

CHAPTER 4. LINGUISTICS, COMPOSITION, AND STYLE: DIONYSIUS' USE OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, we have examined Dionysius' knowledge of the grammatical theory of the parts of speech, in order to establish his place in the history of grammar. But Dionysius did not write grammatical treatises. As a rhetorician, he used the theories of grammarians for his own purposes. His works on style and rhetorical composition offer a unique possibility for us to observe how the two language disciplines that were arguably most prominent in the ancient world, namely grammar and rhetoric, were integrated into a coherent set of ideas. While the connections between grammar and philosophy in antiquity have been the subject of several modern publications, scholars have paid less attention to the relation between ancient grammar and rhetorical theory.¹ A rhetorician who focuses on aspects of style can apply the theory of the parts of speech in several ways. Dionysius seems to have used that grammatical theory more frequently than other teachers of rhetoric.² One might say that there are three different capacities in which Dionysius deals with the theory of the *μέρια λόγου*. As a rhetorician (section 4.3), he regards the parts of speech as the building blocks for the composition of texts. Thus, the description of particular types of composition is partly based on the way in which writers use the parts of speech. The *μέρια λόγου* are so important that they even figure in the general definition of 'composition' (*σύνθεσις*) at the beginning of the work *On Composition*. This definition of *σύνθεσις* as 'a certain arrangement of the parts of speech' leads to a doxographical overview of earlier thinkers on the parts of speech. Here, we observe Dionysius' second role: as a 'historian of linguistics' (section 4.2), he discusses the early history of the theory of the parts of speech. Finally, as a literary critic (section 4.4), Dionysius discusses the style of Thucydides by analysing the historian's use of the parts of speech: in this context, the theory of the parts of speech is employed as an instrument for literary analysis.

It is important to realise that Dionysius' 'history of linguistics' is subservient to his ideas on composition and style. In fact, it would be more correct to state that there are only two purposes for which Dionysius needs the parts of speech. On the one hand, the theory of the *μέρια λόγου* offers the rhetorician the starting point for the process

¹ For studies on the connections between ancient philosophy, grammar, and rhetoric, see section 1.1.

² However, I will compare passages from 'Demetrius', 'Longinus', Quintilian and later rhetoricians who make use of grammatical terminology (see sections 4.3. and 4.4).

of composition, which puts ‘the parts of the phrase’ together as elements. On the other hand, the theory enables the critic to reduce the stylistic particularities of a phrase to the way in which specific *parts* of the phrase have been used. Whereas Dionysius can indeed be called a rhetorician and a literary critic, his role as a ‘historian of linguistics’ is a very limited one. However, since Dionysius’ history of the μόρια λόγου in *On Composition 2* is inextricably bound up with the definition of composition (σύνθεσις), I have chosen to discuss this passage in relation to the use of the parts of speech in composition and stylistic analysis. When I speak of Dionysius’ three ‘capacities’, the reader should understand that only two of them are really part of Dionysius’ own intentions, while the third one (that of historian of linguistics) is subservient to the other two. This will be illuminated in the following section.

4.2. Dionysius as a historian of linguistics

*Partes orationis quot sunt?*³ ‘How many parts of speech are there?’ It is with this question that the Roman grammarian Donatus (who was active around 350 AD) starts his *Ars Minor*. His answer is: *octo*, ‘eight’. Traditionally, we learn that the system of eight word classes, which we find in the works of Apollonius Dyscolus and in the *Technê grammatikê*, was the result of a long cumulative process: Plato identified two parts of speech, Aristotle three or four, the Stoics five or six, and Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax eight.⁴ This presentation of the history of the word class system has been criticised in recent years, but it is characteristic for the traditional historiography of linguistics, represented by scholars like Lersch (1838-1841), Schoemann (1862), Steinthal (1863), Benfey (1869), Robins (1967 and later) and Lallot (1988).⁵ However, as far as we know, the first text that presented the history of the word class system in this way is Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ work *De compositione verborum*.⁶ In this section, I intend to make clear that Dionysius can be considered the prototype of the traditional western approach to the history of linguistics. In *Comp. 2*, Dionysius discusses the history of the theory of the μόρια (or μέρη) λόγου.⁷ Brief as it may be, this passage may be considered one of the very first histories of linguistics, which

³ Section 4.2 has been published in a slightly different form as De Jonge (2005a).

⁴ Cf. Sluiter (1998) 24-25.

⁵ For objections to the traditional presentation of the history of the word class system, see Taylor (1987), Sluiter (1993) 131, Schenkeveld (1994) 270, Blank (1998) 174 and Matthaïos (1999) 492. See also section 4.2.4.

⁶ Cf. Taylor (1987) 3. Dionysius’ *method* of discussing earlier thinkers goes back to Aristotle: see section 4.2.2.

⁷ Apart from Dionysius’ history of the word class theory (*Comp.* 2.6,17-7,21), the account of Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 1.4.17-21) will be discussed in this chapter (section 4.2.3). Somewhat diverging accounts are Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 515,19-521,37 and Priscian, *Inst.* II.15-17 (*G.L.* II, 54,5-55,3).

would make Dionysius one of the first *historians* of linguistics.⁸ First, I will discuss the relationship between Dionysius' history of the word class system and the rest of his work *On Composition*. Second, I will comment on some particularities of Dionysius' 'history of linguistics'. Finally, I will compare Dionysius' approach with that of Quintilian and modern historians of linguistics. Thus, I hope to answer the question what kind of historian of linguistics Dionysius actually was.

4.2.1. Dionysius' history of the theory of the parts of speech

Dionysius' history of the theory of the parts of speech can be found immediately after his definition of σύνθεσις (composition) in the second chapter of *De compositione verborum*:⁹

Ἡ σύνθεσις ἔστι μὲν, ὡσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ τοῦνομα, ποιά τις θέσις παρ' ἄλληλα τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων, ἃ δὴ καὶ στοιχεῖά τινες τῆς λέξεως καλοῦσιν. ταῦτα δὲ Θεοδέκτης μὲν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ οἱ κατ' ἐκείνους φιλοσοφήσαντες τοὺς χρόνους ἄχρι τριῶν προήγαγον, ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ συνδέσμους πρῶτα μέρη τῆς λέξεως ποιοῦντες. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους γενόμενοι, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ τῆς Στωικῆς αἰρέσεως ἡγεμόνες, ἕως τεττάρων προὔβιβασαν, χωρίσαντες ἀπὸ τῶν συνδέσμων τὰ ἄρθρα. εἶθ' οἱ μεταγενέστεροι τὰ προσηγορικὰ διελόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνοματικῶν πέντε ἀπεφήναντο τὰ πρῶτα μέρη. ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀντονομασίας ἀποζεύξαντες ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἔκτον στοιχεῖον τοῦτ' ἐποίησαν. οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιρρήματα διελόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τὰς προθέσεις ἀπὸ τῶν συνδέσμων καὶ τὰς μετοχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν προσηγορικῶν, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄλλας τινὰς προσαγαγόντες τομὰς πολλὰ τὰ πρῶτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως ἐποίησαν· ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐ μικρὸς ἂν εἴη λόγος. πλὴν ἢ γε τῶν πρώτων εἴτε τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων εἶθ' ὅσων δὴ ποτε ὄντων μερῶν πλοκὴ καὶ παράθεσις τὰ λεγόμενα ποιεῖ κῶλα, ἔπειθ' ἢ τούτων ἀρμονία τὰς καλουμένας συμπληροῖ περιόδους, αὐταὶ δὲ τὸν σύμπαντα τελειοῦσι λόγον.

⁸ It is, however, very well possible that Dionysius (and Quintilian) used an older source (which is now lost) for the history of the word class system. We might think of Asclepiades of Myrlea (see section 4.2.3).

⁹ *Comp.* 2.6,17-7,21 (for a shorter version of Dionysius' overview, see *Dem.* 48.232,20-233,2; cf. section 3.7). In this passage, it is impossible to translate the terms ὀνόματα, ῥήματα, σύνδεσμοι etc. in a consistent way, because these terms have a different scope in each of the stadia that Dionysius distinguishes (see section 3.2): for example, we cannot use the term 'noun' for Aristotle's ὄνομα. Even in a system of eight or nine parts of speech, the word class σύνδεσμοι covers more than our 'conjunctions' or 'connectives'. However, some readers may find it useful to have an indication of the meaning of the terms in Dionysius' survey. There is no completely satisfactory solution to this problem, but I have decided to preserve the Greek terms in the translation, while adding the usual (partly anachronistic) translations of these terms between inverted commas.

‘Composition is, as the name itself indicates, a certain arrangement of the parts of speech, or the elements of diction, as some call them. Theodectes and Aristotle and the philosophers of their time increased the number of these to three, making ὀνόματα (‘nouns’), ῥήματα (‘verbs’) and σύνδεσμοι (‘conjunctions’) the primary parts of speech. Their successors, and in particular the leaders of the Stoic school, raised the number further to four, separating the ἄρθρα (‘articles’) from the σύνδεσμοι (‘conjunctions’). Next, later generations distinguished the προσηγορικά (‘appellative nouns’) from the ὀνοματικά (‘proper nouns’) and presented the primary parts as five. Others detached the ἀντωνομασίαι (‘pronouns’) from the ὀνόματα (‘proper nouns’) and made this the sixth element. Yet others divided the ἐπιρρήματα (‘adverbs’) from the ῥήματα (‘verbs’), the προθέσεις (‘prepositions’) from the σύνδεσμοι (‘conjunctions’) and the μετοχάι (‘participles’) from the προσηγορικά (‘appellatives’); while others introduced still further divisions and so made the primary parts of speech many in number. The subject could be discussed at considerable length, but it is enough to say that the combination or juxtaposition of these primary parts, whether there be three, four or any number of them, forms what are called clauses. Next, the joining together of these clauses constitutes what are called the ‘periods’, and these make up the complete discourse (λόγος).’

Before we take a closer look at Dionysius’ history of the word class system itself, we should consider the relationship between this passage and his theory of composition. Dionysius’ reason for giving a history of the word class theory is that he regards the μόρια or μέρη λόγου as the central units of composition. Composition is defined as ‘a certain arrangement of the parts of speech’, and Dionysius adds that some people call these ‘elements of diction’ (στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως). I have already pointed to the interesting background of this remark: we know that the Stoic philosophers considered the parts of speech στοιχεῖα (elements), but they referred to them as τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου (the elements of meaningful utterance), whereas their στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως were the letters (the elements of articulate sound). Dionysius is the only author who refers to the parts of speech as στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως (see sections 2.2, 3.2 and 3.3). I have suggested (in section 3.5) that Dionysius’ use of στοιχεῖα λέξεως for the parts of speech unites a philosophical perspective (the parts of speech as elements) and a rhetorical approach to language as expression (λέξις). In any case, by using the term στοιχεῖα Dionysius emphasises the symmetry between the different levels of language: the parts of speech constitute the λόγος, just as the letters are the building blocks of the syllables. This view of language as a hierarchical structure characterises Dionysius’ entire treatment of composition: σύνθεσις plays a role on all levels of language, and the units on one level are the building blocks (or elements) of the units

on the next level. Thus, syllables are composed of letters, words (or parts of speech) of syllables, clauses of words, periods of clauses, and the discourse of periods. As I have pointed out above (section 2.2), this atomistic view on language is found in many other ancient texts, such as the treatises on metre and music by Hephaestion and Aristides Quintilianus.¹⁰ We may also compare Apollonius Dyscolus' approach to syntax (σύνταξις), which seems to be influenced by Stoic ideas.¹¹

When we compare Dionysius' version of the history of the word class theory with other (ancient and modern) versions, we can detect a number of interesting differences.

(1) Dionysius starts his overview with Aristotle and his student Theodectes, thereby omitting Plato, while modern historians of grammar usually observe that Plato already distinguished ὄνομα and ῥῆμα.¹² It is interesting, though, that Dionysius states that Theodectes and Aristotle 'increased' the number of the parts of speech: προήγαγον, the word he uses, literally means 'carried forward'. This word already contains the idea of gradual progress, which characterises the whole passage on the history of the word class system. When Dionysius says that Aristotle distinguished three 'parts of speech', ὄνομα, ῥῆμα and σύνδεσμος, he is probably referring to the *Rhetoric*, for in

¹⁰ Cf. Van Ophuijsen (1987) 8-9 and Barker (1989) 393-394.

¹¹ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.2: ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰς συλλαβὰς ἀποτελεῖ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιπλοκάς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ σύνταξις τῶν νοητῶν τρόπον τινὰ συλλαβὰς ἀποτελέσει διὰ τῆς ἐπιπλοκῆς τῶν λέξεων. καὶ ἔτι ὄν τρόπον ἐκ τῶν συλλαβῶν ἡ λέξις, οὕτως ἐκ τῆς καταλληλότητος τῶν νοητῶν ὁ αὐτοτελής λόγος. 'And just as the elements (i.e. letters) compose syllables according to their combinations, so, in turn, the structural combining (*syntaxis*) of meanings will in a certain way produce syllables (i.e. sentences) by combining words. Just as the word is made of syllables, so the complete sentence is made by the grammatical collocation of meanings.' (Translation adapted from Householder.) On this text, see Blank (1982) 30-31 and Sluiter (1990) 44-46. Note that Dionysius' formulation (*Comp.* 2.7,18) τελειοῦσι λόγον resembles Apollonius' concept of the αὐτοτελής λόγος, but Dionysius' λόγος is a text (discourse) not a sentence. See also Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* IV.16: Ἐφραμεν γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς ἐκδόσεως, ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπέχει τοῖς στοιχείοις τῆς λέξεως. 'Back at the beginning of this treatise we said that that the elements of the sentence behaved similarly to the elements of the word.' (Translation by Householder.) Swiggers & Wouters (1995) 37 n. 46 also point to the similarity between the approaches of Dionysius and Apollonius. See further Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 211,27-212,1: καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων συλλαβαί, ἀπὸ δὲ συλλαβῶν λέξεις, ἀπὸ δὲ λέξεων διάνοιαι, ἀπὸ δὲ διανοιῶν ὁ τέλειος λόγος. 'For syllables are composed of letters, and words of syllables, and thoughts of words, and the complete text of thought.' The διάνοιαι in the latter text might be compared to Apollonius' νοήσεις. For the Stoic ideas on language as a hierarchical structure, see *FDS* 539-541; cf. Pinborg (1975) 97-98 and Sluiter (1990) 43-44.

¹² Ancient histories of the word class system never start with Plato: Quintilian (1.4.17-20) begins, like Dionysius, with Aristotle and Theodectes. See also *FDS* 543-546, overviews that start with either Aristotle or the Stoics. Modern histories that start with Plato's distinction of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are, for example, Pinborg (1975), Robins (1966), Robins (1986), Lallot (1988) and Robins (1997⁴).

his *Poetics* Aristotle had also mentioned the ἄρθρον, the invention of which Dionysius attributes to the Stoics.¹³

(2) Dionysius gives the Stoics credit for the distinction of the ἄρθρον. He attributes the distinction of the προσηγορικόν (appellative) to οἱ μεταγενέστεροι, ‘later people’. Since we know that the distinction between proper noun and appellative noun was definitely an invention of the Stoic philosophers, a fact also known in antiquity, we might interpret the words οἱ μεταγενέστεροι as ‘later generations of Stoic philosophers’.¹⁴ I would prefer this interpretation to that of Usher, who translates ‘[s]ubsequent *grammarians*’ (my italics), for until now, Dionysius has only mentioned philosophers.¹⁵

(3) Another particularity is the fact that, according to Dionysius, the pronoun (ἀντωνομασία) was separated from the proper noun (ὄνομα), whereas most ancient and modern scholars think that the pronouns, before they were recognised as a separate group, belonged to the ἄρθρα.¹⁶ The question of why Dionysius thinks that the pronoun was separated from the ὄνομα (and not from the ἄρθρον), can probably be answered by referring to ancient grammatical theory on the ἀντωνυμία.¹⁷ According to Apollonius Dyscolus, the pronoun can replace the noun: therefore, it can be combined with a verb, thus forming a complete sentence, which normally consists of a noun and a verb.¹⁸ Apollonius also tells us that the function of the pronoun is

¹³ Janko (2000) 186-187 thinks that Dionysius and Quintilian are citing an Aristotelian dialogue in which Theodectes appeared. See section 3.3.1.

¹⁴ Cf. *FDS* 536.

¹⁵ Usher (1985) 21. More correct translations are those of Rhys Roberts (1910), ‘later inquirers’, and Aujac & Lebel (1981), ‘les générations postérieures’. According to other sources, the Stoics were also responsible for the distinction of the adverb, to which Antipater allegedly gave the name μεσότης (Diogenes Laertius VII.57 = *FDS* 536). Matthaios (1999), however, has pointed out that Aristarchus (217-145 v. Chr.), who was active before Antipater of Tarsos (*fl.* 150) already knew the eight canonical word classes, including the μεσότης. He also discusses (548 ff.) the relation between Aristarchus and Antipater, and concludes that Aristarchus, like Antipater, borrowed the *term* μεσότης from older Stoic sources, which did, however, not give that name to a separate ‘part of speech’. The first extant texts in which the term ἐπίρρημα (in the sense of adverb) occurs are the fragments of Tryphon and the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. See section 3.2.

¹⁶ See *FDS* 542: τέταρτον ὑφ’ ἐν ἄρθρον καὶ ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μὲν φάσκοντες ἀόριστον ἄρθρον, τὸ δὲ ὀρισμένον ἄρθρον. Cf. Lallot (1988) 17 and Robins (1997⁴) 41. Steinthal (1890-91 II) 214ff. follows Dionysius’ view that the pronoun was separated from the noun. Matthaios (1999) 491ff. disagrees with Dionysius and Quintilian, but also with the traditional view that the ἀντωνυμία was separated from the Stoic ἄρθρον: the ἄρθρον, he argues, had an entirely different function than that of being a combination of two grammatical word classes, ‘pronoun plus article’.

¹⁷ For the use of the term ἀντωνομασία (instead of ἀντωνυμία), see section 3.6.3.

¹⁸ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.15: Οὐ τοῦτο δέ φημι, ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀντωνυμίας αὐτοτέλεια συνίσταται, ὅπου φαμὲν οὕτως, ἐγὼ περιπατῶ, σὺ περιπατεῖς. τότε γὰρ συνίσταται ἡ αὐτοτέλεια, ὅταν ἀντ’ ὀνόματος παραληφθῇ ἡ ἀντωνυμία καὶ δυνάμει πάλιν ἡ αὐτὴ σύνταξις ᾗ. ‘I am not here claiming that you cannot have a complete sentence with a pronoun (ἀντωνυμία), such as “I’m walking, you’re walking”. For then, too, completeness is achieved, when a pronoun (ἀντωνυμία) is used in place of a

expressed in its name: an *ἀντωνυμία*, or (as Dionysius calls it) *ἀντονομασία*, is a word that is used ‘instead of’ (*ἀντί*) the *ὄνομα* (noun).¹⁹ Taking this theory into account, we can explain why Dionysius thinks that the pronouns were separated from the nouns (and not, as modern scholars think, from the *ἄρθρον*). Dionysius’ idea is presumably that words such as *οὗτος* (‘this one’) were originally classified as nouns (*ὀνόματα*), because they replaced nouns in the construction of a sentence.²⁰ In later times this type of words would have gotten the name *ἀντονομασῖαι* (or *ἀντωνυμῖαι*), that is ‘instead of-nouns’.

(4) A further difference between Dionysius and other historians of grammar concerns the view that the participle (*μετοχή*) was separated from the appellative (*προσηγορικόν*). According to most scholars, the participles originally belonged to the verbs (*ῥήματα*) before they were treated as a separate group.²¹ In order to explain Dionysius’ different opinion, it is again useful to take into account the ancient grammatical theory on this part of speech. The participle (*μετοχή*) owed its name to the fact that it ‘participated’ in the morphological and syntactical qualities of two other word classes, namely verb *and* noun. Apollonius Dyscolus explains in his *Syntax* that participles were invented because users of language needed verbs with cases and genders, so that they could express congruence (*καταλληλότης*).²² Thus, the participle is derived from a verb, but, like a noun, it has case, number and gender. When we take into account that in ancient grammar the participle was considered a sort of intermediate form between noun and verb, it should not surprise us that Dionysius suggests that the participle was separated from the appellative, and not from the verb. We should keep in mind that the words that we call adjectives also

noun (*ἀντ’ ὀνόματος*) which gives virtually the same construction (*σύνταξις*).’ (Translation adapted from Householder.) Cf. [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 63,1: *ἀντωνυμία ἐστὶ λέξις ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παραλαμβάνομένη*. ‘A pronoun is a word that is used as a substitute for a noun.’

¹⁹ The pronoun does not only replace the noun, but it was, according to Apollonius Dyscolus (*Synt.* I.19), even invented for the sake of the construction of verbs in the first and second person. Nouns always refer to third persons, and because verbs are also used in the first and second person, the pronoun was ‘invented’. Although Apollonius Dyscolus discusses the invention of the pronouns themselves and not the invention of the term *ἀντωνυμία*, it is probable that Dionysius’ idea on the separation of the word class ‘pronoun’ from the word class ‘noun’ is based on the same theory.

²⁰ I give the example of *οὗτος* because Dionysius classifies *τουτονί* as an *ἀντωνυμία* in *Comp.* 6.29,20. I emphasise that Dionysius does not give the argument on pronouns replacing nouns: this is my reconstruction of his reasoning, on the basis of Apollonius Dyscolus’ arguments.

²¹ See *FDS* 542: *τρίτον ὅφ’ ἐν ῥήμα (καὶ) μετοχή, τὸ μὲν ῥήμα κατηγορημα λέγοντες, τὴν δὲ μετοχὴν ἔγκλιμα ῥήματος, ὃ ἐστὶ ῥήματος παραγωγή*. ‘Third, under one part of speech they [i.e. the Stoics] list verb and participle, calling the verb predicate, and the participle an inflected form of the verb, i.e. a derivation from the verb.’ Cf. Robins (1997⁴) 41. Because of a remark by Priscian (*G.L.* II, 548,2 [*FDS* 575]), historians of linguistics used to think that Tryphon was the first who distinguished the participle as a separate word class. However, Matthaios (1999) 420ff. shows that Aristarchus already recognised the participle as a separate word class, for which he also used the term *μετοχή*.

²² *Synt.* I.21. On the term *καταλληλότης*, see section 5.2.

belonged to the appellatives: it is possible that Dionysius is mainly thinking of participles that are used attributively, or as substantives.

(5) Finally, Dionysius states that the ἐπιρρήματα (adverbs) were divided from the ῥήματα (verbs). He apparently thinks that adverbs (ἐπιρρήματα) originally belonged to the verbs. According to other sources, the adverbs originally belonged to the nouns. Again, we can understand that Dionysius relates the ἐπίρρημα to the ῥήμα. He may have thought that adverbs were considered parts of verbs (rather than that adverbs were called verbs): εὖ ποιεῖν ('to do well') would have been taken as one verb, and not yet as adverb plus verb.

We may conclude that, in his reconstruction of the development of the theory of the parts of speech, Dionysius is always reasoning on the basis of the name and function of the word classes that are distinguished in the system of his own time. Thus, he presumes that the pronouns originally belonged to the nouns, that the participles were originally part of the appellatives, and that the adverbs belonged to the verbs, before these parts of speech were recognised as separate groups.

4.2.2. Dionysius' approach to the history of linguistics

Dionysius of Halicarnassus was, of course, not a historian of linguistics in the strict sense. As we have seen, he only mentioned the development of the doctrine of the parts of speech in the context of his own discussion of composition. Nevertheless, we might very well regard Dionysius as the first representative of a typical approach to the history of linguistics, which indeed remained the standard until the last part of the twentieth century AD.

In the opening section of this study (1.1), I distinguished two possible approaches to the history of linguistics, namely the 'internal' and the 'external' approach.²³ A historian who adopts the 'internal' approach (Rorty's rational reconstruction) considers earlier 'linguists' as his colleagues: when dealing with a certain problem, he looks for solutions that have been suggested in earlier periods in the history of linguistics. He analyses and criticises these solutions, but does not always pay attention to the fact that earlier linguists did not ask the same questions as he does. An ancient example of this approach is the way in which Aristotle discussed the philosophers who lived before him: as Guthrie has pointed out, Aristotle looked at the early philosophers 'in the light of his own view of reality, and (...) saw them as

²³ Cf. Rorty (1984) and Sluiter (1998) 24-25.

“striving” to reach the same view.’²⁴ The second approach to the history of linguistics is the ‘external’ approach (Rorty’s historical reconstruction): the historian who adopts this method does not try to apply earlier linguistic theories to his own purpose; instead, he attempts to take into account the context in which earlier ideas about language were developed, and adheres to the ‘principle of charity’.²⁵

It is clear that Dionysius of Halicarnassus belongs to the group of historians who adopt the ‘internal’ approach to the history of linguistics. He discusses the history of the word class system only because he has to find an answer to the question as to which elements are the central units that one uses when composing sentences and texts. Aristotle, the Stoics and the grammarians were, of course, dealing with different problems, but Dionysius applies their views, which originated in such diverse fields as ontology, logic, philology or grammar, to the topic of his own investigation into σύνθεσις.²⁶

The internal method in the historiography of science, as we find it in Aristotle and Dionysius, is often combined with a strong belief in progress: the traditional historian of linguistics looks back from the standpoint of his own linguistic system and considers earlier periods as preliminary stages that were groping for and striving towards that system.²⁷ This attitude is particularly characteristic for nineteenth-century scholars such as Benfey and Steinthal.²⁸ But even a more recent scholar like Robins, in spite of his own warnings against the dangers of ‘looking to the past through the eyes of the present’, presents the development of the word class theory in a tree diagram, which bears a remarkable resemblance to the scheme that one can extract from the second chapter of Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *On Composition*.²⁹

²⁴ Guthrie (1957) 38.

²⁵ Sluiter (1998) 25.

²⁶ Cf. Lallot (1998) 124 on the discussion of the history of the word class theory in the scholia on the *Technê Grammatikê* (Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 515,19-521,37): ‘L’interprétation fine de ces textes reste à faire, et la tâche n’est pas facile, car, ici comme dans toutes les doxographies antiques, la perspective historique est biaisée par une propension naturelle et permanente à l’anachronisme: les grammairiens qui en sont les auteurs (ou les compilateurs) la présentent toujours du point de vue de la doctrine et dans le métalangage qui sont les leurs.’

²⁷ Cf. Schmitter (1987) 103: ‘In mehreren neueren methodologischen Beiträgen zur Geschichtsschreibung der Linguistik wird den Historiographen dieses Faches vorgeworfen, sie zeichnen ein unzutreffendes Bild seiner historischen Entwicklung, weil sie die Geschichte der Linguistik insgesamt als einen Prozeß beschrieben, der durch fortschreitenden Wissens- und Erkenntniszuwachs, durch allmähliches Aufdecken der Wahrheit sowie durch kontinuierliche Verbesserung von Theorien und Methoden charakterisiert sei.’

²⁸ See Steinthal (1891² II) 209-218 and Benfey (1869) 121ff. For a discussion of their approach, see also Grotzsch (1982) 118-139 and Schmitter (1987) 105.

²⁹ For a theoretical discussion of the problematic notion of ‘progress’, see Schmitter (1987), esp. 103-113. Robins’ tree diagram can be found in Robins (1986) 26. For his (traditional) history of the parts of speech see Robins (1997⁴) 32-43. Robins (1966) 18 and Robins (1986) are similar in this respect.

Robins presents the system of eight word classes as the result of a long cumulative process: Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the grammarians, it is suggested, all contributed their bit to the completion of the final word class system. As we have seen, the idea of progress is also clearly present in Dionysius' account: 'Theodectes and Aristotle *increased* the number of the parts of speech to three; the Stoics *raised* the number further to four; (...) others made the primary parts of speech many in number.' In fact, the resemblance between Robins and Dionysius is of course not so remarkable at all: by now it has become clear that the traditional approach to the history of linguistics, which tends to portray the history of linguistic ideas as the 'progressive discovery of the truth' (Robins [1997⁴] 3), can be largely traced back to Dionysius' *On Composition*.

There is, however, one important aspect in which Dionysius differs from later historians of linguistics. Unlike later scholars, Dionysius does not present the history of the word class theory as leading to a final and complete system of eight or nine μέρη λόγου. Although he implicitly mentions a system of nine, he adds that other people distinguished even more parts of speech. Dionysius does not express his preference for a particular system, and in the end does not seem to care how many parts of speech really exist, 'whether there be three, four or any number of them', as he says. This attitude is reflected in other parts of his work, where he leaves open the question of how certain words should be classified. He tells us, for instance, that the word ἐπί ('on') might be called either a σύνδεσμος ('conjunction') or a πρόθεσις ('preposition').³⁰ Such remarks do not only indicate that, in Dionysius' time, the system of eight word classes had not yet become a fixed canon, but also that the exact number of word classes was not so important for Dionysius' specific purpose. For the composition of a text out of words, it does not matter to which particular word classes these words belong. A 'historian of linguistics' who was more inclined to view the word class system of his own time as the final truth about the matter was Quintilian, whose *Institutio oratoria* was written at the end of the first century AD.

Possibly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian were his primary sources. Grotzsch (1982) 147-150 analyses Robins' approach in the following way: 'Er [Robins] weist zurück sowohl eine reine Fortschrittsansicht von der Geschichte, wie auch eine teleologische Geschichtsansicht, wie auch eine, die vom Standpunkt der Gegenwart aus alles aus der Geschichte ausscheidet, was nicht auf die Gegenwart direkt bezogen werden kann, möchte aber davon, Wertgeschichtspunkte in die Geschichtsbetrachtung einzubringen, nicht gänzlich absehen, *sofern ein gültiger Fortschritt auszumachen sei.*' (My italics, CCdJ.) For his own warnings, see Robins (1997⁴) 3: 'It is tempting, and flattering to one's contemporaries, to see the history of a science as the progressive discovery of the truth and the attainment of the right methods (...). But this is a fallacy.'

³⁰ *Comp.* 22.102,16; see section 3.6.4. Again, the English translations of the Greek technical terms given here are no real equivalents: the σύνδεσμος covers more than our 'conjunctions'.

4.2.3. Quintilian's history of the theory of the parts of speech

The similarities between the passages of Dionysius (*Comp.* 2) and Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 1.4.17-21) have often been noted.³¹ Quintilian's account of the development of the word class theory is as follows:³²

Tum uidebit, ad quem hoc pertinet, quot et quae partes orationis, quamquam de numero parum conuenit. Veteres enim, quorum fuerunt Aristoteles quoque atque Theodectes, uerba modo et nomina et conuinctiones tradiderunt, uidelicet quod in uerbis uim sermonis, in nominibus materiam (quia alterum est quod loquimur, alterum de quo loquimur), in conuinctionibus autem complexum eorum esse iudicauerunt: quas conuinctiones a plerisque dici scio, sed haec uidetur ex syndesmo magis propria tralatio. Paulatim a philosophis ac maxime Stoicis auctus est numerus, ac primum conuinctionibus articuli adiecti, post praepositiones: nominibus appellatio, deinde pronomen, deinde mixtum uerbo participium, ipsis uerbis aduerbia. Noster sermo articulos non desiderat ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur, sed accedit superioribus interiectio. Alii tamen ex idoneis dumtaxat auctoribus octo partes secuti sunt, ut Aristarchus et aetate nostra Palaemon, qui uocabulum siue appellationem nomini subiecerunt tamquam speciem eius, at ii qui aliud nomen, aliud uocabulum faciunt, nouem. Nihilominus fuerunt qui ipsum adhuc uocabulum ab appellatione diducerent, ut esset uocabulum corpus uisu tactuque manifestum: 'domus' 'lectus', appellatio cui uel alterum deesset uel utrumque: 'uentus' 'caelum' 'deus' 'uirtus'. Adiciebant et adseuerationem, ut 'eu', et tractionem, ut 'fasciatim': quae mihi non adprobantur.

'The teacher responsible will then need to consider how many parts of speech there are, and what they are, although there is little agreement about the number. Earlier writers, including also Aristotle and Theodectes, listed only *uerba* ('verbs'), *nomina* ('nouns') and *conuinctiones* ('conuinctions'): evidently, they took the force of language to be in the verbs, and the substance in the nouns, because the one is what we say, the other is what we speak about, while the 'conuinctions' provided the connections between them. (I know most people say 'conjunctions', but 'conuinctions' seems the better translation of *syndesmos*.) The philosophers,

³¹ Cf. Colson (1924) 45-46, Schenkeveld (1994) 270 n. 22, Lallot (1998) 124 and Matthaïos (1999) 194 n. 17. On Quintilian's views on the Latin language and its divergences from Greek, see Fögen (2002).

³² Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* 1.4.17-21. On this passage, see also Colson (1914, 1916 and 1924). I repeat my remark on *Comp.* 2.6,17-7,21 (section 4.2.1): there is no satisfactory method of translating the terms of the parts of speech in this overview. This case is even more problematic, because Quintilian himself is translating Greek terms into Latin. Again, I preserve the Latin terms in the translation, adding the usual (anachronistic) translations between inverted commas.

particularly the Stoics, gradually increased the number: to ‘convincions’ were first added *articuli* (‘articles’), and then *praepositiones* (‘prepositions’); to ‘nouns’ was added the *appellatio* (‘appellative’), next the *pronomem* (‘pronoun’), and then the quasi-verbal *participium* (‘participle’); to ‘verbs’ were added *adverbia* (‘adverbs’). Our language does not need *articuli* (‘articles’), and these are therefore distributed among other parts of speech, but in addition to the parts mentioned previously there is the *interiectio* (‘interjection’). Some, belonging to the competent authorities, have gone as far as eight parts of speech:³³ so Aristarchus and, in our own day, Palaemon, who both put ‘vocable’ or ‘appellative’ under ‘noun’, as species of that genus. Those who distinguished ‘vocable’ from ‘noun’ make the total nine. Yet some have also separated ‘vocable’ itself from ‘appellation’, making ‘vocable’ indicate visible and tangible objects — ‘house’ or ‘bed’ — and ‘appellation’ things in which either or both of these characteristics were absent, like ‘wind, ‘heaven’, ‘God’, or virtue’. They have also added ‘asseveration’ (like *eu*) and ‘derivative’ (like *fasciatim*). I do not approve of these.’

There are many similarities between the accounts of Dionysius and Quintilian, and it is probable that either the Roman made use of the work of his predecessor, or that the two versions are based on the same source.³⁴ Blank has argued that much of the grammatical theory that is found in both Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian can be traced back to Asclepiades of Myrlea, who possibly taught in Rome in the early first century BC (see section 1.4).³⁵ Sextus Empiricus does not refer to the history of the word class system, but we should not rule out the possibility that Asclepiades was the model of the accounts of Dionysius and Quintilian.³⁶ There are, however, also differences between Dionysius and Quintilian. Dionysius states that the participle was separated from the appellative, whereas Quintilian thinks that it was separated from

³³ Most translators take the words *ex idoneis auctoribus* with *secuti sunt*: ‘others followed good authorities’. Russell translates ‘some, with good authorities to back them’. It is, however probable that Quintilian considered Aristarchus and Palaemon the ‘competent authorities’ rather than that he thought that they followed competent authorities. Thus, I would read Quintilian as follows: ‘some, belonging to the competent authorities, followed eight parts of speech; so Aristarchus and Palaemon.’ The only problem is the interpretation of *dumtaxat*. We may follow Matthaios (1999) 191 n. 2, who also interprets *ex idoneis auctoribus* as a partitive construction: ‘Andere indes von den kompetenten — versteht sich — Autoritäten folgten acht Redeteilen.’ For the expression *idonei auctores*, see also Kaster (1978).

³⁴ Rhys Roberts (1910) 71 thinks that Dionysius and Quintilian used the same source. Brandenburg (2005) 65 also rejects the idea that Quintilian’s overview directly depends on Dionysius: ‘Man kann also davon ausgehen daß beide derselben Tradition verpflichtet, aber nicht unmittelbar voneinander abhängig sind.’

³⁵ Blank (1998) xlv-xlvi.

³⁶ Kroll (1907) 91-92 already suggested that Asclepiades was Dionysius’ source for the history of the word class theory in *Comp.* 2.

the verb.³⁷ An interesting difference is the fact that Dionysius constantly speaks of ‘splitting’ and ‘separation’, whereas Quintilian refers to the ‘addition’ and ‘extension’ of the system.³⁸ Dionysius uses the words χωρίζω (‘to separate’), διαίρῶ (‘to divide’), ἀποξέγγυμι (‘to part’) and τομή (‘division’), while Quintilian uses the verbs *adicio* (‘to add’) and *accedo* (‘to join’, ‘to be added’).³⁹ The different vocabulary seems to reflect a difference in perspective: Dionysius reasons from the past and emphasises the many distinctions that were developed in the course of time, while Quintilian presents the history of the word class theory as gradually leading to the completion of the system in his own time. Quintilian’s terminology of ‘adding’ seems to suggest (though not explicitly) that the early systems were not complete, whereas Dionysius’ terminology of ‘division’ seems to imply that Aristotle’s terms already covered everything, although the system was refined in later times.

These diverging perspectives are related to another difference between the two accounts. While Dionysius, as we have seen, does not really care how many parts of speech exactly exist, ‘whether there be three, four or any number of them’, Quintilian insists that there be clarity how many parts of speech there are, and what they are: *quot et quae partes orationis*. These words remind us of the opening of Donatus’ *Ars minor*, which I quoted above. Although Quintilian admits that there is no agreement on the exact number, he clearly opts for a system of eight or nine parts of speech, and he explicitly rejects the later additions to the system (*quae mihi non adprobantur*).⁴⁰ To explain the different attitudes of Dionysius and Quintilian, we should look at the contexts in which they were presenting their histories of the word class system. In Dionysius’ account, the word classes figure as the primary building blocks of composition. Certainty about the exact number of these ‘elements’ was not relevant for Dionysius’ purpose, since, when one composes a text, it does not really matter whether one assigns a word to one word class or another. Quintilian, on the other hand, discussed the history of the word class system in a passage about the teaching of Latin and Greek in the school of the grammarian. The procedure of *merismos* (the

³⁷ Cf. Brandenburg (2005) 65.

³⁸ See Brandenburg (2005) 66, who distinguishes between Dionysius’ ‘Meronomie’ and Quintilian’s ‘Taxonomie’.

³⁹ With respect to the *number* of ‘parts of speech’, both Dionysius and Quintilian speak in terms of extension: Dionysius uses the words προήγαγον, προῦβίβασαν, προσαγαγόντες, while Quintilian says *auctus est*.

⁴⁰ Murphy (2000) 489 presents Quintilian’s views wrongly by remarking that the Roman rhetorician ‘is not sure how many parts of speech there are, and he concludes by saying “it is a matter of no relevance” (1.4.21).’ In fact, Quintilian does not say that the number of the parts of speech in general ‘is a matter of no relevance’: this is only true of the question whether one should distinguish appellative and noun as two different word classes: *vocabulum an appellatio dicenda sit προσηγορία et subicienda nomini necne, quia parui refert, liberum opinaturis relinquo*.

classification of the parts of speech) was a standard exercise in the lessons of the *grammaticus*, so that clarity about the number of word classes was necessary. Obviously, a teacher of grammar would not want to bother his students too much with the different views that various scholars had developed on the subject.⁴¹

4.2.4. Dionysius, Quintilian and modern historians of linguistics

In his influential article ‘Rethinking the History of Language Science in Classical Antiquity’ (1987), Daniel Taylor states that one of the key notions that are central to the traditional version of Graeco-Roman language science is ‘the emphasis upon the development of the doctrine of the parts of speech, especially as it accumulates or evolves in measured stages from its beginnings in Plato to its fullest expression in Dionysius Thrax.’⁴² In this section (4.2), I have tried to show in what sense the Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian can be considered the prototypes of modern traditional historiographers of linguistics.

Dionysius’ history of the word class system is in two respects characteristic for the traditional historiography of linguistics. First, he adopts an ‘internal’ approach to the history of science, applying earlier views on language, which were developed in several disciplines, to his own particular subject, which is in his case the art of composition. Second, his account of the development of the word class theory is characterised by the idea that *gradual progress* was made by successive stages in the history of linguistics. Unlike many other historians of linguistics, however, Dionysius does not present the word class system of his own time as the ultimate truth.

⁴¹ Another difference between Dionysius and Quintilian is the following: Dionysius distinguishes five stages in the development of the theory of the parts of speech, while Quintilian summarises these in only two stages, to which he adds two Roman developments of the system. The four stages in Quintilian’s overview are organised in the following way: (1) like Dionysius, Quintilian starts with Aristotle and Theodectes, who would have known three parts of speech. (2) Next, Quintilian states that the number of parts of speech increased ‘gradually’ (*paulatim*), but, unlike Dionysius, in the first instance he does not present the extension of the system chronologically, but *systematically*: the starting point is the system of Aristotle, and the new word classes are discussed in relation to the three original ones, namely σύνδεσμος (*convinctio*), ὄνομα (*nomen*), and ῥῆμα (*verbum*). Within his presentation of the development of the system Quintilian does make chronological distinctions, by adding words like *primum* (‘first’), *post* (‘next’) and *deinde* (‘thereafter’). Quintilian’s second stage includes the same word classes as Dionysius’ fifth stage. (3) The third stage in Quintilian’s overview is the Roman substitution of the interjection for the article. Quintilian remarks that some people put the appellative under ‘noun’ (‘as species of that genus’), while other people consider *vocabulum* and *nomen* as two different word classes. That makes the total number of parts of speech eight or nine. (4) In a fourth stage, even more distinctions were added by ‘others’ (*alii*): *vocabulum*, *adseveratio*, and *tractio*; but Quintilian himself rejects these differentiations. The additions to the system that he mentions would increase the total number of word classes to a maximum of twelve, but Quintilian himself opts for a system of eight or nine word classes.

⁴² Taylor (1987) 3.

Quintilian, on the other hand, expresses his preference for a system with eight or nine parts of speech. I have explained this difference by pointing to the different contexts in which the two writers presented their views.⁴³

Over the last two decades, Taylor himself and other historians of ancient linguistics (such as Schenkeveld, Law and Sluiter) have distanced themselves from the traditional approach to the history of linguistics in general and to the history of the word class theory in particular. Nowadays, scholars are more willing to recognise that Plato, the Stoics, the Alexandrian philologists and the technical grammarians all had their own, different purposes; and, accordingly, that the units that they called *μέρη λόγου* were entirely different matters for all of them.⁴⁴ In the article mentioned above, Daniel Taylor stated that the different philosophers, philologists and grammarians ‘were not playing the game by the same rules’.⁴⁵ I would like to go one step further: *they were not even playing the same game*. Philosophers were not interested in enumerating as many word classes as possible, so one would do them wrong by interpreting them as if they were grammarians. As a *historian of linguistics*, therefore, I do not agree with the way in which Dionysius and Quintilian presented the history of the word class system. As a *historian of the historiography of linguistics*, however, I conclude that their approach to the history of linguistics has been very influential.

4.3. Dionysius as a rhetorician: the parts of speech in the theory of composition

In the previous section, we have seen that Dionysius regards the *μόρια λόγου* as the primary building blocks in the procedure of composition. The emphasis on the *μόρια λόγου* in Dionysius’ definition of composition (*Comp.* 2.6,17-19: *τις θέσις παρ’ ἄλληλα τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων*) can be explained as follows. On the one hand, it indicates that, in Dionysius’ view, words are the central units in the process of composition; on the other hand, it underlines the fact that words are components (*μέρη* or *μόρια*) and building blocks (*στοιχεῖα*) of larger structures (namely clauses, periods

⁴³ Priscian (6th century AD) seems to have been the first who both presented a history of the word class theory and adhered to a fixed number of eight *partes orationis*: see *G.L.* II, 54,5-55,3. Similar is the *Ars anonyma Bernensis* (*FDS* 549). Donatus (*G.L.* IV, 372) does not discuss the history of the word class system, but only remarks that *multi plures, multi pauciores partes orationis putant*.

⁴⁴ See now also Matthaios (1999) 492: ‘Die von Dionysios von Halikarnaß und Quintilian gegebene Erklärung für die Erweiterung des Wortartensystems durch Aufspaltung umfangreicher Redeteile läßt genauso wie die in den grammatischen Berichten vorgenommene Zuweisung der einzelnen Wortarten zum stoischen Redeteilsystem die Tatsache außer acht, daß der Begriff “Redeteil” bzw. “Wortart” von Schultradition zu Schultradition eine andere Bedeutung hat.’

⁴⁵ Taylor (1987) 5.

and discourse).⁴⁶ The idea that the scientific treatment of a certain subject should start from its ‘elements’ is a common assumption in various ancient language disciplines.⁴⁷ According to Dionysius, the combination of the parts of speech forms the clauses (κῶλα), the joining of the clauses constitutes the periods (περίοδοι), and these make up the complete discourse.⁴⁸ How does he develop the idea of composition from μόρια λόγου in the rest of his treatise on σύνθεσις?

The reader who has just been told that composition starts from the μόρια λόγου might be disappointed to find out that most parts of Dionysius’ work deal in fact with other units of σύνθεσις. Many chapters concentrate on letters and syllables on the one hand and clauses on the other.⁴⁹ Still, it would be wrong to suggest that Dionysius turns out to reject his own definition of σύνθεσις. Pohl argues that Dionysius ‘improves’ his original definition, which started from the μόρια λόγου, by offering ‘eine verbesserte Definition’ that focuses on words, clauses and periods.⁵⁰ However, the passage that

⁴⁶ It is remarkable that in *Thuc.* 22.358,15-17 Dionysius divides σύνθεσις into κόμματα (‘cuts’, i.e. short clauses), κῶλα and periods. ‘Words’ are not mentioned here: the ‘elementary parts of speech’ belong to the selection of words (ἐκλογή), not to composition. Thus, the ‘comma’ takes the place of the ‘word’. The division of composition into comma, colon and period, which seems to be more traditional than the one into word, colon and period, is also found in Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.22: *comma*, κῶλον and περίοδος (see below). In the rest of Dionysius’ works, however, the κόμμα plays a minor part, although it figures as an important unit in the discussion of poetry resembling prose: see *Comp.* 26.136,9ff. See also *Dem.* 39.213,1 and 43.227,4. On the *comma*, see Viljamaa (2003) 173-176, who compares κόμματα to the intonation units in modern discourse analysis. That it is not self-evident that composition should start from words (or μόρια λόγου) is clear from ‘Demetrius’, who regards clauses (κῶλα) as the starting point for prose writing. See *Eloc.* 1: ‘Just as poetry is organised by metres (...), so too prose is organised and divided by the so-called clauses.’ Having discussed the length and use of clauses, ‘Demetrius’ points out that ‘from the combination of such clauses and phrases are formed what are called periods’ (*Eloc.* 10).

⁴⁷ See Van Ophuijsen (1987) 9 on Hephaestion, *On Metre*: ‘(...) this is to be explained by the assumption common to the Greek grammarians that the part is systematically prior to the whole, so that, to be scientific, the exposition of a subject must proceed from its ultimate elements of analysis, the atoms as it were, through its intermediate constituents, to the level at which the need for an exposition is felt.’ See further sections 2.2 and 4.2.1 on Apollonius Dyscolus (*Syntax* I.2; cf. Swiggers & Wouters [1995] 37 n. 46) and Aristides Quintilianus.

⁴⁸ *Comp.* 2.7,14-18: see section 4.2.1 above. Viljamaa (2003) refers to this same text (*Comp.* 2.7,14-18) when he states that ‘in Dionysius’ opinion, the *colon* is the most important unit of linguistic expression, and indeed the central unit of the sentence structure (...)’. I do not see how the passage that Viljamaa cites supports this conclusion. The starting point of composition is the arrangement of words, not the joining of clauses. Viljamaa fails to see that this is the difference between Dionysius and ‘Demetrius’. For the ancient theory of the period, see Siebenborn (1987).

⁴⁹ Composition from letters and syllables is the subject of *Comp.* 14-16 (on μέλος), composition from κῶλα is treated in *Comp.* 7-9 (the second part of the discussion of the three activities of composition). Tukey (1909a) 189 argues that Dionysius’ treatise deals with σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων, τῶν συλλαβῶν and τῶν γραμμάτων.

⁵⁰ Pohl (1968) 2. In a similar way, Tukey (1909a) 188 complains that the connotation of the term σύνθεσις changes in the course of Dionysius’ treatise: in the first nine chapters σύνθεσις means σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων, whereas in the later chapters, σύνθεσις is ἀρμονία, which concerns the musical aspects of language; in the latter sense, σύνθεσις would also include the *selection* of (euphonious) words. In my view, however, words (μόρια λόγου) remain the starting point for

she regards as a ‘new definition’ is in fact a list of the ἔργα of composition: ‘The functions of composition are to place the words in a proper way beside each other and to give the clauses the fitting harmony and to divide the discourse suitably into periods.’⁵¹ In this passage, Dionysius does not reject his original definition: composition still starts from words (the ‘parts of the phrase’) as its basic units, even if the arrangement of clauses and periods also belongs to its functions. Pohl thinks that the rhetorical point of view (which deals with words, clauses and periods) takes the place of Dionysius’ earlier grammatical point of view.⁵² In my opinion, it would be more correct to say that the term μόρια λόγου, which refers to words not only as ‘word classes’ but also as ‘parts of the phrase’, enables Dionysius to combine the two perspectives. The grammatical point of view is not rejected, but it becomes an integrated part of the rhetorical process of composition: the correct use of word classes and their *accidentia* is one aspect of σύνθεσις. This aspect is especially highlighted in three passages of the work *On Composition*, namely the investigation into natural word order (*Comp.* 5), the discussion of the three activities of σύνθεσις (*Comp.* 6), and the description of the austere composition type (*Comp.* 22).⁵³

In the first of these passages (*Comp.* 5) Dionysius tries out whether the juxtaposition of words according to their grammatical categories results into beautiful composition: should nouns precede verbs, verbs precede adverbs, and substantives come before adjectives? This discussion of ‘natural’ word order is arguably the best (though perhaps not the most successful) example of the integration of grammatical and rhetorical theory. It would thus deserve to be treated in this section as an example of the rhetorical use of the linguistic theory of the μόρια λόγου. However, the passage is also heavily influenced by philosophical ideas that (as I will argue) originate in the school of Stoic philosophers. Because of the complexity of the subject, I have chosen to give the passage on natural word order a separate treatment in the next chapter (section 5.3) of this study. Since Dionysius finally decides to abandon the approach to σύνθεσις undertaken in *Comp.* 5, the theory of natural word order in fact falls outside

composition throughout the treatise, even if some passages deal with the forming of (mimetic) words (*Comp.* 16) or other aspects of sound. In *Comp.* 22-24, composition still starts from words as its building blocks: see section 4.3.2.

⁵¹ *Comp.* 2.7,18-21: ἔστι δὴ τῆς συνθέσεως ἔργα τὰ τε ὀνόματα οἰκείως θείναι παρ’ ἄλληλα καὶ τοῖς κώλοισι ἀποδοῦναι τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρμονίαν καὶ ταῖς περιόδοις διαλαβεῖν ἐν τὸν λόγον. This text immediately follows the history of the theory of the parts of speech (see section 4.2.1).

⁵² Pohl (1968) 2.

⁵³ Pohl (1968) 3 states: ‘Mit dem Scheitern dieses Versuches [i.e. the discussion of natural word order in *Comp.* 5] wird der grammatikalisch-logische Gesichtspunkt endgültig aufgegeben.’ In fact, however, the importance of the grammatical aspects of the art of composition are made very clear already in *Comp.* 6, where σχηματισμός (the grammatical formation of words) is the second activity of composition.

his theory of composition. In the next sections (4.3.1 and 4.3.2) we will therefore focus on the two other passages (*Comp.* 6 and *Comp.* 22-24) that develop the theory of ‘placing the parts of speech beside each other’ (θέσις παρ’ ἄλληλα τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων).

4.3.1. The parts of speech as building blocks: text as architecture

In the sixth chapter of the treatise, Dionysius starts a discussion of the three activities (ἔργα) of the art of composition:⁵⁴ ‘the first is to observe which element fitted together with which element will naturally produce a beautiful and attractive combination. The second is to judge how each of the parts that are to be fitted together should be shaped so as to improve the harmonious appearance of the whole. The third is to judge whether any modification is required in the material used — I mean subtraction, addition or alteration — and to carry out such changes with a proper view to their future purpose.’⁵⁵ It should be observed that these ‘three activities of the theory of composition’ (τῆς συνθετικῆς ἐπιστήμης τρία ἔργα) do not correspond to the earlier three συνθέσεως ἔργα mentioned above (section 4.3).⁵⁶ The three ‘functions of composition’ (mentioned in *Comp.* 2) are the arrangement of words, clauses and periods respectively. The ‘activities of the theory of composition’ (treated in *Comp.* 6), however, are three techniques that apply to *each* of the levels of language (words, clauses, and periods). In other words, the first list of ἔργα introduces the three levels of composition, while the second list of ἔργα enumerates ‘processes’ or ‘techniques’ that concern all levels: they should be applied first to words (which are the building blocks of clauses), then to clauses (which are the building blocks of periods), and finally to periods (which make up the λόγος). Thus, in *Comp.* 6, Dionysius explains how the three techniques are applied to the μόρια λόγου; in the next three chapters (*Comp.* 7-9) he shows that *mutatis mutandis* the same ἔργα play a role in the arrangement of clauses.⁵⁷ Finally, he adds that what he has said also applies to the so-

⁵⁴ See also Viljamaa (2003) 170.

⁵⁵ *Comp.* 6.27,19-28,2: ἔν μὲν ἰδεῖν, τί μετὰ τίνος ἀρμοττόμενον πέφυκε καλὴν καὶ ἡδεῖαν λήψεσθαι συζυγίαν· ἕτερον δὲ γνῶναι τῶν ἀρμόττεσθαι μελλόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἂν ἕκαστον σχηματισθὲν κρείττονα ποιήσῃ φαίνεσθαι τὴν ἀρμονίαν· τρίτον δ’ εἴ τι δεῖται μετασκευῆς τῶν λαμβανομένων, ἀφαιρέσεως λέγω καὶ προσθήκης καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, γνῶνά τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσαν χρείαν οἰκειῶς ἐξεργάσασθαι. I have adapted Usher’s translation. In *Comp.* 6.27,19, I read ἀρμοττόμενον with P (followed by Aujac and Rhys Roberts); Usener reads ἀρμοζόμενον. On the three ἔργα, see also Viljamaa (2003) 170.

⁵⁶ Compare *Comp.* 2.7,18-21 and *Comp.* 6.27,18-28,2.

⁵⁷ I do not agree with Rhys Roberts (1910) 3, who, in his summary of *On Composition*, states that there are three ‘processes’ of composition with regard to words, and only two in the case of κῶλα. Dionysius’ discussion of the ἔργα of the composition of clauses (*Comp.* 7.30,18-31,4) is clearly divided into three parts· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα (1) ἀρμόσαι πρὸς ἄλληλα δεῖ ὥστ’ οἰκεία φαίνεσθαι καὶ φίλα καὶ (2) σχηματίσαι ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχῃται κράτιστα (3) προκατασκευάσαι τε, εἴ πού τι δέοι, μειώσει καὶ

called periods.⁵⁸ Dionysius' list of three ἔργα (attractive juxtaposition, σχηματισμός and μετασκευή) does not correspond to the lists of Roman rhetoricians. Quintilian lists order (*ordo*), linkage (*iunctura*) and rhythm (*numerus*) and Cicero divides composition into euphony, periodic structure and rhythm.⁵⁹ The first item of the latter list agrees more or less with Dionysius' general interest: words must be arranged so that the final syllables may fit the following initial syllables 'as neatly as possible, and that the words may have the most agreeable sounds'. However, Cicero does not mention the grammatical formation of words, whereas the notion of rhythm (*numerus*) is absent from Dionysius' list.⁶⁰ It seems, then, that Dionysius takes an original approach to σύνθεσις by integrating grammatical and rhetorical notions; but it is also possible that he was influenced by Hellenistic ideas on poetic composition, such as we find in Philodemus' *On Poems*.⁶¹

Before he goes into details, Dionysius illustrates the three activities of composition with the analogy of the builder of a house (οἰκοδόμος), who 'composes' a building from stones, timber, tiling, etc. The builder asks himself three questions: '(1) what stone, timber and brick is to be fitted together with what other stone, timber and brick? (2) How should each of the materials that are being joined be fitted, and on which of the sides? (3) If anything fits badly, how can that very piece be pared down and trimmed and made to fit well?'⁶² The shipwright will apply the same method, says

πλεονασμῶ καὶ εἰ δὴ τιν' ἄλλην μετασκευὴν δέχεται τὰ κῶλα. 'For also these [i.e. just like the words] one must (1) join to one another so that they appear familiar and belonging to each other and (2) give them the best form of which they are capable and (3) adapt them further, if necessary, by abbreviation, expansion and by any other change of form that clauses admit.' It is obvious that these ἔργα on the level of the clauses correspond on the level of words to (1) the putting together of the μόρια λόγου (*Comp.* 6.28,16-20), (2) the grammatical formation (σχηματισμός) of words (*Comp.* 6.28,20-29,14) and (3) the modification (μετασκευή) of words for the sake of harmony (*Comp.* 6.29,14-30,12). The repetition of the terms σχηματίσαι and μετασκευή in the passage on clause arrangement is significant. Cf. Nassal (1910) 28-29.

⁵⁸ *Comp.* 9.35,17-36,1.

⁵⁹ Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.22; Cicero, *Orator* 149. Cf. Scaglione (1972) 49.

⁶⁰ For these reasons, it is unclear to me how Nassal (1910) 35-36 can think that Dionysius' list of ἔργα in *Comp.* 2.7,18-21 'entspricht (...) vollständig' the list in Cicero, *Orator* 149: the only similarity is that both lists consist of three items. In *Orator* 219, Cicero has *compositio*, *concinntitas* and *numeri*. In *De oratore* 3.171, Cicero (Crassus) states that 'connection of words' (*continuatio verborum*) requires two things, namely 'juxtaposition' (*conlocationem*) and 'a certain cadence and form' (*modum quandam formamque*). Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.22 lists three units of composition, namely *incisa* or *commata*, cola and the period. He then discusses three 'necessary elements' of composition, namely *ordo*, *iunctura*, *numerus* ('order, linkage and rhythm'). The latter bears some resemblance to Cicero, *Orator* 149, but Quintilian's treatment of the three aspects of composition seems to be independent.

⁶¹ In *Comp.* 4.22,3-23,5, Dionysius claims to be original.

⁶² *Comp.* 6.28,5-13: ὁ τε γὰρ οἰκοδόμος ὅταν πορίσῃται τὴν ὕλην ἐξ ἧς μέλλει κατασκευάζειν τὴν οἰκίαν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ κέραμον καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, συντίθησιν ἐκ τούτων ἤδη τὸ ἔργον τρία ταῦτα πραγματευόμενος, ποίω δεῖ λίθῳ τε καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ πλίνθῳ ποῖον ἀρμόσαι λίθον ἢ ξύλον ἢ πλίνθον, ἔπειτα πῶς τῶν ἀρμοζομένων ἕκαστον καὶ ἐπὶ ποίας πλευρᾶς ἐδράσαι, καὶ τρίτον, εἴ τι δύσεδρόν ἐστιν, ἀποκροῦσαι καὶ περικόψαι καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εὐέδρον ποιῆσαι.

Dionysius, and ‘those who are going to put the parts of speech together effectively’ (τοὺς μέλλοντας εὖ συνθήσειν τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη) should proceed similarly. Their building blocks are not stone, timber and tiling, but noun, verb and the other parts of speech. The analogy between the composition of a text and the building of a house is found in other ancient texts as well.⁶³ For Dionysius, the idea seems to be even more important than for other rhetoricians, because he focuses on stylistic composition.⁶⁴ With regard to the organisation of subject matter (οἰκονομία), Dionysius adopts Aristotle’s concept of *organic* unity, thus taking a ‘biological’ approach to discourse.⁶⁵ For example, Dionysius praises Herodotus because out of a great variety of subjects he has made one ‘harmoniously unified body’ (σύμφωνον ἐν σῶμα).⁶⁶ With regard to stylistic composition (σύνθεσις), however, Dionysius’ approach is determined by the concept of *architecture*.⁶⁷ The architectural character of discourse

⁶³ The comparison between text and architecture may be traced back to Democritus fr. 21 Diels-Kranz: Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτήνατο παντοίων. ‘Since Homer was divinely inspired, he succeeded in building a *kosmos* out of all kinds of words.’ For the influence of this text on the poetic theory that regards a text as a ‘universe’ consisting of elements (στοιχεῖα), see Armstrong (1995) 212-213. ‘Demetrius’, *Eloc.* 13 compares clauses (κῶλα) to stones: ‘The clauses in the periodic style may in fact be compared to the stones (τοῖς λίθοις) that support and hold together the roof which encircles them, and the clauses of the disjointed style to stones which are simply thrown about near one another and not built into a structure.’ Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 7.pr.1 compares *dispositio* (the ordering of the material, the second *officium oratoris*) to putting together ‘stone, timber, and other building material’ (*saxa atque materiam et cetera aedificanti utilia*). In *Inst. orat.* 9.4.27, a sentence whose words have not been put in their right places is compared to a construction of unhewn stones (*structura saxorum rudium*). In some cases, the analogy is limited to the use of a specific word. Thus, Cicero, *De oratore* 3.173 speaks of *componere et struere verba* (‘to put and build the words together’). Many rhetorical terms seem to be based on this analogy, such as κανὼν, ἔδρα and ὕλη (cf. Rhys Roberts [1910] 106 n. 2). Finally, I would like to add that ‘Demetrius’ (*Eloc.* 91), in his discussion of compound words (σύνθετα ὀνόματα), recommends the word ‘architects’ (ἀρχιτέκτονας) as a useful composite. In my view, he may have selected this example as a *leçon par l’exemple*, i.e. the word ‘master-builder’ is well built itself.

⁶⁴ Dionysius consistently distinguishes between subject matter (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) and style (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος). Each of these components consists of two parts: ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος deals with παρασκευή (= εὕρεσις), ‘invention’, and χρῆσις (οἰκονομία), ‘arrangement’; ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος deals with ἐκλογή τῶν ὀνομάτων, ‘selection of words’ and σύνθεσις, ‘composition’. See esp. *Dem.* 51.240,20-241,7. Kremer (1907) 2-3 offers a reconstruction of Dionysius’ rhetorical system that relies on *Thuc.* 22, where Dionysius mentions κόμμα, κῶλον and περίοδος as the units of composition. This division does not correspond to the one in *De compositione verborum* (see above).

⁶⁵ Aristotle’s comparison of epic to ‘a single and whole animal’ (*Po.* 1459a20) is reflected in *Rh.* 1415b7-9, where it is said that in some cases a speech does not need a *prooimion*, except in order to state the subject in summary (κεφαλαιωδῶς), so that ‘like a body it may have a head’ (ἵνα ἔχη ὡσπερ σῶμα κεφαλὴν). Cf. Heath (1989) 20.

⁶⁶ *Pomp.* 3.238,8-11. On Dionysius’ use of the Platonic concept of organic unity, see also Fornaro (1997a) 209-210. Heath (1989) 85-89 points out that by organic unity Dionysius does not mean a *thematic* integration, but rather a text in which all elements ‘are brought together in the appropriate order so defined’. On Dionysius’ evaluation of the unity of Herodotus’ work, see also De Jong (2002) 245.

⁶⁷ Breitenbach (1911) 170-172 shows that Aristotle’s ideas on the nature of discourse are influenced by Plato’s concept of organic unity (*Phdr.* 264c2-5, cf. Sicking [1963]), whereas Dionysius’ point of view is ‘architectonic’. Breitenbach is right as far as the treatise *On Composition* is concerned, but traces of Aristotelian ideas on text as an organic unity are found in Dionysius’ treatment of subject matter (as in

underlies not only his views on the relation between composition and selection of words (*Comp.* 2) and his discussion of the ἔργα of composition (*Comp.* 6), but also the description of the three types of σύνθεσις (*Comp.* 22-24).⁶⁸ Some scholars have pointed to related views in ‘Demetrius’ and Quintilian, but one very relevant parallel has so far largely been ignored.⁶⁹ In Philodemus’ *On Poems*, there is a fragment in which one of the Hellenistic *kritikoi* (see section 1.5) compares composition (σύνθεσις) to ‘house-building’ (οἰκοδομη[σαι]).⁷⁰ Janko considers the possibility of correcting οἰκοδομεῖν here into οἰκονομεῖν, but I think that Dionysius’ comparison of the orator with an οἰκοδόμος provides a convincing argument for retaining the text as it stands.⁷¹ The context of the fragment in Philodemus is very much in line with Dionysius’ approach to composition. The critic who uses the word οἰκοδομεῖν in the relevant fragment (Pausimachus, according to Janko) points out that some claim that good poetry depends on beautiful words, whereas others think that beautiful poetry arises from commonplace words that have been well arranged.⁷² The same arguments play an important role in the opening chapters of Dionysius’ *On Composition*.⁷³ We may add that ‘Longinus’, in his discussion of σύνθεσις, which echoes Dionysius’ view on the magical effects of good composition (see section 6.2), also speaks of τῆ τε τῶν λέξεων ἐποικοδομήσει (‘piling phrase on phrase’).⁷⁴ In view of the other parallels between Dionysius and the *kritikoi* (which are partly taken up by ‘Longinus’), we cannot exclude the possibility that Dionysius’ concept of σύνθεσις as house building is influenced by the views of Hellenistic critics of poetry.⁷⁵ Stanford interestingly compares the ancient concept of ‘euphonic architecture’ to an orchestral

Pomp. 3.238,8-11 above). In other words, the scope of *On Composition* accounts to a large extent for the difference between Aristotle and Dionysius.

⁶⁸ *Comp.* 2.8,3-16: in arts that combine materials and make from them a composite product, such as building (οἰκοδομική), carpentry (τεκτονική) and embroidery (ποικιλτική), the potentialities of composition are second in logical order to those of selection, but they are prior in potency. This is also true in the case of λόγος: σύνθεσις is logically second to ἐκλογή, but it has far more power. For *Comp.* 22.96,15-19 (analogy between the austere composition and a construction of blocks of natural stone put together), see section 4.3.2 below.

⁶⁹ For the parallels in ‘Demetrius’ and Quintilian, see above. I should add that ‘Demetrius’, *Eloc.* 33 points out that an enthymeme can have the accidental property of periodicity, just as a building (οἰκοδομούμενον) can have the accidental property of whiteness. This comparison, however, does not seem to pertain to the characterisation of composition as a process of putting building blocks together.

⁷⁰ Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 55 Janko.

⁷¹ Janko (2000) 245 n. 4 mentions the parallel, but seems unconvinced.

⁷² See Janko (2000) 245.

⁷³ Cf. *Comp.* 3.9,2-9. See also section 7.2.

⁷⁴ ‘Longinus’, *Subl.* 39.3. Cf. Janko (2000) 245 n. 4. Aristotle, *Rh.* 1365a discusses the powerful effect of ‘combination and building up’ (τὸ συντιθέναι καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν). Here the term ἐποικοδομεῖν probably refers to the figure of speech that builds a chain of clauses, each of which repeats one or more words from the preceding clause: see also *Rh. Al.* 3.11. Some rhetoricians simply call this figure ‘climax’. See Anderson (2000) 57-58 on ἐποικοδομήσις.

⁷⁵ See also sections 1.5, 3.2, 3.3, 6.2, 6.6, and 7.2.

symphony.⁷⁶ Indeed, the concept of architectural discourse or poetry seems to be closely connected to the idea of musical and magical speech (see section 6.2), which is also a prominent theme in Dionysius and ‘Longinus’.

When discussing the concept of architectural text, we should not forget that while Dionysius was teaching in Rome, the Roman Vitruvius was writing his ten books *De architectura*. That work was probably published between 30 and 20 BC.⁷⁷ Just like Dionysius (*Preface to On the Ancient Orators*), Vitruvius starts his work by commenting upon the new world order that started with Augustus’ victory at Actium (31 BC). Both Dionysius and Vitruvius are exponents of the classicism of Augustan Rome, and they both demand that their students (future orators and future architects respectively) are broadly educated. According to Vitruvius, the education programme for the architect includes, among other things, literature, history, philosophy, music, medicine, and law.⁷⁸ At the beginning of his work, Vitruvius points out that architecture consists of *ordinatio* or τάξις (‘ordering’), *dispositio* or διάθεσις (‘arrangement’), *eurythmia* (‘harmony’), *symmetria* (‘proportion’), *decor* (‘propriety’) and *distributio* or οἰκονομία (‘allocation’).⁷⁹ All these terms or their Greek equivalents play a role in rhetorical theory as well: Dionysius and Vitruvius largely use the same discourse. Where Dionysius defines composition as the juxtaposition of words or στοιχεῖα (‘elements’), Vitruvius states that *dispositio* (‘arrangement’) is ‘the apt putting together (*apta conlocatio*) of things and the elegant effect obtained by adjustments (*compositionibus*) appropriate to the character of the work.’⁸⁰ Although I do not think that there is a direct relationship between Vitruvius and Dionysius, it is, on the other hand, not impossible that Dionysius knew the Roman or his work. In any case, it is interesting to realise that not only some of their ideas but also the way they present them are rather similar and reflect the discourse of their time. I will return to the analogy between text and architecture in the discussion of the austere composition type.

We will now focus on the first level to which the three ἔργα of the theory of composition apply, namely the level of words or, as Dionysius says, τὰ πρῶτα μόρια

⁷⁶ Stanford (1967) 78-79 and 92. I may be allowed to carry this analogy one step further by remarking that, conversely, the symphonies of Anton Bruckner are often characterised as ‘cathedrals’.

⁷⁷ See Rowland & Howe (1999) 2-5.

⁷⁸ Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 1.1.1-18.

⁷⁹ Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 1.2.1-9.

⁸⁰ Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 1.2.2: *dispositio autem est rerum apta conlocatio elegansque compositionibus effectus operis cum qualitate.*

καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως.⁸¹ In this case the three activities of σύνθεσις are the following. First, the words that have been selected have to be juxtaposed in an attractive basic order. Although Dionysius does not use the term here, later passages suggest that this first ἔργον is called ἄρμολογία ('combination').⁸² Secondly, one has to decide which grammatical form the words should have: this technique is called σχηματισμός.⁸³ Thirdly, one has to adapt the form of the words by means of the addition, subtraction or alteration of certain letters: this final activity is called μετασκευή.⁸⁴ It is clear that the second of these processes is concerned with the μόρια λόγου *qua* word classes (i.e. it selects the correct *grammatical* form), whereas the first and third ἔργα deal with the μόρια λόγου *qua* parts of the phrase.⁸⁵ Therefore, instead of saying that the rhetorical point of view replaces the grammatical point of view, as Pohl does, we should understand that composition (σύνθεσις) comprises both grammatical considerations and matters of euphony.⁸⁶ The first step is described as follows:⁸⁷

πρῶτον μὲν σκοπεῖν, ποῖον ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων ποίῳ συνταχθὲν ἐπιτηδείως ἔσται κείμενον καὶ πῶς εὖ ἢ ἄμεινον (οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάντα γε μετὰ πάντων τιθέμενα πέφυκεν ὁμοίως διατιθέναι τὰς ἀκοάς).

'First, they should consider which noun or verb or other part of speech composed with which other part of speech will be suitably placed and how [it will be done] in a correct or better way (for clearly not every arrangement naturally affects the ears in the same way).'

⁸¹ *Comp.* 7.30,13-14. Here, the arrangement of the parts of speech is regarded as 'one consideration (θεωρία) of the science of composition', besides the second one, which is concerned with clauses, and the third one, which starts from periods. In *Comp.* 7.30,14, ἕτερον is not 'the other' [aspect of composition], as Usher (1985) 59 translates it, but 'another' or rather 'the second' one (cf. Aujac [1981] 84: 'en second lieu'); the third θεωρία is concerned with periods (*Comp.* 9.35,17-36,1). On the expression τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως see section 3.5.

⁸² See *Comp.* 8.32,6 on clauses. Dionysius uses σχηματισμός and μετασκευή (the second and third ἔργα) both in the context of words and in the context of κῶλα. Therefore, we may assume that ἄρμολογία is also the term for the juxtaposition of word (the first ἔργον).

⁸³ See *Comp.* 6.28,20-21 (σχηματισθέν) and *Comp.* 6.29,6 (σχηματισθείη). The term is repeated in the discussion of the second activity of the composition of clauses in *Comp.* 7.31,1 (σχηματίσαι), thus indicating the symmetry between the different levels of composition.

⁸⁴ See *Comp.* 6.29,15 (μετασκευῆς) and *Comp.* 6.30,11 (μετασκευάζει). The term is repeated in the discussion of the third activity of the composition of clauses in *Comp.* 7.31,3-4 (μετασκευήν).

⁸⁵ For the double character of Dionysius' μόρια λόγου, see section 3.4.

⁸⁶ Pohl (1968) 2-3.

⁸⁷ *Comp.* 6.28,16-20. With Usener I read καὶ πῶς εὖ ἢ ἄμεινον. Rhys Roberts and Usher follow the MSS in reading καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἄμεινον, which is however not only 'a difficult litotes' (Rhys Roberts), but also does not seem to follow logically the first part of the question that starts with ποῖον. Rhys Roberts and Usher obscure this difficulty in their translation: 'in what combinations with one another will nouns, verbs or other parts of speech be suitably placed, and how not so well' (Usher). Aujac reads καὶ πῶς εὖ καὶ ἄμεινον.

When Dionysius says that we should first consider which part of speech should be combined with which other part (ποιῶν ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων ποίῳ συνταχθέν), he is looking for a certain basic order of words.⁸⁸ In Cicero, this basic word arrangement (ἀρμογή) is called *collocatio*.⁸⁹ What are the criteria for this first process in the arrangement of the parts of speech? Dionysius explains that ‘not all words combined with all words naturally affect the ears in the same way’. Now, the word πέφυκεν reminds us of the discussion of ‘natural’ word order in the preceding chapter, *Comp.* 5 (see section 5.3 of this study). At the end of that chapter, Dionysius has rejected the rigidity of the rules formulated there (nouns precede verbs, verbs precede adverbs, etc.), and he has even stated that these theories do not deserve any serious attention. With his remark in *Comp.* 6 he again seems to refer to the existence of some natural word order, but this time it is another type of order: one should juxtapose the parts of speech in such a way that their combination ‘pleases the ears’. So this word order is based on the euphony of the selected words, and not on the word classes to which they belong: euphony has taken the place of the rules of logic here. Although Dionysius exemplifies the μόρια λόγου here as ‘noun, verb or another part’, his comments make it clear that these items are now treated as ‘parts of the phrase’ rather than as ‘word classes’. He now concentrates on the aesthetic quality of composition, as the ‘ear’ perceives it.

The role of the ear (ἀκοή) in determining (and evaluating) good composition is an important theme in Dionysius’ treatise *On Composition*, which is also found in the theories of the Hellenistic *kritikoi* and Cicero. This seems to be the right place for a short digression on the theme of hearing and irrational judgement, because the subject will turn out to be relevant in later sections of this study as well.⁹⁰ ‘Demetrius’ reports that Theophrastus defined beauty in a word as ‘that which is pleasant in regard to hearing (ἀκοήν) or in regard to sight (ὄψιν), or that which suggests in thought great value.’⁹¹ In this way, Theophrastus adapted Aristotle’s definition, according to which beauty in a word is ‘in the sounds or in what is signified’ (ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαينوμένῳ).⁹² Thus, although Aristotle already paid attention to the vocal qualities

⁸⁸ Rhys Roberts (1910) 3 summarises this first step as ‘the *choice* of elements likely to combine effectively’ (my italics, CCdJ), but Dionysius clearly means the *combination* of the selected words (cf. συνταχθέν): otherwise we would miss an essential part of composition among the ἔργα, i.e. the simple putting together of the μόρια. Besides, ἐκλογή (selection of words) is explicitly set apart from the process of composition. Kroll (1907) 92 makes the same mistake as Rhys Roberts.

⁸⁹ E.g. Cicero, *Orator* 149.

⁹⁰ See sections 6.2, 6.6 and 7.3.2.

⁹¹ ‘Demetrius’, *Eloc.* 173 = Theophrastus fr. 687 Fortenbaugh: κάλλος ὀνόματός ἐστι τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀκοήν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ δὲ, ἢ τὸ τῆ διανοίᾳ ἔντιμον.

⁹² On the fragment of Theophrastus and its relation to Aristotle *Rh.* 1405b6-8, see Fortenbaugh (2005) 281-286. Dionysius, *Comp.* 16.66,8-18 (Theophrastus fr. 688 Fortenbaugh) discusses ‘words that are

of words, Theophrastus seems to have focused more on the *perception* of beauty (both in hearing and in sight). The notion of ‘hearing’ developed into an essential idea in later poetical and rhetorical theory. It figures most prominently in the ideas of some of the *kritikoi* in Philodemus’ *On Poems* (see section 1.5). Although there are considerable differences between the exact views of these critics, it would be correct to say that many of them focused on the form of poetry. On the one hand, they thought that ‘pleasing the ear’ was the sole purpose of poetry. On the other hand, they claimed that the ear was the only criterion for the *evaluation* of poetry. The term ἀκοή occurs in a significant number of fragments in Philodemus’ discussion of the views of the *kritikoi*, but the best example is perhaps Heracleodorus. He claimed that both the contents and the words of a poem were irrelevant to its quality. The only thing that matters in poetry is composition (σύνθεσις) and ‘the sound that supervenes upon it’.⁹³ It is composition that makes that ‘the hearing is delighted by verses’.⁹⁴ Like Dionysius, Heracleodorus also applied metathesis to prove the quality of a certain composition (see section 7.2). Further, he thought that ‘we do not need to understand poetry to be enthralled by it’.⁹⁵ The latter view is doubtlessly related to the ideas that we find in other fragments of Philodemus’ treatise, where certain critics claim that the ear is the only criterion by which we judge poetry: it has an irrational delight (τὴν χάριν τὴν ἄλογον or τὴν τέρ[ψιν] <τὴν> ἄλογο[v]) in the sounds of poetry.⁹⁶

There are two rhetoricians in particular who adopt similar views on the importance of hearing, namely Cicero and Dionysius.⁹⁷ Cicero tells us that the decision as to subject matter and words is in the ‘intellect’ (*prudencia*), whereas ‘of sounds and rhythms the ears are the judges’ (*vocum autem et numerorum aures sunt iudices*).⁹⁸ According to Dionysius, ‘the ear is pleased’ (τὴν ἀκοὴν ἡδεσθαι) by melody, rhythm, variety and

by nature beautiful’ and refers to the ideas of Theophrastus; these views on ὀνόματα φύσει καλά were probably expressed in the same passage in *On Style* from which ‘Demetrius’ (*Eloc.* 173) borrows Theophrastus’ ideas on ‘the beauty in a word’.

⁹³ Cf. Janko (2000) 156.

⁹⁴ Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 193 Janko (= Heracleodorus fr. 7 Janko): τέρπ[εσ]θαι τὴν ἀκ[ο]ήν ὑπὸ τῶν ποημάτων.

⁹⁵ *P. Herc.* 1676 fr. 1-4.

⁹⁶ Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 83 and fr. 151 Janko. The euphonists were strongly influenced by musical theory. Aristoxenus, *Harmonics* 2.33 says: ‘Through hearing (ἀκοῆ) we assess the magnitudes of intervals and through reason we apprehend their functions.’ (Translation Barker.)

⁹⁷ For the connections between the ideas on irrational hearing in Philodemus, Cicero and Dionysius, see Nassal (1910) 38-40, and esp. Janko (2000) 361 n. 3 and 395 n. 4. Atkins (1934 II) 133 and Schenkeveld (1968) already argued that Dionysius’ theories are influenced by the views of the *kritikoi*.

⁹⁸ Cicero, *Orator* 162. See also *Orator* 67 (cited in section 6.6 of this study) and *Orator* 173: *et tamen omnium longitudinum et brevitatum in sonis sicut acutarum graviumque vocum iudicium ipsa natura in auribus nostris collocavit*. ‘And yet nature herself has implanted in our ears the power of judging long and short sounds as well as high and low pitch in words’. (Translation Hubbell). On Cicero and the *iudicia vulgi*, see Schenkeveld (1989).

appropriateness, the four means of composition.⁹⁹ In *On Lysias*, Dionysius gives those students who wish to learn the nature of Lysias' charm the same advice that teachers of music give to their students, namely 'to cultivate the ear, and to look for no other standard of judgement than this one' (τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐθίζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ταύτης ἀκριβέστερον ζητεῖν κριτήριον).¹⁰⁰ In the same passage, Dionysius expounds his views on the 'irrational feeling' (ἄλογος αἴσθησις) on which everyone can rely in judging literature. When determining whether a specific speech was really composed by Lysias or not, one should apply the irrational criterion (τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον) rather than the rational criterion (τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον).¹⁰¹ For a more detailed discussion of these ideas, I refer to Schenkeveld and Damon, who have usefully illuminated Dionysius' views.¹⁰²

In preceding chapters, I have already mentioned some similarities between the ideas of the *kritikoi* and those of Dionysius. How should we judge the connections between Dionysius and the *kritikoi*? Goudriaan puts forward five arguments against Dionysius' dependence:¹⁰³ (1) Dionysius does not mention the *kritikoi*; (2) Dionysius compares prose and poetry and treats prose as a kind of music; (3) some specific aspects of Dionysius' theories, such as the four means of composition, do not occur in the theories of the *kritikoi*; (4) Dionysius characterises only two of his three composition types (austere and smooth), the middle composition being a combination of the extremes, whereas the *kritikoi* characterise all of them (λέξις λεία, λέξις τραχεῖα, λέξις εὐπαγής);¹⁰⁴ (5) the *kritikoi* are interested in the trained ear, whereas Dionysius is also interested in the untrained ear. In my view, none of these arguments is convincing: (1) Dionysius does not mention all the earlier scholars whom he knows or uses, and his silence on the *kritikoi* cannot be used as an argument; (2) Dionysius' characterisation of prose authors as poets is very similar to the remarks of the *kritikoi* on Herodotus and Xenophon as 'poets' (see section 6.6); (3) if Dionysius borrows some ideas from the *kritikoi* it does not imply that we should find all his theories in their works; (4) the similarities between Dionysius' three composition types and the λέξεις of the *kritikoi* are more significant than the terminological difference; (5) *pace* Goudriaan, both the *kritikoi* and Dionysius are interested in the 'irrational' delight of

⁹⁹ *Comp.* 11.38,13-15. See also *Comp.* 11.40,11-16 (ἡ ἀκοὴ τέρπεται etc.) and *Comp.* 23.119,16-17: τὸ ἄλογον ἐπιμαρτυρεῖ τῆς ἀκοῆς πάθος. 'The ear's instinctive feeling will testify (...).'

¹⁰⁰ *Lys.* 11.19,1-10.

¹⁰¹ *Lys.* 11.18,15-20,6. See also *Thuc.* 27.371,5-10.

¹⁰² Cf. Schenkeveld (1975) 93-107 and Damon (1991) 44-45. See also Goudriaan (1989) 142-154. Schenkeveld (1975) concludes that there is no coherent system behind Dionysius' theories of evaluation, but Damon (1991) rightly argues that Schenkeveld should have taken the relative order of Dionysius' rhetorical works into account.

¹⁰³ Goudriaan (1989) 153-154.

¹⁰⁴ On these three types of λέξις, see Schenkeveld (1968) 198 and Pohl (1968) 99.

the ear (see above). Having taken these arguments into consideration, and given the many similarities between Dionysius and the *kritikoi* (see also sections 6.2, 6.6 and 7.2), I conclude that it is probable that Dionysius borrowed some of their ideas for his composition theory. In some cases, similarities may also be the result of the influence of earlier (Peripatetic or musical) theories on both the *kritikoi* and Dionysius. Finally, there are a few similarities (like the method of metathesis — see chapter 7) that can be explained as part of the general set of ideas of the rhetorical and critical traditions.

When we return to Dionysius' discussion of the three ἔργα of composition, we can now recognise that his views on the arrangement of words that should affect the ears (διατιθέναι τὰς ἀκοάς) should be interpreted within the context of the theories on euphony such as were developed by the critics of poetry. The basic ordering of the parts of speech, the first ἔργον of composition, is determined by the vocal qualities as perceived by the ear. Grammar becomes an important factor in the second technique of composition concerning words:¹⁰⁵

ἔπειτα διακρίνειν, πῶς σχηματισθὲν τούνομα ἢ τὸ ῥῆμα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅ τι δὴ ποτε χαριέστερον ἰδρυθήσεται καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὑποκείμενα πρεπωδέστερον· λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων, πότερον ἐνικῶς ἢ πληθυντικῶς λαμβανόμενα κρείττω λήψεται συζυγίαν, καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐκφερόμενα πῶσιν ἢ κατὰ τῶν πλαγίων τινά, καὶ εἴ τινα πέφυκεν ἐξ ἀρρενικῶν γίνεσθαι θηλυκὰ ἢ ἐκ θηλυκῶν ἀρρενικὰ ἢ οὐδέτερα ἐκ τούτων, πῶς ἂν ἄμεινον σχηματισθεῖη, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων, πότερα κρείττω λαμβανόμενα ἔσται, τὰ ὀρθὰ ἢ τὰ ὑπτια, καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἐγκλίσεις ἐκφερόμενα, ἃς δὴ τινες πτώσεις ῥηματικὰς καλοῦσι, κρατίστην ἔδραν λήψεται, καὶ ποίας παρεμφαίνοντα διαφορὰς χρόνων καὶ εἴ τινα τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἄλλα παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκε (τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ λόγου μερῶν φυλακτέον, ἵνα μὴ καθ' ἕνα ἐκαστον λέγω).

‘Then they should decide the form in which the noun or verb or whichever of the other parts of speech it may be will be situated more elegantly and in a way that fits more appropriately the underlying matter: I mean, with regard to nouns, whether they will produce a better combination if used in the singular or the plural; and whether put in the nominative or in one of the oblique cases; and, if certain words admit of a feminine instead of a masculine form or a masculine instead of a feminine form, or a neuter instead of either, how they would be shaped in a better way and so on.¹⁰⁶ With

¹⁰⁵ *Comp.* 6.28,20-29,14.

¹⁰⁶ For this passage, see also section 4.4.1. My translation of ἐκ and ἐξ as ‘instead of’ is based on the fact that Dionysius is thinking of substitution of feminine for masculine forms, etc. The idea is that in the first part of the composition process one has selected certain basic grammatical forms; in the second

regard to verbs, which form it will be better to adopt, the active or the passive, and in what moods, which some call ‘verbal cases’, they should be expressed in order to occupy the best position, and what differences of tense they should indicate and so with all the other natural accidents of verbs (and these same provisions must be made with regard to the other parts of speech also; but I need not go into details).’

This passage is one of the earliest texts in which some of the *accidentia* of the parts of speech are discussed.¹⁰⁷ It is not, however, ‘the oldest extant discussion of some of the accidents of the parts of speech *as such*’ [my italics, CCdJ], as Pinborg says, for the *accidentia* are not discussed for their own sake, but only because the selection of the correct grammatical form of a word is part of the process of rhetorical composition; therefore, Dionysius does not offer a complete list of accidents.¹⁰⁸ Dionysius tells us that the second activity of composition is to decide how every part of speech should be formed (σχηματισθέν) so that ‘it will occupy its position more elegantly and more appropriately fitting to the ὑποκείμενον’. Usher translates the latter word as ‘context’, but this is not correct, for ὑποκείμενον literally means ‘that which underlies’ (i.e. the form); in rhetorical and literary theory, the word refers to ‘subject matter’ (see section 2.3).¹⁰⁹ In other words, σχηματισμός has two purposes at the same time. The grammatical form of the words should be selected so that it produces a pleasing harmony (that the word is situated χαριέστερον), but it should also fit the ‘subject’ (πρὸς τὰ ὑποκείμενα πρεπωδέστερον). According to this interpretation, Dionysius acknowledges that euphony is not the only thing that matters in the process of composition: one should also take care that the forms of words correspond to the things that are signified. For this reason, I disagree with Scaglione’s observation that Dionysius is only interested words as sounds and not in words as symbols (see section 2.3).¹¹⁰ In our passage, he makes it clear that the grammatical form of a word should be selected in such a way that the words do not only make a pleasing combination with one another, but also ‘appropriately fit to the subject matter’. He does not explain how we should understand the latter principle, but fortunately we find some illuminating illustrations in his second letter to Ammaeus (see section 4.4.2). There,

phase (σχηματισμός), one substitutes other forms for the original ones: masculines instead of feminines, etc.

¹⁰⁷ For a discussion of the grammatical terms συμβεβηκότα, παρακολουθεῖν and σχηματίζω in this passage, see my section 3.7. For πτώσεις ῥηματικάί, see sections 3.8 and 5.3.6.

¹⁰⁸ Pinborg (1975) 117 n. 45.

¹⁰⁹ Usher (1985) 57. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 82 correctly translate the word as ‘sujet’. Rhys Roberts (1910) 107 renders ὑποκείμενον as ‘ground scheme’, but I do not see what this should mean in the relevant passage. Meijering (1987) 110 points out that in the scholia ὑποκείμενον is used as a synonym of ὑπόθεσις (‘plot’). For the philosophical use of ὑποκείμενον as one of the categories, see my section 5.3.3.

¹¹⁰ Scaglione (1972) 58.

Dionysius states for example that Thucydides used the active κωλύει ('hinders'), whereas 'the meaning' (τὸ σημαίνόμενον) required the passive κωλύεται ('is hindered').¹¹¹ Thucydides also speaks of 'the Syracusan' and 'the Athenian' when he 'means to say' (βούλεται ... λέγειν) 'Syracusans' and 'Athenians':¹¹² he has used the singular instead of the plural, thus selecting the incorrect grammatical form. These are clear examples of wrong σχηματισμός, not because the forms are not harmonious, but because the words do not fit to 'that which underlies' (τὸ ὑποκείμενον).¹¹³ I will return to Dionysius' discussion of Thucydides' use of the parts of speech in section 4.4.

In his list of the *accidentia* of verbs, Dionysius states that one should select the right form of the voices, moods and tenses, so that the word 'will occupy the best position' (κρατίστην ἔδραν λήψεται). The word ἔδρα ('sitting-place') is again borrowed from the context of architecture, where it has the meaning of 'foundation'.¹¹⁴ In the analogy of house building, Dionysius has already pointed out that in the second ἔργον of composition one should ask on which sides of the materials one should fit (ἔδράσαι) the stones, timber and tiling.¹¹⁵

It is interesting to observe that Dionysius, having listed the various *accidentia* of nouns and verbs, refers to the other 'parts of speech' as τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ λόγου μερῶν.¹¹⁶ This is the only passage where Dionysius uses the traditional philosophical (and later grammatical) term τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου in the sense of 'the parts of speech', and not his usual expressions τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου, τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως and, less frequently, τὰ μέρη τῆς λέξεως. Normally, Dionysius seems to avoid the traditional term in order to distinguish between 'parts of a speech (text)' and 'parts of speech'. It is possible that Dionysius uses the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου here because he is still thinking of Chrysippus' treatise Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, to which he referred at the end of *Comp.* 4.¹¹⁷ Besides, Dionysius may have used the traditional term for the 'parts of speech' here because there is no risk of

¹¹¹ *Amm.* II 7.427,17-428,5. Dionysius' remark concerns Thucydides 1.144.2: οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνο κωλύει ταίς σπονδαῖς οὔτε τόδε. 'For neither the one is hindered by the truce nor the other.'

¹¹² *Amm.* II 9.428,19-429,4.

¹¹³ For the term σχηματισμός, see *Amm.* II 7.427,17-18: 'Ὅταν δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων ἀλλάττη τὰ εἶδη τῶν παθητικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν, οὕτω σχηματίζει τὸν λόγον.' 'When he interchanges the passive and active forms of verbs, this is how he constructs his sentence.' Σχηματισμός can refer to the formation of a single word and to the construction of a sentence, but both aspects are closely connected: if all words are given their correct grammatical form, the construction of the λόγος as a whole will also be correct.

¹¹⁴ See also *Comp.* 23.112,1 and *Comp.* 23.119,11. Cf. 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 183 and 206. For ἔδρα as 'base' or 'foundation', see Plutarch, *Demetrius* 21.

¹¹⁵ *Comp.* 6.28,10-12.

¹¹⁶ *Comp.* 6.29,13.

¹¹⁷ *Comp.* 4.22,12-13. See my sections 3.5 and 5.3.1.

misunderstanding in this passage: after a list of the various *accidentia* of nouns and verbs, no reader will think of the parts of a text instead of the parts of a phrase. This explanation would be satisfactory for the exceptional use of the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, but there are three more terminological particularities in *Comp.* 6. (1) Dionysius' remark that some people call the moods πτώσεις ῥηματικάς ('verbal cases') seems to refer to Stoic ideas (see section 3.8).¹¹⁸ (2) Dionysius adopts the Stoic terminology for the voices (τὰ ὀρθὰ ἢ τὰ ὑπτία), whereas he elsewhere follows the Alexandrian distinction between ἐνεργητικόν and παθητικόν (see section 3.8). (3) He uses the term ἀντωνυμία instead of his normal term ἀντωνομασία (see section 3.6.3).¹¹⁹ Thus, in total, there are four terminological peculiarities in *Comp.* 6. Although I think that we should be careful in assigning Dionysius' ideas to specific sources, the use of a certain model might be the best explanation of the terminological characteristics of *Comp.* 6.¹²⁰ Although three of the four departures from normal terminology seem to reflect Stoic ideas, it seems unlikely that *Comp.* 6 is based on Stoic texts, because the Stoics did not distinguish the ἀντωνυμία (pronoun) and πρόθεσις (preposition).¹²¹ It is more plausible that *Comp.* 6 is based on the theories of the Hellenistic *kritikoi*, who share Dionysius' interest in euphonious composition. We know that the *kritikoi* also dealt with the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.¹²² Besides, the *kritikoi* seem to have adopted Stoic ideas. The famous Stoic Crates of Mallos called himself a "critic" and he discussed the views of earlier *kritikoi*.¹²³ Therefore, the hypothesis that in *Comp.* 6 Dionysius makes use of the ideas of the Hellenistic *kritikoi* might also account for the Stoic terminology in that passage.

When we look for *rhetoricians* who share Dionysius' ideas on the use of the *accidentia* of the parts of speech in rhetorical composition, we actually do not have to go far back in time. Although Nassal has suggested that Dionysius might have been influenced by the theory of figures of his colleague Caecilius of Caleacte (which I do not believe — see below), he seems to have overlooked a very relevant testimony.¹²⁴

¹¹⁸ Matthaios (1999) 299 thinks that this is a reminiscence of the Aristotelian concept of πτώσις, but I agree with Schenkeveld (1984) 336, who thinks of Stoic influence. See section 3.8.

¹¹⁹ *Comp.* 6.29,20.

¹²⁰ Ammon (1889) 28-37 and Pohl (1968) 80 think that Dionysius' ideas on the ἔργα of composition (*Comp.* 6-9) are influenced by Stoic ideas. However, the Stoics did not distinguish the ἀντωνυμία as a part of speech; the focus on euphony and the reference to the effect of sounds on the 'ear' seem to point in the direction of the *kritikoi*. If there is Stoic influence, Crates of Mallos (who discusses the views of the *kritikoi* in Philodemus' *On Poems*) might be the missing link, but this is mere guessing.

¹²¹ Dionysius mentions the πρόθεσις at *Comp.* 6.30,2.

¹²² See also section 3.2. Cf. Janko (1995) and Janko (2000) 186-187 on Pausimachus.

¹²³ See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.79.

¹²⁴ Nassal (1910) 31: 'Also muß die Möglichkeit einer Beeinflussung des C. [i.e. Cicero] wie des DH. [i.e. Dionysius] in der Figurentheorie durch Caecilius eine offene bleiben.' Unlike Nassal, I do not make any claim about the possible influence of Caecilius on Dionysius (or *vice versa*): I merely point

In one of the few extant fragments of his work *On Figures*, Caecilius says that ‘ἀλλοίωσις (‘alteration’) occurs with regard to a noun, cases, numbers, persons and tenses’ (καί φησιν αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι κατ’ ὄνομα καὶ πτώσεις καὶ ἀριθμοὺς καὶ πρόσωπα καὶ χρόνους).¹²⁵ Although Caecilius deals with the figures of speech and Dionysius (*Comp.* 6) with the formation of single words, there are some remarkable similarities between the two accounts, especially in their use of terms. We will return to Caecilius’ views on ‘alteration’ when we discuss Dionysius’ analysis of Thucydides’ style. There, Dionysius deals with the use of the parts of speech in sentence construction, and it will turn out that Caecilius’ account summarised above is a very close parallel to Dionysius’ discussion of Thucydides. We will now proceed to the final technique of composition, which is μετασκευή:¹²⁶

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τὰ ληφθέντα διακρίνειν, εἴ τι δεῖται μετασκευῆς ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα, πῶς ἂν ἐναρμονιώτερόν τε καὶ εὐεδρότερον γένοιτο· τοῦτο τὸ στοιχεῖον ἐν μὲν ποιητικῇ δαψιλέστερόν ἐστιν, ἐν δὲ λόγοις πεζοῖς σπανιώτερον· πλὴν γίνεται γε καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐφ’ ὅσον ἂν ἐγχωρῆ.

‘Next, one must decide concerning the selected words if any noun or verb requires modification, how it may be more harmonious and well positioned: this function is applied more lavishly in poetry and more scarcely in prose; but it is applied also in prose so far as possible.’

The word εὐεδρότερον takes up the architectural image of ἔδρα that we encountered in the previous passage. Again, Dionysius has anticipated the use of the term in his analogy of house building, where he discusses the third ἔργον of composition: if a certain material is ‘fitting ill’ (δύσεδρον), one should ‘pare it down and trim it and make it fit well (εὐεδρον)’.¹²⁷ Dionysius states that, although poetry makes more use of μετασκευή, prose should apply it where possible. If we assume that Dionysius’ ideas on euphonious composition are (partly) based on the views of poetical criticism, the latter statement might be taken as a sign that Dionysius is introducing a poetical

to the similarity between Caecilius’ treatment of figures and Dionysius’ discussion of σχηματισμός in order to illuminate the context of Dionysius’ ideas.

¹²⁵ Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 75 Ofenloch. The rhetorician Tiberius preserves this fragment. We should allow for the possibility that he uses his own terminology when quoting Caecilius (see section 4.4), although there is no reason to believe that Caecilius could not have expressed the views that Tiberius quotes.

¹²⁶ *Comp.* 6.29,14-19.

¹²⁷ *Comp.* 6.28,12-13.

approach to σύνθεσις into the field of rhetoric.¹²⁸ Indeed, there are reasons to believe that the Hellenistic *kritikoi* were interested in the modification of words as Dionysius describes it. In Philodemus' *On Poems*, there are some fragments in which the critic Pausimachus speaks of the euphonious effects of 'adding and removing letters'.¹²⁹ Just like, Dionysius, Pausimachus specifically mentions the modification of 'nouns and verbs'. For 'adding' he uses the term προσλαμβάνω, for 'removing' a verb that starts with ἀπο-.¹³⁰ In the examples that follow Dionysius' explanation of the technique of μετασκευή, he uses προστίθημι for 'adding', and he further mentions the terms προσυξάνω ('lengthening'), ἐλαττώ ('making smaller') and ἀποκρούω ('cutting off').¹³¹ At the beginning of *Comp.* 6, however, Dionysius has divided the technique of modification into ἀφαίρεσις ('subtraction'), προσθήκη ('addition') and ἀλλοίωσις ('alteration').¹³² These are standard categories in ancient linguistics, which can ultimately be traced back to Plato's *Cratylus*.¹³³ Where Dionysius has ἀλλοίωσις, most ancient thinkers who use these categories distinguish between (a) the substitution of one letter for another and (b) the interchanging of place of two or more letters.¹³⁴ Thus, they arrive at four (instead of three) different categories of modification. These categories are used in various language disciplines, such as philosophy, metric, grammar (etymology) and rhetoric. Dionysius' contemporary colleague Caecilius of Caleacte seems to have used the categories of modification to order the rhetorical figures of style (σχήματα).¹³⁵ He uses the same terms as Dionysius: in the fragments of his *On Figures*, we find the verb προστίθημι, and the nouns ἀφαίρεσις and ἀλλοίωσις.¹³⁶

Dionysius' examples of the μετασκευή of words make it clear that the third ἔργον of composition still deals with words *qua* parts of the phrase (μῦρια λόγου).¹³⁷ One

¹²⁸ See Janko (2000) 178: 'But the rest of this material [i.e. Pausimachus' theories on sound] undermines the originality of his [Dionysius'] *De compositione verborum*: he is, at best, applying to prose a method which others had developed for poetry.'

¹²⁹ Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 85 Janko and P. Herc. 994 fr. 18,26-19,7.

¹³⁰ Cf. Janko (2000) 185. In his introduction, Janko (2000) 185 says that Pausimachus probably uses ἀποβάλλω, but in his text he reads ἀπο[τιθέμενα] (*On Poems* 1 fr. 85) and [ἀποτιθέμενα] (Janko [2000] 282 n. 1). Perhaps we should read ἀπο[κρούμενα].

¹³¹ *Comp.* 6.29,19-30,12.

¹³² *Comp.* 6.27,23-28,1.

¹³³ Usener (1913) 288-303 shows that the four categories of change are applied in ancient metrical studies, etymology, orthography, and linguistic discussions of barbarism and solecism. He also refers to Dionysius' three categories (with ἀλλοίωσις covering both *immutatio* and *transmutatio*) in *Comp.* 6.27,23-28,1. Ax (1987) traces these categories back to Plato (see *Cratylus* 394b). See also Sluiter (1990) 12. The Stoics use the terms πρόσθεσις, ἀφαίρεσις, ἐναλλαγή and μετάθεσις.

¹³⁴ Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 90 n. 87.

¹³⁵ Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 73-76 Ofenloch. Cf. Ax (1987) 32.

¹³⁶ See Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 73 (προθέντες), fr. 74 (ἀφαίρεσις), and fr. 75 (ἀλλοιώσεως) Ofenloch. Theon applies the four categories of change to the *paraphrasis*: see section 7.3.2.

¹³⁷ *Comp.* 6.29,19-30,12.

should adapt the ‘parts of the phrase’ so that they are well connected to each other, by adding a prefix or a deictic ι , by elision or removal of movable ν , and other adaptations. Two examples are taken from Demosthenes, namely the use of $\tauουτονί$ instead of $\tauούτων$ and the use of $\kappaατιδών$ instead of $ιδών$.¹³⁸ The other examples are invented, and some of them seem to be iconic: this seems to be the case in $ἔγραψε$ (‘he wrote’), which can be written instead of $ἔγραψεν$, and in particular in $ἀφαρήσομαι$ (‘I will be removed’), which is the result of removing two letters from $ἀφαρεθήσομαι$: $ἀφαίρεσις$ is the grammatical term for the ‘removal’ of letters, and, as we have seen, Dionysius himself uses this term as one of the categories of word modification.¹³⁹ This type of examples, in which the form of a word corresponds to its meaning, is also found in the fragments of Dionysius’ contemporary Tryphon: for example, in the word $ἡμικύκλιον$ (‘half-circle’), the word $ἡμισυς$ (‘half’) has been reduced to *half* of its original form ($ἡμι-$).¹⁴⁰ In one case, the grammatical aspect of the $μόρια λόγου$ (‘word classes’) is explicitly referred to: $\tauουτονί$ is a modification of the ‘pronoun’ ($ἀντωνυμία$) $\tauούτων$.¹⁴¹ The latter remark is also interesting for another reason. As we have seen before, Dionysius normally uses the term $ἀντονομασία$ and not the traditional $ἀντωνυμία$.¹⁴² Together with the exceptional use of the expression $\tauὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου$ (see above), the use of $ἀντωνυμία$ might indicate that this particular passage in Dionysius’ work (*Comp.* 6) builds on theories on the modification of the parts of speech that Dionysius has found in some source.¹⁴³ As I argued before, we should not exclude the possibility that he used a treatise on the euphonious composition of poems. This might well be the type of work from which we find the (badly preserved) traces in Philodemus’ *On Poems*. With this consideration, our discussion of Dionysius’ use of the parts of speech as building blocks in the process of composition (in *Comp.* 6) is completed. We may now turn to the role of the $μόρια λόγου$ in the discussion of the three types of composition.

4.3.2. The parts of speech in the description of composition types

One of the most original parts of Dionysius’ *On Composition* is the description of the three types of composition in *Comp.* 22-24. Dionysius distinguishes the austere composition (the $σύνθεσις$ or $ἀρμονία αὐστηρά$), the smooth composition (the $σύνθεσις$ or $ἀρμονία γλαφυρά$) and the well-blended composition (the $σύνθεσις$ or

¹³⁸ Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 1 and *On the Peace* 6.

¹³⁹ For $ἀφαίρεσις$, see also *Comp.* 9.34,15-35,16, where the ‘reducing’ of $κῶλα$ is discussed.

¹⁴⁰ Tryphon fr. 131 Von Velsen. See Sluiter (1990) 28, who discusses more examples.

¹⁴¹ For this modification, which one could regard as a case of metathesis (rewriting Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 1), see section 7.3.2.

¹⁴² See section 3.5.

¹⁴³ In *Comp.* 6.30,5, Dionysius uses his normal term $\tauὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου$ again.

ἁρμονία εὐκράτος).¹⁴⁴ It is important to realise that these three composition types are not the same as the three styles (χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως), which Dionysius discusses elsewhere.¹⁴⁵ In this section, it is not my purpose to analyse the theory of the three composition types as such. I will only investigate the role of the μόρια λόγου in this theory, in order to illuminate further the integration of grammar and rhetoric. We will see that the analogy between composition and architecture is further developed. In our discussion of *Comp.* 6 we observed that the parts of speech were the building blocks that were put together, shaped and modified, according to the three functions of σύνθεσις. We will now examine how the use of these building blocks differs among the three composition types, which could be considered three types of architecture.

The austere composition type is introduced as follows. ‘It requires that the words are firmly planted (ἐρείδεσθαι) and occupy strong positions (στάσεις), so that each word is seen on every side, and that the parts (τὰ μόρια) shall be at considerable distances from one another, being separated by perceptible intervals. It does not mind admitting frequently harsh and dissonant collocations, just as the sides of the stones that are put together in building as they are found (τῶν λογάδην συντιθεμένων ἐν οἰκοδομίαις λίθων) do not appear square and polished, but unwrought and rough.’¹⁴⁶ The word λογάδην (‘as they are picked out’) is mostly used of stones that are brought together for a building without being polished. Thucydides uses the word when he tells that the Athenians built a wall at Pylos, λογάδην δὲ φέροντες λίθους, καὶ ξυνετίθεσαν ὡς ἕκαστόν τι ξυμβαίνοι (‘bringing stones as they picked them out, and they put them together as each stone happened to fit in’).¹⁴⁷ The combination of the rare word λογάδην and the verb συντίθημι (‘to compose’) in this text is striking, and it may

¹⁴⁴ See also *Dem.* 37-41. For an analysis of Dionysius’ three composition types, see Pohl (1968) 22-68.

¹⁴⁵ The three styles are discussed in *Dem.* 1-3. For the differences between the styles and the composition types, see Pohl (1968) 22-46, esp. 45, Grube (1974) 78, and Reid (1996) 49-55. Isocrates, for example, belongs to the ‘middle’ or ‘mixed’ style, but he represents the smooth (not the well-blended) composition type. Dionysius discusses both the theory of styles and the theory of composition types in the treatise *On Demosthenes*, but he does not connect the two theories: cf. Aujac (1988) 22. Tukey (1909a) 188 rightly corrects the view of Rhys Roberts (1901) 18 n. 2, who thinks that the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως are restricted to the selection of words. Grube (1952) 262 revived Rhys Roberts’ interpretation: in his view, the first part of *On Demosthenes* deals with ‘diction’ only, not with ‘style in the wider sense’. See also Grube (1965) 223-224. Although Grube (1952) 262 n. 15 states that ‘those who interpret the expression ἡ μικτὴ λέξις in *Dem.* 3 as the mixed or third kind of style make complete nonsense of the structure of the whole treatise (...)’, most recent scholars do indeed think that Dionysius deals with three ‘styles’ in the first part of *On Demosthenes*: see Usher (1974) 235-237, Aujac (1988) 16-24, Innes (1989) 269 and Wooten (1989) 576.

¹⁴⁶ *Comp.* 22.96,11-19: ἐρείδεσθαι βούλεται τὰ ὀνόματα ἀσφαλῶς καὶ στάσεις λαμβάνειν ἰσχυράς, ὥστ’ ἐκ περιφανείας ἕκαστον ὄνομα ὀρᾶσθαι, ἀπέχειν τε ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τὰ μόρια διαστάσεις ἀξιολόγους αἰσθητοῖς χρόνοις διειργόμενα· τραχείαις τε χρῆσθαι πολλαχῆ καὶ ἀντιτύποις ταῖς συμβολαῖς οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει, οἷαι γίνονται τῶν λογάδην συντιθεμένων ἐν οἰκοδομίαις λίθων αἱ μὴ εὐγώνιοι καὶ μὴ συνεξεσμένοι βάσεις, ἀργαὶ δὲ τινες καὶ αὐτοσχέδιοι.

¹⁴⁷ Thucydides 4.4.

well be that Dionysius' analogy alludes to exactly this passage from Thucydides. In any case, Thucydides' description of the building of a wall closely corresponds to Dionysius' presentation of the austere composition. The parts of the phrase clash with each other, because they are not adapted and modified as to make them fit harmoniously. In practice, this means that the words are separated from each other by the use of hiatus or the colliding of the final letter of one word with the first letter of the next word. In his analyses of Pindar and Thucydides, two authors who represent the austere composition, Dionysius points in particular to the harsh effect of the juxtaposition of one word ending in the semivowel $-v$ and words starting with the consonants $\chi-$, $\pi-$, $\theta-$, $\tau-$, $\delta-$, $\lambda-$, and $\kappa-$. The same effect is said to be the result of the juxtaposition of a word ending in $-ς$ and a word starting with $\xi-$.¹⁴⁸ Dionysius' explanation for the roughness is that the combinations of these letters (στοιχεία) cannot be pronounced within one syllable, so that the speaker has to interrupt his speech between the words that clash with one another: a certain 'pause' (σιωπή) between the words is the result.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the hearing (ἀκρόασις) perceives the words not as 'one continuous clause' but as separate units.¹⁵⁰ For a more detailed analysis of Dionysius' views on the rough combinations of letters at word boundaries I refer to the illuminating article by Vaahtera.¹⁵¹

In his analyses of Pindar and Thucydides, Dionysius focuses on the juxtaposition (ἀρμογή) of words. However, the austere composition is also described with regard to the arrangement of its clauses and periods: on all levels, the σύνθεσις ἀύστηρά is 'unstudied', and it wishes its units to be more similar to 'nature' (φύσει) than 'art' (τέχνη).¹⁵² Thus, in the building of periods, the austere composition 'does not use certain additional words in order to complete the period, when they contribute nothing to the sense' (οὔτε προσθήκαις τισὶν ὀνομάτων, ἵνα ὁ κύκλος ἐκπληρωθῆ, μηδὲν ὠφελούσαις τὸν νοῦν χρωμένῃ).¹⁵³ Behind the term προσθήκη ('addition'), there lies an important theory that was influential in both rhetorical and grammatical theory, and

¹⁴⁸ *Comp.* 22.99,7-110,20. The examples are from Pindar fr. 75 Bergk and Thucydides 1.1. Dionysius points in particular to the juxtaposition of the following words. In Pindar: ἐν χορόν, κλυτὰν πέμπετε, ὀμφαλὸν θυόεντα, πανδαίδαλόν τ' εὐκλέ' ἀγοράν, ἰοδέτων λάχετε, στεφάνων τᾶν, ἀοιδᾶν Διόθεν τε, ἀγλαΐα ἴδετε (hiatus). In Thucydides: Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε (-ς ξ-), τὸν πόλεμον τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων (-ν π-, -ν τ-, -ν π-, -ν κ-, -ι α-). Cf. Blass *DAB I* (1979³ [1868]) 221.

¹⁴⁹ *Comp.* 22.101,16-21.

¹⁵⁰ *Comp.* 22.110,6-9.

¹⁵¹ Vaahtera (1997) investigates the authors that Dionysius discusses and concludes that his evaluation of their use of combinations of semivowels and consonants at word boundaries is not fully consistent with the reality of the texts. Isocrates, representing the smooth composition, has in fact more clashes between consonants than Thucydides, who belongs to the austere composition.

¹⁵² *Comp.* 22.97,2-18.

¹⁵³ *Comp.* 22.97,12-14. On Dionysius' use of the term κύκλος for 'a well-rounded period', see Lockwood (1937) 200.

which is also essential to our understanding of Dionysius' ideas on austere composition.¹⁵⁴ In his discussion of the grand style (λέξις μεγαλοπρεπής), the rhetorician 'Demetrius' states that connectives (σύνδεσμοι) add to the grandeur of composition, but he strongly disapproves of the idle use of 'empty additions' (προσθήκαι κενάι).¹⁵⁵ Among the 'additions' that may contribute to the grandeur of language (but only if they are used in the right way) there is one particular group of words that 'Demetrius' calls σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί.¹⁵⁶ These 'expletive connectives' (his examples include δή and νυ) also play an interesting role in grammatical theory, where they form a subcategory of the grammatical word class of the σύνδεσμοι ('conjunctions'). These particular 'conjunctions' were discussed from two angles. First, it seems that this group of σύνδεσμοι became the object of discussions on the possible absence of meaning of 'conjunctions'.¹⁵⁷ Where Aristotle thought that σύνδεσμοι do not have meaning, most grammarians thought that this was only true for the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί.¹⁵⁸ Second, these 'conjunctions' were regarded as words with a certain *stylistic* function. Dionysius' contemporary and fellow citizen Tryphon discussed the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί in his grammatical works.¹⁵⁹ He compared these conjunctions with 'padding' (στοιβή): just as padding prevents the jarring and breaking of amphoras, 'in the same way, this combination of words is adopted in order to avoid the parts of the expression from being rough (τραχύνεσθαι).'¹⁶⁰

The ideas of Tryphon and other grammarians seem to be echoed in Dionysius' theory of the three composition types. Dionysius himself does not discuss the 'expletive conjunctions' as a grammatical category, but he does use the term παραπλήρωμα ('filler') in his description of the composition types. In fact, he employs παραπλήρωμα in exactly the same way as προσθήκη. His statement that the austere

¹⁵⁴ See Sluiter (1997).

¹⁵⁵ 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 55-58. Cf. Sluiter (1997) 239-240.

¹⁵⁶ 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 55.

¹⁵⁷ See Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj.*, *G.G.* II 1, 247,22-258,26. Although the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί appear in two fragments of Aristarchus (fr. 172 Matthaios on the conjunction δέ and fr. 177 Matthaios on the conjunction ἄν), it is doubtful whether the terminology can be traced back to Aristarchus himself: see Matthaios (1999) 582-584.

¹⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Po.* 1456b38: σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστὶν φωνὴ ἄσημος. 'A "conjunction" is a non-significant word.' See Sluiter (1997) 234.

¹⁵⁹ Tryphon fr. 41 and fr. 57 Von Velsen. See Sluiter (1997) 237 and Dalimier (2001) 376-385. P. Yale I 25 (first century AD) also lists the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί as one subtype of the conjunctions. In Sch. Homer, *Iliad* 1.173-175 (ἔμοιγε καὶ ἄλλοι, οἳ κέ με τιμήσουσι) it is stated that the σύνδεσμος κε is here περισσός ('superfluous').

¹⁶⁰ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj.*, *G.G.* II 1, 247, 26-29 (Tryphon fr. 41 Von Velsen): "ὄν γάρ," φησι, "τρόπον εἰς τὰς συνθέσεις τῶν ἀμφορέων εὐχρηστεῖ ἢ τῶν στοιβῶν παρένθεσις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταθραύεσθαι τοὺς ἀμφορεῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ τῆς φράσεως μὴ τραχύνεσθαι ἢδε ἢ σύνταξις τῶν μορίων παραλαμβάνεται."

composition does not use meaningless προσθήκαι (see above) is elsewhere formulated as follows: it contains unequal periods, μηδέ γε παραπληρώμασι τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἀναγκαίοις ὡς πρὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην διάνοιαν χρωμένας ('not using filler words that are not necessary for the underlying meaning').¹⁶¹ The smooth composition, on the other hand, does make good use of this kind of additions: it uses 'words that do not contribute to the underlying sense, but serve as a sort of connection or bonding between what precedes and what follows, so that words ending and words beginning with a rough letter (τραχὺ γράμμα) may not clash (...).'¹⁶² The consequence is that the austere composition, which does not use these empty words, 'is rough and harsh upon the ears' (τραχύνει ... καὶ πικραίνει ... τὰς ἀκοὰς).¹⁶³ In his analysis of the smooth composition of a Sapphic poem, however, Dionysius remarks that in all the nouns and verbs and other parts of speech there are only very few combinations of semivowels and voiceless consonants that do not naturally blend with each other, 'and even these do not make the euphony rough' (τραχυνούσας τὴν εὐέπειαν).¹⁶⁴ In other words, not only the term παραπλήρωμα, but also the verb τραχύνω seems to connect Dionysius' views on austere and smooth composition with Tryphon's definition of the expletive conjunctions.¹⁶⁵ Now, Dionysius' terms παραπλήρωμα and προσθήκη are not confined to certain conjunctions, but there is good reason to believe that Dionysius recognises the 'expletive' power of (certain) conjunctions as well. When he summarises the most important aspects of the austere composition, he tells us that, among other things, it is ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος ('using few connectives') and ἄναρθρος ('lacking articles').¹⁶⁶ Here, we encounter a very effective integration of grammatical and rhetorical theory: the different types of composition are characterised by their use of specific parts of speech, namely the conjunction and the article.

¹⁶¹ *Dem.* 39.212,20-22. For the use of παραπλήρωμα in Dionysius, see also *Isoc.* 3.58,20 (Isocrates' use of filler words that contribute nothing), *Dem.* 19.168,8 (Dionysius rewrites Isocrates leaving out the παραπληρώματα: see section 7.3.1), *Comp.* 9.33,23 (the unnecessary additions in Plato, *Menexenus* 236e) and *Comp.* 16.67,12-13 (see below).

¹⁶² *Dem.* 40.215,19-216,5: τινὰς ἐτέρας λέξεις ὑπομένει πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον νοῦν οὐτ' ἀναγκαίως οὐτ' ἴσως χρησίμας, δεσμοῦ δέ τινος ἢ κόλλης τάξιν ταῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ μετ' αὐτὰς κειμέναις ὀνομασίαις παρεξομέναις, ἵνα μὴ συναπτόμεναι πρὸς ἀλλήλας αἱ καταλήγουσαι τε εἰς τραχὺ γράμμα καὶ αἱ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τινος τοιοῦτου λαμβάνουσαι σπαδονισμοὺς τῶν ἤχων ποιῶσι καὶ ἀντιτυπίας (...).

¹⁶³ *Comp.* 22.100,11-12 on Pindar. See also *Comp.* 22.102,1. For the 'ear', see section 4.3.1.

¹⁶⁴ *Comp.* 23.116,15-20.

¹⁶⁵ The characterisation of sounds as 'smooth' and 'rough' seems to have its origin in musical theory: see 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 175-176 and cf. Pohl (1968) 149-150.

¹⁶⁶ *Comp.* 22.98,1-2. The austere composition is also ἀντίρροπος (or perhaps we should read ἀγγίστροφος with manuscript P: cf. 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.1) περὶ τὰς πτώσεις ('flexible / quick changing in its use of cases'), ποικίλη περὶ τοὺς σχηματισμοὺς ('using a variety of figures') and ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπεροπτικὴ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ('in many cases neglecting the logical order'). For the latter characteristic, see section 5.2.

I have argued elsewhere that we can give two explanations of the fact that Dionysius' austere composition is ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος (containing few connectives).¹⁶⁷ First, the reason might be that connectives can make the structure of a text more explicit, whereas the austere composition should aim to 'emphasise its unstudied and simple character'.¹⁶⁸ This explanation might be related to Aristotle's view that asyndeton is appropriate to the λέξις ἀγωνιστική (the style of an oral speech), whereas it should be absent from the λέξις γραφική (the style of a written composition).¹⁶⁹ According to Aristotle, asyndeton creates amplification (αὐξήσις), 'because many things seem to be said at the same time', whereas the use of connectives makes 'many things seem one'. If we follow this interpretation, we might compare Dionysius' smooth composition with Aristotle's λέξις γραφική in the sense that it is more 'precise' (Aristotle calls it ἀκριβεστάτη), so that the coherence of a text is made explicit by the use of conjunctions. We cannot exclude the possibility that Dionysius is guided by this kind of considerations. However, I think that a more convincing explanation (which does not have to exclude the former one) is that Dionysius is thinking of the 'expletive' use of σύνδεσμοι, that is, the use of conjunctions for the sake of euphony. According to this interpretation, the austere composition is ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος because it does not avoid hiatus and clashes between semivowels and consonants by the use of 'additional words'. As we have seen, hiatus and rough sounds are characteristic of the σύνθεσις ἀύστηρά.¹⁷⁰ The σύνδεσμος is like 'cement': in the architecture of the austere composition, it should not be used too much, because the intervals between the 'stones' of composition should not be filled in. The stones should be unpolished and the transitions between them should be rough. 'Longinus' expresses a similar view on the use of connectives with regard to sublime writing: if you insert many conjunctions (συνδέσμους), 'you will know that the rush and ruggedness (ἀποτραχυνόμενον) of the emotion, if you polish it by the use of conjunctions into smoothness, loses its sting and its fire is quickly put out.'¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ De Jonge (2005b) 478.

¹⁶⁸ *Comp.* 22.97,11-18.

¹⁶⁹ Aristotle, *Rh.* 1413b3-1414a28.

¹⁷⁰ It has been noticed that the writer Dionysius himself is less interested in the avoidance of hiatus than his contemporaries. See Kallenberg (1907) 9: 'Man braucht nur wenige Seiten von der Archaeologie des Dionys von Halikarnass zu lesen, um zu erkennen, dass der Verfasser in der Vermeidung des Hiatus nicht die Strenge beobachtet wie sein Zeitgenosse Diodor oder vor ihm Polybius und nach ihm Plutarch.' For Dionysius' style, see Usher (1982).

¹⁷¹ 'Longinus', *Subl.* 21.1: (...) εἴση κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς οὕτως παραγράφων ὡς τοῦ πάθους τὸ συνδεδιωμένον καὶ ἀποτραχυνόμενον, ἐὰν τοῖς συνδέσμοις ἐξομαλίσῃς εἰς λειότητα, ἄκεντρον τε προσπίπτει καὶ εὐθὺς ἔσβεσται.

As we have seen, Dionysius' austere composition is not only ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος, but also ἄναρθρος ('lacking articles').¹⁷² It seems attractive to explain the latter characteristic in the same way as the avoidance of many conjunctions. In my view, Dionysius' discussion of the austere composition in the treatise *On Demosthenes* provides a very convincing argument for this interpretation. There, he declares that the σύνθεσις ἀσπτηρά uses neither many conjunctions, nor ἄρθροις συνεχέσιν.¹⁷³ Usher translates: 'the article is not consistently employed', thus interpreting the adjective συνεχής as 'successive'.¹⁷⁴ However, συνεχής literally means 'holding together'. Dionysius employs the substantive συνέχεια ('continuity') in his discussion of the smooth composition, where 'the words are woven together according to certain natural affinities and combinations of letters'.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, we may conclude that the smooth composition uses articles in order to connect the words through a continuous stream of sound, whereas the austere composition avoids the use of this kind of ἄρθρα.

These ideas on the (dis)continuity of sound are without any doubt related to the views of musical and poetical critics. Aristoxenus, the Peripatetic musical theorist whom Dionysius mentions twice, was also interested in the continuity of sounds, both in music and in the σύνθεσις of letters.¹⁷⁶ In his *Harmonics*, the concept of συνέχεια ('continuity') plays an important role.¹⁷⁷ In the first book of that work, Aristoxenus states that 'the nature of continuity (τοῦ συνεχοῦς) in melody seems to be similar to that which in speech relates to the putting together of letters.'¹⁷⁸ In the second book, he explains this as follows: 'The order (τάξις) which relates to the melodic and unmelodic is similar to that concerned with the combination of letters in speech: from a given set of letters a syllable is not generated in just any way, but in some ways and not in others.'¹⁷⁹ In other words, continuity between letters is only produced when one combines certain letters that fit together, but there are some letters that do not

¹⁷² Blass *DAB* I (1979³ [1868]) 222-223 agrees with Dionysius' characterisation of Thucydides' composition as ἄναρθρος.

¹⁷³ *Dem.* 39.213,6-8.

¹⁷⁴ Usher (1974) 387. Aujac (1988) 125 offers the same interpretation: 'elle [l'harmonie austère] (...) ne met pas constamment les articles.'

¹⁷⁵ *Comp.* 23.116,5-8.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Janko (2000) 170 n. 3. Dionysius mentions Aristoxenus in *Comp.* 14.49,2 and *Dem.* 48.233,8-9.

¹⁷⁷ Aristoxenus, *Elementa Harmonica* 1.27ff. See Gibson (2005) 47 ff.

¹⁷⁸ Aristoxenus, *Elementa Harmonica* 1.27: φαίνεται δὲ τοιαύτη τις φύσις εἶναι τοῦ συνεχοῦς ἐν τῇ μελωδίᾳ οἷα καὶ ἐν τῇ λέξει περὶ τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων σύνθεσιν. The translation is by Barker (1989).

¹⁷⁹ Aristoxenus, *Elementa Harmonica* 2.37: ἔστι δὲ τοιαύτη τις ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐμμελές τε καὶ ἐκμελές τάξις οἷα καὶ ἡ περὶ τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων σύνθεσιν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τρόπον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γραμμάτων συντιθεμένη ξυλλαβὴ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πὼς μὲν, πὼς δ' οὐ. The translation is by Barker (1989). See also Aristoxenus, *Elementa Rhythmica* 2.30 on συνεχής ῥυθμοποιία ('continuous rhythmic composition'). Cf. Gibson (2005) 95.

combine naturally. In the same way, not every note or interval can be sung after another one, but only certain combinations produce continuity (συνέχεια). The idea of the continuity of sound seems implied in Dionysius' treatment of the juxtaposition of words (ἄρμογή, the first ἔργον of composition) as described in *Comp.* 6 (see section 4.3.1): 'Clearly not every juxtaposition of words naturally affects the ears in the same way.'¹⁸⁰

The notion of continuity also seems to be important to the ideas of the critic Pausimachus of Miletus, one of the *kritikoi* in Philodemus' *On Poems*, although it is difficult to interpret the scanty evidence.¹⁸¹ For our interpretation of Dionysius' smooth composition and its continuity of sound, it may be relevant that Pausimachus' theory of euphony considered the possibility of adding and dropping letters in the case of nouns, verbs, prepositions and conjunctions.¹⁸² Another critic in Philodemus, perhaps Heracleodorus (as Pohl thinks), shares Dionysius' views on the insertion of semivowels in order to fill in the hiatus between two words. In the work *On Demosthenes*, Dionysius says:¹⁸³

δείκνυται γὰρ ὑπὸ τε μουσικῶν καὶ μετρικῶν ὁ διὰ μέσου τῶν φωνηέντων χρόνος ἑτέρων παρεμβολῆ γραμμάτων ἡμιφώνων ἀναπληροῦσθαι δυνάμενος.

'It is shown by musical and metrical writers that the intermediate pause between two vowels may be filled in by the insertion of other letters, semivowels.'

The *kritikos* in Philodemus' second book *On Poems* uses the same term for 'insertion': in the case of clashes, 'one must insert (παρεμβάλλειν) one productive sound, as short and smooth as possible.'¹⁸⁴ 'Demetrius' expresses a similar view on the addition of movable ν (a semivowel) to the accusative of Δημοσθένη and Σωκράτη for the sake of euphony, and he proceeds by informing us that musicians call a word smooth (λείον), rough (τραχύ), well-proportioned (εὐπαγές) or weighty (ὀγκηρόν).¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ *Comp.* 6.28,16-20: οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάντα γε μετὰ πάντων τιθέμενα πέφυκεν ὁμοίως διατιθέναι τὰς ἀκοάς. See section 4.3.1.

¹⁸¹ See Janko (2000) 170 and 259 n. 2 on Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 64 Janko, where he reconstructs the word [... συ]νεχ[εστ]έραν.

¹⁸² Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 85 Janko

¹⁸³ *Dem.* 38.210,22-211,2.

¹⁸⁴ Philodemus, *On Poems* 2, P. Herc. 994 cols. 27-38: (...), δεῖ παρεμβάλλειν ἐν δυνατόν καὶ ὡς βραχύτατον καὶ λειότατον. Cf. Pohl (1968) 150. See also Janko (2000) 335 n. 1.

¹⁸⁵ 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 175-176.

To summarise, Dionysius' theory of composition types clearly illustrates the many connections between different ancient language disciplines. Dionysius' ideas on the addition or insertion of letters or parts of speech (articles and conjunctions) with a view to smooth composition can be related to the traditions of musical, poetical, rhetorical and grammatical theory. The characterisation of rough sounds and the continuity of speech seem to originate in musical theory, as 'Demetrius' and Dionysius suggest.¹⁸⁶ The discussion of euphonious composition (σύνθεσις) and its use of inserted letters belong to the tradition of the Hellenistic *kritikoi*, but it is also represented in the stylistic tradition. The view that certain parts of speech (in particular the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί) can fill the composition for the sake of euphony is expressed in both rhetorical and grammatical works. Dionysius twice refers to the musical theorist Aristoxenus, and he may have known and used the work of the *kritikoi*. He also may have known the views of the grammarian Tryphon, since they were fellow citizens of Rome at the end of the first century BC (see section 1.5). It is not necessary to trace each of Dionysius' views back to one specific author. It is more interesting to conclude that Dionysius made good use of different disciplines, all of which contribute to his own theory of composition.

To complete the discussion of composition and the theory of 'filler words', I briefly return to 'Demetrius'. Despite the similarities between their views on παραπληρώματα, we should notice that there is an important difference between the author of *On Style* and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 'Demetrius' deals with the 'expletive conjunctions' in the grand style, but he only accepts the use of these words when they contribute to grandeur. Dionysius assigns the use of 'filler words' to the smooth composition, whereas the austere composition should avoid them. In other words, 'Demetrius' considers the 'expletive conjunctions' as a source of elevation, whereas for Dionysius the filler words are primarily concerned with euphony: although the austere composition, just like the grand style, uses rhythms that are 'dignified and impressive' (ἀξιοματικὸς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπής), it *avoids* the use of παραπληρώματα.¹⁸⁷ These divergent points of view are closely related to the difference between the system of styles and the system of composition types. Still, the two approaches can lead to a similar evaluation of good composition, as we can see in the case of Homer's catalogue of ships. Both 'Demetrius' and Dionysius praise the passage from the *Iliad* that contains the names of Boeotian towns. 'Demetrius' argues that the connectives (σύνδεσμοι) have given the Boeotian names, which are ordinary

¹⁸⁶ 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 176 and *Dem.* 38.210,22-211,2 (above).

¹⁸⁷ *Comp.* 22.97,3-4.

and small, a certain dignity (ὄγκος) and greatness (μέγεθος).¹⁸⁸ Dionysius states that Homer has so beautifully interwoven the names with *euphoniou* ‘filler words’ (παραπληρώμασιν), that they appear as the ‘most impressive’ (μεγαλοπρεπέστατα) of all names (see also section 2.5.4).¹⁸⁹

4.4. Dionysius as a literary critic: the parts of speech and the analysis of style

Since Dionysius regards the parts of speech as the building blocks of composition, they are not only the starting point for the production of speeches, but also useful tools for the analysis of texts: the architecture of a discourse that has been built from μόρια λόγου can also be resolved into these parts again. In other words, a critic who intends to evaluate the style of a certain text can focus on the use of the parts of speech in that text, thus reducing the stylistic aspects of a text to its elements (στοιχεῖα). In this section, I will enquire how the *literary critic* Dionysius uses the grammatical theory of the parts of speech. I will concentrate on his *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, in which he analyses the style of the historian Thucydides.¹⁹⁰ This letter is a kind of appendix to chapter 24 of the Dionysius’ treatise *On Thucydides*: Ammaeus, the addressee of the letter, considered Dionysius’ remarks in that passage disappointing, because they were not illustrated with actual passages from Thucydides’ work.¹⁹¹ Although Dionysius thinks that citing and analysing passages from Thucydides is the practice of ‘authors of rhetorical handbooks and introductions’ (οἱ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς εἰσαγωγὰς τῶν λόγων πραγματευόμενοι), he agrees to fulfil Ammaeus’ wish, thus adopting ‘the didactic instead of the epideictic method.’¹⁹²

4.4.1. Dionysius on the style of Thucydides

Dionysius’ remarks on Thucydides’ style in his letter to Ammaeus should be understood in the context of the ‘Thucydidism’ that had emerged among critics of first

¹⁸⁸ ‘Demetrius’, *Eloc.* 54 and 257 on Homer, *Iliad* 2.497.

¹⁸⁹ *Comp.* 16.67,11-14 on Homer, *Iliad* 2.494-501.

¹⁹⁰ On the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, see esp. the commentaries by Rhys Roberts (1901), Pritchett (1975) 83-104 and Aujac (1991). See also Blass *DAB* I (1979³ [1868]) 207-244 and Ros (1938) 49-68. On the structure of this text, see Egger (1902) 233-234 and Warren (1899), who points to Dionysius’ ‘hastiness’ in composing the letter.

¹⁹¹ *Amm.* II 1.421,5-422,6. On the identity of Ammaeus, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

¹⁹² *Amm.* II 1.422,6: τὸ διδασκαλικὸν σχῆμα λαβὼν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπιδεικτικοῦ. Aujac (1991) 131 renders these words as ‘prenant le ton du professeur, au lieu de celui du conférencier’. She comments that Dionysius prefers an impressionistic kind of criticism to that of a teacher: ‘la critique d’un homme de goût plutôt que d’un spécialiste.’

century Rome.¹⁹³ In the *Orator* (46 BC), Cicero tells us that recently a new group of writers had become active who called themselves ‘Thucydideans’. Cicero disapproves of these imitators of the Greek historian: ‘Those famous speeches contain so many dark and obscure sentences as to be scarcely intelligible, which is a prime fault in a public oration.’¹⁹⁴ According to Cicero, Thucydides is to be praised only as a historian who writes about wars, but not as an orator.¹⁹⁵ Among historians of this period, the most famous imitator of Thucydides was Sallustius, who had died five years before Dionysius’ arrival in Rome.¹⁹⁶ Another imitator seems to have been the Roman historian Quintus Aelius Tubero, who is the recipient of Dionysius’ treatise *On Thucydides*.¹⁹⁷

Dionysius regards Thucydides’ style (at least in its most extreme form) as unsuitable for practical purposes. In *On Thucydides*, he even contests the view of some ‘reputable critics’ that the style, although not appropriate to oratory, could be a useful model for historians.¹⁹⁸ The contested view corresponds to the one that Cicero expresses in *Orator* 31 (see above) and *Brutus* 287: one could imitate Thucydides in the writing of history, but not in pleading cases.¹⁹⁹ Therefore, I think that Dionysius, who never names a Roman writer except for his addressees, may well have used the expression *τινες οὐκ ἄδοξοι σοφισταί* to refer to Cicero.²⁰⁰ Nassal already considered the possibility that Dionysius thought of Cicero (‘aber sicher nicht in erster Linie’), but finally decided that Dionysius’ view must have referred to a Greek source, ‘denn der Römer C[icero] besaß nicht diese detaillierte Kenntnis von

¹⁹³ On the popularity of Thucydides as a model for the writing of history in this period, see Leeman (1955). Cf. Bowersock (1979) 68-69 and Innes (1989) 269-270.

¹⁹⁴ Cicero, *Orator* 30: *Ipsae illae contiones ita multas habent obscuras abditasque sententias vix ut intellegantur; quod est in oratione civili vitium vel maximum.*

¹⁹⁵ Cicero, *Orator* 31. Cf. Leeman (1955) 195-196.

¹⁹⁶ See e.g. Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 10.1.101.

¹⁹⁷ On Quintus Aelius Tubero, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there. In *Thuc.* 25.364,14-16, Dionysius states that his work should benefit those who wish to imitate (*μιμεῖσθαι*) Thucydides. In the final chapter of the treatise (*Thuc.* 55.418,19-21), Dionysius says: ‘I could have written an essay on Thucydides that would have given you more pleasure than this one, (...) but not a more truthful one.’ This statement seems to imply that Quintus Aelius Tubero admired Thucydides. Cf. Bowersock (1965) 130.

¹⁹⁸ *Thuc.* 50.409,8-410,7.

¹⁹⁹ Goudriaan (1989) 266 objects that Cicero prefers Isocrates and Theopompus as models for historiography (see *Orator* 207), so that the remarks on the imitation of Thucydides in *Brutus* 287 and *Orator* 31 would be ‘insincere’ (‘onoprecht’). However, Cicero’s preference of the periodical style of Isocrates and Theopompus (*Orator* 207) does not at all imply that historians could not imitate Thucydides as well. In other words, there is no real inconsistency in Cicero’s remarks.

²⁰⁰ Pavano (1958) 196 and Goudriaan (1989) 266 n. 3 state that it is impossible to discover the identity of the *οὐκ ἄδοξοι σοφισταί*. This is true, but I think we should at least mention the possibility that Cicero was one of them. Bowersock (1979) 69-70 points out that Dionysius must have known from Cicero’s ideas on Roman classicism via his ‘patron’ Quintus Tubero: Cicero was a friend of Tubero’s father Lucius.

Th[ucydides].²⁰¹ Are we really to believe that Cicero, who spent so much time with Greek teachers, both in Greece and Rome, was not able to judge the style of Thucydides?²⁰² Nassal does so, because this belief would support his central thesis, namely that both Cicero and Dionysius followed the views of Caecilius of Caleacte: Cicero would simply have taken over Caecilius' views on Thucydides, whereas Dionysius would have corrected them. Nassal argues that Caecilius wrote a treatise between the publication of Cicero's *De oratore* (55 BC) and *Orator* (46 BC), which would account for the differences between these two works.²⁰³ At the same time, this treatise would explain the similarities between the doctrine of Dionysius and that of the later works by Cicero. On the connections between Cicero and Dionysius, Nassal remarks the following: 'Eine Abhängigkeit des C[iceros] von DH. [i.e. Dionysius] ist aus chronologischen Gründen ausgeschlossen. Ich möchte darum [sic] in der vorliegenden Arbeit den Nachweis versuchen, daß die zwischen DH. und C. sowohl in der rhetorischen Techne als auch in der ästhetisch-rhetorischen Beurteilung griechischer Schriftsteller vorliegenden Berührungspunkte sehr wahrscheinlich zurückzuführen sind auf die oben für C.s "Orator" vermutete bzw. geforderte griechische Schrift über Stil und Komposition.'²⁰⁴ It is typical that Nassal does not even mention the possibility that the Greek Dionysius could have used the ideas of a Roman colleague. Nassal's entire theory relies on the assumption that Caecilius was significantly older than Dionysius, for which there is no convincing evidence.²⁰⁵ The Suda tells us that Caecilius was active under August.²⁰⁶ Most modern scholars assume that Caecilius was roughly contemporary with and perhaps slightly younger than Dionysius (*fl.* 30-8 BC), who refers to his 'friend' in one of the literary letters.²⁰⁷

²⁰¹ Nassal (1910) 105. Leeman (1963) 180 and Aujac (1991) 161 also think that Dionysius refers to Caecilius of Caleacte. Egger (1902) 77, however, considers the possibility that Dionysius read Cicero's rhetorical works and used them for his composition theory.

²⁰² Crawford (1978) 199 points out that Cicero was mainly taught by Greeks.

²⁰³ Nassal (1910) 5-10.

²⁰⁴ Nassal (1910) 6-7.

²⁰⁵ Nassal's hypothesis about Caecilius' dates is based on the reconstruction of the Atticist movement by Wilamowitz (1900). Wilamowitz (1900) 6 suggests that the title of Caecilius' work *Κατὰ Φρυγῶν* (*Against the Phrygians*) indicates that Caecilius wrote that book when the battle of Atticists against Asianic rhetoric was still going on. If this is true, Wilamowitz argues, Caecilius' work must have preceded Dionysius' preface to *On the Ancient Orators*, which reports the victory of Atticism. In my view, we should avoid presenting the conflict of Atticists who objected to 'Asianic' style as a real 'battle' that was decided at a particular moment. There were many different concepts of correct 'Attic' style (see also section 1.2), and there is no reason to believe that all controversies were over after 31 BC. The title of Caecilius' book does not imply that it was written before the moment on which the Atticists attained their alleged 'victory'.

²⁰⁶ See Suda s.v. *Καϊκίλιος* and s.v. *Ἐρμούρορας*. Cf. Blass (1865) 174. On Caecilius of Caleacte, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

²⁰⁷ For Dionysius' reference to Caecilius (*Pomp.* 3.240,14), see section 1.4 and esp. Tolkieln (1908). Blass (1865) 174, Bowersock (1965) 124 and Kennedy (1994) 160 assign Caecilius' career to Augustan Rome. Brzoska (1899) thinks that Caecilius was a bit younger than Dionysius, and Weißenberger (1997) 896 states that Caecilius was born ca. 50 BC.

Cicero's *De oratore*, however, was already finished in 55 BC, and the *Orator* was written in 46 BC. Therefore, it is chronologically not very probable that Caecilius influenced Cicero. Instead of assuming that Cicero relied on Caecilius, or any other Greek source that wrote on Thucydides, I think that we should simply accept the more elegant solution, namely that Dionysius knew the *Orator* and referred to Cicero in his treatise *On Thucydides*.²⁰⁸

Dionysius' criticism of the style of Thucydides especially concerns the poetic diction, the variety of figures, the dissonance of the composition and the speed with which the ideas are expressed.²⁰⁹ Dionysius thinks that Thucydides' style is only successful when it does not depart too much from the usual. The problem is that Thucydides rather frequently diverges from common words and figures, so that his style becomes obscure.²¹⁰ He describes various aspects of Thucydidean style as 'unnatural', and he points out that it does not preserve 'logical order' (ἀκολουθία) and 'grammatical congruence' (καταλληλότης). The latter terms and their connection to Dionysius' concept of 'natural' style will be the subject of section 5.2, where I will also discuss Dionysius' analysis of Thucydides' Melian dialogue in *Thuc.* 37. In the current section I will focus on the discussion of Thucydides' use of the parts of speech in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*.²¹¹

Before we discuss Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides (section 4.4.2), I should draw attention to the fact that there are two ancient texts that contain very similar observations on Thucydides. The relevance of one of these parallels has been

²⁰⁸ Wisse (1995) has convincingly argued that we should no longer exclude the possibility that Romans may indeed have expressed original Roman views, without relying on Greek sources, and that Greeks may have taken over certain ideas that were developed by Romans. Goudriaan (1989) 13 thinks that it is remarkable that Dionysius does not mention Cicero in any of his works.

²⁰⁹ *Thuc.* 24.363,10-12: τὸ ποιητικὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὸ πολυειδὲς τῶν σχημάτων, τὸ τραχὺ τῆς ἁρμονίας, τὸ τάχος τῶν σημασιῶν. Cf. Grube (1950) 105. On the poetic character of Thucydides' style, see also section 6.4. The variation of figures (μεταβολή) is generally considered one of the most important characteristics of Thucydides' style: see esp. Ros (1938). Blass *DAB* I (1979³ [1868]) 226 agrees with Dionysius on Thucydides' 'Gedrängtheit'. See also Norden (1915³) 97-98.

²¹⁰ *Thuc.* 49.408,4-10. Cf. Cicero, *Orator* 30.

²¹¹ For Dionysius' views on Thucydides and historiography in general see Grube (1950), Grube (1974), Sacks (1983), Sacks (1986), Heath (1989) 71-89 and Toye (1995). For a comparison of the evaluations of Thucydides' style by Cicero and Dionysius, see Nassal (1910) 101-115. Although Blass agrees with many of Dionysius' observations on Thucydides, he objects to Dionysius' blunt criticism of Thucydides (Blass *DGB* [1865] 187): 'Aber allerdings (...) die schroffe Art in der er sein Urtheil ausspricht zeugt wenig von der Pietät, die er gegen einen so überlegenen Geist hätte haben müssen.' The verdict of Norden (1915³) 96 is even more severe: 'Dionys v. H. denkt sich nun in seinen Kritiken den Thukydiden als einen höchst eigensinnigen Schriftsteller, der, ergriffen von der Sucht, Neues und Ungewöhnliches zu bieten, immer das gerade Gegenteil von dem dachte und schrieb, was normale Menschen gedacht und geschrieben hätten. Das ist die Vorstellung die dieser Mann von Originalität hat.' Etc.

noted before, namely that of the scholia on Thucydides. Not many scholars have noticed the second parallel: a fragment from Caecilius of Caleacte's *On Figures*.²¹² I will briefly introduce both texts, to which I will also refer in my discussion of Dionysius' grammatical observations.

Usener first noticed the similarities between Dionysius' grammatical observations in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* and the scholia on Thucydides.²¹³ From his comparison of these two texts he concluded that Dionysius made use of scholia that antedated the grammarian Didymus (who was contemporary to Dionysius and may have settled down in Rome at some point).²¹⁴ Usener even suggested that Dionysius had an edition of Thucydides that contained critical signs and scholia, a view that was taken over by Radermacher.²¹⁵ One important argument for this view is Dionysius' own remark (in *On Thucydides*) that there are not many people who can understand the whole of Thucydides 'and even these cannot understand certain passages without a linguistic explanation' (ἐξήγησεως γραμματικῆς).²¹⁶ A little later, he adds that many passages from Thucydides are difficult to follow and require 'linguistic explanations' (γραμματικῶν ἐξήγησεων).²¹⁷ As Pfeiffer points out, the term ἐξήγησις does not necessarily imply a commentary (ὕπομνημα), but it is possible that the 'interpretations' to which Dionysius refers were indeed part of a commentary.²¹⁸ Luschnat has argued that both the scholia on Thucydides and Dionysius' *Second Letter to Ammaeus* can ultimately be traced back to a commentary on Thucydides composed in Hellenistic Alexandria.²¹⁹ Pfeiffer accepted this reconstruction and suggested that it was Aristarchus who wrote the first commentary on Thucydides.²²⁰ Now, it is important to realise that it is not certain how far the annotations in the Thucydides scholia go back in time. Usener and Luschnat argue that the similarities between Dionysius and the scholia point to a common source. We should not exclude the possibility, however, that Dionysius influenced certain later lexicographers and grammarians, so that the scholia on Thucydides as they survive might partly be based

²¹² See, however, Ros (1938) 56 n. 17, who mentions the parallel.

²¹³ Usener (1889) 71 ff. The edition of the scholia on Thucydides is by Hude (1927). Apart from the scholia, which survived in manuscripts of the 10th–14th centuries AD, there are also two papyri that contain similar grammatical observations on Thucydides: P. Oxy. 6.853 (Pack² nr 1536, 2nd century AD) and P. Rainer 29.247 (3rd century AD). The author of the text of the former papyrus is engaged in a polemic with Dionysius and rejects his objections to Thucydides' style: see Luschnat (1954) 25-31.

²¹⁴ On Didymus, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

²¹⁵ Radermacher (1905) 968-969.

²¹⁶ *Thuc.* 51.410,15-17. On Thucydides' obscurity, see also Cicero, *Orator* 30 (above).

²¹⁷ *Thuc.* 55.417,22-25

²¹⁸ Pfeiffer (1968) 223 and 225 n. 4.

²¹⁹ Luschnat (1954), esp. 22-25.

²²⁰ Pfeiffer (1968) 225.

on his observations.²²¹ On the other hand, Dionysius' remarks on the ἐξήγησις γραμματική seem to strengthen the belief that he used a commentary in his letter to Ammaeus, and if such a commentary existed, it could be the origin of (part of) the scholia as well. There are also some terminological differences between the letter and Dionysius' other works (in particular *On Composition*), which seem to support the idea that Dionysius made use of a certain grammatical work. This does not mean, of course, that the entire letter to Ammaeus is copied from a grammatical source. If he used a commentary, Dionysius has surely added his own remarks and examples.

The second text that contains very similar observations on Thucydides is a fragment from Caecilius of Caleacte's *On Figures* (Περὶ σχημάτων), to which I already drew attention in our discussion of *Comp.* 6 (section 4.3.1).²²² The rhetorician Tiberius reports that 'Caecilius introduces the figure of alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) and says that this figure occurs in relation to a noun, cases, numbers, persons and tenses.'²²³ He proceeds by discussing each of these *accidentia* of nouns and verbs and the kind of alteration (or grammatical variation) that occurs in their use. Thus, the alteration concerning ὄνομα is explained as ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος τὸ θήλυ ἢ τὸ οὐδέτερον παραλαμβάνοντες, ἢ τῷ ἄρρενι ἀντ' ἀμφοῖν χρώμενοι: 'adopting the feminine or the neuter instead of the masculine, or using the masculine instead of both of the other genders.' This statement resembles Dionysius' formulation of the σχηματισμός of the genders (cited above, section 4.3.1): ἐξ ἀρρενικῶν γίνεσθαι θηλυκὰ ἢ ἐκ θηλυκῶν ἀρρενικὰ ἢ οὐδέτερα ἐκ τούτων. Next, Caecilius treats the use of singular instead of plural ('Greece' instead of 'the Greeks'), the alteration concerning 'number' and the one concerning tenses, 'when they use the present tenses instead of the past tenses' (ὅταν τοῖς ἐνεστῶσιν ἀντὶ τῶν παρῳχημένων χρώωνται). Since Tiberius only mentions Caecilius at the beginning of his treatment of ἀλλοίωσις, we should allow for the possibility that Caecilius is not responsible for the complete text of the fragment. However, in our discussion of Dionysius' grammatical observations in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, we will notice that there are many parallels with the

²²¹ Cf. Ros (1938) 65 n. 36, Luschnat (1954) 23-24 and Goudriaan (1989) 18 n. 2.

²²² Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 75 Ofenloch (Tiberius, *Rhetores Graeci* III [ed. Spengel], 80-81). Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.89 reports that Dionysius also wrote a book on figures (see also section 1.3), but a treatise Περὶ σχημάτων has not survived in Dionysius' name. It has been thought that at two places Dionysius indicates that he was going to write a treatise on figures, namely at *Dem.* 39.212,13-16 and *Comp.* 8.33,3-5: cf. Egger (1902) 24, Radermacher (1905) 969 and Aujac (1978) 21. However, in these passages Dionysius merely says that he does not have enough time to enumerate all figures in the treatise that he is actually writing (i.e. *On Composition* and *On Demosthenes*).

²²³ On the figure ἀλλοίωσις, see Anderson (2000) 16-17. On Tiberius (the author of Περὶ σχημάτων), see Solmsen (1936). Later rhetoricians who write on figures echo the views of Dionysius (see Ros [1938] 67-68), but in this section I will concentrate on the similarities between the theories of Dionysius, his contemporary Caecilius, 'Longinus' and Quintilian.

examples that are mentioned in the fragment of Caecilius. There are two differences between the two treatments. First, Caecilius draws his examples not only from Thucydides, although many of them are indeed taken from the historian.²²⁴ Second, Caecilius deals with ἀλλοίωσις in a discussion of approved figures, whereas Dionysius mentions the same kind of variations in a negative treatment of Thucydides' stylistic defects. Still, the treatment of ἀλλοίωσις in the relevant fragment from Tiberius' *On Figures* seems to correspond more to Dionysius' discussion than to later treatments, such as the one in 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23-24, who appears to correct his predecessor Caecilius (see below). Therefore, I believe that Caecilius, just like Dionysius, was acquainted with certain grammatical theories, which he may have borrowed from the grammarians who were active in Rome at the end of the first century BC. Even if their observations on Thucydides were (partly) based on a grammatical commentary, the type of comments that they make seems to be representative of the integration of grammar, rhetoric and criticism in the Augustan period. Where Hellenistic philologists point to variations in grammatical construction in order to explain a transmitted text, Dionysius uses these observations for his rhetoric and literary criticism, and Caecilius seems to have employed them for his theory of figures.

4.4.2. Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides

In the second chapter of his letter to Ammaeus Dionysius repeats the remarks that he had made on Thucydides' style in *On Thucydides* 24.²²⁵ Having mentioned some aspects of his selection of words, Dionysius summarises the most important characteristics of Thucydides' constructions (σχηματισμοί — for the term, see section 3.7):²²⁶

²²⁴ Solmsen (1936) 804-807 points out that in those parts where Tiberius cites Caecilius he draws more examples from Thucydides, whereas Tiberius himself prefers Demosthenes for his examples. This might indicate that his quotations from Caecilius are reliable.

²²⁵ *Amm.* II 2.422,7-425,8.

²²⁶ *Amm.* II 2.422,21-424,7: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σχηματισμῶν, ἐν οἷς μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη διενεγκεῖν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ, πλείστην εἰσενεγκάμενος πραγματεῖαν, τοτὲ μὲν λόγον ἐξ ὀνόματος ποιῶν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ὄνομα συνάγων τὸν λόγον· καὶ νῦν μὲν τὸ ῥηματικὸν ὀνοματικῶς ἐκφέρων, αὐθις δὲ τοῦνομα ῥῆμα ποιῶν· καὶ αὐτῶν γε τούτων ἀναστρέφων τὰς χρήσεις, ἵνα τὸ μὲν ὀνοματικὸν (προσηγορικὸν γένηται, τὸ δὲ προσηγορικὸν ὀνοματικῶς) λέγηται, καὶ τὰ μὲν παθητικὰ ῥήματα δραστήρια, τὰ δὲ δραστήρια παθητικά· πληθυντικῶν δὲ καὶ ἐνικῶν ἀλλάττων τὰς φύσεις καὶ ἀντικατηγορῶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλων, θηλυκὰ τ' ἀρρενικοῖς καὶ ἀρρενικὰ θηλυκοῖς καὶ οὐδέτερα τούτων τισὶν συνάπτων, ἐξ ὧν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία πλανᾶται· τὰς δὲ (τῶν) ὀνοματικῶν ἢ μετοχικῶν πτώσεις τοτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὸ σημαίνοντο ἀπὸ τοῦ σημαίνοντος ἀποστρέφων, τοτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὸ (σημαίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ) σημαίνομένου· ἐν δὲ τοῖς συνδετικοῖς καὶ τοῖς προθετικοῖς μορίοις καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις ποιητοῦ τρόπον ἐνεξουσιάζων. πλείστα δ' ἂν τις εὔροι παρ' αὐτῷ τῶν σχημάτων, προσώπων τε ἀποστροφῶν καὶ χρόνων ἐναλλαγῶν καὶ τροπικῶν σημειώσεων μεταφοραῖς ἐξηλλαγμένα καὶ σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίας· ὅποσα τε γίνεται πράγματα ἀντὶ σωμάτων ἢ

‘With regard to the constructions, in which he particularly wished to excel his predecessors, he took the greatest care. Sometimes he makes a phrase (λόγος) from a noun, and sometimes he condenses a phrase into a noun. Sometimes he expresses ‘the verbal’ in a nominal form, and sometimes he changes a noun into a verb. And of the nouns themselves he inverts their normal use, so that the proper noun becomes an appellative, and the appellative is expressed in the form of a proper noun, and the passive verbs become active, and the active verbs become passive; and he alters the natural uses of plural and singular and substitutes the one for the other, and he combines feminine forms with masculine forms and masculine forms with feminine forms and neuters with both, as a result of which the natural order (ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία) is ruined.²²⁷ He sometimes changes the cases of nouns and participles from the signifying to the signified and sometimes from the signified to the signifying. And in the use of connectives and prepositions (τοῖς συνδευτικοῖς καὶ τοῖς προθετικοῖς μορίοις) and even more in the words that articulate the values of words (τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις) [i.e. articles], he allows himself full poetic licence. One can find in his work a great many constructions that are unusual through changes of persons and variations of tenses and use of metaphors of figurative expressions and acquire the appearance of solecisms (σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίαν).²²⁸ And he often substitutes things for persons and persons for things.’

After this summary of the unusual aspects of Thucydides’ constructions, Dionysius goes on to enumerate the particularities of Thucydides’ enthymemes and Gorgianic figures of style, which are less interesting for our purpose.²²⁹ In the remaining part of the letter (chapters 3-17), Dionysius offers and discusses examples of many (but not all) of the Thucydidean characteristics mentioned above (with regard to selection of words, constructions, and figures respectively).²³⁰ Most of these concern the use of the μόρια λόγου, especially nouns, verbs, participles, conjunctions, prepositions and articles. We will analyse these remarks in order to understand Dionysius’ blending of

σώματα ἀντὶ πραγμάτων, (...). The corresponding passage from *On Thucydides* that Dionysius quotes (with some changes) is *Thuc.* 24.361,12-362,18.

²²⁷ On Dionysius’ use of the term ἀκολουθία, see section 5.2.

²²⁸ On the expression σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίαν, related to the term σολοικοφανής, see below and also section 5.2.

²²⁹ *Amm.* II 2.424,6-425,8.

²³⁰ Dionysius does not offer examples of proper nouns that become appellatives and appellatives that become proper nouns (announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,6-8). Neither does he discuss the poetic licence in the use of connectives, prepositions and articles (announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,16-424,2). See Warren (1899), who concludes that there is a lacuna after *Amm.* II 6.427,16 and 7.427,17 (where the substitution of τὸ προσηγορικόν for ὄνομα and *vice versa* was treated) and between *Amm.* II 13.433,5 and 14.433,6 (this lacuna was already indicated by Krüger and Usener). Warren points to more differences between the outline of the letter (*Amm.* II 2) and Dionysius’ actual discussion of examples (*Amm.* II 3 ff.), but perhaps we should not wish to make the correspondence perfectly consistent.

grammar and literary criticism. Before we start our discussion of chapter 3-14, however, we should pay attention to a difficulty in Dionysius' terminology. In the passage cited above, Dionysius refers to articles as τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις.²³¹ The MSS have νοημάτων here, but editors have correctly restored the ὀνομάτων that occurs in the corresponding passage in *On Thucydides* 24.²³² Schenkeveld pointed out that this expression does not refer to particles, since in antiquity these words were not distinguished as a group, but to articles (ἄρθρα).²³³ How should we then interpret the words τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις?²³⁴ Schenkeveld points to the Stoic definition of the ἄρθρον as 'a declinable part of speech, distinguishing the genders and numbers of nouns'.²³⁵ On the basis of this text, Schenkeveld argues that 'according to DH articles serve as distinctors of gender and number, and thus have to do with the meaning of words. But one is justified in doubting whether he himself understood what he had written.'²³⁶ I think that Dionysius did understand what he had written, and I do not believe that the definition of the ἄρθρον from Diogenes Laertius is relevant here. The verb διαρθρώω means 'to articulate', but LSJ also give the meaning 'to fill up so as to form an organic whole'.²³⁷ We have seen (section 4.3.2) that in the discussion of the three composition types Dionysius points out that the austere composition is ἀναρθρος ('lacking articles').²³⁸ He also tells us that the σύνθεσις ἀύστηρά does not use ἄρθροις συνεχέειν ('articles that hold together').²³⁹ Where the smooth composition produces a continuous stream of sound through the use of articles and conjunctions, the austere composition wants the words to stand firmly apart: it avoids the use of ἄρθρα that would make the transitions between the words smooth. Now, Thucydides is the most important representative of the austere composition. When Dionysius states that the historian allows himself poetic licence in the use of connectives, prepositions and especially in τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις, he must be thinking of the omission of these parts of speech for the sake of the roughness of

²³¹ *Amm.* II 2.424,1.

²³² *Thuc.* 24.362,11-12. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 79.

²³³ Schenkeveld (1983) 79-80 and Schenkeveld (1988).

²³⁴ See also *Amm.* II 11.430,12-14, where Dionysius quotes instances 'in which he [Thucydides] turns the cases of proper nouns, appellative nouns, participles, and <τῶν> συναπτομένων τούτοις ἄρθρων away from the usual.'

²³⁵ Diogenes Laertius VII.58: διορίζον τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 80. Pinborg (1975) 99 points out that this definition does not look very Stoic: it seems to be influenced by grammarians. The Stoics probably defined the ἄρθρον as a part of speech that indicates the οὐσία: cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 9,9. See also Luhtala (2000) 80 and my section 5.3.6.

²³⁶ Schenkeveld (1983) 80.

²³⁷ LSJ refer to Aristotle, *Historia Animalium* 521a10 and *Ethica Nicomachea* 1098a22.

²³⁸ *Comp.* 22.98,1-2.

²³⁹ *Dem.* 39.213,6-8. See section 4.3.2.

sound.²⁴⁰ The term δύναμις often refers to phonetic value or sound in Dionysius' works.²⁴¹ Elsewhere, Dionysius points out that modification of the parts of speech, which may involve the addition or omission of a preposition (κατιδών or ιδών), is applied more frequently in poetry than in prose.²⁴² The same thing seems to be true of the omission of articles and the paraplomatic σύνδεσμοι (see above, section 4.3.2). Therefore, it seems clear that when Dionysius refers to Thucydides' poetic use of prepositions, σύνδεσμοι (including our 'particles') and articles, he actually means the avoidance of these parts of speech. He describes the articles as 'words that connect (or fill up) the (phonetic) values of words' because their presence or absence can cause the words either to form one continuous stream of sound or to stand firmly apart. The latter option is the one that Thucydides, as a representative of the austere composition, prefers. Pritchett mentions examples of the omission of the article from Thucydides' work, which seem to support Dionysius' analysis.²⁴³

In the third chapter of the letter, Dionysius starts his demonstration of Thucydides' characteristics. Having briefly mentioned a number of archaic words, he turns to the inventiveness and versatility that Thucydides shows in his constructions (σχηματισμοί). In the fourth chapter, he illustrates the periphrasis of one single noun or verb (λέξιν εἴτε ὀνομαστικὴν εἴτε ῥημαστικὴν) by the use of more words.²⁴⁴ He does not comment upon the first example (Thuc. 1.138.3), but it seems clear that Dionysius regards the words διαφερόντως τι ἐξ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιός θαυμάσαι ('especially in this respect deserving more respect than any other') as periphrastic here.²⁴⁵ Dionysius' analysis of the next example (Thuc. 2.37.1) is unfortunately lost in a lacuna.²⁴⁶ After that lacuna, he seems to be discussing the opposite of periphrasis, namely the expression of a phrase in one single word, a Thucydidean characteristic that had been announced at the beginning of the letter (τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ὄνομα συνάγων τὸν λόγον).²⁴⁷ The example (Thuc. 4.12.1) concerns the word παρεξαιρεσία

²⁴⁰ On Thucydides' poetic license, see section 6.4.

²⁴¹ Cf. Rhys Roberts (1910) 296.

²⁴² *Comp.* 6.29,17-30,3.

²⁴³ Pritchett (1975) 94.

²⁴⁴ *Amm.* II 4.425,1-426,2: ὅταν μὲν οὖν μίαν λέξιν εἴτε ὀνομαστικὴν εἴτε ῥημαστικὴν ἐν πλείοσιν ὀνόμασιν ἢ ῥήμασιν ἐκφέρῃ περιφράζων τὴν αὐτὴν νόησιν, τοιαύτην ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. 'When he conveys a single noun or verb in more nouns or verbs, expressing the same idea periphrastically, he produces this sort of phrase.'

²⁴⁵ See also Ros (1938) 56. Further examples of periphrasis in Thucydides are found in the rhetorical literature on figures: see esp. Spengel III 32,15 and III 76,8.

²⁴⁶ Here I follow Aujac (1991) 134. Usener does not assume that there is a lacuna, but reads σύντομον instead of σημαίνόμενον at *Amm.* II 4.426,8. But the transition between 'periphrasis' and 'concision' would then be rather abrupt, and it is more natural that the words καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις (*Amm.* II 4.426,7-8) refer to the preceding example.

²⁴⁷ *Amm.* II 2.423,3.

(‘outrigger’). In order to make it clear that this strange word is the condensed form of a whole phrase (λόγος), Dionysius rewrites the sentence, thus explaining what Dionysius ‘wants to signify’ (βούλεται δηλοῦν).²⁴⁸ The scholia on Thucydides give different explanations of the term.²⁴⁹

In the next chapter (*Amm.* II 5), Dionysius deals with passages in which Thucydides ‘casts the verbal parts of speech in the form of nouns’ (τὰ ῥηματικὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως ὀνοματικῶς σχηματίζει).²⁵⁰ The example (Thuc. 1.41.1) contains the words παραίνεσις (‘exhortation’) and ἀξίωσις (‘claim’). Dionysius states that ‘the words παραινεῖν and ἀξιοῦν, which are verbs, have become nouns, παραίνεσις and ἀξίωσις’ (τὸ γὰρ παραινεῖν καὶ ἀξιοῦν ῥήματα ὄντα ὀνοματικὰ γέγονεν παραίνεσις καὶ ἀξίωσις).²⁵¹ The scholia on Thucydides give the same explanation, and a scholiast remarks the following: τὸ παραινεῖν καὶ ἀξιοῦν, ῥήματα ὄντα, ὀνοματικῶς προήνεγκεν. ‘He has expressed the words παραινεῖν and ἀξιοῦν, which are verbs, in the form of nouns.’²⁵² Dionysius’ other examples are ἀποτειχίσις (not in the received text, but Thuc. 3.95.2 has περιτειχίσις) instead of ἀποτειχίσαι and ὀλόφυρσις (‘lamentation’) instead of ὀλοφύρασθαι. The scholia merely explain the word ὀλόφυρσιν as θρήνον and λύπην, without deriving it from the verb that Dionysius mentions.²⁵³

When Thucydides turns nouns into verbs (τὰ ὀνόματα ποιῆ ῥήματα), he uses for example ἀναγκάσαι and πολεμεῖν instead of ἀνάγκη and πόλεμος.²⁵⁴ Thucydides (1.23.6) writes τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀληθεστάτην αἰτίαν, λόγῳ δὲ ἀφανεστάτην, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἴομαι μεγάλους γινομένους ἀναγκάσαι εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν. ‘Now the most genuine cause, though given least publicity, I consider to have been the fact that growing Athenian power made it necessary for them to go to war.’ Dionysius’ explanation of this passage from Thucydides is literally the same as the one that we find in the scholia: βούλεται γὰρ δηλοῦν, ὅτι μεγάλοι γινόμενοι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνάγκην παρέσχον τοῦ πολέμου. ‘For he wants to signify that growing Athenian power imposed upon them the necessity of war.’²⁵⁵ In the scholia, this explanation is preceded by the observation τὰ ὀνόματα ῥήματα ἐποίησεν (‘he has turned the nouns

²⁴⁸ On metathesis, see De Jonge (2005b) and chapter 7 of this study.

²⁴⁹ Hude (1927) 234-235. Cf. Ros (1938) 55 n. 14.

²⁵⁰ *Amm.* II 5.426,15-16.

²⁵¹ *Amm.* II 5.426,20-427,1. Blass *DAB* I (1979³ [1868]) 213 agrees with Dionysius on Thucydides’ ‘Verbalnomina’.

²⁵² Hude (1927) 40.

²⁵³ Hude (1927) 106.

²⁵⁴ *Amm.* II 6.427,7-16.

²⁵⁵ *Amm.* II 6.427,12-14. Hude (1927) 26. Noonan (1992) discusses the passage and defends Thucydides against the criticism of Dionysius and the scholia.

into verbs'). Dionysius adds the following words to the explanation: πεποίηκεν δὲ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ὀνοματικῶν ὄντων ῥηματικὰ τό τε ἀναγκάσαι καὶ τὸ πολεμεῖν. 'But for the nouns "necessity" and "war" he has substituted the verbs "made it necessary" and "to wage war".' How should we explain the fact that the scholiast gives the verbatim text that we find in Dionysius?²⁵⁶ Did Dionysius quote a text from a grammatical commentary that also survived in the scholia, or did the scholiast make use of Dionysius' comments? To answer this question, we should observe that the combination of βούλεται and δηλοῦν is rather frequent in Dionysius: it occurs seven times in the rhetorical works. In many cases, (as in *Amm.* II 6) the words introduce Dionysius' rewriting (metathesis) of a passage, which intends to make clear 'what the author intends to signify'.²⁵⁷ Apart from βούλεται δηλοῦν, we also find many instances of βούλεται λέγειν in Dionysius' works.²⁵⁸ In the scholia on Thucydides, however, the expression βούλεται δηλοῦν does not occur anywhere else. It does occur in the scholia on Homer, but the rewriting seems characteristic of Dionysius' method.²⁵⁹ Therefore, it seems likely that the scholiast made use of Dionysius' observations on Thucydides: in his discussion of Thucydides 1.23.6 he agreed with Dionysius and decided to quote him. If this conclusion is correct, it will have far-reaching consequences for our understanding of the relation between Dionysius and the Thucydides scholia in general. Both Usener and Radermacher assumed that the scholia on Thucydides represent an independent tradition that was not influenced by a rhetorician like Dionysius.²⁶⁰ Although Ros and Luschnat admit the possibility that it was Dionysius who influenced the scholia, they finally follow the authority of Usener and Radermacher.²⁶¹ I think that it is still plausible that Dionysius made use of some grammatical commentary (see above), but we should be very careful when tracing the scholiastic tradition in the form that we know it back to Alexandria. In any case, it seems that this tradition was not independent of the rhetorical tradition from the Augustan period: at least part of the comments in the scholia seem to be borrowed from Dionysius' observations.

Dionysius now turns to Thucydides' interchanging of the *accidentia* of the parts of speech: he discusses the use of the voices (*Amm.* II 7-8), numbers (*Amm.* II 9),

²⁵⁶ Aujac (1991) and other commentators are silent on this correspondence. Noonan (1992) 38 observes the 'identical reaction' of Dionysius and the scholia, but does not explain the fact that they use exactly the same words.

²⁵⁷ The expression βούλεται δηλοῦν occurs in the following passages: *Thuc.* 29.374,22; *Thuc.* 30.375,25-376,1; *Thuc.* 30.376,6; *Thuc.* 31.378,5; *Amm.* II 4.426,12; *Amm.* II 6.427,12-13; *Amm.* II 8.428,12-13. See also *Ant. Rom.* 4.41.4; 4.69.4; 5.19.5.

²⁵⁸ E.g. *Thuc.* 29.374,13.

²⁵⁹ For the use of βούλεται δηλοῦν in the scholia on Homer, see e.g. Sch. Homer, *Iliad* 8.185.

²⁶⁰ Usener (1889) 71 ff.; Radermacher (1905) 968-969.

²⁶¹ Ros (1938) 65 n. 36; Luschnat (1954) 23-24.

genders (*Amm.* II 10), cases (*Amm.* II 11) and tenses (*Amm.* II 12). Just like the early grammarians, Dionysius distinguishes only two voices (see section 3.8). In our passage (*Amm.* II 7-8), Dionysius uses the terms ποιητικόν and ἐνεργητικόν for active, and παθητικόν for passive. In the introduction of the letter (which he cites from *On Thucydides* 24), however, he uses the terms τὰ δραστήρια (the active forms) and τὰ παθητικά (the passive forms).²⁶² In the sixth chapter of *On Composition* (see section 4.3.1), which seems to be influenced by theories from Hellenistic poetic theory, he again uses different terms: τὰ ὀρθά (active) and τὰ ὑπτια (passive).²⁶³ According to Schenkeveld, ποιητικόν is ‘unique in this sense of active’.²⁶⁴ Since it occurs only here, we might assume that Dionysius found his examples of the interchanging of passive and active in a source that used different terms than he himself when he mentioned the characteristics of Thucydides’ style in his treatise *On Thucydides*.

As examples of Thucydides’ use of the active instead of the passive Dionysius mentions κωλύει (‘hinders’) (Thuc. 1.144.2), which is used instead of κωλύεται (‘is hindered’) and ἐπιμιγνόντες (‘mingling’) (Thuc. 1.2.2), which is used instead of ἐπιμιγνόμενοι (‘being mingled’).²⁶⁵ At the latter passage, the scholia explain οὐδ’ ἐπιμιγνόντες ἀδεῶς as ἐπεμίγνοντο μὲν οὐκ ἀδεῶς δέ (‘they mingled but not without fear’), thus silently substituting the middle for the active participle.²⁶⁶ Thucydides’ use of the passive instead of the active is illustrated by ἐνηλλάγησαν (‘they had been brought into contact’) (Thuc. 1.120.2), which is said to replace the active συνήλλαξαν (‘they dealt with’), and by κατοικημένους (‘who had been settled’) (same passage), which Thucydides is said to have used instead of κατοικηκότας (‘who had settled’).²⁶⁷ The latter examples return in the later rhetorical treatments of figures.²⁶⁸ The scholiast also agrees with Dionysius and writes that ἐνηλλάγησαν is used ἀντὶ τοῦ συνέμιξαν καὶ ὠμίλησαν (‘instead of “they mixed together” and “they consorted”’).²⁶⁹

Dionysius is not the first to discuss the interchanging of active and passive. Aristarchus already pointed out that Homer used the active ναιετάουσι (*Iliad* 4.45)

²⁶² *Amm.* II 2.423,8-9: καὶ τὰ μὲν παθητικὰ ῥήματα δραστήρια, τὰ δὲ δραστήρια παθητικά.

²⁶³ *Comp.* 6.29,8. See sections 3.8 and 5.3.6.

²⁶⁴ Schenkeveld (1983) 84.

²⁶⁵ *Amm.* II 7.427,17-428,9. For Dionysius’ use of the term ῥῆμα with regard to the participle ἐπιμιγνόντες, see section 3.6.

²⁶⁶ Hude (1927) 2.

²⁶⁷ *Amm.* II 8.428,10-18.

²⁶⁸ See *Rhetores Graeci* ed. Spengel (1856) III 34,17, III 184,19 and III 89,27. Quintilian *Inst. orat.* 9.3.7 also mentions variation in the voices of verbs. Cf. Ros (1938) 57 n. 20.

²⁶⁹ Hude (1927) 86.

instead of ναιετάονται.²⁷⁰ He also pointed to the use of τὸ παθητικὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ ('passive instead of active') in ὀρᾶσθαι (*Iliad* 3.106) and τιμῆσονται (*Iliad* 9.297).²⁷¹ The original aspect of Dionysius' discussion of this kind of variations is of course that he does not use these grammatical observations in order to correct or to explain a text, but in order to support his stylistic analysis of Thucydides. Even if he consulted certain philological or grammatical works for his examples, the way in which he used these examples was probably rather new: the basic units of technical grammar, the parts of speech and their accidentia, have now become the tools for literary criticism. Dionysius always emphasises that Thucydides' use of the parts of speech deviates from the 'natural' and from the 'usual': thus, the grammatical analysis supports his literary evaluation of the historian.²⁷² It seems that Dionysius' friend and colleague Caecilius of Caleacte similarly used the accidentia of the parts of speech for rhetorical purposes (see below), in particular for his treatment of the figures of style. It was 'Longinus' who brought the integration of grammar and literary criticism to perfection: in his discussion of 'changes of case, tense, person, number or gender that vary and stir up the expressions', he makes a much more refined use of these grammatical categories than Dionysius does.²⁷³ Nevertheless, it may well be that Dionysius (perhaps with Caecilius) deserves the credit of being one of the pioneers in this field that lies between the disciplines of rhetoric and grammar. Besides, there is an important difference between Dionysius' use of grammar in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* on the one hand and the way in which Caecilius (if the fragment from Tiberius preserves his words), 'Demetrius' (see below) and 'Longinus' employ the grammatical categories on the other hand. The latter critics and rhetoricians discuss figures that one can adopt in order to achieve grand or sublime style. They select examples from different authors that illustrate each relevant figure. Dionysius, however, applies the grammatical categories in order to analyse the style of a single author (Thucydides). For him, the changes in number, case, gender, tense and voice do not contribute to grandeur, but they illustrate his mainly negative evaluation of Thucydides' style, which he regards as unsuitable for imitation.

²⁷⁰ Aristarchus, fr. 55 Matthaïos: see Matthaïos (1999) 309-312. The same example is given in *FDS* 596.

²⁷¹ Aristarchus, fr.57 and 59 Matthaïos: see Matthaïos (1999) 312-318.

²⁷² See e.g. *Amm.* II 6.427,7 (ἀντιστρέψας ἑκατέρου τούτων τὴν φύσιν) and *Amm.* II 9.429,9 (ἐξαλλάττων τὴν συνήθη φράσιν).

²⁷³ 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23-27. See esp. *Subl.* 23.1: τί δὲ αἱ τῶν πτώσεων χρόνων προσώπων ἀριθμῶν γενῶν ἐναλλάξεις, πῶς ποτε καταποικίλλουσι καὶ ἐπεγείρουσι τὰ ἐρμηνευτικά; 'And the changes of cases, tenses, persons, numbers, and genders, how do they vary and excite the expressions?' Görler (1979) 186-198 shows that Roman poets of the Augustan period (esp. Vergil) put 'Longinus'' advices on syntactical variety into practice. He argues that Horace's *iunctura callida* (*Ars poetica* 47) is also 'eine Aufforderung zu kühnen und darum verfremdenden syntaktischen Neuerungen'.

In *Amm.* II 9, Dionysius discusses Thucydides' interchanging of the singular and the plural (see also *Amm.* II 13 below).²⁷⁴ He first points out that Thucydides (6.78.1) speaks of 'the Syracusan' and 'the Athenian' when he means 'the Syracusans' and 'the Athenians', and (Thuc. 4.10.3) that he writes 'the enemy' (πολέμιος) when he means 'the enemies' (πολέμιοι).²⁷⁵ Dionysius' example of the use of the plural instead of the singular is from a different character: here, Dionysius points out that Thucydides (Thucydides 2.35.2) starts with a singular pronoun (ἕκαστος), and then goes on with a plural participle (φθονοῦντες) and verb (ἀπιστοῦσιν).²⁷⁶ On ἀπιστοῦσιν, the last word of this sentence, the scholiast on Thucydides remarks that λείπει ἕκαστος: 'the word "each" is omitted'.²⁷⁷ He adds that it is a figure (σχῆμα). In other words: he explains that the word ἕκαστος, which appears earlier in the sentence, should be added to the verb ἀπιστοῦσιν again, thus forming a *constructio ad sensum*, ἕκαστος being a collective pronoun. Thus, where Dionysius objects to Thucydides' interchanging of singular and plural, the scholiast gives a more positive explanation. In a similar way Quintilian's discussion of the substitution of singulars for plurals and *vice versa* differs from Dionysius' treatment: *sunt et illa non similia soloecismo quidem, sed tamen numerum mutantia, quae et tropis adsignari solent, ut de uno pluraliter dicimus (...) et de pluralibus singulariter*. 'There are other devices, not indeed like solecisms, but involving a change of number, which are often reckoned

²⁷⁴ *Amm.* II 9.428,19-21: Παρὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν ἐνικῶν τε καὶ πληθυντικῶν διαφορὰς, ὅταν ἐναλλάτῃ τὴν ἑκατέρου τούτων τάξιν, ἐνικὰ μὲν ἀντὶ πληθυντικῶν οὕτως ἐκφέρει. 'With regard to the distinctions between singular and plural, when he changes the order of both of them, he expresses singulars instead of plurals as follows.' *Amm.* II 9.429,7-9: Ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐνικοῦ τὸ πληθυντικὸν παραλαμβάνει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐξαλλάττων τὴν συνήθη φράσιν. He adopts the plural instead of the singular, in this way departing from the usual expression.' The subject is announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,9-10.

²⁷⁵ *Amm.* II 9.428,19-429,7. The former passage (Thuc. 6.78.1) is also discussed in *Thuc.* 48.407,2-15, where Dionysius criticises the change (in the second part of the sentence) from the third person to the first person: καὶ ἔτι τὸ κατακορὸς τῆς μεταγωγῆς (τῆς) ἕκ τε τοῦ πληθυντικοῦ εἰς τὸ ἐνικὸν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περὶ προσώπων λόγου εἰς τὸ τοῦ λέγοντος πρόσωπον. 'And again, the wearisome change from the plural to the singular and from the third person to the first person.' On the terms τὸ λέγον πρόσωπον ('the speaker' i.e. the first person) and λόγος περὶ τῶν προσώπων ('utterance about persons' i.e. the third person), see Matthaios (1999) 392-395. He points out that these terms for the grammatical persons are based on Aristotle, who (*Rhetoric* 1358a37) distinguishes between ὁ λέγων (the speaker), πρὸς ὃν λέγει (the one whom he addresses), and περὶ οὗ λέγει (the subject on which he speaks). Varro's distinction concerning the three grammatical persons is between *qui loqueretur, ad quem*, and *de quo* (*De lingua latina* 8.20 — but *ad quem* is a conjecture). Aristarchus seems to have distinguished between πρὸς αὐτόν (second person) and περὶ αὐτοῦ (third person). Because one scholion to *Iliad* 5.265 refers to Hecabe and Hector as τὰ λέγοντα πρόσωπα ('the talking persons'), Matthaios (1999) 393 believes that Aristarchus also used the expression τὸ λέγον πρόσωπον as a grammatical term for the first person. Dionysius' contemporary Tryphon wrote a treatise *Περὶ προσώπων* (fr. 38 Von Velsen). See also section 3.8.

²⁷⁶ *Amm.* II 9.429,7-17. Thucydides 2.35.2: μέχρι γὰρ τοῦδε ἀνεκτοὶ οἱ ἔπαινοί εἰσιν περὶ ἐτέρων λεγόμενοι, ἐς ὅσον ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος οἴηται ἰκανὸς εἶναι δρᾶσαί τι ὧν ἤκουσεν, τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτὸν φθονοῦντες ἤδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν. On this variation in number, see Ros (1938) 57-58.

²⁷⁷ Hude (1927) 130.

also as Tropes: speaking of a single thing in the plural (...) or of a number of things in the singular.²⁷⁸ The Latin examples are the use of *nos* ('we') instead of 'I' (Vergil, *Georgics* 2.541) and the use of *acer Romanus* ('the fierce Roman') (Vergil, *Georgics* 3.346) instead of 'the fierce Romans'. Quintilian would agree with Dionysius that writers who employ these substitutions 'depart from customary usage'. However, Quintilian explicitly states that these devices are not solecisms, whereas Dionysius' discussion illustrates the idea that Thucydides' style is not to be used as a model. Although he does not use the word solecism with regard to the interchanging of singular and plural, Dionysius does say (in the same letter) that Thucydides could be said to commit solecism (σολοικίζειν) in the use of cases (πτώσεις) (see below). That the borderline between solecisms and figures could indeed be vague is made clear in various ancient texts on σολοικισμός.²⁷⁹ Elsewhere, Dionysius uses the term σολοικοφανής ('like a solecism') (see section 5.2). Just as the expression σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίας ('acquiring the appearance of solecisms'), the term σολοικοφανής seems to indicate that a certain obscure construction can be sanctioned in the style of a classical author like Thucydides, but should not be imitated by Dionysius' students.²⁸⁰

For Dionysius' discussion of the use of singular and plural, we also have an interesting parallel in the fragment of his contemporary Caecilius of Caleacte on ἀλλοίωσις.²⁸¹ Caecilius first points to the variation 'concerning the plural' (κατὰ τὸ πληθυντικόν) that occurs in Thuc. 1.6.1: πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐσιδηροφόρει ('for entire Greece went armed'), where Greece is used instead of the Greeks. This Thucydidean example corresponds more or less to Dionysius' examples of the use of the singular instead of the plural. But Caecilius also offers two examples of 'variation concerning numbers' (περὶ δὲ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀλλοίωσις), which occurs in sentences that combine a singular with a plural: these cases correspond to Dionysius' discussion of the *constructio ad sensum* in *Amm.* II 13 (below). The first is taken from Eurpolis: ἅπαντα γὰρ ποθοῦμεν ἡ κλεινὴ πόλις ('for we, the famous city, desire'). A

²⁷⁸ Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.20. The translation is by Russell (2001).

²⁷⁹ See e.g. *FDS* 601a: ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν σχῆμα ἔχει τινὰ αἰτίαν εὐλογον καθισταμένην εἰς εὐπρέπειαν, ὁ δὲ σολοικισμὸς οὐκ ἔχει. 'For the figure has a certain plausible reason, which makes it acceptable, but the solecism does not have such a reason.' Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 22 tells us a story that shows that the use of incorrect grammatical constructions could have serious consequences. Once, when the grammarian Marcus Pomponius Porcellus (who was active under Augustus and in the early years of Tiberius) was acting as an advocate, 'he was so persistent in condemning a solecism (*soloecismum*) made by his opponent that finally Cassius Severus addressed the judges and asked for an adjournment, so that his client could call in another grammarian — since he thought that the dispute with his opponent was going to turn not on a point of law but on a point of solecism (*soloecismo*).' The translation is by Kaster (1995).

²⁸⁰ For σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίας, see *Amm.* II 2.424,5-6 (cited above).

²⁸¹ Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 75 Ofenloch.

second example concerns the expression (in Demosthenes) ὑμεῖς ὦ βουλή ('you, council').²⁸² In both cases the stylistic (or grammatical) particularity concerns the *combination* of a singular with a plural, not the substitution of an independent plural for a singular. 'Longinus' has more to say on the variation concerning numbers.²⁸³ A writer can start with a singular form that turns out to signify a plural: the example, whose source is unknown, concerns the combination of the singular λαός ἀπείρων ('a numberless people') with the plural verb κελάδησαν ('shouted'). This example fits the 'variation concerning numbers' of Caecilius, but 'Longinus' thinks that this kind of figure is actually of minor importance. 'It is still more worthy of notice that plurals sometimes make a grander impression'.²⁸⁴ Here, 'Longinus' seems to correct his predecessor Caecilius, who also wrote on the sublime: according to 'Longinus', one should not bother too much about a *constructio ad sensum* (he does not use the term), for it is much more interesting how one can produce *grandeur* by the use of the plural: thus, Sophocles makes Oedipus speak six lines on marriages, marriages, fathers, sons, brothers, brides, wives, and mothers, so that his misfortunes seem to be plural as well.²⁸⁵ Likewise, 'Longinus' adds, one can speak of 'Hectors and Sarpedons'. The opposite technique, the contraction of plurals to singulars, can also give the effect of sublimity: 'Longinus' examples here include a passage from Demosthenes, who says ἔπειθ' ἡ Πελοπόννησος ἅπασα διειστήκει ('then the Peloponnese as a whole was split').²⁸⁶ This kind of 'compressing the number of separate individuals into a unified whole' agrees with Caecilius' example ('entire Greece') from Thuc. 1.6.1 (above).²⁸⁷ Some of the examples mentioned above are related to the ancient ideas on the anomaly that can exist between the form and the meaning of a word. Both Stoic philosophers and philologists seem to have pointed to the anomaly in collective nouns (δῆμος, λαός), singulars that refer to a plurality, and names of towns such as Ἀθῆναι and Πλαταιαί, plurals that refer to a single city.²⁸⁸ The Stoic Chrysippus wrote a work *Περὶ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας* (*On Anomaly*) in which he probably dealt with words that showed an anomaly between σημαῖνον (form) and σημαίνόμενον (meaning).²⁸⁹ As a

²⁸² Eupolis fr. 104. The words ὑμεῖς ὦ βουλή are not found in our text of Demosthenes, but see *Third Olynthiac* 31: ὑμεῖς δ' ὁ δῆμος.

²⁸³ 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23-24.

²⁸⁴ 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23.2.

²⁸⁵ Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex* 1403-1408; 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23.3.

²⁸⁶ Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 18.

²⁸⁷ 'Longinus', *Subl.* 24.1: τὰ ἐκ τῶν πληθυντικῶν εἰς τὰ ἐνικὰ ἐπισυναγόμενα ἐνίστε ὑψηλοφανέστατα. Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.8 also mentions the *figura in numero*: either a plural follows a singular (*Romani* corresponding with *gens*), or a singular follows a plural (the example is a problematic passage from Vergil, *Eclogues* 4.62-63). For examples of variation in numbers in later rhetoricians, see Ros (1938) 58 n. 23.

²⁸⁸ Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.154 uses the word ἀνωμαλία.

²⁸⁹ See *FDS* 194 (= Diogenes Laertius VII.192) and *FDS* 640 (= Varro, *De lingua latina* 9.1). On the Stoic views on anomaly, see Siebenborn (1976) 98-100 and Ax (1996) 290. The account of Dahlmann

philologist, Aristarchus also commented on Homeric words of which the form did not seem to agree with the meaning.²⁹⁰ In connection with his observations on this type of words, he also pointed out that Homer sometimes uses the plural instead of the singular, for example *στέμματα* (*Iliad* 1.14), which refers to one garland, and *πύλαι*, which refers to one single gate.²⁹¹ The plural names of cities he also explained in this way. In later times, the technical grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus points out that there are various words whose grammatical form is in conflict with their meaning (*δηλούμενον*). His examples are *μάχομαι*, which has a ‘passive’ form and an active meaning, *παιδίον*, which is a neuter but refers to a boy or a girl, and *Θῆβαι*, which is a plural whereas it signifies a single city.²⁹²

Dionysius’ next subject is the use of genders: masculine, feminine and neuter.²⁹³ Again, Thucydides’ interchanges are said to ‘depart from the normal forms’ (*ἐκβεβηκυῖαι τῶν συνήθων*).²⁹⁴ He first mentions some individual words with unusual genders: he argues that Thucydides uses *τάραχος* for *ταραχή*, *ὄχλος* for *ὄχλησις*, and *τὸ βουλόμενον* and *τὸ δυνάμενον* instead of *βούλησις* and *δύναμις*.²⁹⁵ More interesting is Dionysius’ last example (Thuc. 4.78.3): *ὥστε εἰ μὴ δυναστεία μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομία ἐχρῶντο τῷ ἐπιχωρίῳ οἱ Θεσσαλοί*.²⁹⁶ ‘So that if the Thessalians had not been under despotic rule rather than enjoying equal civil rights by the law of their country.’ Dionysius points out that Thucydides has made the feminine

(1932) 52-53 is illuminating: ‘Dies zeigt, daß die Stoiker (...) τὸ τῷ σημαينوμένῳ δηλούμενον und τὸν τῷ τύπῳ τῆς φωνῆς χαρακτηῖρα (...), den eigentlichen Sinn des Gegenstandes und seine sprachliche Form oder, wie es in dem ganz stoisch-chrysippischen Stück bei Varro VIII 40 heißt, das, was die *vox significat, quam intellegimus* und die *vox quae ex syllabis est ficta, eam quam audimus*, unterschieden und eine Anomalie, die zwischen beiden besteht, betonten. Ähnliche Unstimmigkeiten bezüglich des Geschlechtes und der Zahl (154) führt auch Sextus (adv. gramm. 148 ff.) an und nennt das Anomalie (...). Aus all diesem ergibt sich, was Chrysipp unter Anomalie verstanden hat: ein Plural bezeichnet einen einzelnen Gegenstand, ein maskulines Wort einen femininen Begriff, eine Privativform eine Sache, die keinen entsprechenden Sinn hat. Das sind alle Anzeichen dafür, daß die φωνή dem σημαينوμένῳ nicht gerecht wird.’

²⁹⁰ See Aristarchus fr. 82 Matthaïos. See Matthaïos (1999) 282-283.

²⁹¹ Aristarchus fr. 38 Matthaïos. See Matthaïos (1999) 283.

²⁹² Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj.*, G.G. II 1, 215,16-216,2. Cf. Matthaïos (1999) 282-283 and Dalimier (2001) 246-247.

²⁹³ *Amm.* II 10.429,18-430,11. The subject is announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,11-13: *θηλυκά τ’ ἀρρενικοῖς καὶ ἀρρενικὰ θηλυκοῖς καὶ οὐδέτερα τούτων τισὶν συνάπτων, ἐξ ὧν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία πλανᾶται*. ‘He connects feminine forms with masculine forms and masculine forms with feminine forms and neuters with both, as a result of which the natural order is ruined.’ Thus, the outline promises a discussion of the *combination* of unusual genders; the substitution of genders of particular words (*Amm.* II 10.429,18-430,6) is not announced: cf. Warren (1899) 319.

²⁹⁴ *Amm.* II 10.429,19.

²⁹⁵ The word *τάραχος* is in fact not found in Thucydides. See Usener (1889) 106 and Ros (1938) 59 n. 24. On the use of *ὄχλος* for *ὄχλησις*, see Blass, *DAB* I (1979³ [1868]) 214. *τὸ δυνάμενον* is not found in our Thucydides text either. The word *τὸ βουλόμενον*, which Dionysius adopts in his quotation of Thucydides 6.24.2, does not occur in our text of that passage: see Aujac (1991) 164.

²⁹⁶ The Thucydides MSS have *τὸ ἐγχώριον*, Hude (OCT) corrects it into [*τὸ*] *ἐγχωρίῳ*.

(τὸ θηλυκόν) word ἐπιχώριος ('of the land', adjective) neuter (οὐδέτερον). Dionysius wants to take the adjective ἐπιχώριον with ἰσονομία. 'What is signified by the expression' (τὸ σημαίνομενον ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως), he says, is the following:²⁹⁷ ὥστε εἰ μὴ δυναστεία μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομία ἐχρῶντο τῇ ἐπιχώριον οἱ Θεσσαλοί. 'So that if the Thessalians had not been under despotic rule rather than enjoying national equality of civic rights.' The latter metathesis only changes the article τῷ into τῇ, thus restoring the agreement with ἰσονομία.²⁹⁸

For the interchange of genders, the fragment from Caecilius provides another parallel to Dionysius' discussion. In his treatment of ἀλλοιώσις ('variation'), Caecilius states that 'they change nouns by adopting the feminine or the neuter instead of the masculine, or using the masculine instead of both of the other genders' (ὀνόματα μὲν ἀλλοιοῦσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος τὸ θῆλυ ἢ τὸ οὐδέτερον παραλαμβάνοντες, ἢ τῷ ἄρρενι ἀντ' ἀμφοῖν χρώμενοι). Just like Dionysius, Caecilius draws his example from Thucydides (2.44.4), who speaks of τὸ φιλότιμον instead of ἡ φιλοτιμία, using the neuter instead of the feminine.²⁹⁹ This example clearly fits the first examples of Dionysius.³⁰⁰ When we turn to the field of philology, we observe that Aristarchus already commented on words whose gender Homer was supposed to have changed, making πύλος instead of πύλη, χόλος instead of χολή, etc.³⁰¹ He also claimed that it is characteristic for the language of Homer that he sometimes combines a feminine substantive with a masculine adjective: Aristarchus used this principle to defend certain readings in the Homeric text.³⁰² Thus, in *Iliad* 15.626 he preferred the feminine form of the substantive ἀήτη ('blast') to the masculine form ἀήτης, thus reading ἀνέμοιο δὲ δεινὸς ἀήτη ('the terrible blast of the wind'). In order to prove that Homer could use a feminine substantive with a masculine adjective, he pointed to the Homeric expression κλυτὸς Ἴπποδάμεια ('the renowned Hippodameia', *Iliad* 2.742).³⁰³

²⁹⁷ On the phrase τὸ σημαίνομενον ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως, see also section 2.3.

²⁹⁸ See Ros (1938) 59-60, who points out that the original text was probably ἐχρῶντο ἐγχωρίως (as in Hude's edition). The scholia interpret τὸ ἐγχωρίον as ἐγχωρίως: see Hude (1927) 268.

²⁹⁹ Caecilius fr. 75 Ofenloch. The same example in the Epitome Alexandri, *Rhetores Graeci* III 33,16 Spengel (= Caecilius fr. 75a Ofenloch), but there τὸ φιλότιμον is said to be used instead of ὁ φιλότιμος.

³⁰⁰ 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23 merely mentions the γενῶν ἐναλλάξεις. Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.6. mentions Vergil's *oculis capti talpae* ('blind moles', *Georgics* 1.183) and *timidi dammae* ('frightened deer', *Eclogues* 8.28). He correctly adds that there is a reason for this use of *talpa* and *damma*: these words can refer to both males and females. These rather unsatisfying examples make the impression as if Quintilian took over the *figurae* concerning *genus in nominibus* from Greek predecessors without knowing where to find appropriate Latin equivalents to the Greek examples.

³⁰¹ Aristarchus fr. 35 Matthaïos. See Matthaïos (1999) 275.

³⁰² Aristarchus fr. 33 Matthaïos. See Matthaïos (1999) 276.

³⁰³ Cf. Matthaïos (1999) 276.

In this context, I should also point to an interesting passage that can be found in Sextus Empiricus' arguments against the grammarians. When he attacks the grammarians' claim that some nouns are masculine by nature, others feminine and others neuter, Sextus Empiricus gives various arguments that are opposed to the concept of natural gender. One of them is that one word (for example *στόμος*, 'jar') can be feminine for the Athenians and masculine for the Peloponnesians.³⁰⁴ Further he points out that even 'the same people will use the same names differently, pronouncing them sometimes masculine, sometimes feminine, and saying both ὀλιμός and ἡ λιμός ('hunger').'³⁰⁵ Sextus Empiricus' argument in fact seems to be directed against scholars like Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who thinks that he can censure Thucydides for writing *τάραχος* for *ταραχή*. Sextus would object (as he does against the grammarians) that no noun is feminine by nature; and if the reason for the criticism were that the noun is feminine by common usage, he would answer that 'the criterion of what is said correctly and what not will not be any expert grammatical rule, rather the non-expert and simple observance of usage.'³⁰⁶

So far, Dionysius has been rather neutral in his analysis: he has merely pointed to the 'unusual' of Thucydides' variations in the use of the parts of speech and their *accidentia*. In the next chapter (*Amm.* II 11), his judgement becomes more severe, when he comes to speak on the historian's use of cases (*πτώσεις*) of proper nouns, appellatives, participles, and the articles attached to them (*(τῶν) συναπτομένων τούτοις ἄρθρων*).³⁰⁷ He tells us that Thucydides does not write as 'those who construct the expression in conformity with common usage' (*οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀκολούθως τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ σχηματίζοντες τὴν φράσιν*) (see also sections 5.2 and 7.3.1).³⁰⁸ Because he combines words that do not agree with the cases and genders that would be required according to regular grammar, Thucydides could even be said to commit solecism (*σολοικίζειν*).³⁰⁹ The first example (Thuc. 8.64.5) is as follows:³¹⁰

³⁰⁴ Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.148.

³⁰⁵ Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.149: οἱ αὐτοὶ δὲ διαφόρως ταῦτ' ὅτε μὲν ἀρρενικῶς ἐκφέρουσιν ὅτε δὲ θηλυκῶς, λέγοντες τὸν λιμόν καὶ τὴν λιμόν. The translation is by Blank.

³⁰⁶ Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.153: γενήσεται τοῦ τε εὖ λεγομένου καὶ μὴ κριτήριον οὐχὶ τεχνικός τις καὶ γραμματικός λόγος ἀλλ' ἡ ἄτεχνος καὶ ἀφελὴς τῆς συνηθείας παρατήρησις. The translation is by Blank.

³⁰⁷ *Amm.* II 11.430,12-15: Ἐν οἷς δὲ τὰς πτώσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν προσηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν μετοχῶν καὶ τῶν συναπτομένων τούτοις ἄρθρων ἐξαλλάττει τοῦ συνηθούς, οὕτως σχηματίζει [τῇ φράσει]. 'When he changes the cases of proper nouns and appellative nouns and participles and the articles attached to them departing from the usual, he makes the following construction.' The subject announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,13-16 seems a combination of the actual subjects of *Amm.* II 11 (the use of cases) and *Amm.* II 13 (*constructio ad sensum*). Cf. Warren (1899) 319.

³⁰⁸ *Amm.* II 11.430,18-20.

³⁰⁹ *Amm.* II 11.431,9. On Dionysius' use of the term solecism, see also section 5.2.

³¹⁰ The MSS of Thucydides have τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπουλον αὐτονομίαν. Rhys Roberts (1900b) has convincingly argued (against Usener [1889] 107) that Dionysius preserves the correct text of

σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν, τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες.

‘For the states, having acquired a moderate constitution and security in their actions, moved towards downright independence, showing no regard for the hollow pretence of law and order offered by the Athenians.’

Dionysius has two objections to this construction: προτιμήσαντες (masculine) should agree with the feminine noun πόλεις, and εὐνομίας (genitive) should be an accusative (as direct object with the participle).³¹¹ He corrects these ‘mistakes’ and rewrites the sentence as follows:

σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν, τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπουλον εὐνομίαν οὐ προτιμήσασαι.

The second example concerns a passage (Thuc. 4.10.2) in which Thucydides has combined the dative τῷ πλήθει with the participle καταπλαγέντες (‘frightened by their number’). Dionysius would prefer an accusative (πλήθος ... καταπλαγέντες, ‘fearing their number’), and he compares the use of the verb φοβεῖσθαι (‘to fear’), which normally takes the accusative and not the dative.³¹² This is a remarkable piece of syntactical theory, which we could compare with the Alexandrian procedure of analogy.³¹³ The Alexandrian philologists determined the correct forms of words by comparing a doubtful form with an established form (a bipartite proportion), or by

Thucydides here. Indeed, the editions of Hude (Teubner, Leipzig 1901) and Stuart Jones / Powell (OCT 1942) have adopted Dionysius’ reading (which is confirmed by a scholion, see Hude [1927] 419) in the text of Thucydides.

³¹¹ A scholiast explains προτιμήσαντες here as φροντίσαντες (‘regard’, with genitive): see Hude (1927) 419.

³¹² *Amm.* II 11.431,13-15.

³¹³ See Pfeiffer (1968) 229, Siebenborn (1976) 56-84, Schenkeveld (1994) 283-287 and Ax (1996) 286. On the basis of two fragments from Varro (*De lingua latina* 8.23 and 9.1), Lersch (1838-1841) and Steinthal (1890-1891) reconstructed the ancient controversy between anomalists (represented by the Stoic Crates of Mallos) and analogists (represented by Aristarchus). However, since Fehling (1956-1957) has expressed the view that Varro’s presentation of the controversy between supporters of analogy and supporters of anomaly is a rhetorical construct that Varro needs for his exposition (i.e. that the debate did not take place in the form that Lersch and Steinthal reconstructed), scholars disagree about the existence and the nature of that debate. Siebenborn (1976) 97-98 and Ax (1996) 289-295 hold to the opinion that there was a real controversy between two schools (Alexandria and Pergamon), even if it is difficult to determine the exact extent and effects. Blank (1982) 1-4 denies that there was a conflict at all. Taylor (1987) 6-8 and Schenkeveld (1994) 286-287 emphasise that there is no sufficient evidence for the belief that a large-scale quarrel between analogists and anomalists took place.

comparing a doubtful form and an established form of one word with the same forms of another word (a quadripartite proportion, such as ἔκειρε : κείρων = ἔπειρε : πείρων).³¹⁴ When the words that were compared were similar both with regard to their form and with regard to their meaning, the comparison was called a ‘perfect’ analogy.³¹⁵ Varro gives the example *bonus : malus = boni : mali*. Dionysius seems to adopt a similar procedure, not in order to establish the correct form of one word, but in order to determine the correct syntax, more precisely the combination between a verb and its object. He argues that καταπλήττομαι takes the accusative and he tries to prove this by comparing that verb to another verb (φοβοῦμαι), which can be used with the same meaning.³¹⁶ Dionysius points out that one would not say τῇ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀργῇ φοβεῖσθαι (‘being afraid through the anger of the gods’) but τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὀργήν (‘to fear the anger of the gods’). We might think that this is not a very strong argument, because two verbs that have the same semantic value do not necessarily combine with the same case. Nevertheless, it is a striking example of syntactical reasoning, which seems to foreshadow Apollonius Dyscolus’ investigations into syntactical regularity. Apollonius also mentions φοβοῦμαι as one of the verbs that require the accusative, and he compares this verb with τρέμω, φεύγω and φρίσσω, all of which can mean ‘to fear’.³¹⁷ Although these verbs do not indicate an activity (οὐδεμιᾶς ὄντα ἐνεργείας ἐμφατικά), they are still combined with an accusative. In other words, the peculiarity of these verbs is that the accusative σε in the sentence τρέμω σε cannot be changed into the subject of a corresponding passive sentence. Apollonius explains this fact by assuming an ellipsis of διὰ (a preposition that requires the accusative) in the construction of these verbs:³¹⁸ φοβοῦμαι σε is actually φοβοῦμαι διὰ σε. Dionysius’ use of the analogy between καταπλήττομαι and φοβοῦμαι in order to prove that the former verb requires an accusative is paralleled by Apollonius, *Synt.* III.167, where it is argued that δέομαι takes the genitive because it signifies (σημαίνει) something similar as λείπομαι with the genitive.³¹⁹

Dionysius’ analysis of these ungrammatical constructions is of high importance to his judgement on Thucydides. He wrote the treatise *On Thucydides* with the intention that

³¹⁴ On this example, see Siebenborn (1976) 71-72, Schenkeveld (1994) 283 and Ax (1996) 284. It may be that Aristarchus only used the bipartite proportion.

³¹⁵ Varro, *De lingua latina* 10.68. Cf. Callanan (1987) 107-108.

³¹⁶ *Amm.* II 11.431,9-15. Aujac (1991) 164 suggests that Dionysius introduces the example with φοβεῖσθαι because he was not entirely certain that the verb καταπλήττομαι really requires an accusative; Thucydides in fact uses that verb with a dative more than once. Rhys Roberts (1901) 181 remarks that Dionysius himself uses ἐκπλήττεσθαι with a dative in *Pomp.* 1.221,12.

³¹⁷ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.166

³¹⁸ See Sluiter (1990) 67 n. 113 and Lallot (1997 II) 259 n. 403.

³¹⁹ See Lallot (1997 II) 259 n. 406.

those readers who wished to imitate the historian would know which aspects of his treatment of subject matter and style should be avoided.³²⁰ It is precisely the ‘unusual’ that makes his style unfit for imitation (μίμησις). The illustrations of Thucydides’ deviations in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* support Dionysius’ argument, and the solecisms to which he points form the strongest warning that one should not copy his style indiscriminately. Dionysius points to another instance of the incongruity of cases in Thucydides in his discussion of tenses (below).

When we look for other ancient discussions of the variation of cases, we find different kinds of treatments. Aristarchus considered the ‘changes of cases’ (ἐναλλαγὰι τῶν πτώσεων) characteristic of the Homeric language.³²¹ The explanation that Homer used one case instead of another one seems to have been one of the most important principles in Aristarchus’ philological work.³²² In the field of criticism, ‘Longinus’ mentions the variations of cases (πτώσεων ἐναλλάξεις) as a source of the sublime, but he does not offer any examples.³²³ Later rhetoricians strangely cite the opening of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as examples of the variation of cases, and remark that the poet changed from the accusative to the nominative, probably meaning that the opening words ἄνδρα and μῆνιν (accusatives) are taken up by the relative pronouns ὅς and ἣ (nominatives).³²⁴ It is quite remarkable that this normal grammatical phenomenon could be considered a rhetorical figure. More interesting is a passage from ‘Demetrius’ (*On Style* 65), who states that grandeur in figures is produced from ‘not staying in the same case’.³²⁵ He illustrates this technique with a passage from Thucydides 4.12.1, the same passage that Dionysius cites as an example of the expression of a phrase in one single word (see above): καὶ πρῶτος ἀποβαίνων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν ἐλειποψύχησέ τε, καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν παρεξίρεσίαν. ‘The first to step on the gangway, he fainted, and when he fell on the outrigger (...).’ In this sentence, the subject (Brasidas) is first qualified by a *participium coniunctum* in the nominative (ἀποβαίνων) and then by a genitive absolute construction (πεσόντος αὐτοῦ): in other words, the subject of ἀποβαίνων and πεσόντος is the same, but it appears in two different cases. In order to prove the grandeur of this figure, ‘Demetrius’ rewrites the sentence in a way that destroys the striking effect of the original.³²⁶

³²⁰ Cf. *Thuc.* 1.325,11-16 on his earlier treatment of Thucydides in *On Imitation*.

³²¹ See Matthaïos (1999) 285-289.

³²² See Aristarchus fr. 42 Matthaïos and cf. Matthaïos (1999) 285.

³²³ ‘Longinus’, *Subl.* 23.1

³²⁴ *Rhetores Graeci* III 34,1 Spengel and III 168,10 Spengel. Cf. Ros (1938) 60 n. 27.

³²⁵ ‘Demetrius’, *Eloc.* 65: τὸ μηδὲ τῆς αὐτῆς μένειν πτώσεως.

³²⁶ Ros (1938) 55-56 points out that the sentence does not only contain a change from *participium coniunctum* to genitive absolute, but (in the subsequent words) also a change of subject (first Brasidas,

In *Amm.* II 12, Dionysius discusses ‘the style that deviates from the syntactical congruence with regard to the tenses of verbs’ (ἡ δὲ παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους τῶν ῥημάτων ἐκβεβηκυῖα τὸ κατάλληλον φράσις). The expression τὸ κατάλληλον refers to the congruence of a syntactically regular sentence. The term plays an important role in the work of Apollonius Dyscolus, and it seems to be of Stoic origin.³²⁷ According to Diogenes Laertius VII.59, the Stoics defined solecism as λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος (see below). In *Amm.* II 12, the concept of τὸ κατάλληλον is not only used with regard to the use of tenses, but also with regard to the use of cases (see below).³²⁸ We will more thoroughly discuss Dionysius’ use of this term and related ideas on syntax in section 5.2. For Dionysius’ terminology for the tenses ‘present’ (ὁ παρὼν χρόνος) and ‘future’ (ὁ μέλλον χρόνος), see section 3.8.

Dionysius offers two examples of Thucydides’ change of tenses. In the first passage from Pericles’ funeral speech (Thuc. 2.39.4), Dionysius thinks that ‘the future verb’ ἐθέλοιμεν (which is in fact a present potential optative in a conditional clause — ‘we should wish’) should have been combined with the future verb περιέσται (‘we will have advantage’) in the main clause instead of Thucydides’ present tense περιγίγνεται (‘we have the advantage’).³²⁹ Although this kind of construction is in fact not uncommon in Greek (the present indicative in the apodosis refers in such cases to general present time), Dionysius thinks that it is not regular (ἀκόλουθον).³³⁰ For the determination of ἐθέλοιμεν as a ‘future’, Schenkeveld refers to Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.98.³³¹ In that passage, Apollonius says that according to some, it does not make sense to attribute tenses to the optative, since ‘wishes are for the coming to pass of something which does not yet exist’ (ἐν τοῖς οὐκ οὖσιν αἰ εὐχαὶ γίνονται εἰς τὸ ἐγγενέσθαι). In *Synt.* III.100, he says that wishes (which are expressed in the optative) refer to ‘that which is not present with us’: ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ συνοῦσιν αἰ εὐχαὶ γίνονται.

then ‘the shield’). The text of Thucydides (which diverges from the quotation in ‘Demetrius’) is as follows: καὶ τραυματισθεὶς πολλὰ ἐλιποψύχησέ τε καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν παρεξαιρεσίαν ἢ ἀσπίς περιερρύη ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν (...).

³²⁷ See section 5.2. See also Blank (1982) 27-28 and Sluiter (1990) 50-52.

³²⁸ *Amm.* II 12.431,16-17; *Amm.* II 12.432,8-9. See further section 5.2 and cf. Blank (1982) 55.

³²⁹ The Thucydidean text is as follows: καίτοι εἰ ῥαθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτη, καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλεόν ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλοιμεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάνειν καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέροις τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούτων φαίνεσθαι. ‘And yet, if we would wish to face danger in a spirit of easy indifference rather than after laborious preparation, and with a courage born of habit rather than from respect for the law, we have the advantage of not suffering hardships when they are yet to come, while in actually confronting them we show ourselves no less courageous than those who are always toiling.’

³³⁰ See Smyth (1956) 535: ‘εἰ with the optative (instead of ἐάν with the subjunctive) is not infrequent in the protasis with a primary tense of the indicative (...) in the apodosis. The reference is usually either to general present time (with the present indicative), or to future time.’ Smyth also refers to Thuc. 2.39. On Dionysius’ example see Krüger (1823) 233 and Aujac (1991) 164-165.

³³¹ Schenkeveld (1983) 84.

Thus, it seems that because they regarded the optative as the mood of wishes and prayers, grammarians associated this mood with future situations. This seems to be the reason for Dionysius' qualification of ἐθέλοιμεν as a future.

The second example of the change of tenses is Thucydides 4.10.3:³³²

τοῦ τε γὰρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον ἡμέτερον νομίζω, ὃ μενόντων μὲν ἡμῶν σύμμαχον γίνεται· ὑποχωρήσασι δὲ καίπερ χαλεπὸν ὄν εὐπορον ἔσται.'

'I consider the inaccessibility of the spot to be in our favour, which, if we stand our ground, is our ally. But if we withdraw, the position, although it is difficult in itself, will be easy to pass through.'

Dionysius tells us that the verb γίνεται ('is') points to the present, whereas ἔσται ('will be') points to the future (τὸ μὲν γὰρ γίνεται τοῦ παρόντος ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἔσται τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου δηλωτικόν). Further, there is an incongruent construction:³³³ Thucydides has expressed the participle μενόντων and the pronoun ἡμῶν in the genitive case, but ὑποχωρήσασιν in the dative. According to Dionysius, it would be more appropriate (οἰκειότερον) to put ὑποχωρήσασι in the genitive as well. Again, there is a scholion on Thucydides that agrees with Dionysius' view: it explains ὑποχωρήσασι as ὑποχωρησάντων.³³⁴ Indeed, some modern scholars think that the dative form in Thucydides' text is corrupt: Hude prints a crux in his Thucydides edition, and Ros thinks it is only explained by Thucydides' preference of variation and incontinuity.³³⁵

Dionysius calls μενόντων a μετοχικὸν ὄνομα, which Aujac translates as 'substantif participial'.³³⁶ She thinks that this is the term for a participle in a genitive absolute construction, and refers to Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.141. I do not think that her interpretation is correct, for two reasons. First, Dionysius frequently uses adjectives in the neuter for the parts of speech, either or not with a substantive (προσηγορικόν, ῥηματικόν, τὰ προθετικὰ μόρια, etc.).³³⁷ Therefore, it is more probable that Dionysius uses ὄνομα here in the general sense of 'word' rather than as 'substantive': μενόντων is a 'participial word', i.e. a participle. Second, the passage in Apollonius

³³² *Amm.* II 12.432,3-13.

³³³ Cf. Blank (1982) 55.

³³⁴ Hude (1927) 232.

³³⁵ Hude (1913), Ros (1938) 62.

³³⁶ Aujac (1991) 139.

³³⁷ See Schenkeveld (1983) 70-71.

Dyscolus to which Aujac refers (*Synt.* I.141) does not deal with a μετοχικὸν ὄνομα, but with σύνταξις μετοχική: the construction of the participle. Apollonius here discusses the construction of a participle with an infinitive (ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον θέλων ὑβρίσαι οὗτος ἐστίν), which has nothing to do with Dionysius' example.

Caecilius of Caleacte also seems to have discussed the variation concerning tenses. In the fragment from Tiberius' *On Figures*, two examples are mentioned:³³⁸ Demosthenes has used the present instead of the perfect in τοὺς ὀρῶντας ὑμῖν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι ('I will bring forward for you those men who saw it'): the present participle ὀρῶντας is said to replace the perfect ἐωρακότας ('those men who have seen it').³³⁹ The second example seems to concern a historical present (ὀρῶ instead of εἶδον in Euripides' *Andromeda*).³⁴⁰ Finally, Caecilius also mentions the funeral speech from Thucydides (2.35.1), where he thinks that ἐπαινοῦσι ('they praise') is used instead of ἐπήνεσαν ('they praised'). Indeed, Pericles refers in this passage to his predecessors, who have spoken at previous occasions: 'most of the men who have spoken here praise the one who has added this speech to the usual ceremony.'³⁴¹ In this case, the present tense makes that Pericles' words refer to the general usage at the occasions of a funeral speech. In narrative, on the other hand, the present can of course be used to highlight certain events: 'Longinus' notes that the historical present occurs frequently in Thucydides. The effect of this use of the present instead of the past tense he describes as follows: 'you will transform the passage from a narrative into a vivid actuality.'³⁴² Quintilian offers an example of present instead of past tense from Cicero's *In Verrem*.³⁴³ Interestingly, he adds that 'there is a figure corresponding to every kind of solecism'. Dionysius did not share this view, at least not as far as Thucydides' style was concerned. Where other rhetoricians treat the variation of tenses as a figure, he thinks that Thucydides departs from τὸ κατάλληλον.

In *Amm.* II 13, Dionysius discusses constructions that concern 'the turning away from the signified to the signifying' (πρὸς τὸ σημαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ σημαινομένου πράγματος

³³⁸ Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 75 Ofenloch.

³³⁹ Demosthenes, *Against Neaira* 34.

³⁴⁰ Euripides, *Andromeda* fr. 145 Nauck.

³⁴¹ Thucydides 2.35.1: Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηνότων ἐπαινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε.

³⁴² 'Longinus', *Subl.* 25: οὐ διήγησιν ἔτι τὸν λόγον ἀλλ' ἐναγώνιον πρῶγμα ποιήσεις. Sicking and Stork (1997) have recently rejected this interpretation of the historical present. For more examples of tense variation from the rhetoricians who write on figures, see Ros (1938) 61 n. 28.

³⁴³ Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.11 on Cicero, *In Verrem* 5.116.

τὴν ἀποστροφὴν), and *vice versa* (see also section 2.3).³⁴⁴ These are sentences in which a collective noun in the singular is combined with a plural verb (*constructio ad sensum*). In these cases, the verb is not connected to the grammatical form of the verb, but with that which it signifies. Thus, in the first example (Thuc. 6.35.1), τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ('the populace of the Syracusans') is combined with the plural verb ἦσαν ('were').³⁴⁵ The second example (Thuc. 5.4.2) is slightly different: here, the subject changes from Λεοντῖνοι ('men of Leontini') to ὁ δῆμος ('the populace').³⁴⁶ As we have seen, Dionysius has already discussed Thucydides' interchanging of the singular and the plural (*Amm.* II 9 above): there, he pointed to the substitution of one singular word for a plural (e.g. 'the Syracusan'). In relation to that passage, we have also referred to Caecilius' discussion of the variation concerning numbers (περὶ δὲ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀλλοίωσις), where he mentions a *constructio ad sensum* (ποθοῦμεν ἢ κλεινὴ πόλις), and we have observed that 'Longinus' offers a similar example (λαός ... κελάδησαν).

All the examples mentioned here concern the syntax of collective nouns: both of Dionysius' examples contain the word δῆμος, and later rhetoricians cite sentences with the words πόλις and λαός. Grammarians were also interested in the constructions of this kind of words. In the *Technê Grammatikê*, we find the following definition of the περιληπτικόν ('collective noun'): περιληπτικὸν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τῷ ἐνικῷ ἀριθμῷ πλήθος σημαίνομενον, οἷον δῆμος χορός ὄχλος. 'A collective noun is a noun in the singular number that signifies a plurality, such as "people, chorus, crowd".'³⁴⁷ The scholia add the following explanation: 'Therefore poets, who know the meaning of the word, react to the signified (πρὸς τὸ σημαίνομενον) and bring in plural verbs, as in ἀγρόμενοι πᾶς δῆμος ('the entire population being gathered', *Iliad* 20.166) and ἡ πληθὺς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν ἀπονέοντο ('the multitude departed to the ships of the Greeks', *Iliad* 15.305).'³⁴⁸ Apollonius Dyscolus also mentions the former

³⁴⁴ *Amm.* II 13.432,14-433,5. Krüger (1823) 234 argues that there is no Greek or Latin author who did not use this construction (*et quis vel Graecus vel Latinus auctor eam [structuram] non usurpaverit?*), and he points to the use of that construction in [Dionysius of Halicarnassus] *Ars Rhetorica* 383,7-8, which is however not anymore considered to be the work of Dionysius.

³⁴⁵ The text of Thuc. 6.35.1 runs as follows: τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν. 'The populace of the Syracusans were engaged in great strife with one another.'

³⁴⁶ The text of Thuc. 5.4.2 runs as follows: Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν σύμβασιν πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἐπενόει τὴν γῆν ἀναδάσασθαι. 'For when the Athenians left Sicily after the convention, the men of Leontini enrolled many new citizens, and the populace turned its mind to the idea of redistributing the land.' The scholia on Thucydides do not say anything about these passages.

³⁴⁷ [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 40,4-41,1. The translation is by Kemp (1987).

³⁴⁸ Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 241,4-8: Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ εἰδότες τὴν δύναμιν τῆς λέξεως πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ σημαίνομενον ὑπαντῶσι καὶ ῥήματα πληθυντικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐπάγουσιν, οἷον (Υ 166) ἀγρόμενοι πᾶς δῆμος καὶ (Ο 305) ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν ἀπονέοντο.

example when he speaks about collective nouns, ‘which are said in the singular, but thought in the plural.’³⁴⁹ Already Aristarchus pointed to a similar construction in *Iliad* 2.278 (φάσαν ἡ πλῆθύς, ‘the crowd said’).³⁵⁰ However, he seems to have called this a σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ νοητόν, whereas Dionysius and the later grammarians call it a construction πρὸς τὸ σημαίνομενον. This can be explained by the fact that grammatical theory after Aristarchus (from Dionysius Thrax onwards) was heavily influenced by Stoic philosophy. The Stoics distinguished between the expression or form of a word (τὸ σημαίνον) and its meaning (τὸ σημαίνομενον) (see also section 2.3).³⁵¹ Thus, Dionysius seems to have adopted the Stoic terminology in this passage.

We have already seen that Dionysius’ terms ἀκολουθία and κατάλληλος likewise reflect the Stoic ideas on syntax and grammatical congruence. Now, the Stoics also had a theory of solecism (σολοικισμός): a grammatical irregularity in a combination of words, which they seem to have defined as λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος (‘a meaningful utterance put together incongruently’).³⁵² Later sources tell us that solecism can occur in various forms, including gender and number (both of which Aristotle already mentions in his account of ἐλληνίζειν), case, person, tense, voice and mood.³⁵³ It is possible that the Stoics also discussed the kind of solecisms to which Dionysius refers in this letter. For we are told that the Stoic Chrysippus stated that Homer committed a solecism (σολοικίζειν) when he combined the verb δῶσι with the subject ‘Zeus’, ‘thus using a plural instead of a singular verb’.³⁵⁴ Although this example is in itself rather dubious because δῶσι is a normal Homeric singular, the fragment may be regarded as evidence that Stoics discussed this type of solecism. The type of solecism here mentioned (even if it is not a true one) concerns the combination of a singular with a plural, just like the Thucydidean construction (δῆμος ... ἦσαν) to which Dionysius objects. Elsewhere, Dionysius refers to Chrysippus’

³⁴⁹ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.67: ἀθροιστικὰ ὀνόματα, ἅπερ ἐνικῶς μὲν λέγεται, πληθυντικῶς δὲ νοεῖται.

³⁵⁰ Aristarchus fr. 82 Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 384.

³⁵¹ See Sluiter (1990) 22-23. They further distinguished the τυγχάνον (the thing in reality to which a word refers).

³⁵² See *FDS* 594 and *FDS* 600-604a. Cf. Sluiter (1990) 23 and Ildefonse (1997) 273-275. On the ancient definitions of solecism, see Baratin (1989) 262-278 and Hyman (2003) 180-181.

³⁵³ See *FDS* 601a. In *Rh.* 1407a19, Aristotle states that ἐλληνίζειν (‘purity of language’) is the foundation of style, which depends on five rules: the use of σύνδεσμοι (μέν and δέ), the use of specific words (ἰδίους ὀνόμασι), the avoidance of ambiguous terms (ἀμφιβόλοις), the correct agreement (ἀποδιδόναι ... ὀρθῶς) of genders (τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων), and the use of number (τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ ἓν, ‘many, few or one’). Next, Aristotle (*Rh.* 1407b) points out that a text should not be difficult to understand. Solecism (σολοικίζειν), which is explained as τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι (‘lack of correspondence’), can for example occur when the word ‘seeing’ is used with both ‘sound’ and ‘colour’, where the word ‘perceiving’ would be appropriate. See Siebenborn (1976) 24 and Basset (2003) 54-56.

³⁵⁴ *FDS* 601d.

works *Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν* (*On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*).³⁵⁵ It is possible that Chrysippus discussed solecism in that work, but he also wrote a separate work *On Solecisms* (*Περὶ σολοικισμῶν*).³⁵⁶ But when we take the Stoic influence on technical grammar in the first century BC into account, we may as well conclude that Dionysius' remarks in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* reflect grammatical ideas on *καταλληλότης* and syntax. It is possible that the grammatical treatises of Asclepiades, Tyrannion and Tryphon (see section 3.2) contained similar views, although Matthaios argues that Tryphon was not interested in *καταλληλότης* (see section 5.2).³⁵⁷

The final subject that is relevant to our investigation into the integration of grammar and literary criticism is found in *Amm.* II 14. In this chapter, Dionysius discusses passages in which Thucydides has treated *πράγματα* as *πρόσωπα* and *σώματα* as *πράγματα*.³⁵⁸ The traditional interpretation is that both *πρόσωπα* and *σώματα* refer to 'persons', and that Dionysius discusses first the treatment of things as persons, and next the treatment of persons as things.³⁵⁹ However, Schenkeveld thinks that Dionysius here mixes up two different theories, namely one theory that distinguishes between 'abstractum and concretum' (*πρᾶγμα* and *σῶμα*), and one theory that distinguishes between *persona* and *res* (*πρόσωπον* and *πρᾶγμα*). The former distinction is found in the *Technê Grammatikê*, where the *ὄνομα* is defined as a part of speech that is subject to case inflection and signifies something *corporeal* (*σῶμα*) or *non-corporeal* (*πρᾶγμα*).³⁶⁰ Schenkeveld's reason for supposing that Dionysius mixed up two different linguistic theories is the obscure example that Dionysius offers when discussing the treatment of *πράγματα* as *πρόσωπα* (Thuc. 1.71.1): *πρὸς τάδε βουλευέσθε εὖ, καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πειρᾶσθε μὴ ἐλάσσον' ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ οἱ πατέρες ὑμῖν παρέδοσαν*. 'Therefore you must take good counsel, and strive to ensure that the Peloponnese you lead forth may be no less powerful than when your fathers left it in your care.' Dionysius first points out that Thucydides has used *ἐξηγεῖσθαι* ('to lead forth') here in the sense of *προάγειν ἔξω τὴν Πελοπόννησον*

³⁵⁵ *Comp.* 4.22,8-23,1: see sections 3.2.2. and 5.3.1 For the title of Chrysippus' work, see *FDS* 194. For the Stoic influence on stylistic theory, see Atherton (1993) 483-486, but she does not mention Dionysius here.

³⁵⁶ See *FDS* 194 (= Diogenes Laertius VII.192).

³⁵⁷ On Tryphon and syntax, see Matthaios (2003). Matthaios (2003) 128 concludes that unlike Apollonius Dyscolus Tryphon did not examine *καταλληλότης*.

³⁵⁸ *Amm.* II 14.433,6: *Πρόσωπα δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τὰ πράγματα γίνεται ...* 'In Thucydides things become persons (...).' *Amm.* II 14.433,18: *Πράγματα δὲ ἀντὶ σωματῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γίνεται*. 'Things are used instead of persons by him as follows.'

³⁵⁹ See Pritchett (1975) 96, Usher (1985) 423-425 and Aujac (1991) 140-141. For the contrast between *σῶμα* and *πρᾶγμα*, see also *Dem.* 40.215,14; *Comp.* 12.46,21-47,1. For the contrast between *πρόσωπον* and *πρᾶγμα*, see *Comp.* 20.88,11-15; *Dem.* 13.156,6-7.

³⁶⁰ [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 24,3: *ὄνομά ἐστι μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, σῶμα ἢ πρᾶγμα σημαίνον.*

ἡγουμένους αὐτῆς (‘to lead the Peloponnese outside as its leaders’). According to Dionysius, this could not possibly happen to the territory (χώρα), but only to ‘its reputation and its material resources’ (τῆ δὲ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν), ‘and this is what Thucydides means to signify’.³⁶¹ There are two problems here. First, already Krüger has pointed out that Dionysius’ interpretation of the word ἐξηγεῖσθαι is obscure.³⁶² It seems that Dionysius’ explanation προάγειν ἔξω τὴν Πελοπόννησον means ‘to expand the Peloponnese’ (*Peloponnesum augere*, according to Krüger), which would rather agree to the expression μὴ ἐλάσσον’ ἐξηγεῖσθαι as a whole. A better explanation of ἐξηγεῖσθαι would be ‘to lead the Peloponnesians to other countries’ (*ducere Peloponnesios in externas terras*, according to Krüger), which would fit Dionysius’ discussion of the treatment of things as persons. Second, Dionysius states that ἐξηγεῖσθαι could not happen to the Peloponnese, but that it could happen to its reputation and πράγμασιν, thus somewhat obscuring the distinction between things and persons: in this opposition the Peloponnese should be a thing, but Dionysius’ explanation opposes it to other ‘things’ instead of persons.³⁶³ The example would have been easier if Dionysius had pointed out that one could not ‘lead’ a country (a thing) but only its inhabitants (persons), so that Thucydides treated a thing (the Peloponnese) as a person. For this reason, Schenkeveld concludes that Dionysius has identified the distinction πρᾶγμα / σῶμα (*abstractum / concretum*) with the distinction πρόσωπον / πρᾶγμα (*persona / res*), and that he did not realise that the example from Thuc. 1.71.1 was a case of the anthesis πρᾶγμα / σῶμα (*abstractum / concretum*).³⁶⁴ Although I agree that Dionysius’ example and his explanation are somewhat problematic, I do not think that we have to attribute the difficulties to the alleged confusion of two different theories. The word σῶμα (*concretum* according to Schenkeveld) does not occur in Dionysius’ discussion of the first example, but only in the next one, which is a clear and unproblematic example of the treatment of persons (σώματα) as things, namely the use of τὸ ὑμέτερον (‘your way’) instead of ὑμεῖς (‘you’) in Thuc. 1.70.2.³⁶⁵ With regard to this second example, Dionysius states the following: τὸ γὰρ ὑμέτερον ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑμεῖς παρείληπται, πρᾶγμα ὑπάρχον ἀντὶ σώματος. ‘For “your way” has been submitted for “you”, a thing taking the place of a person.’ If Dionysius was using a theory on *abstractum pro concreto* in the first

³⁶¹ *Amm.* II 14.433,13-17: τὸ γὰρ ἐξηγεῖσθαι νῦν τέθηκεν ἐπὶ τοῦ προάγειν ἔξω τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἡγουμένους αὐτῆς· τοῦτο δὲ τῆ χώρᾳ μὲν ἀδύνατον ἦν συμβῆναι, τῆ δὲ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν τοῖς περὶ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχουσιν δυνατόν, καὶ βούλεται τοῦτο δηλοῦν.

³⁶² Krüger (1823) 235-236.

³⁶³ See Aujac (1991) 165.

³⁶⁴ Schenkeveld (1983) 78.

³⁶⁵ *Amm.* II 14.433,18-434,12. It should be noted that σῶμα is also the term that Dionysius uses in the outline of the letter in *Amm.* II 2.424,6-7: ὅποσα τε γίνεται πράγματα ἀντὶ σωμαμάτων ἢ σώματα ἀντὶ πραγμάτων (see above).

example (τὴν Πελοπόννησον ... ἐξηγεῖσθαι), we would expect him to have used the term σῶμα in that case, but there he only speaks of πρόσωπα. Further, if Schenkeveld were right that Dionysius' first example concerns a case of *abstractum pro concreto*, we would have to assume that the Peloponnese is the *abstractum*, and τῇ δὲ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν the *concreta*. This could work for πράγματα, but it could not for δόξα ('reputation'). For this reason, Schenkeveld's suggestion that Dionysius was thinking of an antithesis πῶμα / σῶμα does not make the passage more understandable. In other passages, the distinction between πῶμα and σῶμα does not differ from the one between πῶμα and πρόσωπον (see section 2.3). I think, then, that Dionysius does regard the expression τὴν Πελοπόννησον ... ἐξηγεῖσθαι as a case of personification, because he thinks that ἐξηγεῖσθαι should be used with a personal object. This interpretation is supported by the explanations in the scholia on Thucydides. Here we find the following interpretation of ἐξηγεῖσθαι: ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν ἐτέρων, 'to rule over, to be master of other people'.³⁶⁶ Although this interpretation differs from the one that Dionysius offers, it seems to support the idea that ἐξηγεῖσθαι is considered a verb that governs a personal object. In spite of the obscurity of Dionysius' comment, we may conclude that he regards τὴν Πελοπόννησον ... ἐξηγεῖσθαι as a case of personification: the Peloponnese is a thing (πῶμα) that is treated as a person (πρόσωπον).

In our discussion of chapter 3-14 of the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, we have compared Dionysius' grammatical notes with the observations of philologists (Aristarchus and the scholia on Thucydides), rhetoricians ('Demetrius', Caecilius of Caleacte, Quintilian), a literary critic ('Longinus'), technical grammarians (in particular Apollonius Dyscolus) and philosophers (the Stoics). We have not only observed that similar ideas on the substitution and combination of the *accidentia* of the parts of speech are found in all these disciplines, but also that the use of these ideas diverges from discipline to discipline. Most illustrative are the different treatments of Thucydides' deviating language in the scholia, Caecilius and Dionysius respectively. They all point to similar passages in Thucydides' work where the historian expresses his ideas in an unusual way. The scholia comment upon these passages in order to explain them, so that the reader of Thucydides will be able to understand what he means to say. Caecilius of Caleacte includes some of these same passages in his account of the figure ἀλλοίωσις: the implication seems to be that orators could use these figures in their speeches, thus imitating the variations of Thucydides and other authors. Dionysius however objects to Thucydides' unusual

³⁶⁶ Hude (1927) 57. Another scholion on the same passage says: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄγειν τὸ ἐξηγεῖσθαι ('ἐξηγεῖσθαι is used instead of "to bring"').

expressions, and in some cases he even refers to them as solecisms. He points to the historian's deviating language in order to prevent his readers from imitating Thucydides' style, which he considers inappropriate for both historians and orators. Dionysius' integration of grammar and literary criticism in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* supports his views on Thucydides' style, which he already expressed in his treatise *On Thucydides*. The grammatical notes on his use of the parts of speech confirm the evaluation of Thucydides as an author whose style should not be copied indiscriminately.

4.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have investigated Dionysius' use of the grammatical theory of the parts of speech. We have seen that Dionysius employs the *μῦρια λόγου* both as a rhetorician and as a literary critic. His definition of *σύνθεσις* emphasises that composition starts from the parts of speech as its building blocks. Although this definition is directly followed by a history of the theory of the *μῦρια λόγου* in the sense of 'word classes' (here we have seen Dionysius' role as a historian of linguistics), the other aspect of words, that of 'parts of the phrase' is similarly relevant for Dionysius' composition theory. We have discussed two passages from the work *On Composition* that make clear that the grammatical point of view is essential to Dionysius' views on *σύνθεσις*. In *Comp.* 6, he argues that words should be combined and shaped in a form that is appropriate both with regard to grammar and with regard to euphony. In *Comp.* 22-24, Dionysius describes the three different types of composition, and he argues that the use of the parts of speech is one of the factors that contribute to the smoothness or austerity of the *σύνθεσις*. In both passages, the concept of architecture is very prominent. As a literary critic Dionysius supports his criticism of Thucydides' style by pointing to specific deviations in the historian's use of grammatical constructions (*σχηματισμοί*). Dionysius' stylistic analyses foreshadow Apollonius Dyscolus' work on syntax: the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* contains a number of syntactic observations that have so far been ignored by scholars who study the history of syntax in antiquity. In chapter 5, I will come back to Dionysius' views on syntax.

I hope to have shown that the integration of grammar and rhetorical theory on the one hand and grammar and literary criticism on the other is fundamental to Dionysius' works. He has taken up linguistic views that were developed in the context of philology and technical grammar and uses them for his own purposes. More specifically, Dionysius seems to have incorporated theories from various disciplines.

First, it is plausible that he used theories on σύνθεσις that were developed by the Hellenistic *kritikoi*, who also used the theory of the parts of speech in their theory of composition. Further, he seems to have employed a philological commentary on Thucydides, from which he may have taken the examples of deviating style. On the other hand, we have seen that, conversely, the later scholia partly seem to rely on Dionysius. Finally, he knew Stoic works on the syntax of the parts of speech; the extent to which Dionysius actually made use of the Stoic works is not yet clear, but I will argue in the next chapter (5) that Dionysius' discussion of natural word order (*Comp.* 5), which is another example of the integration of grammar and rhetoric, is indeed based on Stoic theories. As to specific 'sources' I want to be very careful. We may make an exception for the philological work on Thucydides that Dionysius seems to have used in his *Second Letter to Ammaeus*. Apart from that, I will not make any specific claims on the sources that he may have used for different parts of his work. Dionysius knew a large number of works from various language traditions in which the parts of speech played a role (philology, philosophy, poetic criticism, and probably technical grammar). Some of these works he mentions himself, and others he may have used without mentioning them. Thus, it is possible that he knew the work of the grammarians Asclepiades of Myrlea, Tyrannion or Tryphon. Indeed the history of the theory of the parts of speech might rely on a discussion of the μέρη λόγου in a treatise by one of those grammarians. However, we will never know to what extent Dionysius depended on this kind of work. It is more rewarding to conclude that Dionysius was one of the very first rhetoricians who systematically integrated various language disciplines in order to support his own purposes as a rhetorician. The theory of the parts of speech has proven to be a perfect example of this successful synthesis.