)\(^{12}\). This is an indication of their epistemological status: the nature of the arguments which are discussed in the *Topica* is not strictly logical, but rather dialectical (in the Aristotelian sense of the word), i.e. of an epistemologically speaking lower level (cf. Brunschwig’s introduction to the Bude-edition, ix f., especially xii).

Within the treatment of the topics of the accidentis\(^{13}\) the μάλλον/ἡττον-argumentation is twice given extensive attention: II 114b37-115a26 and III 116a1-119a1 (or -a31)\(^{14}\). In the first passage (ἐκ τοῦ μάλλον καὶ ἡττον 114b37) four τόποι are distinguished: (1)...εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ το μάλλον τῷ μάλλον, οἴον εἰ ηδονή ἄγαθόν, καὶ ἡ μάλλον ἡδονή μάλλον ἄγαθόν (‘If ‘more’ follows ‘more’, e.g. if pleasure is good, that too which is pleasure to a higher degree is to a higher degree good’). If an increase in the συμβεβηκός follows the increase in the ύποκείμενον, one may inductively conclude that the συμβεβηκός is present (114b38-115a6).

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12) Cf Mau 56 (referring to Gal *IL* XVI 12) “Die Schlüsse nach dem ‘mehr’ und ‘weniger’ weisen auf die Topik des Aristoteles (II Ende bis III Anfang passim), wo eine Vielzahl von Sachverhalten logisch untersucht wird, die nur das gemeinsam haben, dass in ihrer sprachlichen Wiedergabe ‘mehr’ und ‘weniger’ vorkommt.” Incidentally, the Stoics criticized λόγοι such as το πρῶτον τοῦ δεύτερον μείζον, το δε δεύτερον τοῦ τρίτου, το ἀρα πρῶτον τοῦ τρίτου μείζον, because the protasis το το μείζονος μείζον και το το ἐλάττωνος ἐλάττων μείζον έστι has been omitted. Alex in Arist *An Pr* (CAG 2,1,21,38 f Wallies).

13) In the *Topica* the topics of the accidentis, genus, proprum and definition are discussed consecutively

14) Also mentioned in for instance 119b17-30, 127b18-128a12 In the next section I have generally used the Loeb-translation by E. S. Forster
(2) "Another topos (commonplace): when one predicate is applied to two subjects; if it does not belong to the one to which it is more likely to belong, then neither does it do so to the one to which it is less likely to" (115a6-8).

(3) Again, when two predicates are applied to one subject; if that which is more generally believed to belong to it does not belong to it, then neither does that which is less generally believed to it (115a8-11).

(4) Further, when two predicates are applied to two subjects; if that which is more generally believed to belong to one does not belong to it, then neither does the other to the other') (115a11-14). Aristotle continues by treating the topos of 'ομοίως' (115a15ff.).

The second passage (III 116a1 ff.) discusses the 'topics' of the eligible (116a1 f. Πότερον δ' αίρετώτερον ή βέλτιον δυεΐν ή πλειόνων, εκ τώνδε σκεπτέον ('(the question) which is more eligible or better of two or more things must be examined in the light of the following considerations')). According to Brunschwig (introd. p. lviii f.) the first three chapters of this book constitute a unity which is clearly distinct from the preceding and following parts in terms of content and style. He suspects that they led a separate existence before being incorporated in the Topica. This section does not just give a general treatment of the S1 more-P than S2-type of predication, but it is exclusively concerned with the gradations of the predicate αίρετόν. It is not until chapter V that a generalization takes place.

Aristotle starts by warning us 'that our inquiries do not concern things which are far apart and diverge widely from each other (for

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15) This form of a fortiori reasoning is criticized in practice in that passage of Pl. Phaed in which Cebes gives an exposition of his objections to the preceding argumentation, especially 87b4 ff. The argument which is there presented as an example of objectionable reasoning runs as follows. A man has a longer lifespan than a cloak, the cloak still exists, therefore a fortiori does the man. Εί ἐνὸς περὶ δύο λεγομένου (εἴ τε "to live"/"to have a certain lifespan")...εἰ ὃ ήττον εἰκὸς ὑπάρχειν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ὃ μᾶλλον
no one is at a loss to decide whether happiness or richness is the more eligible), but it is concerned with things that are close to each other, and about which we discuss which we ought preferably to support, because we cannot detect any superiority of the one over the other'.

Next, he discusses the various topoi, e.g. 116b 10 ff. και το φύσει (sc. ἀγαθόν) τοῦ μὴ φύσει (sc. ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερον), οίον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φύσει, τὸ δ’ επίκτητον (‘Also, that which is naturally good is more eligible than that which is not so by nature, e.g. justice rather than the just man. For the former is naturally good, whereas the goodness of the latter is acquired’). At 119a 1 he concludes the first part.

As pointed out above, a generalization of what precedes is given in ch. V (119a 12 ff.); this is meant to increase the practical usefulness of the topoi which have already been mentioned, by widening their scope. To this end the term ἀγαθόν/αἱρετόν is replaced by τοιοῦτο (119a 14 ff. ‘It is possible to make some of the above-mentioned topoi more generally applicable by adopting a small change of terminology, e.g. ‘that which is x by nature, is more x than that which is not x by nature’, cf. the example given above). In this way we do indeed obtain the schema $S_1$ more-P than $S_2$. The ‘topics’ of eligibility, which had apparently been used originally to tackle problems of an ethical nature, is thus adapted to a more general use.

Propositions containing μᾶλλον and ἦττον were used by among others Theophrastus in hypothetical syllogisms. As a general term ‘hypothetical syllogism’ refers to an argument which is based on at least one complex premiss. Alexander (in Arist. An. Pr., CAG 2,1 ed. Wallies, 389 ff.) gives a survey of the hypothetical forms, combining Stoic and older (Peripatetic) terminology. The hypothetical syllogisms include οἱ διὰ συνεχοῦς (the Stoic συνημμένα) (used as major premiss) plus a minor premiss; οἱ διὰ τοῦ διαφρετικοῦ καὶ διεξευγμένου; οἱ διὰ ἀποφασικῆς συμπλοκῆς; and—if they really are in any way different from the preceding ones—οἱ εἰς ἀναλογίας and οἱ κατὰ ποιότητα) (390, 7 f. τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ήττον καὶ ὁμοίως)

16) Kneale and Kneale, 105; (cf. 106); Graeser, 93 f.
17) This term comes from Aristotle: Alex. in Arist. An. Pr. (CAG 2,1, 226, 2 f. Wallies).
etc. An instructive example of such reasoning may be found in Alex. l. l. 265.28 ff. Εἰ ἔν μείρα ἡ ὑποθέσεως καὶ ὁ ἀπο τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦ ὑμιοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἤττον... (example 1. 32) εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἄγαθὸν τινος ἢ μῆ ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικὼν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἤττον ὑγεία δὲ μᾶλλον ἄγαθὸν οὕτω πλούτου οὐχ ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονίας ποιητική κτλ. (‘The hypotheticals may include those (sylogisms) which are based on ‘more’, ‘equally’ and ‘less’. If that which is more-something-good than something does not bring about happiness, then neither does that which is less-something-good. Now, health being more-something-good than riches does not bring about happiness’). The example has again been borrowed from ethics. The major, which contains μᾶλλον, has been conditionalized, so that as a matter of fact we are dealing with a συνήμμενον. This probably explains Alexander’s (and possibly Theophrastus’ cum suis) reserve in acknowledging οἱ κατὰ ποιότητα as a separate group. It is clear, incidentally, that the later Peripatos elaborated the principles which had been laid down by Aristotle in the Topica.

Evidently, the Stoic example μᾶλλον ἡμέρα ἐστίν ἡ νύξ ἐστίν fits badly into the Aristotelic model. This is caused by the fact that Aristotle’s logic is a logic of terms, representing classes, whereas the Stoa developed a logic of propositions. This means that Aristotle substitutes terms for his variables (S₁ more-P than S₂: the-naturally-good (S₁) is-more-eligible (p) than the-not-naturally-good (S₂)), while the Stoa replaces them with whole sentences, which express propositions (Σ₁ more than Σ₂: ἡμέρα ἐστίν (Σ₁) μᾶλλον ἡ νύξ ἐστί (Σ₂)). This implies that one element less is involved in the comparison.

2.2.2. Θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς: In this respect the example μᾶλλον ἡ ἄρετή ὠφελεῖ ἡ βλάπτει is much closer to μᾶλλον ἡμέρα ἐστίν ἡ νύξ ἐστί. The interpretation of this sentence makes us attach the value of, as we would call it, an eliminative coordinator to the combination μᾶλλον...ἡ: Simultaneously a θέσις (namely of the member containing μᾶλλον) and an ἀναίρεσις (namely of the member introduced by ἡ) take place, witness the paraphrase ἡ ἄρετή ὠφελεῖ,

18) Connected with this is the fact that the Aristotelian examples are mostly construed by means of a gen comparativeness—with ἡ, however, e.g. 116a12 ff., αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἡ, 116b24
In passing I observe that D.L.'s example also belongs to the department of ethics.—The elimination is, however, a matter of interpretation. Just like the English expression 'rather than' the Greek μάλλον ή is probably a more careful way of formulating than the blunt elimination by means of the eliminative 'not A, but B'/'B, but not A'.

Elimination is a linguistic (semantic) rather than a logical phenomenon. Thus, the syndesmos ἀλλά ('but'), which in Greek is the eliminative coordinator par excellence, has no part to play whatsoever in logic. In Antiquity it is classed among the copulative conjunctions. From a logical point of view it makes no difference whether the eliminative coordination of A and B is formulated as 'not A, but B', 'B, but not A', or 'ΒΛ-Α'—apart from the fact that formal logic would reject all non-formal expressions as useless. The linguistic component, irrelevant to formal logic, is the semantic incompatibility of (associations of) A and B, which is presupposed in eliminative coordination.

The explanation of this construction which is given by Apollonius Dyscolus also fits an eliminative interpretation of μάλλον...ή. In de conjunctionibus 215,14 ff. the diazeuktikoi syndesmoi are discussed, followed by (219,12 ff.) the paradiazeuktikoi and (221,16 ff.) the diasaphētikoi. The conjunction ή may be used in all

19) I did find some—later—cases in which the diasaphetic ή has been paraphrased by means of ἀλλά Sch Eur Phoen 508 (vs 507 i runs τούτ' οὐν τῷ χρηστῶν, μήτερ, οὐχί βουλουμαι/ἄλλω παρείναι μάλλον ή σύζευξιν ἔμοι) τῷ ή νόν ἀντί τοῦ ἄλλα. Note that the presence of the negation οὐ exerts its influence here. ἀλλά as an eliminative coordinator is always combined with a negation in either of the two members (cf Ruijgh, par 134) Α, ἄλλον ή B (eliminatio inversa), οὐκ A ἀλλά B. Another factor is that the combination οὐ μάλλον A ή B is ambiguous, cf § 2 2. This makes a paraphrase by means of a clearly eliminative coordinator desirable. A second place is the scholion on Med 327 (φιλό γάρ οὐ στι μάλλον ή δόμους ἐμούς· ἰδιοί στι τοῦ ἄλλα. In this case the same observation holds true as in the preceding example. See further EG 233,57 f. τότε σημαίνει ή ή σύνδεσμος, ἰδιοί τοῦ τῷ τόδε ή διαζευκτικός, (Prof C J Ruijgh p c ) has suggested to me that one read ήτοι for ή τόδε ή ή νόν τοῖς καὶ [ = διαζευκτικός], and—for a fairly explicit eliminative interpretation (here styled 'corrective') of ἀλλά—the Lexicon Vindobonense (ed Nauck) p 26 s v ἀλλά ἀλλά σύνδεσμος ἐπὶ διορθώσει λαμβάνεται, οὐν οὐ τόσο, ἄλλα έκείνο. See further AO Cramei I 302,16 ff. ἐν τούς κατά ἀπόθεσιν ή ονάσεως σχήμασι (cf n 22)
20) E g DTh, Techne 89,1 (Uhlig)
21) Cf Slings, 116 ff
three meanings The following Apollonian passages are relevant to us here: (221,16 ff.) "Εστί {καί τρίτης} διαφορά του ή συνδέσμου, ήτις καλείται διασαφητική. Τού μὲν γὰρ προτέρου ὑπαρξὶν διας <αφεῖ>, τοῦ δὲ ἐπιφερομένου ἀναίρεσιν, βούλομαι πλουτεῖν ἢ πένεσθαι, βούλομαι φιλολογεῖν ἢ σχολάζειν. τοιεύεται καὶ μετὰ τοῦ περὶ τὴν σύνταξιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἡπερ νῦ... (23 fl.) τὸ διασαφητικῶ συνδέσμῳ οὐκ ἄλλο τι σύνεστι μόριον ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ μέτα τοῦ περὶ τὴν σύνταξιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἡ πένεσθαι, ἢμέρα ἔστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ <νῦν>... (222,4 fl.) ἄποφήνασθαι· (πλουτεῖν βούλομαι,) οὐ πένεσθαι. ήμερα εστίν, οὐχί δὲ <νῦν>... (222,24 ff.) Φαίνεται δὲ ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη διαφορά τοῦ συνδέσμου ἀπὸ τῆς διαζευκτικῆς συνδέσμους μετέβαλεν εἰς τὴν διασαφητικὴν, ἀσει ἐπικριτικῇ γενομένη τῆς διαζευκτικῆς. ἐπαγγέλλεται γὰρ τὸ διαζευκτικὸν, ἐάν τοῦτο, οὐ τοῦτο· εἰ τοῦτο μὲν, τοῦτο. καὶ έτι, ή τοῦτο (η) καὶ τὸ συνὸ διασαφητικῶν, τὸ δὲ λειτόμενον, τοῦτο, οὐ τοῦτο. τέθεται γὰρ τὸ πλουτεῖν βούλομαι αὐγηρημένου τοῦ πένεσθαι. ‘(221,16 ff.) There is also a third different type (of use) of the conjunction ή, which is called ‘diasaphetic’ (‘making completely clear’, ‘determining unambiguously’). For it makes the reality of the first member and the elimination of the second completely clear, e.g. ‘I wish to be rich rather than poor’, ‘I wish to study literature rather than to be idle’23). It also forms a compound with περ, ‘it is day rather than (ἡπερ) night’ ... (23 fl.)
The diasaphetic conjunction is combined with the words μάλλον and ήττον only ... (222,4 ff.) ‘It is day, rather than night’, ‘I wish to be rich rather than poor’. The same may be expressed like this: ‘I wish to be rich, not poor’. ‘It is day, and not night’ ... (222,24 ff.) It seems that this distinct use of the conjunction provokes a change from disjunctive to diasaphetic connection, because it cuts as it were the knot of the disjunction: the disjunctive (ή) indicates ‘if this, not that; if not this, that’. And further, ‘either this or also the accompanying member or members’...which is called quasi-disjunctivum [so-called inclusive disjunction]. And finally, ‘this, not that’. For ‘I wish to be rich’ is posited, whereas ‘to be poor’ is eliminated.’

Several points met so far recur in the Apollonian discussion:
a) In the first place the name of the conjunction: ή διασαφητικός no doubt is the conjunction which is used in the Stoic ἀξίωμα τὸ διασαφούν τὸ μάλλον.
b) τέθειται and ἀνηρμένου (223,1 f.) correspond to θέσις and ἀναίρεσις in D.L. (see § 2.2.). Cf. 221,17 f. ὑπαρξις and ἀναίρεσις.
c) Apollonius too draws attention to the combination with μάλλον and ήττον.
d) The fact that Apollonius attaches an eliminative interpretation to ή διασαφητικός is apparent from (b), and from his paraphrasing it by means of οὖ (222,4 ff.) as well as from his describing the diasaphetic construction as ἐπικριτική τῆς διαζεύξεως (222,25); this description also seems to be meant as an explanation of the relationship between ή διασαφητικός and διαζευκτικός: whereas diazeuctic ή leaves open both possibilities A and B, diasaphetic ή explicitly opts for A and against B (cf. Appendix I). The possibility that the term διασαφητικός was created with the intention of underlining its relationship to διαζευκτικός is not to be excluded.

It is a well-known fact that Apollonius in coni. generally follows the Stoa (cf. coni. 214,2 f.). That such is the case here too appears

24) The very word βούλομαι is a preeminent apt illustration because of its two meanings ‘to wish’ and ‘to prefer’ (‘to wish A rather than B’). When meaning ‘to prefer’ it may be followed by ή, when meaning ‘to wish’ by οὖ—the result is comparable

from the occurrence of the typical sentence ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἦ(περ) νύξ.

The other examples which are given here are partly borrowed from schoolpractive and have thus probably been developed by a grammatical, e.g., βούλομαι φιλολογεῖν ἦ σχολάζειν (221,18 f.), γράφω ἦπερ λέγω, διαλέγομαι ἦπερ ἀναγινώσκω (222,22)26), another product of (scientific) grammar is the discussion of the philological problem constituted by Hom Il A 117 and Od α 164 (cf also the scholia a l.) (cont. 223,9 ff) The other example, however, again (cf p 53-4 (Aristotle, Theophrastus) and 55 (D L)) points to an ethical context βούλομαι πλουτεῖν ἦ πένεσθαι ('I wish to be rich rather than poor', 221,18, 222,4 ff, 223,1 f).

2.3 After all this I would suggest that the following development took place in Aristotle—in an (Aristotehc-)dialectical context—theoretical observations on arguments containing μᾶλλον/ἡττόν, which were possibly used originally in problems of an ethical nature, are to be found for the first time Theophrastus adopts these relational arguments in his list of ὑποθέσεων (hypothesis propositions and syllogisms) This is at least one of the reasons why they appear in the Stoic series of non-simple axiomata This last step is accompanied by two interdependent changes on the one hand, μᾶλλον ἦ no longer indicates the degree to which a predicate belongs to a subject, but it connects two propositions 27) on the other hand, it has the value of an eliminative coordinator.

Thus it appears that although μᾶλλον/ἡττόν-propositions had indeed acquired a certain traditional status at the time the Stoa adopted them, they did not fit the Stoic schema without some adaptations As the Stoics were prepared actually to go to the trouble of adapting them, it seems no more than reasonable to suppose that they must have envisaged some function for complex propositions of this form. Since no traces of a strictly logical function are to be found in the remains of Stoic logic which have come down to us, I should like to devote the final sections of this paper to the suggestion that these axiomata expressed a principle which was of foremost importance in Stoic ethics, to wit ἐκλογή ('choice').

26) γράφω ἦπερ λέγω For parallels, see KG II 2, 303, Blass Debrunner-Rehkopf, Grammatik d neuesten Griech., par 245 5 b

27) I.e. in logical theory Linguistically speaking μᾶλλον ἦ = ἀλλ' οὗ is a secondary, somewhat idiomatic use of the 'normal' μᾶλλον ἦ
3 Stoic ethics strictly differentiate between ἀγαθά and ἀδιάφορα (bona and indifferentia) There are several ways of subdividing the adiaphora (cf Bonhoeffer 1894, 170 ff for the desperate terminological confusion reigning in this area) Some things are absolutely indifferent—is the number of hairs on my head even or uneven?—others may be dispensable for human happiness, but are nevertheless to be preferred to their opposites in our daily life health is preferable to sickness, life to death and riches to poverty, health, life etc arouse an ὀρμή, sickness an ἀφορμή. The examples are standard

In the doctrine of the good an important place is occupied by the ἄξια-theory. The most important testimonia on this subject are to be found in Stobaeus (II 83 10 ff W) and Diogenes Laertius (7,104 ff)28 As far as the problem of ἦ διασαφητικός is concerned a special relevance should be attributed to the work of Antipater of Tarsos, who distinguished as a separate type of ἄξια the ἄξια eklektīkē (Stob Ecl II 83,10 ff W): Πάντα δὲ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἄξιαν ἔχειν καὶ πάντα τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαξίαν. Τὴν δὲ ἄξιαν λέγεσθαι τριχώς, τὴν τε δόσιν καὶ τιμὴν καθ’ αὐτό καὶ τὴν ἄμοιβήν τοῦ δοξιμαστοῦ. Καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἢν ὁ Ἀντίπατρος ἐκλεκτικήν προσαγορεύει, καθ’ ἂν διδόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τάδε τινά μᾶλλον ἀντί τῶν ἀφορμῶν, οἰον ἄξιαν ἀντὶ νόσου καὶ ξωῆς ἀντὶ θανάτου καὶ πλούτου ἀντὶ πενίας... ('Everything which is according to nature has value and everything contrary to nature has 'disvalue', objectionableness [ἀπαξία is a negative value] Aξία (value) is used in three ways, as an absolute valuation and estimation (of something) in itself (1) and as the exchange-value defined by the examiner (2) And the third (type of 'value') which Antipater calls 'eclectic' (eklektīkē), on the basis of which we choose—if the circumstances allow it—one thing rather than the other, e.g. health instead of sickness and life instead of death and riches instead of poverty')

Successively, an absolute valuation29, an explicit fixing of a price ('what an examiner/appraiser would give for it') and, finally,
the Æξία ἐκλεκτικὴ are distinguished. The latter is the kind of (relative) estimation that plays a part in making choices. From the examples it would appear that this axia is operative in the field of the προηγμένα, those ἀδιάφορα which cause us to undergo a positive ὀρμή (‘impulse’, ‘inclination’). Cf. Stob. II 84, 18 ff. προηγμένον δ’ εἶναι λέγοντι ὁ ἀδιάφορον ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον (‘A proégmenon they call that which being indifferent we choose on account of primary reasonableness’).

The importance of the concept of ἐκλογή is illustrated by its prominence—starting from Diogenes of Babylon—in the Stoic telos-formulas: εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ (καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ) Stob. (Diogenes of Babylon)30) (‘to be reasonable in the choice (and rejection) of that which is according to nature’), and ζῆν ἐκλεγομένους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγομένους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν δινεκός (Antipater)31) (‘to live while choosing that which is according to nature and constantly rejecting that which is contrary to nature’). Goerler (454 f.) draws attention to the fact that in the Old Stoa the view was probably held already that ‘das Sittlich-Gute werde verwirklicht anhand der naturgemässen Güter, bestehe in deren vernünftigen Auswahl’32). The ἐκλογή (the ἀξία ἐκλεκτικὴ) might be given expression on the level of the sentence33) by means of the complex axioma which was formed by means of ή διασαφητικός34).

30) D L 7,88 and Stob Ecl II 76 W (= SVF III 219,9 ff)
31) Stob Ecl II 75 W = SVF III 252,37 i, cf 253,3 ff
32) Cf e g Plut comm not 23,1069E (= SVF III 134,1 ff), c 26, 1071B, Epict diss 2,6,9 αὐτός γὰρ μ’ ὁ θεὸς τοιούτων (i.e τῶν κατὰ φύσιν) ἐκλεκτικὸν ἔποιησε See also Long 1967, esp 68 f
33) The relationship between ethical problems and the way these should be linguistically expressed appears from e g SVF III 22,19 f, which deals with ἀγαθά and ὀφελήματα. The former are αἰρετά, the latter αἰρετέα, because they are (1 38) κατηγορήματα. The passage continues (1 39 f) Κατηγορήματον γὰρ αἰτείται καὶ ἀρέτες καὶ ὀρείσεις καὶ μουλήσεις γίνονται, ὡστε καὶ αἰτείται (cf 1 21 ff δι’ αἰτείας ήτον τὰ αἰρετά, όποιν τὸ φρονέω, δὲ μὴν αἰρομεθα μὲν τὰ αἰρετά, δὲ τὸ φρονέω, δὲ μὴν αἰρομεθα, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα, ἔχειν αὐτὸ αἰρομεθα) (1 42 f) Τὸ γὰρ φρονήσει αἰρομεθα ἔχειν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, οὐ μᾶ Δία τὸ φρονέω καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἀναμένει δὲ καὶ κατηγορήματα.
34) The same goes for ἀπεκλογή and propositions containing ἠττον ἡ. No practical examples are to be found—a choice in favour of a προηγμένον, expressed by means of μάλλον ἡ implies a rejection of the corresponding ἀποπροηγμένον, which might be expressed by means of ἦττον ἡ.
In Sextus Empiricus\textsuperscript{35} the \textit{άδιάφορα} are classified as follows (\textit{Adv Eth} 59 f) 1) πρὸς δ' μήτε ὀρμὴ μήτε ἄφορμὴ γίνεται (the absolute \textit{adaphora}) (‘that for which there exists neither inclination nor disinclination’),

2) πρὸς δ' ὀρμὴ μὲν καὶ ἄφορμὴ γίνεται, οὔ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸ δὲ ἔτος (\textit{e.g.} the choice between two identical coins) (‘that for which there exists inclination and disinclination, but not more for this thing than for that’),

3) τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον (\textit{e.g.} health/sickness etc) (‘that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness’) Maybe we can deduce from this passage that the difference between 2) and 3)—which are together opposed to group 1)—consists in the fact that the ὀρμὴ or ἄφορμὴ in 2) is not open to μᾶλλον and ήττον, whereas those in 3) are, incidentally, ὀρμὴ is not mentioned explicitly in the third group at all

In any case the \textit{άδιάφορα} to which \textit{ἐκλεκτικὴ αξία} was attributed are in this group Thus, for the second group ‘οὔ μᾶλλον Α ἢ Β’ would hold, for the third ‘μᾶλλον Α ἢ Β’ (There is no denying, by the way, that the relative estimation of the \textit{adaphora} is not always consequently and automatically formulated by means of the phrase μᾶλλον ή)\textsuperscript{36}

An example of a case from the third group which is expressed by a μᾶλλον ή-phrase may be found in \textit{S E PH} III 192 (Some people—the reference is to (adherents of) Aristo of Chios—deny that any such things as φύσει προηγμένα or ἀποπροηγμένα exist at all. The \textit{adaphora} should be judged on the basis of the περιστάσεις (‘ex-

\textsuperscript{35} Translations from Sextus Empiricus are generally taken from the Loeb edition by Bury

\textsuperscript{36} Maybe it would not be too far-fetched to consider the possibility of Sextus Empiricus’ using the expression οὔ μᾶλλον against the Stoic in a more emphatic way than he usually would. In \textit{Adv Eth} 147 he argues that a sceptical attitude towards ἀγαθὰ and κακὰ leads to \textit{ataraxia}. Anyone who considers riches as an ἀγαθὸν and poverty as a κακὸν leads a disturbed life. On the other hand, ὁ μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει ἀγαθοῖς τάττων τὸν πλοῦτον μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς, τὴν δὲ οὐ μᾶλλον προφερόμενος φωνήν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τοῦτον παράτεται οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ γέγονεν, μένει δὲ καθ’ ἑκάστων ἀτάραχος. Now, ὁ κακοῖς would have been supported by any Stoic. But it is precisely the \textit{adaphora} that according to them may be subdivided in προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα by applying the term μᾶλλον to some of them. Thus, the usual sceptical formula οὔ μᾶλλον would gain in force because it is used in the precise context where a Stoic would have used ‘μᾶλλον’
ternal circumstances’): εἰ γοῦν, φασίν, οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι ἐπιβουλεύοντο ὑπὸ τυράννου, οἱ δὲ πέντες εἰρήνευοντο, πάς ἂν ἔλοιπο εἶναι πένης μᾶλλον ἡ πλούσιος, ὡς ἀποπροηγμένον γίνεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον (‘‘For certainly’, they argue, ‘if the rich were being threatened with attack by a tyrant while the poor were being left in peace, everyone would prefer to be poor rather than rich, so that riches would be a thing rejected’). Cf. Adv. Eth 64 ff., where the same opinion is discussed, this time illustrated as follows (par. 66) εάν γοῦν δέη τοὺς μὲν ὑγιαίνοντας ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ νοσοῦντας ἀπολύομενοις τῆς ὑπηρεσίας συναπολύεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, ἔλοιπ’ ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ σῶφος τὸ νοσεῖν κατὰ τούτον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ ὑγιαῖνειν (‘Were it for instance obligatory that men in sound health should serve under the tyrant and on this account be destroyed, but that the sick should be set free from that service and freed likewise from destruction, on such an occasion the wise man would choose sickness rather than health’).

By means of μᾶλλον ἡ the relative value of adiaphora in comparison to each other may be brought out without passing judgment on any absolute values37). This might explain why the expression μᾶλλον ἡ deserved a separate place in the list of axiomata, although at first sight the combination of a συμπλεκτικὸς σύνδεσμος and a negation could fulfill its part just as well. This just does not seem to be true after all: as a paraphrase ‘Α βούλομαι, οὐ B’ might be acceptable—to a grammarian it certainly would—but if a choice between adiaphora is concerned, this way of expressing oneself may simply be too apodictical. A Stoic could hardly say ‘οὐ βούλομαι νοσεῖν’ without seriously endangering his chances of ever reaching ἀπάθεια38).

4. Support for the connection between the terms ἐκλεκτικὸς and διασαφητικὸς may be found e.g. SchDTh 291,30 ff.: παρέλειψε δὲ τοὺς

37) For this function of a μᾶλλον ἡ-phrase cf Pl Gorg 469b12 ff.—Σῶ δὰ ρα βούλουν ἢν ἄθικεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄθικειν,—Βουλοίμην μὲν ἢν ἐγώ ὠδέστερα εἰ δ’ ἄναγκαιον ἢθ’ ἄθικειν ἢ ἄθικεσθαι, ἐλοιπὸν ἂν μᾶλλον ἄθικεσθαι ἢ ἄθικειν

Because adiaphora are devoid of any intrinsic value Aristotle’s condition stipulating that questions about αἱρετικὸ-ship should only be raised in case of a real dubium has been implicitly fulfilled (see § 2 2 1)

38) Cf careful stipulations like διδόντων τῶν πραγμάτων (Antipater apud Stob) and si detur electio (Sen ep 92,13)
διασαφητικούς· τίθενται δε οὔτοι μεταξύ δύο λόγων, και τὴν ἐκλογήν τοῦ ἐνὸς ποιοῦνται, οἶνον πλούτων βούλομαι ἡ πένεσθαι· εἰς ἐπίτασιν δὲ λαμβάνουσι τὰ τῆς ἐπιτάσεως ἐπιρρήματα [περ and/or μάλλον are meant], μάλλον ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ περ νῦς· Much more important is the comment AO I (ed. Cramer) (Epimerisms), 189,22 ἢ στι δὲ καὶ διασαφητικὸς ὁ ἐκλεκτικὸς (cod. ἐλεγκτικὸς) καλοῦμενος παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς This text not only explicitly mentions the identification of the διασαφητικοὶ with ἐκλεκτικοὶ and consequently with the concept of ἐκλογή, but also ascribes this terminology to the Stoa. It continues by claiming that the examples II A 117 and Od α 164 should not be explained disjunctively, ἀλλὰ ἐκλεκτικὸν καὶ διασαφητικὸν.

Eustathius (62,11 ff v d Valk) mentions the diasaphetic interpretation of A 117 and adduces a certain Phocion, whose adaptation of this verse for his own purposes is based on this interpretation, as becomes apparent from his use of μάλλον (τὸ μάλλον χαρακτηριστικὸν δὲ τοῦ ... διασαφητικοῦ τοῦ ἡ ἀπολέσθαι). ἦστι γὰρ, φασί, διασαφητικὸς τοιοῦτος σύνδεσμος ὁ μεταξὺ δύο λόγων τιθέμενος καὶ ἐκλεγόμενος τὸ ἔτερον, εἰς ἐπίτασιν δὲ ποτὲ προσλαμβάνων τὸ μάλλον ἐπίρρημα...ἡ τὸν περ σύνδεσμον (‘For such a syndesmos’, they say, ‘which is interposed between two sentences and selects one of them and which sometimes for intensification adopts the adverb μᾶλλον or the conjunction per is diasaphetic’) Priscian too, the follower of Apollonius Dyscolus, combines the two terms, XVI 9,98,25 (GL III) Disertiae vel electiave (sc. conunctiones) [i.e. διασαφητικοὶ καὶ ἐκλεκτικοὶ sunt, quando diversis propositis aliquid ex eis nos eligere osten-dimus, ut ‘dives esse volo quam pauper’.

Later sources, from the time of Herodianus, stress the notion of αἰρεσις EM 415,45 ff ὅτι τὸν ἡ σύνδεσμον ἐξ διαφόρως σημαίνειν φησιν Ἡρωδιανός (53) Ἐθος δὲ τοῖς διασαφητικοῖς συνδέσμοις δύο πραγμάτων προκειμένων τοῦ μὲν ἐνὸς ποιεῖται αἰρεσις, τοῦ δὲ ἔτερου ἀποβολήν. καὶ ἀποβολὴ μὲν ὡς το βούλουμ’ ἐγὼ λαὸν σόν ἐμμεναι ἡ ἀπολέσθαι. Αἰρεσις δὲ ὡς, τὸ Ἐρανις φρενῶν μοι μᾶλλον ἡ βυθὸς τύχης. The last two examples have clearly been added by a compiler who did not understand that αἰρεσις and ἀποβολή occur simultaneously if the construction of η διασαφ is used (cf p 54, 57) The examples are again standardized, cf EM 415,27 ff 39)

39) See further Schneider comm ad ApD cont 221,23 223,22 (p 225 f) for
To sum up, ἡ διασαφήτικός originates in forms of argumentation which belong to the logic of relations. After their dialectical use by Aristotle, propositions containing μᾶλλον/ήττον ἡ are classified by Theophrastus cum suis among οἱ ύποθετικοὶ. The Stoa adapts their form in such a way that their schema of two axiomata connected by one or more conjunctions can remain intact. The οὐχ ἀπλὰ ἀξιώματα formed by means of μᾶλλον (ήττον) ἡ are eliminative and may have played a part in expressing the ethical procedure of ἐκλογή. The fact that μᾶλλον ἡ-formulas seem to have functioned of old in ethical discussions enhances the probability of this supposition. Apart from considerations of traditionality, their ethical use would constitute an extra reason for the adoption of μᾶλλον ἡ-axiomata in the list of Diogenes Laertius, especially since there are no good grounds on which to assign a strictly formal logical role to these axiomata.

APPENDIX I

Without its being used as a terminus technicus, the verb διασαφέω occurs several times in contexts which are of interest to our argument (NB I did not make any systematic inquiries to catalogue all places where this verb occurs).

Pl Prot 348b (Protagoras is given the choice between answering Socrates’ questions himself or having Socrates answering his)

Δέγοντος οὖν ἐμού ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπέσαφε ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὁπότερα ποιήσοι... (Alcibiades) ‘δοκεῖ σοι...καλῶς Πρ. ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἔθελων εἰτε δώσει λόγον εἰτε μὴ διασαφεῖν,’ In this context it is a choice from a disjunctively connected couple that we are concerned with.

The next example does not concern choice, but διασαφεῖν is here opposed to ‘leaving undecided, undetermined (άόριστον)’—εν ἐν

more references, to which may be added Mich Synp. (ed Donnet) par 191, 1614 f and 1621 Διασαφητικός δὲ οἶνον ‘πλούτευν ἔθελων ή πένεσθαι’ ης καὶ τον περ προσλαμβάνει οἶνον ‘heiro πένεσθαι’ διασαφεῖ γάρ τὸ εἶτεν ὅπερ αἱρεῖται, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ ημήτη (A117) Suda (II 545,11 ff) does mention ἀνικήτως διασαφητικός δὲ, ὅτι τῶν δύο προτεθέντων τὸ ἐν ἀνικήτως πολλα. The signification is impeccable, so corrup
tion could have been easy.
this case too a standpoint has to be decided upon: Pl. Leg. 916e: νομοθέτη δὲ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ τοῦτο ἀόριστον εὖν, ἀλλ’ ἕ μείζους ἢ ἐλάττους ὤρους ἀεὶ δεὶ διασαφεῖν.

In Hp. Ἐρ. 12 (bd. 9 ed. Littré) the context is eliminative: οὐ μακάριν, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς τινὰ ὑσὶν ὑπερβάλλουσαν διασαφηνέοντος τοῦ ἀνδρός.

E. Ph. 398 may be more general: (concerning ἐπίθετα): οὐδ’ ὁ χρόνος αὐτὰς διεσάφησ’ οὐσίας κενάς; although here too the interpretation that time decides whether hope is εἶτε κενή εἶτε μή is defensible.

Elimination is implicitly present in the context of ἈπΔ synt. 166,7, too.

APPENDIX II

I list here some divergent observations concerning ἡ διασαφητικός, which I found in later sources.

— Apart from ἡ(τοι) the Etymologica also mention ἀλλ’ ἡ (EM 66,38), and ἡγουν and τουτέστα (EG 533,14; EM 773,15 f.) as διασαφητικοί. In the case of ἀλλ’ ἡ this is easily understood. About τουτέστα we find (EG 533,14): σύνδεσμος διασαφητικός ἄντι τοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχει [1. τοῦ τούτο ὑπάρχει I.S.], ὡμοιώς καὶ τὸ ἡγουν. We are not dealing with an eliminative coordinator here; rather, τουτέστα, ‘i.e.’, is explicative. Thus it is closer to the paradiazeuctic than to the diasaphetic ἡ (type: Φαίδων ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς).

— In a passage of the Anecd. Gr. Boissonade (ΠΙΙ 337), which has, however, come down to us in a rather muddled way, ἦτοι, ἡγουν and εἶτου are apparently called διασαφητικὰ ἐπιρρήματα. Cf. Ps.-Theodos. (ed. Goettling) 78,26 f. δηλοντι, δηλαδή, ἡγουν ἐπιρρηματικά (sc. ἐπιρρήματα). οίον διασαφητικόν... (29 f.) μενούνγε ἑκλογῆς (cf. Blass-Debr. 450,6). Lascaris (Milan 1476) also considers οἶον, ‘e.g.’, to be one of τὰ διασαφήσεως.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ApD Apollonius Dyscolus, his works are cited by page and line of the edition by R. Schneider, Grammata Graecae (GG) II: (adv = de adverbio, cons = de coniunctibus) and G. Uhlig, GG II n. (synt = syntaxis)
CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
EG Etymologicum Graecae linguae Gudianum (ed. F. W. Sturz), Leipzig 1818 (Hildesheim-New York 1973)
EM Etymologicum Magnum (ed. T. Garsford), Oxford 1848 (Amsterdam 1962)
KG R. Kuhner, B. Gerth, Ausfuhrliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Hannover/Leipzig 1904
SchDTh Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem grammaticam, rec. A. Hilgard, GG I m., Leipzig 1901 (Hildesheim 1965)
SchEur Scholia in Eunpidem, ed. E. Schwartz, Berlin 1887 (vol. I), 1891 (vol. II)
SVF Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, coll. I ab Arnim, Leipzig 1905-1924

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