

## CHAPTER 3. DIONYSIUS ON THE GRAMMATICAL THEORY OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

### 3.1. Introduction

Our study of Dionysius' integration of different language disciplines will continue with an examination of the connections between grammar and rhetoric. Ancient grammar focused on the word as the central unit of language. Modern scholars have characterised the ancient *artes grammaticae* (τέχνη γραμματικαί) as 'word-based grammars'. Adopting the 'word and paradigm model' as their framework, these treatises mainly consist of a discussion of μέρη λόγου (normally translated as 'parts of speech' or 'word classes') and their *accidentia*.<sup>1</sup> The *Technê Grammatikê* that has come down to us under the name of Dionysius Thrax distinguishes eight word classes: ὄνομα (noun), ῥήμα (verb), μετοχή (participle), ἄρθρον (article), ἀντωνυμία (pronoun), πρόθεσις (preposition), ἐπίρρημα (adverb) and σύνδεσμος (conjunction).<sup>2</sup> For a long time, Dionysius Thrax (170-90 BC) was considered to have been the first grammarian who used this system of eight parts of speech. In 1958, however, Di Benedetto put forward the view that most part of the *Technê Grammatikê*, including the exposition of the word class system, was to be regarded as a compilation that was put together in the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> century AD.<sup>3</sup> Although doubts about the authenticity of the *Technê* had already been expressed in antiquity, Di Benedetto was the first to claim that Dionysius Thrax himself only wrote the first five paragraphs of the *Technê*.<sup>4</sup> The publication of Di Benedetto's views was the starting point of a long and passionate debate on the authenticity and authority of the *Technê*.<sup>5</sup> Although several scholars (notably Pfeiffer and Erbse) have tried to rebut Di Benedetto's arguments, most specialists have now accepted the view that Dionysius Thrax himself wrote only the very first part of the *Technê Grammatikê*, while the rest of the work, including the classification of the parts of speech, belongs to the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> century AD.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Robins (1997) 31.

<sup>2</sup> The English terms do not entirely coincide with the Greek concepts: the ἄρθρον does not only cover the article, but also our relative pronoun, the ἐπίρρημα also includes interjections, and the σύνδεσμος comprises what we call 'particles'. The ὄνομα covers both substantives and adjectives. The Romans substituted the interjection for the ἄρθρον, thus listing the following eight word classes: *nomen, verbum, participium, pronomem, praepositio, adverbium, coniunctio, interiectio*.

<sup>3</sup> Di Benedetto (1958-1959).

<sup>4</sup> For the ancient doubts on the authenticity of the *Technê Grammatikê*, see Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 124,7-14 and Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 160,24-161,8.

<sup>5</sup> Di Benedetto (1973, 1990, 2000) has repeated and illuminated his arguments in response to his opponents Pfeiffer (1968) and Erbse (1980). For the problems of authenticity and authority of the *Technê*, and the arguments *pro* and *contra*, see also Pinborg (1975) 103-106, Kemp (1996<sup>2</sup>) 307-315, Law & Sluiter (1998<sup>2</sup>) and Lallot (1998) 20-25, and the literature cited there.

<sup>6</sup> Exceptions are prof. A. Wouters and prof. P. Swiggers, who regard the *Technê Grammatikê* as authentic, although they acknowledge that the preserved text may have undergone some changes. See e.g. Wouters (1998) and Swiggers & Wouters (2002) 16-17.

Having acknowledged that the major part of the *Technê* was not written by Dionysius Thrax, historians of grammar had to reconsider questions about the origin and development of the traditional system of eight word classes. According to ancient testimonies, Dionysius Thrax ‘separated’ ὄνομα (proper noun) and προσηγορία (appellative), and ‘combined’ ἄρθρον (article) and ἀντωνυμία (pronoun).<sup>7</sup> This would mean that he did not use the word class system that we find in the *Technê Grammatikê*. Those scholars who have accepted Di Benedetto’s thesis that the *Technê* is not authentic have pointed to the works of other grammarians as the possible origin of the traditional word class system. In particular, Di Benedetto himself and others have argued that it was the grammarian Tryphon (1<sup>st</sup> century BC) who first adopted the traditional system of eight word classes.<sup>8</sup> More recently, however, Matthaïos has shown that Aristarchus (216-144 BC), the teacher of Dionysius Thrax, already distinguished the word classes that were to become the canonical eight.<sup>9</sup> He did not discuss these word classes in a grammatical treatise, but he employed them for his philological activities (Ax characterises Aristarchus’ grammar as a ‘Grammatik im Kopf’).<sup>10</sup> Apart from the adverb, for which he used the term μεσότης (instead of the later ἐπίρρημα), all word classes that were identified by Aristarchus carried the names that would become standard in later grammars. With the acknowledgement of the important role of Aristarchus, a new picture of the early history of the system of eight word classes has been drawn.<sup>11</sup>

Many things are still unclear, however, concerning the distribution, development and systematisation of the traditional word class theory in the period after Aristarchus.<sup>12</sup> It is certain that many other word class systems, consisting of nine or more μέρη λόγου,

<sup>7</sup> Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 124,7-14; Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 160,24-161,8. The information that Dionysius Thrax combined ἀντωνυμία and ἄρθρον may depend on Apollonius Dyscolus’ report (*Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1.1, 5,18-19) that Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά. Scholars interpret Apollonius’ testimony in different ways. Some believe that Dionysius Thrax treated the pronouns and articles as one single word class, whereas others think that he called pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά (‘deictic articles’) without rejecting their status as a separate word class (so Matthaïos [2002] 193). See sections 3.2 and 3.6.3 of this study.

<sup>8</sup> For the view that Tryphon was the one who introduced the system of eight word classes, see Di Benedetto (1958) 125-126, Pinborg (1975) 116-117, Schenkeveld (1994) 268 and 277, and Lallot (1998) 124-125. Ax (1982) 98-100 usefully summarises the views that various scholars have expressed on the two relevant questions: (a) from which time was a grammatical theory of word classes used? And (b) at which point was it fixed in a grammatical treatise?

<sup>9</sup> See Matthaïos (1999), who has elaborated the views of Ax (1982, 1996<sup>2</sup>).

<sup>10</sup> Ax (1996<sup>2</sup>) 288.

<sup>11</sup> Matthaïos has used the results that he obtained from his research on Aristarchus to write a new reconstruction of the history of the theory of the parts of speech: see Matthaïos (2001) and Matthaïos (2002).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Robins (1998<sup>2</sup>) 19: ‘We know the names of several important grammarians in the Greek world who were active in the first centuries BC and AD, and we desperately need to find out what was going on in the Greek world between the times of Dionysius [i.e. Dionysius Thrax] and Apollonius over a span of about three hundred years.’ See also Lallot (1998) 29-30.

circulated in the period between Aristarchus (second century BC) and Apollonius Dyscolus (second century AD), before the latter grammarian adopted the system of eight word classes in his *Syntax* and other grammatical works.<sup>13</sup> And although Apollonius was very influential, the octopartite system probably did not become canonical until the Roman grammarian Donatus (active around 350 AD) had adopted it.<sup>14</sup> What happened in the period between Aristarchus and Apollonius is difficult to tell, because so many important texts have been lost: only fragments survive of the works written by important grammarians such as Dionysius Thrax, Tyrannion, Asclepiades of Myrlea and Tryphon (see section 3.2).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus did not write any grammatical treatises, but we have seen (section 1.5) that in the context of his rhetorical theory he makes use of views that were developed in philology, grammar and philosophy. Unlike the grammatical treatises of Alexandrian scholars (Tyrannion, Asclepiades of Myrlea and Tryphon), most of the works of Dionysius have survived. Schenkeveld was the first to draw attention to Dionysius' treatises as 'a possible source of information for the level of linguistic knowledge in the second half of the first century BC.'<sup>15</sup> In this chapter, I intend to build on Schenkeveld's work by using Dionysius' works as a source that can increase our knowledge of the theory of the parts of speech as it was circulating at the end of the first century BC. I will shed more light on the transmission of that theory in the period between Aristarchus and later grammarians by re-examining the relevant data that Dionysius offers on the word class theory and by interpreting them in the light of recent scholarly work.<sup>16</sup> In this way, I will also attempt to establish Dionysius' place in the history of the theory of the 'parts of speech'.

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<sup>13</sup> Ancient histories of the theory of the parts of speech inform us about the existence of various systems: see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Comp.* 2.6,20-7,13 and Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 1.4.17-21 (see sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 of this study). See also Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 356,16-21 and Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 520,23-27 (systems of nine, ten and eleven word classes). In practice, we find systems with nine word classes in the grammatical papyri P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters) and P. Heid. I 198 (nr. 12 Wouters). See Wouters (1979) 179 n. 22. If one follows Schenkeveld (1983), Dionysius of Halicarnassus also uses a system of nine parts of speech, but see my section 3.6.6. For Apollonius' use of the eight word classes, see *Synt.* I.14-29. Schoemann (1862) 12 already pointed out that many grammarians after Aristarchus adopted different word class systems.

<sup>14</sup> The Romans substituted the interjection for the article. This may have been the work of Palaemon (see Taylor [1996a] 344), but the definitive *canonisation* of the system of eight word classes, to the exclusion of systems with nine or more *partes orationis*, belongs to later times. For the influential role of Apollonius Dyscolus, see Lallot (1997 I) 23 n. 35.

<sup>15</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 67.

<sup>16</sup> In particular, the contributions of Sluiter (1990) and Lallot (1997) on Apollonius Dyscolus, Lallot (1998) on the *Technê Grammatikê*, Blank (1998) on Sextus Empiricus, Matthaïos (1999) on Aristarchus, and Janko (2000) on Philodemus shed new light on the history of the theory of the 'parts of speech', which has consequences for our interpretation of the information found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

I will argue that Dionysius' treatment of the parts of speech incorporates views from different language disciplines, in particular the Alexandrian philological tradition (known to us especially through the fragments of Aristarchus) and the Stoic philosophical tradition.<sup>17</sup> In other words, as far as Dionysius of Halicarnassus shows knowledge of the grammatical theory of word classes, he belongs to a particular tradition of scholars such as Dionysius Thrax, Tyrannion, and writers of some grammatical papyri: in the surviving fragments of these grammarians we find the influence of the original Alexandrian tradition of philologists (Aristophanes, Aristarchus) on the one hand and the Stoic tradition on the other.<sup>18</sup> From Dionysius Thrax onwards, Alexandrian and Stoic ideas on language were integrated into one system that constituted the basis of technical grammar. Apollonius Dyscolus completes the integration process by making a complete synthesis of the two traditions.<sup>19</sup> I will discuss various aspects of Dionysius' use of grammar that support the view that he was influenced by both philological and Stoic ideas. Further, we will see that Dionysius' use of the parts of speech theory is not only influenced by philology, grammar and philosophy, but also by the tradition of poetic criticism (see sections 3.2 and 4.3).

The study of Dionysius' works can increase our knowledge of the development of grammatical theory between Aristarchus and Apollonius Dyscolus. This should, however, not obscure the fact that Dionysius is a rhetorician and not a grammarian: when using his works in order to reconstruct the history of linguistics, we should not ignore the fact that his concept of 'parts of speech' is somewhat different from that of the grammarians (see section 3.4), and that he uses grammatical theory for different purposes, namely rhetorical theory and literary criticism.<sup>20</sup> In the current chapter I bring together the relevant data from Dionysius' works, in order to reconstruct his grammatical knowledge. In chapter 4, I will discuss the contexts in which Dionysius mentions the grammatical theories, in order to show how he makes use of the theory

<sup>17</sup> See also Matthaïos (2001) 89.

<sup>18</sup> On Stoic influence on Dionysius Thrax, see Matthaïos (2002) 192-193 and see section 3.2. On the Stoic influence on Tyrannion, see Matthaïos (2002) 193-195.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Matthaïos (2001) 88: 'Er [Apollonius Dyscolus] ist derjenige, durch dessen Leistung die alexandrinische und die stoische Lehrtradition zu einer sinnvollen Synthese und Fügung gelangt sind.' For Apollonius and the influence of philology and philosophy on his work, see Blank (1982) and Sluiter (1990) 40-41.

<sup>20</sup> Dionysius' remarks on the parts of speech are often cited as evidence for the grammatical knowledge of his time, but his own aims are sometimes ignored. Thus, Pinborg (1975) 117 n. 45 pays no attention to the function of Dionysius' discussion of the *accidentia* in *Comp.* 6 (see section 4.3.1), and Matthaïos (2001) 89 refers to Dionysius as if he were a grammarian. Schenkeveld (1983) 69 does mention the fact that Dionysius' grammatical observations serve 'his argument on literary matters', although in his interpretation of single passages he does not always take the rhetorical context into account, which can sometimes lead to misunderstanding (e.g. when dealing with Dionysius' 'system' of word classes, see section 3.6.6).

of the parts of speech in different parts of his rhetorical and critical works. Before I investigate Dionysius' views on the parts of speech, I will recall the earlier views on the parts of λόγος and λέξις (section 3.2) in various language disciplines, and consider to what extent Dionysius was acquainted with these views (section 3.3).

### 3.2. *Logos, lexis, and their parts in the various language disciplines*

The most obvious approach to reconstructing the history of the parts of speech in the period before Dionysius of Halicarnassus might seem to start from his own history of the theory of the parts of speech in *De compositione verborum* 2.<sup>21</sup> As I have argued elsewhere, this passage may be characterised as the first extant history of linguistics in the western world.<sup>22</sup> Dionysius describes the gradual increase of the number of the parts of speech from Aristotle onwards: Theodectes and Aristotle distinguished three parts (ὀνόματα, ῥήματα and σύνδεσμοι), the Stoic philosophers added the ἄρθρον and distinguished four, 'later generations' (οἱ μεταγενέστεροι) separated ὀνοματικά and προσηγορικά, thus arriving at five parts. 'Others' (ἕτεροι) distinguished the ἀντονομασία as the sixth part of speech, and 'yet others' (οἱ δέ) added the ἐπιρρήματα, προθέσεις and μετοχαί, thus listing nine parts of speech; others (οἱ δέ) introduced still further divisions. I will discuss this overview of the development of the parts of speech in section 4.2, where I will argue that Dionysius' overview is the archetype of the traditional historiography of linguistics. His presentation of the history of the parts of speech as a gradual progress (from three parts in Aristotle to a system of nine or more parts) has remained standard in overviews of ancient grammar until the end of the twentieth century. When determining Dionysius' own position in the history of linguistics, however, I will not adopt his approach as a historian of linguistics. Taylor (1986), Schenkeveld (1994) and other scholars have rightly argued that historians of linguistics should no longer ignore the different contexts in which ancient ideas on language were developed.<sup>23</sup> This means in particular that we should take into account that the units that were called μέρη were in fact very different items that were used differently in distinct language disciplines. The English term 'parts of speech' is the traditional translation of the Greek τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, and the Latin *partes orationis*.<sup>24</sup> Originally a philosophical term, it was used in different ways and

<sup>21</sup> *Comp.* 2.6,17-7,21.

<sup>22</sup> De Jonge (2005a).

<sup>23</sup> See also Sluiter (1993, 1998) and De Jonge (2005a) 15-16.

<sup>24</sup> On the terms μέρη λόγου and *partes orationis*, and their meaning and possible translations, see also Pinborg (1975) 116, Lambert (1985) 115-116, Robins (1986) 20, Lallot (1992) 127-129 ('Comment dit-on "mot" en Grec?'), Blank (1998) 174, Matthaios (1999) 198-200 and Law (2003) 59. Pinborg (1975) 116 is particularly instructive: 'The concept of "part of speech" is somewhat heterogeneous as a consequence of its historical origin. It is used of a segment of a string (identified with a word) and of classes of such segments. Aristotle seems to have used the term exclusively in this way. It is then used

contexts by Aristotle and the Stoic philosophers respectively. Philologists and grammarians, on the other hand, distinguished different ‘word classes’, for which at some point they borrowed the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου from the philosophers. In theories of composition and syntax, the term could be used to designate the ‘parts of a phrase’: the words in their context. In short, the phrase τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου did not mean the same thing to the various thinkers who used the term. Therefore, when sketching the history of the theory of the parts of speech as a background to Dionysius’ position, I will not follow Dionysius’ own historical overview, which does not pay attention to the contexts of the views of Aristotle, the Stoics, and other thinkers. Instead, I will summarise the most important distinctions that his predecessors, including philosophers, critics, philological and technical grammarians, made concerning λόγος, λέξις and their μέρη.<sup>25</sup>

For Aristotle, the μέρη λόγου were the parts of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός (‘assertion’), and in *De interpretatione* he distinguished two of them, namely ὄνομα and ῥῆμα.<sup>26</sup> The term σύνδεσμος does occur in this work, but it is not considered a part of the λόγος: it only refers to the ‘joining’ of primitive assertions.<sup>27</sup> Likewise, in his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle considers ὄνομα and ῥῆμα the sole components of a λόγος, although the σύνδεσμοι do appear elsewhere in the same work.<sup>28</sup> Aristotle’s distinction of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα in *De interpretatione* is the result of a logical analysis of a sentence as the bearer of truth or falsity, which Aristotle needs for his investigation into contradictions.<sup>29</sup> In the *Poetics*, however, Aristotle discusses the μέρη λέξεως or ‘parts of the expression’:<sup>30</sup> στοιχείον (‘element’, i.e. ‘letter’), συλλαβή (‘syllable’), σύνδεσμος (‘conjunction’), ὄνομα (‘noun’), ῥῆμα (‘verb’), ἄρθρον (‘joint’), πτώσις (‘case’) and λόγος (‘utterance’). This list contains all items that can be considered ‘components of diction’, whether they are smaller than words

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of classes established as semantic classes (especially by the Stoics) and of classes of words undergoing similar inflections. The traditional exposition of the eight parts of speech reflects a conglomeration of these different approaches.’

<sup>25</sup> The treatment of the μέρη λόγου and μέρη λέξεως by various philosophers, philologists and grammarians is, of course, a complex problem: I can only deal with the aspects that are most relevant as a background to Dionysius’ use of the ‘parts of speech’.

<sup>26</sup> Aristotle, *Int.* 16a19-17a7: see the interpretation in Whitaker (1996) 35-73. For Aristotle’s analysis of the λόγος in *De interpretatione* and its role in the history of the theory of the ‘parts of speech’, see also Arens (1984), Lallot (1988) 15, Ax (1992) 247-248, Schenkeveld (1994) 271 and Arens (2000).

<sup>27</sup> The expression συνδέσμων εἷς occurs in *Int.* 17a9 and 17a16: non-primitive assertions are ‘single by conjunction’, i.e. formed by joining primitive assertions together. Thus, the *Iliad* is also ‘single by conjunction’. Cope (1867) 392-397 discusses Aristotle’s use of the term σύνδεσμος.

<sup>28</sup> For ὄνομα and ῥῆμα as the components of the λόγος, see *Rh.* 1404b26-27; the σύνδεσμοι are mentioned in *Rh.* 1407a21, 1407b12, 1407b39 and 1413b33.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Whitaker (1996) 7.

<sup>30</sup> *Po.* 20. Cf. Schenkeveld (1994) 271 and Grintser (2002) 104-105.

(e.g. ‘element’ and ‘syllable’), words, or combinations of words:<sup>31</sup> thus, λόγος is here a μέρος λέξεως and it is defined as ‘a compound, significant utterance, some of whose parts do have independent significance’.<sup>32</sup> Aristotle’s μέρη λέξεως and his μέρη λόγου represent two entirely different approaches to language, and neither of these concepts corresponds to the ‘word classes’ that grammarians identified in later times.<sup>33</sup>

The Stoics had a different ontology and logic than Aristotle, which is mirrored in their list of μέρη λόγου.<sup>34</sup> They identified first four, later five ‘parts of speech’: Chrysippus added the προσηγορία to the list of four parts that were distinguished by earlier Stoics, namely ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, ἄρθρον and σύνδεσμος. The μεσότης (adverb) was added at a still later stage, presumably under influence of Alexandrian philology.<sup>35</sup> Chrysippus’ distinction between ‘proper noun’ (ὄνομα) and ‘appellative’ (προσηγορία) was based on the ontological difference between an individual quality and a common quality.<sup>36</sup> For the Stoics, λέξις is articulated sound, which is either meaningless or meaningful.<sup>37</sup> Λόγος, however, is a *semantic* unity, which is always meaningful, whether it refers (in non-Stoic terms) to a word, a series of words or an entire text.<sup>38</sup> The στοιχεῖα λέξεως (or φωνῆς) are the ‘elements of articulated sound’, that is the letters, while the στοιχεῖα λόγου are the ‘elements of speech’, that is the (meaningful) ‘parts of speech’.<sup>39</sup>

Alexandrian philologists and (in a later period) technical grammarians partly used the same terms as the Stoics, but they did so in a different way and for a different

<sup>31</sup> Lallot (1992) 128 remarks that Aristotle does in fact not have a word meaning ‘word’.

<sup>32</sup> *Po.* 20.1457a 23-24: λόγος δέ φωνή συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἥς ἔνια μέρη καθ’ αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι. The translation is by Halliwell (1995).

<sup>33</sup> The Aristotelian distinction between λόγος and λέξις is also preserved in Theophrastus fr. 683 Fortenbaugh. On the ‘grammatical’ chapters in Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* (1-4), *Poetica* (19-22) and *Rhetorica*, see Arens (1984), Rosén (1990), Ax (1992), Weidemann (1996<sup>2</sup>), Ildefonse (1997) 72-117, Grintser (2002) and Swiggers & Wouters (2002).

<sup>34</sup> For the fragments on the theory of the Stoic μέρη λόγου, see *FDS* 536-549. See especially Diogenes Laertius VII.56-58 (= *FDS* 536). Cf. Schenkeveld (1994) 271-272 and Luhtala (2000) 78-85.

<sup>35</sup> In Stoic grammar the μεσότης was introduced by Antipater (Diogenes Laertius VII.57), but Aristarchus used the term already before that time. See Matthaios (1999) 553: ‘Diese Entwicklung impliziert die Annahme, Antipater habe unter dem Einfluß der Ansichten der Alexandriner die Selbständigkeit des Adverbs auch für das stoische Redeteilsystem angenommen und zu dessen Bezeichnung den von den Alexandrinern geprägten Terminus μεσότης übernommen.’

<sup>36</sup> Diogenes Laertius VII.58. See also section 5.3.6.

<sup>37</sup> Unlike the grammarians, who equated λέξις with ‘word’, the Stoics used the term λέξις (‘articulated sound’) only in the singular.

<sup>38</sup> Diogenes Laertius VII.56-57. Cf. Sluiter (1990) 23 and Luhtala (2000) 72-73.

<sup>39</sup> See *FDS* 539-541. The term στοιχεῖα λόγου also appears in the title of a work by the Peripatetic philosopher Theophrastus: Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων (fr. 683 Fortenbaugh). It has been suggested that this title refers to the first part of Theophrastus’ Περὶ λέξεως, but Schenkeveld (1998a) 69-79 has argued that it is the title of a logical work. See section 3.3.1.

purpose. Matthaios has shown that Aristarchus (216-144 BC) distinguished the names of eight word classes, namely ὄνομα ('noun'), ῥῆμα ('verb'), μετοχή ('participle'), ἄρθρον ('article'), ἀντωνυμία ('pronoun'), μεσότης ('adverb'), σύνδεσμος ('conjunction') and πρόθεσις ('preposition').<sup>40</sup> Aristarchus and his Alexandrian colleagues used these word classes and their *accidentia* for the explanation and textual criticism of Homer. For example, Aristarchus observed that in a certain verse Homer used a passive instead of an active verb form (παθητικὸν ἀντὶ ἐνεργητικοῦ), or that he used the word τούς not as an ἄρθρον (article), but instead of an ἀντωνυμία (pronoun).<sup>41</sup> Aristarchus seems to have refined the terminological system of his Alexandrian predecessors, who already made some important distinctions: Apollonius Dyscolus reports that Aristophanes of Byzantium used the term πρόθεσις ('preposition'), and that Aristarchus' older contemporary Comanus knew the pronoun, which he called ἀντωνομασία (see section 3.6.3).<sup>42</sup> Aristarchus' most important contributions may have been the distinction of the adverb and the participle as separate word classes, for the terms μεσότης and μετοχή are not used in this sense in earlier extant texts.<sup>43</sup> For our reconstruction of the history of the word class system after Aristarchus, it is important that we pay attention to two important facts. First, Aristarchus did not use the term ἐπίρρημα, which was the normal term for 'adverb' in later times.<sup>44</sup> Second, he presumably did not use the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου to designate ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, etc.<sup>45</sup> Unlike the philosophers, Aristarchus was not interested in 'parts of λόγος', but in 'word classes' (types of words).<sup>46</sup>

<sup>40</sup> See Matthaios (1999). Matthaios concludes that careful analysis of the fragments of Aristarchus confirms the testimony of Quintilian (*Inst. orat.* 1.4.20; see section 4.2.3), who states that Aristarchus knew eight *partes orationis*. On Aristarchus and his philological work, see Pfeiffer (1968) 210-233.

<sup>41</sup> Aristarchus, fr. 57 Matthaios (Sch. Hom., *Iliad* 3.306-310): see Matthaios (1999) 312-318; Aristarchus, fr. 100a Matthaios (Sch. Hom., *Iliad* 10.322): see Matthaios (1999) 437-438. On Aristarchus' use of the word classes in his philological work, see Ax (1982), Schenkeveld (1994) 273-278, Ax (1996<sup>2</sup>) 282-288, and especially Matthaios (1999).

<sup>42</sup> For Aristophanes' use of the πρόθεσις, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* IV.11. Cf. Callanan (1987) 28ff., Schenkeveld (1994) 275, Lallot (1997 II) 286-287 and Matthaios (1999) 588, 608 and 613. For Comanus on the ἀντωνομασία see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron., G.G.* II 1, 4, 18.

<sup>43</sup> For μετοχή, see Aristarchus fr. 92a Matthaios. For μεσότης, see Matthaios (1999) 520ff.

<sup>44</sup> See Matthaios (1999) 548-563.

<sup>45</sup> The term μέρη λόγου is not found in the fragments of Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax: see Matthaios (1999) 198-200. Aristarchus seems to have used the term λέξεις when discussing the category to which a word belongs, and later grammarians still used λέξεις when they defined particular word classes. But grammarians did not say that 'there are eight (or nine) λέξεις'. Schenkeveld (1994) 279-280 thinks that the 'parts' of the Alexandrians (Aristophanes and Aristarchus) were actually μέρη λέξεως in the Aristotelian sense; however, it should be emphasised that Aristotle included also other units than words among the μέρη λέξεως.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Law (2003) 59. Leonard Bloomfield introduced the term 'word classes' in 1914.

In the generation of Aristarchus' pupil Dionysius Thrax (ca. 170-90 BC), Stoic influence on the Alexandrian grammarians became stronger.<sup>47</sup> It has been noticed that where the teachings of Dionysius Thrax (as reported by ancient testimonies) differ from the theories in the *Technê Grammatikê*, Dionysius Thrax seems to have adopted Stoic ideas.<sup>48</sup> In particular, Dionysius Thrax is said (1) to have separated ὄνομα (proper noun) and προσηγορία (appellative), (2) to have called the pronoun ἄρθρον δεικτικόν ('deictic article'), and (3) to have defined the verb as 'a word that signifies a predicate' (ῥῆμα ἐστὶ λέξις κατηγορημα σημαίνουσα).<sup>49</sup> All these doctrines can be explained as resulting from Stoic influence. As Frede and Janko point out, it may have been Apollodorus of Athens who influenced Dionysius Thrax by introducing to him the teachings of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (2<sup>nd</sup> century BC).<sup>50</sup> Both Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax studied with Aristarchus in Alexandria. Apollodorus shared at least one of the views of Dionysius Thrax: he too called pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά (see section 3.6.3).<sup>51</sup> A second factor that may have contributed to the integration of philological and Stoic ideas was the so-called *secessio doctorum*: in 145 BC many scholars were forced to leave Alexandria and moved to Rhodes, Pergamon, Athens and (in later times) Rome. As a result, many ideas seem to have been exchanged between philosophers and philologists who now came into contact with each other at various Hellenistic centres of learning.<sup>52</sup>

In the period after Dionysius Thrax, a new discipline must have developed from the philological work of the Alexandrian scholars, namely that of technical grammar: scholars now started to write systematic grammatical treatises, including lists of word classes and their *accidentia*. One might say that these technical treatises systematically fixed down the 'Grammatik im Kopf' that Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax used for their philological explanations. We do not know who wrote the first treatise of technical grammar, but I have already mentioned (in section 1.4) that Asclepiades of Myrlea (who came from Alexandria to Rome in the first century BC) wrote a treatise *Περὶ γραμματικῆς* (*On Grammar*), which Sextus Empiricus used as a source for his refutations of grammatical theories in his *Against the Grammarians*.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>47</sup> A very instructive history of the word class theory in the period after Aristarchus is found in Matthaios (2002) 191-213. For the fragments of Dionysius Thrax, see Linke (1977) and for a reconstruction of his 'Precepts' (Παραγγέλματα), see Schenkeveld (1998<sup>2b</sup>) and Di Benedetto (2000).

<sup>48</sup> See Frede (1987b) 358-359 and Janko (1995) 215.

<sup>49</sup> The ancient testimonies are the following: Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 124,7-14; Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 160,24-161,8; Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 5,13-19. See my discussion in section 3.6.3.

<sup>50</sup> Frede (1987b) 358-359; Janko (1995) 215. Diogenes of Babylon, who wrote a *τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς*, is mentioned several times in the account of Diogenes Laertius (VII.55-58 etc.). On Apollodorus, see Pfeiffer (1968) 252-266.

<sup>51</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 5,18-19.

<sup>52</sup> See Matthaios (2002) 191-192.

<sup>53</sup> On Asclepiades, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

We have also seen that Tyrannion, who lived in Rome from 67 BC onwards, wrote a treatise *Περὶ μερισμοῦ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν* (*On the Classification of the Parts of Speech*).<sup>54</sup> In this work, Tyrannion may have discussed the number and order of the word classes, and presumably he also dealt with the assignment of words to their proper word class, the procedure for which Apollonius Dyscolus uses the word *μερισμός*.<sup>55</sup> The title of this work on the parts of speech makes Tyrannion the first grammarian of whom we know that he used the expression *τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου*, which is until this time only attested in philosophical writings.<sup>56</sup> The introduction of the originally philosophical expression *τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου* in philology and technical grammar is another example of Stoic influence on Alexandrian scholars. For Aristotle and the Stoics, this term referred, as we have seen, to the components of *λόγος*, but for the grammarians it now came to designate the types of words (word classes) that they distinguished.<sup>57</sup> From now on, *μέρος λόγου* seems to be the standard term for word class, but the term *μόριον* was used as well: in the grammatical papyri, the works of Apollonius Dyscolus and the *Technê grammatikê*, both *μέρος λόγου* and *μόριον* are used in the sense of word class.<sup>58</sup> Finally, the distinction between *λέξις* and *λόγος* developed into one between ‘word’ and ‘sentence’: this is a relatively late application of these terms, which we find in Apollonius Dyscolus and in the *Technê Grammatikê*, where *λέξις* is defined as ‘the smallest part of the constructed sentence (*λόγος*)’.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Haas (1977) has collected the fragments of the two grammarians named Tyrannion (Diocles, the younger Tyrannion, probably took over the name of his teacher Tyrannion). Pfeiffer (1968) 272-274 offers a general discussion of the scholarly work of Asclepiades and Tyrannion. For Tyrannion’s life and works, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

<sup>55</sup> On the content of Tyrannion’s treatise, see Wendel (1943) 1815. The titles *Περὶ μερισμοῦ* and *Περὶ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ λόγου* (Tyrannion fr. 55-56 Haas), both mentioned in Suda, have been identified as one treatise that would have carried the title *Περὶ μερισμοῦ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν*, which was also the title of one of the works of Apollonius Dyscolus. Cf. Wendel (1943) 1815: ‘Gewiß betont Lehrs (...) mit Recht, daß *μερισμός* die Aufteilung der Sprache auf die Wortklassen bedeutet, so daß deren Zahl und wechselseitiges Verhältnis sowie die Unterbringung von Wörtern zweifelhafter Zugehörigkeit in derartigen Schriften vorwiegend erörtert werden mußte (...), aber das Ergebnis solcher Untersuchungen war doch eben die Feststellung und Abgrenzung der *μέρη τοῦ λόγου*, so daß die Titel *Περὶ μερισμοῦ* und *Περὶ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ λόγου* durchaus verschiedene Kürzungen des gleichen Volltitels darstellen können.’ On Apollonius’ use of *μερισμός*, see Sluiter (1990) 106-139.

<sup>56</sup> If Blank (1998) is right that Asclepiades of Myrlea was, via an intermediate Epicurean text, the main source of Sextus’ *Against the Grammarians*, we may assume that Asclepiades also used the term *τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου*, since the discussion in *Adv. Math.* I.131-158 (esp. 132-141) presupposes a grammarian who used that term.

<sup>57</sup> Matthaïos (1999) translates *μέρος λόγου* with ‘Redeteil’ when dealing with Aristotle or Stoics, but with ‘Wortart’ when dealing with the grammarians: see Matthaïos (1999) 200.

<sup>58</sup> The term *μέρος λόγου* is found in Apollonius Dyscolus, e.g. *Synt.* I.14-29 etc., [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 22,4-23,3, and in the following papyri: P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters), P. Lond. Lit. 182 (nr. 2 Wouters), P. Heid. I 197 (nr. 6 Wouters), and P. Heid. I 198 (nr. 12 Wouters). For *μόριον*, see e.g. Apollonius Dyscolus *Synt.* I.19 (where *τὸ μόριον* refers to the word class pronoun) and *Synt.* I.22 (where *τὸ μόριον* refers to the word class participle).

<sup>59</sup> [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 22,4: *λέξις ἐστὶ μέρος ἐλάχιστον τοῦ κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου*. Cf. Lallot (1992) 128-129.

Not only Tyrannion's adoption of the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, but also his treatment of the different word classes betrays Stoic influence.<sup>60</sup> For example, he does not seem to have distinguished the participle as a separate word class, but as a subtype of the noun.<sup>61</sup> The integration of Alexandrian and Stoic ideas that characterises the grammatical views of Dionysius Thrax and Tyrannion is mirrored in some grammatical papyri from later times. In these texts, the originally Stoic distinction of ὄνομα and προσηγορία (proper noun and appellative) is incorporated in a list of word classes: this results in a system of nine word classes (with proper noun and appellative noun as two separate classes), which we find in two papyri in the collection of Wouters.<sup>62</sup>

We recall that for most word classes, Aristarchus already used the names that were to become the traditional ones, but that he called the adverb μεσότης, not ἐπίρρημα. The term ἐπίρρημα (in the sense of adverb) seems to have been introduced in the first century BC: it first appears in the fragments of Tryphon (active in the Augustan period), namely in the title of his work Περὶ ἐπιρρημάτων ('On Adverbs'), and, in roughly the same period, in the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (see section 3.6.5).<sup>63</sup>

While philologists in Alexandria were explaining and commenting on the Homeric texts, another group of Hellenistic scholars, known as κριτικοί, was engaged in a heated debate on the criteria of good poetry (see section 1.5). We know these critics from Philodemus' *On Poems*. One of the surviving fragments of this work, which Janko has assigned to the critic Pausimachus of Miletus (cited by Philodemus via Crates), mentions ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, and a word that must be restored as πρόθεσις.<sup>64</sup> For our purposes this fragment is important because the interests of the *kritikoi* are similar to those of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The way in which the 'parts of speech' (we do not know what they called them) are used in this context

<sup>60</sup> On Stoic influence on Tyrannion's treatment of the parts of speech, see Matthaïos (2002) 193-195.

<sup>61</sup> Tyrannion fr. 56 Haas. See Matthaïos (2002) 194.

<sup>62</sup> P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters) and P. Heid. I 198 (nr. 12 Wouters) (see also section 3.6.6).

<sup>63</sup> Tryphon, fr. 65 Von Velsen (= Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, G.G. II 1, 146,15-23). See also Tryphon, fr. 66-77 Von Velsen. Cf. Matthaïos (1999) 559-560. For Dionysius' use of the adverbs, see also section 5.3.4.

<sup>64</sup> Janko (2000) 282-283 (P. Herc. 994 fr. 19,4-5). Note that Janko reads πρ[οθέσις] because πρ[οσηγορίας] would exceed the space of the lacuna. If Janko's reconstruction is correct, the fragment would confirm the belief, based on Apollonius Dyscolus' reference to Aristophanes of Byzantium, that the πρόθεσις (preposition) was already distinguished in the period before Aristarchus. Apollonius (*Synt.* IV.11) suggests that Aristophanes of Byzantium already knew the πρόθεσις (see above). In an earlier publication, Janko (1995) 228 assigned the fragment from Philodemus to Aristarchus' older contemporary Crates of Mallos, but more recently (Janko [2000] 186-187) he has identified this critic as Pausimachus of Miletus, who, according to Janko's reconstruction, is quoted by Crates of Mallos.

seems to correspond to the way in which Dionysius of Halicarnassus employs them in some passages of *De compositione verborum* (see below, section 4.3.1). Like Dionysius, the *kritikoi* seem to have used the doctrine of the parts of speech in their discussion of σύνθεσις (composition), in particular by arguing that the modification of the parts of speech (by adding and removing letters) can lead to a more euphonious composition.<sup>65</sup> The fragmentary state of Philodemus' *On Poems* and the lack of other evidence make it impossible to judge the exact connections between the *kritikoi* and Dionysius, but it is not unlikely that Dionysius' use of the parts of speech was influenced by these Hellenistic critics (see section 4.3.1).

Dionysius' contemporary colleague Caecilius of Caleacte, critic and rhetorician, also seems to have used the grammatical theory of the parts of speech in his rhetorical teaching (see also section 1.5). Only a few fragments of his works have come down to us, but they show us that, in his work *On Figures*, Caecilius dealt with at least ὀνόματα and ῥήματα and discussed figures that made particular use of the *accidentia*, in particular πτώσεις (cases), ἀριθμός (number), πρόσωπα (persons) and χρόνοι (tenses).<sup>66</sup> In as far as the fragments allow us to draw conclusions, Caecilius' use of the parts of speech in rhetorical theory resembles that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (section 4.4.2).

This overview of the various traditions of philosophers, philological and technical grammarians, poetical critics and rhetoricians, all of which played their own role in the history of the analysis of λόγος and λέξις into μέρη, be it as 'parts of the expression', 'parts of speech', 'parts of the phrase', or 'word classes', serves as a background to Dionysius of Halicarnassus' use of the μόρια λόγου and μόρια λέξεως. Before we turn to a discussion of Dionysius' use of these 'parts of speech', we should consider his possible connections to the different traditions listed above, so that our analysis will enable us to establish Dionysius' place in the history of the theory of the parts of speech.

### 3.3. Dionysius' knowledge of earlier and contemporary theories

Dionysius uses the theory of the parts of speech only in four of his treatises, namely *Dem.*, *Comp.*, *Thuc.* and *Amm.* II, all of which are works belonging to the middle or late periods in the division of Dionysius' works (see section 1.3). Although we should

<sup>65</sup> It may well be that the concept of the 'parts' of the *kritikoi* was similar to that of Dionysius, namely 'word classes' as well as 'parts of the phrase' (words as building blocks of composition): see section 3.4.

<sup>66</sup> Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 73 and 75 Ofenloch.

not exclude the possibility that it was because of the character of his earlier works (*Lys.*, *Isoc.*, *Is.*) that Dionysius did not use grammatical theories there, I think that Schenkeveld has rightly argued that Dionysius obtained his knowledge about grammatical theories when he had been in Rome for some time.<sup>67</sup> In this section, I will discuss the connections between Dionysius and the scholars of various disciplines that dealt in some way with a theory of the parts of speech. This discussion will consist of two parts. First, I will discuss those philosophers, philologists and critics of earlier periods with whose ideas we know Dionysius must have been acquainted, since he refers to their works (section 3.3.1). Second, I will list a number of contemporary grammarians with whose views on the parts of speech Dionysius may have become familiar in Rome, where many intellectuals came together in the first century BC (section 3.3.2).<sup>68</sup> Finally, I will briefly discuss the passages where Dionysius describes how one learns to read and write: Dionysius' discussion shows that the word classes were part of the grammatical curriculum of his time (section 3.3.3).

Because Dionysius does not mention the names of contemporary scholars, we can never be certain about his connections with them, but we should definitely allow for the possibility that he knew their ideas on language. This is not to say that this study will engage in *Quellenforschung* here: it will not be my purpose to assign each of Dionysius' ideas to one particular philosopher or grammarian. Instead, I will explore the intellectual context in which Dionysius was working, so that we may better understand how Dionysius' use of the *μῦθια λόγου* is related to the various theories that existed in his time. As I have argued above (section 1.3), Dionysius' participation in the network of intellectuals at Rome is fundamental to our understanding of his works. In this light, it is not useful to point to specific sources of his ideas, but more so to reconstruct the collective set of ideas that circulated in this network, and the discourse in which these ideas were expressed and exchanged.

Only in a few cases will I point to a specific text as the possible source of Dionysius' views: I will only do so when there are strong reasons to believe that a certain passage should be traced back to an earlier treatment, for instance because Dionysius' terminology in that passage differs from the terminology in the rest of his work, or because the views that are expressed in that passage seem to be typical of a particular school or discipline: the history of the theory of the parts of speech (*Comp.* 2) may be a case in point (see section 4.2.3). Here, Dionysius tells us that 'some' (τινες) call the

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<sup>67</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 69.

<sup>68</sup> For the intellectual life in Augustan Rome, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

parts of speech στοιχεῖα. Quintilian offers a history of the parts of speech that closely resembles Dionysius' account (see section 4.2.3), and Blank has argued that much of Quintilian's grammatical theory is based on Asclepiades of Myrlea.<sup>69</sup> We can imagine that a technical grammatical treatise started with a historical overview of the development of the parts of speech from Aristotle onwards, so in this case we might indeed think of Asclepiades' *On Grammar* (or another grammatical work) as the source of Dionysius' account.<sup>70</sup> Another case is Dionysius' *Second Letter to Ammaeus* (see section 4.4), which partly seems to be based on a philological commentary on Thucydides. In general, however, I will refrain from tracing his ideas back to specific sources: it is more useful to illustrate the ways in which Dionysius reflects the discourse of his time.

### 3.3.1. Dionysius' knowledge of earlier views on the parts of speech

Dionysius knew the views of several thinkers of the four traditions that we have discussed in section 3.2: those of the Peripatetic philosophers, the Stoic philosophers, the Alexandrian philologists and the Hellenistic *kritikoi*. He mentions representatives of the first three groups, while his connection to the *kritikoi* seems to be clear from the similarity between their and his views on euphony. Did Dionysius also know how the parts of speech were treated in these different traditions?

In section 1.5, we have observed that Dionysius knew both Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Theophrastus' *On Style*. Above, I have pointed out that, in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle distinguished only two μέρη λόγου, namely ὄνομα and ῥῆμα.<sup>71</sup> He did mention σύνδεσμοι in the same treatise, however, and this could explain why Dionysius, in his history of the theory of the parts of speech (see section 4.2.1), tells us that Aristotle (and Theodectes) considered ὀνόματα, ῥήματα and σύνδεσμοι the primary parts of speech.<sup>72</sup> Janko's suggestion that Dionysius is here quoting an Aristotelian dialogue in which Theodectes appeared seems unnecessary, for we can imagine that Dionysius is referring to the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and to a similar work on style by Aristotle's pupil Theodectes.<sup>73</sup> In any case, there is a reasonable chance that Dionysius' history of the theory of the parts of speech in *Comp.* 2 depends on a grammatical source (Asclepiades' *On Grammar* has been suggested), and,

<sup>69</sup> Blank (1998) xlv-xlvi.

<sup>70</sup> See also De Jonge (2005a) 14 n. 19.

<sup>71</sup> Aristotle, *Rh.* 1404b26-27.

<sup>72</sup> *Comp.* 2.6,20-7.2. The σύνδεσμοι are mentioned in Aristotle, *Rh.* 1407a21; 1407b12; 1407b39; 1413b33.

<sup>73</sup> Janko (2000) 186-187. Frede (1987a) 317 thinks that the information on Theodectes can only derive from 'Theodectes' remarks on diction in one of his rhetorical writings'.

consequently, that the observations on the number of parts of speech distinguished by Aristotle and later thinkers are not necessarily based on Dionysius' own investigations.<sup>74</sup> Dionysius presumably did not know Aristotle's *Poetics*, but there is a chance that the Aristotelian difference between μέρη λόγου (parts of the assertion, namely ὄνομα and ῥῆμα) and μέρη λέξεως (parts of expression, namely στοιχείων, συλλαβή, σύνδεσμος, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, ἄρθρον, πτώσις and λόγος) was known to him from the works of Aristotle's successor Theophrastus.<sup>75</sup> Simplicius tells us that Theophrastus, in his work *On the Elements of Speech* (Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων) inquired 'whether just the noun and verb are elements of speech (τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα), or also ἄρθρα and σύνδεσμοι and certain others — these too are parts of expression (λέξεως μέρη), but noun and verb are parts of speech (λόγου) — (...)'.<sup>76</sup> The latter words indicate that Theophrastus preserved the Aristotelian distinction between λόγος and λέξις and their respective μέρη. Now, it has been suggested that *On the Elements of Speech* is another title of Theophrastus' book *On Style* (Περὶ λέξεως), or perhaps a name of the first part of that work.<sup>77</sup> If this were true, it would mean that Dionysius could have taken notice of the Peripatetic distinction between λόγος and λέξις from Theophrastus' *On Style*, a work that he used extensively. However, Schenkeveld has argued that Simplicius' passage mentioned above does not refer to Theophrastus' *On Style*, but rather to a logical treatise by the same author.<sup>78</sup> Therefore, we do not know whether Theophrastus mentioned the parts of expression (either in connection with the parts of the assertion or not) in his work *On Style*, nor do we know whether Dionysius was acquainted with the difference between Aristotle's μέρη λόγου and μέρη λέξεως.<sup>79</sup> Dionysius himself does not distinguish between parts of the assertion and parts of the expression: as we

<sup>74</sup> See Kroll (1907) 91-92, Blank (1998) xlv-xlvi, and my section 4.2.3.

<sup>75</sup> Dionysius seems to be ignorant of the *Poetics*: in *Comp.* 2, he states that Aristotle only distinguished ὄνομα, ῥῆμα and σύνδεσμος as parts of speech, but in *Poetics* 20.1456b38-1457a10 the ἄρθρον is mentioned. Cf. Fortenbaugh (2005) 249.

<sup>76</sup> Simplicius, *In Cat.* 8.10,20-11,2 (= Theophrastus fr. 683 Fortenbaugh): ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων ὅ τε Θεόφραστος ἀνακινεῖ (...) οἷον πότερον ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα ἢ καὶ ἄρθρα καὶ σύνδεσμοι καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ (λέξεως δὲ καὶ ταῦτα μέρη, λόγου δὲ ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα) ...

<sup>77</sup> See Theophrastus fr. 666 (titles of books) 17a (*On Style*) and b (*On the Elements of Speech*) and Fortenbaugh's comments there. On the possible identification of *On the Elements of Speech* with (a part of) *On Style*, see also Frede (1987a) 317.

<sup>78</sup> Schenkeveld (1998a) 69-79. In his commentary, Fortenbaugh (2005) 244-245 agrees with Schenkeveld: he now recommends placing fr. 683 before fr. 78 (Ammonius, *On Aristotle's De Interpretatione* 4.17a1), which seems to be based on the same logical treatise by Theophrastus.

<sup>79</sup> P. Hib. 183 (Theophrastus fr. 683 appendix 8 Fortenbaugh) seems to mention 'eight parts of the expression', but Fortenbaugh (2005) 250-254 is not convinced that this text should be attributed to Theophrastus. P. Hamb. 128 (Theophrastus fr. 683 appendix 9 Fortenbaugh) contains a discussion of types of words, where 'nouns and verbs combined' (ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων συνθέτων) are mentioned. But Schenkeveld (1993) disagrees with Snell's attribution of the text to Theophrastus' *On Style*. Fortenbaugh (2005) 254-266 (see esp. 265-266) hesitates.

will see, he uses both μόρια (or μέρη) λόγου and μόρια (or μέρη) λέξεως, but without adopting the Peripatetic (or the Stoic) distinction between the two (see section 3.5).

In *Comp.* 4, Dionysius tells us that he has read two treatises of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus with the title *Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν*, *On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*, which did not adopt a rhetorical but a dialectical approach (see also sections 1.5 and 5.3.1).<sup>80</sup> They dealt with ‘the composition (σύνταξις) of true and false propositions, possible and impossible ones, propositions that are contingent, changing their truth value, ambiguous ones and others of such a kind’.<sup>81</sup> Dionysius emphasises that Chrysippus’ books were not useful to civil oratory, ‘at least as far as the attractiveness and beauty of style (ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ἐρμηνείας), which should be the aims of composition, are concerned’.<sup>82</sup> Just before mentioning the title of Chrysippus’ treatise, Dionysius also refers more generally to Stoic τέχναι ὑπὲρ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων, ‘handbooks on the syntax of the parts of speech’, which were very disappointing to him, because the writers who claimed to write on the syntax of the parts of speech, and Chrysippus in particular, turned out to be the worst examples of stylistic writing themselves:<sup>83</sup> ‘they never even dreamt what it is that makes composition attractive and beautiful.’<sup>84</sup> Although Dionysius objects so strongly both to Chrysippus’ own stylistic composition and to his logical approach to the grouping of the parts of speech, we should not exclude the possibility that the rhetorician’s use of the μόρια λόγου reflects to a certain extent his reading of these Stoic texts.<sup>85</sup> This seems to be true at least for the experiment concerning natural word

<sup>80</sup> *Comp.* 4.22,12-17. The title does not entirely correspond to the titles of Chrysippus’ works that we know from Diogenes Laertius VII.192: *Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως καὶ στοιχείων τῶν λεγομένων* and *Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν λεγομένων*. On Chrysippus’ treatises mentioned by Dionysius and Diogenes Laertius, see Barwick (1957) 21, Frede (1987a) 324-325, Atherton (1993) 142 n. 7 and Van Ophuijsen (2003) 81 and 93.

<sup>81</sup> *Comp.* 4.22,14-17: ὑπὲρ ἀξιωματῶν συντάξεως ἀληθῶν τε καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ δυνατῶν καὶ ἀδυνάτων ἐνδεχομένων τε καὶ μεταπιπτόντων καὶ ἀμφιβόλων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν τοιοῦτοτρόπων.

<sup>82</sup> *Comp.* 4.22,18-23,1: οὐδεμίαν οὐτ’ ὀφέλειαν οὐτε χρεῖαν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς λόγοις συμβαλλομένης εἰς γοῦν ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ἐρμηνείας, ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι τὴν σύνθεσιν.

<sup>83</sup> *Comp.* 4.21,10-18: ἀπόχρη δὲ τεκμηρίῳ χρῆσασθαι τοῦ λόγου Χρυσίππῳ τῷ Στωϊκῷ (περαιτέρω γὰρ οὐκ ἂν προβαίην)· τούτου γὰρ οὐτ’ ἄμεινον οὐδεὶς τὰς διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας ἠκρίβωσεν οὔτε ἀρμονίᾳ χεῖρονι συνταχθέντας ἐξήνεγκε λόγους τῶν γοῦν ὀνόματος καὶ δόξης ἀξιωθέντων. καίτοι σπουδάζεσθαι γέ τινες προσεποιήθησαν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ὄν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τέχνῳ γέ τινες ἔγραψαν ὑπὲρ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων. ‘It is sufficient to point to Chrysippus the Stoic as proof of my statement [that those who claim to be philosophers and publish handbooks on logic are inept in the arrangement of their words], for beyond that I refuse to go. Of writers who have been judged worthy of renown or distinction, none has written treatises on logic with more precision, and none has published discourses that are worse specimens of composition. And yet some of those writers claimed to make a serious study of this department also, as being indispensable to good writing, and even wrote handbooks on the syntax of the parts of speech.’ In this passage, I follow the text of Aujac & Lebel (1981). Usener reads προβαίην instead of προβαίην (MSS).

<sup>84</sup> *Comp.* 4.22,2-3: οὐδ’ ὄναρ εἶδον, τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ποιῶν ἡδεῖαν καὶ καλὴν τὴν σύνθεσιν.

<sup>85</sup> While the Stoic treatises dealt with σύνταξις, Dionysius himself is interested in the σύνθεσις of the parts of speech. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* IX.8 tells us that according to technical authors

order (*Comp.* 5), which immediately follows the remarks on Chrysippus' works (see section 5.3). Dionysius abandons that experiment with the logical ordering of the parts of speech (nouns precede verbs, verbs precede adverbs, etc.) for the reason that in many cases the logical rules do not lead to a composition that is pleasing (ἡδέϊα) and beautiful (καλή):<sup>86</sup> this was, as we have seen, exactly the objection that he had uttered to Chrysippus' work and to the logical handbooks in general. I will argue that Dionysius' discussion of natural word order is indeed based on the Stoic theory of the parts of speech, although I do not think that Chrysippus himself was as interested in pleasing and beautiful word order as Dionysius was: we should rather believe that Dionysius borrowed Stoic theories on the hierarchy of the parts of speech, which he himself applied to the art of composition.<sup>87</sup> Stoic ideas also play a role in other parts of his work, and Schenkeveld has rightly drawn attention to the Stoic terminology that Dionysius uses in his grammatical observations.<sup>88</sup> It will turn out that many aspects of Dionysius' use of the parts of speech can indeed be considered Stoic. This does not imply, however, that Dionysius borrowed all such theories from Chrysippus or another Stoic source. Since Stoic thought influenced many grammarians of the second and first centuries BC, Dionysius' Stoic terminology may also have resulted from his use of grammatical, rather than philosophical treatises.<sup>89</sup> Stoic terminology was part of the intellectual discourse of the time.

We can be quite certain, then, that Dionysius was acquainted with Stoic views on the μέρη λόγου. Although he is less explicit about his knowledge of the achievements of Alexandrian philologists in this field, we may assume that he was acquainted with their views. When Dionysius refers to Aristophanes of Byzantium, he only mentions the fact that the Alexandrian scholar 'or any other metrician' divided poems into metrical

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(τεχνογράφοι), who may be identified as Stoics, 'a definition differs from a universal statement only in σύνταξις, but it is the same in "semantic potential" (δύναμις).' The translation is by Van Ophuijsen (2003). Sextus Empiricus gives an example that suggests that, for the Stoics, σύνταξις has nothing to do with the order of words, but with the logical combining (by the use of conjunctions) of propositions. See Van Ophuijsen (2003) 82-84.

<sup>86</sup> *Comp.* 5.26,17-20.

<sup>87</sup> Kroll (1907) 91 has suggested that Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order, including its examples, is borrowed from Chrysippus. See also Jensen (1923) 149. Barwick (1957) 21 also thinks that the Stoic τέχνοι themselves treated the order of the parts of speech in a sentence, and so does Frede (1987a) 324-325. It is, however, also possible that the Stoics discussed the natural hierarchy of the parts of speech without implying that the μέρη λόγου should be placed in a sentence according to that order: in that case, Dionysius (*Comp.* 5) would have gone one step further than the Stoics themselves. See section 5.3.7.

<sup>88</sup> Schenkeveld (1983).

<sup>89</sup> Matthaios (2002) 191-213 discusses Stoic influence on technical grammarians in the period between Aristarchus and Apollonius. The Stoic Crates of Mallos, who came to Rome in 168 BC, played an important role in the development of Roman grammatical ideas: see Taylor (2000) 455 and Matthaios (2002) 201.

*cola*.<sup>90</sup> Dionysius nowhere mentions Aristarchus or Dionysius Thrax. However, in his discussion of the style of Thucydides, he remarks that nobody could understand the historian without the use of a ‘linguistic interpretation’ (ἐξήγησεως γραμματικῆς) (see section 4.4).<sup>91</sup> The term ἐξήγησις does not necessarily imply a commentary (ὑπομνήμα), but the similarity between Dionysius’ notes on Thucydides in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* and the comments in the scholia on Thucydides indeed suggests that Dionysius made use of a philological commentary. Such a commentary may have originated in Alexandrian scholarship. If Pfeiffer correctly assumes that Aristarchus wrote the first commentary on Thucydides, then we may believe that Dionysius used that work.<sup>92</sup> In any case, Dionysius’ analysis of Thucydides’ use of the parts of speech resembles the kind of remarks that we know from Aristarchus’ work on Homer. For example, Dionysius points out that a noun is used instead of a verb (or *vice versa*), or that a single pronoun is combined with a plural verb. I will discuss the relation between Dionysius and Alexandrian scholarship in more detail in section 4.4.2. Dionysius does not refer to the *kritikoi* whom we know from Philodemus’ *On Poems*. Nevertheless, in the discussion of Dionysius’ theory of μετασκευή (*Comp.* 6), we will see that the way in which the theory of the parts of speech is used in that passage is related to the views of the *kritikoi* (section 4.3.1).

### 3.3.2. Dionysius’ knowledge of contemporary views on the parts of speech

Having considered Dionysius’ connections to the earlier thinkers who wrote about the parts of speech in different contexts, we should now focus on the grammarians of the first century BC, whose views Dionysius may have learned during his stay in Rome. Dionysius may have known Tyrannion’s Περὶ μερισμοῦ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν (*On the Classification of the Parts of Speech*) (see section 1.4). He also may have known the commentary on this work, the Ἐξήγησις τοῦ Τυραννίου μερισμοῦ, written by the younger Tyrannion or Diocles. Particularly relevant for our purposes is the work of Asclepiades of Myrlea, Περὶ γραμματικῆς (*On Grammar*). It has been argued that the structure of Asclepiades’ book is reflected in Sextus Empiricus’ *Against the Grammarians*. According to David Blank, Sextus Empiricus made use of an Epicurean source that attacked Asclepiades’ treatise. In *On Grammar*, Asclepiades also included a discussion of the parts of speech, which was probably the basis for

<sup>90</sup> *Comp.* 22.102,2: Ἀριστοφάνης ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις μετρικῶν. *Comp.* 26.140,19: Ἀριστοφάνης ἢ ἄλλός τις). Dionysius himself is not interested in Aristophanes’ division into metrical clauses, but only in the division of a poem into rhetorical clauses, i.e. grammatical unities that contain a complete thought. On Dionysius’ concept of *colon*, see Viljamaa (2003), who compares the *colon* to the intonation unit of modern text analysis.

<sup>91</sup> *Thuc.* 51.410,15-17.

<sup>92</sup> See Pfeiffer (1968) 225. See further section 4.4.2.

Sextus' attacks on that theory in *Adv. Math.* I.131-158. Blank has suggested that Asclepiades' grammatical theories have influenced both Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian (*Inst. orat.* 1.4-8).<sup>93</sup> He even goes so far as to state that not only Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian, but also Dionysius of Halicarnassus closely follow Asclepiades' exposition of grammatical doctrines:<sup>94</sup> Dionysius' discussion of 'voice ([*Comp.*] 14), letters or elements ([*Comp.*] 14); syllables ([*Comp.*] 15); words ([*Comp.*] 15); and *lógos* ([*Comp.*] 16)' (thus Blank) in *De compositione verborum* would reflect what Asclepiades had written on these topics. Although I do think that Asclepiades may have influenced Dionysius' ideas, I do not agree with Blank's suggestion that *Comp.* 14-16 follows the sections of a grammatical treatise. These chapters are all part of Dionysius' discussion of μέλος, one of the means of composition, and they contain many observations that originate in musical and stylistic theory rather than grammar. A grammatical treatise may have been *one* of the models (besides a treatise of Aristoxenus) for the discussion of the individual properties of letters and syllables in *Comp.* 14-15. But from the end of *Comp.* 15, the focus is on such combinations of letters and syllables that aim to portray emotions or to express the content of a passage in general.<sup>95</sup> There is no grammatical discussion of 'words' in *Comp.* 15, nor is there any linguistic treatment of 'logos' in *Comp.* 16, which deals, in fact, with the selection and formation of imitative words.<sup>96</sup>

Especially relevant to this analysis is the grammarian Tryphon, Dionysius' contemporary in Augustan Rome (see section 1.4). As I have pointed out, it is possible that Tryphon and Dionysius participated in the same network of intellectuals, although we do not have any evidence that they knew each other. We have seen that Tryphon was the author of separate treatises on the parts of speech, namely Περὶ ἄρθρων, Περὶ προθέσεων, Περὶ συνδέσμων, and Περὶ ἐπιρρημάτων.<sup>97</sup> I recall the fact (see section 3.2) that the latter title of Tryphon's treatise on adverbs and Dionysius' rhetorical works are the earliest extant texts in which the term ἐπίρρημα is used for the adverb.

Finally, we should briefly consider the possible connections between Dionysius and the Roman grammarians who were active under the reign of Augustus (see section

<sup>93</sup> Blank (1998) xlvi and Blank (2000).

<sup>94</sup> Blank (2000) 410.

<sup>95</sup> *Comp.* 15.60,6ff.

<sup>96</sup> I do think that Dionysius' surveys of grammatical teaching in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 (letters, syllables, parts of speech) correspond to the expositions that we find in Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian. Blank (1998) does not mention this agreement, but I consider these more convincing parallels than Blank's reference to *Comp.* 14-16: see below.

<sup>97</sup> See Von Velsen (1853) and Wendel (1939).

1.4). Varro enumerated only four parts of speech on a strictly morphological basis, and in this respect he was an outsider in Hellenistic grammar.<sup>98</sup> As far as the theory of the parts of speech is concerned, his influence on someone like Dionysius was probably limited. Varro's views on the parts of speech were not influential: in the beginning of the first century AD, Remmius Palaemon wrote an *ars grammatica* in which he distinguished eight parts of speech, thus following the Alexandrian grammarians rather than his famous Roman predecessor.<sup>99</sup> Quintilian's remarks on Palaemon (see section 4.2.3) suggest that he was only one of the grammarians who distinguished eight *partes orationis*. It is possible that earlier Roman grammarians also listed eight parts of speech, but Suetonius, who is our major source on the *grammatici* of the first century BC, does not mention any treatise on the parts of speech.<sup>100</sup> We do not know whether Dionysius' contemporary Roman colleagues mentioned by Suetonius (Marcus Verrius Flaccus, Lucius Crassicius, Scribonius Aphrodisius, Gaius Iulius Hyginus, Gaius Melissus: see section 1.4) wrote on the parts of speech.

### 3.3.3. Dionysius on the grammatical school curriculum

Although Dionysius does not mention any of the grammarians listed above (section 3.3.2), there is one strong indication that he was familiar with contemporary theories on the parts of speech: in two similar passages, Dionysius refers to the curriculum of grammar schools, in which he tells us that pupils first learn the letters (γράμματα), then the syllables (συλλαβαί), then the words (λέξεις) or parts of speech (τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη) and their *accidentia* (συμβεβηκότα); finally they start to read and write.<sup>101</sup> Barwick has argued that Dionysius' discussions of the curriculum of grammar (*Comp.* 25 and *Dem.* 52) depend on Stoic sources.<sup>102</sup> He based his

<sup>98</sup> On Varro's unconventional treatment of the parts of speech, see Dahlmann (1932), Taylor (1996<sup>2</sup>a) 338, Taylor (1996b) 18-30, Taylor (2000) and Matthaios (2002) 203-208. Varro distinguished the following word classes: words with case, words with tense, words with both case and tense and words with neither.

<sup>99</sup> Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 23 is silent on Palaemon's *ars*, but Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 1.4.19-20 and Juvenal 6.451-453 inform us about the work and its reputation. On Palaemon, see Kaster (1995) 228-242. Barwick's reconstruction (1922) of Palaemon's *Ars grammatica* has been criticised on various points, particularly on his view that the Stoic (Pergamenic) τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς was the starting point of Roman grammar: see Pinborg (1975) 113-114, Schenkeveld (1990), Baratin (2000) and Schenkeveld (2004) 22.

<sup>100</sup> Kaster (1995) 230 warns against overestimation of Palaemon's *ars*. Other works may have been equally influential despite of Suetonius' silence. Suetonius focuses on the lives of the grammarians, and does not intend to mention all their writings.

<sup>101</sup> *Dem.* 52.242,12-243,9 and *Comp.* 25.134,23-135,12. For the Greek text, see section 3.7. Note that the three technical stages are termed differently in the two passages: in *Dem.* 52 they are referred to as (1) στοιχεῖα τῆς φωνῆς or γράμματα, (2) συλλαβαί and (3) τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, while in *Comp.* 25 they are (1) γράμματα, (2) συλλαβαί and (3) λέξεις.

<sup>102</sup> Barwick (1922) 107-108; Barwick (1957) 47-48.

conclusion on the assumption that in these passages, Dionysius uses Stoic terminology when he distinguishes between the ὄνομα, τύπος and δύναμις of letters.<sup>103</sup> However, even if it is true that these terms are Stoic, we should realise that Stoic ideas had influenced both philologists and technical grammarians (e.g. Dionysius Thrax and Tyrannion) of the second and first century BC (see section 3.2). Therefore, Stoic terminology cannot be used as evidence for the use of a Stoic source. Given the importance of grammatical teaching in Augustan Rome and Dionysius' own career as a teacher of rhetoric, it seems obvious that in a description of grammatical schoolpractice he would present his own knowledge and experience rather than relying on Stoic sources. Moreover, he refers to the grammatical curriculum as 'something that we all know' (ὁ γὰρ ἅπαντες ἴσμεν), thus implying that his audience recognises his description (see section 3.7).<sup>104</sup> Now, the nature of the relationship between the scholarly treatises mentioned earlier and the type of grammar that was actually taught at grammar schools in Rome is a complex problem.<sup>105</sup> The few sources, apart from Dionysius, that inform us about the teaching of grammar in the first century BC seem to indicate that technical grammar was only a small part of it:<sup>106</sup> 'grammar' (γραμματική) was the art of reading and writing, and the γραμματικός or *grammaticus* taught literature, especially poetry.<sup>107</sup> Most scholars assume that some parts of *technical* grammar, dealing with letters, word classes, orthography and ἑλλητισμός, made their entrance in the school curriculum at the end of the first century BC:<sup>108</sup> that is exactly the period in which Dionysius of Halicarnassus was working in Rome. Therefore, it is plausible that his remarks on the teaching of letters, syllables and parts of speech (as preparation for reading and writing) refer to the actual situation that he observed in Rome between 30 and 8 BC (see also section 3.7).

<sup>103</sup> *Comp.* 25.135,1-2; *Dem.* 52.242,16-18.

<sup>104</sup> *Comp.* 25.134,21-22.

<sup>105</sup> According to Suetonius, *De grammaticis* 3, there were more than twenty grammar schools (*super viginti celebres scholae*) in Rome. On the teaching of grammar in antiquity, particularly in Rome, see Bonner (1977), Kaster (1988), Hovdhaugen (1996<sup>2</sup>), Morgan (1998) and Schenkeveld (2000).

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Hovdhaugen (1996<sup>2</sup>) 384.

<sup>107</sup> It should be noted that Cicero, *De Oratore* 1.187 does not include any theory of word classes under the parts of 'grammar': he only mentions 'the examination of the poets, the investigation of the stories, the explanation of words, and the sounds that should be used in pronouncing them.' (Translation May & Wisse.) As Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 1.252 tells us, Asclepiades of Myrlea divided γραμματική (i.e. 'science of literature') into three parts: 'the expert, the historical and the grammatical' (τεχνικὸν ἱστορικὸν γραμματικόν). The 'expert' part (τεχνικόν) dealt with letters, word classes, orthography, etc., the 'historical' part (ἱστορικόν) with historical and mythical data, and the 'grammatical part' (γραμματικόν) with the interpretation of poets and prose-writers. See also *Adv. Math.* 1.91-95 and cf. Blank (1998) 264-266 and Blank (2000) 409.

<sup>108</sup> See Schenkeveld (1994) 264 and Hovdhaugen (1996<sup>2</sup>) 389. This assumption is based on several sources, including Suetonius, Quintilian, the grammatical papyri and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

Schenkeveld thinks that Dionysius' description 'looks implausible', because it implies that pupils first learn 'a complete grammar' before starting to read and write.<sup>109</sup> However, exercises containing (1) alphabets, (2) syllabaries (αυ βαν γαν δαν ζαν etc.) and (3) isolated words are numerous among the grammatical papyri, as well as exercises with classifications and declensions of nouns and conjugations of verbs.<sup>110</sup> Schenkeveld's suggestion that the doctrine of the parts of speech was explained at a later stage, when pupils could already read and write, may sound more convincing; but I emphasise that Dionysius' words do not suggest that one learns a 'complete grammar' before starting to read and write, but rather that one digests a (brief) survey of the parts of speech and their properties. Besides, Dionysius states that his readers are familiar with his description of the grammatical curriculum. I will come back to this problem in section 3.7. For now, the most important thing is that Dionysius' information shows that the theory of the parts of speech had a place in the school curriculum.

It is possible that in this period grammarians had started to make use of τέχναι (grammatical manuals), although the earliest extant remains of such works in the papyri date from the first century AD.<sup>111</sup> It should be noticed that the curriculum of grammar as Dionysius describes it (letters, syllables, parts of speech and finally reading and writing) largely corresponds to the exposition of grammatical doctrines that we find in Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian, which Blank has traced back to Asclepiades' *On Grammar* (see section 1.4).<sup>112</sup> In my view, the agreement between Dionysius' references to school grammar and the evidence from Sextus and Quintilian suggests that some technical grammatical school treatise was used at the end of the first century BC, which may have been a τέχνη not known to us, or, perhaps, (a summary of) Asclepiades' *On Grammar*.<sup>113</sup> My hypothesis is that Dionysius knew (theories from) such a treatise and combined it with ideas found in a number of other sources, including the Peripatetic and Stoic works by Theophrastus and Chrysippus mentioned above.

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<sup>109</sup> Schenkeveld (2000) 433.

<sup>110</sup> See Morgan (1998) 163-164 and 156-158.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Wouters (1979) and Morgan (1998) 156. See especially P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters), from the first century AD, in which nine parts of speech are listed.

<sup>112</sup> Blank (1998) xlvi and Blank (2000) 410. As I mentioned above, Blank detects the structure of Asclepiades' *On Grammar* (letters, words, *logos*) in Dionysius, *Comp.* 14-16. He does not refer to the passages on grammatical teaching in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25, which are in my view much more convincing parallels to the expositions known from Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian.

<sup>113</sup> Blank (1998) 110 only briefly refers to *Dem.* 52, but he does not discuss the correspondence between Dionysius' discussions of school grammar and the exposition of grammatical theories in Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian.

### 3.4. The double character of Dionysius' μόρια λόγου

Having considered the intellectual contexts of his grammatical ideas, we can now focus on the actual theories on the parts of speech that we find in Dionysius' rhetorical works. As we have seen, the terminological differences between Aristotle, the Stoics and the grammarians are closely related to their different interests and approaches. The terminology that we find in the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus differs from that of all these groups, which can again partly be explained by the fact that his analyses have a different purpose, namely that of instruction in rhetorical theory. Dionysius uses various expressions when referring to the parts of speech, namely τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, τὰ μέρη τῆς λέξεως, τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου and τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως (see section 3.4.2). When referring to Dionysius' 'parts of speech' I will for the sake of convenience use the term μόρια λόγου (or τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου): this choice is based on two considerations, namely that μόρια λόγου and μόρια λέξεως occur in his works more frequently than the other two expressions, and that μόρια λόγου is used in Dionysius' definition of composition in *Comp.* 2.<sup>114</sup> In this section, I will examine Dionysius' concept of the μόρια λόγου. The next section (3.5) will deal with the terminology with which he refers to words, word classes and parts of speech.

Dionysius' use of the term μόρια λόγου combines the point of view of the grammarians, who listed several 'categories of words', with an approach that is closer to that of Aristotle's analysis of the 'components of the λέξις'. On the one hand, Dionysius classifies words as 'word classes', a procedure that grammarians called μερισμός.<sup>115</sup> On the other hand, Dionysius considers the μόρια λόγου the primary building blocks of composition (σύνθεσις) (see section 4.3.1). Thus, Dionysius' μόρια λόγου are both word classes and parts of the phrase, even if one of the two aspects can be dominant in a specific context. The double character of the μόρια λόγου is particularly clear in Dionysius' definition of 'composition' (σύνθεσις) in *Comp.* 2, a passage that is extremely important for our understanding of both Dionysius' use of the parts of speech and his theory of composition:<sup>116</sup>

Ἡ σύνθεσις ἔστι μὲν, ὡσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ τοῦνομα, ποιὰ τις θέσις παρ' ἄλληλα τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων, ἃ δὴ καὶ στοιχεῖά τινες τῆς λέξεως καλοῦσιν.

'Composition is, as the name itself indicates, a certain arrangement of the parts of speech, or the elements of diction, as some call them.'

<sup>114</sup> *Comp.* 2.6,17-19.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 73-77.

<sup>116</sup> *Comp.* 2.6,17-19. For Dionysius' definition of composition in its context, see section 4.2.1.

Τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρια are here presented as the building blocks (στοιχεῖα) of σύνθεσις: they are literally the ‘parts’ of the structure that they constitute. Therefore, it would be natural to interpret τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρια as ‘parts of the phrase’. However, Dionysius immediately tells us that various generations of philosophers and grammarians distinguished different numbers of μέρια λόγου, and he lists the items that they distinguished in different periods: ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον, προσηγορικόν, ἀντονομασία, ἐπίρρημα, πρόθεσις, μετοχή (for a discussion of this passage, see section 4.2). In the second instance, then, it becomes clear that τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρια are also the ‘word classes’ that were distinguished by grammarians. Dionysius does not distinguish between the concept of the μέρη λόγου in Aristotle and Stoic philosophy on the one hand, and the concept of the word classes of the philologists and technical grammarians on the other. His own concept of the μέρια λόγου has two aspects: they are parts of the phrase *and* word classes. Unlike the writers of *artes grammaticae*, Dionysius is not so much interested in word classes as such, but rather in words as they are combined in larger structures of language. By consequence, his concept of μέρια λόγου seems to be broader than that of the μέρη λόγου in the *Technê Grammatikê*, which focuses on separate words, without paying much attention to matters of composition or syntax. Dionysius’ concept of the parts of speech is more similar to that of the syntactician Apollonius Dyscolus, who is, like Dionysius, concerned with words in their contexts.<sup>117</sup>

### 3.5. Words, word classes, and parts of the phrase: Dionysius’ terminology

Dionysius does not only use the term μέρια λόγου, but he also makes use of other terms, which can, from various points of view, all refer to ‘words’:<sup>118</sup> μέρια λέξεως, μέρη λέξεως, μέρη λόγου, πρῶτα μέρη, πρῶτα μέρια, στοιχεῖα λέξεως and στοιχειώδη μέρια.<sup>119</sup> Dionysius also refers to ‘words’ as ὀνόματα and, less often, as

<sup>117</sup> See Lallot (1997 II) 9 n. 9 on Apollonius Dyscolus’ concept of μέρος λόγου: ‘La synonymie qui vient d’être signalée met en évidence que le syntagme μέρος (τοῦ) λόγου ne doit pas être traduit mécaniquement, chez A[pollonius], par “partie du discours”, expression figée qui évoque pour nous la catégorie grammaticale dont relève un mot. Pour A., μέρος (τοῦ) λόγου, en plus de ce sens, peut aussi bien avoir celui de segment d’une phrase particulière; c’est en raison de cette flexibilité du sens de l’expression grecque que j’ai pris le parti (...) de la traduire par “partie de (la) phrase”.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 70 and Schenkeveld (1998<sup>2</sup>) 50: ‘This fact [i.e. Dionysius’ use of a ‘mixture of expressions for “word classes”] I can only explain by the assumption that an original distinction between μέρη λέξεως as “parts of the expression” and μέρη λόγου “parts of the proposition” was not taken over by the first Alexandrian scholars.’ In grammar, however, the term μέρη λόγου is only attested from Tyrannion onwards: concerning the *first* Alexandrian scholars we do not know whether they used this term; neither μέρη λόγου nor μέρη λέξεως is found in the fragments of Aristarchus: see Matthaios (1999) 198-200.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 70 and Schenkeveld (1994) 280.

λέξεις. How does he use all these different expressions?<sup>120</sup> Although ὄνομα, λέξις, μέρος, μόριον and στοιχείον can all refer to a ‘word’, each of these terms seems to represent a different point of view.

(1) Although in Dionysius’ works, as in the grammatical tradition, the term ὄνομα can refer to the word class ‘noun’, it normally has the general meaning of ‘word’. In particular, it is used to distinguish ‘words’ from letters and syllables on the one hand, and clauses, periods and discourse on the other hand.<sup>121</sup> Thus, ὄνομα is Dionysius’ most general term for ‘word’, and as such it plays the role that λέξις plays in the works of the Alexandrian grammarians.<sup>122</sup> The use of ὄνομα as ‘word’ in general, which we do find in Plato and Aristotle, is rare in technical grammatical works:<sup>123</sup> for Aristarchus, ὄνομα is the word class ‘noun’ (including κύριον ὄνομα, προσγορία and ἐπίθετον), and although there are a few instances where Apollonius Dyscolus uses ὄνομα in the sense of ‘word’, he, too, normally uses it in the specific sense of ‘noun’.<sup>124</sup> ‘Demetrius’ and ‘Longinus’, however, frequently use the word ὄνομα as ‘word’, for instance when speaking of ὀνομάτων ἐκλογή (selection of words) or ὀνομάτων σύνθεσις (composition or ‘putting together’ of words).<sup>125</sup> In this respect there seems to be a noteworthy difference between the rhetorical and grammatical traditions. The difference between the terminology of rhetoricians and grammarians can probably be explained by pointing to the genres in which they were writing. In rhetoric and literary criticism, the term λέξις was primarily reserved for ‘style’, ‘diction’, ‘expression’ or ‘passage’. For that reason, the rhetoricians seem to have selected the term ὄνομα as their standard term for ‘word’, in order to avoid the confusion that would arise from using λέξις for too many different items. In grammatical works, on the other hand, ὄνομα carried the technical meaning of ‘noun’, which explains why the grammarians, on their part, preferred λέξις as their normal term for ‘word’.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>120</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) has listed the various expressions, but he has refrained from analysing the ways in which they are used. He considers ὄνομα, λέξις and μόριον λόγου equivalents, without paying attention to their different connotations. See also Schenkeveld (1998<sup>2</sup>) 50: ‘(...) in the treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus we come across a mixture of expressions for “word classes”, (...) without any difference between the terms.’

<sup>121</sup> See *Comp.* 16.63,4-18, where the symmetry between the levels of γράμματα, συλλαβαί, ὀνόματα and λόγος is discussed.

<sup>122</sup> On the use of λέξις in technical grammar, see Lallot (1992) 129.

<sup>123</sup> See Schoemann (1862) 3, Lallot (1992) 128 and Matthaios (1999) 201. The term ὄνομα (‘name’) is related to the concept of language as a nomenclature. On Plato’s use of ὄνομα (‘name’) and ῥήμα (‘attribute’), see De Rijk (1986) 218-225.

<sup>124</sup> For Aristarchus’ use of ὄνομα, see Matthaios (1999) 201-296. For Apollonius’ use of ὄνομα, see Lallot (1997 II) 22 n. 64.

<sup>125</sup> See e.g. ‘Demetrius’, *Eloc.* 49, 50, 92; ‘Longinus’, *Subl.* 8.1, 30.1, 30.2.

<sup>126</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.18 considers two explanations for the fact that ὄνομα means both ‘word’ and ‘noun’: either ὄνομα was originally only used for ‘noun’ and, because of the primacy of

(2) Besides ὄνομα, Dionysius also uses λέξις in the sense of word, but this use is less frequent.<sup>127</sup> In the cases where Dionysius uses λέξις (and not ὄνομα) as ‘word’, he often points to a particular word in the text that he is analysing: in most cases, λέξις is a word *qua* concrete and specific form.<sup>128</sup> In purely grammatical contexts, the term λέξις may be preferred to ὄνομα for practical reasons. Thus, Dionysius refers to μίαν λέξιν εἴτε ὀνοματικὴν εἴτε ῥηματικὴν (‘a single noun or verb’) when he opposes the use of one single word to the use of ‘more nouns or verbs’ (πλείοσιν ὀνόμασιν ἢ ῥήμασιν).<sup>129</sup> In this case, use of the term ὄνομα for ‘word’ (e.g. ὄνομα ὀνοματικόν) would of course be rather confusing, because in the same passage it already has the meaning of ‘noun’.

(3) When Dionysius refers to a ‘word’ with the term μόριον or μέρος (λέξεως or λόγου), he normally regards it as a word that is a part or constituent of a larger structure.<sup>130</sup> This perspective is, of course, particularly relevant in *De compositione verborum*, where words are considered the units of which texts are composed.<sup>131</sup>

(4) In Dionysius’ works, μέρη λέξεως, μέρη λόγου, μόρια λέξεως and μόρια λόγου can all refer to words.<sup>132</sup> Μόρια, however, is much more frequent in this sense than μέρη: Dionysius refers to words only once as μέρη λόγου, and only twice as μέρη λέξεως, while μόρια λόγου and μόρια λέξεως (or simply μόρια) are the standard expressions:<sup>133</sup> μόρια λόγου is found ten times, μόρια λέξεως twelve times.<sup>134</sup>

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this part of speech, it was later used in the sense of ‘word’ in general; or ὄνομα originally meant ‘word’ and was later introduced as the special term for the ‘first’ in the hierarchy of the parts of speech, i.e. ‘noun’. According to Apollonius, both explanations would confirm the primacy of the ‘noun’ over the other parts of speech.

<sup>127</sup> For λέξεις as ‘words’ in Dionysius, see e.g. *Comp.* 6.30,11; 9.34,13; 11.41,18; 11.41,19; 11.42,5; 20.91,10; 20.92,16; 20.93,7; 25.135,4.

<sup>128</sup> E.g. λέξεις (*Comp.* 6.30,11) in the context of the modification of specific words; τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως (*Comp.* 9.34,13) refers to the repeated word καλεῖς in Aesch. 3.202, τῶν τριῶν λέξεων (*Comp.* 11.42,5) refers to Euripides’ σίγα σίγα λευκόν. In *Comp.* 11.41,18-19 (τάς τε λέξεις τοῖς μέλεσιν ὑποτάττειν ἄξιόι καὶ οὐ τὰ μέλη ταῖς λέξεσιν) Dionysius does not discuss specific words, but here, too, it is the form of words that is relevant.

<sup>129</sup> *Amm.* II 4.425,19-426,1.

<sup>130</sup> See Rhys Roberts (1910) 311 on μόρια: “‘Words’ simply might serve as a rendering in many cases, except that it is usually well to preserve Dionysius’ idea of “words in their syntactical relations”, “words in a sentence”.”

<sup>131</sup> A similar distinction between λέξις and μέρος λόγου is found in Apollonius Dyscolus. Lallot (1997 II) 9 n. 9 states that in Apollonius Dyscolus, λέξις, μέρος τοῦ λόγου and μόριον are ‘largement interchangeables’. There is, however, a difference in connotation, which Lallot himself confirms elsewhere: see Lallot (1992) 129, where he explains that λέξις is Apollonius’ term for a word *qua* ‘forme individuelle et concrète’, whereas μέρος λόγου points to a word as belonging to a word class.

<sup>132</sup> The distinction between ‘particles’ and ‘word classes’ is one of later times, as has been shown by Schenkeveld (1988).

<sup>133</sup> Dionysius himself uses the term τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου for words only in *Comp.* 6.29,13 (τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ λόγου μερῶν). In *Comp.* 4.22,12-13, the expression is part of the title of Chrysippus’ treatises Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν. The *epitome* of *Comp.* (17.171,12) substitutes πᾶν μέρος λόγου for

Dionysius' preference for μόρια instead of μέρη can again be explained by the fact that he is a rhetorician. Philosophers used τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου when referring to the parts of speech, and in later times grammarians adopted the term for their word classes (as we have seen, Tyrannion may have been the first grammarian who used the term). For rhetoricians, however, τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου is the technical expression that refers to 'the parts of a speech', i.e. the parts of a text. Indeed, Dionysius uses the word μέρη normally when referring to larger structures. Τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, on the one hand, are primarily the parts of a *text*, such as introduction (προοίμιον) and narrative (διήγησις).<sup>135</sup> The arrangement of these 'parts of a text' is called οἰκονομία, while the arrangement of the smaller 'parts of the phrase' is called σύνθεσις.<sup>136</sup> Τὰ μέρη τῆς λέξεως, on the other hand, are the aspects of stylistic writing, namely selection of words (ἐκλογή) and composition (σύνθεσις).<sup>137</sup>

The fact that Dionysius speaks of both 'parts of the λόγος' and 'parts of the λέξις' when referring to words reminds us of Aristotle's 'parts of the assertion' (μέρη λόγου) and 'parts of the expression' (μέρη λέξεως) (see section 3.2). We have already seen that Dionysius may have been familiar with the Peripatetic distinction between μέρη λόγου and μέρη λέξεως from his reading of Theophrastus' *On Style* (see section 3.3.1). However, Dionysius uses the expressions 'parts of the λόγος' and 'parts of the λέξις' without adopting the Aristotelian distinction between the two: in his case, the different terms do not imply two different concepts.<sup>138</sup>

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πᾶν ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ ἄλλο μόριον λέξεως (*Comp.* 17.68,13). Τὰ μέρη τῆς λέξεως refers to words only in *Comp.* 2.7,2 (with the adjective πρῶτα) and *Comp.* 12.43,18.

<sup>134</sup> Τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου (or μόρια λόγου): *Dem.* 26.185,1; *Dem.* 52.242,20; *Comp.* 2.6,18-19; *Comp.* 4.21,17; *Comp.* 5.23,14; *Comp.* 6.28,15-16; *Comp.* 6.30,5; *Comp.* 11.41,2; *Comp.* 12.46,21; *Comp.* 25.132,7. Τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως (or μόρια λέξεως): *Dem.* 39.211,24-25 (τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις τε καὶ στοιχειώδεσι μορίοις τῆς λέξεως); *Dem.* 48.232,20-21 (τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως); *Dem.* 48.233,10-11 (τῶν πρώτων μορίων τῆς λέξεως); *Dem.* 51.240,6-7 (τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 2.7,1-2 (τὰ πρῶτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 7.30,14-15 (τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 12.44,6 (τῶν τῆς λέξεως μορίων); *Comp.* 16.66,19 (τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 17.68,13 (μόριον λέξεως); *Comp.* 17.69,17 (δισυλλάβων μορίων λέξεως); *Comp.* 20.90,20 (τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς λέξεως μόρια); *Comp.* 22.101,7-8 (λέξεως μορίων); *Comp.* 22.109,9-10 (τῶν μορίων τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 26.136,5 (τὰ τῆς λέξεως μόρια); *Amm.* II 5.426,15 (τὰ ῥηματικὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως). In *Pomp.* 2.230,14-15, Dionysius does not refer to a word but to an *aspect* of Plato's style, whether one retains the MSS' τῆς δὲ λέξεώς τι μόριον, which is printed by Aujaç (1992) 85, or reads Usener's τοῦ δὲ λεκτικοῦ μορίου.

<sup>135</sup> See *Ant. Rom.* 1.40.6; 3.65.6; *Lys.* 16.27,10-11; *Is.* 14.111,11-12.

<sup>136</sup> See *Dem.* 51.240,20-241,7. Cf. Kremer (1907) 2-3.

<sup>137</sup> See *Thuc.* 22.358,8-27 (ὅτι μὲν ἅπαντα λέξις εἰς δύο μέρη διαιρεῖται τὰ πρῶτα etc.); cf. Pohl (1968) 11-12.

<sup>138</sup> Rosén (1990) 116-117 discusses the definition of σύνθεσις in *Comp.* 2.6,17-19 and concludes that Dionysius of Halicarnassus preserves the Aristotelian distinction between λόγος ('Satz') and λέξις ('Rede' or 'Ausdruck'). But he does not take into account the fact that Dionysius uses μόρια λέξεως and μόρια λόγου in quite the same way. Rosén thinks that a direct line runs from Aristotle's *Poetics* to Dionysius Thrax and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but he ignores the Stoic influence on the theory of the 'parts of speech'. Besides, Aristotle's μέρη λέξεως also include 'elements' and syllables, whereas Dionysius' parts of the phrase are words only.

(5) Dionysius also refers to words as στοιχεῖα, ‘elements’.<sup>139</sup> This term points to the role of words as building blocks in the process of composition.<sup>140</sup> The same idea is expressed by the term στοιχειώδη μόρια.<sup>141</sup> In *Comp.* 2, Dionysius states that the μόρια λόγου are also called στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως (‘elements of the phrase’).<sup>142</sup> Now, we know that the Stoic philosophers considered the parts of speech στοιχεῖα (elements), but they did not refer to them as στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως, but as στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου.<sup>143</sup> For them, the στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου were the parts of speech, while the στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως were the letters.<sup>144</sup> The same distinction can be found in the works of the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus. As far as we know, Dionysius of Halicarnassus is the only author who refers to the ‘parts of speech’ as στοιχεῖα λέξεως (instead of λόγου). In Dionysius, words are τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως, whereas the letters (and the corresponding sounds) are τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς φωνῆς. If it is true that the parts of speech were called στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως by some people, as Dionysius claims, then we might suppose that these people (or perhaps Dionysius himself?) have combined an originally philosophical idea (the parts of speech as elements) with a rhetorical approach to language as expression (λέξις) (see also section 4.2.1).<sup>145</sup> However, we have seen that Dionysius does not use μόρια λόγου and μόρια λέξεως with different meanings. We should therefore not attach too much importance to his use of στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως instead of στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου.

(6) The parts of the phrase are also called τὰ πρῶτα μέρη (τῆς λέξεως) and τὰ πρῶτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως.<sup>146</sup> The adjective πρῶτος emphasises the idea that words are the units from which the process of composition starts: the connotation of πρῶτα μέρη

<sup>139</sup> Στοιχεῖα refers to words in *Dem.* 48.232,20-21; *Comp.* 2.6,19; *Comp.* 2.7,8; *Comp.* 7.30,14. It refers to letters in *Dem.* 52.242,16-17; *Comp.* 14.48,5; *Comp.* 14.48,6; *Comp.* 14.48,8; *Comp.* 14.50,4; *Comp.* 22.101,14; *Comp.* 22.101,16; *Comp.* 22.102,9. Other applications of the word στοιχεῖον in Dionysius’ rhetorical works: in *Lysias* (15.25,14; 15.26,16; 16.26,18), the στοιχεῖα are elements of the subject matter (not of language); τὰ πρῶτη στοιχεῖα in *Dem.* 37.209.18-19 are the physical elements of the world; στοιχεῖον in *Dem.* 53.244,6 refers to ‘delivery’ (ὑπόκρισις) as an essential ‘element’ of oratory.

<sup>140</sup> For Dionysius’ explanation of the use of στοιχεῖα in the sense of ‘letters’ (*Comp.* 14.48,3-8), see section 2.2.

<sup>141</sup> *Dem.* 39.211,24-25 (στοιχειώδη μόρια τῆς λέξεως) and *Thuc.* 22.358,13 (στοιχειώδη μόρια). In *Comp.* 14.49,11-12, however, τὰς πρώτας τε καὶ στοιχειώδεις τῆς φωνῆς δυνάμεις are the letters (or sounds).

<sup>142</sup> *Comp.* 2.6,17-19. Cf. *Dem.* 48.232,20-21: τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως, ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα ὑπὸ τινῶν καλεῖται ...

<sup>143</sup> For the Stoic use of the term στοιχεῖον λόγου for a part of speech, see *FDS* 536a and 539-541. Cf. Sluiter (1990) 43-44.

<sup>144</sup> Dionysius, however, refers to letters (γράμματα) as στοιχεῖα, as στοιχεῖα φωνῆς or as ἀρχαὶ φωνῆς; see *Comp.* 14.48,3-8; *Dem.* 52.242,16-17 (τῶν στοιχείων τῆς φωνῆς); *Ant. Rom.* 1.20.3.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. Ildefonse (1997) 105.

<sup>146</sup> Τὰ πρῶτα μέρη: *Comp.* 2.7,7; *Comp.* 2.7,14-15; τὰ πρῶτα μέρη τῆς λέξεως: *Comp.* 2.7,1-2; τὰ πρῶτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως: *Dem.* 48.232,20; *Dem.* 48.233,10-11; *Comp.* 2.7,12-13; *Comp.* 7.30,14.

seems to be similar to that of στοιχεῖα (see also section 2.2).<sup>147</sup> The expression τὰ πρῶτα μέρη (or μόρια) only occurs in passages where the word στοιχεῖα is also mentioned, in some cases clearly as an alternative: τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως ('the first parts and elements of the phrase'); τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα ὑπὸ τινῶν καλεῖται ('the first parts of the phrase, which are called elements by some people') (see section 4.2.1).<sup>148</sup> Just as the term πρῶτος characterises the parts of speech as the 'primary' units of composition, it also refers to the letters as the 'first and elementary powers of voice'.<sup>149</sup>

(7) Schenkeveld also mentions τὰ τῆς φράσεως μόρια as one of Dionysius' expressions for *partes orationis*.<sup>150</sup> It is doubtful whether this is right. The term is found only once in Dionysius' works, and there the context seems to make clear that it refers to 'parts of the expression' in a more general sense.<sup>151</sup> in *Thuc.* 24, Dionysius first tells us that the typical style of Thucydides is characterised by (a) his choice of words (ἐκλογή τῶν ὀνομάτων), (b) his σύνθεσις τ' ἐλαττόνων καὶ τῶν μειζόνων μορίων ('composition of both shorter and longer parts'), and (c) his figures (σχηματισμοί). Then he remarks that, during the entire war, 'Thucydides never stopped revising his eight books (...) and polishing and rounding off every single one τῶν τῆς φράσεως μορίων.'<sup>152</sup> This statement is illustrated by a range of examples, some of which belong to the level of words, while others are related to matters of composition and figures of speech. Therefore, I would prefer to interpret τὰ τῆς φράσεως μόρια in the same way as the 'shorter and longer parts' mentioned earlier: they include both word classes and longer units (e.g. clauses).<sup>153</sup> I have found no other ancient text in which the expression τὰ τῆς φράσεως μόρια (or μέρη) occurs. However, Dionysius himself provides us with a useful parallel. When discussing Plato's style in *Pomp.* 2, he tells us that Plato, 'in aiming to achieve lofty, impressive and daring effects of expression (φράσεως), did not succeed in all aspects (μέρη).'<sup>154</sup>

<sup>147</sup> Cf. *Comp.* 7.30,13: Μία μὲν δὴ θεωρία τῆς συνθετικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως ἦδε. 'This, then, is one aspect of the science of composition, the one which is concerned with the primary parts and elements of speech.' See section 4.2.1.

<sup>148</sup> *Comp.* 7.30,14; *Dem.* 48.232,20-21.

<sup>149</sup> *Comp.* 14.49,11-12: see section 2.2.

<sup>150</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 70.

<sup>151</sup> *Thuc.* 24.361,18.

<sup>152</sup> *Thuc.* 24.361,15-19: διετέλεσέ γέ τοι τὸν ἑπτακαιικοσαετῆ χρόνον τοῦ πολέμου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕως τῆς τελευτῆς τὰς ὀκτὼ βύβλους, ἅς μόνας κατέλιπεν, στρέφων ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ καθ' ἕνα τὸν τῶν φράσεως μορίων ῥινῶν καὶ τορευῶν.

<sup>153</sup> Usher (1974) 527 translates 'the individual phrases', Aujac (1991) 75 'chacun des éléments de son énoncé'.

<sup>154</sup> *Pomp.* 2.231,21-24: (...) τῆς ὑψηλῆς καὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς καὶ παρακεκινδυνευμένης φράσεως ἐφιέμενον Πλάτωνα μὴ περὶ πάντα τὰ μέρη κατορθοῦν.

Here, τὰ μέρη are clearly general ‘aspects’ of expression, which seems to support our interpretation of τὰ τῆς φράσεως μόρια in *Thuc.* 24.<sup>155</sup>

### 3.6. The word classes according to Dionysius

I have argued that Dionysius’ μόρια λόγου are both word classes and parts of the phrase. In this section, I will concentrate on the former aspect. In his passage on the history of the theory of the parts of speech, Dionysius lists nine word classes: ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον, προσηγορικόν, ἀντονομασία, ἐπίρρημα, πρόθεσις, μετοχή.<sup>156</sup> All these word classes are also used in other passages in Dionysius’ works.<sup>157</sup> They appear in different forms: either as nouns (e.g. ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα) or as neuter adjectives (e.g. ὀνοματικόν, προσηγορικόν, ῥηματικόν). In the latter case, the adjectives either qualify a substantive like ὄνομα (e.g. τὸ μετοχικὸν ὄνομα) or μόριον (e.g. τὰ προθετικὰ μόρια), or they are used as substantives (e.g. τὸ προσηγορικόν, τὸ ῥηματικόν).<sup>158</sup> I will briefly discuss each of the word classes that occur in Dionysius: ὄνομα and προσηγορικόν (and ἐπίθετον) (section 3.6.1), ῥῆμα and μετοχή (section 3.6.2), ἄρθρον and ἀντονομασία (section 3.6.3), πρόθεσις and σύνδεσμος (section 3.6.4) and ἐπίρρημα (section 3.6.5). This discussion has two purposes. On the one hand, it will enable us to compare Dionysius’ word class theory with the views of philologists and grammarians, so that we may establish Dionysius’ place in the history of the theory of the parts of speech. On the other hand, the overview will serve to answer an important question: does Dionysius use a system of nine word classes (section 3.6.6)? Schenkeveld has concluded that ‘we may safely ascribe to Dionysius the use of the system of nine word classes’.<sup>159</sup> I will reconsider the evidence and argue that, although Dionysius makes use of a total of nine word classes, we cannot attribute to him the use of a ‘system’ of nine word classes.

#### 3.6.1. ὄνομα and προσηγορικόν (and ἐπίθετον)

Dionysius uses the term ὄνομα in many different ways. We have already seen (section 3.5) that ὄνομα is the most general term for ‘word’. In grammatical contexts, Dionysius uses ὄνομα on two different levels. First, ὄνομα is ‘noun’ in general; that is, any proper noun or appellative noun, and (in modern terms) any substantive or adjective. Second, when it is directly opposed to appellative noun (προσηγορικόν or

<sup>155</sup> The parallel is in itself not decisive, however, because the difference between μέρη (generally larger structures and only in a few cases designating ‘words’) and μόρια noted above might play a role here.

<sup>156</sup> See section 4.2.1. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 70.

<sup>157</sup> See Schenkeveld (1983) 70-71.

<sup>158</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 70.

<sup>159</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 72.

προσηγορία), ὄνομα means ‘proper noun’, i.e. a personal name.<sup>160</sup> When classifying appellative nouns, Dionysius does not consistently use the term προσηγορικόν (or προσηγορία). This term is used when Dionysius points to the difference between a proper noun (ὄνομα) and an appellative noun (προσηγορικόν); but when this opposition is not relevant, appellatives are often classified as ὀνόματα (see below).<sup>161</sup> The form προσηγορικόν occurs fifteen times, the form προσηγορία only twice (in *Amm.* II 11).<sup>162</sup> The fact that προσηγορία appears only in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* supports the idea that Dionysius used a philological commentary in this work (see section 4.4.2). Dionysius’ preference for the term προσηγορικόν might seem to suggest that he regards the appellative noun as a subtype of the noun (i.e. as προσηγορικόν ὄνομα) rather than as a separate word class (i.e. προσηγορία). Schenkeveld, however, observes that in the history of the word class system, Dionysius also uses the term προσηγορικά when a separate word class is meant.<sup>163</sup> Therefore, the neuter form προσηγορικόν does not indicate that the appellative noun is a subtype of the ὄνομα (noun) rather than a separate word class. It is possible that the neuter form προσηγορικόν stands for προσηγορικὸν μόνιον (‘appellative part’) rather than for προσηγορικὸν ὄνομα (‘appellative noun’).

Dionysius classifies the words χορόν, Ὀλύμπιοι, κλυτάν, πανδαίδαλον and Ἀθηναῖος as προσηγορικά, and the word πόλεις as προσηγορία.<sup>164</sup> In some cases, however, appellatives are called ὀνοματικά or ὀνόματα (nouns). For instance, Dionysius (*Amm.* II 5-6) analyses how Thucydides ‘changes verbs into nouns and nouns into verbs’: where normal usage would have demanded a verb, Thucydides uses

<sup>160</sup> See e.g. *Thuc.* 24.361,23-362,1: καὶ αὐτῶν γε τούτων ἀναστρέφων τὰς χρήσεις, ἵνα τὸ μὲν ὀνοματικὸν προσηγορικὸν γένηται, τὸ δὲ προσηγορικὸν ὀνοματικῶς λέγηται. ‘He [i.e. Thucydides] inverts the normal use of the nouns, so that the proper noun becomes an appellative noun, and so that he expresses the appellative noun by a proper noun.’

<sup>161</sup> In the history of the theory of the parts of speech (*Comp.* 2.7,5-6), Dionysius states that the προσηγορικά were separated from the ὀνοματικά. See section 4.2.1.

<sup>162</sup> The term προσηγορικόν occurs in the following passages: *Thuc.* 24.361,23-362,1 (twice); *Amm.* II 2.423,6-7 (= *Thuc.* 24.361,23-362,1; twice); *Comp.* 2.7,5-6; *Comp.* 2.7,11; *Comp.* 5.26,12-13; *Comp.* 5.26,13-14; *Comp.* 22.101,8-9; *Comp.* 22.101,11; *Comp.* 22.101,14-15; *Comp.* 22.102,17-18; *Comp.* 22.103,9; *Comp.* 22.105,6; *Comp.* 22.108,18. The term προσηγορία occurs at *Amm.* II 11.430,13 and *Amm.* II 11.430,20.

<sup>163</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 70. The argument does not work for *Comp.* 2.7,5-6 (τὰ προσηγορικά διελόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνοματικῶν) because here Dionysius could mean that ‘they separated the προσηγορικά ὀνόματα [not yet a separate word class] from the other nouns’, thus forming a new word class προσηγορία. But Schenkeveld’s argument does work for *Comp.* 2.7,11 (καὶ τὰς μετοχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν προσηγορικῶν), where the ‘appellatives’ (προσηγορικά) must be a separate word class.

<sup>164</sup> See *Comp.* 22.101,8-11 (χορόν and Ὀλύμπιοι), *Comp.* 22.102,17-18 (κλυτάν), *Comp.* 22.105,6 (πανδαίδαλον), *Comp.* 22.108,18 (Ἀθηναῖος) and *Amm.* II 11.430,20 (πόλεις). Schenkeveld (1983) 77 also mentions χάριν, but Dionysius does in fact not classify that word in his discussion of ἐπὶ τε κλυτὸν πέμπετε χάριν θεοί in *Comp.* 22.102,5-104,13.

a noun, and *vice versa* (see section 4.4.2).<sup>165</sup> In this passage, the words *παραίνεσις*, *ἀξίωσις*, *ἀποτείχισις*, *ὀλόφυρσις*, *ἀνάγκη* and *πόλεμος* are classified as *ὀνοματικά* (not *προσηγορικά*).<sup>166</sup> The reason for this categorisation is that Dionysius opposes these nouns to the verbs *παραινεῖν*, *ἀξιοῦν*, *ἀποτείχισαι*, *ὀλοφύρασθαι*, *ἀναγκάσαι* and *πολεμεῖν* respectively.<sup>167</sup> In this context, there is no need for Dionysius to classify the relevant nouns as ‘appellatives’, because the opposition here is between verbs and nouns, not between common and appellative nouns. It may be significant that Dionysius uses the term *ὀνοματικά* in this passage, and not *ὀνόματα*, for it is the distinction of ‘nominal’ and ‘verbal’ parts that is relevant here. Elsewhere, Dionysius classifies the words *ἄνδρα*, *μῆνιν* and *ἥελιός* as *ὀνόματα*.<sup>168</sup> This can be explained in the same way. Dionysius points out that in three Homeric verses that he quotes, the nouns are placed before the verbs (section 5.3.3): *ἄνδρα* precedes *ἔννεπε* (*Odyssey* 1.1), *μῆνιν* precedes *ἄειδε* (*Iliad* 1.1), and *ἥελιός* precedes *ἀνόρουσε* (*Odyssey* 3.1). In these examples, the opposition is again between nouns and verbs. The fact that these nouns are *appellative* nouns is not important here, so Dionysius calls them *ὀνόματα*, ‘nouns’.<sup>169</sup> The other words to which Dionysius refers as *ὀνόματα* are *τὸν Συρακόσιον* (‘the Syracusian’) and *τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ* (‘the Athenian’), but here one might also think that *ὀνόματα* has the general sense of ‘words’.<sup>170</sup>

Apart from its use as ‘noun’ and ‘proper noun’, *ὄνομα* is also used in opposition to *ἐπίθετον*. The latter use is only found once in Dionysius’ works, in the passage where he discusses the natural word order of *ὀνοματικά* and *ἐπίθετα* (see section 5.3.6):<sup>171</sup> *ἤξιουν τὰ μὲν ὀνοματικά προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιθέτων*. ‘I thought I should place *ὀνοματικά* before *ἐπίθετα*’. The word *ἐπίθετον* is first mentioned in Aristotle’s

<sup>165</sup> See *Amm.* II 2.423,4-5: καὶ νῦν μὲν τὸ ῥηματικὸν ὀνοματικῶς ἐκφέρων, αὖθις δὲ τοῦνομα ῥῆμα ποιῶν. ‘And sometimes expressing the verbal part in a nominal form, and sometimes changing the noun into a verb.’ *Amm.* II 5.426,15-16: Ἐν οἷς δὲ τὰ ῥηματικά μόρια τῆς λέξεως ὀνοματικῶς σχηματίζει, τοιαύτην ποιεῖ τὴν φράσιν. ‘When he casts the verbal parts of speech in the form of nouns, he expresses himself in the following way.’ *Amm.* II 6.427,8-10: Ὅταν δὲ ἀντιστρέψας ἐκατέρου τούτων τὴν φύσιν τὰ ὀνόματα ποιῇ ῥήματα, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐκφέρει τὴν λέξιν. ‘But when he reverses the natural use of both of these parts and turns nouns into verbs, he produces the following kind of expression.’ See section 4.4.2.

<sup>166</sup> *Amm.* II 5.426,15-427,16. For the context, see section 4.4.2.

<sup>167</sup> *Amm.* II 5.426,20-427,1; *Amm.* II 5.427,4-6; *Amm.* II 6.427,14-16. See section 4.4.2.

<sup>168</sup> *Comp.* 5.23,15-24,4.

<sup>169</sup> Dionysius does not make explicit which are the *ὀνόματα* that are ‘placed after the verbs’ in the Homeric verses quoted in *Comp.* 5.24,9-14. However, the *ὀνόματα* seem to include Ἄτρυτώνη, Μοῦσαι and Ἀχιλλεῦ, and in that case Schenkeveld (1983) 72 is wrong in saying that ‘nowhere does DH classify a proper name’.

<sup>170</sup> *Amm.* II 9.429,2-4. Schenkeveld (1983) 77 also includes the words *τάραχος*, *ταραχή*, *ὄχλησις* and *ὄχλος* among the words that Dionysius classifies as *ὀνόματα*, but Dionysius merely mentions these words in his discussion of the interchange of masculine and feminine (*Amm.* II 10.429,17-430,11), without assigning them to word classes. On this passage, see section 4.4.2.

<sup>171</sup> *Comp.* 5.26,11-12: see section 5.3.6.

*Rhetoric*, where it refers to any ornament that characterises something or somebody.<sup>172</sup> The first definition of the ἐπίθετον is found in the Hellenistic papyrus P. Hamb. 128 (ca. 200 BC): τὸ μετὰ κυρίων ὀνομάτων λεγόμενον ‘that which is said together with substantives.’<sup>173</sup> The papyrus mentions examples like σίδηρος αἶθων and χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις, which seem to support Snell’s interpretation of κύριον ὄνομα in this text as ‘substantive’.<sup>174</sup> Aristarchus does not regard ἐπίθετον as a separate word class, but as one of the functions of the noun (ὄνομα).<sup>175</sup> He classifies adjectives as ὀνόματα (nouns): a word may perform the *role* of ἐπίθετον, but that does not mean that it belongs to a separate word class.<sup>176</sup> In antiquity, the ἐπίθετον was never treated as a separate word class. Apollonius Dyscolus states that ‘the ἐπίθετα signify size, quantity, condition of the soul or something similar’.<sup>177</sup> In the *Technê Grammatikê*, the ἐπίθετον is a subtype of the ὄνομα: ‘it is placed next to proper or appellative nouns alike, and conveys praise or blame.’<sup>178</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not offer any examples of ἐπίθετα, so that it is difficult to determine the status of this item in his theory. Rhys Roberts thinks that Dionysius regards the adjective as a separate part of speech, but Schenkeveld has rejected that view.<sup>179</sup> Schoemann argues that Dionysius uses ἐπίθετον in the same way as Aristotle and he states that Dionysius ‘nennt (...) ein und dasselbe Wort bald ἐπίθετον bald προσηγορικόν, je nachdem es entweder sich dem Eigennamen oder ein anderweitigen Benennung des Gegenstandes anschließt, oder allein als dessen Bezeichnung auftritt (...)’.<sup>180</sup> It is true that, in the rest of Dionysius’ work, the term ἐπίθετον is a rhetorical rather than a grammatical concept. It appears for example in phrases like τὴν ἐπίθετον καὶ κατεσκευασμένην φράσιν (‘the ornamental and elaborate expression’), or τοὺς ἐπιθέτους κόσμους (‘the additional ornaments’).<sup>181</sup> Likewise, ἐπίθετα are ‘additions’ or ‘appositions’ in general.<sup>182</sup> The only grammatical context in which the term appears is the phrase ἡξίου τὰ μὲν ὀνοματικὰ προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιθέτων. According to Schoemann, the

<sup>172</sup> See e.g. Aristotle, *Rh.* 1405a10; 1405b20. Cf. Schoemann (1862) 86 and Matthaios (1999) 236-237.

<sup>173</sup> See Schenkeveld (1993) 69 and Matthaios (1996) 67-68.

<sup>174</sup> Snell (1954) 42 and Matthaios (1999) 237.

<sup>175</sup> See Aristarchus fr. 12b Matthaios, where Aristarchus points out that, in *Iliad* 2.111, μέγας is not used ‘as an epitheton’ (κατ’ ἐπίθετον) but in order to differentiate the great Ajax from the small Ajax. See Matthaios (1999) 233-244.

<sup>176</sup> See Matthaios (1999) 241.

<sup>177</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 26,12: ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰπιθετικά ἢ πηλικότητα ἢ ποσότητα ἢ διάθεσιν ψυχῆς δηλοῖ ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

<sup>178</sup> [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 34,3: Ἐπίθετον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐπὶ κυρίων ἢ προσηγορικῶν † ὁμωνύμως τιθέμενον καὶ δηλοῦν ἔπαινον ἢ ψόγον. The translation is by Kemp.

<sup>179</sup> Rhys Roberts (1910) 299; Schenkeveld (1983) 72.

<sup>180</sup> Schoemann (1862) 86.

<sup>181</sup> E.g. *Dem.* 4.135,16-17; *Dem.* 13.158,7; *Dem.* 18.166,3.

<sup>182</sup> See e.g. *Dem.* 5.137,18.

ὀνοματικά are not ‘substantives’ here but ‘nomina propria’.<sup>183</sup> This is possible, but not necessary. The corresponding passage in Quintilian (see section 5.4.3) seems to translate ὀνοματικά and ἐπιθέτων literally: *nomina adpositis (...) essent priora*.<sup>184</sup> In Aristarchus, ἐπίθετα are combined with both persons and things.<sup>185</sup> Therefore, I conclude that the opposition ὀνοματικά / ἐπίθετα is one of nouns (appellatives or proper nouns) and epithets (ὀνόματα used with the function of describing other nouns). Dionysius presumably thinks of words that we would call adjectives. But if we translate ἐπίθετον as ‘adjective’, we should be aware that the ἐπίθετον is not a separate word class for Dionysius, but a noun (ὄνομα) that is used to qualify another noun (ὄνομα).

In his use of the term κύριον ὄνομα, Dionysius adopts the rhetorical, not the grammatical meaning of the term (see also section 2.5.5).<sup>186</sup> Just like Aristotle, Dionysius uses this term for a noun that is used in its proper sense, as opposed to a word that is used in a metaphorical sense.<sup>187</sup> This use of κύριον ὄνομα is different from the one that we find in Alexandrian scholarship. Aristarchus employs the term κύριον ὄνομα for a word that expresses the actual designation of a person or thing: the κύριον ὄνομα is normally opposed to the ἐπίθετον, which describes or characterises the person or thing designated by the κύριον ὄνομα.<sup>188</sup> Neither κύριον ὄνομα nor ἐπίθετον are separate word classes for Aristarchus, but ‘Anwendungsarten’ of the ὄνομα.<sup>189</sup> In later times, κύριον ὄνομα (‘proper noun’), ἐπίθετον (‘adjective’) and προσηγορικόν (‘appellative’) are treated as subtypes of the ὄνομα.<sup>190</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not employ any of the grammatical concepts of κύριον ὄνομα. In his works, κύρια ὀνόματα are words that are used in their proper sense: we often find the collocation τὰ κύρια τε καὶ κοινὰ ὀνόματα, ‘standard and ordinary words’.<sup>191</sup>

<sup>183</sup> Schoemann (1862) 86 n. 2 adds his own examples: Φωκίων ὁ στρατηγός (‘Phokion, the commander’) and ὁ στρατηγός Φωκίων (‘the commander, Phokion’). In the former order, στρατηγός would be an epithet, in the latter order it would not be an epithet, according to Schoemann.

<sup>184</sup> Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.23.

<sup>185</sup> Matthaios (1999) 235: ἐπίθετον is ‘dasjenige “Nomen”, das der (eigentlichen) Benennung ([κύριον] ὄνομα) einer Person sowie eines Gegenstandes oder Sachverhalts hinzugefügt wird, um diese bzw. diesen durch Angabe einer ihnen eigenen Art oder Beschaffenheit näher zu charakterisieren.’

<sup>186</sup> On the ancient use of the term κύριον ὄνομα, see Matthaios (1996).

<sup>187</sup> For Aristotle’s use of κύριον ὄνομα, see *Po.* 21.1457b1-6. Cf. Matthaios (1996) 65-67.

<sup>188</sup> Matthaios (1999) 224 points out that κύριον ὄνομα in Aristarchus means ‘dasjenige Nomen (ὄνομα), das in Opposition zu anderen ὀνόματα die geltende bzw. die Haupt-Benennung eines Objektes zum Ausdruck bringt.’

<sup>189</sup> Matthaios (1999) 214-244.

<sup>190</sup> E.g. [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 33,6-35,2.

<sup>191</sup> For Dionysius’ use of κύριον ὄνομα, see *Lys.* 3.10,7-8; *Lys.* 3.12,10; *Lys.* 4.12,22; *Isoc.* 11.70,20; *Dem.* 13.156,1; *Comp.* 3.14,14-15; *Comp.* 21.95,14-15 (κυρίως ὀνόμασιν opposed to μεταφορικοῦς ὀνόμασιν); *Pomp.* 2.228,6-7.

### 3.6.2. ῥῆμα and μετοχή

Just like ὄνομα, the term ῥῆμα is used in different ways. First, it has the non-technical sense of ‘saying’ or ‘word’.<sup>192</sup> In grammatical contexts, ῥῆμα is used both in a general and a more specific sense. On the one hand, ῥῆμα can refer to any verbal (rhematic) form, including both verbs and participles. On the other hand, when ῥῆμα is opposed to μετοχή (participle), it refers to the ‘verb’ in the strict sense.<sup>193</sup> In other words, just as ὄνομα can comprise all ‘nominal’ forms, ῥῆμα can cover all ‘verbal’ forms. The term μετοχή occurs twice, the term μετοχικόν thrice in Dionysius’ works.<sup>194</sup> The word μενόντων is the only word that Dionysius classifies as a participle (τὸ μετοχικὸν ὄνομα).<sup>195</sup> The words ἐπιμιγνύντες, κατῳκηκότας and σκληριπτόμενος, however, are called ῥήματα (not μετοχαί).<sup>196</sup> In the case of ἐπιμιγνύντες and κατῳκηκότας, their classification as ‘verbs’ can be explained by the fact that in the relevant context these words are considered ‘verbal’ forms, which adopt the verbal *accidentia*. Thus, in *Amm.* II 7-8, Dionysius discusses how Thucydides interchanges passive and active forms of verbs (see section 4.4.2):<sup>197</sup> the historian uses ἐπιμιγνύντες instead of ἐπιμιγνύμενοι and κατῳκηκότας instead of κατῳκημένους.<sup>198</sup> The relevant contrast is here between active and passive, and not between verbs and participles: the *accidentia* active and passive are attributes of all verbal forms, including participles. Therefore, Dionysius has not used the term μετοχή in this context. Although the case of σκληριπτόμενος is less clear, we can assume that Dionysius classifies this word as a ῥῆμα again because he considers the word as a

<sup>192</sup> For the non-technical use of ῥῆμα, see *Ant. Rom.* 1.28.2; 4.18.2; 10.7.3.

<sup>193</sup> In the history of the theory of the parts of speech (*Comp.* 2.6,20-7,13; see section 4.2.1), Dionysius says that the μετοχαί were separated from the προσηγορικά. Most modern scholars, however, think that participles were classified as ῥήματα before they were regarded as a separate word class. Dionysius’ reconstruction in *Comp.* 2.7,11 (τὰς μετοχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν προσηγορικῶν) seems incompatible with his own classification of participles as ῥήματα.

<sup>194</sup> The term μετοχή occurs in *Amm.* II 11.430,13 and *Comp.* 2.7,11. The term μετοχικόν occurs in *Thuc.* 24.362,7; *Amm.* II 2.423,14; *Amm.* II 12.432,10. Usener rightly deleted τῆς μετοχῆς in *Amm.* II 11.431,1-2.

<sup>195</sup> *Amm.* II 12.432,10. Since Dionysius uses the term μετοχή in the same letter (*Amm.* II 11.430,13), we should not believe that the expression τὸ μετοχικὸν ὄνομα implies that the participle is a subtype of the ὄνομα (a view that Matthaios [2002] 193 attributes to Tyrannion). The term ὄνομα in the expression τὸ μετοχικὸν ὄνομα means ‘word’ rather than ‘noun’. Likewise, in *Comp.* 6.30,2-3, Dionysius refers to κατιδῶν as τοῦνομα, where ὄνομα again has the general sense of ‘word’.

<sup>196</sup> For ἐπιμιγνύντες, see *Amm.* II 7.428,8. For κατῳκηκότας, see *Amm.* 8.428,17. For σκληριπτόμενος (not mentioned in Schenkeveld [1983] 77), see *Comp.* 20.90,9-21. In *Amm.* II 7-8, one might argue that not only ἐπιμιγνύντες and κατῳκηκότας are classified as verbs, but (implicitly) also their ‘passive’ equivalents ἐπιμιγνύμενοι and κατῳκημένους.

<sup>197</sup> See *Amm.* II 7.427,17-18: “Ὅταν δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων ἀλλάττη τὰ εἶδη τῶν παθητικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν, οὕτω σχηματίζει τὸν λόγον.

<sup>198</sup> *Amm.* II 7.428,7-9: καὶ γὰρ (ἐν) τούτοις τὸ ἐπιμιγνύντες ἐνεργητικὸν ὑπάρχον ῥῆμα τοῦ ἐπιμιγνύμενοι παθητικοῦ ὄντος χώραν ἐπέχει. *Amm.* II 8.428,17-18: ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ῥήματος τοῦ κατῳκηκότας τὸ παθητικὸν παρείληφεν τὸ κατῳκημένους.

‘verbal’ part of speech: in *Comp.* 20, Dionysius analyses the description of Sisyphus’ torments in *Od.* 11.593-598; he shows that the composition of these Homeric verses imitates first Sisyphus’ sufferings when rolling his stone to the top of a hill, and then the speed with which the stone tumbles downhill again.<sup>199</sup> The first observation is that ‘in the two lines in which Sisyphus rolls up the rock, except for two verbs all the remaining words in the passage are either disyllables or monosyllables’.<sup>200</sup> This part of the analysis clearly refers to *Od.* 11.595-596, and that means that both σκηριπτόμενος and ὠθεσκε are classified as ῥήματα.<sup>201</sup> Here, Dionysius refers to the two longer words in the Homeric lines by calling them ‘verbs’, thus again opting for the more general classification. The other words that Dionysius classifies as ῥήματα are unproblematic.<sup>202</sup>

### 3.6.3. ἄρθρον and ἀντονομασία

The terminology for most parts of speech corresponds to that of technical grammatical texts, but Dionysius’ term for the pronoun deserves some attention. Instead of the usual ἀντωνυμία, Dionysius normally uses the word ἀντονομασία (or ἀντονομαστικόν).<sup>203</sup> According to Apollonius Dyscolus, the term ἀντωνομασία (not ἀντονομασία) was used by Comanus, an older contemporary of Aristarchus.<sup>204</sup>

<sup>199</sup> *Comp.* 20.89,20-93,19. Schenkeveld (1983) 77 has not included this passage in his list of Dionysius’ classifications of words. The analysis of the Sisyphus passage may be compared with ‘Demetrius’, *Eloc.* 72.

<sup>200</sup> *Comp.* 20.90,19-91,1: πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς δυσὶ στίχοις οἷς ἀνακυλίει τὴν πέτραν, ἔξω δυεῖν ῥημάτων τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς λέξεως μόρια πάντ’ ἐστὶν ἥτοι δισύλλαβα ἢ μονοσύλλαβα.

<sup>201</sup> *Od.* 11.595-596: ἥτοι ὃ μὲν σκηριπτόμενος χερσὶν τε ποσὶν τε | λᾶαν ἄνω ὠθεσκε ποτὶ λόφον (*Comp.* 20.90,11-12). The rest of *Od.* 11.596 (ἀλλ’ ὅτε μέλλοι) and *Od.* 11.597-598 are discussed in the second part of Dionysius’ analysis (*Comp.* 20.92,3-93,19).

<sup>202</sup> The following words are also classified as ῥήματα or ῥηματικά: ἔννεπε (*Comp.* 5.23,19), ἄειδε (*Comp.* 5.23,21), ἀνόρουσε (*Comp.* 5.24,2), κλῦθι (*Comp.* 5.24,9), μνήσαι (*Comp.* 5.24,12), τύπτε (*Comp.* 5.24,21), ἤριπε (*Comp.* 5.25,1), ἐκλίνθη (*Comp.* 5.25,2), πέτονται (*Comp.* 5.25,7), ἐκφανεῖ (*Comp.* 5.25,9), δεῦτε (*Comp.* 22.101,8), παραινεῖν (*Amm.* II 5.426,20), ἀξιοῦν (*Amm.* II 5.426,20), ἀποτειχίσαι (*Amm.* II 5.427,4-5), ὀλοφύρασθαι (*Amm.* II 5.427,5), ἐθέλομεν (*Amm.* II 12.431,22-432,1), περιγίγεται (*Amm.* II 12.432,2), γίνεται (*Amm.* II 12.432,6), ἔσται (*Amm.* II 12.432,7), ἐπαινέσει and παραινέσει (*Dem.* 26.185,18-21); the latter two verbs are not listed in Schenkeveld (1983) 77. Schenkeveld does mention ἔκπεσε (*Comp.* 5.25,2) as a word classified as ῥήμα, but in the Homeric line that Dionysius cites it is ἐκλίνθη that precedes the adverb: ἔκπεσε is not relevant here. Further, ἔρυσαν (*Comp.* 5.25,15) does not belong in Schenkeveld’s list of ‘cases of merismos’ either, for Dionysius does not classify this word.

<sup>203</sup> Ἀντονομασία is found in three passages of the Teubner text: *Comp.* 2.7,7 (ἀντονομασίας, which V corrects into ἀντωνυμίας), *Comp.* 5.26,13 (ἀντονομασίας, but P and the second hand of F have ἀντωνομασίας, while the first hand of F has ἀντωνυμίας) and *Thuc.* 37.389,17 (ἀντονομασίαν, where Sylburg proposed to read ἀντωνυμίαν). Further, ἀντονομαστικόν is found in *Amm.* II 12.432,11 (where some MSS have ἀντωνυμικόν).

<sup>204</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, G.G. II 1, 4,18-19: Ἐκφεύγοντάς φασι τὸ Αἰολικὸν τοὺς περὶ Κομανὸν ἀντωνομασίας καλεῖν, εἶγε τὸ μὲν ὄνυμα οὐ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα. ‘They say that Comanus and those who agree with him, in order to avoiding the Aeolic form, called the pronouns ἀντωνομασίας, for the reason that ὄνομα is the common word, not ὄνυμα.’ The expression τοὺς περὶ Κομανὸν (‘those around

Comanus preferred the term ἀντωνομασία, because he considered ἀντωνυμία an Aeolic form, to which he objected. The term ἀντωνομασία is not only found in Dionysius, but also in a papyrus fragment that dates from the middle of the first century AD.<sup>205</sup> Wouters has argued that those scholars who favoured the use of pure Attic language selected this term.<sup>206</sup> It is possible that Dionysius of Halicarnassus used the term ἀντωνομασία for the same reasons.<sup>207</sup> We should observe that in one passage of Dionysius' text (*Comp.* 5.26,13), the MSS have ἀντωνομασίας (Comanus' term), which the editors correct into ἀντωνομασίας. The traditional term, ἀντωνυμία, occurs only once in Dionysius (*Comp.* 6.29,20). Usener suggests that we should read ἀντωνομασία here, and Schenkeveld agrees.<sup>208</sup> However, the terminology of *Comp.* 6 (where we also find other unusual terms such as παρακολουθεῖν and τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου instead of τὰ μέρη) might indicate that this passage is based on a specific model (see section 4.3.1); this would also explain why ἀντωνομασία is used here instead of ἀντωνομασία.

Dionysius classifies three words as 'pronoun': he calls the word τουτονί an ἀντωνυμία, and the word ἡμῶν an ἀντωνομαστικόν.<sup>209</sup> More interesting is the word αὐτοῦ, which is classified as 'either an ἄρθρον δεικτικόν or an ἀντωνομασία'. Dionysius refers to this word as follows: ἐνικὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν γενικὴν ἐσχηματισμένον πῶσιν, εἴ τε ἄρθρον δεικτικὸν βούλεται τις αὐτὸ καλεῖν εἴ τε ἀντωνομασίαν, τὸ 'αὐτοῦ', '(...) the genitive singular αὐτοῦ, whether one wishes to call it a deictic article or a pronoun.'<sup>210</sup> For our purpose, it is important to observe that there are two possible explanations for the fact that Dionysius offers two classifications. The first possibility is that Dionysius uses a system of nine word classes, and that he refers to the fact that αὐτοῦ could, within that system, for different reasons be called either a deictic article or a pronoun. The second possibility is that Dionysius refers to the fact that different systems of word classes were used: in a system with only five or six parts of speech, αὐτοῦ would belong to the ἄρθρον (which covers both articles and pronouns), whereas in a system with eight or nine

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Comanus') refers to Comanus himself: see Matthaios (1999) 445 n. 68. For the fragment of Comanus, see Dyck (1988) 259. On Apollonius' reference to Comanus, see Brandenburg (2005) 573.

<sup>205</sup> P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters).

<sup>206</sup> Wouters (1979) 58-59. See also Matthaios (1999) 445-446, 503-504 and Matthaios (2001) 69-70.

<sup>207</sup> On Atticism in Dionysius, see section 1.2. In his glossary of rhetorical terms, Anderson (2000) 23 defines ἀντωνομασία as 'an expressive periphrasis used instead of a proper name', and also lists Dionysius, *Comp.* 2, *Comp.* 5 and *Thuc.* 37 under that heading. However, although it is true that the pronoun was understood as 'replacing the noun' (see also section 4.2.1), Dionysius does not use the term ἀντωνομασία for a rhetorical figure.

<sup>208</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 73.

<sup>209</sup> For τουτονί, see *Comp.* 6.29,20 (see also sections 5.3.6 and 7.3.2). For ἡμῶν (not in the list of Schenkeveld [1983] 77), see *Amm.* II 12.432,11.

<sup>210</sup> *Thuc.* 37.389,16-17. For the context, see section 5.2.

parts of speech, it would be classified as an *ἀντωνομασία*. As Schenkeveld has pointed out, this problem is connected to a difficult text from Apollonius Dyscolus' *De pronomibus*. Together, these texts cast light on the terminology of ἄρθρον and ἀντωνυμία in the grammatical writers who were influenced by Stoic ideas.<sup>211</sup> I will first discuss Apollonius' text and then return to Dionysius.

Apollonius Dyscolus tells us that the Stoics did not distinguish the pronouns as a separate word class, but classified them as ἄρθρα. For them, the ἄρθρα included both ἄρθρα ἀόριστα (the later articles) and ἄρθρα ὀρισμένα (the later pronouns).<sup>212</sup> Apollonius adds the following information:<sup>213</sup>

Καὶ Ἀπολλόδορος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος καὶ ὁ Θραξ Διονύσιος καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικὰ τὰς ἀντωνυμίας ἐκάλουν.

‘And Apollodorus from Athens and Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns also deictic articles.’

Scholars strongly disagree on the interpretation of this sentence.<sup>214</sup> Three interpretations have been suggested. (1) Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax used the expression ἄρθρα δεικτικά for *all* pronouns, while completely *avoiding* the term ἀντωνυμία.<sup>215</sup> This would mean that (the later) pronouns and articles were treated as one single word class in the word class system of Dionysius Thrax. According to this interpretation, Apollonius' words καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικά should be explained as ‘also deictic articles’, that is, *apart from* ἄρθρα ὀρισμένα. (2) Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax used the term ἀντωνυμία for pronouns, but they *also* (‘gelegentlich’) called the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά: according to the latter interpretation all pronouns could be called either ἀντωνυμία or ἄρθρα δεικτικά.<sup>216</sup> According to this interpretation,

<sup>211</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 75.

<sup>212</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 5,13-15: Οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἄρθρα καλοῦσι καὶ τὰς ἀντωνυμίας, διαφέροντα δὲ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἄρθρων, ἧ ταῦτα μὲν ὀρισμένα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἀοριστώδη. ‘The representatives of the Stoic school call the pronouns as well articles, which differ from our articles in that the former [i.e. the later pronouns] are definite articles, and the latter [i.e. the later articles] indefinite articles.’

<sup>213</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 5,18-19.

<sup>214</sup> See Schoemann (1862) 119-125, Erbse (1980), Di Benedetto (1990) and the excellent discussion in Matthaios (1999) 509-514. Brandenburg (2005) does not discuss the passage in his commentary on Apollonius' *De pronomibus*. For the various ancient grammatical terms for ‘pronoun’, see Lalot (2001).

<sup>215</sup> See Di Benedetto (1990) 20-26.

<sup>216</sup> For this option, see Schoemann (1862) 120: ‘[I]ch halte es für viel wahrscheinlicher, dass er [i.e. Dionysius Thrax] sich in diesem Punkte an die Tradition der Schule gehalten, und etwa nur gelegentlich in Erörterungen über das Wesen und die Function der Pronomina und mit Beziehung auf

Apollonius' words καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικά should be explained as 'also deictic articles', that is, *apart from* ἀντωνυμίας. (3) Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax used the term ἀντωνυμίας for pronouns, but they called only the *deictic* (not all) pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά.<sup>217</sup>

Di Benedetto has convincingly argued that the third of these interpretations, which is defended by Erbse, is incorrect, because in the context of Apollonius' remark, he uses the term ἀντωνυμίας for all pronouns and not in the restricted sense of 'deictic pronouns'.<sup>218</sup> We may add that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' classification of αὐτοῦ as ἄρθρον δεικτικόν confirms that Erbse is wrong in assuming that only 'demonstrative' pronouns were classified as ἄρθρα δεικτικά. Matthaios correctly argues that the expression ἄρθρα δεικτικά does not designate demonstrative pronouns only: ἄρθρα δεικτικά is an equivalent of the Stoic expression ἄρθρα ὠρισμένα, which included the later personal, demonstrative and anaphoric pronouns.<sup>219</sup> It seems clear, then, that Dionysius Thrax called *all* the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά, just as the Stoics called them ἄρθρα ὠρισμένα. Two possibilities remain: did Dionysius Thrax and Apollodorus, when referring to pronouns, use *only* the expression ἄρθρα δεικτικά (1), or did they use *both* the term ἀντωνυμίας and ('gelegentlich') the expression ἄρθρα δεικτικά (2)?

Di Benedetto and Schenkeveld follow the first interpretation: they think that Dionysius Thrax did not treat the pronoun as a separate word class. Schenkeveld has argued that Apollonius' use of the word καί in καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικά indicates that Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax called pronouns *both* ἄρθρα ὠρισμένα (as the Stoics) *and* ἄρθρα δεικτικά.<sup>220</sup> All this would imply that Dionysius Thrax did not recognise the ἀντωνυμίας as a separate word class: and that is exactly what a scholiast seems to report when saying that Dionysius Thrax 'combined the pronoun with the article' (συνῆπτε τῷ ἄρθρῳ τὴν ἀντωνυμίαν).<sup>221</sup> This statement may be based on Apollonius' remark about Dionysius Thrax, in which case it does not have an

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die bei den Stoikern übliche Benennung derselben gesagt habe, sie könnten auch ἄρθρα δεικτικά heißen.' See also Matthaios (1999) 513.

<sup>217</sup> See Erbse (1980) 255, who translates Apollonius' sentence as follows: 'Und wirklich nannten Apollodorus und Dionysios die (scil. entsprechenden, d.h. deiktischen) Pronomina sogar "deiktische Glieder"'. Schoemann (1862) 120-121 already mentions this interpretation.

<sup>218</sup> See Di Benedetto (1990) 20-26. Schoemann (1862) 121 also mentions this argument. Matthaios (1999) 511-512 rejects Erbse's interpretation.

<sup>219</sup> Matthaios (1999) 512-513.

<sup>220</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 76: '(...) the most acceptable exegesis seems to me that Stoics called both demonstrative and anaphoric pronouns ἄρθρα ὠρισμένα a), and that Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax followed Stoic views when they called these words ἄρθρα δεικτικά also b), i.e. apart from the Stoic nomenclature.'

<sup>221</sup> Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 160,27-28.

independent value as a source; but even if that is true, it is an important ancient interpretation of Apollonius' words.<sup>222</sup> Now, Matthaios has shown that, before Dionysius Thrax, Aristarchus already distinguished the ἀντωνυμία as a separate word class.<sup>223</sup> Therefore, if we follow the interpretation of Di Benedetto and Schenkeveld concerning Dionysius Thrax, one should not believe that 'after Dionysius Thrax and Apollodorus pronouns acquired names of their own', as Schenkeveld believes.<sup>224</sup> We should rather suppose that after Aristarchus, who used a system of eight word classes (including the ἀντωνυμία as a separate word class), Stoic influence on grammar became so strong that Dionysius Thrax adopted a different classification of the parts of speech (with fewer word classes), in which the pronouns belonged to the ἄρθρα. The pronouns would then have gotten the names ἄρθρα ὀρισμένα and ἄρθρα δεικτικά. Matthaios rejects this interpretation: he does not believe that Dionysius Thrax did not use the term ἀντωνυμία, because Aristarchus already used that term before him.<sup>225</sup> But it seems that we should not exclude the possibility that Dionysius Thrax did not follow his teacher in this respect.

Matthaios himself adopts the second interpretation: Dionysius Thrax used the term ἀντωνυμίαι for pronouns (just like Aristarchus), but sometimes he added that they could *also* be called ἄρθρα δεικτικά.<sup>226</sup> According to this interpretation, Dionysius Thrax would not have used a word class system in which pronouns and articles were taken together as one word class, but he would have agreed with Aristarchus in treating the ἀντωνυμία as a separate word class; he would merely have allowed for two possible *alternative terms* for pronouns, namely ἀντωνυμία and ἄρθρον δεικτικόν. This interpretation reduces Apollonius' remark on Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax to a terminological matter (that is, not a problem concerning the word class system).

<sup>222</sup> For the problematic nature of the text, see Matthaios (1999) 511. Di Benedetto (1990) 26-27 argues that the scholion correctly interprets Apollonius Dyscolus' information about Dionysius Thrax.

<sup>223</sup> Matthaios (1999) 432-519.

<sup>224</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 76. My italics.

<sup>225</sup> Matthaios (1999) 511: 'Ferner hat die Interpretation von Di Benedetto zur Folge, daß sich der *terminus post quem* für die Anerkennung des Pronomens als selbständiger Wortart und die Einführung des Terminus ἀντωνυμία auf die Grammatikergeneration nach Dionysios Thrax und Apollodor verschiebt. Diese Schlußfolgerung ist aber unannehmbar. Denn wie unsere Ausführungen gezeigt haben, haben Aristarch und seine unmittelbaren Zeitgenossen das Pronomen bereits als eigenständige Wortart anerkannt und es ἀντωνομασία — so Komanos — bzw. ἀντωνυμία (...) genannt.' But I do not see why it is impossible that Dionysius Thrax distanced himself from Aristarchus and started to call the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά. A parallel case is the grammarian Tyrannion. Matthaios (2002) 194 believes that, unlike Aristarchus, Tyrannion did not regard the participle as a separate word class but as a subtype of the ὄνομα. If Stoic influence caused Tyrannion to disagree so strongly with Aristarchus, could it not have had a similar effect on Dionysius Thrax?

<sup>226</sup> Matthaios (1999) 513; Matthaios (2002) 193.

Apollonius' information about Dionysius Thrax remains difficult to interpret. One thing is clear: Dionysius Thrax was influenced by Stoic ideas on the parts of speech. The question is to what extent the Stoics exercised their influence. According to the first interpretation, Dionysius Thrax was so strongly influenced by Stoic ideas that he distanced himself from the word class system of his teacher Aristarchus, adopting a system of fewer word classes and classifying the pronouns as ἄρθρα. In this case, Apollonius would be saying: and Apollodorus of Athens and Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά *apart from* ἄρθρα ὠρισμένα. According to the second interpretation, Dionysius Thrax did not change the Aristarchean system but merely allowed for an alternative name for pronouns, thus showing his respect for the Stoic terminology. In this case, Apollonius would be saying: and Apollodorus of Athens and Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά *apart from* ἀντωνυμίαι. I cannot solve the problem, but I would like to mention one more argument in favour of the first interpretation: Apollonius' claim that Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns 'also ἄρθρα δεικτικά' directly follows his observation that the Stoics did not call the pronouns ἀντωνυμίαι but ἄρθρα ὠρισμένα (see above); within this context, it would be more natural to understand that, just like the Stoics, Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns ἄρθρα (namely ἄρθρα ὠρισμένα and also ἄρθρα δεικτικά), rather than that, unlike the Stoics, he called them ἄρθρα δεικτικά *as well as* ἀντωνυμίαι.

We can now return to our own Dionysius and his classification of αὐτοῦ as either a pronoun or a deictic article (*Thuc.* 37.389,16-17; see above). The explanation of Dionysius' text depends on the interpretation of Apollonius' information about Dionysius Thrax: the two interpretations of Apollonius' remark that we have discussed above correspond to two different interpretations of Dionysius' classification of αὐτοῦ. According to Matthaios, Dionysius of Halicarnassus' view that one could call the word αὐτοῦ either a 'deictic article' or a 'pronoun' (εἴ τε ἄρθρον δεικτικὸν βούλεται τις αὐτὸ καλεῖν εἴ τε ἀντωνομασίαν) agrees with the alleged use of these terms by Dionysius Thrax.<sup>227</sup> both Dionysius Thrax and Dionysius of Halicarnassus would have used ἄρθρον δεικτικόν and ἀντωνυμία (ἀντωνομασία) as *alternative* terms. Matthaios points out that the particles εἴ τε / εἴ τε are not disjunctive, but indicate that the two options distinguished are both possible. For this reason, he rejects the explanation of Schenkeveld, who argues that Dionysius of Halicarnassus double classification of the word αὐτοῦ shows that he knows of two different word class systems, namely one with nine word classes (in

<sup>227</sup> Matthaios (1999) 513: 'Wie bei Dionysios Thrax und Apollodor erscheint der Ausdruck ἄρθρον δεικτικόν auch bei Dionysios von Halikarnaß als eine Alternative zum Terminus ἀντωνυμία bzw. ἀντωνομασία für die Bezeichnung des Pronomens.'

which the ἀντονομασία is a separate word class) and one with fewer parts (in which pronouns and articles constitute one single word class — the ἄρθρον).<sup>228</sup> Matthaios concludes: ‘Es ist unwahrscheinlich, daß Dionysios von Halikarnaß den Terminus ἄρθρα δεικτικά als Hinweis auf eine Untergruppe des sowohl Artikel als auch Pronomen umfassenden Redeteils ἄρθρον hat gelten lassen. Denn die Kategorien Artikel und Pronomen stellten seiner Ansicht nach sonst zwei selbständige Wortarten dar.’ Here, I would like to raise two objections. First, it is true that Dionysius of Halicarnassus elsewhere classifies τουτονί and ἡμῶν as ἀντονομασῖαι (see above). However, we have also seen that Dionysius classifies appellatives sometimes as ὀνόματα and sometimes as προσηγορικά, and that he classifies participles sometimes as ῥήματα and sometimes as μετοχαί: he uses both general terms and more specific terms. I would suggest that this same principle might apply to his use of ἄρθρον and ἀντονομασία: according to this interpretation, the word αὐτοῦ could be classified either in a general way as ἄρθρον δεικτικόν or in a more specific way as ἀντονομασῖαι. My second objection to Matthaios’ analysis is his interpretation of the particles εἴ τε / εἴ τε. I agree that these particles indicate that the two options are both acceptable for Dionysius. However, I do not agree that this would be inconsistent with Schenkeveld’s suggestion that the two alternative classifications refer to two different word class systems. In my view, it is possible that Dionysius refers to the existence of a system with fewer than nine word classes (without the category of the ἀντωνυμία) on the one hand, in which αὐτοῦ would be classified as an ἄρθρον, and of a system of nine word classes on the other hand, in which it would be classified as an ἀντονομασῖαι. Dionysius would in that case mean to say the following: ‘(...) whether one wishes to call αὐτοῦ a deictic article (as do the Stoics, and Dionysius Thrax, who treat pronouns and articles in one word class) or a pronoun (as do the grammarians who use a system of eight or nine word classes).’ In my view, the fact that Dionysius uses εἴ τε / εἴ τε merely shows that he gives equal value to both possibilities:<sup>229</sup> Dionysius leaves the question open, because he is not interested in the use of grammatical ‘systems’ of word classes with an exact number of μόρια λόγου. I conclude that I prefer Schenkeveld’s interpretation of Dionysius’ classification of αὐτοῦ as referring to two different word class systems. But both Apollonius’ reference to Dionysius Thrax and Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ classification of αὐτοῦ remain difficult problems, which are closely related to our poor knowledge of the most obscure period in the history grammar.<sup>230</sup>

<sup>228</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 76; Matthaios (1999) 513 n. 408.

<sup>229</sup> See Smyth (1956) 647.

<sup>230</sup> To make things even more difficult, Dionysius (*Comp.* 2.7,7-8; see section 4.2.1) tells us that the ἀντονομασῖαι were separated from the ὀνόματα. This would mean that, if one takes different phases of the history of the word class system into account, one could classify the word αὐτοῦ as either an ὄνομα or an ἀντονομασῖαι, but not as an ἄρθρον. But the history of the theory of the parts of speech is

### 3.6.4. πρόθεσις and σύνδεσμος

We have seen that Dionysius uses several grammatical terms both in a more general and in a more specific sense: ὄνομα ('noun') covers both ὄνομα ('proper noun') and προσηγορικόν ('appellative'), ῥῆμα ('verbal part') covers both ῥῆμα ('verb') and μετοχή ('participle'); the classification of the word αὐτοῦ as either an ἄρθρον δεικτικόν or an ἀντονομασία might also be interpreted as indicating that ἄρθρον as a general term covers both the pronouns and the articles. Dionysius' treatment of πρόθεσις ('preposition') and σύνδεσμος ('conjunction') is similar in this respect. The classification of κατ- in κατιδών as πρόθεσις is unproblematic, as is the classification of τε and ἄρα as σύνδεσμοι.<sup>231</sup> However, the words ἐπί and ἐν are called σύνδεσμοι (not προθέσεις), although Dionysius allows for an alternative classification of ἐπί as πρόθεσις.<sup>232</sup> In *Comp.* 22, Dionysius analyses a Pindaric ode, and classifies the words of the first two cola according to their word classes. In his discussion of the first colon (Δεῦτ' ἐν χορὸν Ὀλύμπιοι), he calls the word ἐν a σύνδεσμος.<sup>233</sup> When discussing the second colon (ἐπί τε κλυτὰν πέμπετε χάριν θεοί), he remarks the following:<sup>234</sup>

ἐν δὲ τῇ κατὰ μέρος συνθέσει τοῦ κώλου τοῖς μὲν ἐπί τε συνδέσμοις ἀφ' ὧν ἄρχεται τὸ κῶλον, εἴτε ἄρα πρόθεσιν αὐτῶν δεῖ τὸ ἡγούμενον καλεῖν, τὸ προσηγορικὸν ἐπικείμενον μόριον τὸ κλυτὰν ἀντίτυπον πεποίηκε καὶ τραχεῖαν τὴν σύνθεσιν.

'In the detailed arrangement of the clause, the placing of the appellative word κλυτὰν after the connectives ἐπί τε (or perhaps the first of these should be called a preposition) has made the composition dissonant and harsh.'

As Schenkeveld remarks, according to a system with nine parts of speech, both ἐν and ἐπί should be classified as προθέσεις, not as σύνδεσμοι. Dionysius himself says that ἐπί might be called a πρόθεσις, but he does not say that with regard to ἐν. Possibly, the juxtaposition of ἐπί τε has reminded Dionysius that he could give a more precise classification, since some people would not regard these words as belonging to the same word classes. In any case, Dionysius' mention of two possible classifications for ἐπί (σύνδεσμος or πρόθεσις) could be explained in two ways. The first possibility is

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a rather isolated passage in Dionysius' work; we have already pointed out that his classification of participles as ῥήματα does not agree with his view (in *Comp.* 2.7,11) that the participles were separated from the προσηγορικά.

<sup>231</sup> See *Comp.* 6.30,2 (κατ-); *Comp.* 22.102,16 (τε); *Comp.* 25.129,5 (ἄρα).

<sup>232</sup> *Comp.* 22.102,15-17.

<sup>233</sup> *Comp.* 22.101,7-21.

<sup>234</sup> *Comp.* 22.102,15-17.

that Dionysius' remark points to the difficulty of the *merismos* procedure. In that case, Dionysius' idea would be that one could argue for two different classifications of the word ἐπί, which, for different reasons, could be assigned to either the prepositions or the conjunctions. We should not exclude this possibility, but the problem is that we do not know of any grammatical debate on the classification of ἐπί within a word class system of eight or nine parts of speech. The second possibility has been suggested by Schenkeveld: he argues that the alternative classifications offered by Dionysius are related to the existence of different word class systems: the classification of ἐπί as a σύνδεσμος 'is a sure sign of a system with less than nine (or eight) parts.'<sup>235</sup> In other words: in a system with five or six parts of speech, the σύνδεσμος would also have covered those words that in a system of eight or nine parts would have been identified as prepositions.

In order to support Schenkeveld's interpretation, I would like to point to a passage from Apollonius Dyscolus' Περὶ συνδέσμων.<sup>236</sup> According to Apollonius, Posidonius (probably the Stoic philosopher who lived ca. 135-50 BC) had objected to those people who thought that σύνδεσμοι do not indicate (δηλοῦσι) anything but merely connect the phrase (τὴν φράσιν συνδέουσι).<sup>237</sup> Posidonius thought that σύνδεσμοι did have a meaning of their own, and to prove this he pointed out that ἐπιδοῦναι ('to give besides') differed from ἀποδοῦναι ('to give back') and ἀπαιτεῖν ('to demand back') from προσαιτεῖν ('to beg'). Thus, he showed that ἐπί, ἀπό and πρὸς did in fact 'indicate' something, and he did so 'being confident that the preposition and the conjunction are one part of speech' (πιστούμενος ὅτι ἐν μέρος λόγου ἢ τε πρόθεσις καὶ ὁ σύνδεσμος). Apollonius Dyscolus, however, did not agree that πρόθεσις and σύνδεσμος were one word class, and therefore he had to find another way of proving that σύνδεσμοι have meaning.<sup>238</sup> Posidonius' view seems to correspond to that of the Stoics, which Apollonius reports elsewhere: 'the Stoics also called prepositions "prepositive conjunctions" (προθετικὸς συνδέσμος), considering it better to name this class from its distinctive position than from its force, as was done for the conditional (συναπτικοὶ) and copulative (συμπλεκτικοὶ) conjunctions, and all the other types.'<sup>239</sup> It seems clear, then, that for Posidonius, as for the other Stoics, the

<sup>235</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 73-74. See also Aujac & Lebel (1981) 154 n. 2.

<sup>236</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj.*, *G.G.* II 1, 214,4-20 = Posidonius fr. 45 Edelstein-Kidd. Cf. Dalimier (2001) 236-240.

<sup>237</sup> The view that conjunctions do not have a meaning goes back to Aristotle's definition in *Po.* 1456b38: see Sluiter (1997b) and my section 4.3.2. See also Kidd (1988) 199-204 (the commentary ad Posidonius fr. 45).

<sup>238</sup> See Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj.*, *G.G.* II 1, 214,17-215,13; cf. Dalimier (2001) 240-243.

<sup>239</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* IV.5: ἔνθεν γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς προθετικὸς ἐκάλουν συνδέσμους τὰς προθέσεις, ἄμεινον ἡγησάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξαιρέτου συντάξεως τὴν ὀνομασίαν θέσθαι ἢ περ ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ οἱ τε συναπτικοὶ καὶ συμπλεκτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ὑπόλοιποι.

σύνδεσμος covered both the conjunctions and the prepositions that were distinguished by grammarians like Apollonius Dyscolus.

On these grounds, we may conclude that Dionysius' classifications of ἐν and ἐπί as σύνδεσμοι belong to a system with less than eight (or nine) parts of speech.<sup>240</sup> His remark that ἐπί could be classified as either a σύνδεσμος or a πρόθεσις indicates that he does not make a rigid choice for the use of a system of nine parts of speech: instead, he implies that the classification of ἐπί depends on the word class system that one uses. Taking into account the Posidonius fragment, we may assume that Dionysius is thinking here of the classification that the Stoics would make. In that case, he is implicitly referring to the Stoic system that consisted of five (or six) parts of speech, namely ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ἄρθρον, ῥήμα, (μεσότης) and σύνδεσμος.

### 3.6.5. ἐπίρρημα

Dionysius' use of the term ἐπίρρημα is of high importance.<sup>241</sup> As I have pointed out above, Dionysius' works and the fragments of Tryphon are the earliest extant texts in which the word ἐπίρρημα occurs (see sections 3.2 and 3.3.2).<sup>242</sup> It is interesting that the grammarian Philoxenus (who came from Alexandria to Rome in the first half of the first century BC) still uses the term μεσότης for the adverb: this is the term that the Stoics used, and we also find it in the fragments of Aristarchus.<sup>243</sup> Given the fact that Tryphon was a contemporary and fellow citizen of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, we may regard Dionysius' use of the term ἐπίρρημα as an important sign that his works reflect the most recent developments in grammatical theory.<sup>244</sup> He classifies seven words as adverbs.<sup>245</sup>

<sup>240</sup> In *Comp.* 2.7,10, Dionysius states that the prepositions were separated from the conjunctions (τὰς προθέσεις ἀπὸ τῶν συνδέσμων). This analysis seems to confirm the view that his classification of ἐν and ἐπί represents the use of an older system; these words would be σύνδεσμοι before they were treated as a separate word class (προθέσεις). Dionysius' classification of participles as verbs and his classification of a pronoun as a 'deictic' article, however, cannot be related to his history of the word class theory: there, the participles are said to be separated from the appellatives (not from the verbs) and the pronouns from the nouns (not from the articles) (see above).

<sup>241</sup> The term ἐπίρρημα occurs seven times in Dionysius' works: *Dem.* 26.185,18-19; *Dem.* 26.185,19; *Comp.* 2.7,9; *Comp.* 5.24,16; *Comp.* 5.24,19-20; *Comp.* 5.25,4; *Comp.* 5.25,11.

<sup>242</sup> See Tryphon, fr. 65 Von Velsen (= Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1, 146,15-23).

<sup>243</sup> Philoxenus, fr. 578 Theodoridis: here, Philoxenus classifies the word ἐτῶς as a μεσότης. See Matthaios (1999) 559-560. On Philoxenus and his works, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

<sup>244</sup> The term ἐπίρρημα also occurs in a fragment of Tyrannion in Herodian, but the latter grammarian may be using his own terminology while presenting the views of Tyrannion: see Matthaios (1999) 559-560.

<sup>245</sup> The list of Schenkeveld (1983) 77 is not complete, for it does not include the words ἰκανῶς and εὐμενῶς (*Dem.* 26.185,18-19). The remaining 'adverbs' are ἐπιστροφάδην, ἐξοπίσω, ἐτέρωσε, βοτρυδόν and σήμερον (*Comp.* 5.24,15-25,11).

Schenkeveld has rightly drawn attention to the three types of adverbs that Dionysius mentions in *Comp.* 5.24,18-19: ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου (adverbs of manner), τόπου (place), and χρόνου (time) (see section 5.3.4). The ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου are usually called ἐπιρρήματα ποιότητος, but Schenkeveld's suggestion that the ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου are 'unique' in ancient theory was not correct: Sluiter refers to some later texts, in which the term is used as well.<sup>246</sup> In the examples to which Dionysius refers, ἔξοπίσω and ἑτέρωσε are probably adverbs of place, σήμερον is an adverb of time, while ἐπιστροφάδην and βοτρυδόν must be adverbs of manner.<sup>247</sup> It is interesting to notice that the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus mentions βοτρυδόν among his examples of the adverbs that end on -δόν, which are always adverbs of manner (ποιότητος).<sup>248</sup>

### 3.6.6. Does Dionysius use a system of nine word classes?

In his history of the theory of the parts of speech, Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions systems of three (Aristotle and Theodectes), four (Stoics), five (later Stoics), six, and nine μόρια λόγου: although he adds that other people made more distinctions, the system with nine μόρια is the last one he explicitly mentions (see section 4.2.1).<sup>249</sup> Does this mean that Dionysius himself also used the system of nine word classes? In view of the fact that Dionysius mentions each of the nine word classes not only in the *Comp.* 2 but also in other chapters of *On Composition* and in the other three treatises where grammatical theories are used (*Dem.*, *Thuc.* and *Amm.* II), Schenkeveld states that '(...) we may safely ascribe to DH the use of the system of nine word classes.'<sup>250</sup> The system of nine word classes seems to have been a common alternative to the system of eight μέρη λόγου. The nine-part system differs from the system that we find in the *Technê* in that the appellative noun (προσηγορία) is not treated as a subdivision of the ὄνομα, but listed as a separate part of speech.<sup>251</sup> As I have pointed out above (section 3.2), this separation of proper and appellative noun was taken over from the Stoics, for whom the distinction was based on the ontological difference between

<sup>246</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 81 and (1994) 279; these adverbs are also mentioned in Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 281,11f.; 60,3ff.; 433,21; for more places, see Sluiter (1990) 132 n. 358.

<sup>247</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 81.

<sup>248</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1, 196,13. See also *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1, 146,4; 197,20; 205,4.

<sup>249</sup> *Comp.* 2.7,9-13.

<sup>250</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 72. See also Morgan (1998) 154. Schenkeveld (1983) 73 remarks that, although the distinction between ὄνομα and προσηγορία is originally Stoic, 'it would be dangerous (...) to call the nine-parts system typically Stoic.' In fact this would not only be dangerous, but even wrong: the system with nine parts of speech seems to have been quite common among grammarians; the Stoics however distinguished only five μέρη λόγου (in later times six, including the μεσότης); these parts of speech were essentially different from the grammatical 'word classes'.

<sup>251</sup> Cf. Quintilian *Inst. orat.* 1.4.20 (see section 4.2.3).

individual and common quality.<sup>252</sup> The adoption of this originally Stoic element in the grammatical word class theory resulted in a system with the following *μέρη λόγου*: ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα, μετοχή, ἄρθρον, ἀντωνομασία, πρόθεσις, ἐπίρρημα and σύνδεσμος. We know two grammatical papyri that adopt this system.<sup>253</sup> Schenkeveld argues that Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses this same system with nine word classes.<sup>254</sup>

There are, however, some passages in Dionysius' works that do not seem to support the conclusion that Dionysius used the system of nine word classes: in these passages, Dionysius appears to classify certain words differently from what a system of nine parts of speech would have required. First, we have seen that ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are in some cases used as general terms covering two word classes: ὄνομα covers both ὄνομα and προσηγορικόν, while ῥῆμα covers both ῥῆμα and μετοχή. Second, we have seen that Dionysius' classification of ἐν and ἐπί as σύνδεσμοι points to the use of a system with fewer word classes. According to Dionysius, the prepositions are either covered by the term σύνδεσμος or they are separately classified as προθέσεις. A similar explanation is possible in the case of his classification of αὐτοῦ as a 'deictic article': pronouns are either covered by the general term ἄρθρον or they are separately classified as ἀντωνομασίαι. In other words, although Dionysius knows the names of nine word classes, in many cases he gives classifications that do not fit into the most elaborate system that is available to him. How can we explain this?

According to Schenkeveld, Dionysius normally uses a system of nine parts of speech, but in some instances 'uses a system of less than nine (or eight) parts and mixes it with the full-blown one'.<sup>255</sup> I would like to suggest a slightly different interpretation. In my view, it would be more correct to avoid ascribing any 'system' of word classes to Dionysius in the first place. The fact that his classifications in some instances fit into a system of nine and in other instances into a system of five or six word classes (without ἀντωνυμία and πρόθεσις) does not mean that he is actually using two different grammatical systems. Dionysius is not a grammarian, and he only uses grammatical theories inasmuch as they can help him to clarify his own rhetorical ideas. His rhetorical instructions do not demand that he adopt a specific grammatical 'system' of word classes. Therefore, instead of assuming that Dionysius uses a system of nine parts of speech, which he sometimes mixes up with a system of fewer *μέρη λόγου*, it would be better to accept that Dionysius is not so much interested in the

<sup>252</sup> *FDS* 536 = Diogenes Laertius VII.58.

<sup>253</sup> P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters; first century AD) and P. Heid. I 198 (nr. 12 Wouters; third century AD).

<sup>254</sup> See also Matthaios (2001) n. 115.

<sup>255</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 73.

exact number of word classes: he is not concerned with grammatical systems, but with the composition of texts. This is especially clear in his discussions of specific texts. A good example is his analysis of the arrangement of a Pindaric poem in *Comp.* 22 (see section 3.6.4 above). Dionysius analyses the austere beauty of the σύνθεσις of the verses, which are characterised by rough sounds and dissonant combinations. In his discussion, he points to ‘the connectives ἐπί and τε’, and immediately adds ‘or perhaps the first of these should be called a preposition’.<sup>256</sup> Now, the classification of ἐπί, or of any other word, for that matter, does not have any effect on his analysis of the euphonic aspects of the composition of the Pindaric dithyramb; therefore, Dionysius leaves it to the reader to decide what he wants to call the specific parts of speech.

In fact, Dionysius himself makes it explicitly clear that the exact number of μόρια λόγου is not important for his purpose, and that he does not support any grammatical ‘system’ at all. At the end of his discussion of the different word class systems that have been adopted by earlier thinkers (consisting of three, four, five, six, nine, or more μόρια λόγου), Dionysius concludes the following.<sup>257</sup>

ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐ μικρὸς ἂν εἴη λόγος. πλὴν ἢ γε τῶν πρώτων εἴτε τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων εἴθ’ ὅσων δὴ ποτε ὄντων μερῶν πλοκὴ καὶ παράθεσις τὰ λεγόμενα ποιεῖ κῶλα, (...)

‘The subject could be discussed at considerable length, but it is enough to say that the combination or juxtaposition of these primary parts, whether there be three, four or any number of them, forms what are called clauses (...).’

Unlike Quintilian, who gives a similar history of the word class theory (see section 4.2.3), Dionysius does not choose any of the systems that he mentions. He leaves the question open, ‘whether there be three, four or any number of them’. In *Dem.* 48, he adopts the same attitude: ‘The primary parts of speech, which some call the elements, whether they be three, as Theodectes and Aristotle believe — nouns, verbs and conjunctions — or four, as Zeno and the Stoic school say, or more, are always accompanied by two phenomena of equal importance, tone and time.’<sup>258</sup> Again, Dionysius does not select any of the systems known to him, but makes clear that the number of τὰ πρώτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως is not relevant to his rhetorical

<sup>256</sup> *Comp.* 22.102,15-17.

<sup>257</sup> *Comp.* 2.7,14-16.

<sup>258</sup> *Dem.* 48.232,20-233,2: τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως, ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα ὑπὸ τινῶν καλεῖται, εἴτε τρία ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὡς Θεοδέκτη τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ, ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ σύνδεσμοι, εἴτε τέτταρα, ὡς τοῖς περὶ Ζήνωνος τὸν Στωικόν, εἴτε πλείω, δύο ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ μέλος καὶ χρόνος ἴσα.

investigations.<sup>259</sup> Our conclusion should be that Dionysius does not use a system of nine word classes, nor does he mix different systems of word classes. This teacher of rhetoric makes use of the grammatical word classes when he needs them, but he does not select any of the systems that we find in grammatical treatises. We can also put this in a more general way: as we have seen in section 1.6, Dionysius incorporates many ideas from different disciplines, but he does not want to deal with the too technical details of metrical, grammatical or philosophical problems. Several times, Dionysius emphasises that, although he makes use of theories from grammar, music, metrics, and philosophy, the technical details of these studies are not relevant for his investigations. These disciplines are only important for him as far as they support his rhetorical instructions.<sup>260</sup> For modern scholars, this implies that they should not interpret Dionysius as if he were a grammarian, or, for that matter, a philosopher.<sup>261</sup>

### 3.7. The *accidentia* of the parts of speech: *συμβεβηκότα* versus *παρεπόμενα*

An important part of the ancient grammatical doctrine of the parts of speech was the theory of the *accidentia*: the categories that are applicable to each word class. In Greek technical grammar, these *accidentia* are called *παρεπόμενα*. They traditionally include both inflectional and derivational categories.<sup>262</sup> The *Technê Grammatikê* lists five *παρεπόμενα* for the noun (γένη, εἶδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοί and πτώσεις) eight for the verb (ἐγκλίσεις, διαθέσεις, εἶδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοί, πρόσωπα, χρόνοι and συζυγία) and also mentions the *accidentia* of the participle, article and pronoun.<sup>263</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to the *accidentia* at several passages in his rhetorical works. In this section, I will discuss Dionysius' technical terminology for the *accidentia* and some related terms. In the next section (3.8), I will deal with the specific categories that he distinguishes.

<sup>259</sup> A similar lack of interest in the exact terminology of the word classes seems to be expressed in *Comp.* 17.68,13-14: πᾶν ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ ἄλλο μόνιον λέξεως, ὅ τι μὴ μονοσύλλαβόν ἐστίν, ἐν ῥυθμῷ τινι λέγεται. 'Every noun and verb, and every other part of speech, if it does not consist of a single syllable only, is spoken in some sort of rhythm.'

<sup>260</sup> See *Comp.* 14.50,1-11; *Comp.* 15.59,2-14; *Comp.* 18.73,10-13.

<sup>261</sup> Dionysius' views on the referents of the μόνια λόγου (such as οὐσία, συμβεβηκός, τὸ ποιῶν ἢ πάσχον; see *Comp.* 5.23,13-27,6) will be analysed in the discussion of Dionysius' views on natural word order (section 5.3.3), since we can only interpret these views by paying close attention to their context. The same is true for Dionysius' remarks on σῶμα, πρᾶγμα and πρόσωπον (which are designated by words), and his use of the terms σημαῖνον (that which signifies) and σημαίνόμενον (that which is signified): these subjects will be discussed in section 4.4.2. For σῶμα, πρᾶγμα and πρόσωπον, see *Comp.* 12.46,19-47,2; *Dem.* 40.215,14-15; *Amm.* II 14.433,6-434,12. For σημαῖνον and σημαίνόμενον, see esp. *Amm.* II 13.432,14-433,5 (cf. sections 2.3 and 4.4.2).

<sup>262</sup> Cf. Robins (1997<sup>4</sup>) 43-46.

<sup>263</sup> [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 24,6-7 and 46,5-47,2: the *accidentia* of the noun are gender, type, form, number and case. The *accidentia* of the verb are mood, voice, type, form, number, person, tense and conjugation.

Apart from occasional references to particular *accidentia*, there are four passages (*Amm.* II 6-12, *Comp.* 6, *Comp.* 25, *Dem.* 52) where Dionysius mentions a number of *accidentia*.<sup>264</sup> In the analysis of Thucydides' style in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* (*Amm.* II 6-12; see section 4.4.2), Dionysius points out that the historian uses for example active instead of passive verb forms, singular instead of plural nouns, masculine instead of feminine nouns, a present instead of a future tense, etc. In his discussion of the three ἔργα of composition (*Comp.* 6; see section 4.3.1), Dionysius says that the second activity is the selection of the correct grammatical form of nouns, verbs and other parts of speech: one should select the number, case and gender of nouns, and the voice, mood and tense of verbs, in order to attain the most effective composition. Finally, there are two passages (*Comp.* 25; *Dem.* 52) where Dionysius describes how children learn to read (see section 3.3.3). These two texts will be the starting point for our discussion of the *accidentia* (the other texts where the *accidentia* are treated are discussed in sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.2). In *Dem.* 52, Dionysius gives the following information.<sup>265</sup>

ταύτην γὰρ ὅταν ἐκμάθωμεν, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν στοιχείων τῆς φωνῆς ἀναλαμβάνομεν, ἃ καλεῖται γράμματα. ἔπειτα (τοῦς) τύπους τε αὐτῶν καὶ δυνάμεις. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα μάθωμεν, τότε τὰς συλλαβὰς αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ περὶ ταύτας πάθη. κρατήσαντες δὲ τούτων τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια, ὀνόματα λέγω καὶ ῥήματα καὶ συνδέσμους, καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις, συστολάς, ἐκτάσεις, ὀξύτητας, βαρύτητας, γένη, πτώσεις, ἀριθμούς, ἐγκλίσεις, τὰ ἄλλα παραπλήσια τούτοις μυρία ὄντα.

‘When we learn this [i.e. grammar (γραμματική)] properly, we begin by learning by heart the names of the elements of sound, which we call letters. Then we learn their shapes and values. When we have discovered this, then we learn how they combine to form syllables, and their properties. Having mastered this, we learn about the parts of speech, I mean nouns, verbs and conjunctions, and their *accidentia*: shortenings, lengthenings, high pitches, low pitches, genders, cases, numbers, moods, and countless other related things.’

The corresponding passage (*Comp.* 25) is worded more briefly:<sup>266</sup>

τὰ γράμματα ὅταν παιδευόμεθα, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν ἐκμανθάνομεν, ἔπειτα τοῦς τύπους καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, εἶθ' οὕτω τὰς συλλαβὰς καὶ τὰ ἐν ταύταις

<sup>264</sup> *Amm.* II 6.427,7–12.432,13; *Comp.* 6.28,20-29,14; *Comp.* 25.134,23-135,6; *Dem.* 52.242,15-24.

<sup>265</sup> *Dem.* 52.242,15-24.

<sup>266</sup> *Comp.* 25.134,23-135,6.

πάθη, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τὰς λέξεις καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐταῖς, ἐκτάσεις τε λέγω καὶ συστολάς καὶ προσωδίας καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις.

‘When we are taught to read (“letters”), first we learn by heart the names of the letters, then their shapes and their values, then, in the same way, the syllables and their properties, and finally the words and the *accidentia* that apply to them, by which I mean lengthenings and shortenings and variations in pitch and similar functions.’

Despite some differences, the passages in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 are quite similar, and they serve the same purpose in their context.<sup>267</sup> In both passages Dionysius draws a comparison between rhetoric and grammar, in order to prove that slow and gradual learning finally leads to success: having completed a process of long and laborious learning one will in the end succeed in mastering a technique, which one can then apply with great ease. Part of the process is that one learns the parts of speech and their *accidentia*. For these categories of the parts of speech Dionysius does not use the term *παρεπόμενα*.<sup>268</sup> Dionysius’ term for *accidentia* is *συμβεβηκότα*, which he uses in both *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 (it does not occur in *Comp.* 6 and *Amm.* II). There is one other passage where τὰ *συμβεβηκότα* refer to the *accidentia*: earlier in *Comp.* 25, Dionysius quotes fictitious opponents who do not believe that Demosthenes composed poetic prose (see section 6.3) by ‘keeping a careful watch on the length and quantities of his syllables, and taking great trouble over the cases of nouns, the moods of verbs and all the *accidentia* of the parts of speech’ (*παραφυλάττων τὰ μήκη καὶ τοὺς χρόνους καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὰς ἐγκλίσεις τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ πάντα τὰ συμβεβηκότα τοῖς μορίοις τοῦ λόγου*).<sup>269</sup> The term *συμβεβηκότα* does not only refer to the *accidentia* that apply to the various parts of speech: Dionysius also employs the words *συμβεβηκότα* and *συμβέβηκε(ν)* when discussing properties or characteristics of style, letters, and the human body.<sup>270</sup>

Dionysius does not use the verb *παρέπεσθαι* in discussions of the *accidentia*, but we do find the related words *ἀκολουθεῖν* and *παρακολουθεῖν* in his works. In *Dem.* 48,

<sup>267</sup> *Dem.* 52 mentions τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια, while *Comp.* 25 has τὰς λέξεις. Further, the ὀξύτητας and βαρύτητας of *Dem.* 52 are summarised in the προσωδίας of *Comp.* 25. Finally, *Comp.* 25 does not mention the genders, cases, numbers and moods that occur in *Dem.* 52.

<sup>268</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 82. Τὰ *παρεπόμενα* in *Lys.* 19.31,6 refers to the circumstances of actions.

<sup>269</sup> *Comp.* 25.131,18-132,8. I think that the only specific *accidentia* of the parts of speech mentioned here are the cases of nouns and the moods of verbs: *παραφυλάττων τὰ μήκη καὶ τοὺς χρόνους* seems to be one unit, and the ‘lengths’ (μήκη) and ‘quantities’ (χρόνοι) of syllables do not belong to the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.

<sup>270</sup> Properties of a certain style: *Thuc.* 3.328,10; *Thuc.* 25.364,14; *Amm.* II 1.421,17; properties of letters: *Comp.* 14.50,10; properties of the human body: *Dem.* 50.237,3. In *Thuc.* 22.358,17, Dionysius says that figures (σχήματα) ‘apply’ (συμβέβηκε) to both simple words and composite expressions.

which seems to be influenced by musical theory, Dionysius states that ‘two phenomena of equal importance, namely tone (μέλος) and time (χρόνος), always accompany (ἀκολουθεῖ) the primary parts of speech, whether there be three, four or more of them.’<sup>271</sup> In *Comp.* 6, Dionysius uses the word παρακολουθεῖν when referring to the *accidentia* that ‘apply’ to the verb.<sup>272</sup> Like παρέπεσθαι, the term (παρα)ακολουθεῖν seems to have its origin in Aristotelian philosophy.<sup>273</sup> Both terms indicate that certain attributes ‘closely follow’ something to which they belong. Apollonius Dyscolus also uses παρακολουθεῖν for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.<sup>274</sup>

Apart from συμβεβηκότα and (παρα)ακολουθεῖν, one more technical term should be mentioned. In *Comp.* 6, Dionysius tells us that the second activity of composition is to decide how every part of speech should be ‘formed’ (σχηματισθέν). The verb σχηματίζω is a technical grammatical term, which refers to the morphological formation of words.<sup>275</sup> Dionysius uses the term in that specific sense, but also in a wider (syntactical and rhetorical) sense with regard to word order, figures of speech and figures of thought.<sup>276</sup> Both σχῆμα and σχηματισμός can refer to the form of a word and to a construction.<sup>277</sup> In the specific sense of word formation, σχηματίζειν

<sup>271</sup> *Dem.* 48.232,20-233,2: τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως, ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα ὑπὸ τινῶν καλεῖται, εἴτε τρία ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὡς Θεοδέκτη τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ, ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ σύνδεσμοι, εἴτε τέτταρα, ὡς τοῖς περὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Στωικόν, εἴτε πλείω, δύο ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ μέλος καὶ χρόνος ἴσα. ‘The primary parts of speech, which some call elements, whether they be three, as Theodectes and Aristotle believe — “nouns”, “verbs” and “conjunctions” — or four, as Zeno and the Stoic school say, or more, are always accompanied by two phenomena of equal importance, tone and time.’ This is a shorter version of Dionysius’ history of the theory of the parts of speech in *Comp.* 2.6,17-7,21: see section 4.2.1. Dionysius mentions Aristoxenus at *Dem.* 48.233,8-9 (cf. section 1.5).

<sup>272</sup> *Comp.* 6.29,11-12: εἴ τινα τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἄλλα παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκε. See section 4.3.1. Dionysius uses παρακολουθεῖν in various other contexts. It can e.g. refer to the qualities ‘belonging’ to the three styles (*Dem.* 34.205,3) and to propriety (τὸ πρέπον) ‘accompanying’ the three other means of composition (*Dem.* 47.232,17).

<sup>273</sup> See Aristotle, *Rh.* 1399a11 ff. on the τόπος ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος. Cf. Matthaios (1999) 206.

<sup>274</sup> See Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 4,3. Aristarchus uses the term παρακολουθεῖν in a grammatical context (that is, if Apollonius preserves Aristarchus’ phrasing) when he denies the existence of plural forms of the ‘composite’ third person reflexive pronouns (i.e. ἐαυτῶν, ἐαυτοῖς) for the reason that the pronouns of the first and second person do not have such forms either: Apollonius, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 71,20 (= Aristarchus fr. 125a, 8-9 Matthaios): τῶν πτότων καὶ δευτέρων οὐκ ὄντων ἐν συνθέσει πληθυντικῇ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῖς τρίτοις παρηκολουθεῖ ταυτόν. ‘Since the first and second persons do not exist in the plural composite, the same thing necessarily applies also to the third persons.’ Cf. Ax (1982) 104-105 and Matthaios (1999) 206-207.

<sup>275</sup> For σχηματίζειν as the morphological forming of words, see also *Thuc.* 37.389,15-16 (κατὰ τὴν γενικὴν ἐσχηματισμένον πτόσιν), *Thuc.* 37.389,19-21 (τῷ πληθυντικῷ καὶ οὐδετέρῳ (καὶ) κατὰ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν ἐσχηματισμένῳ πτόσιν) and *Amm.* II 5.426,15-16 (τὰ ῥηματικὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως ὀνοματικῶς σχηματίζει).

<sup>276</sup> See e.g. *Thuc.* 23.359,27 (σχηματίζειν τὰς λέξεις (καὶ) τὰς νοήσεις); *Amm.* II 7.427,18 (σχηματίζει τὸν λόγον); *Amm.* II 8.428,11 (σχηματίζει τὸν τρόπον); *Amm.* II 11.430,19-20 (σχηματιζόντες τὴν φράσιν).

<sup>277</sup> Cf. Blass *DABI* (1979<sup>3</sup> [1868]) 211-212.

and the corresponding noun *σχηματισμός* are also found in the fragments of Aristarchus and Tryphon, in the grammatical papyri and in Apollonius Dyscolus.<sup>278</sup>

Dionysius' use of the term *συμβεβηκότα* provides important evidence for the history of the theory of the *accidentia*. In 1922, Karl Barwick argued that *συμβεβηκότα* was the term that the Stoics used for the *accidentia* that applied to their *μέρη λόγου*, and his most important piece of evidence was Dionysius' use of this term in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 (which we have quoted above).<sup>279</sup> Barwick thought that Dionysius follows a Stoic source in these two passages, because in the same texts he also distinguishes between the *ὄνομα*, *τύπος* and *δύναμις* of letters, a distinction that belongs, according to Barwick, to Stoic theory.<sup>280</sup> Although I agree that the Stoics may have used the term *συμβεβηκότα* for the *accidentia* of their parts of speech, I do not agree with Barwick's argument that Dionysius' reference to the distinction between name, type and value of letters in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 indicates that he used a Stoic source for these chapters; nor do I think that *συμβεβηκότα* was used for the *accidentia* by Stoics only. I have three objections to this analysis. First, we have already seen that Dionysius also uses *συμβεβηκότα* in another passage (*Comp.* 25.131,18-132,8), where we do not find the same remarks on the name, type and value of letters, or any other Stoic theory. Second, Stoic terminology in the two passages does not necessarily point to the use of a Stoic source, for we know that many grammarians of the second and first century BC were influenced by Stoic ideas. Therefore, passages in which Stoic distinctions are mentioned should not automatically be traced back to Stoic sources. This brings us to the third and most important objection against Barwick's analysis. As I have argued in section 3.3.3, the relevant passages from *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 describe the contemporary practice of grammatical education. If we take into account the purpose of Dionysius' argument in these passages, we will easily see that it is not very probable that in this context Dionysius refers to specific Stoic theories. Dionysius intends to point out that his readers know very well that slow and gradual learning in grammatical education finally leads to good results. Likewise, Dionysius argues, rhetorical training demands much exercise and patience, but in the end orators are able to compose texts with great ease. Now, this comparison between grammar and rhetoric would not be very convincing when it did not refer to the

<sup>278</sup> For Aristarchus' use of the term, see Matthaïos (1999) 204-205 and 257-258; for Tryphon, see fr. 56 Von Velsen; for the papyri, see P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters), P. Heid. I 197 (nr. 6 Wouters) and P. Lit. Lond. 182 (nr. 2 Wouters); for Apollonius' use of the term, see Schneider, *G.G.* II 3, 268 (*index vocabulorum*).

<sup>279</sup> Barwick (1922) 107-108. See also Barwick (1957) 47-48.

<sup>280</sup> Barwick (1922) 107-108: '[U]nd daß Dionys. v. Hal. an den Stellen, wo er von den *συμβεβηκότα* spricht, einer stoischen Quelle folgt, geht daraus hervor, daß er ebendasselbst and den *γράμματα* dreierlei unterscheidet, *ὄνομα*, *τύπος* und *δύναμις*: eine Lehre, die wir bereits oben als stoisch kennen gelernt haben.'

contemporary practice in grammar schools, for it depends on the audience's knowledge of grammatical teaching. In Dionysius' words, it is 'something that we all know' (ὁ γὰρ ἅπαντες ἴσμεν).<sup>281</sup> For these reasons, I do not agree with Barwick that Dionysius directly follows Stoic sources in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25.

How can we then reconstruct the early history of the theory of the *accidentia*? Pinborg has rightly argued that the general concept of accident is of Aristotelian origin.<sup>282</sup> Scholars disagree, however, on various problems concerning the ancient theory of grammatical *accidentia*. The most important questions are the following. (1) Did the Stoics know a theory of *accidentia*? And if so, did they use the term συμβεβηκότα or παρεπόμενα? (2) Which term did the early philologists and technical grammarians use? I will briefly consider these questions, paying special attention to the information that Dionysius of Halicarnassus offers.

(1) Pinborg argues that the Aristotelian concept of accident is inconsistent with Stoic epistemology.<sup>283</sup> Frede, on the other hand, thinks that the accidents of the parts of speech were treated in Stoic grammar, and that the use of the concept of 'accident' in grammar may have been of Stoic origin.<sup>284</sup> In my view, our knowledge of Stoic grammar does not support Pinborg's view that the Stoics did not know 'the purely Aristotelian concept of accident'.<sup>285</sup> The word συμβεβηκότα occurs three times in the Stoic fragments: the concept of 'accidents' (συμβεβηκότα) is used to describe predicates (*FDS* 695), corporal accidents such as form and sweetness (*FDS* 746, compare *Dem.* 50.237,3); the consequence of a cause is also an 'accident' (*FDS* 762).<sup>286</sup> I would like to add that in *Comp.* 5, Dionysius distinguishes between 'substance' and 'accident' in a passage that is almost certainly based on Stoic theories (see section 5.3.3).<sup>287</sup> There, τὰ συμβεβηκότα do not refer to the *accidentia* of the parts of speech, but to the predicates that are expressed by verbs: Dionysius tells us that nouns (ὀνόματα) indicate the substance (οὐσία), while verbs (ῥήματα) indicate the accident (τὸ συμβεβηκός).<sup>288</sup> If the passage on natural word order is indeed

<sup>281</sup> *Comp.* 25.134,21-22.

<sup>282</sup> Pinborg (1975) 102. For the Aristotelian concept of accident and its connection to the grammatical *accidentia*, see Ildefonse (1997) 81-86.

<sup>283</sup> Pinborg (1975) 102.

<sup>284</sup> Frede (1987a) 332.

<sup>285</sup> Pinborg (1975) 111 thinks that the grammatical *accidentia* are the result of direct Peripatetic influence on grammar. See also Matthaïos (1999) 207.

<sup>286</sup> *FDS* 695 (κατηγορήματα καὶ συμβεβηκότα) ≈ *SVF* II.182. *FDS* 746 (bodily *accidentia* such as form [σχῆμα] and sweetness [γλυκύτης]) ≈ *SVF* II.381. *FDS* 762 (αἴτιον and συμβεβηκός) ≈ *SVF* I.89.

<sup>287</sup> *Comp.* 5.23,17-18.

<sup>288</sup> Ildefonse (1997) 290 relates Dionysius' remark on the priority of οὐσία over συμβεβηκός to the Aristotelian concept of accident. For the pair οὐσία and συμβεβηκός this is in itself possible, but the rest of *Comp.* 5 shows that Dionysius' experiment is based on Stoic ideas. My view is that *Comp.* 5 can

inspired by Stoic views (as I will argue in section 5.3), this could be an important sign that the Stoics knew the concept of accident.

Schenkeveld has suggested that the Stoics may have used the term *παρεπόμενα* for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.<sup>289</sup> However, there is no evidence for the use of *παρεπόμενα* by the Stoics: this term is mentioned nowhere in the Stoic fragments. Elsewhere, Schenkeveld draws attention to the fact that Dionysius does not use the term *συμβεβηκότα* in *Comp.* 5-6: ‘Now the background of *Comp.* 5-6 seems quite Stoic, so take τὰ *συμβεβηκότα*, which does not occur here, as a distinctly Stoic term is uncalled for.’<sup>290</sup> I agree that at least *Comp.* 5 has a Stoic background (see section 5.3), but I object to the *argumentum e silentio* that Schenkeveld uses: the omission of the term *συμβεβηκότα* in *Comp.* 6 cannot be used as an argument for the view that the Stoics did not use that term. Moreover, *συμβεβηκός* and *συμβεβηκότα* do in fact occur as opposed to *οὐσία* in *Comp.* 5, as I have already mentioned. To conclude, I believe that the Stoics knew the concept of *accident* and that they used the term *συμβεβηκότα* for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.

(2) The second problem concerns the terminology for *accidentia* in the early grammatical texts. Scholars used to think that the term *συμβεβηκότα* was chronologically prior to the term *παρεπόμενα*: the latter term is only found in grammatical texts from the second century AD onwards (Apollonius Dyscolus, grammatical papyri, and the *Technê Grammatikê*).<sup>291</sup> Recently, however, both Ax and Matthaios have questioned the chronological priority of *συμβεβηκότα*.<sup>292</sup> Ax has suggested that Apollonius Dyscolus literally quotes Aristarchus when saying that,

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only be explained on the basis of the Stoic categories: otherwise, one cannot understand why common nouns should be placed before proper nouns and pronouns before common nouns. See De Jonge (2001) and chapter 5 of this study.

<sup>289</sup> Schenkeveld (1999) 192: ‘This Latin term [*accidentia*] is a translation of *συμβεβηκότα* and in texts on the Stoic theory of causes and effects this word means necessary or constant consequence. But it is not found in grammatical texts as a technical term for constant attributes of verb and noun. The traditional Greek name is *παρεπόμενα*, a word known from Aristotelian works in the sense of necessary consequence, and it may well be that Stoics, too, used this term.’ Luhtala (2000) 100 has recently defended Barwick’s view that the Stoics used the philosophical notion of *συμβεβηκότα* for the grammatical accidents.

<sup>290</sup> Schenkeveld (1983) 85.

<sup>291</sup> The terms *παρεπόμενον* and *παρέπεται* are used for the grammatical *accidentia* in Apollonius Dyscolus (cf. Lallot [1997 II] 347), in P. Iand. V 83,13 (nr. 13 Wouters; end of the 3rd century AD) and P. S.I. VII 761,7 (nr. 16 Wouters; 5th-6th century AD), and in the *Technê Grammatikê* ([D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 24,6; 46,5; 60,2; 62,1; 64,1). For the chronological priority of the term *συμβεβηκότα*, see Schenkeveld (1994) 279: ‘The *accidentia* are called *συμβεβηκότα*, not yet *παρεπόμενα*’. In a more recent publication, Schenkeveld (1999) 192 is less certain about the chronological priority. Note that ‘Longinus’, *Subl.* 10.1 uses *παρεπόμενα* in the general sense of ‘accompanying symptoms’: see section 5.3.4.

<sup>292</sup> Ax (1982) 107 n. 38; Matthaios (1999) 205-208.

according to the latter, the word ἄνεφ is an adverb, because its lack of flexion and lack of congruence are properties ‘that did not apply (παρείπετο) to nouns’.<sup>293</sup> Matthaios has pointed out that Aristarchus uses the term ἐκ παρεπομένου ‘in einem grammatisch-technischen Kontext’, namely when reasoning for the meaning of a word ‘aufgrund dessen, was aus der Bedeutung des Wortes folge’ (ἐκ παρεπομένου).<sup>294</sup> I think that we should be very careful when using these two fragments as evidence, for the following reasons. Concerning Ax’ suggestion, it should be emphasised that we do not know how closely Apollonius Dyscolus follows the words of Aristarchus: the word παρείπετο may very well be Apollonius’ own phrasing, and not Aristarchus’. Concerning Matthaios’ reference to Aristarchus’ expression ἐκ παρεπομένου, it should be noted that the term is used here in a different sense than in technical grammar, and in my view it does not prove that Aristarchus actually used the terms παρεπόμενα or παρέπεσθαι for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.<sup>295</sup> Therefore, the doubts of Ax and Matthaios about the chronological priority of the term συμβεβηκότα over παρεπόμενα are based on rather scanty evidence.

For the use of συμβεβηκότα in early times, however, there is more evidence: in a fragment of Philodemus’ *On Poems*, which Janko has assigned to the critic Pausimachus, it is said that ‘(...) in this manner neither the diction (λέξις) nor the subject-matter (ὑποκείμενα) nor any of the συμβεβηκότα will be cause of excellence’.<sup>296</sup> Janko interprets the συμβεβηκότα as the ‘accidents of language, i.e. declension, conjugation and prosody’.<sup>297</sup> This would fit another fragment from Philodemus, where Pausimachus offers a list of several *accidentia*, namely grave and acute (ἄνεσις and ἐπίτασις), aspiration and lack of aspiration (πρόσπνευσις and ψιλότης), lengthening and shortening (ἔκτασις and συστολή), prefixation and case (πρόθεσις and πτώσις).<sup>298</sup> This list partly corresponds to Dionysius’ list in *Dem.* 52 quoted above: he too mentions συστολάς, ἐκτάσεις and πτώσεις, and both the critic and Dionysius enumerate prosodic elements, accents and inflectional categories in one list (see below). Furthermore, the term συμβεβηκότα in the sense of the grammatical

<sup>293</sup> Aristarchus fr. 136 Matthaios (= Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, G.G. II 1, 145,5ff.).

<sup>294</sup> Aristarchus fr. 8a Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 206.

<sup>295</sup> Matthaios (1999) 205 says: ‘Es ist nun durchaus *möglich*, daß Aristarch den Ausdruck παρέπεσθαι bzw. παρακολουθεῖν über dessen Gebrauch in den Erklärungen ἐκ παρεπομένου bzw. ἐκ τοῦ παρακολουθοῦντος hinaus *auch in den Kontext der Wortartensystematik übertragen* und dazu verwendet hat, die einer grammatischen Kategorie zukommenden, akzidentiellen Merkmale zu kennzeichnen.’ (My italics.) We can indeed not exclude the possibility, but we do not have any hard evidence for Aristarchus’ use of παρεπόμενα as *accidentia*.

<sup>296</sup> Pausimachus fr. 74,1-5 Janko (Janko [2000] 268-269). In an earlier publication, Janko (1995) 225-228 assigned this text to Crates of Mallos.

<sup>297</sup> Janko (2000) 269 n. 1. See also Janko (2000) 182-184.

<sup>298</sup> Pausimachus fr. 94,13-25 Janko (Janko [2000] 300-301).

*accidentia* occurs not only in the Pausimachus fragment, but also in Philodemus' rebuttal.<sup>299</sup>

We have seen that Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the term *συμβεβηκότα* when referring to the grammatical curriculum. I have pointed out that his reference to the teaching of letters, syllables and parts of speech (as preparation for reading and writing) presumably corresponds to the actual curriculum of grammar schools in Rome at the end of the first century BC. The various stages that Dionysius mentions (letters, syllables, parts of speech and finally reading and writing) agree with the exposition of grammatical doctrines that we find in Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian. Blank has argued that these expositions depend on Asclepiades' *On Grammar*.<sup>300</sup> But if these expositions of grammatical teaching reflect the general practice of grammar schools, we do not have to trace these texts back to a specific source. Concerning the terminology of accidents, I think that Dionysius' reference shows that *συμβεβηκότα* (and not *παρεπόμενα*) was the normal term for *accidentia* in the first century BC.

Having taken the evidence into consideration, I conclude that it is most plausible that the term *συμβεβηκότα* was chronologically prior to the term *παρεπόμενα*. The Aristotelian concept of accident was taken over by the Stoics, who used the term *συμβεβηκότα*. The *kritikoi*, Philodemus and presumably the grammarians of the first century BC also used this term for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech. In my view, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that Aristarchus used the term *παρεπόμενα* for the grammatical *accidentia*. In later times, grammarians (grammatical papyri, Apollonius Dyscolus, the *Technê Grammatikê*) preferred the term *παρεπόμενα* for the *accidentia*. But grammarians still understood the two terms as having the same meaning.<sup>301</sup> The Roman term *accidentia*, however, is a translation of the original Greek grammatical term, as Barwick has already pointed out.<sup>302</sup>

### 3.8. Dionysius on the *accidentia* of nouns and verbs

We now leave the discussion of the terminology of *accidentia* in general and turn to the specific categories themselves. We have already seen that under the

<sup>299</sup> Cf. Janko (2000) 182 n. 6; P. Herc. 994 fr. 19,7 (Treatise A col. b7 Sbordone): ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομά[των ἢ] τῶ[ν] ῥημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄ[λ]λων ἰ μερῶν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν ἰ παρακειμένων αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκότων. According to Janko, this text belongs to the second book of *On Poems* (cf. Janko [1995] 225 and Matthaios [1999] 207 n. 24). Luhtala (2000) 114 n. 197 wrongly suggests that the first occurrence of the term *συμβεβηκότα* in the sense of *accidentia* is in the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

<sup>300</sup> Blank (1998) xlvi and Blank (2000) 410.

<sup>301</sup> Cf. Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 217,23: Παρεπόμενον δέ ἐστι συμβεβηκός. See also Steinthal (1891 II) 243-244.

<sup>302</sup> Barwick (1922) 107.

συμβεβηκότα, Dionysius lists items from (1) prosody, (2) accentuation and (3) inflectional categories (accidents in the sense of the *παρεπόμενα* distinguished by grammarians of later times). In *Dem.* 52, Dionysius mentions *συστολάς*, *ἐκτάσεις*, *ὀξύτητας*, *βαρύτητας*, *γέννη*, *πτώσεις*, *ἀριθμούς* and *ἐγκλίσεις*. In *Comp.* 25, he lists *ἐκτάσεις*, *συστολάς* and *προσφθίας*. So, the *ὀξύτητας* and *βαρύτητας* of *Dem.* 52 are summarised in the *προσφθίας* of *Comp.* 25, while the latter chapter does not include the genders, cases, numbers and moods that occur in *Dem.* 52.<sup>303</sup> *Συστολαί* and *ἐκτάσεις* refer to the shortenings and lengthenings of syllables, which later grammarians treat under the so-called *πάθη λέξεων*.<sup>304</sup> As we have seen, these items of prosody (*ἔκτασις* and *συστολή*) are also included in the list of *accidentia* in a fragment of Philodemus' *On Poems*.<sup>305</sup> That same fragment also mentions items of accentuation (*ἄνεσις*, grave, and *ἐπίτασις*, acute), be it in different terms than Dionysius, who uses *ὀξύτης* (high pitch), *βαρύτης* (low pitch) and, in general, *προσφθία* (scansion).<sup>306</sup> The combination of items from prosody, accentuation and inflection under the term *συμβεβηκότα* in both Philodemus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus indicates that the technical grammatical distinctions that we know from later texts, such as the grammatical papyri, Apollonius Dyscolus and the *Technê Grammatikê*, were not yet established in the second and first century BC. Besides, Dionysius combines theories from various language disciplines; concerning his use of *accidents* this is particularly clear in *Dem.* 48, where Dionysius says that there are two phenomena that accompany (*ἀκολουθεῖ*) all the parts of speech, namely tone (*μέλος*) and time (*χρόνος*).<sup>307</sup> These accidents are borrowed from musical theory, and it is no coincidence that Aristoxenus is mentioned in the passage that discusses the high and low pitch and rhythm of words.<sup>308</sup> In the rest of this section I will focus on those *accidentia* that are treated as such in technical grammar.

In the list of *συμβεβηκότα* in *Dem.* 52, only the *γέννη* (genders), *πτώσεις* (cases), *ἀριθμοί* (numbers) and *ἐγκλίσεις* (moods) correspond to the morphological *accidentia*, which were also distinguished by technical grammarians of the first century AD onwards.<sup>309</sup> In *Comp.* 6, the *accidentia* are mentioned in two groups, one for nouns and one for verbs, which I will discuss in that order.<sup>310</sup>

<sup>303</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 82.

<sup>304</sup> Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 82. Dionysius himself speaks of *πάθη συλλαβῶν*, not of *πάθη λέξεων*: see *Comp.* 15.59,15-16; *Comp.* 25.135,2-3 and *Dem.* 52.242,19-20.

<sup>305</sup> Pausimachus fr. 94,13-25 Janko (Janko [2000] 300-301).

<sup>306</sup> Cf. Janko (2000) 182.

<sup>307</sup> *Dem.* 48.232,20-233,2 (see above).

<sup>308</sup> *Dem.* 48.233,9.

<sup>309</sup> My discussion of the individual accidents builds on the analysis of Schenkeveld (1983) 83-84.

<sup>310</sup> In *Comp.* 6, Dionysius' terminology differs from that in the rest of his work: see my discussion in section 4.3.1.

With regard to the nouns (ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων), *Comp.* 6 mentions the following items:<sup>311</sup>

- (1) ἑνικῶς (singular) and πληθυντικῶς (plural)
- (2) ὀρθῆ πτώσις (nominative) and πλάγιαί πτώσεις (oblique cases)
- (3) ἀρρενικά (masculine), θηλυκά (feminine) and οὐδέτερα (neuter)

These *accidentia* correspond to ἀριθμοί (numbers), πτώσεις (cases) and γένη (genders) respectively. Dionysius also refers to the numbers as nouns: τὸ ἐνικόν and τὸ πληθυντικόν or τὰ ἐνικά and τὰ πληθυντικά.<sup>312</sup> The oblique cases are specified as αἰτιατική, γενική and δοτική, and the cases are not only mentioned in connection with nouns, but also with appellative nouns (προσηγορικά), participles (μετοχαί) and articles (ἄρθρα).<sup>313</sup> The terms of the genders occur as nouns (τὸ ἀρρενικόν, τὸ θηλυκόν and τὸ οὐδέτερον), as adjectives in combination with γένος (τῷ θηλυκῷ γένει) or μόριον (τὸ θηλυκὸν μόριον), and as adverbs (ἀρρενικῶς).<sup>314</sup>

With regard to verbs (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων), *Comp.* 6 mentions the following items:<sup>315</sup>

- (1) τὰ ὀρθὰ ἢ τὰ ὑπτια
- (2) κατὰ ποίας ἐγκλίσεις ἐκφερόμενα, ἃς δὴ τινες πτώσεις ῥηματικὰς καλοῦσι
- (3) ποίας παρεμφαίνοντα διαφορὰς χρόνων

These *accidentia* correspond to (1) voice, (2) mood, and (3) tense respectively. Elsewhere, Dionysius also mentions (4) number and (5) persons.<sup>316</sup> Because his terminology for the verbal accidents casts light on the development of grammatical theory between Aristarchus and Apollonius Dyscolus, I will discuss each of these items separately.

<sup>311</sup> *Comp.* 6.29,1-7.

<sup>312</sup> *Dem.* 27.189,8; *Thuc.* 24.362,3; *Thuc.* 37.389,7-21; *Amm.* II 2.423,9; *Amm.* II 9.428,19-429,17.

<sup>313</sup> For the specific cases, see *Thuc.* 37.389,7-21 and *Amm.* II 11.431,1-15. See further *Thuc.* 24.362,7 and *Amm.* II 2.423,13-14: ὀνοματικῶν ἢ μετοχικῶν πτώσεις, ‘the cases of nouns and participles’; *Amm.* II 11.430,12-14: τὰς πτώσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν προσηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν μετοχῶν καὶ <τῶν> συναπτομένων τούτοις ἄρθρων, ‘the cases of proper nouns, appellative nouns, participles and the articles attached to them’. These references to the cases of participles and articles should be added to the lists of Schenkeveld (1983).

<sup>314</sup> *Dem.* 27.189,8; *Thuc.* 24.362,4-5; *Thuc.* 37.389,7-21; *Amm.* II 2.423,11; *Amm.* II 10.429,18-430,11; *Amm.* II 11.430,20-431,1 (τῷ τε θηλυκῷ γένει τῆς προσηγορίας τὸ θηλυκὸν ἄν ἔξευξαν μόριον); *Amm.* II 11.431,6-7. The adverb ἀρρενικῶς occurs at *Amm.* II 10.429,21.

<sup>315</sup> *Comp.* 6.29,7-12. See section 4.3.1.

<sup>316</sup> Dionysius does not mention the ‘conjugations’ (συζυγίαι) of verbs, which we find in grammatical texts. In Dionysius, the term συζυγία refers either to the connection or combination of letters and words (e.g. *Comp.* 3.15,1) or to a ‘group’ of letters that share the same characteristics (e.g. *Comp.* 14.56,6).

(1) Voice. The *Technê Grammatikê* distinguishes three voices (διάθεσις), namely active (ἐνεργεία), passive (πάθος) and middle (μεσότης).<sup>317</sup> It is clear that Dionysius of Halicarnassus distinguishes only two voices, namely active and passive, and not the middle voice. In this respect, Dionysius does not differ from the early grammarians: Aristarchus and Varro do not distinguish the middle voice either.<sup>318</sup> As far as we know, Apollonius Dyscolus is the first grammarian who gives the διάθεσις μέση a separate treatment besides the διάθεσις ἐνεργητική and the διάθεσις παθητική.<sup>319</sup> In grammatical texts, the two voices are called ἐνεργητική (active) and παθητική (passive). These terms are also found in the fragments of Aristarchus.<sup>320</sup> The Stoic philosophers, however, used different terms, namely δραστική or ὀρθή (active) and ὑπτία (passive).<sup>321</sup> It is interesting that both the grammatical and the philosophical terms are found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In *Amm.* II 7-8 (see section 4.4.2), Dionysius uses the terms ποιητικόν and ἐνεργητικόν for active, and παθητικόν for passive.<sup>322</sup> In the introduction of the same letter (which he cites from *On Thucydides* 24), however, he employs the terms τὰ δραστήρια (the active forms) and τὰ παθητικά (the passive forms).<sup>323</sup> In *Comp.* 6 (see section 4.3.1), which seems to be influenced by theories from Hellenistic poetic theory, he mentions τὰ ὀρθά (active) and τὰ ὑπτία (passive).<sup>324</sup> Dionysius' terminology of active and passive is important evidence for the reconstruction of the history of grammar in the first century BC. The blending of philological terms on the one hand and Stoic terms on the other confirms that technical grammar in the period after Aristarchus was influenced by Stoic philosophy.

(2) Mood. Dionysius does not mention the specific terms for indicative, subjunctive, optative and imperative. He once refers to τὰ ἀπερέμφοτα ('infinitives') and τὰ παρεμφατικά ('finite verb forms') (see section 5.3.6).<sup>325</sup> Besides, Dionysius is the first extant writer who uses the grammatical term ἔγκλισις, which is the usual

<sup>317</sup> [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 46,5ff.

<sup>318</sup> See Matthaios (1999) 302-326.

<sup>319</sup> Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.30. On the middle voice in ancient grammar, see Rijksbaron (1986).

<sup>320</sup> Aristarchus fr. 20 Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 306.

<sup>321</sup> Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 401,1 (= *FDS* 803): Ἐνεργητική μὲν ἐστὶ διάθεσις (...), ἥτις παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις δραστική καὶ ὀρθή καλεῖται. 'Active is a voice, which is called δραστική and ὀρθή by the philosophers.' For ῥήματα ὀρθά and ὑπτία, see also Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 548,34-37.

<sup>322</sup> *Amm.* II 7.427,17-428,18.

<sup>323</sup> *Amm.* II 2.423,8-9: καὶ τὰ μὲν παθητικὰ ῥήματα δραστήρια, τὰ δὲ δραστήρια παθητικά.

<sup>324</sup> *Comp.* 6.29,8. See also sections 4.3.1 and 5.3.6. Steinthal (1891 II) 274 thinks that the distinction between ὀρθά and ἐγκεκλιμένα (ἐγκλινόμενα according to P) in *Comp.* 5.26,14-15 is the same as that between ὀρθά and ὑπτία in *Comp.* 6.29,8: he interprets ὀρθά as present indicatives, and ὑπτία (= ἐγκεκλιμένα) as all other tenses and moods. Schenkeveld (1983) 84 corrects Steinthal. The term ὑπτία refers to 'passives', whereas ἐγκλινόμενα (which is to be preferred to the reading ἐγκεκλιμένα) are non-indicatives (see below).

<sup>325</sup> *Comp.* 5.26,15-16.

grammatical term for ‘mood’ in later grammatical texts (Apollonius Dyscolus and the *Technê Grammatikê*).<sup>326</sup> Although Aristarchus already mentions all the specific moods (indicative, subjunctive, etc.), he does not know the term ἔγκλισις in the sense of ‘mood’.<sup>327</sup> We do not know whether Dionysius’ contemporary Tryphon used the term ἔγκλισις, but if Dionysius’ references to the grammatical curriculum in *Comp.* 25 and *Dem.* 52 refer to the educational practice of his time, as he suggests (see above), then we may conclude that the term was introduced at some point in the first century BC.<sup>328</sup> With regard to the moods, Dionysius uses two expressions that almost certainly betray Stoic influence. First, he tells us that some people (τινες) call the moods πτώσεις ῥηματικάς (verbal cases) (see section 4.3.1).<sup>329</sup> Second, he mentions a distinction between ὀρθά (indicatives) and ἐγκλινόμενα (non-indicatives) (see section 5.3.6).<sup>330</sup> In later grammatical texts, the verb is defined as a word ‘without case’ (ἄπτωτον).<sup>331</sup> For Aristotle, however, πτώσις refers to the flexion of both nouns and verbs. Thus, the view that moods are ‘verbal cases’ might seem to be related to Aristotle’s views on the verb and its cases (πτώσεις ῥήματος). However, there is an important difference, for Aristotle’s ‘cases of verbs’ are not moods, but tenses: according to Aristotle, ὑγιαίνει (‘is healthy’) is a verb (ῥήμα), whereas ὑγιάνεν (‘was healthy’) and ὑγιανεῖ (‘will be healthy’) are not verbs but ‘cases of verbs’ (πτώσεις ῥήματος).<sup>332</sup> In other words, only the forms that indicate the present tense (τὸν παρόντα χρόνον) deserve the full title of verb, while the forms of the past and future tense, which indicate ‘the (time) beyond’ (τὸν περίξ), are cases of a verb.<sup>333</sup> Matthaios argues that Dionysius’ reference to πτώσεις ῥηματικάί betrays Aristotelian influence. Schenkeveld, however, draws attention to a passage from Macrobius, who states that the Stoics called only the indicative *rectum*, thus comparing the indicative to the nominative (*denique Stoici hunc solum modum rectum, velut nominativum, vocaverunt*).<sup>334</sup> Although Matthaios believes that the Stoics only used the term πτώσις for nouns, Macrobius’ text strongly suggests that they compared the cases of nouns to the moods of verbs, and, in particular, the

<sup>326</sup> For Dionysius’ use of ἔγκλισεις (‘moods’), see *Comp.* 6.29,9; *Comp.* 25.132,6; *Dem.* 52.242,23. In *Dem.* 54.246,2, the word is not used for grammatical moods, but for the tone of delivery.

<sup>327</sup> See Matthaios (1999) 356-360.

<sup>328</sup> Graefenhan corrected one title of Tryphon’s work into Περὶ ῥημάτων ἐγκλίσεων [instead of ἐγκλιτικῶν] καὶ ἀπαρεμφάτων καὶ προστακτικῶν καὶ εὐκτικῶν καὶ ἀποφαντικῶν, but Matthaios (1999) 358 n. 299 rightly doubts the correctness of the expression Περὶ ῥημάτων ἐγκλίσεων. On this title, see also section 1.4.

<sup>329</sup> *Comp.* 6.29,9-10.

<sup>330</sup> *Comp.* 5.26,14-15.

<sup>331</sup> See [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 46,4. Cf. Matthaios (1999) 298 n. 9.

<sup>332</sup> Aristotle, *Int.* 16b16-18.

<sup>333</sup> Aristotle, *Int.* 16b18. Cf. Whitaker (1996) 68-69.

<sup>334</sup> Macrobius, *De diff.*, *G.L.* V, 611,36. Cf. Schenkeveld (1984) 335.

nominative to the indicative.<sup>335</sup> In my view, this would explain both the expression *πτώσεις ῥηματικάί* (verbal cases) and the distinction between *ὀρθά* and *ἐγκλινόμενα* (indicatives and non-indicatives). The terms *ὀρθά* and *ἐγκλινόμενα* will be discussed more fully in section 5.3.6.

(3) Tense. Concerning tenses, Dionysius of Halicarnassus distinguishes between the ‘present’ (*ὁ παρῶν χρόνος*) and the ‘future’ (*ὁ μέλλων χρόνος*); we do not know whether he also knew a term for the past tense, since his examples concern present and future tenses only.<sup>336</sup> Schenkeveld and Matthaios argue that Dionysius’ terminology shows Aristotelian influence: the term *ὁ παρῶν χρόνος* is found in Aristotle’s *Poetics*, but the traditional grammatical term is *ὁ ἐνεστώς χρόνος*.<sup>337</sup> The latter term seems to be of Stoic origin, and Aristarchus also uses it to designate the present tense. The Aristotelian tradition was not only preserved in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ use of the term *ὁ παρῶν χρόνος*, but also in the Latin translation *praesens*.<sup>338</sup>

(4) Number. Dionysius uses the category number (*ἀριθμός*) not only in connection with nouns (see above), but also in connection with verbs.<sup>339</sup> Dionysius’ terms, *ἐνικόν* (singular) and *πληθυντικόν* (plural), are the traditional ones, which Aristarchus already uses.<sup>340</sup> The term for dual is not attested in Dionysius’ works.

(5) Person. Dionysius once refers to the first person as *τὸ τοῦ λέγοντος πρόσωπον* (‘the person of the speaker’) and to the third person as *λόγος περὶ τῶν προσώπων* (‘speech about persons’).<sup>341</sup> He uses these terms when pointing out that in a certain passage Thucydides changes from the third to the first person.<sup>342</sup> Matthaios has argued that the distinction between grammatical persons ultimately goes back to Aristotle’s distinction between *ὁ λέγων* (‘the speaker’), *πρὸς ὃν λέγει* (‘to whom he speaks’) and *περὶ οὗ λέγει* (‘about which he speaks’).<sup>343</sup> Dionysius’ terminology largely corresponds to that of Aristarchus, who refers to the first person as *τὸ λέγον*

<sup>335</sup> Matthaios (1999) 299.

<sup>336</sup> *Amm.* II 12.431,22-432,2. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 82-83 and Matthaios (1999) 329-330

<sup>337</sup> Aristotle, *Po.* 1457a17-18. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 83-84. For the classification of *ἐθέλομεν* as a future tense, see section 4.4.2.

<sup>338</sup> Cf. Matthaios (1999) 330-335 and 344.

<sup>339</sup> *Amm.* II 9.429,10-17: *ἤκουσεν* is classified as singular, *φθονοῦντες* and *ἀπιστοῦσιν* (indirectly) as plurals.

<sup>340</sup> See Matthaios (1999) 377.

<sup>341</sup> *Thuc.* 48.407,4-5. Cf. Matthaios (1999) 394.

<sup>342</sup> *Thuc.* 48.407,2-15 on *Thuc.* 6.78.1.

<sup>343</sup> Aristotle, *Rh.* 1358a37. See Matthaios (1999) 393-394.

πρόσωπον ('the speaking person'), to the second as πρὸς αὐτόν ('to him') and to the third person as περὶ αὐτοῦ ('about him').<sup>344</sup>

### 3.9. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have collected and interpreted Dionysius of Halicarnassus' views on the parts of speech. In this way, I have reconstructed as it were a hypothetical grammar that was used by Dionysius. This is a helpful procedure if one wishes to describe the history of grammar in the first century BC. However, we should realise that Dionysius is not a grammarian, but a rhetorician who makes use of grammatical theory only if he can use it for his own purposes. For this reason, I have argued (*pace* Schenkeveld) that Dionysius does not use a 'system' of nine word classes. He is neither interested in the exact classification of words, nor in the precise number of the μέρια λόγου. His attitude towards grammar as a discipline of which the technical details should be left to the grammarians also explains his fluctuating terminology concerning linguistic matters. As we have seen, Dionysius refers to the voices (active and passive) sometimes by the Alexandrian and sometimes by the Stoic terms. One of the reasons for the variety of terms is, of course, that he does not care about systematic terminology: he is only interested in the effects of the use of active and passive verbs on stylistic composition. Dionysius' profession also accounts for his terminology and his concept of the μέρια λόγου. I have argued that Dionysius prefers the expression μέρια λόγου (and μέρια λέξεως) because a rhetorician uses the expression μέρη λόγου for the parts of a text (e.g. introduction, narrative), and the expression μέρη λέξεως for the aspects of expression (selection of words, composition). Similarly, Dionysius prefers ὄνομα as the most general term for 'word', because in rhetoric λέξις (the grammatical term for 'word') refers to 'style' and 'expression'. The concept of Dionysius' μέρια λόγου comprises two aspects: they are both word classes and parts of the phrase. The former aspect is especially relevant when Dionysius refers to the remarkable use of a specific word class (e.g. the active instead of the passive use of a verb). The latter aspect is especially relevant when Dionysius deals with composition (σύνθεσις), the putting together of 'parts'.

We have seen that in his use of the parts of speech Dionysius is influenced by several ancient language disciplines, in particular Alexandrian philology and Stoic philosophy. In general, Dionysius follows the Alexandrian distinctions and terminology concerning word classes and their *accidentia*. A number of aspects of the grammatical theories in his work, however, betray Stoic influence. In this respect,

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<sup>344</sup> See Matthaïos (1999) 387-393.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus is similar to grammarians like Dionysius Thrax and Tyrannion. Among the Stoic aspects of Dionysius' treatment of the μῦρια λόγου are the distinction of ὄνομα and προσηγορία (προσηγορικών) as two separate word classes (a Stoic element in an Alexandrian word class system) and the use of the Stoic terms τὰ ὀρθά (active) and τὰ ὑπτία (passive) (I have not yet been able to assign Dionysius' use of the term ποιητικόν in the sense of 'active' to any of the earlier traditions). I have argued that the terminology for moods, πτώσεις ῥηματικάί ('verbal cases') and ὀρθά (indicatives) and ἐγκλινόμενα (non-indicatives), is also Stoic. Dionysius' reference to pronouns as ἄρθρα δεικτικά ('deictic articles') corresponds to an ancient testimony on Dionysius Thrax, who seems to have adopted this same expression under Stoic influence. Dionysius' idea that the parts of speech are στοιχεῖα ('elements') is also Stoic. Further, I have argued that Dionysius' term for *accidentia*, συμβεβηκότα was also used by the Stoics. In chapter 4 and 5, we will see that in the field of syntax Dionysius is also influenced by Stoic theories, as the Stoic expressions ὁ κατάλληλος λόγος and ἀκολουθία indicate.<sup>345</sup> But apart from the philological and the Stoic tradition, there were other language disciplines that made use of the parts of speech theory, and in some cases Dionysius follows views that were developed in these disciplines. Thus, in his terminology for tenses, Dionysius seems to follow the Peripatetic tradition, naming the present tense ὁ παρὼν χρόνος instead of ὁ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος, which is the Alexandrian and Stoic expression. Dionysius' use of the 'persons' can be traced back to Aristotelian ideas on communication. It is important to realise that if a certain term is called 'Stoic', this does not imply that Dionysius borrowed that term from Stoic sources. Grammatical treatises of the first century BC seem to have mixed ideas of both Alexandrian and Stoic origin; Dionysius' terminology shows the same integration of philological and philosophical ideas and may therefore be based on grammatical texts of the first century BC.

Two grammatical terms are important because Dionysius' works are the earliest extant texts in which they appear: the term ἐπίρρημα (adverb) first occurs in Tryphon and Dionysius (both active in Augustan Rome). The grammarian Philoxenus (also active in the first century BC) still uses the term μεσότης (which also designates the 'adverb' in the fragments of Aristarchus). The term ἐγκλίσεις ('moods') is first attested in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Because he uses the term when referring to grammatical school practice, we may assume that it was introduced in earlier periods.

<sup>345</sup> In section 5.3, it will be argued that Dionysius' investigation into natural word order (*Comp.* 5), too, is based on Stoic ideas, in particular on the Stoic theory of categories.

In general, Dionysius' descriptions of 'how we learn to read' (τὰ γράμματα ὅταν παιδευώμεθα) (*Comp.* 25 and *Dem.* 52) deserve to be taken into account more seriously than some modern scholars have done. I do not think that these passages are directly based on Stoic texts (*pace* Barwick), nor do I believe that Dionysius' description is unrealistic (*pace* Schenkeveld). Dionysius tells us that one learns first letters (γράμματα), then syllables (συλλαβαί), then words (λέξεις) or parts of speech (τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη) and their *accidentia* (συμβεβηκότα); finally one starts writing and reading. Grammatical papyri confirm that the writing of separate letters, syllables and words was practiced. Both Dionysius' passages on the grammatical curriculum depend on his audience's recognition of the fact that this is the way children learn to read. Therefore I believe that Dionysius' description corresponds to the practice of grammar schools of his time, which he must have known very well.

To conclude, Dionysius of Halicarnassus' treatment of the parts of speech confirms Matthaios' reconstruction of the history of the word class system in the period between Aristarchus and Apollonius Dyscolus.<sup>346</sup> After Aristarchus, the Alexandrian scholars were deeply influenced by Stoic theories. This Stoic influence resulted in a number of grammatical works that must have combined Alexandrian and Stoic ideas on language. Most of these works are lost, but the few extant fragments of Dionysius Thrax and Tyrannion show that they adopted Stoic views in their classification of the word classes. The works of these grammarians have not survived, but my investigations have shown that the grammatical discourse of the Augustan period was indeed characterised by a deep amalgamation of Alexandrian and Stoic theories on language. This integration of philological and philosophical ideas would finally culminate in the work of Apollonius Dyscolus (2<sup>nd</sup> century AD).

The next two chapters will further confirm the view that Dionysius brings theories from different language disciplines together in a useful way. In chapter 5, I will show that Dionysius' views on style and word order, which are related to Stoic ideas on syntax, foreshadow Apollonius Dyscolus' syntactic theory. But first, it is time to focus on Dionysius' use of the μέρη λόγου in the rhetorical and literary context of his works. In chapter 4 we will find that his use of the parts of speech is not only related to the traditions of philologists and philosophers, but also to the disciplines of poetical criticism and musical theory.

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<sup>346</sup> Matthaios (2002).

