1. Introduction

1.1. Peter of Mantua's treatise

Probably between 1384 and 1392 the Italian philosopher Petrus Mantuanus (Peter of Mantua) composed a large work called Logica ('Logic'). One of the treatises of this work is called in the explicit of the 1477 edition: Tractatus de veritate et falsitate, sive de taliter et qualiter ('Treatise on the truth and falsity of a proposition, or on things being in this way, or being in some way or other').

1.2. Aim of this paper

In this paper I intend to show that Peter of Mantua distinguishes between two ways in which the human mind can think, speak or write about things outside itself:

a. Things can be conceived, on the one hand, under a specific concept or according to a specific way of being: It is precisely under this concept or according to a specific way of being that things are presented to the human mind and on no account can this concept be exchanged for another. According to this way of conceiving things, the human mind (ratio) plays a decisive role in the identification of things known.

b. On the other hand, things can be conceived without a specific concept or without a specific way of existence, being relevant. According to this way of conceiving things, things are known as things (res) which can be considered by someone under a specific concept, but this may also occur under another concept (by which, e.g., someone else considers it).

I shall illustrate this distinction by two examples:

1. Things can be considered either according to a specific way of being, or as things:

To use Peter's examples: God can be considered, on the one hand, according to a specific way (modus) of His being. In this way,
God can be described, e.g., in as far as He produces something outside Himself, or in as far as He is a finite being that moves quickly, or in as far as He is contingent in a certain moment of time. Considered in this way, Peter says, God's being and properties are comparable with the being and properties of the things that are created by Him. 5)

On the other hand, God can be considered as far as He is a thing (res) in reality outside the human mind. According to that way of consideration, such concepts as 'producing something outside Himself' etc. cannot be applied to Him as exclusively naming God as thing, that is: God's Essence. If this were so, the concepts 'producing something outside Himself' etc. would refer to the very thing which is God: in other words: to His Essence, and this is certainly not the case. If one wishes to name God's Essence, something like 'Necessary Being' should be applied first. According to this latter way of consideration, God Himself is signified as something not to be compared with other things.

2. My second example is intended to illustrate the distinction between the different ways in which the human mind can conceive things, according to such properties as money, or white etc. Such a property is not a specific mode of being like contingent, as illustrated above, but refers to the substance or accidents of a thing.

Take the example of money. Given a certain number of small pieces of metal; these can be called money. Now, it is possible for me to conceive them precisely under the concept of money and to love these small pieces of metal just for their being money.

This way of considering things under a specific concept is discussed by e.g. Marsilius of Inghen (c. 1340-1396). In his treatise Appellationes, he illustrates this kind of conception of things by way of the example diligo pecuniam ('I love money') (see Marsilius of Inghen, ed. 1983: 154). Construed in this way the proposition signifies that I love money precisely in as far as it is money. Here, pecuniam is said by Marsilius to have appellatio rationis, that is: by the fact that the term (viz. pecuniam) has this content things are referred to under this specific concept. The term money brings to my mind the property of being-money of a certain number of small pieces.
of metal. In the way of being money, and for nothing else, the metal things are presented to me. One is reminded of Frege's 'Art des Gegebenseins'. The thing itself is not signified, but the thing under a specific aspect, in which it possibly communicates with other things, e.g. paper money.

The human mind can also consider things without a specific concept being relevant. Things as such (like res) are at the centre of his interest. These things can be named under different concepts: a specific concept is not relevant, however.

In the case posited above, this kind of consideration is illustrated by pecuniam diligo. This should be interpreted as: there is something, or: there are some things, which can be called money; this thing, or these things, I love. I do not necessarily love the small pieces of metal under the aspect money. Within this context I could very well have named them: 'beautiful silver coins' or something like that. Marsilius of Inghen says that pecuniam has suppositio determinata, that is: there is reference to things (res) without any specific concepts being relevant.

In a recent paper (to which I am much indebted for this contribution) Nuchelmans (1983) has lucidly discussed the two kinds of consideration of things in respect of a part of Paul of Venice's Logica Magna. Following Nuchelmans I call the kind of consideration of things according to specific concepts (the level of ratio): intensional. This way of conceiving things notably occurs in propositions with verbs that denote propositional attitudes, that is: with verbs like to believe, to know, to be uncertain, or with verbs that denote modalities, like to be possible.

The other kind of consideration of things in which a specific concepts is not relevant, I call, with Nuchelmans: extensional.

2. Three notes

Before verifying the proposed distinction of Peter of Mantua's text, three things should be noted.

1. The distinction in the consideration of things applies equally to ontological characteristics of things like contingent and to categorical qualifications and properties, like money or white, which
belong to contingent things.

2. The different ways in which things can be considered is not primarily by way of propositions. Primarily, a knowing subject knows, or names (in writing and speech), things known. Often, but not primarily, our conception of things is communicated by way of propositions.

This is evident from Peter's texts: he speaks of the aliqualiter esse ('being some way') or the taliter esse ('being in such a way') of things. Of course, we can express this kind of consideration of e.g. a thing \( x \) as: "\( x \)'s being is in some way" etc.

3. The different kinds of consideration of things as explained above can be expressed in language by different word order. Word order is one of the means to make clear that things are conceived either according to a specific concept, or without a concept being relevant.

In the illustration to my thesis about Peter's text, I gave *diligpeccuniam* as example of an intensional context. Here, the noun (pecuniam) follows the verb (diligo) with which it is construed. *Pecuniam diligo* is the illustration of an extensional context. Here, the noun precedes the verb with which it is construed.

As De Rijk (1980: 230) has pointed out, 'word order was often considered very important, since word order was viewed as the rendez-vous of grammar and ontology'. Indeed, by way of word order, the distinction between knowledge and things could be expressed.

3. Peter of Manuta on 'entia qualia' ('qualitative beings') and 'entia possibilia' ('possible beings')

Peter of Mantua starts his treatise *De veritate et falsitate, sive de taliter et qualiter* with two *premissiones* ('axioms') in which he discusses two ways in which things can be said to be. In the first axiom Peter considers things as they are individual and actual existents, in the second axiom things are considered according to possibilitas ('possibility'), that is here: non-actuality. Here Peter uses his notion of modus essendi (way of being).

In discussing first the nature of things themselves according to Peter's view I shall follow his text. From this discussion we shall be
able to understand how things which are considered in the ways mentioned above, are as beings. Secondly, I shall try to verify my thesis of the text itself. I shall try to show that Peter carefully distinguishes between the levels of ratio ('concept') and res ('thing'), and I shall indicate how he elaborates this distinction.

3.1 On 'entia' ('beings') as 'entia qualia' ('qualitative beings')

Peter says:

'Premittamus primo quod omne ens est quale: quia omne ens est perfectum; ideo est quale. Consequentia patet: quia, si omne ens est perfectum, ipsum est perfectum quale ipsum est; quia omne ens est tale quale ipsum est.

Et adhuc dato, per possibile, quod prima materia a qualibet forma accidentali et substantiali esset denudata, ipsa esset qualis, quia figurata. Tenet consequentia a specie ad genus. Ex quo sequitur quod non omne quod est quale, est quale per aliquam qualitatem ab eo distinctam; est enim qualibet qualitas qualis cum ipsa sit intensa vel remissa.'

('Axiom I. Every being is qualitative: for every being is perfect; therefore every being is qualitative. The inference is valid: if every being is perfect, every being is the perfect thing it is itself, for every being is such as it is itself.

Even if the prime matter were deprived of every accidental and substantial form - which is possible - , the prime matter would be qualitative, for it would possess shape. This is a inference from species to genus. Consequently, everything which is qualitative is not qualitative because of a quality which can be separated from it: every quality is qualitative because it is intense or remitted').

In his first axiom Peter interprets actual entia as entia qualia, i.e. qualitative beings.

First, Peter argues, all beings are perfect. I interpret this as: things are what they are, e.g.: a cow, or something white, is perfect just because it is a cow, or something white, however mortal it is or subject to change.

Secondly, Peter says that even prime matter is qualitative: for
if it is deprived of substantial or accidental form (e.g. 'cow-ness', or whiteness), which seems possible to Peter, this prime matter still is qualitative. The reason is that it possesses shape. All qualities of things (substantial, or accidental, or the shape of prime matter) are qualities because of their intension or remission, i.e.: because of their possession of grades of form. Peter clearly links these two properties of a form both to substantial or essential qualities, and to sensible qualities, (which is the 'accidental form' of Peter's treatise) and even to prime matter. The Dutch historian of science Dijksterhuis (1969:186) concludes: "Pre-Thomistic Scholasticism did not explicitly link this question (i.e. whether charitas ('charity') in man (...) admits of change in the sense that it may be more or less intense at different moments - E.P.B.) with the intensity-problem for sensible qualities; from Thomas Aquinas onwards, however, this was done regularly."

That Peter links intension and remission to substantial (or: essential) form is even more remarkable. In this respect the way in which he preserves the identity of a species seems to me to pose problems. Peter apparently interprets all things in the world as possessing greater and lesser degrees, and consequently, as being they are different from each other. Peter seems to come close to a Heraclitean notion of flux.

Elsewhere I have concluded that in his Logic Peter shows what I call: a 'physicist' approach to things: things are interpreted by Peter as being in constant change in time. Peter's attribution of intention and remission to substantial form confirms my earlier interpretations, I feel. 11)

3.2 On 'entia' as 'entia possibilia' ('possible beings')

Peter's second axiom runs as follows: 12)

'Adhuc premittamus quod omne ens est cuilibet enti simile aliquo modo et cuilibet enti aliquo modo similiter se habens. Quia: quodlibet ens est possibile, et quodlibet ens est possibiliter ens qualiter quocumque aliud ens quod detur; igitur omne ens est cuilibet enti simile et cuilibet enti similiter se habens.
Item, quocumque ente dato ipsum est ens quod non cuilibet enti
secundum omnem suum modum agendi vel essendi est infinite
dissimile; igitur quocumque ente dato ipsum est cuilibet enti
simile et similiter se habens. Patet consequentia illa: quia sicut
omne finite magnum est parvum et omne finite difficile est facile,
sic omne finite dissimile est simile'.

('Axiom II. a. Every being is in some way equal to any other
being, and in some way possesses an equal mode of being as any
other being. For every being is a possible being, and every being
possesses possible being in the way any other being possesses
this; therefore, every being is equal to every other being and
possesses an equal mode of being as every other being.

b. Every being of whatever sort is a being that is not
infinitely unequal to any other being according to every mode in
which it acts and is; therefore, any being whatever is equal to
any other being and possesses an equal mode of being as every
other being. This inference is evident: just as every finite big
thing is small, and every finite difficult thing is easy, so every
finite unequal thing is equal').

My interpretation of Peter's second axiom:

Entia are equal to each other on the level of their being
possible ('possible') and therefore, Peter implies, are possible.

By possible Peter means, as will be evident from the subsequent
discussion: not-impossible in the sense of: not being a necessary
actual being (said of God) or a contingent actual being (said of
creatures). Peter takes possible in a broad sense of the word. Under
this aspect things are equal to each other, because they are
considered as non-actual.

In Peter's view, things possess possible being (possibiliter se
habere) in virtue of their being possible things. The nature of the
being (esse) of things is dependent on the nature of the thing itself.
As Peter says somewhere else in his tract: celum est aliqualiter
('the heaven is of some kind') is based on: celum est
aliquale ('the heaven is of some kind').

Things being possible are on the same level with things being
finite. Under the latter aspect all things are equal in their modes of
being and acting.

In an answer to an objection Peter says:
'Sicut recto nihil est rectius, et nihil est intense aut remisse rectum, ita nihil est intense aut remisse possibile'.
('Just as nothing is more right than that which is right, and just as nothing is intensely or remittedly right, so nothing is intensely or remittedly possible').

There are no degrees in the domain of possibility and, indeed, in the domain of correctness, which is equivalent to possibility.

To wind up this section: I conclude from Peter's second axiom that the equality of entia, according to possibility, is based on his interpretation of actual entia as entia qualia. The two ways in which things are considered here are distinct: entia can be said to be unequal (the first axiom) and equal (the second axiom).

It may also be concluded that, on the one hand, things can be signified as things (aliqua) in the outside world, and, on the other hand, the mode of being of things can be the signifcate of propositions. In the subsequent discussion I shall return to Peter's dualistic conception of signification.

5. Peter of Mantua on 'aliquidier esse' ('being in some mode') and 'talter esse' ('being in such a mode')

This distinction between possible and actual is elaborated by Peter in this conclusion:

'Ex quibus sequitur quod quodlibet aliquamiter esse est cuilibet aliquamiter esse simile. Patet hoc, quia: omne ens est cuilibet enti simile et quodlibet aliquamite est cuilibet aliquamite simile; igitur quodlibet taliter esse et quodlibet aliquamiter esse est cuilibet talis esse et cuilibet aliquamite esse simile.

Quo dato sequitur quod quodlibet ens aliquamiter est et taliter ipsum non est, et taliter ipsum non potest esse. Celum enim est aliquamiter et taliter ipsum non est. Patet quia: sicut celum est aliquamite et talis ipsum non est, celum est aliquamiter et taliter ipsum non est.'

('I conclude: every being-in-some-way is equal to every other being-in-some-way, for: every being is equal to every other being,
and every being-of-some-sort is equal to any other being-of-some-sort; therefore, every being-in-that-way and every being-in-some-way is equal to every being-of-that-sort and every being-of-some-sort.

On this premiss it follows: every being is a being-in-some-way, but being-in-that-way it itself is not, nor can it itself be so. For, the heaven is in-some-way, but being-in-that-way the heaven itself is not; for: just as the heaven is of-some-sort, but something-of-thát-sort it itself is not, so the heaven is in-some-way but in that way it itself is not'.

I infer, first, that the similitudo ('equality') of things under the aspect of aliqualiter esse is on the same level as the equality of things under the aspect of possibiliter esse.

Secondly: according to Peter, the aliqualiter esse is based on a thing's aliquale esse; I have referred above to this reduction of the nature of a mode of being to the nature of a being itself.

Thirdly: in the first paragraph of the text just quoted the conclusion after igitur should of course have been identical with the conclusion which follows it: Ex quibus sequitur quod quodlibet etc. In fact they are not identical: a) the relation between aliqualiter esse and aliquale esse is inserted; b) a new element is introduced, viz. taliter esse and tale esse. This is unexpected.

In the passages which follow, Peter makes clear how he uses the two expressions aliqualiter esse and taliter esse. The inference from a proposition in which aliqualiter is used after the verb with which it is construed, to a proposition in which taliter is used in front of the verb, is illicit, just as it is illicit to pass over from possibility to actuality. The different levels in the significations of things are indicated here by way of word order.

In Peter's treatise the different considerations of things concern both specific characteristics of being as such, e.g. contingent, and substantial and accidental properties like money or whiteness, that is: properties of contingent beings. However, Peter exemplifies the distinction primarily by way of terms denoting specific characteristics of being as such.

God can be considered by the human mind, on the one hand,
according to what He is in Himself, viz. the Necessary Being, or as a Contingent Being; in the latter case, contingent should be qualified by necessary. For it is necessary that God can act contingently towards creatures.

On the other hand, God can be considered according to His relations to creatures outside Himself. Then He can be considered as being contingently to whatever (ad utrumlibet), in the way in which the human will is often defined in medieval tracts, or contingent in a certain moment (instans) or in the way a human being is contingent. According to the latter consideration of God, He is described in His relations towards creatures.

Subsequent to our last quotation, our author says:

(1) Licet tamen sit concedendum quod Deus est aliqualiter et taliter ipsum non potest esse, et de omni alio ente similiter,
(2) negandum tamen est quod aliqualiter Deus est et non taliter potest esse.
(3) Et si arguitur quod sic: quia contingenter Deus est in hoc instanti et non contingenter potest esse, igitur Deus est aliqualiter et non taliter potest esse,
(4) huic dicitur de virtute sermonis negando antecedens: Deus enim est contingenter in hoc instanti et contingenter potest esse, quamvis non contingenter ad utrumlibet Deus possit esse, quia necessario Deus potest esse. Verum tamen contingenter Deus non potest esse, quia modo contingenti quo tu vel hoc instans est, Deus non potest esse.'

(1) This should be conceded, however: God's being is in some way but that way of being He himself cannot be. This is the case for all other things.

(2) On the other hand, this should be denied: God's being is in some way, but it is not the case that that way of being He himself can be.

(3) Objection: God's being is contingent in this instant of time, and it is not the case that it can be contingent. Therefore, God's being is in some way, and it is not the case that His being can be in that way.

(4) Answer to the objection: the antecedent is denied by virtue of
the terms used: God's being is contingent in this instant of time, and it can be contingent, although He cannot be contingent to anything whatever, for God is necessarily contingent. However, God as God Himself can not be contingent, for in the way that you, or this instant of time, are contingent, in that same way of being God cannot be.')

In the last words of the text Peter says that God's Being cannot be contingent, that is: not in the way creatures can be said to be contingent. According to Peter, God can be said to be contingent in His relations to creatures. According to this aspect He communicates with creatures. This is not, however, God's Essence. So, one cannot without any further qualification convert Deus est contingenter ('God's Being is contingently (meaning: viz. towards creatures)), into: Contingenter Deus est ('A contingent being God is in Himself').

The two ways of signification used by Peter in the preceding lines are brought together in a text (in which, by the way, Peter denies the validity of an inference):^26

'Sic etiam non sequitur: qualitercumque li homo significat hominem, taliter illum hominem significat; sed principaliter significat hominem, igitur principaliter illum hominem significat.'

('This inference is not valid: In the way the term 'man' signifies man, in that way it signifies this man; now, the term 'man' primarily signifies man, so, it primarily signifies this man').

My conclusion is that, in Peter's view, if the signification of a term is primarily to something in some way, e.g. a content (i.e. the intensional context), the same term does not in the same way ana primarily signify an individual man (i.e. the extensional context). The two levels of signification should be kept apart. In Peter's Logica we find a sharp distinction between the various ways in which a thing, or things, can be signified.

According to our logician, one should bear in mind, first, not to confuse the level of naming according to a specific concept (or, to put it more briefly: the level of the ratio ('concept')) with the level of naming things when a specific concept is not relevant (short: the level of the res ('thing')).
Secondly, one should not apply a specific concept according to which a thing is conceived, to another thing. On the level of ratio the different concepts are formally different (though materially they can be the same, for these different concepts can refer to the same thing).

Peter's position can be exemplified when in his treatise an opponent argues that from Peter's axioms it follows: *Aliqualiter qualiter Deus est, ipse non est* ('In some way as God is, He is not'). The inference is valid, according to the opponent, for:

'Isto modo Deus non est (demonstrando modum quo celum est), et ille est aliqualiter qualiter Deus est; igitur aliqualiter qualiter Deus est, ipse non est.'

('In this way God is not (the way in which the heaven is, is pointed at); this is some way as God is, therefore in some way as God is, He is not').

The opponent argues that this consequent proposition viz. *Aliqualiter qualiter Deus est, ipse non est* is correctly inferred; the consequent is false, however. The opponent does not give reasons for his rejection of the truth of the consequent. Perhaps he concludes to the falsity because he does not distinguish between the different ways in which God is named in the first part of the consequent as opposed to the second part.

As is clear from his answer Peter carefully distinguishes between the ways in which the two parts of the consequent signify, in accordance with what he has said earlier in his tract. Peter admits the consequent as true.

He says: 28)

'Ad secundum dicitur concedendo istam conclusionem sicut et istam: *Aliqualiter Deus est qualiter nescit se esse*. Similes etiam sunt concedende: (1) *Aliqualiter qualiter scis esse, nullus homo scit esse*. Quia, demonstrato modo ignoto homini, tunc ille modus est aliqualiter qualiter scis esse, et ille modus est aliqualiter qualiter nullus homo scit esse, igitur etc. Et sic de multis aliis dici potest.

(2) Similiter concedi debet quod: *Aliqualiter qualiter scit esse, taliter dubitas esse*, et: *Qualitercumque aliquis homo scit esse, taliter ipse dubitat esse*, posito quod per aliquam propositionem
sciat aliquis homo sic esse vel sic, et aliquam aliam dubitet. Qualitercumque enim scit aliquis homo, taliter ipse non potest scire.'

('Reply to the second objection: I concede the opponent's conclusion [viz. 'in some way as God is, He is not' - E.P.B.]. I also concede similar propositions: 'In some way as you know something to be, no man knows it to be.' For, if something is known to be in a way as another man does not know it to be, than that way of being is in the way you know something to be, and that way is some way as no man knows it to be; therefore etc. This applies to many other cases.

Likewise, I concede: In some way in which you know something to be, in that way you doubt it to be. Further: in whatever way that a man knows, that something is, in that way he doubts it to be (on the assumption that by way of some proposition a man knows it to be so or so, and that by way of another proposition he doubts it to be so or so. For, in whatever way a man knows something to be, in that way he can not-know something to be').

In this text Peter makes two things clear:

1) Ad (1): A concept according to which a man (e.g. Socrates) knows something, is the way in which Socrates knows something: it is quite possible (as it is in Peter's example) that another man (e.g. Plato) does not know the same thing with the same concept. Peter wants to make clear, I think, that Socrates' concepts of a thing is his individual concept corresponding to a property of a thing of which Socrates conceives.

2) Ad (2): one and the same man (e.g. Socrates) can know something by way of some particular proposition, but can have doubt about some thing by way of another proposition. Here Peter says, I think, that in these two ways of conceiving things according to different mental attitudes (viz. knowledge and doubt) the thing itself is not thereby affected. Peter intends to keep separate the levels of ratio as opposed to res.
6. Peter of Mantua on signification

Peter's definition of signification corresponds to his distinction between ratio and res. He gives three more presuppositiones ('axioms') on signification:

IV. Item, presupponatur quod nihil potest intelligere intellectus humanus quod non possit intelligere esse ens. Patet quia: ens est primum objectum intellectus; ideo tantum ens, seu aliquid, potest intellectus humanus apprehendere aut intelligere.

V. Et adhuc accipiatur quod significare est virtuti cognitive aliquid vel aliqua vel aliquid aliter representare.

Ex quo sequitur quod nihil potest aliquod signum significare quod non possit intellectus intelligere. Patet, quia bene sequitur: hoc significatur, ergo hoc intelligitur.

Ultimo accipitur quod ex additione sincathegoreumatis (sic) aut termini nihil significantis termino aliquid significanti non resultat complexum quod significet aliquid quam significet ille terminus cathegoreumaticus cui additur id sincathegoreuma seu terminus nihil significans. Verbi gratia: significatum huiusmodi complexi omnis homo aut aliquis homo si aliquid sit eius significatum, non est aliquid quam significatum illius termini homo. Patet hæc suppositio intelligenti materiam.

('Axiom IV: The human intellect can only understand something which can be understood to be a being. This is evident: being is the first object of the intellect; therefore, the human intellect can only apprehend or understand: being, or something. Axiom V: To signify means: to represent something, or something, or in some way, to the cognitive power. Conclusion: a sign can not signify something which can not be understood by the intellect. For this is signified, therefore this is understood is a valid inference. Axiom VI (last axiom): if a syncategorematic term (that is: a term which does not signify anything by itself) is added to a term which does signify something, the result is not a complex of terms which signifies something other than is signified by the categorematic term, to which the syncategorematic term (that is a
term which does not signify anything by itself) is added. E.g.: if the complex every men, or some men do have a significate, this significate is the same as that to which the term men refers. This axiom is clear').

From Peter's fourth axiom I conclude that the human intellect can only apprehend or understand something which can be understood to be a being, or something. Peter does not say: 'The human intellect can only understand something which is'. Peter carefully distinguishes between the levels of ratio and res.

Now, that which can be understood can be signified. Signification, according to Peter in his fifth axiom, is about: 1) a thing, or things; or it is about: 2) some way in which things are.

The first object (1) of signification are things that exist in the world, the second object (2) is not. From the conclusion Peter adds to his fourth and fifth axiom, I infer that in Peter's view the levels of both signification and understanding should be distinguished from the level of existence: the levels of ratio and res should be kept separate.

From the sixth axiom, the distinction between ratio and res becomes even more clear: a change or addition of syncategorematic terms, i.e. of terms which do not signify on their own but depend for their signification on categorematic terms, does affect the mode of signification, not the significate in the outside world.

Peter is justified, I feel, in drawing this conclusion from his axioms:

'Ex ists iam acceptis inferamus quod quacumque propositione data affirmativa, sive vera, sive falsa, que aliqualiter esse significat, precise sicut est, significat.' ('From these axioms I conclude: if an affirmative proposition (true or false) signifies a mode of being, it signifies just as something is').

In this case of signification, viz. aliqualiter esse, the term precise ("just") qualifying 'is' indicates that a specific form of thinking, or speaking, about the world is at issue. In these contexts Peter uses as synonym of precise: adequate.

Another consequence of Peter's view to distinguish between the
levels of ratio and res is that the significate of one of a pair of contradictory propositions is the same as the significate of the other proposition. Peter argues as follows: 35)

'Preterea sequitur quod omne significatum unius contradictorias est significatum alterius, et quidquid significatur per unum, significatur per aliud. Patet illud ex ultima et penultima suppositione: quia, si aliquid esset significatum unius quod non esset significatum alterius, hec esset propter syncategoreuma quod est in una positum et non in alia: sed syncategoreuma non variat significatum, quia nihil significat, sed solum variat modum significandi propositionis: igitur etc.'

('Therefore, every significate of one of a pair of contradictory propositions is the significate of the other of this pair: Whatever is signified by one, is signified by the other. This is evident from the last and penultimate axiom [that is: the fifth and sixth quoted above 36] — E.P.B.]. For, if something would be the significate of one of the pair of contradictory propositions and not of the other, this would be the result of the syncategorematic term which occurs in the one and not in the other. A syncategorematic term does not change the significate, however: for this term does not signify anything, but only changes the mode of signification of a proposition. Therefore, etc. ')

The distinction between ratio and res is worked out by Peter in some other respects as well, which I shall not discuss here. 37)

7. Conclusion

My conclusion is, that Peter distinguishes sharply between:

1a. the mode of being of things and:
1b. the things themselves;
2a. the specific concepts by which things are conceived and:
2b. the concepts of things when no specific concept is relevant.

For the human mind's understanding of things the levels of ratio and res are kept apart by Peter. For example: the addition of syncategorematic terms like non (added to a verb), omnis and quidam
function on the level of ratio and do not affect the level of res.

The difference between the two levels may be indicated by different word order. Conversion of a proposition in an intensional context into a proposition in an extensional context is not allowed.

One of Peter's main devices in expressing the different levels of consideration of things is his use of taliter and qualiter, inter alia in connection with word order. A title like De taliter et qualiter, then, seems preferable as the title of Peter's treatise discussed here.
0. I thank Mr. J. Deahl (Leiden) for the correction of my English.

1. For the years within which Peter probably composed his Logica see James, 1974: 163

2. Edition Padua, 1477, f.63vb, 11.38-39. I thought it desirable to number the folios with Arab figures; this seems to be an easier notation, and, moreover, one that is more often used in early prints than the combination of letters and Roman numbers at the bottom of the incunable folios. So, I have numbered the tract De taliter et qualiter: ff. 53va-63vb. I have numbered the lines of each column on each folio 1-39. Each column of the 1477 edition contains the same number of lines. I have compared the text of this early print with the text preserved in MS. Vatican, Bibl. Apost. Vat., lat. 2135 (dated 1416).

For other early prints and manuscripts containing Peter's Logica (or parts of it, see Bos 1982: 232 (notes 7 and 8)).

3. I shall give my view on the title to be preferred for the treatise in the conclusion of this paper (par. 7).


5. F. 54rb, 11.3-4.


7. The example pecuniam diligo as such is not to be found in Marsilius' Appellationes.

8. For Buridan on this topic, see Van der Lecq, 1983: ch. 6.

9. F. 53va, 1.30- f. 53vb, 1.8
10. For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Maier, 1968, ch.I.


14. See, esp., par.5 below.

15. F.54rb, 11.16-20

16. F.54vb, 11.17-27

17. F.54vb, 11.26-29

18. Par.6

19. F.54rb, 11.5-17

20. See p. 297 above

21. In the 'second' conclusion of the text: 1) taliter] entaliter VI (f.34vb), 0 (f.108va); essentialiter Va (f.61rb); ens taliter V2 (f.34ra) // 2) tali ] entali V1, 0; essentiali Va; enti tali V2 (All same folia as for the other variant reading of this note; for the sigla, see above, note 13). The MSS are not unanimous. 'Essentialiter' may be a gloss.

22. Cf. above, p. 294

23. P. 298 above.


26. F.54vb, 11.2-6

27. F.55ra, 11.8-12.

28. F.55rb, 1.31-f.55va, 1.9.

29. The third axiom (which is third at least according to my interpretation; the text is not clear on this point) is on f.55va, 11.19-24. This axiom is not discussed in this paper.

30. F.56va, 1.14-f.56vb, 1.1.

31. Significatum] MS Va (cf. note 18), f.62rb signo inc.

32. Complexi] MS Va (Cf. note 18), f.62rb complexum inc.

33. Maierù's (1974: 168-9) conclusion is the same.

34. F.57va, 11.20-24.

35. F.59rb, 1.32- f.59va, 1.6.

36. P. 304.

37. E.g. the problem of propositio plures (associated with the problem of equivocity); the relation between senses and intellect.

38. Cf. note 3.


Ria van der Lecq, 1983: Johannes Buridanus, Questiones longe super librum Perihermeneias, edited with an introduction by Ria van der Lecq, Nijmegen.

A. Maier, 1968: Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie Das Problem der intensiven Grösse; die Impetustheorie. Roma 1968 (3) (1951 (2); 1939/1940 (1)).
